DYINGTOFORGET

DYINGTOFORGET

OIL,POWER,PALESTINE,&theFoundationsof

U.S.PolicyintheMiddleEast

IRENEL.GENDZIER

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Dyingtoforget:Oil,power,Palestine,andthefoundationsofU.S.policyintheMiddleEast/IreneL.Gendzier.pagescm

Includesbibliographicalreferencesandindex.ISBN978-0-231-15288-4(cloth:alk.paper)—ISBN978-0-231-52658-6(ebook)

1.UnitedStates—Foreignrelations—MiddleEast.2.MiddleEast—Foreignrelations—UnitedStates.3.UnitedStates—Foreignrelations—1945-1953.I.Title.

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Contents

Acknowledgments

Introduction:OpenSecrets

PARTI ThePetroleumOrderandthePalestineQuestion,1945–1946

1 ThePrimacyofOil

2 ThePalestineQuestion:1945

PARTII TheQuestionofPartitionandtheOilConnection,1947–1948

3 TheCriticalYear:1947

4 TheWinterofDiscontent:1948

5 TheOilConnection

PARTIII Beware“AnomalousSituation,”1948

6 TheTransformationofPalestine

7 TruceandTrusteeship

8 RecognitionandResponse

PARTIV RethinkingU.S.PolicyinPalestine/Israel,1948

9 ReconsideringU.S.PolicyinPalestine

10 ThePalestineRefugeeProblem

11 TheStateDepartmentontheRecord

PARTV TheEndastheBeginning,1948–49

12 ThePCC,Armistice,Lausanne,andPalestinianRefugees

13 TheViewfromthePentagonandtheNationalSecurityCouncil

14 TheIsraeli–U.S.OilConnectionandExpandingU.S.OilInterests

PARTVI InPlaceofaConclusion

ReflectionsonDiscovery,Denial,andDeferral

NotesIndex

Acknowledgments

Thisworkhasbeenunderwaysinceat least2008.Researchfor itwasundertakenwhileIwasProfessor intheDepartmentofPoliticalScienceat Boston University. During this period, I was also fortunate to be anAffiliate inResearch at theCenter forMiddleEasternStudies,HarvardUniversity, and a Research Affiliate of theMITCenter for InternationalStudies.

Iamgratefulfortheopportunitytothankthosewhoseassistanceandsupporthavebeenindispensabletotheresearchandwritingofthisbook,for which I remain solely responsible. Individuals are identified by thepositionstheyheldatthetimetheyprovidedassistance.

First to be listed are the archivists and librarians who generouslyshared theirknowledgeandmadeU.S. recordsandpresidentialpapersaccessible.Itisdifficulttoexaggeratetheimportanceoftheirassistance;quitesimply,withoutitthiswork,asIconceivedit,wouldnothavebeenpossible.Secondisthelistof individualsandinstitutionsthat invitedmetosharemy findingsandenabledme tobenefit fromthequestionsandcriticismsthatfollowed.Thirdarethosewhosegenerousassistanceandmoral supportmade a great difference tomy understanding of variousaspects of U.S. policy and Israeli and Palestinian development. Somesharedtheirownwork,whichopeneddoorsthatprovedsignificanttomyresearch. Others offered critical insights based on their knowledge ofdifferent aspects of postwar U.S. foreign policy.Otherswere helpful inpostingmyarticlesandessaysatonlinesitesandinpublicationssuchastheIsraelOccupationArchive(IOA),ZNet,LeMondeDiplomatique,andBidayat (Beirut).Still others includepresentaswell as formergraduatestudents,manynowsuccessful professionals,who in sharing their ownwork enriched mine. Unnamed in the list below are the many whosesupport—whetherfromnearorfar—gavemethecouragetopersistintheefforttomakesenseofthepoliciesandpolitics

Reflectingonthenamedandtheunnamedisareminderoftheextenttowhichtheproductionofknowledgetakesplaceinasocialcontext,nomatterhowsolitaryisthetaskofwritingandresearch.

