Balkan Egyptians and Gypsy/Roma discourse

Balkan Egyptians and Gypsy/Roma Discourse

Sevasti Trubeta

Introduction

Events and Questions

Since the 1990s, yet another entity has emerged among the wide range of groups and

minorities in the Balkans attracting the attention of politicians, scholars and the public.

Known as “Egypcani” in Macedonia and Kosovo, or as “Jevgs/Jevgits” in Albania,

these Albanophone Muslims are usually identified as Albanianised “Gypsies” by

the societies in which they live, although they consider themselves to be descendents

of Egyptian immigrants to the Balkans. Today, Balkan Egyptians are officially recog-

nised as a distinct population group in the Republic of Macedonia, while they enjoy

political influence through representative and cultural organisations in Kosovo and

Albania.

Given the unstable power relations in the former Yugoslavia, particularly in Kosovo

after 1989, the emergence of this entity has had political consequences. According to

press reports,1 the Egyptians gained sympathy in Belgrade because they were per-

ceived to be distinct from the larger Albanian population and potential allies of

Serbian nationalists. Specifically, in October 1990, the German magazine Der

Spiegel reported that then Yugoslav President Milosevic had decided to recognise

the Egyptians as a distinct population group in advance of the forthcoming elections:

“The Serbian leader suddenly claims that the Albanian majority in Yugoslavia are in

reality Egyptians . . . The chief of the federal commission for the next census, Hisein

Ramadani, comes closer to the truth: The hundreds of Egyptians represent at best a

handful of Gypsies who have been Albanianised for a long time but suddenly do

not want to be Albanians.”2

At the end of the Kosovo crisis, regional tensions turned tragic as the Albanian

population expelled the Egyptians, Ashkali and Roma and accused them of having col-

laborated with Serbian militias.3 The consequences of this persecution included vio-

lence and forced displacement as well as the deterioration of living conditions for

those who remained behind or have since returned.4 As a result of the Kosovo

crisis, many Egyptians sought refugee status in other European countries.5 The result-

ing formation of an Egyptian diaspora has in turn led to and even sustained the

creation of elites and gained some measure of international political support for

the groups in question.6 Given the ongoing and problematic situation in Kosovo,

Nationalities Papers, Vol. 33, No. 1, March 2005

ISSN 0090-5992 print; ISSN 1465-3923 online/05/010071-25 # 2005 Association for the Study of Nationalities

DOI: 10.1080/00905990500053788

the debate about the “true identity” of the Balkan Egyptians continues to reflect a

variety of political interests.

In addition to the charged question of minorities in the Balkans after 1989 and, as a

result of the political implications the “Egyptian issue” possessed in the former Yugo-

slavia, the Egyptians have also attracted the attention of Human Right Institutions,

public and scholars, as attested by the numerous publications and references

devoted to this group.7 It is worthy of note that, regardless of whether or not the Egyp-

tians are construed as Gypsies/Roma, scholars usually treat them as one particular

aspect of a larger Gypsy/Roma problematic. In a debate that has taken on increased

intensity since the 1990s, one central issue is whether the Egyptians are “in reality”

Gypsies/Roma or descendants of immigrants (or former slaves) from Egypt who

arrived in the Balkans centuries ago. A majority of scholars tend to argue (or

imply) that those currently called Egyptians are simply Gypsies/Roma claiming a

“more prestigious identity,” in effect seeking to free themselves of the Gypsy

stigma.8 Although this view reflects the dominant paradigm in social-scientific dis-

course, some scholars have also looked for traces of and historical evidence for a

long-standing Egyptian presence in the Balkans in order to find a possible link

between early migration from Egypt and the current groups in question. As Duijzings9

and Marushiakova et al.10 note, Serbian and other scholars from the former Yugosla-

via supported the claims of the Egyptian elites, and tried to establish the early presence

of Egyptians in the Balkans as well as “to draw up a specific interpretation of historical

documentation that can serve as the basis of an account of the creation and develop-

ment of this community.”11 It is questionable, however, whether such attempts furnish

any evidence for the relationship between Egyptians who arrived in the Balkans in the

fifth century BC, those who were present in the Macedonian, Roman, Byzantine and

Ottoman Empires, and the recently emerged Egyptian communities, even if it is

claimed that “[h]istory gives us some material that can be used to argue for the

arrival of these people from Egypt to Balkans. The first historical source is probably

one noted by Herodotus.”12 What factors and circumstances could explain such a con-

tinuity of communities over centuries? Would they comprise some perpetuating and

traceable social forms of life, or a common Egyptian memory and consciousness

demonstrable across the Balkans and over centuries, or maybe in an Egyptian geneal-

ogy based on biological continuity?

The view expressed by the European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC) report13 concern-

ing the Albanian Jevgs/Jevgjits illustrates the tendency to consider Egyptians to be

Gypsies/Roma attempting to dissociate from the “Gypsy” label. While the self-ascribed

“Jevgs” form of identification is considered to be “an ideology cultivated by a minority

in response to persecution and the stigma associated with one’s native identity,”14 the

ERRC report calls attention to a further issue, i.e. a “political correctness” that obliges

social majorities to respect any form of self-identification. In the words of the report,

one “must be cautious in denying the assertions of a person or group of people

about themselves.”15 And yet this politically sensitive attitude is absent in the

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ERRC’s report on the Egyptians in Macedonia,16 which characterises “the appearance

in 1991 of 3307 people from the south-western Macedonian towns of Struga and Ohrid

who declared themselves to be ‘Egyptians’ in the census” as “[p]erhaps the most

perplexing aspect of the question of Romani identity in Macedonia.”17

The question of the Egyptians, their origins and relationship to the Gypsies/Roma, is

not new, nor does it solely concern Kosovo and the Republic of Macedonia. As a result

of the publicity the Egyptian issue has generated in theses areas, similar questions

have surfaced in other Balkan states, specifically in Albania (with respect to the

Jevgs/Jevgits), Bulgaria (with respect to the Agupti) and, to a far lesser degree, in

Greece. As will be shown in the following, groups of Muslim Roma with supposedly

Egyptian origins were mentioned in early twentieth-century travel reports and essays

on Thrace and Albania. There is a new quality in the current debate, however, owing to

the dynamism the Egyptian form of identification has recently attained (although in

varied degrees in each country) as a result of its institutionalisation, its national styli-

sation and, more importantly, its involvement in the nationalistic conflicts in several of

the Balkan countries.

Terminological Clarification, Methodological Approach and Working Hypothesises

The focus of this article is upon processes of identification potentially leading to the

constitution of large communities and, in particular, of “imagined communities.” Des-

ignations such as “Gypsies,” “Roma,” Egyptians, etc. will be employed here by con-

vention as discursive categories rather than as terms to describe (homogeneous) social

groups. Accordingly, the category “Gypsies” will refer to a collective stereotype con-

structed and employed by social majorities.18 The term “Roma” will refer primarily to

a collective form of self-identification with a distinct set of political implications

arising from the Romani emancipation movement (conventionally defined as having

commenced with the First World Romani Congress in 1971). “Roma” is also the “pol-

itically correct” term employed by the larger societies in which those designated as

Roma live. The category Egyptians (written in italics) will refer to those actors

who, although resident in various Balkan countries, are potentially objects of the

recent debate and who share at least a common characteristic: they define themselves

as descendents of Egyptians but they are perceived by others as Gypsies/Roma.

Taking this common form of identification as starting point, the following analysis

aims to call attention to the conditional character of its development as well as to

demonstrate that its diverse implications in the Balkans are effects of its being

embedded in different political discourses in each country.

The present article also treats the continuity and discontinuity of forms of identifi-

cation (and not of groups) and approaches the question of the Egyptians principally as

a discourse.19 In concrete terms, as a public debate occurring in a pre-structured

societal order (discursive field) in which diverse sets of actors (discursive commu-

nities) participate, interacting with each other and representing distinct (or even

BALKAN EGYPTIANS AND GYPSY/ROMA DISCOURSE

73

controversial) standpoints and concerns. A crucial aspect here is that the actors

involved in the discourse possess more or less distinct social positions within the dis-

cursive field as a consequence of differing degrees of access to social resources and

power structures. At the same time, they are collectively initiators and agents of rep-

resentations of (differently perceived) societal events. A key issue in this context con-

cerns the (possible) existence of leading groups within discursive communities and the

strategies they employ in order to serve their political ends and collective interests,

and, in particular, to achieve the legitimacy of the forms of identification they intro-

duce by embedding them in institutional systems.

Consistent with Brubaker/Cooper’s critical analysis of the term “identity,”20 the

present article will employ the term as a “category of practice” in order to characterise

contextual, discursive and intentionally stylised forms of identification, i.e. of self-

understanding and perception by others. Diverse forms of identification shall be

regarded as dynamic processes encompassing various historical phases through the

course of time. In doing so, both particular qualities and symptoms of potential

change within specific historical contexts can be made conspicuous.

In attempting to apply the method of discourse analysis to the issue of the Balkan

Egyptians, this article will, in keeping with the current debate, distinguish convention-

ally between two qualitatively distinct phases concerning this form of identification,

each corresponding to its distinct societal relevance. The first phase covers the

period until the late 1980s when the term Egyptians was deployed to denote a

group lacking political and economic elites and, consequently, any power ambitions

(what Otto Bauer has termed a “folk without history”).21 During this period, the Egyp-

tian form of identification had scarce political and social relevance.

