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Stephenson J. Beck, Robert S. Littlefield and Andrea J. WeberMeeting Interaction

Public Meeting Facilitation: A Naïve Theory Analysis of Crisis  

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1North Dakota State University, Fargo, ND, USA

This article is part of a special issue on Organizational Meetings, SGR, 43(2), April 2012

Corresponding Author:Stephenson J. Beck, North Dakota State University, Department of Communication No. 2310, P.O. Box 6050, 202 Ehly Hall, Fargo, ND 58108-6050, USA Email: stephenson.beck@ndsu.edu

Public Meeting Facilitation: A Naïve Theory Analysis of Crisis Meeting Interaction

Stephenson J. Beck1, Robert S. Littlefield1, and Andrea J. Weber1

Abstract

During the record 2009 flood, the city of Fargo, North Dakota, United States held daily televised public meetings. Unknown to many citizens, the city also held private premeetings to prepare for the public meetings. The present study examined city leaders’ naïve theories of meeting facilitation in light of a minimalist view of public meetings (McComas, 2001). Interviews of city leaders during and after the flood, as well as meeting transcripts, were ana-lyzed. Findings indicated that city leaders believed debate about controver-sial issues should be contained within private premeetings, where leaders planned how to be open with citizens during public meetings. City leaders also believed public meetings had to portray a calm yet urgent image for the public. City leaders used micro-level (e.g., humor, explicit vigilant messages, and metaphor) and macro-level (transparency) processes to communicative-ly accomplish their desires.

Keywords

meeting facilitation, naïve theory, dramatist metaphor

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In many communities, government administrators conduct city council meet-ings to manage local affairs. These meetings provide opportunities for citi-zens to express concerns and participate in civic duties and for city commissioners to publicly debate and decide issues. In moments of crisis, these meetings become especially pertinent as city administrators make deci-sions that influence how community partners and citizens attend to day-to-day volunteer needs. In addition, how these meetings unfold before the public eye can greatly influence citizen perception of their elected officials’ han-dling of the crisis as well as the nature of the crisis itself.

Public meeting facilitation is of particular interest to small group research-ers; meeting facilitation hinges on city leaders’ naïve (or implicit) theories of meeting conduct. Meeting leader beliefs about proper and effective meeting conduct influence their facilitation efforts, as does concern for how meetings are being perceived by others. Although public meeting leaders are often viewed as controlling or manipulative in meetings (Checkoway, 1981; McComas, 2001), their perspective is often neglected. Considering the per-spective of the leader will enhance knowledge on meeting management and facilitation, particularly in light of goal accomplishment behaviors. In addi-tion, public meetings complicate the notion of group membership through the attendance and contribution of citizens. The availability of public meetings through mediated forums has made audience adaptation more complex for city leaders. Of necessity, meeting leaders must plan public meetings with an eye toward presenting a positive image to a variety of different audiences who possess a range of stakeholder positions.

As researchers consider naïve theories of meeting facilitation, comparing meeting leader beliefs in relation to meeting leader communication is imper-ative. Recent calls for a more communicative focus in small group research have emphasized coupling cognition and communication (Keyton, Beck, & Asbury, 2010). Investigating how meeting leaders communicatively imple-ment their plans emphasizes coupling, as it joins different disciplinary approaches in a meaningful way, an important interdisciplinary effort for group researchers.

Naïve TheoryNaïve theories are implicit belief systems about specific phenomena that are confirmed through daily life (Heider, 1958). These personal theories derive from the premise that individuals perceive reality based on a variety of fac-tors and assumptions (e.g., beliefs, experience), which in turn influence interpretation, behavior, and prediction processes. Naïve theory “assumes

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that individuals have a need to understand and explain the events around them, and that based upon this need, individuals will develop a lay or ‘naïve’ psychology of behavior” (Staw, 1975, p. 124). Naïve theory “permits man [sic] to give meaning to action, to influence the actions of others as well as of himself, and to predict future actions” (Heider, 1958, p. 123).

Various studies have confirmed that individuals’ assumptions and beliefs serve as a lens through which human behavior is perceived and experienced. Studies using naïve theory to investigate group interactions often explore how feedback influences perceptions of past performance (e.g., Martell & Guzzo, 1991; Staw, 1975). As meetings are locations where member goals are brought to the forefront of interaction (Tracy & Dimock, 2004), a naïve theory approach may be beneficial in investigating how leaders orchestrate meetings to convey a positive public image. In the present study, meeting leader concerns over public reaction and subsequent beliefs about meeting management were investigated. Theoretical implications focus on the influ-ence of context in meeting leader naïve theories, especially in light of the minimalist view of public meetings, and the communicative accomplishment of meeting strategies, specifically when portraying transparency, calmness, and urgency.

Public MeetingsResearch on meetings in general has been lacking (Rogelberg, Scott, & Kello, 2007). Given the importance of public meetings in local and national government, the lack of research on public meetings is especially disconcert-ing. Public meetings are defined as “nonrestricted gatherings of three of more people for purposes that include providing information, discussing issues, obtaining information, reviewing projects, evaluating options, devel-oping recommendations, and making decisions” (McComas, 2001, pp. 36-37).