The archivists and specialists at the Harry S. Truman Library andMuseum were quite simply indispensable. Jim Armistead, ArchivistSpecialist,whoguidedmethroughthepapersofMaxW.Ball,ClarkM.Clifford, and Ralph K. Davies, was not only consistently helpful andinstructive but supportive of my research. In addition, ElizabethCarrington, Archivist at the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library,provided critical assistance inPresident Truman’s correspondencewithJacobBlaustein.Archivist-LibrariansTedBenicoff,oftheSeeleyG.MuddManuscript Library, at Princeton University, and Scott S. Taylor, theManuscripts Processor at the Georgetown University Library, SpecialCollections Research Center, were similarly generous in providinginformation on their respective holdings. Nicole Toutounji, UNICEFPhotography,DivisionofCommunicationattheUnitedNations,informedmeabouttheArchivalReferenceServicesUnitandtheonlinedatabaseofUNdocumentsrelatedtoPalestine, includingthosebearingon1948.Correspondenceandadditionalfindingsfromrelatedresearcheffortsareincorporatedinthebodyofthetext.

TheGovernmentDocumentssectionoftheHarvardCollegeLibraryatLamont,partofHarvardUniversity,alsoproved tobean indispensableresourcetowhichIrepeatedlyreturnedandonwhoseexpertlibrariansIrelied.AmongthemwereJohnA.Collins,ReferenceLibrarian,ResearchServices, Government Documents; Vida Margaitis, GovernmentDocuments,HarvardCollegeLibrary;OdileHarter,ResearchLibrarianatthe Harvard College Library; and John Baldisserotto, Data ReferenceLibrarian,HarvardCollegeLibrary.

At MIT, Bethanie Pinkus helped me to locate the papers of FredaKirchwey through InstituteArchives andSpecialCollections, and I alsoturned to the collection at the Schlesinger Library of the RadcliffeInstitute.AtColumbiaUniversity,JerryBreeze,Government InformationLibrarian of Lehman Library, made it possible for me to examine thepapersofJamesMcDonald in theRareBookandManuscriptLibrary inButlerLibrary.

Presentations, lectures, and workshops were offered at the MiddleEast Institute, Columbia University; Department of Political Science,

BostonUniversity;TheMiddleEastCenter,HarvardUniversity;theEmileBustaniSeminar,MIT;Watson Institute,BrownUniversity;UniversityofMaryland; Kevorkian Center for Middle East Studies, New YorkUniversity;TamimentCenter,NewYorkUniversity;GraduateCenter forMiddle Eastern and Middle Eastern American Center, CUNY; and aseminar in the Department of Political Science, AmericanUniversity ofBeirut.

Among the many individuals whose work and, in some instances,personal assistance, made a difference are Andrew Bacevich, NathanCitino,PeterDimock,AlainGresh,RashidKhalidi,PhilipKhoury,MichaelKlare, Zachary Lockman, KarimMakdisi, David Painter, Robert Vitalis,the late Eric Rouleau, Sara Roy, Steve Shalom, Yair Svoray, SalimTamari,FawwazTraboulsi,andWalidKhalidi,whosepioneeringworkon1948remainsunparalleled.NoamChomskyholdsaspecialplaceinthisstudynot only becauseof his support for this undertakingbut becausehisownworkonIsraelandPalestinehaslongservedasanexampleofhis courageous search for truth,which remains a permanent source ofinspiration.

EditorAnneRoutonwaswitnesstothedifferentstagesofthisworkinprogressandremainedpatientandsteadfastinhersupport,asdidothermembers of the Columbia University Press editorial staff, includingWhitney Johnson, Roy Thomas,Michael Haskell, and BenKolstad, forwhichIamgrateful.

