Wittgenstein: Epistemology

Wittgenstein: EpistemologyAlthough Ludwig Wittgenstein is generally moreknown for his works on logic and on the nature oflanguage, but throughout his philosophical journey hereflected extensively also on epistemic notions such asknowledge, belief, doubt, and certainty. This interest ismore evident in his final notebook, publishedposthumously as On Certainty (1969, henceforth OC),where he offers a sustained and, at least apparently,fragmentary treatment of epistemological issues. Giventhe ambiguity and obscurity of this work, written underthe direct influence of G. E. Moore’s A Defense ofCommonsense (1925, henceforth DCS) and Proof of anExternal World (1939, henceforth PEW), in the recent

literature on the subject, we can find a number of competing interpretations of OC; at first,this article presents the uncontentious aspects of Wittgenstein’s views on skepticism, that is,his criticisms against Moore’s use of the expression “to know” and his reflections on theartificial nature of the skeptical challenge. Then it introduces the elusive concept of“hinges,” central to Wittgenstein’s epistemology and his views on skepticism; and it offersan overview of the dominant “Wittgenstein-inspired” anti-skeptical strategies along with themain objections raised against these proposals. Finally, it briefly sketches the recentapplications of Wittgenstein’s epistemology in the contemporary debate on skepticism.

Table of ContentsWittgenstein on Radical Skepticism: A Minimal Reading1. The Therapeutic Reading2. The Epistemic Reading3. The Contextualist Reading4. The Non-epistemic Reading5. The Non-propositional Reading6. The Framework Reading7. Concluding Remarks8.

Wittgenstein: Epistemology | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy http://www.iep.utm.edu/witt-epi/

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References and Further Reading9.

1. Wittgenstein on Radical Skepticism: A MinimalReadingThe feature of Cartesian-style arguments is that we cannot know certain empiricalpropositions (such as “Human beings have bodies,” or “There are external objects”) as wemay be dreaming, hallucinating, deceived by a demon, or be “brains in the vat” (BIV), thatis, disembodied brains floating in a vat, connected to supercomputers that stimulate us injust the same way that normal brains are stimulated when they perceive things in a normalway. Therefore, as we are unable to refute these skeptical hypotheses, we are also unable toknow propositions that we would otherwise accept as being true if we could rule out thesescenarios.

Cartesian arguments are extremely powerful as they rest on the Closure principle forknowledge. According to this principle, knowledge is “closed” under known entailment.Roughly speaking, this principle states that if an agent knows a proposition (for example,that she has two hands), and competently deduces from this proposition a secondproposition (for example, that having hands entails that she is not a BIV), then she alsoknows the second proposition (that she is not a BIV). More formally

The “Closure” Principle:

If a subject S knows that p, and p entails q, then S knows that q.

Let’s take a skeptical hypothesis, SH, such as the BIV hypothesis mentioned above, and M,an empirical proposition such as “Human beings have bodies” that would entail the falsity ofa skeptical hypothesis. We can then state the structure of Cartesian skeptical arguments asfollows:

(S1) I do not know not-SH

(S2) If I do not know not-SH, then I do not know M

(SC) I do not know M

Considering that we can repeat this argument for each and every one of our empiricalknowledge claims, the radical skeptical consequence we can draw from this and similararguments is that our knowledge is impossible.

A way of dealing with “Cartesian-style” skepticism is to affirm, contra the skeptic, that we


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can know the falsity of the relevant skeptical hypothesis; for instance, in DCS and PEW, G.E. Moore famously argued that we can have knowledge of the “commonsense view of theworld,” that is of statements such as “Human beings have bodies,” “There are externalobjects,” or “The earth existed long before my birth” and that this knowledge would offer adirect response against skeptical worries.

Moore himself (1942) was not fully convinced by the anti-skeptical strength of DCS andPEW, which have engendered a huge debate that will be impossible to summarize here (seeMalcolm, 1949; Clarke, 1973; Stroud, 1984). Nonetheless, it is important to notice thatMoore’s affirmation that he knows for certain the “obvious truisms of the commonsense” ispivotal in his anti-skeptical strategy; his knowledge-claims would allow him to refute theskeptic.

But, argues Wittgenstein, to say that we know “obvious truisms” such as “There are externalobjects” is misleading for a number of reasons. First, because in order to claim “I know,” oneshould be able to, at least in principle, produce evidence or offer compelling grounds for herbeliefs. That is to say, the “language-game” of knowledge involves and presupposes theability to give reasons, justifications, and evidence; but crucially (OC 245), Moore’s groundsare not stronger than what they are supposed to justify. In other words, as perWittgenstein, if a set of evidence has to count as compelling grounds for our belief in acertain proposition, then that evidence must be more certain than the belief itself; thiscannot happen in the case of Moore’s “obvious truisms” because, at least in normalcircumstances, nothing is more certain than the fact that we have two hands or a body (OC125).

Just imagine, for instance, that one attempted to legitimate one’s claim to know that p byusing the evidence that one has for p (that is, what one sees, what one has been told about pand so on). Now, if the evidence we adduce to support p is less certain than p itself, then thissame evidence would be unable to support p.

However, Wittgenstein argues that if it would be somewhat odd to claim that we still knowMoore’s “obvious truisms,” they cannot be an object of doubt. For instance, if someone isseriously pondering whether she has a body or not, we would not investigate the truth-valueof her affirmations; rather, we would question her ability to understand the language she isusing or her sanity, for a similar false belief would probably be the result of a sensorial ormental disturbance (OC 526).

Moreover, for Wittgenstein, the kind of never-ending doubt put forward by a proponent ofradical skepticism, far from being a legitimate intellectual enterprise, will prevent hisproponents from engaging in any intellectual activity at all; to support his point,Wittgenstein gives the example (OC 310) of a pupil who constantly interrupts a lesson,


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questioning the existence of things or the meanings of words. His doubts will lack any sense,and at most they will lead him to a sort of epistemic paralysis; he will just be unable to learnthe skill/subject we are trying to teach him (OC 315).

More generally, for Wittgenstein, any proper epistemic inquiry presupposes that we takesomething for granted; if we start doubting everything, there will be no knowledge at all. Ashe remarks at one point:

If you are not certain of any fact, you cannot be certain of the meaning of your wordseither […] If you tried to doubt everything you would not get as far as doubtinganything. The game of doubting itself presupposes certainty (OC 114–115).