Past research has shown that private citizens often feel undervalued in public meetings. “One finding endorsed by all is the ineffectiveness, and often alienating effect, of communication and involvement through public hearings” (Kasperson, 1986, p. 280). In addition, McComas (2001, 2003) found that local officials rate their own participation in public meetings as more pleasing than do private citizens. Such findings are consistent with a minimalist view of public meeting interaction, which assumes local officials or agencies can “exercise control over the process and can maneuver it to meet their objectives” (McComas, 2001, p. 38). The minimalist view consid-ers public meetings to be manipulated orchestrations designed to meet the

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minimum requirement of public deliberation. Although there are exceptions to this view (Checkoway, 1981), the majority of public meeting studies often come to the cynical conclusion that public meetings are a way to “legitimate a decision that has already been made” (pp. 570-571).

Although the public’s view of public meetings has been explored, research on public meeting leader beliefs and communication has been largely neglected. One exception is McComas’s (2001) study that found that through their own experiences, meeting officials often develop their own criteria to determine whether a meeting will be effective. In other words, they develop a naïve theory of public meeting effectiveness. Despite McComas’s study, further research is needed to investigate the meeting facilitator perspective of public meetings. Past communication-oriented research endeavors have largely focused on ways the public disagrees with local officials (e.g., Tracy & Durfy, 2007). Contrasting the public’s viewpoint with a meeting facilitator perspective is an appropriate extension of minimalist view research, as it provides a holistic understanding of how meeting interaction is perceived by all participants.

In addition to these extensions of past research and theory, the present study’s meeting context is unique in several ways. First, the public meeting was available for anyone to attend in person or on television. Although tele-vised public meetings have become more common, considering an audience that is not physically present complicates meeting leaders’ ability to adapt their messages to the audience. Second, the crisis situation meant public viewership was higher than normal, particularly through the televised forum. Thus, virtual members were not only present but also very salient to meeting leader plans and behaviors. Last, the nature of a crisis situation minimizes the amount of preparation and planning available to meeting leaders. As meet-ings were conducted daily, meeting agendas had to be created in the short amount of time between meetings. This truncated time frame may have led meeting leaders to rely more heavily on their naïve theories of meeting facili-tation in running the meetings.

The 2009 Fargo Flood MeetingsThe Red River Valley has always been prone to flooding. One of the worst floods in recorded history occurred in 1997, when water overtook a consider-able portion of Grand Forks, North Dakota, and East Grand Forks, Minnesota, United States. The damage was extensive, and more than 50,000 people were displaced, the largest displacement in American history until Hurricane Katrina (NPR, 2007).

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In spring 2009, a record flood hit the Red River Valley. The situation was especially perilous in Fargo, North Dakota, where the water level reached a record height more than 22 feet above flood stage. The National Guard was called in to help contain the flood, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) recommended evacuation. However, damage was minimal in Fargo, as volunteers contributed thousands of hours to create and maintain a 3.5-million sandbag dike, which effectively protected the city (Kolpack, 2009).

To coordinate the thousands of volunteers and military personnel, the city of Fargo held regular 8 a.m. meetings, broadcast to the public on local televi-sion stations. During these meetings, the mayor and city commissioners met with city staff, nonprofit organizations, military personnel, and congressio-nal leaders to report, discuss, and make decisions concerning daily flood efforts. Meetings were conducted around a large oval table with seating available for media and the public on one side of the room. Although mes-sages were definitely intended for public consumption, they were directed toward meeting members. On occasion, public participation was permitted, but it was rare. Following the public meeting, the mayor, vice-mayor, and city manager held a press conference where they took questions from the media. Fargo residents tuned into these broadcasts to learn about volunteer needs and flood updates.

Dramatist metaphor. Although decisions made during these meetings were certainly effective, the discussion and debate was not unpracticed. Weeks after the flood effort ended, city leaders openly talked about staff meetings that took place before the public meetings. As stated after-the-fact by city leaders, at these premeetings leaders debated and discussed issues to prepare for the televised meeting. The notion of premeetings and public meetings cre-ated a unique opportunity to explore meeting leader behavior, as the exis-tence of the premeetings suggests a different purpose than public meetings. The private nature of the premeetings and the public nature of the televised meetings are similar to a theatrical production, suggesting that the dramatist metaphor may be a helpful way of situating the two meetings. Specifically the notion of frontstage/backstage talk is a helpful analytical tool when inves-tigating meetings. Using Goffman’s approach, “dramaturgy is the art of stage-acting. It tells us how to present ourselves so as to be believable. . . .” For Goffman, “the stage, the drama, is a metaphor . . . on stage the actors know how it will all turn out. The audience does not” (Gusfield, 1989, p. 22). Goffman’s premise for this metaphor is based on an individual’s need to con-trol others’ impressions of the self during communication.

The dramatist metaphor places emphasis on communication as the medium through which image is managed. Without communication, the audience’s

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interpretation of the actor’s image cannot be negotiated between parties: “For if the individual’s activity is to become significant to others, he must mobilize his activity so that it will express during the interaction what he wishes to convey” (Goffman, 1959, p. 30, emphasis in original). In televised meetings, interaction becomes even more complicated as meeting members know their messages influence the public but are not able to explicitly see public response.

Using Goffman’s dramatist metaphor, the premeetings represent a location for backstage discussion prior to the city leaders’ performance to the public. Premeeting discussion took place in a location where “the impression fos-tered by the performance is knowingly contradicted” (Goffman, 1959, p. 112). Instead of letting events and discussion unfold naturally during a public meeting, city leaders opted to confront and discuss issues without an audi-ence before performing for the public. Thus, this performance provides evi-dence concerning meeting leaders’ naïve theories of meeting facilitation.

The present study focuses on the naïve theories of meeting facilitation held by city leaders concerning crisis meetings. Specifically, the beliefs and pur-poses of meeting leaders are explored as an essential comparison with the minimalist view of public meetings. Importantly, the public notion of televised meetings is investigated, examining how naïve theories consider a salient yet physically absent audience. Thus, the following questions were asked:

Research Question 1: What premeeting interaction is appropriate given meeting leaders’ naïve theories?