IntroductionOpenSecrets

GAZA2014AND1948

Icompletedthisstudyin2014inthemidstoftheIsraeliinvasionofGaza.Thosefamiliarwiththedistantoriginsofthepresentconflictwillrecalltheeventsof1948.1

AsinpastIsraeliinvasionsofGaza,in2008and2012,the2014warin Gaza was enabled by U.S. support. In the summer of 2014, theNationalSecurityAgency(NSA)disclosedthat“Israeliaggressionwouldbe impossiblewithout theconstant, lavishsupportandprotectionof theU.S.government,whichisanythingbutaneutral,peace-brokeringpartyin these attacks.”2 Subsequent disclosures in theWall Street JournalexposedthedirectlinkbetweenIsraelandthePentagon,thusbringingtolight a relationship that embarrassed the White House, which did notcontestit.3

The link between the events of 1948, when Israel was established,and the latest war inGazawas highlighted byWilliamR. Polk, formerU.S.diplomatandauthor.AsPolkwrote inAugust2014, “theeventsoftodaywerepreordained,”adding that “only ifweunderstand thehistorycan we hope to help solve this very complex, often shameful andsometimes dangerous problem.”4 Gaza was directly affected by thathistory in 1948–1949, when its population was vastly increased as aresultoftheinfluxofPalestinianrefugees.5

The problem transcendsGaza, however, as journalist Rami Khourypointedoutinthefallof2012whenheassertedthat

as longas the crimeof dispossession and refugeehood thatwas committed against thePalestinianpeoplein1947–48isnotredressedthroughapeacefulandjustnegotiationthatsatisfiesthelegitimaterightsofbothsides,wewillcontinuetoseeenhancementsinboththedeterminationandthecapabilitiesofPalestinianfighters—ashasbeenthecasesincethe1930s.6

TheconnectionbetweenGazaand1948wasmadebyothercriticsaswell, including Donna Nevel, who pointed out that “the heart of theproblemisnotHamasorwhothePalestinianleadershipis,itistheIsraelioccupation, beginning with the expulsion of the Palestinians from theirland in 1948 (what thePalestinians term theNakba or ‘catastrophe’).”7The same view was echoed by journalist Steven Erlanger in theNewYorkTimesonAugust16,2014,whenhereportedthat“Israeliscanfeelasstuck, indifferentways,as thePalestinians themselves.BecauseofcoursethisisreallyjustanotherroundintheunresolvedArab-Israeliwarof1948–49.”8

What these varied commentaries left unsaid was that this was butanother chapter in U.S. policy in this region. By 1948–49, it was theUnitedStatesthatfelt“stuck,”asitconfronteditsfailedeffortstoresolvethe very sameconflict.U.S. officials engaged in thePalestinequestionunderstoodthen,asnow,thattheyneededtoaddressthecoreissuesoftheconflict, includingtheoriginandrepatriationofPalestinianrefugees,the absence of internationally accepted boundaries, and the fate ofJerusalem.

DespiteitsavowedsupportforconsensusbetweenArabandJewastheessentialprerequisiteforaresolutionoftheconflictinPalestine,U.S.policysubvertedsuchagoal.Washington’ssupport forIsrael’spolicyof“transfer,”whichmeantthecoerciveexpulsionofPalestiniansfromtheirtownsandvillagestoensurealargelyhomogeneousJewishpopulation,was incompatible with this objective. It intensified the refugee problemthat theUnitedStates repeatedly criticized, as it repeatedly announceditssupportforUnitedNationsGeneralAssembly(UNGA)Resolution194anditsrecommendationfortherepatriationofPalestinianrefugees.

This was not the product of caution or confusion. There was noconspiracy involved. There was no wavering at the top. The UnitedStates was not ambivalent about what policies to pursue. On thecontrary, the decisions to stop pressuring Israel to take action on therefugeequestionandtolaylowinopposingIsrael’sterritorialexpansionwereunmistakablesignsthattherewasashiftinpriorities.

U.S. officials recognized the Israeli relianceon force to expandandcontrol territory. They appreciated the political efficiency of the IsraelileadershipanditsmilitarysuperiorityascomparedtothatofsurroundingArab states. On the basis of such developments, and, notably, in

response to Israel’s ability to alter the regional balance of power,WashingtoncalculatedthatIsraelcouldbeusefulintheprotectionofU.S.regional interests. While successive U.S. administrations continued toidentify the core issues in the conflict in terms of refugee repatriation,territorial expansion, and Jerusalem’s status, they did not move toimplementchanges.Onthecontrary,theUnitedStatesdeferredtoIsraelipolicywhileinsistingontheneedforArab-Jewishconsensus.