The second phase covers the relatively brief, but qualitatively distinct, period start-

ing in the 1990s. It is characterised by the dynamic employment of this form of identi-

fication after the rise of political elites and their engagement in the construction,

stylisation and legitimacy of a unique Egyptian identity in some Balkan countries.

On the basis of these methodological caveats, the subsequent analysis focuses on

discursive communities and their strategies, and will provide the following main

arguments:

The recent debate on the Egyptians occurs on the basis of a common acceptance and

internalisation by all participants in the debate of the dominant European national

concept. Hence, treating nations as “imagined communities,”22 the debate as a

whole tends to concentrate on whether the disputed entity is entitled to participate

as an actor within the national arena, and in what position. At the same time,

parties to the debate in question all share the same Gypsy stereotype. Independent

of whether the actors involved in this discourse are defending, rejecting, constructing

or deconstructing the Egyptian form of identification, they all project a common,

stereotypical Gypsy image upon the Egyptians. Given both the pejorative connotations

entailed by this Gypsy image and the hierarchical character of the national concept,

current discourse about the Egyptians is inherently evaluative.

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Early Debates on the Egyptians in Various Balkan States

It is well known that speculation about the origins of Gypsies/Roma and their possible

connection to Egypt dates to the first recorded evidence of their presence in the Byzan-

tine Empire.23 Later, Ottoman documents refer to groups named “Cingene” and/or

“Kipti/Kiptiyan.” Scholars tend to identify both terms with the Gypsies/Roma and

hypothesise that the term “Kipti” in particular refers to the Coptic confession of Egyp-

tians.24 In his famous Seyahat-name (Book of Travels, 1668), Evliya Celebi refers to

groups named both cinganeler and qiptıler, particularly in Anatolia and Rumelia.25

However, because they left no written records, it is an open question whether the

groups in question used such terms to identify themselves. Consequently, our know-

ledge of them is based only on data obtained and interpreted by members of a then

dominant society. Furthermore, the secondary literature often provides interpretations

of the past that are based on anachronistic analytical models devised for quite different

historical frameworks and largely expressed in confusing ethnic terms.26

Some authors attempt to solve the riddle—posed in studies and travel reports

throughout the twentieth century—of the origins of groups called Egyptians by com-

paring their phenomenological characteristics with the stereotypical Gypsy image. As

will be shown below, scholars usually treat this issue by employing as criteria the ten-

dency of the groups in question to be sedentary or roaming, and the relative degree to

which each group has been marginalised. Another criterion often employed is the

relationship between such Egyptians and self-identified Roma.

Several articles concerning groups settled in Albania reflect this tendency. Accord-

ing to Stuart Mann,27 Albanian society at large distinguishes between Arli (called

“Jevg” or “Magjyp”) and Roma (called “Kurbat,” “Tsergetar” or “Alegi”).28 Mann

describes Jevgs as “dark, reddish-skinned people”29 who “stoutly deny any connection

with the Roms, and to call them ‘Tsikan’ is the worst possible insult. Their traditions

seem to point to an African origin.”30 From a conversation with an “old Jevg” who

claimed that his “tribe came from a land ‘a two day’s journey towards the sun,’”31

the author concludes that this country “must be Egypt.”32 The claim, however, that

Jevgs have nothing whatsoever to do with the Roma “seems to be borne out by the

fact that in type and feature the two tribes do not resemble one another in the

slightest.”33 Consistent with Gypsy discourse, Mann describes Jevgs as possessing

qualities that are the inverse of the negative Gypsy stereotype and claims that they

are “clean, honest, hard-working, and fairly intelligent. Many of their children go

to school.”34 Jevgs, however, are said to suffer marginalisation and exclusion by

the Albanian majority and to lead a “communal life in colonies quite apart from the

Albanian settlements.”35 But even if they are despised by the Albanians, they see

themselves (“justly” according to Mann) “to be above the Roms.”36 The author

seems to be so convinced of the Jevgs’ Egyptian descent that he even claims to see

Nefertiti in the face of every Jevg woman. He writes, “I have seen many who are

the living image of Queen Nefertiti, with the same high eyebrows converging


75

towards the middle of the forehead, the large eyelids and the oval face and small

chin; but how far my comparison is due to imagination, I can not say. Unfortunately

I did not take any photographs.”37 Responding to Mann, Margaret Hasluck38 argues

that Jevgs are Gypsies. She does, however, ascribe to them some basic differences

vis-a-vis other Gypsy groups insofar as they are “sedentary” and speak Albanian,

whereas the latter are “nomadic” and speak Romanes.39

A similar problematic is evident with groups in Bulgaria named “Agypti.”40 One of

the earliest41 known references to the Agupti is probably contained in Konstantin

Irecek’s Principality Bulgaria.42 Irecek classifies them as Gypsies who live scattered

throughout the country leading either a sedentary or nomadic existence. He notes

that they are generally called “Ciganin,” though in Turkish they are referred to as

“Cingene.” They are only called “Aguptin” in Rhodops and “Gjube” in Macedonia.

Irecek claims that the two names derive from the Greek word “Yyftos”43 and the old

Turkish word “Kipt,” respectively, and reflect the Gypsies’ alleged Egyptian origins.

Indicative of the discourse of the post-1945 period and the way in which Bulgaria’s

Agupti were perceived by scholars is Primovski’s folkloristic study of Muslim black-

smiths referred to as “Agupti” in the Bulgarian town of Madan (in the Rhodops).44 In

this study, Primovski implies that he considers members of this group to be Gypsies

even if he ascribes to them distinguishing characteristics of other local Gypsy

groups. Primovski is not able to say with any certainty whether the origins of the

Agupti are Indian or not. According to their own legends, however, Agupti are the des-

cendants of Egyptian immigrants. In addition to its stereotypical view of Gypsies,

Primovski’s study is also indicative of the problematic of the Muslim minority in

Bulgaria. Agupti are Muslims and Bulgarophones, and, according to the social

majority in Bulgaria, their language is an old Bulgarian dialect, even older than the

current national language.45 Here, it is interesting to note the relevance of the linguis-

tic aspect of the minority issue in Bulgaria in the post-1945 era. The case of the

Pomaks provides an illustrative example. Since their language is regarded as an

ancient Bulgarian dialect, it is cited as evidence of their “Bulgarian national charac-

ter.”46 By contrast, the Bulgarian national belongingness of the Agupti of Madan is

not discussed, despite the supposedly “Bulgarian authenticity” of their language. It

seems that the ascription of positive qualities to the Agupti (“hard-workers,” “believ-

ers,” “clever,” etc.)47 may be able to call into question their relation to designated

Gypsies but is insufficient to associate them with the Bulgarian nation. The probable

reason for this is that, to an even greater extent than other Muslim groups in Bulgaria,

the Aguptis are marginalised and live in conditions of extreme poverty and therefore

lack prestige.48

Marushiakova and Popov49 consider the Bulgarian Agupti to be members of a larger

group of Gypsies/Roma called “Jerlii” and to be “probably the descendants of an older

wave of immigrants to the Balkans, considerably different from the other Gypsy

groups and sharply distanced from them.”50 What is thought to distinguish them

from the Roma is their remarkable tendency towards acculturation and integration

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into local society. According to the authors, the “Agupti are distinguished by their

strong inspiration to integrate into the surrounding Turkish or Bulgarian Muslim

(Pomaks) population and adopt the Turkish or Bulgarian language.”51

At this point, a remarkable similarity between the Bulgarian Agupti and certain

Gypsy/Roma groups in Greece should briefly be noted. E. Zeginis52 discusses

groups named “Eguptin” (feminine “Agupka”) or “Yeguptin” (feminine

“Yagupka”) settled in Greek Thrace, even in villages of the Pomak-dominated prefec-

ture of Xanthi.53

Nevertheless, not every group of supposedly African origin has been associated

with the Egyptian discourse. In a travel report on Albania, Jonny Behm54 gives an

account of a “former nigger quarter” in the Albanian town of Berat inhabited by a

heterogeneous population living in conditions of extreme poverty. According to

Behm, the inhabitants of this quarter (who were about to disappear at the time of

his travel) were descendants of slaves brought from Egypt during the Ottoman era

in the service of a Pasha.55 Behm, however, does not associate this group with the

Gypsies/Roma and, as the context of his report suggests, there is no indication of

any relevance of this designation among the few remaining members of this group

of supposedly Egyptian origins.

Behm’s account of Berat contains similarities with the cases of some Turcophone

members of the Muslim minority in Greek Thrace who, due to their self-described

“dark skin colour,”56 believe that their ancestors arrived from Africa during the

Ottoman era, perhaps as slaves from present-day Sudan,57 though they could not

state this with any certainty. This conviction, however, does not seem to play a signifi-

cant roll in their own self-identification. By contrast, a group of (today bilingual)

Slavophones living in a Greek Macedonian area close to the town of Serres claim to

be of “Egyptian descent” whereas the local society considers them Gypsies.58

Comparing the Egyptian issue in the various Balkan states, the distinctively discur-

sive character of this form of identification becomes apparent. Despite the differences

between them, each case provides evidence of an ascribed and internalised character-

istic “otherness.” In each of the countries where these groups are present, they are not

considered to be members of a titular nation.59 Furthermore, such groups are socially

positioned more or less on the margins of their respective societies. According to the

texts just examined, any self-perceived (hence internalised) “otherness” of Egyptians

(Agupti, Jevgs, etc.) seems to have two aspects: a manifest sense of superiority vis-a-

vis the actors labelled as “Gypsies,” on the one hand, and a perception of inferiority

vis-a-vis the dominant societies in which they live as a result of discrimination and

exclusion, on the other. Given their lack of elites and thus of strategies for confronting

their societal surroundings, the self-ascribed identification of the Egyptians retains its

social relevance only among local populations of Egyptians and in relation to other

local population groups. The extent of this relevance is expressed as solidarity with

or dissociation from other groups with respect to social practises, e.g. in marriage

strategies/practices, the building of (closed) professional systems, etc. In sociological


77

terms, however, such “groups” would undergo political transformation when pre-

sented with an appropriate set of circumstances.