Research Question 2: What public meeting interaction is appropriate given meetings leaders’ naïve theories?

Answers to these two questions will provide evidence of city leaders’ naïve theories of meeting facilitation. Due to our concern for the communica-tive accomplishment of these naïve theory beliefs, the last research question is also proposed:

Research Question 3: What type of interaction helped city officials accomplish their goals for the public meetings?

MethodData

Qualitative methods are appropriate for questions of what or how (Creswell, 1998) and are often used in natural contexts to obtain in depth meaning from

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communicative discourse. The purpose of qualitative methods is not to gen-eralize but to provide holistic, thorough investigation of complex phenom-ena. Thus, a qualitative approach is useful for the purposes of this study.

To investigate the three research questions, two primary forms of data were collected: interviews with city leadership and meeting transcripts. As part of a larger research study on disaster management, interviews with the mayor, vice-mayor, city manager, and other city staff were conducted during the flood and shortly after the flood subsided. Initial interviews were often squeezed into short periods of time when a city official had a free moment and lasted anywhere from 10 to 45 min. The questions focused on a variety of topics, including, “What was learned during 1997 that is helping you to communicate more effectively now?” “What is your relationship with the media?” “What is the role of the communications officer?” “How is the com-munity responding to the disaster?” For the present project, additional follow-up interviews were conducted several months after the flood to help clarify answers to earlier interviews. These interviews were semistructured and cen-tered around three primary questions: “What was the purpose of the premeet-ings?” “What was the purpose of the public meetings?” and “What was the difference between the premeetings and the public meetings?” These ques-tions were designed to probe the assumptions of respondents’ naïve theories of meeting facilitation. The second author served as the primary interviewer and asked follow-up questions when appropriate.

The majority of data used for this study came from three individuals, each of whom was contacted at least four times throughout the research process: the mayor, Dennis Walaker; the vice-mayor, Tim Mahoney; and the city man-ager, Pat Zavoral. Although others were interviewed (e.g., communications director, Red Cross director, mayor of neighboring town, county sheriff), all interviews indicated that these three individuals were the decision makers in control of the premeetings and public meetings. Thus, when referring to naïve theories of meeting facilitation, we are referring to the beliefs and assumptions of these three individuals.

In addition, public meetings were recorded during the 2009 Fargo flood from March 23 to April 3. These meetings were held each morning at 8 a.m. and televised on local ABC, CBS, and NBC affiliates. They normally lasted for about an hour, followed by a press conference.

AnalysisThe qualitative approach used to analyze the transcripts is based on Tracy’s (1995) action-implicative discourse analysis (AIDA). We use the term based

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as the analysis is similar to AIDA, but the analytical steps described here are not spelled out in other studies. AIDA is a methodological offshoot of grounded practical theory (Craig & Tracy, 1995) and is a way of iteratively analyzing discourse to conduct “theoretically-informed induction” (Tracy, 2007, p. 424) of language strategies. We base our approach on AIDA due to our focus on practical, naïve theories of meeting facilitation through inter-views and meetings, which often contain monologic speech over long periods of time (Tracy, 2007). To holistically and interpretively analyze naive theo-ries, it is important to “analyz[e] the discourse of an occasion (the interaction) and the discourse about an occasion (interviews)” (Tracy, 1995, p. 208). AIDA is also beneficial in that it encourages analysts “to label and character-ize salient conversational moves so they are recognizable strategies apart from the specific discourse excerpts in which they are illustrated” (Tracy, 1995, p. 211).

Interviews were professionally transcribed, resulting in 49 pages of data, 31 devoted specifically to the city leaders. Four meetings were professionally transcribed, resulting in 68 pages of data. These meetings were selected as they represented the pinnacle of the flood crisis, when the river crested.

For Research Question 1 and Research Question 2, analysis focused on city leader beliefs about meeting purposes and effectiveness in the respective meetings. Considering the context of the interview is important when inter-preting data (Tracy & Robles, 2010). In this instance, government officials were aware that their decisions were being highly scrutinized, and their responses to interview questions could have potentially reflected this contex-tual dynamic (e.g., face-saving). The analysis was conducted in five steps. Initially, the first and third authors independently read through the transcripts several times to become familiar with the data. Second, these two authors independently open coded the data, looking for emic themes associated with the intended purposes of each meeting type. Third, the two compared and discussed findings, specifically emphasizing purposes and differences between the two meeting types. After agreement was achieved, the two cod-ers each wrote up independent interpretations of the findings, as a way to compare their level of interpretive agreement. Last, the final analysis was reviewed by the second author who conducted the interviews; his review of the interview transcripts and methodological interpretations was a final check on interpretative validity.

The findings of Research Question 2 became the “interesting practices” that “would challenge or extend theorizing” (Tracy, 2007, p. 424) in Research Question 3. Each author independently conducted a close analysis of the tran-scripts, repeatedly analyzing meeting interaction for communicative evidence

Beck et al. 219

of the results found in Research Question 2. This enabled the researchers to consider the communicative creation of the beliefs and attitudes associated with city leaders’ naïve theories.