More than sixty years later, as U.S. Secretary of State John KerryattemptedyetanotherefforttobrokerpeacetalksbetweenIsraelandthePalestinians,theIsraelidailyHa’aretzobservedthateveryoneknowsthat“theconditionforreachingadealisthroughagreementsontherealcoreissuesoftheconflict:therefugees,thestatusofJerusalem,bordersandsecurity arrangements.”9 The sameeditorial added that “anyattempt toavoiddealingwiththeseissues,orinvestmentofenergyinotherissues,isasifnonegotiationsaretakingplace.”

Seldom were the reasons for the failure of such efforts as starklystated in the U.S. media, or in many parts of academia. The habit ofdeferral and denial was deeply ingrained in both circles, where the“lingering effects of past struggles on present confrontations” wereignored.10 Yet as Eugene Rogan and Avi Shlaim reminded readers inconsideringthewaroverPalestine,

no event has marked Arab politics in the second half of the twentieth century moreprofoundly. The Arab-Israeli wars, the Cold War in the Middle East, the rise of thePalestinianarmedstruggleandthepoliticsofpeacemakinginalloftheircomplexityareadirectconsequenceofthePalestineWar.11

WHYTHISBOOK?

TheroleoftheUnitedStatesintheArab-Israeliconflictisaninextricablepart of history in this region. Confronting that role is indispensable tounderstanding both U.S. policy in the conflict and its course.12 Aknowledge of the foundation of U.S. policy in the Middle East in thepostwar years is indispensable to an understanding of current U.S.policies in theMiddleEast inwhichoil,Palestine, and Israel play suchsignificantroles.

TherecordofU.S.policyfrom1945to1949challengesfundamentalassumptions aboutU.S. understanding and involvement in the struggle

over Palestine that continue to dominate mainstream interpretations ofU.S.policyintheMiddleEast.ComingtogripswiththeU.S.recordanditsfrequentlymythifieddepictionofthestruggleoverPalestineiscritical.Those engaged in the creation of the Common Archive, a project ofZochrot, the IsraeliNGO, inwhich IsraelisandPalestinianshave joinedto reconstruct the history of Palestinian villages destroyed by Israel in1948,13 clearly understand the importance of this record. Palestinianhistorians have long written about this history, and Israel’s “NewHistorians” have confirmed it in their challenge to the dominant Israelinarrativeofthewarof1948.

TheMiddleEastin2014isnotamirrorimageofwhatitwasin1948,when the struggle over Palestine was at its height. In the immediatepostwaryears,theUnitedStatesdefineditspolicyintheNearandMiddleEast in terms of assuring unimpeded access and control by U.S. oilcompaniesofitsgreatmaterialprize,petroleum.Congressionalhearingsontheroleofpetroleumandthenationaldefenseenvisionedpetroleumasaweaponofwar.Itfollowedthatensuringthepresenceandstabilityofcompatible regimes was an essential dimension of policy, as wascontainingandcrushingthosewhosenationalistandreformistorientationrenderedthemsuspect.

At once undermining and inheriting Britain’s imperial mantle, theAmericanstatewaswidelyviewedbypolitical leaders intheareaasananti-imperialist power, albeit driven by petroleumand political ambition.Its footprints were found in widely divergent endeavors, includingmissionary and educational enterprises. But in the immediate postwaryears,Washington was increasingly drawn into the Palestine problem,whose origins linked Europe’s dark history with Zionist ambitionsprotected by the Britishmandate. The ensuing struggle over Palestinewas accelerated in the years that followed as Washington becameincreasinglyinvolvedinitsoutcome,awareoftheinevitablelinkbetweenthe fate of Palestine and U.S. oil and defense interests in the MiddleEast. The controversies over British policy, over partition, the war of1948, thearmisticeagreements,and theLausanneConference in1949consumed Washington’s Near and Middle East specialists and theirrepresentativesattheUnitedNations.

This history is not new. The subject has long evoked interest andcriticism.Whatwastabooyesterday,however,isopenlydiscussedtoday,

as theweight of currentwars compels a confrontationwith events thatcannolongerbeignored.