That is to say, the questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that somepropositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn […] Butit isn’t that the situation is like this: We just can’t investigate everything, and for that reasonwe are forced to rest content with assumption. If I want the door to turn, the hinges muststay put (OC 341–343).

Neither knowable nor doubtable, for Wittgenstein, Moore’s “obvious truisms of thecommonsense” are “hinges” (OC 341–343): apparently empirical contingent beliefs whichperform a different, basic role in our epistemic practices.

2. The Therapeutic ReadingThe “therapeutic reading” of OC (Conant, 1998) stems from the remarks in whichWittgenstein talks about Moore’s “misuse” of the expression “to know”:

Now, can one enumerate what one knows (like Moore)? Straight off like that, I believenot. For otherwise the expression “I know” gets misused. And through this misuse aqueer and extremely important mental state seems to be revealed (OC 6).

I know that a sick man is lying here? Nonsense! I am sitting at his bedside, I am lookingattentively into his face. So I don’t know, then, that there is a sick man lying here? Neitherthe question nor the assertion makes sense. Any more than the assertion “I am here”, whichI might yet use at any moment, if suitable occasion presented itself. […] And “I know thatthere’s a sick man lying here”, used in an unsuitable situation, seems not to be nonsense butrather seems matter-of-course, only because one can fairly easily imagine a situation to fit it,and one thinks that the words “I know that…” are always in place where there is no doubt,and hence even where the expression of doubt would be unintelligible (OC 10).

According to the proponents of the “therapeutic reading,” we should read these passages in


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light of the theory, pivotal in later Wittgensteinian thought, that the meaning of a wordconsists in its use in ordinary situations. As he writes in his Philosophical Investigations(1997, henceforth PI):

For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word “meaning”it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language (PI 43).

This would allow us to reconstruct Wittgenstein’s treatment of skepticism as follows. Moorefails to mean something quite particular by stating his “obvious truisms” outside of alanguage-game, that is outside any of our everyday epistemic practices; thus, in thecircumstances in which they are actually used, it is not clear what has been said, if anything.

At the same time, a radical skeptic fails to recognize the role—or, using Wittgenstein’sexpression, the use—that expressions such as “knowledge” and “doubt” play in our ordinaryepistemic practices; as in our everyday life there is nothing similar to the kind of generalinvestigation pursued by the radical skeptic (OC 209 “A doubt without an end is not even adoubt.”), the skeptical challenge would be, strictly speaking, senseless (1998, 241–248).

Following the therapeutic reading of OC, then, both Cartesian skepticism and Moore’santi-skeptical strategy would be based on a misunderstanding of how language works; it isnot clear what Moore and the skeptic are doing with their words and therefore, even ifapparently they have a meaning, they lack any sense.

This rendering of Wittgenstein’s anti-skeptical position has appeared to manycommentators (see, for instance, Salvatore, 2013) to be simply too crude.

Consider the following entries:

The statement “I know that here is a hand” may then be continued: “for its my handthat I am looking at”. Then a reasonable man will not doubt that I know. Nor will theidealist; rather he will say that he was not dealing with the practical doubt which isbeing dismissed, but there is a further doubt behind that one. That this is an illusion hasto be shewn in a different way (OC 19).

But it is an adequate answer to the skepticism of the idealist, or the assurances of therealist, to say that “There are physical object” is nonsense? For them after all it is notnonsense. It would, however, be an answer to say: this assertion, or its opposite, it’s amisfiring attempt to express what can’t be expressed like that. And that it does misfirecan be shewn; but that isn’t the end of the matter. We need to realize that what presentsitself to us as the first expression of a difficulty, or of its solution, may as yet not becorrectly expressed at all. Just as one who has a just censure of a picture to make will


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often at first offer the censure where it does not belong, and an investigation is neededin order to find the right point of attack for the critic (OC 37).

These remarks alone seem to suggest that Wittgenstein was well aware that simply showingthat the skeptic was using terms such as “knowledge” and “doubt” outside of any ordinarypractice was not enough to dismiss skeptical worries. On the contrary, he seems to concedethat nothing prevents us from thinking that the skeptic and his opponent are engaged in a“language-game,” that is philosophical inquiry, in which the expressions “to know” and “todoubt” are used in a way that is at odds with their everyday usage but is still, at leastapparently, meaningful and legitimate.

Also, these passages show that Wittgenstein would not consider a rebuttal of skepticism onthe basis of pragmatic considerations alone to be satisfactory. Recall that on Conant’sreading, Wittgenstein would dismiss skeptical doubts as they are at odds with our ordinarypractices, thus unintelligible on closer inspection; on the contrary, he stresses the necessityfor a philosophical analysis of the hidden assumptions that make the skeptical “doubt” soapparently compelling.

3. The Epistemic ReadingA very influential reading of OC is Crispin Wright’s notion of “rational entitlement”(2004a/2004b), which stems from his famous diagnosis of Moore’s Proof (1985). If in DCS,as we have already seen, Moore argued that we can have knowledge of the “commonsenseview of the world,” that is of very general “obvious truisms” such as “I am a human being,”“Human beings have bodies,” “The earth existed long before my birth,” and so on, in PEW,he famously maintained that even an instance of everyday knowledge such as “This is ahand” can offer a direct response against skeptical worries. Moore’s Proof is standardlyrendered as follows:

(MP 1) Here is a hand

(MP 2) If there is a hand here, then there are external objects

(MP C) There are external objects

As per Wright, we can reconstruct PEW as follows:

I. It perceptually appears to me that there are two handsII. There are two handsIII. Therefore, there are material objects


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In other words, to state I) amounts to saying that there is a proposition that correctlydescribes the relevant aspects of Moore’s experience in the circumstances in which the Proofwas given; in the case of the Proof, for instance, I) will sound like “I am perceiving (what Itake to be) my hand.” Then, from I) follows II) and from II) follows III), since “a hand” is aphysical object; and given that the premises are known, so is the conclusion.