FindingsNaïve Theories of Premeeting Interaction

The first research question focuses on the type of interaction city leaders deemed appropriate for premeetings, thus illuminating the naïve theories that were the foundation for such beliefs. According to interview transcripts, there were two primary objectives for the premeetings. First, the city leaders wanted a setting where decision makers from both the city government and invited community and national partners could debate key issues without inhibition. As there were disagreements on how to handle matters, and public knowledge of these disputes could negatively affect public sentiment, city leaders decided to hold premeetings. The city manager used a metaphor to describe this scenario:

City manager: We had staff meetings in advance of every one of (the public meetings), where we hashed out a lot of things. The old say-ing that we looked like a duck on water, were scrambling under-neath quite a bit, but it was based on our knowledge of what we had.

In other words, the premeetings represented the frantic activity taking place out of view of the public. The interaction was necessary for effective decision making but was not visible to the public.

Some of the issues discussed in the premeetings were controversial, espe-cially when decisions were made to ignore reports from the National Weather Service or determine how many sandbags would be shared with townships outside of city boundaries. Debate on these issues involved open disagree-ment: “The 7 a.m. staff meetings were very give and take. Sometimes there was a lot of shouting going on” (city manager). Premeeting conversations were never supposed to be made public.

Vice-mayor: The flood task team vowed to never ha(ve) a public fight. Decisions that were made behind these doors were then supported and defended. During Hurricane Katrina, we saw the national and local government officials fighting over decisions made and not made. This fighting is what the media and most people then focused on instead of true devastation and situation that was unfolding.

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Thus, the public never saw disagreement among decision makers: “We had staff meetings in advance . . . so a lot of consensus building in staff meet-ings was portrayed as a final decision” (city manager). As it was clear to everyone that the final decisions would be presented as united positions, pre-meetings allowed for group members to take risks and experiment with ideas without worrying about public rebuke.

A second objective of premeetings was to plan how to be open with the public. Officials believed that even though the real decisions were made out of view of the public, witnessing decision making and having access to infor-mation was still important for the public.

City manager: You can’t give the public the impression that they don’t know what they don’t know, and therefore you gotta trust me. You got to give them all the information you have and you know. So that they say—well, that makes sense, they have given me all the infor-mation and they are reaching the conclusion that I would have reached if I had all this information.

Implicit in this excerpt is the city manager’s assumption that the public would reach the same decisions as the city leaders if provided the informa-tion. However, sometimes the public’s decision-making process was not as important as the appearance of openness when making the decision.

Vice-mayor: If you’re transparent in your communication, the public doesn’t panic so much. So kind of our sense of how to do that was, we do have staff meetings every morning, which the press isn’t a part of, but those are the staff meetings in which you can kind of figure some things out.

Referring to lessons learned from previous floods, the mayor stated that transparency was a main reason why premeetings were created. Paradoxically, city leaders believed the way to create openness was to hold private premeet-ings. The purpose behind the premeetings was to create an atmosphere where necessary debate and argument could take place out of the public eye and to plan how to make flood crisis information and decisions open to the public.

In regard to city leaders’ naïve theories, their comments suggest they were aware that contentious discussion was necessary for effective decision mak-ing. In other words, meeting participants needed to feel free to say what was on their mind without worrying about possible backlash. Thus, premeetings became a backstage way of achieving this objective. In addition, city leaders

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did not define openness in terms of spontaneity; instead, they viewed openness as something that could be produced or created and could be presented in a way to the public that could maximize benefits. These components of city leaders’ naïve theories enabled openness to be strategically planned in the premeetings and performed in the public meetings.

Naïve Theories of Public Meeting InteractionThe second research question focuses on the type of interaction city leaders deemed appropriate for the public meetings. Interviews revealed two primary beliefs city leaders held concerning the public meetings. First, they believed that balancing the necessity of remaining calm and showing proper decorum, while at the same time portraying an urgently-responding city government, was important. This tension was oftentimes hard to navigate:

Mayor: There is a fine line that I feel, between trying to remain calm and leave the people something with not so much of an afraid feel-ing of what’s going on. . . . Right now there are some people that are frustrated about our lack of urgency, so what I struggle with from my point of view is how to remain calm and express the con-fidence to the people that are out there at the front of the lines and living along the river.

The mayor referred to past experiences as directly influencing how city leaders managed the calm/urgency balance in 2009. During the last major flood in 1997, there were several communication problems that immobilized flood crisis efforts. As a result, premeetings and other communication-ori-ented changes (e.g., addition of a communications official) were implemented to repair the situation for the future. They sought to relieve the community of uncertainty where possible: “They get the fear out during the 7 a.m. meeting in order to go over statements calmly during the 8 a.m. meeting” (mayor).

Referring back to the duck-on-water metaphor, a key part of city leaders’ naïve theories of meetings was the desire for meeting participants to show unity and calm above the surface and leave conflict and disunity underwater. At the same time, city leaders believed the public wanted an urgent approach to handling the pending crisis. If the absence of conflict or calmness equated with unpreparedness, then problems would ensue. The difficult part for city leaders was balancing the two.

The second objective of public meetings was to implement the script or plan to create openness. Creating a sense of openness was strategically prepared in

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several ways. For example, all agenda items were predetermined to orchestrate member contributions: “During the 7 a.m. meeting, priorities are set as to what will be said. A script is made” (city manager). The meeting script became the major way of controlling how content was presented to the audience.

For city leaders, the public meetings were also an opportunity for the public to see the realness of the situation: “Transparency, open access to everything for the media–show real emotions, real sincerity and so forth” (mayor). In other words, city leaders believed that openness also required the public to see a per-sonal or human side of meeting participants. City leaders’ naïve theory of meet-ing interaction required the meeting participants to do more than simply regurgitate information; participants were asked to put forth a real performance. Similarly, city officials believed that specific individuals in charge of different areas of flood crisis efforts should represent themselves in the public meetings:

Vice-mayor: Then when we went in front of the press, the idea of hav-ing each individual talk about their own portfolio is that the public gets to see who’s in charge of that. . . . It also gives the public an opportunity to see faces that people are in charge of something so then they know, ok, that person’s in charge.