Disclosuresofpreviouslyclassifiedinformation,aswellaspreviouslyignored sources, whether of Palestinian or Israeli origin, have furtheraltered the record. Although U.S. sources have long been open, theyhavebeeninadequatelyexamined,significantlycontributingtotheflawedhistory of U.S. postwar policy in theMiddle East, including oil and thetransformationofPalestine.

MainThemes

Anumber of key questions have long dominated scholarly accounts ofpostwar U.S. policy in the Middle East, and these questions compelconsideration. Among them is the ongoing controversy over thebureaucratic origins of U.S. policymaking in the Middle East in thepostwar years. Did the State Department or the White House makeMiddleEastpolicy?Waspolicydeterminedbydomesticorforeignpolicyconsiderations? Did domestic lobbying by Zionists or by oil companypartisansshapepolicy?

How did the president fit into this context? Some lauded PresidentTrumanasunquestionablycommittedtothecreationofaJewishstate.14Was he moved primarily by religious, humanitarian, and moralconsiderations that trumped other factors?15 Some argue that cultural,psychological, and religious factors cannot be ignored in shaping U.S.policy.16Ontheotherhand,worksbyKennethBain,andmorerecentlybyPeter Hahn, Melvin Leffler, and John Judis, have, in different ways,demonstrated the extent of the president’s ambivalence, if not overthostility, to the ideaofa religiousstate.17Without ignoringanyof thesefactors, some historians also include the role of the Cold War as aninfluenceonU.S.policyinPalestine.18

Analysts such as J. C. Hurewitz, who was a consummate insider,recalled another important dimension of early policy formation in hisstudyonPalestine.HeremindsusthatthebureaucracydealingwiththePalestine question in 1943 was very small, and few officials wereinvolved.19U.S.policymakersconfirmedthiswhentheyfacedtheneedtodefine U.S. policy. Within a very few years, however, the Palestinequestion assumed greater importance, as its connection withdevelopmentsintheSecondWorldWarandtheHolocaust,aswellasitsrelationtothefoundationofpostwarU.S.oilinterestsintheMiddleEast,promotedmoreattentiontotheneedsofpolicymakinginthisarea.

AsthequestionofpartitiononPalestineassumedgreaterimportanceinWashington, another themedominated, as it still does.Thiswas theclaim that U.S. policymakers were faced with the choice of protectingU.S.oil interestsordeferring topartisansofpartitionand, later, Jewishstatehood.Thequestionbecame:Oilor Israel?This formulaerred,as I

willexplaininthefollowingchapters.ThechoicefacingpolicymakerswasnotoilversusIsraelbutratheroilandIsrael.Intheyearsthatfollowed,itwasoilandIsraelversusreformandrevolutionintheArabworld.

TheChangingLandscapeofMiddleEastStudiesThechanginglandscapeofMiddleEastscholarshipisapparentinthespateof

publications,books,andarticlesappearingonU.S.foreignpolicyintheMiddleEast.Collectively,theyattesttothechangingnatureofresearchandtheincreasingavailabilityofU.S.andinternationalsourcesthatcontributetoa“transnational”and“multiarchivalperspective.”20

ParticularlyatthistimeofincreasedU.S.interventionintheMiddleEast,thisexpandedviewandincreasedunderstandingbywestern,notablyAmerican,writersontheMiddleEastissomethingthatUssamaMakdisi

haseloquentlypleadedfor,particularlyatatimeofincreasedU.S.interventionintheMiddleEast.21

Thenewscholarshippromisesnoagreementbutprovidestheseedsfor a more informed debate, although thus far it has not alteredconventionalaccountsoftheMiddleEastorU.S.policyintheregion.Norhasitfundamentallychallengedthemedia,whooftenportraytheMiddleEast as a danger zone whose complexity and controversy defiesunderstanding,asdoesitsallegedpredilectiontoviolence,instability,andsectarianhatreds.