A Dynamic Identification as Egyptians

In the 1990s, the Egyptian form of identification began to have political implications

and subsequently to assume greater social relevance as a consequence of its being

linked to contemporary nationalist conflicts in several of the Balkan states. This devel-

opment may be regarded as part of a larger context that included both confrontations

of rival nationalist ideologies and the widespread political movement of several

minority groups subsequent to the upheaval in many Balkan states after 1989.

The following analysis attempts to distinguish the main actors of the discursive

communities within which recent political discourse concerning Egyptians has

occurred, focusing mainly on the strategies of these communities’ elites and leading

representatives.

Self-Identification: Strategies of the Elites

More recent discourse about Egyptians has been determined by a process of gradual

collectivisation (which is a prelude to the typical nationalistic demand for homogenis-

ation), institutionalisation and, finally, national stylisation of an Egyptian identity. Col-

lectivisation and institutionalisation have emerged with the relatively recent formation

of numerous Egyptian representative associations. The first one was founded in 1990

in Ohrid and a short time later (October 1990) a sister association in Prishtina followed,

both attaining influence among Albanophone Muslims identified as Gypsies.60 During the

same period, similar associations of Evgjit were also founded in Albania, the first one of

them (was founded) in Korcha (June 1992) while (the founding of) a number of other

regional organisations soon followed.61 At the end of the decade, there was an attempt

to effect a collective Egyptian form of identification extending beyond the limited

regional level, and in doing so several associations united and, at “a congress in Ohrid

[1998], the formation of the Balkan Union of the Egyptians was announced.”62 The

resulting Association of the Balkan Egyptians in West Europe has existed in Germany

(Mulheim/Ruhr) since 1999.63 However, the most important event in the broader institu-

tionalisation of the Egyptian form of identification (one providing it with legitimacy)

occurred in the Republic of Macedonia with the introduction of the designation “Egyp-

tian” as a particular population category in the census of 1991.64

The intention to disassociate from the Gypsy label seems to make up just one aspect

of the Egyptian movement. A more decisive aspect, mainly characterising the strat-

egies of Egyptian elites, is the declaration of a collective “identity” with national

implications as well as a claim (albeit only partially established) to legitimacy.

Thus, the recent phenomenon can be regarded as an emancipatory act with two

basic dimensions: deconstructive and constructive.

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The transition from the deconstruction of the Gypsy stigma to the construction of a

modern and prestigious collective identity allowing the Egyptians to link themselves

to a national group-building discourse began as soon as the necessary conditions were

fulfilled. These conditions included the historical framework of nationalist ideologies

in which minorities participated in order to gain recognition, as well as the formation

of a leadership able to create a national profile. The latter was achieved through the

formation of national myths,65 references to an external “original homeland” and

the attempt to establish connections with Egyptian state authorities.66 These con-

ditions surfaced after 1989 and made possible a new, dynamic form of Egyptian

identification in precisely those countries where the question had hardly been an

issue before, namely in Macedonia and Kosovo.

As such, the proclamation of “Egyptian identity” currently lacks any conflict poten-

tial and hence remains neutral as a form of identification, since Egypt is not involved

in the Balkan conflicts. Yet such neutrality ends when the actors or elites of a particu-

lar discursive community become involved in events in centres of political conflict.

This is exactly what occurred in Kosovo, where an explosive nationalist conflict

and accompanying crisis left very little room for any neutral actors.

Identification by Others

Roma leaders. The emergence of the Egyptian issue in recent years has also attracted

the attention of Roma leaders, among whom it has provoked differing reactions. Such

reactions were only to be expected given the ascendancy of the Romani movement in

the region during the same period. Particularly in the Republic of Macedonia, the

Romani elites stylised a Roma identification free of pejorative connotations and

partially (re)articulated nationalistic aspirations.67

The former secretary-general of the World Congress of Roma and later president

of the Romano-Rat (Berlin), Dr Rajko Djuric, characterised discourse about the

Egyptians as a “comedy,” an act that lacked seriousness but served political purposes:

above all the division and subsequent weakening of the Romani movement.68 From

Djuric’s point of view, the Egyptian movement is the symptom of a “divide and

conquer” strategy deployed by politicians in order to gain influence over and thus

to instrumentalise large numbers of the Romani population in the service of their

own interests.

However, not all Roma representatives seem to share this opinion. As reported by

the European Roma Rights Centre,69 Pellumb Fortuna and Marcel Courthiade claimed

in an unpublished letter70 to Le Monde that in Albania, Roma and Jevgjit are distinct

groups who are usually perceived as indistinguishable by the dominant society.

According to the same source, the authors of the mentioned letter suppose that the

difference between the two groups concerns their origins, since the former came

from India while the latter are descendants of Copts resident in the Balkans for cen-

turies. Furthermore, Jevgjit are said to “only speak the language of their adopted


79

country. They consider themselves superior to the Gypsies.”71 Nevertheless, both

groups are thought to share a common feature, namely their “skin colour.” Just this

is believed to cause confusion, since “[i]gnorant people in Albania see the colour of

the skin but are incapable of distinguishing to what origin a colour belongs. They

cannot understand that the Evgjits or Jevgs, although they have a dark skin like us,

constitute a completely different ethnic group.”72 Obviously such an argument

employs a mode of discourse in which “descent,” “colour” and “language” are per-

ceived as decisive and even “objective” criteria of group membership.

Rival titular nations: serving nationalistic purposes. In Albania, the main actors in

the recent debate over the Jevgs are members/elites of both the Jevgs themselves and

the Roma rather than of the dominant society. This may be due to the low relevance

such a form of identification possesses with respect to national questions in post-

socialist Albania. In Bulgaria, the Agupti form of identification seems to possess

even less social relevance and to be raised as an issue only in scholarly debate.

By contrast, in the cases of Macedonia and Kosovo, the controversy over the “true

identity” of the Egyptians—at least in the 1990s—can only be explained in the context

of attempts by national rivals to instrumentalise population groups in order to legiti-

mate competing claims of sovereignty. The debate on the Egyptians is in this respect

only one aspect of a more comprehensive issue in which the attention of a dominant

society towards minorities increases as soon as the potential significance of the latter

rises, e.g. due to greater electoral importance or the formation of minority elites and

their involvement in directing social developments, etc. Such an interest does not

necessarily indicate the willingness of a dominant society (or titular nation) to

accept these groups as equal members of society or as actors in and writers of national

history, but rather reflects the intention to instrumentalise them.73 In the explosive

conflict in divided Yugoslavia and particularly in Kosovo, construing the disputed

groups as “Egyptians” allows for their disassociation from Albanians, whereas iden-

tifying them as “Albanianised Gypsies” has the effect of distinguishing them from

Serbs via a two-fold distinction.

According to Duijzings’s study, the political support the Egyptian issue has

received from Serbian nationalists has been echoed in the discourse of the scientific

community as well.74 Since the 1990s, there have been notable attempts by several

scholars to make the Egyptian form of identification the subject of biologically deter-

mined discourse. Duijzings discusses the example of an ethnologist at the University

of Skopje who claimed to be able to trace the origins of this group to ancient Egypt by

verifying their supposed cultural continuity with their “predecessors” in ancient Egypt

by means of archaeological evidence and even blood testing. Such biological argu-

ments are symptomatic of the revival of racial discourse in the last decade, which,

especially in Southeastern Europe, has been adopted in order to legitimise nationalist

agendas.75 This development goes hand in hand with recent emphasis on ethnic

characteristics76 and the central position “heritage” plays in argumentation for the

historical continuity of titular nations.77

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A further criterion in the argument for an Egyptian (that is, non-Albanian) origin is

religious confession. Serbian scholars assume that “many beliefs, rituals and magical

practices among Macedonian Egyptians show close similarities with those of the

Copts.”78 Moreover, instances of Christian belief and the celebration of Christian holi-

days by Muslim Egyptians are emphasised in order to construct a link to Christian

Serbs or at least to disassociate the former from the Muslims Albanians.79

The practice of Christian rituals by Muslims is also an issue in other Balkan

Christian states in the context of the debate over minorities.80 In this respect, the

Muslim minority living in Greek Thrace81 bears the closest resemblance to the Egyptian

one. In both cases, there is the intention of the titular nations to dissociate Muslim

minorities from rival (Muslim) nations that function as (potential) “external home-

lands” for these minorities. In the ensuing discourse, both religious belief and its mani-

festation are retrospectively interpreted to suit current nationalistic principles and then

equated with institutional religion. The latter is subsequently associated with systems

of power and, in the national context, is construed ideologically as a representative of a

rival nation.82 However, such a view overlooks at least one crucial point, i.e. that

religious behaviour and expressions of belief depend on the actors’ relationship to

(religious) power centres. The impact of both syncretism and religious brotherhoods

emphasising “the equality of religions” seems to be of great relevance to socially

deprived and marginalised people in the Balkans. Islamic (like Christian) brother-

hoods that deviated from orthodoxy and were often therefore excluded from power

centres frequently won influence among socially deprived or marginalised groups.83

The unorthodox religious practices of such groups have been the object of an “inves-

tigation of folk religiousness” focusing on “religious movements from below.”84

In such nationalistic settings, the religious factor is highly important in the case of

the Egyptians. Although confession has played only a minor role in the Slavic–

Albanian conflict in Macedonia (probably due to the relatively low degree of rel-

evance of religion to Albanian nationalism), it is currently used to distinguish

between Macedonian and Albanian nationalisms.85 Accordingly, the supposedly

once (Coptic) Christian confession of the Egyptians functions to link them potentially

to the Slavs. Hence the emphasis on Christian cults implemented by Egyptians (e.g.

the worship of Christian saints) aims to dissociate the Egyptian population from a

rival nationalism.