But, argues Wright, the passage from I) to II) is highly problematic: if Moore was victim of askeptical scenario such as the “Dream hypothesis” and thus was just dreaming his hand, II)would no longer follow from I). More generally, I) can ground II) only if we already take forgranted that our experience is caused by our interaction with material objects; thus, sensoryexperience can warrant a belief about empirical objects only if we already assume that thereare material objects.

Hence, we need to already have a warrant for III) in order to justifiably go from I) to II); andthis is why Moore’s Proof would be question begging or epistemically circular: in order toconsider the premises of Moore’s Proof true, we are implicitly assuming the truth of itsconclusion.

Thus, Moore’s Proof would lead to another, more subtle form of skepticism that Wright callsHumean ; while Cartesian-style skepticism goes from uncongenial skeptical scenarios toshow that we cannot know any of our empirical beliefs, Humean skepticism argues thatanytime we make an empirical knowledge claim, we are already assuming that, so to say,things outside of us are already the way we take them to be and, more generally, that thereare material objects.

Again, in order to go from I) to II) to III), we need to have an independent warrant tobelieve that III) is true; and as we do not have this independent warrant, then the argumentfails to provide warrant for his conclusions. This is a phenomenon that Wright calls “failureof transmission of warrant” (or transmission failure for short). However, Wright argues, inmany cases our inquiries are based on commitments or presuppositions that cannot bejustified, but that nonetheless we take for granted whenever we are involved in an epistemicpractice; and this is what happens with Moore’s “obvious truisms of the commonsense.” OnWright’s account, “hinges” are beliefs whose rejection would rationally necessitate extensivereorganization, or the complete destruction, of what should be considered as empiricalevidence or more generally of our epistemic practices.

This reading of OC leads Wright to propose the following “Wittgenstein-inspired”anti-skeptical account. Each and every one of our ordinary inquiries would then rest onungrounded presuppositions, “hinges”; but still, argues Wright, since the warrant to holdMoore’s “obvious truisms” is acquired in an epistemically responsible way, we cannotdismiss them simply because they are groundless as this would lead to a complete cognitive


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paralysis (2004a, 191).

As per Wright, then, Cartesian skepticism would only show that every process of knowledge-acquisition rests on ungrounded presupposition. However, a system of thought, purified ofall liability to hinges, would not be that of a rational agent; and because rational agency is abasic way for us to act, we therefore have a default rational basis, an entitlement, to believein “hinges” and thus to know them, even if in an unwarranted way (hence “epistemicreading”).

Wright’s rational entitlement has engendered a huge debate that would be impossible tosummarize here (see Pryor 2000, 2004, 2012; Davies 2003, 2004; Coliva, 2009a, 2009b,2015). This article presents only the main objections raised against the plausibility of the“epistemic reading” and its anti-skeptical strength.

A first issue (Salvatore, 2013) is that following this account, the Cartesian skepticalchallenge, even if ultimately illegitimate, would nonetheless have the merit to highlight aconstitutive limit of our epistemic practices, namely that they rest on ungroundedpresuppositions. On the contrary, far from revealing the structure of our epistemicpractices, for Wittgenstein, Cartesian-style skepticism will undermine the same notion ofwhat an epistemic practice is. For once we doubt a hinge such as “There are externalobjects,” expressions like “evidence,” “justification,” and “doubt” will radically alter if notcompletely lose their meaning. Wittgenstein stresses this point in many entries of OC, as inthe following remark, where he writes:

If, therefore, I doubt or am uncertain about this being my hand (in whatever sense),why not in that case about the meaning of these words as well? (OC 456).

That is to say, once we assume ex hypothesis that we could be victims of a skepticalscenario, it would be hard to understand what could count as evidence for what, as each andevery one of our perceptions would be the result of constant deception. Thus, to doubt ahinge would put in question the same meaning of the words with which we are expressingour doubts.

Another objection against Wright’s proposal goes as follows. Recall that, for Wright, we arerationally entitled to believe in the truth of hinges such as “Human beings have bodies” or“There are external objects.” A consequence of this thought (Pritchard, 2005) is thatfollowing this strategy, it would be possible to know the denials of skeptical hypotheses,even if in an unwarranted way: an anti-skeptical move which is excluded by Wittgenstein inmany remarks of OC, as in the following entries:

Moore has every right to say he knows there’s a tree there in front of him. Naturally he


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may be wrong. (For it is not the same as with the utterance “I believe there is a treethere”.) But whether he is right or wrong in this case is of no philosophical importance.If Moore is attacking those who say that one cannot really know such a thing, he can’tdo it by assuring them that he knows this and that […] (OC 520).

Moore’s mistake lies in this—countering the assertion that one cannot know that, bysaying “I do know it” (OC 521).

That is to say, to claim against a Cartesian skeptic that we know Moore’s “obvious truisms ofthe commonsense” would be at the same time misleading and unconvincing.

First, as we have already seen “hinges” cannot be evidentially grounded, for any evidence,we could adduce to support a proposition p such as “I have a hand” would be less securethan p itself. As Wittgenstein writes at some point:

One says “I know” when one is ready to give compelling grounds. “I know” relates to apossibility of demonstrating the truth. Whether someone knows something can come tolight, assuming that he is convinced of it. But if what he believes is of such a kind thatthe grounds he can give are no surer than his assertion, than he cannot say that heknows what he believes (OC 243).

Also, and more importantly, to claim that we “know” Moore’s “‘obvious truisms of thecommonsense” on the basis of pragmatic considerations would simply miss the point of theskeptical challenge.

Moreover (Pritchard, 2005; Jenkins, 2007) following Wright, it is entirely rational to setaside skeptical concerns whenever we want to pursue a given epistemic practice; but hereWright seems to conflate practical and epistemic rationality. That is to say, a Cartesianskeptic can well agree that we have to dismiss skeptical concerns whenever we are involvedin a given epistemic inquiry, as not to do so would lead to a cognitive paralysis. But evenconceding that it would be practically rational to set aside skeptical worries in order toachieve cognitive results, what is at issue in the skeptical challenge is the epistemicrationality of trusting our senses when skeptical hypotheses are in play. In other words, askeptic can grant that we have to rule out skeptical worries when we need to form truebeliefs about the world in our everyday life; still, she can argue that the fact that we needtrue beliefs about the world does not make our acceptance of “hinges” epistemically rationalas long as we cannot rule out skeptical scenarios. Wittgenstein himself was well aware ofthis point; consider OC 19:

The statement “I know that here is a hand” may then be continued: “for its my handthat I am looking at”. Then a reasonable man will not doubt that I know. Nor will the


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idealist; rather he will say that he was not dealing with the practical doubt which isbeing dismissed, but there is a further doubt behind that one. That this is an illusion hasto be shewn in a different way.