City leaders believed that allowing the audience to see and hear from the different people in charge of various aspects of the flood was essential to portraying openness to the public.

In terms of what these results reveal about naïve theories of meeting facilita-tion, city leaders viewed the balance of appearing calm yet urgent as critical to public meetings. Without this balance, the city leaders believed the public would be dissatisfied with the characteristic found lacking (whether calm or urgency). In addition, city leaders saw implementation of the openness plan as requiring a human element. As a result of these findings, the authors examined how these objectives were communicatively accomplished in the public meetings.

Creating Calm and UrgencyThe third research question focuses on the interaction used to accomplish city leader purposes of the public meetings. Meeting transcripts were ana-lyzed for evidence of calmness and urgency. After discussing each, the bal-ancing of calmness and urgency will be discussed in light of the strategic creation of openness.

Calm. The primary technique used to display and create calmness in public meetings was through humor. Humor and laughter are often used in a variety of contexts to diffuse potential tension in meetings, including contexts where

Beck et al. 223

the nature of the task suggests humor would be inappropriate (e.g., jury delib-erations in a murder trial; Keyton & Beck, 2010). Crisis meetings fall into this category; however, joking and laughter were consistent throughout the four meetings analyzed, which included meetings during the climax of the flood crisis efforts.

Laughter was inserted into potentially controversial issues to diffuse ten-sion. For example, a controversy arose when city officials asked nonessential businesses to close in order for city vehicles hauling sandbags and equipment to have access to major thoroughfares. Businesses that closed during this period of time lost considerable money, and questions arose about the label nonessential business. As city leaders tried to manage the situation, the mayor felt a need to address it at the beginning of a public meeting:

Mayor: Now, as far as essential services, this is what we mean, I want my Dairy Queen open so I can get a bar-b-q. (laughter) So all restau-rants, essential can open. . . . As far as all non-essential places, and they are not, the wording is, does not mean they do not provide service to say non-essential is, I guess, is probably a misnomer. But, we will recommend that they stay closed, general retail through Monday, with updates coming every day. (March 29, 2009 public meeting, p. 1)

In this excerpt, the mayor makes a joke about what he considers to be an essential business. He uses this light moment to discuss “nonessential busi-nesses” in a productive manner, while still continuing with the policy of clo-sure for most area businesses. Humor was used in a similar way to handle other controversial issues, such as when the mayor accidently insulted a neighboring town’s hockey team.

City officials also used humor to tone down messages that were essential, but could potentially come off as harsh. For example, a few individuals, including members of the media, were caught standing on dikes or attempt-ing to enter the river on small boats. This angered the local sheriff. In response, he issued a very strongly worded warning to potential violators.

Sheriff: The Coast Guard will be putting into play, no travel on the waterway zone . . . We’re not going to tolerate that. So, stay off [said with emphasis] the river, we’re close, don’t put anybody in jeop-ardy. If somebody wants to test it, we’ve got a place for you to stay. (Laughter)

City manager: You got gun boats? Is that what I hear? (Laughter)Sheriff: There was a few ideas thrown across the bow we might say.

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Mayor: Mayor [referring to himself] can help you with dynamite. (Laughter) (March 30, 2009 public meeting, pp. 6-7)

The jokes and laughter did not take away from the sternness of the message; however, the addition helped take some of the edge off the message.

Jokes in the later meetings tended to trend toward personal anecdotes unrelated to the flood. When the tension concerning the flood dissipated due to lowering water levels, the jokes and laughter became more common and contagious. In the last meeting alone, there were 25 instances of laughter across the 18 pages of transcript, whereas there was only an average of 13 per meeting in the three prior meetings.

Urgency. Different techniques than those displaying calmness were used to portray urgency in the public meetings. This was perhaps due to the inability to use emotional communication (such as laughter) to show urgency without undermining efforts to keep the public calm. In other words, emotions related to urgency (e.g., panic, stress, yelling) would have been counterproductive. In light of this, more explicit approaches were used.

City leaders repeatedly instructed the public to follow instructions and be vigi-lant. In this example, the vice-mayor emphasizes the need to remain on alert.

Vice-mayor: I want everybody to know that we are still on high alert. We have not dropped our guard, so I do not want anybody to think just because the river’s starting to flatten out, I’m not convinced it will stay that way. It may go a little higher again so our community is still on high alert and I will ask the businesses to respect that. When our team is comfortable, we can come off high alert and we will communicate that to you. But for the present, we are still on high alert. (March 28, 2009 public meeting, p. 4)

Explicit messages of vigilance occurred most often at the beginning and conclu-sion of public meetings. The vice-mayor often delivered these messages.

Another way city leaders portrayed urgency was through metaphor. Specifically, meeting leaders would use war, game, and patriotic metaphors to combine messages of urgency with Fargo’s city identity. Many times throughout the flood crisis efforts, the media would frame stories in terms of close-knit, determined Fargo citizenry that united in a common cause to save their houses (e.g., Johnson & Davey, 2009). Meeting participants, including national leaders that attended the public meetings, used this identity as a way to rally citizens in their vigilance. For example, U.S. Senator Kent Conrad spoke in terms of metaphor when he referring to “winning” the flood fight.