Thoseseekingtobreakwithsuchcaricatureddepictionsofstatesandsocieties in the Middle East discover that this is no easy matter. Thefamiliar imagesofmadmullahsand jihad-prone fanaticsallow forscantreflectiononwhoorwhatisinvolved,letalonetheconditionsgivingrisetotheemergenceofreligiousmovementsacrosstheregion. Insuchanintellectual environment, approaches that challenge long-standingnarrativesareoftenviewedas frankly subversive.Asa result, theyaremarginalized in the media and often in academia, particularly in fieldssuch as international relations that have long served to justify westernsupremacy.22

Inthiscontext,recentscholarshipmayindeedmakeadifference.Butexamining previously neglected sources of newly declassifiedgovernment documents, of whatever origin, is not enough. What isrequired is not only newdata but newwaysof thinkingaboutwhatwe

know, or have chosen to ignore. Considering why certain questionsrelated to policy remain unanswered, or unasked, involves asking whobenefits fromtheexistingproductionofknowledge,andwhoseinterestsareservedbycensoringthosewhochallengeit?

ConsidertheimpactoftheinvaluablestudiesoftheIsraeli-PalestinianconflictproducedbysomeofIsrael’snewhistorians,suchasIlanPappé,Benny Morris, and Avi Shlaim, and the journalist and historian SimhaFlapan.TheirworkisbasedonthereleaseofclassifiedIsraelidocumentsthatchallenge fundamental Israelimythsconcerning theeventsof1948and Israel’s emergence as an independent state.23 Such works haveconfirmed the accounts ofPalestinian historians suchasWalidKhalidi,Nur-eldeen Masalha, and Rashid Khalidi and have been criticallyappraised by others, such as JosephMassad, who havewritten abouttheeventsof1948.24MasalhahasarguedthattheworkofIsrael’s“NewHistorians” is indicative of “a marked desire among the youngergeneration of Israeli authors and academics to unearth the truthconcerning the events surrounding the Palestinian refugee exodus of1948.Thisnew tendencybreaks thewallofsilence,myth,secrecyandcensorshipinstitutedbytheoldergenerationofZionistleadership.”25

In a penetrating essay on the new Israeli historiography, however,historianJoelBeininpointsout that “much,even ifnotall thedetailsofthe information [Benny]Morris presents inThe Birth of the PalestinianRefugeeProblemandotherworkswasalwaysavailable inone formoranother. It was actively rendered illegible in the Israeli historicalnarrative.”26

ThisappliestothehistoricalevidenceconcerningU.S. foreignpolicyintheMiddleEastaswell.U.S.sourcesprovideevidencethathas longbeenavailablebutinsomeinstanceshasbeenallbutinvisible.Sourcessuch as those included in the Foreign Relations of the United States(FRUS), U.S. Presidential Papers, and the records of the U.S. JointChiefs of Staff, for example, in conjunction with Israeli and Palestiniansources,stronglysuggesttheneedtoreconsiderthedominantnarrativesofU.S.policyintheconflictbetweentheIsraelisandthePalestinians.

HowthePresentWorkDiffersBuildingontherecordofpastscholarshipandcriticismofU.S.policy,thisbookdiffersfrompreviousaccountsinseveralsignificantrespects.ItsituatestheoriginoftheU.S.relationship

severalsignificantrespects.ItsituatestheoriginoftheU.S.relationshipwithIsraelin1948intheframeworkofpostwarU.S.policywhen

petroleumdominatedU.S.planningfortheMiddleEast.Moreover,onthebasisofU.S.sources,thepresentstudymaintainsthattheprevailingassumptionwithrespecttoU.S.policytowardPalestine,accordingtowhichU.S.officialsfearedthatsupportforZionismandpartitionof

PalestinewouldundermineU.S.oilinterestsintheArabworld,provedtobeafalseassumption.ThepapersofMaxBall,directoroftheOilandGasDivisionoftheInteriorDepartment,andhisexchangeswiththe

representativeoftheJewishAgencyintheUnitedStates,EliahuEpstein,confirmthisfear,asdoIsraelirecordsofthesameperiod.Balloperatedoutsidetheformalchannelsofpolicymakers,whichdoesnotnegatethe

importanceofhisexperience.Itmayexplain,however,whythatexperiencehasbeenneglectedinaccountsofU.S.policy.