4. The Contextualist ReadingAnother influential reading of OC is Michael Williams’ “Wittgensteinian Contextualism”which he has proposed in his book Unnatural Doubts and in a number of other more recentworks (1991, 2001, 2004a, 2004b, 2005). A first formulation of a contextualistinterpretation of OC can be found in Morawetz (1978). (For a general introduction toepistemic contextualism, along with an overview of other “non Wittgensteinian”contextualist anti-skeptical proposals, see here.)

Recall that in some passages of OC (OC 114, 115, 315, 322), Wittgenstein argues that anyproper inquiry presupposes certainty, that is, some unquestionable prior commitment. Inthese remarks, Wittgenstein also alludes to the importance of the context of inquiry; hencestating that without a precise context, there is no possibility of raising a sensible question ora doubt. Williams generalizes this part of Wittgenstein’s argument as follows: in eachcontext of inquiry, there is necessarily a set of “hinge” beliefs (that he names methodologicalnecessities), which will hold fast and which are therefore immune to epistemic evaluation inthat context.

A motivation for this reading is the extreme heterogeneity of the “hinges” mentioned byWittgenstein. Along with Moore’s “obvious truisms,” in fact, throughout OC he considers as“hinges” propositions whose certainty is indexed to a historical period (“No man has everbeen on the moon.”) together with basic mathematical truths (“12 × 12 = 144”) andcontingently empirical claims (“This is a hand.”). As per Williams, this would be a way tostress a basic feature of our inquiries: namely, they all would rest on unsupportedpresuppositions that can nevertheless be dismissed/questioned where new questions ariseor when we are switching from a context of inquiry to another. For instance, a historicalinquiry about whether, say, Napoleon won at Austerlitz presupposes “hinge commitments”such as “The world existed long before my birth”; all our everyday epistemic practicespresuppose hinges such as “There are external objects” or “Human beings have bodies,” andso on.

Crucially, for Williams to take for granted the “methodological necessities” of a givenepistemic practice is not only a matter of practical rationality as in Wright’s “entitlementstrategy”; rather, it is a condition of possibility of any sensible enquiry. That is to say, whilefollowing Wright, we have to rest on “hinges” mostly because it is the only practicalalternative, for Williams our confidence in Moore’s “obvious truisms” would highlight theconstitutively “local” and “context-dependent” nature of all our epistemic practices.


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Thus, in ordinary contexts, it would be illegitimate to doubt hinges such as “Human beingshave bodies” or “There are external objects”; but once these are brought into focus, forinstance by running skeptical arguments, we are simply switching from a context of inquiryto another, that is, from the everyday context into the philosophical one.

Therefore, by doubting the “hinges” of our most common epistemic practices, the skeptic issimply leading us from a context in which it is legitimate to hold these hinges fast toward aphilosophical one in which everything can be doubtable.

Nonetheless, the skeptical move cannot affect our everyday knowledge claims, which aremade by taken-for-granted “methodological necessities” such as “The earth existed longbefore my birth” or “Human beings have bodies.” At most, what the Cartesian skeptic is ableto show us is that, in the more demanding context of philosophical reflection, we do notknow, strictly speaking, anything at all.

A consequence of this thought is that, even if legitimate and constitutively unsolvable at aphilosophical level, the Cartesian skeptical challenge would not affect our everydayepistemic practices as they belong to different contexts, with completely differentmethodological necessities or “hinges.” Moreover, the same propositions that we cannotclaim to know at a philosophical level are known to be true, albeit tacitly, in other contextseven if they lack evidential support. Evidential support is something that they cannotconstitutively possess, insofar as any hinge has to be taken for granted whenever we areinvolved in an epistemic practice.

There are many problems that Williams’ “Wittgensteinian contextualism” has to face inorder to be considered a plausible interpretation of Wittgenstein’s thought. First, on hisaccount, the skeptical enterprise is both completely legitimate and constitutively unsolvable.That is to say, in the context of our ordinary epistemic practices, it would be illegitimate todoubt “obvious truisms” such as “Human beings have bodies” or “This is a hand”;nonetheless, “hinges” would still be doubtable and dismissible in the more demandingcontext of philosophical inquiry.

Even if in some passages of OC, as we have seen while discussing the “therapeutic reading,”Wittgenstein seems to concede that a skeptic might be using the expressions “to know” and“to doubt” in a specialized and, so to say, “philosophical” way, this does not lead him toadmit that the skeptic would be somewhat “right,” even if only in the philosophical context.Rather, throughout OC, Wittgenstein stresses that there is no context in which we canrationally hold a doubt about Moore’s “obvious truisms”; as we have seen supra, to seriouslydoubt a “hinge” would look more similar to a sign of mental illness than to a legitimatephilosophical inquiry:


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In certain circumstances a man cannot make a mistake. (Can here is used logically, andthe proposition does not mean that a man cannot say anything false in thosecircumstances.) If Moore were to pronounce the opposite of those propositions whichhe declares certain, we should not just not share his opinion: we should regard him asdemented (OC 155).

If I now say “I know that the water in the kettle in the gas-flame will not freeze but boil”,I seem to be as justified in this “I know” as I am in any. “If I know anything I know this”.Or do I know with still greater certainty that the person opposite me is my old friendso-and-so? And how does that compare with the proposition that I am seeing with twoeyes and shall see them if I look in the glass? I don’t know confidently what I am toanswer here. But still there is a difference between cases. If the water over the gasfreezes, of course I shall be as astonished as can be, but I shall assume some factor Idon’t know of, and perhaps leave the matter to physicists to judge. But what could makeme doubt whether this person here is N.N., whom I have known for years? Here a doubtwould seem to drag everything with it and plunge it into chaos (OC 613, my italics).