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Senator Kent Conrad: I can just tell you there is no alternative in this fight but victory. We have got to win. I believe we will [said with emphasis] win it, and it will be because of the extraordinary spirit of the people of this community. (March 28, 2009 public meeting, p. 1)

Thus, the use of explicit messages in combination with metaphor was another strategy that city leaders used to show a sense of urgency in the public meetings.

Strategically Planned OpennessMicroprocesses. Openness was accomplished at micro and macro levels of

interaction. Openness was achieved at the micro-process level through the city manager. Specifically, the city manager functioned in three primary ways to ensure meetings transpired as planned. In performing these functions, the city manager accomplished the metaphorical role of a stage manager, who handles the step-by-step operations of a performance.

First, the city manager was in charge of directing the meetings and deter-mining the agenda. He mentioned in interviews his ability to ultimately decide what information was important for the public to hear. A typical meeting would start off with the mayor discussing a few of the more controversial matters of the day. After these remarks, the mayor would explicitly turn the direction of the meeting over to the city manager, who would proceed to introduce the agenda and the speakers.

Mayor: Pat, you want to go around and ask the various people for their comments?

City manager: Yes. Good morning. What we are going to do now as we are moving into our watch and respond portion of our coordination meetings. (March 28, 2009 public meeting, p. 4)

The city manager framed the rest of the meeting as a “watch and respond portion” of the meeting to distinguish it from the mayor’s comments. He then cued meeting participants to report on their flood crisis responsibilities.

His second function with regard to openness was having advanced knowledge of what meeting participants were going to say. Although a few messages were developed (i.e., extemporaneous, interactive, and respon-sive to feedback; see Howell, 1982), the majority were predetermined or scripted. Evidence of this is contained in his introductions; as he knew

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what they were going to say, he was able to introduce or frame their com-ments as he desired.

City manager: Thank you. Mark, I’m gonna ask you a little bit about sandbag dikes and, are they completely impervious to the water that’s on the other side of them or will we have leaks? And as we get a response from that I’d like Al Weigel to speak a little bit about pumps and how we are going to have pumps available. But we want to implore people that if we have trickles or whatever, sump pumps will work and then if you need something else bigger pumped. So Mark, maybe you can speak just to the architecture of sandbag dikes. (March 28, 2009 public meeting, pp. 6-7)

Several of the city manager’s comments in his introduction of Mark showed that he already knew the answer concerning sandbag dike leaks. His following comments show which issues he wanted shared before the public. In addition, the transcripts show times when presenters would attempt to dis-cuss information that was scheduled for later on the agenda. The city man-ager would effectively interrupt these comments, state they would be discussed later, and take the conversation down a different path.

Although the majority of meeting interaction transpired according to plan, there were a few instances when a presenter made a statement that was not in accordance with the script. During these circumstances, the city manager per-formed a third function as stage manager: to correct mistakes. The city man-ager would make these changes immediately and explicitly. For example, a staff member was speaking about water pump issues and stated a number the public could call if help was needed. The city manager immediately interrupted him and made it clear that the phone number shared by the staff member was not for public use, and he changed the topic to the next issue on the agenda. Determining the meeting agenda, knowing beforehand what participants would say, and correcting any mistakes were ways the city manager ensured the openness script was followed.

Macroprocesses. Through our analysis, we believe that the city leaders’ push for transparency was also their way of balancing calmness and urgency. Transparency, which city leaders often used synonymously with openness, was accomplished through the city’s overall communication process. Meet-ings can “generate the appearance that reason and logical processes are guiding discussion and decisions” (Schwartzman, 1989, p. 42). By revealing the city government’s plan to manage the impending flood disaster through public meetings, city leaders helped the public remain calm while portray-ing an urgent response to the flood.

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Having and following a crisis plan is essential in emergency situations and has helped organizations and communities to be proactive in their management of the crisis (Seeger, 2006). The vice-mayor revealed that he believed the crisis plan developed by the current mayor after the 1997 flood was the main reason why the current crisis was being managed effectively.

Vice-mayor: The public sometimes wonders why we’re so prepared and after the 1997 flood, staff went back and designed a program. All commissioners were given a book this thick. And the irony of life is the person who signed this is some Dennis Walaker [current mayor] Public Works Director. . . . And I must admit, I put it on my shelf and didn’t read it until a few weeks ago, but we’re well pre-pared. (March 31, 2009 public meeting, p. 10)

The public meetings not only provided a micro-level opportunity to dis-seminate the plan to volunteers but also provided a sense of calm at the macro level because citizens knew crisis leaders had regularly scheduled public meetings as part of the plan. Thus the meetings represented a successful implementation of the plan; the public meetings were the plan in action.

In addition, the media played an important part in the appearance of trans-parency conveyed by the crisis management team. The fact that the city was cognizant of the importance of the media and had regularly scheduled press conferences suggested to the public that the city was not only prepared but that it had important messages to share. On several occasions, references were made to press conferences. The mayor noted, “We certainly appreciate the media. . . . They understand the importance of this and we try to use them to get the information out” (March 29, 2009 public meeting, p. 1). On another occasion, the mayor praised the media: “I think they’ve done an excellent job of making this a real, a real event with communications and getting the information out” (March 31, 2009 public meeting, p. 18). After each public meeting, media representatives had an opportunity to ask questions to the mayor, vice-mayor, and city manager. Clearly, there was evidence to suggest that the city leaders were conscious of the need to be open with the public and considered the city’s communication process in general as key to helping the public remain calm as well as display urgency during the crisis.

DiscussionThe purpose of this study was to expand on the minimalist perspective of pub-lic meetings by exploring city leaders’ naive theories of meeting facilitation.