Evidence of the encounter betweenMaxBall andEliahuEpstein in1948formsthebasisofthe“oilconnection”discussedinthisbook.Theencounter opened doors and broke barriers that had long beenconsidered taboo. It revealed that major U.S. oil executives werepragmaticintheirapproachtothePalestineconflictandwerepreparedtoengage with the Jewish Agency and later with Israeli officials, albeitoperatingwithinexistingconstraints.TherelationshipbetweenMaxBall,hissonandassociate,andhisson-in-lawRayKosloff,whobecamethefirst Israeli adviser on oil matters, yields additional information on howthis former U.S. official assisted Israel in its fuel policy after hisretirement.

Second,IemphasizetheextenttowhichU.S.officialswhowerepartoftheformalpolicymakingframeworkunderstoodthesecularrootsoftheconflictinPalestine,itssignificanceforZionistsupport,anditstraumaticimpact on Palestinians. They understood that Zionist objectives wereincompatiblewithPalestinianArabself-determinationandindependence,evenastheypersistedincallingforcompromiseamongtheparties.WellinformedabouttheconsequencesofthestruggleoverPalestinebyU.S.consuls, officials in Washington, including the secretary of state,undersecretary,andtheircolleaguesoperatingintheUnitedNationsandin the specialized agencies dealing with Palestine and the Near andMiddleEast,werepreparedtoreconsiderpartitioninfavoroftrusteeship.The record of their views on the Palestinian refugee problem and,

specifically, the Israeli response and rejection of responsibility for itscreation, led to major clashes betweenWashington and Tel Aviv afterIsrael’semergence.

That record is known, but a more detailed examination of theevidence is required and is presented here. This examinationcomplements someof theworkof Israel’s “NewHistorians,” aswell asPalestinian historians. More attention needs to be paid to thecontributions of the U.S. consuls in Jerusalem, Thomas Wasson andRobertMacattee, aswell as to the viewsofGordonMerriam,whohadbroadexperienceincludingoilpolicyaswellasworkingwithinthePolicyPlanning Staff, among other assignments; Mark Ethridge, the U.S.delegatetothePalestineConciliationCommission;andPhilipJessupinhis role at theUnitedNations.Reconsidering their analyses aswell asthoseofthefarbetterknownandmoreauthoritativefiguresinthepolicyestablishment—such as Robert McClintock, Loy Henderson, RobertLovett,GeorgeMarshall,andDeanAcheson—providesaclearerviewofthenatureandevolutionofU.S.policytowardIsraelandPalestine.

Third,theinputofthechiefofstaffoftheU.S.AirForce,thechiefofnaval operations, the secretary of defense, and the joint chiefs of staff(JCS) also provides insight into U.S. policy in the Middle East. WithinmonthsofIsrael’semergence,U.S.officialsreassessedtheirviewsofthenewstate,inaccordwithpresidentialrecognitionofIsrael.Whatfollowedwas not only recognition of Israeli sovereignty but recognition of itsstrategic potential in Washington’s postwar policy in the Middle East,whichwasdesignedtoexcludetheUSSRandtoprotectU.S.oilinterestsand allied defense arrangements. This assessment underminedWashington’scriticalpositiononIsraelipolicytowardPalestinianrefugeerepatriation and territorial expansion. These vital factors in the conflictbetween Israel-Palestine and the Arab world thereby assumed asubordinate position in light of the priorities defined by the JCS andofficialsintheDepartmentofState.

Here, then, is the logicofU.S. oil policy,whichwas responsible fortheincreasingdeferencetoIsraelipolicieswhosepurposewastoensurethat Israel turned toward the United States and away from the USSR.This objective, in turn, was allied toWashington’s principal goal in theMiddleEast—protectionofitsuntrammeledaccessandcontrolofoil.