Thus, even if Wittgenstein seems somewhat to concede a prima facie plausibility toskeptical hypotheses, he nonetheless denies Moore’s “obvious truisms of the commonsense”can be sensibly doubted or denied, even if only in the context of philosophical inquiry (cfr.OC 231, 234).

Also, for Williams (2004a), Wittgenstein’s treatment of Moore’s “obvious truisms” woulddiffer sensibly throughout OC; while the “hinges” listed by Moore would be “methodologicalnecessities,” a statement such as “There are external objects,” namely the conclusion ofPEW, would be plain nonsense (2004a, 86–87).

OC would then present two different anti-skeptical strategies, influenced respectively byMoore’s PEW and DCS. The first 60 entries of OC would be concerned with Moore’s Proof.On Williams’ reading, in these remarks, Wittgenstein would consider the skeptical challengeand Moore’s anti-skeptical strategy as constitutively senseless; both Moore and the skepticwould, in fact, treat “There are external objects” as a hypothesis that can be either confirmedby evidence or dismissed. But “There are external objects” is not an empirical hypothesisthat can be tested or doubted; the very fact that we think, talk, and make judgments aboutthe world shows that “There are external objects” and so any attempt to prove or to doubtthis “proposition” would be misguided.

Williams motivates this division also to make sense of Wittgenstein’s saying that “There areexternal objects” is nonsense, but (Moyal-Sharrock, 2004, 91–92) Wittgenstein does notnecessarily use the term nonsense in a derogatory way. Just consider this passage of thePhilosophical Grammar (1974, henceforth PG):


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[…] when we hear the two propositions, “This rod has a length” and its negation “Thisrod has no length”, we take sides and favor the first sentence, instead of declaring themboth nonsense. But this partiality is based on a confusion; we regard the firstproposition as verified (and the second as falsified) by the fact “that rod has a length of4 meters” (PG 129).

For Wittgenstein, then, nonsense is not only what violates sense, but also what defines orelucidates it. Thus, Wittgenstein calls “There are physical objects” nonsense; still, this doesnot amount to saying that it is unintelligible or senseless. Also, while it is undeniable that,for Wittgenstein, “There are external objects” cannot be treated as a hypothesis, there is noclear suggestion that he would consider other “hinges” as open to doubt or verification .Consider the following entry:

It is clear that our empirical propositions do not all have the same status, since one canlay down such a proposition and turn it from an empirical proposition into a norm ofdescription. Think of chemical investigations. Lavoisier makes experiments withsubstances in his laboratory and now he concludes that this and that takes place whenthere is burning. He does not say that it might happen otherwise another time. He hasgot hold of a definite world-picture—not of course one that he invented: he learned it asa child. I say world-picture and not hypothesis, because it is the matter-of-coursefoundation for his research and as such also does unmentioned (OC 167, my italics).

5. The Non-epistemic ReadingIf for Wright and Williams, it is then possible to know hinges such as “There are externalobjects” or “Human beings have bodies,” whether out of practical considerations or in thecontext of our ordinary epistemic practices; according to the proponents of the“non-epistemic reading” of OC, “hinges” are, strictly speaking, unknowable; still, this willnot lead to skeptical conclusions.

This reading of OC was firstly proposed by Strawson (1985; for similar proposals, see alsoWolgast 1987, Conway 1989). According to Strawson, for Wittgenstein skeptical doubts areneither meaningless nor irrational but simply unnatural. This is because, since the radicalskeptical doubts are raised with respect to propositions that we find it natural to take forgranted (such as “There are external objects” or “Human beings have bodies”), given ourupbringing within a community that collectively holds them fast, we cannot help acceptingMoore’s “obvious truisms of the commonsense” while lacking reasons and grounds in theirfavor. Thus, following this interpretation of OC, skeptical hypotheses should not rebutted byargument, but simply recognized as idle and unreal as they call into doubt what we cannothelp believing, given our shared “form of life.”


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A similar account has been proposed by Stroll (1994). According to Stroll, “hinges” lie at thefoundation of our language-games with ordinary empirical propositions; as such, theycannot be said to be propositions in the ordinary sense, as they are not subject to truth andfalsity or to verification and control.

Thus, the certainty of “hinges” such as “There are external objects” or “Human beings havebodies” has a non-propositional, pragmatic, or even animal nature that are not be subject toany epistemic evaluation.

This reflection on the “animal,” pre-rational certainty of “hinges” is the starting point ofanother “non-epistemic reading” of OC, proposed by Moyal-Sharrock (2004, 2005). As perMoyal-Sharrock, our confidence in Moore’s “obvious truisms of the commonsense” such as“There are material objects” or “Human beings have bodies” is not a theoretical orpresuppositional certainty but a practical certainty that can express itself only as a way ofacting (OC 7, 395); for instance, a “hinge” such as “Human beings have bodies” is thedisposition of a living creature, which manifests itself in her acting in the certainty ofhaving a body (Moyal-Sharrock, 2004, 67), and manifests itself in her acting embodied(walking, eating, not attempting to walk through walls, and so forth).

Accordingly, Cartesian skeptical arguments, even if prima facie compelling, rest on amisleading assumption: the skeptic is simply treating “hinges” as empirical, propositionalknowledge-claims, while on the contrary, they express a pre-theoretical animal certainty,which is not subject to epistemic evaluation of any sort.

Due to this categorical mistake, a proponent of Cartesian skepticism conflates physical andlogical possibility (2004, 170). That is to say, skeptical scenarios such as the BIV one arelogically possible but just in the sense that they are conceivable; in other words, we canimagine skeptical scenarios, then run our skeptical arguments, and thus conclude that ourknowledge is impossible. Still, the mere hypothesis that we might be disembodied BIV hasno strength against the objective, animal certainty of “hinges” such as “There are materialobjects” or “Human beings have bodies,” just as merely thinking that “human beings can flyunaided” has no strength against the fact that human beings cannot fly without help.

Therefore, skeptical beliefs such as “I might be a disembodied BIV” or “I might be the victimof an Evil Deceiver” are nothing but belief-behavior (2004, 176), as the skeptic is doubtingobjectively certain “hinges”; thus, we should simply dismiss skeptical worries, for a skepticalscenario such as the BIV one does not and cannot have any consequences whatsoever on ourepistemic practices or, more generally, on our “human form of life.”