Patterns of Scholarly Explanation and “Ethnic Mimicry”

Several scholars tend to explain the Egyptian phenomenon by employing terms

such as “falsified identity by Gypsies”86 or “camouflage.”87 Another widely used

term seems to be “ethnic mimicry.”88 Such patterns of explanation are an inherent

ingredient in the discourse about Gypsies who are perceived by social majorities

as attempting to “imitate the life of the rich Gadze,”89 to “negotiate identities,”90 to

attain a “preferential ethnic conscience,”91 etc.


81

In addressing these views, three key terms arise: “identity,” “ethnicity” and

“mimicry.” All three terms and their combination with one another entail the distinc-

tions “inclusion–exclusion” and “sameness–diversity” and imply boundaries that are

predetermined and unchangeable. As a symptom of inclusion and exclusion,

“identity” (a “plastic word,” as Porksen terms it)92 asserts both the sameness of

members of a group or category and diversity with respect to others involved in the

same discursive field. “Identity” does not, however, imply a mere identification but

rather prescribes affiliation; essentially it shapes a topos in which social actors are

obligatorily classified after it has been predetermined which of their experiences,

characteristics, etc. are important and worthy of representation. The attribution of

sameness leads to the treatment of identity as a “reality” or even as a quality attaching

to individuals or collective subjects and possessing an ontological dimension.93

The imperative of sameness is also facilitated by ethnic categories that prescribe

affiliation on the basis of cultural, linguistic, religious and similar characteristics as

well as of descent or even explicitly of race. As associated with concepts of nation

and race,94 ethnic categories mediate between both by means of an idea of descent

which is employed to establish genealogies and codify them in “collective identi-

ties.” In doing so—whether on the basis of national or racial traits—descent pre-

scribes an unchangeable character to ethnic affiliation. In this context, the question

is not asked of whether these “ethnic groups” are “face-to-face communities,” that

is, bounded entities with immediate exchange and possibly kinship relations

among their members or “imagined” communities according to Max Webers’ defi-

nition,95 a definition that is close to the concept of nation. The frequent juxtaposition

of these different types of groups facilitates the projection of characteristics of the

first onto the latter with the effect that face-to-face and kinship relations as well

as a primitive character are attributed to imagined communities. This very confusion

occurs quite often in studies of the Rom,a in which scholars frequently emphasise

ethnic characteristics such as culture, kinship, etc., often basing their assertions on

fieldwork conducted in particular settlements, though considering their results to

be universally valid.96

The term “mimicry” (borrowed from biology and psychology) has become quite

prominent in the social sciences via postcolonial studies.97

The term “ethnic mimicry” as applied to the Gypsies/Roma seems, however, to be

introduced by Vukanovic in his study on the “Gypsy Population in Yugoslavia”

(1963),98 rather than to be adapted from the post-colonial studies. Vukanovic’s

article is indicative of the merger of racial and ethnic characteristics and the allegedly

objective (and thus immutable) character of “group membership.” Vukanovic com-

plains about the lack of statistical data based on “ethnic characteristics” which pre-

vents an accurate estimate of the “real size” of the Gypsy population in Yugoslavia.

He considers the most important reason for this deficit to be the “very characteristic

problem . . . [of] ethnical mimicry among Gypsies,”99 i.e. a widespread tendency

among the “Gypsy population . . . to hide its real racial character, pretending to

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belong to some other Balkan ethnical group . . . which results in reducing the estimated

number of Gypsy inhabitants.”100 With respect to the criterion of racial belonging,

Vukanovic complains that a “number of persons belonging to the Gypsy race is

included in some other ethnical group.”101

Although both issues—the claim of “objectivity” on the basis of the quantification

of data102 as well as the debate about the “true Gypsy”—have long traditions,103 it is of

particular significance that Vukanovic’s assertion could be expressed only a few years

after the Second World War even though it applies the same arguments used by

National Socialist “experts” who complained about the lack of statistical data on

the Balkan Gypsies with respect to racial and volkisch criteria.104 The use of the

concept of “ethnic mimicry” by many current scholars without reflecting upon its con-

notations is no less significant. Such usage can be attributed to a set of factors, the most

important of which may be the positive connotative potential both terms—“ethnicity”

and “mimicry”—enjoyed after the Second World War, a potential apparently deriving

from the interplay of politics and science. While ethnic categories have been associ-

ated to a wide extent with “alterity,” “otherness” and “minorities” and refer to entities

to be protected, they have gained positive political implications. At the same time,

“race” has not been cancelled from mainstream Anglo-American (as distinguished

from German) discourse after the Second World War.105 On the contrary, “race”

has emerged as a key notion, particularly in the postcolonial discourse and “cultural

and racial studies” which currently have a great deal of influence on social and

human sciences.106 In light of these developments, ethnic and to some extent racial

terminology appears to have been dissociated from negative connotations, thus allow-

ing for the possibility of racial or even genetic arguments about the Roma. A symptom

of these multidimensional connections is that ethnologists have participated in

research on the genetic characteristics of the Roma.107

Whether consciously or not, use of the term “ethnic mimicry” finally has the same

effect: it ascribes to the Roma an “immutable character” that they allegedly acquire at

birth and never lose; it denies the “‘right of exit’ from the group.”108 Even if the racial

element is not always mentioned explicitly by current participants in this debate,109 it

is nevertheless present and is effectively perpetuated by the ascription of a fatal char-

acter to “Gypsy identity.” Such an ascription is best expressed by Lockwood who

claims in his well-known article on the Balkan Gypsies that some “Gypsies have

made their way in the gadje world, nevertheless maintaining a sense of their Gypsy

distinctiveness.” Lockwood goes on to assert that Roma have adapted to the con-

ditions of their surrounding society, “[a]nd adapt they have, all the while maintaining

their distinctive Gypsy identity”.110

Such use of the term “ethnic mimicry” is indicative of both the racial character of

the stereotypical Gypsy image and the racist or biological character of the concept of

nation. Moreover, the standpoint typical of scholars is symptomatic of the dominant

patterns of majority self-identification via national attributes,111 since just such an

identification contains a fatal element of descent in which group and national


83

affiliation is considered a destiny, since it is regarded as inborn and therefore cannot be

lost or acquired. That such a view is not self-explanatory and not applicable generally

becomes clear when it is compared with other, including political, conceptualisations

of nationality. Terms such as “ethnic mimicry,” “falsification of identities” or “camou-

flage” have not been used to characterise second or third generations of immigrants in

Canada or the U.S., when they simply perceive themselves as Canadians or Ameri-

cans. Yet such terms are applied to members of the disputed groups (Egyptians as

well as Roma) who have been native to the Balkans for centuries.

Concluding Reflections

The presence of (groups called) “Egyptians” in the Balkans is well documented

through various historical periods, so it is hardly a controversial issue per se. By con-

trast, the question that has recently arisen concerning the possible connection between

current Egyptians and immigrants from Egypt arriving in the Balkans centuries ago is

a current political issue. Such a connection, typically established by myth-making, has

relevance to the present insofar as a particular concept of the past serves as a means of

entitling minority groups to participate as equal members in mainstream societies. In

other words, “[m]yth and invention are essential to the politics of identity by which

groups of people today, defining themselves by ethnicity, religion or the past or

present borders of states, try to find some certainty in an uncertain and shaking

world by saying, ‘We are different from and better than the Others.’”112

It is certainly the task of historians and social scientists to explore the pasts of par-

ticular settlements and communities and to investigate their histories as well as the

processes and conditions that could have lent support to the formation and perpetu-

ation of a group consciousness. Yet without necessary archival information, there

can only be speculation about the origins of (ancestors of) groups such as the Egyp-

tians (Agupti, Jevgs, etc.). However, the key question of how the preservation of

the memory of an ancient origin is facilitated (if indeed it is) by communities

lacking elites and institutions capable of preserving and updating collective memories

remains unanswered.

While such an exploration is the task of historians, attaching synchronic signifi-

cance to historical events in order to establish a correspondence with contemporary

groups is the work of politicians and ideologues. Historical events serve in this

instance as the basis for myth and invention, since the “most usual ideological

abuse of history is based on anachronism rather than lies.”113

The Egyptian issue as it has arisen in the post-1945 period (and particularly since

the 1990s) may be regarded as occurring within the context of nationalist conflicts

as well as the emancipation movements of minorities and diverse population groups

in the Balkans. The attempt to establish a link between past and present by asserting

historical continuity and objectifying this through the concept of descent is a classic

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case of myth-making that is treated differently by each set of actors involved in

the discourse as a whole. Egyptian elites try to construct their own national

profile through a particular interpretation of the past and the positing of a historical

continuity between this past and their present circumstances. At the same time,

the larger societies in which the Egyptians live also make use of the concept of the

past, even if only to refute the identity proclaimed by Egyptians, replacing it with

a different one implying a naturalistic or biological form of continuity, i.e. of

Gypsy descent. Hence, both actors “turn the past into the present,” and yet they do

so for opposed reasons: the Egyptians in order to gain the legitimacy required for

entrance into the world of established and prestigious large communities, the societies

in which they live in order to justify the exclusion of the Egyptians from that same

arena.