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The study’s context complicated the notion of meeting participant, as a tele-vised audience was a salient consideration for meeting leaders’ plans and deci-sions for the public meetings. The following paragraphs illustrate theoretical implications for research about the minimalist view of public meetings, meet-ings, naïve theory, and the dramatist metaphor.

What does knowing city leaders’ naïve theories about public meeting interaction mean to the minimalist perspective of public meetings? McComas (2001, 2003) and Checkoway’s (1981) research has shown the public to be disillusioned by the public meeting process. In establishing a minimalist view of public meeting interaction, McComas (2001) portrays a public that believes city leaders manipulate and subvert the process to accomplish their goals, often to the detriment of public participants. The present study suggests such strategic planning does take place; city leaders not only controlled the agenda but also dictated the script from which meeting participants would speak. Opportunities for free and open conversation were held to a minimum. The public meetings were similar to a play; meeting members spoke to one another about issues, even though many had been previously decided.

However, there was also a lack of negative sentiment from the public in regard to these manipulations; in fact, it may be that they preferred the meet-ings to be conducted in this manner. Of course, it is important to note that audience effect was not directly investigated in this project. However, articles and citizen responses in the media, high attendance in post flood celebrations, and the popularity and reelections of all upper-level city leaders suggests that there was not a high amount of public dissent to the meeting process.

Perhaps the context of these meetings provides some justification for the public’s allowance. During the precrisis phase when the severity of the situation was unpredictable, city leaders and the public often engaged in dialogue con-cerning flood issues. On moving to the crisis phase, the information needs of the public changed and scripted communication became the way for city lead-ers to provide the public with the specific information they needed to protect themselves and their property. Thus, the same controlled meeting behavior loathed by citizens as shown in past research studies is perhaps expected and preferred in crisis situations. Crises are often associated with the public experi-encing anxiety and uncertainty. However, having the city leaders establish themselves as taking charge of the situation may reduce uncertainty and other negative effects.

Also, as the larger share of the audience was watching the meeting proceed-ings through mediated sources, there was no immediate opportunity for dis-paragement from the public. This lack of feedback may have cast the public meetings in a positive light; without the ability to question or criticize the

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meeting discussion, city leaders may have assumed there was no dissent toward the proceedings. Even if the public did disagree, they had no way of gauging whether others shared their opinions. The televised nature of the pub-lic meetings suggested to the audience that not only were meetings running smoothly but the public was also supportive of city leadership. Thus, this study enlightens the minimalist perspective of public meetings by considering con-textual factors related to the crisis and media use that may have fostered the appearance of positive support from the public for city leader decisions.

Certainly city officials’ naïve theories acknowledged that they believed they could exert greater control in a crisis context through the two-meeting system. First, city leaders’ naïve theories suggested that conflict in crisis communication situations, although necessary for effective results, was prob-lematic when viewed by the public. In other words, the need to show unity in flood crisis strategy trumped the value of allowing the public to witness debate. In addition, city leaders believed that such conflict was essential to effective flood efforts; as a result, they conducted premeetings to provide an environment for such discussion.

Second, city leaders believed not only that a sense of openness was essen-tial for positive public opinion of the proceedings but also that openness could be strategically created through scripted messages. These messages were pre-determined and facilitated by a city manager, who acted like a stage manager guiding a theatrical performance. Such scripted openness may have justified the city leaders’ high level of meeting control in the eyes of the public. In addi-tion, city leaders believed the inclusion of the human element was necessary for the performance to be successful. City leaders’ naïve theories also indi-cated that the public wanted to simultaneously feel confident and calm con-cerning the flood crisis as well as witness vigilance by city leaders on behalf of the community. According to city leaders, balancing both needs was diffi-cult, and a variety of communicative strategies were used to manage it.

Consistent with past research (Kelly & Spoor, 2006, 2007), findings suggest city leaders’ naïve theories were nuanced; in certain contexts (such as a flood crisis), public input could be controlled or restricted to serve the greater pur-poses of the city, as long as city leaders were open with the public. Presumably, this would not be true in other, noncrisis contexts. The high level of harmony in public meetings, which is rarely seen in public meetings about controversial issues, is in part due to the controlled structure of the meetings. City leaders also believed the public would not be content with a limited role unless they had access to information, and thus a premeeting/public meeting format was created. In addition, the city leaders’ naïve theories influenced communication at both the macro (e.g., structure of meetings, overall communication process)

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and micro (e.g., humor, explicit statements, metaphor) levels. Thus, naïve theo-ries of meeting facilitation were multidimensional, suggesting meeting leader naïve theories had a high level of nuance and sophistication.

The city leaders’ naïve theories were based in part on flood crisis experi-ences 12 years earlier. Larsson (2010) indicates that organizational learning “applies to efforts where individuals and collectives in organizations . . . use knowledge from an earlier crisis when managing a new crisis, especially to correct previous shortcomings and mistakes” (p. 714). The 2009 leaders acknowledged previous communication shortcomings from earlier flood cri-ses, prompting them to create a communication process whereby difficult decisions could be made out of the public spotlight and a united image could be transmitted through carefully directed public meetings. Consistent with Heider (1958), previous experiences of city leaders helped shape their naïve theories about the appropriateness of public access to meeting interaction. City leaders used their naïve theories to predict what communication would be most effective in future public meetings. The ability of city leaders to meet and discuss their beliefs, and to plan how to implement a public meeting consistent with their beliefs, allowed them to move forward with a collective naïve theory.