This reading of OC has attracted several criticisms (see, for instance, Salvatore 2013, 2016).If, from one side, Moyal-Sharrock stresses the conceptual, logical indubitability of Moore’s


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“truisms,” she nonetheless seems to grant that the certainty of “hinges” stems from theirfunction in a given context, to the extent that they can be sensibly questioned and doubtedin fictional scenarios where they can “play the role” of empirical propositions. But crucially,if “hinges” are “objectively certainties” because of their role in our ordinary life, a skepticcan still argue that in the context of philosophical inquiry, Moore’s “commonsensecertainties” play a role which, similar to the role they play in fictional scenarios, is both atodds with our “human form of life” and still meaningful and legitimate.

Moreover, despite Moyal-Sharrock’s insistence on the conceptual, logical indubitability ofMoore’s “truisms of the commonsense,” her rendering of Wittgenstein’s strategy seems toresemble Williams’ proposal, thus incurring the objections we have already encounteredagainst this reading. As it is argued throughout this work, to simply state that Cartesianskepticism has no consequence on our “human form of life” sounds like too much of apragmatist response against the skeptical challenge. This is so because a skeptic can wellagree that skeptical hypotheses have no consequence on our everyday practices or that theyare just fictional scenarios; also, she can surely grant that Cartesian-style arguments cannotundermine the pre-rational confidence with which we ordinarily take for granted Moore’s“obvious truisms of the commonsense.” But crucially, and as Wittgenstein was well aware, askeptic can always argue that she is not concerned with practical doubt (OC 19) but with a,so to speak, purely philosophical one.

Also and more importantly, even if we agree with Moyal-Sharrock on the “nonsensical”nature of skeptical doubts, this nonetheless has no strength against Cartesian-styleskepticism. Recall the feature of Cartesian skeptical arguments: take a skeptical hypothesisSH such as the BIV one and M, a mundane proposition such as “This is a hand.” Now, giventhe Closure principle, the argument goes as follows:

(S1) I do not know not-SH

(S2) If I do not know not-SH, then I do not know M

Therefore

(SC) I do not know M

In this argument, whether an agent is seriously doubting if she has a body or not iscompletely irrelevant to the skeptical conclusion, “I do not know M.” Also, a proponent ofCartesian-style skepticism can surely grant that we are not BIV, or that we are notconstantly deceived by an Evil Genius and so on. Still, the main issue is that we cannotknow whether we are victim of a skeptical scenario or not; thus, given Closure, we are stillunable to know anything at all.


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6. The Non-propositional ReadingWittgenstein’s reflections on the structure of reason have influenced a more recent“Wittgenstein-inspired” anti-skeptical position, namely Pritchard’s “hinge-commitment”strategy (2016b), for which “hinges” are not beliefs but rather arational, non-propositionalcommitments, not subject to epistemic evaluation.

To understand his proposal, recall the following remarks we have already quoted supra:

If you are not certain of any fact, you cannot be certain of the meaning of your wordseither […] If you tried to doubt everything you would not get as far as doubtinganything. The game of doubting itself presupposes certainty (OC 114–115).

The question that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some propositions areexempt from doubt, are as it were the hinges on which those turn [….] that is to say, itbelongs to the logic of our scientific investigations that certain things are indeed notdoubted [...] If I want the door to turn, the hinges must stay put (OC 341–343).

As per Pritchard, here Wittgenstein would claim that the same logic of our ways of inquirypresupposes that some propositions are excluded from doubt; and this is not irrational orbased on a sort of blind faith but, rather, belongs to the way rational inquiries are putforward (see OC 342) . As a door needs hinges in order to turn, any rational evaluationwould then require a prior commitment to an unquestionable proposition/set of “hinges” inorder to be possible at all.

A consequence of this thought (2016b, 3) is that any form of universal doubt such as theCartesian skeptical one is constitutively impossible; there is simply no way to pursue aninquiry in which nothing is taken for granted. In other words, the same generality of theCartesian skeptical challenge is then based on a misleading way of representing theessentially local nature of our enquiries.

This maneuver helps Pritchard to overcome one of the main problems facing Williams’“Wittgensteinian Contextualism.” Recall that, following Williams, the Cartesian skepticalchallenge is both legitimate and unsolvable, even if only in the more demandingphilosophical context. On the contrary, argues Pritchard, as per Wittgenstein, there issimply nothing like the kind of universal doubt employed by the Cartesian skeptic, both inthe philosophical and in the, so to say, non-philosophical context of our everyday epistemicpractices. A proponent of Cartesian skepticism looks for a universal, general evaluation ofour beliefs; but crucially, there is no such thing as a general evaluation of our beliefs,whether positive (anti-skeptical) or negative (skeptical), for all rational evaluation can takeplace only in the context of “hinges” which are themselves immune to rational evaluation.


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Each and every one of our epistemic practices rests on “hinges” that we accept withcertainty, a certainty which is the expression of what Pritchard calls “‘über-hinge’commitment.” This would be an arational commitment toward our most basic beliefs (suchas that “There are external objects” or “Human beings have bodies”) that, as we mentionedabove, is not itself opened to rational evaluation, but that importantly is not a belief.

To understand this point, just recall Pritchard’s criticism toward Wright’s rationalentitlement. As we have seen, Wright argues that it would be entirely rational to claim thatwe know Moore’s “obvious truisms of the commonsense” whenever we are involved in anepistemic practice which is valuable to us; but, Pritchard argues, in order to know aproposition, we need reasons to believe that proposition to be true. And as, followingWright, we have no reason to consider “hinges” true other than the fact that we need to takethem for granted, then we cannot have knowledge of them either.

With these considerations in mind, we can come back to Pritchard’s “‘über-hinge’commitment.” As we have seen, this commitment would express a fundamental arationalrelationship toward our most basic certainties, a commitment without which no knowledgeis possible. Crucially, our basic certainties are not subject to rational evaluation; forinstance, they cannot be confirmed or disconfirmed by evidence and thus they would benon-propositional in character (that is to say, they can be neither true nor false).Accordingly, they are not beliefs at all; rather, they are the expression of arational,non-propositional commitments. Thus, the skeptic is somewhat right in saying that we donot know Moore’s “obvious truisms of the commonsense”; but this will not lead to skepticalconclusions, for our “hinge commitments” are not beliefs so they cannot be objects ofknowledge. Therefore, the skeptical challenge is misguided in the first place.