The same employment of the past and its genealogical implications is apparent in

scholarly discourse, irrespective of the acceptance, denial or exploration of the Egyp-

tian form of identification. In the context of the use of the past just discussed, the

search for historical evidence of Egyptian immigration to the Balkans in Herodotus’s

texts or in the histories of the Macedonian, Roman or Byzantine Empires without con-

sidering the mechanisms that make possible the perpetuation of communities is essen-

tially the same as simply ascribing an Illyrian origin to contemporary Albanians or an

ancient Hellenic one to present-day Greeks.

Beyond the discourse of elites and with respect to the necessity for the groups and

actors in question to counter their own marginalisation in order to participate equally

in mainstream societies, it is hardly important whether such groups and actors are “in

reality” Gypsies/Roma or descendants of Egyptian immigrants. The question about

such a “reality” points to the “regime” and “politics of truth”114 in each society.

Thus, the matter of their “real identity” implies a more fundamental question: How

shall community membership be defined? The “reality” that possesses a primary

social relevance is that the actors in question have been perceived and treated as

Gypsies by the societies in which they live. In that same framework, any treatment

of them as either Gypsies/Roma or Egyptians would essentially be a hierarchical

ascription of otherness, all the more so because the option of affiliating them with

the titular nation is not considered. Yet both Egyptians and Roma are essentially as

native as the other inhabitants of the regions in which they live. At that point,

shared collective representations become significant within discourses in which

group affiliation is regarded as immutable in character because it is thought to

derive from a genealogy perpetuated through the centuries. However, by considering

group affiliation from the perspective suggested by David A. Hollinger,115 one reacts

“against prescribed affiliation on the basis of descent.”116 Such a “postethnic perspec-

tive challenges the right of one’s grandfather or grandmother to determine primary

identity. Individuals should be allowed to affiliate or disaffiliate with their own com-

munities of descent to an extent that they choose, while affiliating with whatever non-

descent communities are available and appealing to them.”117


85

The focal point of the discourse about Egyptians seems to concern not merely the

distinctiveness of Egyptians with respect to Gypsies, but primarily their being alien as

construed by a dominant society and internalised by the affected groups themselves.

Finally, Roma have recently also formed a group profile that emphasises an Indian

origin and “homeland,” even though historical sources date their arrival in Europe

to approximately the eleventh century. The ascription and internalisation of exclusion

prove to be the most acceptable option for all participants in the discourse, i.e. for

dominant societies, for both Egyptian and Roma elites and as well as for the scholarly

community.

Such an attitude seems to be an elite perspective owing its legitimacy to the fact that

it is a norm of national ideology. The effect of its enforcement is such that when

groups of inferior social status (such as a large part of the Roma or Egyptians) perceive

themselves as members of titular nations, it is interpreted as “mimicry.” Consequently,

the dominant societies in respective national contexts full participatory status to such

actors. At the same time, minority elites commit themselves to the goal of political

emancipation without developing alternative strategies. In effect, the entire process

is a vicious circle that begins and ends with national concepts.

NOTES

1. Der Spiegel, 15 October 1990. See also the reference to Svet, 18 April 1990, pp. 56–57 inG. Duijzings, Religion and the Politics of Identity in Kosovo (London: Hurst, 2000),pp. 132–133.

2. Der Spiegel, 15 October 1990, p. 197. My translation.3. See G. Duijzings, “Die Erschaffung von Agyptern in Kosovo und Makedonien,” in

U. Brunnbauer, ed., Umstrittene Identitaten. Ethnizitat und Nationalitat in Sudosteuropa(Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2002), p. 148; St. Muller, “Die Situation der Roma in Kosovo,”Sudost-Europa Zeitschrift fur Gegenwartsforschung, Nos 9–10, 1999, p. 512; EuropeanRoma Rights Centre, “Roma in the Macedonian Conflict,” press release, 13 July 2001,,http://www.errc.org/publications/letters/2001/on_macedonia_july_13_2001.shtml.;ibid., “ERRC Press Statement: Roma in the Macedonia Conflict,” ,http://www.errc.org/rr_nr2-3_2001/advo3.shtml . .

4. The European Roma Rights Centre has reported regularly on the situation of Roma inKosovo since 1999. See e.g. ,http://errc.org/publications/indices/kosovo.shtml.. Oneof the most recent assessments of the situation of Egyptians, Ashkali and Roma inKosovo is Paul Polansky’s report for the Gesellschaft fur bedrohte Volker entitled“Roma, Ashkali und ‘Agypter’—ohne Zukunft im Kosovo. Ergebnis einer Recherchevom 1. Marz bis 30. September 2003,” October 2003. See also “The Current Plight ofthe Kosovo Roma,” written by Carol V. Bloom, Sunil K. Sharma, E. Ann Neel on thebasis of former field research and reports by Paul Polansky, Voice of Roma, Sebastopol,California, 2002 ,http://www.voiceofroma.org.. Human Rights Watch, “Out ofLimbo? Addressing the Plight of Kosovo Roma Refugees in Macedonia,” HumanRights Watch Briefing Paper, 10 December 2003, ,http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/eca/macedonia1203/.. On the excesses in Kosovo in March 2004 and the renewedattacks against Roma and Ashkali, see Human Rights Watch, “Failure to Protect:

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Anti-Minority Violence in Kosovo,” March 2004, ,http://hrw.org/reports/2004/kosovo0704/..

5. See ,http://www.refugees.org/news/crisis/kosovo_e.htm..6. The establishment of the Association of Balkan Egyptians in West Europe is indicative of

such support. See ,http://www.balkanaegypter.de..7. See e.g. E. Marushiakova et al., Identity Formation among Minorities in the Balkans: The

Cases of Roms, Egyptians, and Ashkali in Kosovo (Sofia: Minority Studies Society StudiiRomani, 2001), pp. 30–39; Muller, Die Situation der Roma in Kosovo, p. 507; H. Poulton,The Balkans. Minorities and States in Conflict (London: Minority Rights Group, 1991),p. 91; H. Poulton, “The Roma in Macedonia: A Balkan Success Story?” RFE/RLResearch Report, Vol. 2, No. 19, 1993, p. 43; European Roma Rights Centre, “A PleasantFiction. The Human Rights Situation of Roma in Macedonia,” Country Reports Series,No. 7, 1998, p. 34. See also G. Duijzings, “Egyptians in Kosovo and Macedonia,” inE. Hardten, ed., Der Balkan in Europa (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1996), pp. 103–121, aswell as Duijzings, Religion and the Politics of Identity, and Duijzings, Die Erschaffungvon Agyptern in Kosovo. Duijzings seems to be the first scholar to have dealt substantiallywith the Egyptian question in the context of nationalist conflicts in the dividedYugoslavia. He is also the first to have called attention to the new quality of the dynamismof this form of identification. The success of his study is attested by the repeated occasionof its publication (see above). The present article will refer to the publication from 2000(Religion and the Politics of Identity).

8. See below, as well as e.g. Z. Barany, “The Roma in Macedonia: Ethnic Politicsand the Marginal Condition in a Balkan State,” Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 18,No. 3, 1995, p. 517; A. Fraser, The Gypsies (Oxford and Cambridge: Blackwell, 1992),p. 298; Poulton, The Balkans, p. 91; and Poulton, The Roma in Macedonia, p. 43.E. Marushiakova and V. Popov, “Myth as Process,” in Th. Acton, ed., Scholarshipand the Gypsy Struggle. Commitment in Romani Studies (Hatfield, Hertfordshire:University of Hertfordshire Press, 2000), pp. 81–93, esp. pp. 84–85.

9. Duijzings, Religion and the Politics of Identity, p. 143.10. Marushiakova et al., Identity Formation among Minorities, p. 30.11. Ibid., p. 30, my emphasis.12. Ibid., my emphasis.13. European Roma Rights Centre, “Roma in Albania,” Country Reports Series, No. 5, 1997,

p. 11.14. Ibid., p. 11.15. Ibid.16. European Roma Rights Centre, A Pleasant Fiction.17. Ibid., p. 34.18. See e.g. W. D. Hund, Zigeuner. Geschichte und Struktur einer rassistischen Konstruktion

(Duisburg: DISS, 1996); J. Giere, ed.,Die gesellschaftliche Konstruktion des Zigeuners: zurGenese eines Vorurteils (Frankfurt: Campus, 1996); K. Holz, Zigeuner, Wilde undExoten. Fremdbilder in der franzosischen Literatur des 10. Jahrhunderts (Berlin: ErichSchmidt Verlag, 2002).

19. M. Schwab-Trapp (“Diskurs als soziologisches Konzept. Bausteine fur eine soziologischorientierte Diskursanalyse,” in R. Keller, A. Hirseland, W. Schneider, W. Viehover, eds,Handbuch Sozialwissenschaftliche Diskursanalyse, Vol. 1: Theorien und Methoden[Opladen, Germany: Leske Budrich, 2001], pp. 261–283) has developed a very usefulconception of discourse derived from Foucault. See e.g. M. Foucault, L’ ordre du discours


87

(Paris: Gallimard, 1971). The present article is based in large part on Schwab-Trapp’smethodological proposals.