This project couples cognition and communication in small group research (Keyton et al., 2010). Instead of relying solely on postmeeting data collection, this project used both real-time and postmeeting approaches. Data for the study were collected in two phases. Initial interviews and recordings of the public meetings took place while tensions were at their highest point. The follow-up interviews occurred later, enabling the crisis leaders an opportunity to reflect on the crisis. This in-the-present and postcrisis reflection contributes to the validity of the process used to gather data. For practical application purposes, researchers that are prepared to collect data in-the-present of a crisis situation will have richer data and be better able to understand how partici-pants felt. Thus, this mixed-method approach establishes another important way of bridging the gaps created by disciplinary boundaries.

The implications of the city leaders’ naïve theories extend to other types of work meetings as well. Investigating the wisdom of resolving conflict prior to meetings, or using humor, explicit messages, and metaphor to estab-lish a calm yet urgent approach to crisis in meetings may likewise be appli-cable. In addition, the dramatist metaphor suggests a less spontaneous nature to meetings, identifying meetings as locations where city leaders can control the message and hypothetically the behavior of meeting participants. Although participation may be welcome, meeting leaders, much like stage managers, control the content through their ability to create agendas, frame

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participant responses, and correct messages. Certain meeting contexts may amplify the meeting leader’s ability to control meeting interaction. For example, in this study, the televised nature of the meetings and the reduced role of the public allowed for greater ability to strategically control proceed-ings. If meeting leaders can frame an issue as urgent or a crisis, they may have greater latitude to control meeting interaction without offending the public. Other meeting types, such as virtual meetings, may provide meeting facilitators with similar opportunities to control interaction.

The frontstage/backstage notion of the dramatist metaphor may prove beneficial for future analysis of meeting interaction. Mirivel and Tracy’s (2005) work on small talk prior to meetings suggests important events take place prior to meetings that can greatly influence the communication cli-mate. The present study extends this even further; communication between meeting participants prior to meetings can set the agenda and dictate meet-ing conversation. Although the notion of meeting planning is not new, understanding the premeeting decisions that leaders make and whether they unfold as planned is important. Naïve theory and the dramatist metaphor are particularly helpful in understanding how city leaders use backstage plans to control meeting interaction.

Several specific communicative findings, especially in terms of how meeting interaction accomplished the goals of the public meetings, have additional implications for future meeting research. Past research on laughter (Keyton & Beck, 2010) has shown its multifunctional nature; the present study echoes this finding. Humor and laughter were used in a variety of ways to relieve tension, create a calm atmosphere, and change message tone. When is humor appropriate to use in meetings? There appears to be risk associated with humor in crisis situations (e.g., the mayor had to apologize for his joke about a neighboring city’s hockey team). This risk may extend to other meet-ing contexts as well, where humor may be associated with laziness, lack of focus, or a lack of interest.

As is the case when investigating natural contexts, there are several limita-tions to the scope of the project and the data collection. First, analysis of premeeting is based entirely on interview data. Due to the private nature of these meetings, transcripts could not be obtained. In addition, although this study focuses on several meetings, it only involves one team of individuals. Thus, the findings are limited in how they can be generalized to other meet-ing contexts.

The interviews of the city leaders may have been influenced by the success of the flood crisis efforts. Similar to Staw’s (1975) study, interviewing city lead-ers after the crisis may have allowed their successes to influence their memories

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of premeetings and public meetings. Although this remains plausible, there were two ways this study attempted to account for these concerns. First, the first set of interviews was conducted during the flood crisis, when the outcome was still in doubt. Second, considering meeting transcripts allowed the authors to connect meeting interaction to interview data, as opposed to relying solely on self-report data. Although it would have been desirable to obtain more inter-view data, given the logistical constraints of a crisis situation and the benefit of directly interviewing city leaders, the data are considered very rich.

AIDA was a very helpful methodological foundation for uncovering the naïve theories and communicative techniques of city leaders. AIDA allows researchers to “go beyond what is visibly displayed to speak to issues of what routinely may be inferred,” thus including contextual information from both interviews and observation (Tracy, 1995, p. 203). Such an approach may be helpful in analyzing work meetings, especially when trying to analyze naïve theories, which are consistent with the grounded practical theory on which AIDA is based (Craig & Tracy, 1995). This approach was also helpful in answering the call (Keyton et al., 2010) to unite cognition and communicative behaviors.

In conclusion, this study advances small group research, especially on meeting interaction, in several ways. First, it adds a needed perspective to the minimalist view of public meetings, establishing how leaders strategi-cally control meetings and how the amount of control may increase in cer-tain contexts. In addition, meeting leaders must consider the perception of interaction to meeting participants, including participants who are not phys-ically present. Last, this project connects city leaders’ naïve theories of meeting facilitation to specific communicative acts, coupling cognition and communication research. These contributions are important to enhancing meeting effectiveness, given the high reliance on meetings in all levels of society.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This project was funded in part by a NDSU Development Foundation Gundlogson grant.

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Bios

Stephenson J. Beck (PhD, University of Kansas) is an assistant professor of com-munication at North Dakota State University, Fargo, United States. His research interests include examining the strategic and functional use of messages, particularly in meeting conflict and decision-making interaction.

Robert S. Littlefield (PhD, University of Minnesota) is a professor of communica-tion and director of the Risk+Crisis Communication Project at North Dakota State

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University. His research interests include crisis and risk communication among com-munity members during disaster. He is coauthor of Effective Risk Communication: A Message-Centered Approach (2009).

Andrea J. Weber (MA, North Dakota State University) is a lecturer at North Dakota State University. Her primary research interest is in health communication.