Pritchard’s account is concerned first and foremost with the psychology of our inquiries,and not with the epistemic status of the “hinges”; thus, his reflections on the structure ofreason are just meant to stress the local nature of our epistemic practices, for which we haveto rule out general doubts such as the skeptical one. But (Salvatore, 2016) even if, followinghis strategy, we are able to retain our knowledge of “mundane” propositions, the skeptic willstill be able to undermine our confidence in the rationality of our ways of inquiry; underskeptical scrutiny, we will be forced to admit that all our practices rest on unsupported,ungrounded arational presuppositions that are not, and crucially cannot be, rationallygrounded.

7. The Framework ReadingAnother reading of OC is the “framework reading” (McGinn, 1989; see also Coliva, 2010)according to which “hinges” are “judgments of the frame,” that is, conditions of possibility ofany meaningful epistemic practice.


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This reading stems from the passages in which Wittgenstein highlights the analogy betweenMoore’s “obvious truisms of the commonsense” and basic mathematical truths:

But why am I so certain that this is my hand? Doesn’t the whole language-game rest onthis kind of certainty? Or: isn’t this “certainty” (already) presupposed in thelanguage-game? […] Compare with this 12×12=144. Here too we don’t say “perhaps”.For, in so far as this proposition rests on our not miscounting or miscalculating and onour senses not deceiving us as we calculate, both propositions, the arithmetical one andthe physical one, are on the same level. I want to say: The physical game is just ascertain as the arithmetical. But this can be misunderstood. My remark is a logical andnot a psychological one (OC 446– 447).

I want to say: If one doesn’t marvel at the fact that the propositions of arithmetic (e.g.the multiplication tables) are “absolutely certain”, then why should one be astonishedthat the proposition “This is my hand” is so equally? (OC 448).

According to McGinn, we should read Wittgenstein’s remarks on “hinges” in light of hisviews about mathematical and logical truths. In the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus(henceforth TLP), Wittgenstein held what we might call an “objectivist” account of logicaland mathematical truths, for which they were a description of the a priori necessarystructure of reality. In the later phase of his thinking, Wittgenstein completely dismissedthis view, suggesting instead that we should think of logical and mathematical truths asconstituting a system of techniques originating and developed in the course of the practicallife of human beings. What is important in these practices is not their truth or falsity buttheir technique-constituting role; so, the question about their truth or falsity simply cannotarise. Quoting Wittgenstein:

The steps which are not brought into question are logical inferences. But the reason isnot that they “certainly correspond to the truth-or sort-no, it is just this that is called“Thinking”, “speaking”, “inferring”, “arguing”. There is not any question at all here ofsome correspondence between what is said and reality; rather is logic antecedent to anysuch correspondence; in the same sense, that is, as that in which the establishment of amethod of measurement is antecedent to the correctness or incorrectness of a statementof length (RFM, I, 156).

That is to say, logical and mathematical truths define what “to infer” and “to calculate” is;accordingly, given their “technique-constituting” role, these propositions cannot be tested ordoubted, for to accept and apply them is a constitutive part of our techniques of inferringand calculating.

If logical and mathematical propositions cannot be doubted, this is also the case for Moore’s


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“obvious truisms of the commonsense.” Even if they resemble empirical, contingentknowledge claims, all these “commonsense certainties” play a peculiar role in our system ofbeliefs; namely, they are what McGinn calls “judgment of the frame” (1989, 139).

As mathematical and logical propositions define and constitute our techniques of inferringand calculating, “hinges” such as “This is a hand,” “The world existed long before my birth,”and “I am a human being” would then define and constitute our techniques of empiricaldescription. That is to say, Moore’s “obvious truisms of the commonsense” would show ushow to use words: what “a hand” is, what “the world” is, what “a human being” is and so on(1989, 142).

Both Moore and the skeptic misleadingly treat “hinges” such as “Human beings havebodies” or “There are external objects” as empirical propositions, which can be known orbelieved on the basis of evidence. But Moore’s “obvious truisms” are certain, their certaintybeing a criterion of linguistic mastery; in order to be considered a full participant of ourepistemic practices, an agent must take Moore’s “obvious truism” for granted.

Even though the “framework reading” has generally been considered a more viableinterpretation of Wittgenstein’s thought (see Coliva, 2010), its anti-skeptical strength hasbeen the focus of some serious analysis. First, following this account, to take “hinges” forgranted is a condition of possibility of our epistemic practices (1989, 116-120); still (Minar,2005, 258), a skeptic can nonetheless argue that the indubitability of Moore’s “obvioustruisms of the commonsense” is nothing but a fact about what we do. That is to say, “hinges”such as “Human beings have bodies” or “There are external objects” are presupposed by ourordinary linguistic exchanges and constitute what McGinn calls our “frameworkjudgments”; but once these “obvious truisms” are brought into focus, the skeptic will findthat their not being up for questioning is simply what happens in normal circumstances. Aswe have already seen while presenting Conant’s and Wright’s readings of OC, the very factthat in our ordinary life we have to rule out skeptical hypotheses has no strength againstCartesian skepticism; again, what is at issue in the skeptical challenge is not the practical,but the epistemic rationality of setting aside skeptical concerns when we cannot rule outCartesian-style scenarios.

8. Concluding RemarksGiven the elusive nature of Wittgenstein’s remarks on skepticism, there is still little to noconsensus on how they should be interpreted or, more generally, whether Wittgenstein’sremarks alone can represent a valid response to radical skepticism. Pritchard’s (2016b, c)reflection on “hinges,” for example, are just one part of a more complex anti-skepticalframework that he calls epistemological disjunctivism (Pritchard, 2016b) and that would beimpossible to summarize here. Coliva (2010, 2015) has recently proposed a version of the


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“framework reading” in which “hinges,” even if propositional, have a normative role, andtheir acceptance is a “condition of possibility” of any rational enquiry (on Coliva’s reading ofOC and its anti-skeptical implications, see Moyal-Sharrock, 2013, and Pritchard & Boult,2013). On the contrary, Salvatore (2015, 2016) has used the analogy drawn by Wittgensteinbetween “hinges” and “rules of grammar” in order to argue for the nonsensicality ofskeptical hypotheses, which would be nonsensical combination of signs excluded by ourepistemic practices (defined and constituted by “hinges” such as “Human beings havebodies” or “There are external objects”).