20. R. Brubaker and F. Cooper, “Beyond ‘Identity,’” Theory and Society. Renewal andCritique in Social Theory, Vol. 29, 2000, pp. 1–47. For further critical considerationof the term “identity,” see L. Niethammer, Kollektive Identitat. Heimliche Quelleneiner unheimlichen Konjunktur (Hamburg: Rowolt Taschenbuch, 2000).

21. O. Bauer, Die Nationalitatenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie (Vienna: Marx-Studien 2,1924). Bauer’s study is important insofar as it may be viewed as an initial analysis ofthe ethnicisation processes. On the notion of ethnicisation, see S. Trubeta, “‘Minoriza-tion’ and ‘Ethnicization’ in Greek Society: Comparative Perspectives on MoslemMigrants and the Moslem Minority,” History and Culture of South Eastern Europe—An Annual Journal, Vol. 5, 2003, pp. 95–112.

22. B. Anderson, Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism.(London and New York: Verso, 1991).

23. G. Soulis, “The Gypsies in the Byzantine Empire and the Balkans in the Late MiddleAges,” Dumbarton Oaks Papers, Vol. 15, 1961, pp. 143–165; I. Rochow and K.-P.Matschke, “Neues zu den Zigeunern im Byzantinischen Reich um die Wende vom 13.zum 14. Jahrhundert,” Jahrbuch der Osterreichischen Byzantinistik, Vol. 41, 1991,pp. 241–254.

24. See e.g. Tayyib M Gokbilgin, “Cingeneler,” Islam Ansiklopedisi (Istanbul), Vol. 3, 1945, pp.420–426; the Turkish journal Trih ve Toplum, No. 137, 1995; E. Zeginis, Oi mousoulmanoiAthiganoi tis Thrakis (The Muslim Athigani of Thrace) (Salonica: Institute for BalkanStudies, 1994); E. Marushiakova and V. Popov, Gypsies in the Ottoman Empire (Paris:Centre de recherches tsiganes and University of Hertfordshire Press, 2001).

25. V. A. Friedman and R. Dankoff, “The Earliest Known Text in Balkan (Rumelian)Romani: A Passage from Evliya Celebi’s ‘Seyahat-name,’” Journal of the Gypsy LoreSociety, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1991, pp. 1–20.

26. The most problematical point in such a consideration is the frequent confusionbetween primordial and modern components of ethnic categories. The present articleis, however, not concerned with a closer examination of this issue. See hereS. Trubeta, Die Konstitution von Minderheiten und die Ethnisierung sozialer undpolitischer Konflikte. Eine Untersuchung am Beispiel der im griechischen Thrakienansaßigen Moslemischen Minderheit (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1999), pp. 26–57; andTrubeta, “‘Minorization’ and ‘Ethnicization.’”

27. St. E. Mann, “Albanian Romani. Introduction,” Journal of the Gypsy Lore Society, Vol.12, No. 1, 1933, pp. 1–32.

28. See also Duijings (Religion and the Politics, p. 134), who notes that in “Albania, Gypsiesare called ‘Evgite’ or ‘Magjype’, both derived from ‘Egyptian.’”

29. Mann, “Albanian Romani,” p. 2.30. Ibid.31. Ibid.32. Ibid., p. 3.33. Ibid.34. Ibid.35. Ibid.36. Ibid.37. Ibid.38. M. Hasluck, “I. The Gypsies in Albania,” Journal of the Gypsy Lore Society, Vol. 17,

No. 2, 1938, pp. 49–61.

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39. Hasluck, “Gypsies in Albania,” p. 49.40. E. Marushiakova and V. Popov, Gypsies (Roma) in Bulgaria (Frankfurt: Peter Lang,

1997).41. According to Primovski (“Kovacite Agupti v gr. Madan” [Egyptian Blacksmiths in

the Town of Madan), Iztestija na ethnografskija institut s muzej, Vol. 2, 1955, p. 217),an early text by Benventura Vulkanija dated to the beginning of the seventeenthcentury mentions groups in Bulgaria called “Agupti” and supposes that they are ofEgyptian origin. (For the translation of Bulgarian references and an invaluable exchangeof information, I am grateful to Dr Evangelos Karagiannis.) Marushiakova and Popov(Gypsies (Roma) in Bulgaria) address the case of the misinterpretation of a documentfrom 1378, namely the Rila charter (“Rilska Gramota”) of Char Ivan Shishman(Sisman), which allegedly refers to the existence of Agupti in a Bulgarian province.They argue that the “place mentioned in the text as ‘Agupovi kleti’ has often beenassociated with Gypsies (including its reading as ‘Agupti kleti’ (‘poor Egyptians’) bothby Bulgarian and foreign scholars” (p. 18). The authors are, however, critical of theunverifiable conclusions drawn by scholars who claim a settlement of “Agupti” in theregion in question.

42. K. Irecek, Knjazestvo Balgarija, Cast parva, Balgarska darzava, (Principality Bulgaria,First Part, The Bulgaria State) (Plovdiv: Danov, 1899), p. 148.

43. See G. Messing, “Tsinganos and Yiftos: Some Speculations on the Greek Gypsies,”Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies, Vol. 7, 1981, pp. 155–167.

44. Primovski, Kovacite Agupti v gr. Madan.45. Ibid., p. 219.46. See C. Vakarelski, “Altertumliche Elemente in Lebensweise und Kultur der bulgarischen

Mohammedaner,” Zeitschrift fur Balkanologie, Vols 1–2, 1966, pp. 149–172. Cf.E. Karagiannis, Zur Ethnizitat der Pomaken Bulgariens (Munster: Spectrum, 1997),p. 38 and passim.

47. Primovski, Kovacite Agupti v gr. Madan, p. 248.48. Ibid., passim.49. Marushiakova and Popov, Gypsies (Roma) in Bulgaria.50. Ibid., p. 73.51. Ibid. The authors regard Agupti as Gypsies “who have almost forgotten their own

language and adopted Turkish or Bulgarian together with a corresponding Turkish, Bul-garian or Agupti ethnic consciousness” (p. 97).

52. Zeginis, Oi mousoulmanoi Athiganoi tis Thrakis, p. 54.53. It should be kept in mind that, especially in the post-war era, numerous Bulgarian

Muslims migrated to Greek Thrace. They usually settled in suburbs inhabited byTurkish-speaking Muslims who were perceived as Gypsies by both Greeks and otherMuslim groups. However, further groups of Romanes speakers also migrated from Bul-garia both before and after World War II. See Trubeta, Die Konstitution von Minderheitenund die Ethnisierung, p. 184; and S. Trubeta, Kataskevazontas Taftotites gia tous Musul-manus tis Thrakis. To Paradeigma ton Pomakon kai ton Tsiganon (Constructing Identitiesfor the Thracian Moslems. The Cases of the Pomaks and the Gypsies) (Athens: Kritiki,2001), p. 165.

54. J. Behm, “Durch den Epirus und das neue Albanien. VIII. Im Negerviert von Berat—Aberglaube—Die Zigeuner von Berat—Im Christenviertel—Abreise mit Hindernissen,”Durch alle Welt, No. 43, 1931, pp. 11–13.

55. Compare this with Hasluck’s assertion (I. The Gypsies in Albania) that Jevgs also lived inBerat.


89

56. Cited from interviews of members of this “group” conducted during my fieldwork inspring 1997. See also S. Trubeta, Die Konstitution von Minderheiten und die Ethnisierung,and S. Trubeta, Kataskevazontas Taftotites gia tous Musulmanus.

57. D. Lafazani (“Mikta xoria tou kato Strymona: Ethnotita, Koinotita, Entopiotita,” SygxronaThemata, No. 63, 1997, pp. 96–107) and P. Y. Pechoux (Les Paysans de la rive orientaledu bas Nestos, Thrace Greque, Etudes rurales [Athens: Centre National de RecherchesSociales, 1969]) also claim that some members of this group originated in the Sudan.

58. This information comes from several colleagues who have conducted research in theregion of Greek Macedonia. I am especially grateful to Ms Miranda Terzopoulou (anthro-pologist, Academy of Athens). To date, there is no literature on this topic and it is not yetpossible to say approximately how long this phenomenon has existed. My first acquain-tance with Roma groups of supposedly Egyptian origin in Greece occurred during myfieldwork in Thrace (1997). One interviewee made reference to his encounter with anauthor who had voiced the intention of writing a study in which he would argue thatthe Roma of Greek Thrace originally came from Egypt. It seems likely that this intentionwas an expression of the Greek nationalist attempt to keep away a numerically consider-able segment of the Muslim minority from the Turkish nationalism by ascribing to theman “objectively” distinct, i.e. Egyptian, that is, non-Turkish, ancestry.

59. The case of the Ottoman Empire in particular should be examined with respect to both thefollowing factors: the lack among Ottoman rulers of an assimilation strategy for popu-lation groups; and the social status of the assimilated groups referred to.

60. H. Poulton, The Balkans, p. 9, and Poulton The Roma in Macedonia, p. 43. Duijzings(Religion and the Politics of Identity, p. 145) claims that in Kosovo “all data indicatesthat the Egyptians recruit their members mainly from the Ashkali . . . a term that mostof these ‘Albanian’ Gypsies use for themselves.” See also Marushiakova et al., IdentityFormation among Minorities in the Balkans, esp. p. 38, about the relationship betweenAshkali and Egyptians. For more on such “identity switching,” see Bloom et al., TheCurrent Plight of the Kosovo Roma.