9. References and Further ReadingClarke, T. (1972), “The Legacy of Skepticism,” The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 69, No. 20, Sixty-Ninth

Annual Meeting of the American Philosophical Association Eastern Division, 754–769.Conway, G. D. (1989), Wittgenstein on Foundations, Atlantic Highlands, N.J., Humanities Press.Coliva, A. (2015), Extended Rationality: A Hinge Epistemology, Palgrave MacMillan.Coliva, A. (2010), Moore and Wittgenstein. Scepticism, Certainty and Common Sense, Palgrave

MacMillan.Coliva, A. (2009a), “Moore’s Proof and Martin Davies’ epistemic projects,” Australasian Journal of Phi-

losophy.Coliva, A. (2009b), “Moore’s Proof, Liberals and Conservatives. Is There a Third Way?” in A. Coliva (ed.)

Mind, Meaning and Knowledge. Themes from the Philosophy of Crispin Wright, OUP.Conant, J. (1998), “Wittgenstein on Meaning and Use,” Philosophical Investigations.Malcolm, N. (1949), “Defending Common Sense,” Philosophical Review.Minar, E. (2005), “On Wittgenstein’s Response to Scepticism: The Opening of On Certainty,” in D.

Moyal-Sharrock and W.H. Brenner (eds.), Readings of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty, London, Pal-grave, 253–274.

Moore, G. E. (1925), “A Defense of Common Sense,” in Contemporary British Philosophers, 1925,reprinted in G. E. Moore, Philosophical Papers, London, Collier Books, 1962.

Moore, G. E. (1939), “Proof of an External World,” Proceedings of the British Academy, reprinted inPhilosophical Papers.

Moore, G. E. (1942), “A Reply to My Critics,” in Paul Arthur Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of G. E.Moore. Open Court.

Moyal-Sharrock, D. (2013), “On Coliva’s Judgmental Hinges,” Philosophia, Vol. 41, No. 1, 13–25.Moyal-Sharrock, D. (2004), Understanding Wittgenstein’s On Certainty, London, Palgrave Macmillan.Moyal-Sharrock, D. and Brenner, W. H. (2005), Readings of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty, London, Pal-

grave.McGinn, M. (1989), Sense and Certainty: A Dissolution of Scepticism, Oxford, Blackwell.Morawetz, T. (1978), Wittgenstein & Knowledge: The Importance of “On Certainty,” Cambridge, MA,

Harvester Press.Pritchard, D. H. (2016a), Epistemic Angst. Radical Scepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believ-

ing, Princeton University Press.Pritchard, D. H. (2016b), “Wittgenstein on Hinges and Radical Scepticism in On Certainty,” Blackwell

Companion to Wittgenstein, H.-J. Glock & J. Hyman (eds.), Blackwell.


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Pritchard, D. H. and Boult, C. (2013), “Wittgensteinian anti-scepticism and epistemic vertigo,”Philosophia, Vol. 41, No. 1, 27–35.

Pritchard, D. H. (2005), “Wittgenstein’s On Certainty and Contemporary Anti-skepticism,” in Readingsof Wittgenstein’s On Certainty, D. Moyal-Sharrock and W.H. Brenner (eds.), London, Palgrave,189–224.

Salvatore, N. C. (2016), “Skepticism and Nonsense,” Southwest Philosophical Studies.Salvatore, N. C. (2015), “Wittgensteinian Epistemology and Cartesian Skepticism,” Kriterion-Journal of

Philosophy, Vol. 29, No. 2, 53–80.Salvatore, N. C. (2013), “Skepticism, Rules and Grammar,” Polish Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 7, No. 1,

31–53.Strawson, P. F. (1985), Skepticism and Naturalism: Some Varieties, London, Methuen.Stroll, A. (1994), Moore and Wittgenstein On Certainty, Oxford, Oxford University Press.Stroud, B. (1984), The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism, Oxford, Oxford University Press.Williamson, T. (2000), Knowledge and Its Limits, Oxford, Oxford University Press.Williams, M. (2004a), “Wittgenstein’s Refutation of Idealism,” in Wittgenstein and Skepticism, D. Mc-

Manus (ed.), London, New York, Routledge, 76–96.Williams, M. (2004b), “Wittgenstein, Truth and Certainty,” in Wittgenstein’s Lasting Significance, M.

Kolbel, B. Weiss (eds.), Routledge, London.Williams, M. (2005), “Why Wittgenstein isn’t a Foundationalist,” in Readings of Wittgenstein’s On Cer-

tainty, D. Moyal-Sharrock and W. H. Brenner (eds.), 47–58.Wright, C. (1985), “Facts and Certainty,” Proceedings of the British Academy, Vol. 71, 429–472.Wittgenstein, L. (2009), Philosophical Investigations, revised 4th edn. edited by P. M. S. Hacker and

Joachim Schulte, tr. G. E. M. Anscombe, P. M. S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte, Wiley-Blackwell, Ox-ford.

Wittgenstein, L. (1979), Wittgenstein’s Lectures, Cambridge 1932–35, from the Notes of Alice Ambroseand Margaret MacDonald, ed. Alice Ambrose, Blackwell, Oxford.

Wittgenstein, L. (1974) Philosophical Grammar, ed. R. Rhees, tr. A. J. P. Kenny, Blackwell, Oxford.Wittgenstein, L. (1969), On Certainty, ed. G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright, tr. D. Paul and G.

E. M. Anscombe, Blackwell, Oxford.Wolgast, E. (1987), “Whether Certainty is a Form of Life,” The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 37,

161–165.Wright, C. (2004a), “Warrant for nothing (and foundation for free)?” Aristotelian society Supplement,

Vol. 78, No. 1, 167–212.Wright, C. (2004b), “Wittgensteinian Certainties,” in Wittgenstein and Skepticism, D. McManus (ed.),

22–55.

Author InformationNicola Claudio SalvatoreEmail: [email protected] of Campinas - UNICAMP


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Wittgenstein: Epistemology

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