61. Marushiakova et al., Identity Formation among Minorities in the Balkans, p. 34.62. Ibid., p. 35.63. See ,http://www.balkanaegypter.de . .64. According to Duijzings (Religion and the Politics of Identity, p. 139), Egyptian leaders in

Ochrid claimed that earlier they had already attempted to be included in the census ques-tionnaires as a separate category, but without success. In this way, they attempted to gainofficial recognition as a nationality (narodnost): “Although their demands had not beengranted by the government of Macedonia, at least 200 of them declared themselves tobe Egyptians, thus ending up in the category ‘unknown.’” As for the census of 1991,“only Macedonia published the census figures for Egyptians: the 1991 figures list3,307 Egyptians in Macedonia” (ibid., p. 140) while Serbia did not publish figures forEgyptians. See also Z. Barany, The Roma in Macedonia, p. 518.

65. See ,http://www.balkanaegypter.de.. In 1991, a book of Egyptian folktales, legendsand customs was published in Macedonia. The author was Stojan Ristekis, “a Macedonianfrom Ohrid, one of the main defenders of their [the Egyptians’] cause.” Duijzings(Religion and the Politics of Identity, p. 133) argues that this is obviously a characteristicform of national myth-making, in its typical pattern of European nation building. Seealso Marushiakova and Popov, Myth as Process, p. 85.

66. According to Duijzings (ibid., pp. 132–133), the Egyptian ambassador in Belgrade twiceinvited Egyptcani to the Egyptian embassy in 1990 and 1991 for the Egyptian nationalholiday on 23 July. In the spring of 1991, they presented the ambassador with a copy

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of Stojan Risteskis’s book. The Egyptians also extended their congratulations to Boutros-Boutros-Ghali (a Copt from Egypt) after his election as United Nations secretary-general (December 1991) and asked him to do his utmost to solve the Yugoslav crisispeacefully.

67. In September 1990, leaders of the Romani community appealed to all Roma “to stop iden-tifying themselves as Albanians simply on the basis of a common religion and declared 11October—already a Macedonian public holiday—of that year to be the first official day ofrecognition of the cultural achievements of Romano Macedonia” (Poulton, The Roma inMacedonia, p. 43). See also Poulton, The Balkans, p. 91 with reference to Tanjug on 1September 1990. Furthermore, in a letter to the U.N. from March 1993, the Party forthe Complete Emancipation of Roma in Macedonia (the main vehicle for Romanipolitical aspirations despite the founding of a rival party in the 1990s) called for “theestablishment of a Romany nation and a state, to be called ‘Romanistan’” (Poulton,The Roma in Macedonia, p. 45 with reference to Tanjug, 27 March 1993). Nationalistictendencies among Roma leaders are not a new phenomenon, however. On Romani nation-alism, see I. Hancock, “The East European Roots of Romani Nationalism,” NationalitiesPapers, Vol. 19, No. 3, 1991, pp. 251–267. On the Romani political movement, seeM. Sewering-Wollanek, “Die Roma in Ostmittel- und Sudosteuropa,” in G. Brunner andH. Lemberg, eds, Volksgruppen in Ostmittel- und Sudosteuropa (Munich: Sudosteur-opa-Studien, 1994), pp. 253–263; G. Puxon, “The Romani Movement: Rebirth andthe First World Romani Congress in Retrospect,” in Th. Acton, ed., Scholarshipand the Gypsy Struggle. Commitment in Romani Studies (Hatfield, Hertfordshire:University of Hertfordshire Press, 2000), pp. 94–113.

68. Interview with Rajko Djuric, Berlin, 11 March 2002.69. European Roma Rights Centre, “Roma in Albania.”70. The letter is dated 2 January 1997 and signed by both Pellumb Fortuna and Marchel

Courthiade.71. European Roma Rights Centre, “Roma in Albania,” p. 11.72. Ibid.73. Cf. K. Clewing, “Mythen und Fakten zur Ethnostruktur in Kosovo—Ein geschichtlicher

Uberblick,” in J. Reuter and K. Clewing, eds, Der Kosovo Konflikt. Ursachen, Verlauf,Perspektiven (Klagenfurt, Austria and Vienna: Wieser, 2000), p. 17.

74. Duijizings, Religion and the Politics of Identity, p. 143.75. Chr. Promitzer, “Vermessener Korper: ‘Rassenkundliche’ Grenzziehungen im sudostli-

chen Europa,” in K. Kaser, D. Gramshammer-Hohl and R. Pichler, eds, Europa unddie Grenzen im Kopf (Klagenfurt, Austria: Wieser, 2003), pp. 357–385. Chr. Promitzer,“The Body of the Other: ‘Racial Science’ and Minorities in Southeastern Europe,”Historyand Culture of South Eastern Europe, Vol. 5, 2003, pp. 27–40.

76. Indicative of the connection between ethnic categories and racial discourse is P. L. vanden Berge’s view (“Race and Ethnicity: A Sociobiological Perspective,” Ethnic andRacial Studies, Vol. 1, No. 4, 1978, pp. 401–411) and the controversial debate it hascaused (e.g. G. Fischer and M. Wolflingseder, eds, Biologismus, Rassismus, Nationalis-mus, rechte Ideologien im Vormarsch (Vienna: Promedia, 1995)). On the centralconcept of “heritage” in ethnic categorisation, see also E. Balibar and I. Wallerstein,Race, Nation, Classe. Les identites ambigues (Paris: La Decouverte, 1988); E. J. Dittrichand F.-O. Radtke, eds, Ethnizitat (Opladen, Germany: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1990). OnMacedonia in particular, see E. Kofos, “National Heritage and National Identity in Nine-theenth and Twentieth-Century Macedonia,” in M. Blinkhorn and T. Veremis, eds,Modern Greece: Nationalism and Nationality (London: Sage, 1990).


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77. L. Danforth, The Macedonian Conflict. Ethnic Nationalism in a Transnational World(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995). With respect to the Republic of Macedonia,the recent currency of this tendency is reflected in the term “ethnic Macedonian space,” i.e.the so-called “Makedonski etnicki prostor” as expressed by St. Kiselinovski, Etnickitepromeni vo Makedonija (Skopje, 2000), 49, cited by Chr. Voss, “Der albanisch-makedonische Konflikt in der Republik Makedonien in zeitgeschichtlicher Perspektive,”Sudosteuropa Mitteilungen, Vol. 3, 2001, p. 275. Ethnogenesis and historical continuityhave been crucial aspects of Macedonian nationalism since 1991 due to the disputewith Greece regarding Macedonia’s origin and historical past. Voss (ibid. p. 279) callsthe proclamation of the Albanian “Republika Ilirida” in Struga (Macedonia) an instanceof “delusional continuity and aboriginalness” (Kontinuitats- und Autochthonizitatswahn).See also K. S. Brown, “Seeing Stars: Character and Identity in the Landscapes of ModernMacedonia,” Antiquity, Vol. 68, No. 261, 1994, pp. 784–796. For an overview of Mace-donian historiography before and after 1991, see V. Roudometof, ed., The MacedoniaQuestion: Culture, Historiography, Politics (New York: Columbia University Press2000); St. Troebst, “Geschichtspolitik und historische ‘Meistererzahlungen’ in Makedo-nien vor und 1991,” in A. Ivanisevic, A. Kappeler, W. Lukan and A. Suppan, eds, Klioohne Fesseln? Historiographie im ostlichen Europa nach dem Zusammenbruch desKommunismus. Osterreichische Osthefte, Vol. 16 (Vienna: Peter Lang, 2002), pp. 453–472.

78. Duijzings, Religion and the Politics of Identity, p. 143.79. It is worth mentioning that the attempt to divide the Muslim community has been legit-

imised by emphasising linguistic divergence among Muslims. Support for Macedonianspeakers is not a new phenomenon and occurred as early as the 1970s. See E. Kraft,“Die Religionsgemeinschaften in Makedonien,” Osterreichische Osthefte SpecialEdition (Vienna: Bohlau, 1998), pp. 339–376.

80. For details of this debate in Bulgaria see e.g. Karagiannis, Zur Ethnizitat, and Marushia-kova and Popov, Gypsies (Roma) in Bulgaria.

81. Part of the Muslim minority in Grecian Thrace is regarded by both the larger Greeksociety as well as the other members of the minority as “Gypsies,” whereas they definethemselves as Turks. In the Greek–Turkish conflict over the Thracian Muslim minority,the Turkish state claimed the presence of a unified Turkish minority. Subsequently,Muslim Roma were declared by Turkish politicians to be Turkish. The Greek state,attempting to counter the Turkish claim, ascribed a political neutrality and even a folklo-ric “Gypsiness” to these groups. In support of this tactic, Greek scholars argued for sup-posedly objective differences between “Turks” and “Gypsies” and included thecontroversial groups in the latter category. In the framework of this discourse, scholarstended to argue with a general bias toward Gypsies, especially concerning the alleged“lack of real faith” and “ostensible” conversion to Islam by the groups in question. Thelatter were thought to practise Christian rituals. Furthermore, it was asserted that theydid not convert to Sunni Islam but to that form of Islam practised by the Bektashi broth-erhoods (Zeginis, Oi mousoulmanoi Athigganoi). See Trubeta, Die Konstitution vonMinderheiten, pp. 208–215, and Trubeta “‘Minorization’ and ‘Ethnicization.’”

82. See G. G. Arnakis, “The Role of Religion in the Development of Balkan Nationalism,” inB. & C. Jelavich, eds, The Balkans in Transition (Berkeley: Elgar, 1974), pp. 115–144;V. Roudometof, Nationalism, Globalisation and Orthodoxy. The Social Origins of EthnicConflict in the Balkans (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2001).

83. Classical studies on unorthodox Christian and Islamic brotherhoods and theirsecular tendencies with respect to social issues of poverty, wealth, power, etc., include

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D. Angelov, Der Bogomilismus auf dem Gebiete des Byzantinischen Reiches—Ursprung,Wesen und Geschichte, Ist Part: Ursprung und Wesen (Sofia: Imprimerie de l’Universite,1948 and 1950; G. Jacob, “Die Bektaschijje in ihrem Verhaltnis zu verwandtenErscheinungen,” Abhandlungen d. I.Kl.d.K.Ak.d.Wiss, XXIV, Vol. 3, 1909, pp. 1–52;H. J. Kissling, “The Sociological and Educational Role of the Dervish in the OttomanEmpire,” American Anthropologist, Vol. 56, No. 2, 1954, pp. 23–35; M. D. Lembert,Ketzerei im Mittelalter. Eine Geschichte von Gewalt und Scheitern (Freiburg im Breis-gau: Herder, 1991).

84. P. Dinzelbacher, “Zur Erforschung der Geschichte der Volksreligion. Einfuhrung undBibliographie,” in P. Dinzelbacher and D. R. Bauer, eds, Volksreligion im hohen undspaten Mittelalter (Paderborn: Schoningh, 1990), pp. 9–27.

85. K. S. Brown, “Seeing Stars: Character and Identity in the Landscapes of Modern Mace-donia,” Antiquity, Vol. 68, No. 261, 1994, pp. 784–796. Cf. K. Buchenau, “VerspateteErnuchterung: Die serbisch-orthodoxe Kirche im Kosovokonflikt 1960–1999,” Arbeit-spapiere Geschichte und Kultur des Osteuropa-Instituts der Freien Universitat Berlin,Vol. 2, 1999, pp. 5–43. Recent violent events (March 2004) in Kosovo and Serbia inwhich churches and mosques were destroyed by Albanian and Serbian nationalists areindicative of the increasing relevance of religion at least in symbolic terms.

86. Barany, The Roma in Macedonia, p. 517.87. Duijzings, Religion and the Politics of Identity, p. 148.88. See e.g. ibid., pp. 147–150.89. A. Petrovic, “Contributions to the Study of the Serbian Gypsies. ‘Bijeli’ or white

Gypsies,” Journal of the Gypsy Lore Society, Vol. 19, No. 3, 1940, p. 89.90. C. Silverman, “Negotiating Gypsiness. Strategy in Context,” Journal of American

Folklore, Vol. 101, No. 399, 1988, pp. 261–275.91. V. Popov, “La conscience ethnique preferentielle des Tsiganes,” Etudes Tsiganes,

Vol. 38, No. 2, 1992, pp. 38–43.92. Uwe Porksen, Plastikworter. Die Sprache einer internationalen Diktatur (Stuttgart: Klett-

Cotta, 1998), p. 11.93. For more on this controversial debate, see Rogers Brubaker and Frederic Cooper,

“Beyond ‘Iidentity,’” Theory and Society. Renewal and Critique in Social Theory, Vol.29, 2000, pp. 1–47; Lutz Niethammer, Kollektive Identitat. Heimliche Quellen einerunheimlichen Konjunktur (Hamburg: Rowolt Taschenbuch, 2000); Stuart Hall, “WhoNeeds identity?” in Stuart Hall and Paul du Gay, eds, Questions of Cultural Identity(London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi: Sage, 1996), pp. 1–17; Lawrence Grossberg,“Identity and Cultural Studies—Is That All There Is?” in Stuart Hall and Paul du Gay,eds, Questions of Cultural Identity (London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi: Sage, 1996),pp. 87–107.

94. The relationship between national, ethnic and racial concepts has been addressed inseveral works. See “‘Minorization’ and ‘Ethnicization’ in Greek Society: ComparativePerspectives on Moslem Migrants and the Moslem Minority,” History and Culture ofSouth Eastern Europe/Jahrbucher fur Geschichte und Kultur Sudosteuropas (Munich),Vol. 5, 2003, pp. 95–112; Die Konstitution von Minderheiten und die Ethnisierungsozialer und politischer Konflikte. Eine Untersuchung am Beispiel der im griechischenThrakien ansassigen “Moslemischen Minderheit” (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1999), esp.pp. 26–57; “Minorities and ethnic identification” (in Greek: “M1ionotht1c kai

1unotikhtaytopoıhsh”), Journal of the Greek Society for Ethnology (Athens),Vol. 8, 2001, pp. 173–219.


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95. Max Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Grundriss der verstehenden Soziologie. (Tubin-gen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1972), p. 237.

96. On ethnic categorisation in the case of the Roma, see Thomas Acton, Gypsy Politicsand Social Change. The Development of Ethnic Ideology and Pressure Politics amongBritish Gypsies from Victorian Reformism to Romani Nationalism (London and Boston:Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974), esp. pp. 9–24.

97. See Michael Taussig, Mimesis and Alterity. A Particular History of the Sciences(New York and London: Routledge, 1993); Homi K. Bhabha, The Location of Culture(London and New York: Routledge, 2004).

98. T. P. Vukanovic, “The Gypsy Population in Yugoslavia,” Journal of Gypsy Lore Society,Vol. 42, Nos 1–2, 1963, pp. 10–27.

99. Ibid., p. 11.100. Ibid.101. Ibid., p. 12.102. Theodore M. Porter, Trust in Numbers. The Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and Public

Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).103. Acton, Gypsy Politics and Social Change, pp. 93–53.104. S. Trubeta, “‘Gypsiness’, Racial Discourse and Persecution: Balkan Roma during the

Second World War,” Nationalities Papers, Vol. 31, No. 4, 2003, pp. 495–514.105. One of the best analyses of this discourse is Robert J. C. Youngs, Colonial Desire.

Hybridity in Theory, Culture and Race (London and New York: Routledge, 1995).106. See the interesting remarks about postcolonial discourse by Jonathan Friedman and in

particular his thesis on “postcoloniality and cultural elitism” (pp. 242–245) in hisarticle “The Hybridization of Roots and the Abhorrence of the Busch,” in Mike Feather-stone and Scott Lash, eds, Spaces of Culture: City, Nation, World (London/ThousandOaks/New Delhi: Sage, 1999), pp. 230–256

107. See e.g. D. Gresham, B. Morar et al., “Origins and Divergence of the Roma (Gypsies),”American Journal of Human Genetics, Vol. 69, 2001, pp. 1314–1331, ,http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/AJHG/journal/issues/v69n6/013258/013258.html..

108. David A. Hollinger, Postethnic America. Beyond Multiculturalism (New York: BasicBooks, 2000), p. 117.

109. This is not to imply that racial/biologistic elements in recent scholarly treatments of theRoma are infrequent. See e.g. E. Sunderland, “The Population Structure of the RomanyGypsies,” in M. H. Crawford and J. H. Mielke, eds, Current Developments in Anthropo-logical Genetics, Vol. 2: Ecology and Population Structure (New York: Plenum Press1982), as well as the often quoted A. Fraser, The Gypsies (particularly the chapter“Physical Anthropology,” pp. 22–25) and Gresham et al., “Origins and Divergence ofthe Roma (Gypsies).” With respect to the Bulgarian Roma, see e.g. I. Tournev,A. Todorova et al., “C283Y Mutation and Other C-Terminal Nucleotide Changes inthe g-Sarcoglycan Gene in the Bulgarian Gypsy Population,” Human Mutation,Vol. 14, 1999, pp. 40–44; A. Todorova, I. Tournev et al., “Screening for C283YGamma-Sarcoglycan Mutation in High Risk Group of Bulgarian Gypsies: Evidence forGeographical Localization and Non-random Distribution among Gypsy Subgroups,”Community Genetics, Vol. 5, No. 4., 2002, pp. 217–221. Concerning Greek groupssee K. N. Zafeiris and N.I. Xirotiris, “Oi Poma toy Aratoy: Dhmografikh kai

g1n1alogikh m1l1th” [Oi Roma tou Aratou: Dimografiki kai genealogiki meleti(“The Roma of Aratos: A demographic and genealogical study”)]. In: Oi Poma sthn

Ellada [Oi Roma stin Ellada (The Roma in Greece)], edited by Greek Society ofEthnology, Athens, 2002, pp. 25–109.

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110. William G. Lockwood, “An Introduction to Balkan Gypsies,” Giessener Hefte furTsiganologie, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Giessen, 1985) pp. 17–23.

111. As Troebst “The Politics of Macedonian Historiography,” in James Pettifer, ed., The NewMacedonian Question (Basingstoke, England: Macmillan Press, 2001, p. 62) has argued,historical conceptions of “Egyptian Roma,” just like those of Balkan titular nations andother groups such as Aromunians, Torbeshs, etc., “assume one single line of traditionthat . . . is considered to be decisive and is extended rigorously in both directions alongthe axis of time. Contemporary ideas are easily projected back into the past, just ashistorical facts are extrapolated into the present and then on into the future.”

112. E. Hobsbawm, On History (London: Abacus, 1998), pp. 9–10.113. Ibid, p. 8.114. M. Foucault, Dispositive der Macht (Berlin: Merve-Verl., 1978), p. 51.115. Hollinger, Postethnic America.116. Ibid., p. 117.117. Ibid., p. 116.


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Balkan Egyptians and Gypsy/Roma discourse

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