Theseconnectionsarecrucialtounderstandingwhatmanyhistorians

have taken to be signs of the cautious and contrary character, orweakness,ofU.S.policy,whichappearedtowaverbetweencriticismofIsraelandsilenceinthefaceoftheverypoliciesitcriticized.Inthisbook,I focuson theconsequencesof thesepolicies, thenetworkof relationstheypromoted,theirobjectives,andtheireffectonIsrael,Palestine,andtheArabworldin1949andtheyearsthatfollowed.

ConfrontingthishistoryisanexerciseinuncoveringtheopensecretsofpastU.S.policyandinconfrontingthepast,whichremainsembeddedinthetroubledpresent.

PARTIThePetroleumOrderandthePalestine

Question,1945–1946

Part I introduces readers to the dominant role of petroleum in postwarU.S.policyand illustrates themanner inwhich it shapedU.S. policy intheMiddleEast,includingPalestine.

Chapter1demonstratestheU.S.commitment tomaintainingaccessand control over Middle East oil resources, as revealed in thepronouncementsandpracticesofU.S.officials in theStateDepartmentand the network of allied agencies established to deal with petroleumpolicy.Againstthisbackground,whichconstitutedWashington’songoingcommitment to U.S. oil interests in theMiddle East, President Trumanand thepolicymakingeliteconfrontedpostwarconditions inEurope thathadprofound implications forPalestineand theMiddleEast.Chapter2analyzes the Earl Harrison Report, the Anglo-American CommitteeReport,andtheMorrison-Gradyplansthatfollowed,withspecialattentiontothereactionsofU.S.officials,includingthedissentersamongthem.

1ThePrimacyofOil

DEFININGU.S.OILPOLICY

TheU.S. preoccupationwithMiddleEast oilwasa trademark of policyplanning in theperiodafterWorldWar II,although itwasbynomeanslimited to theTrumanera,as theexperienceof successivepresidentialdoctrines of the Eisenhower, Nixon, and Carter administrations, andthosethatfollowed,havedemonstrated.1

U.S. policymakers crafted their vision of a petroleum order in“postwar”21945,anenvironmentmarkedbytheemergenceoftheUnitedStatesas theundisputedpowerof thepostwarworld,withaneconomy“three times the size of the USSR’s and five times that of Britain,commandinghalfoftheworld’sindustrialoutputandthreequartersofitsgold reserves.”3 By contrast,Washington faced the despairing plight ofmillions of Displaced Persons4 across the boundaries of its allies andformerenemies,whosepopulationswouldbehauntedby the trialsandjudgments at Nuremberg and by the nameless atrocities committed inHiroshima and Nagasaki. Postwar U.S. policy in the Middle East, andmore particularly in Palestine, was to be defined by these diverse andincompatibleforces.

In1945JohnLoftus,thespecialassistanttothedirectoroftheOfficeof International Trade Policy in the State Department categoricallyasserted that “a review of diplomatic history of the past 35 years willshow thatpetroleumhashistoricallyplayeda largerpart in theexternalrelationsof theUnitedStates thananyothercommodity.”5 Inexplainingits“uniqueandoutstandingimportance,”Loftusunderlinedthe“absoluteimportanceofoilasacommodity in termsof thegrossvalueofannual

production;andinpartfromtheextremelyhighrelativeimportanceofoilintheforeigntradeofcertainnations.”6Inlightoftheseconditions,Loftusargued that it was desirable for U.S. companies to control petroleumproductionabroad.Heofferedatwo-partjustificationforthisposition;thefirst restedon the “talentof theAmericanoil industry fordiscoveryanddevelopment”; the second, was that “oil controlled by United Statesnationals is likely tobea littlemoreaccessible to theUnitedStates forcommercialusesintimesofpeaceandforstrategicpurposesintimesofwar.”7

Moreover, as Philip Burch reported, “the nation’s major corporateinterests, having reestablished good working relations with the federalgovernmentduring thewaryears, remainedverymuch incontrolof thekeydefenseandforeignpolicypostsduringtheTrumanadministration.”8According to Burch’s calculation, “over 70 percent (22 out of 31) ofTruman’s chief defense and foreign policy officials had elitist links, thebulk of them with America’s rapidly evolving business establishment.”9AmongTruman’sselectofficialswerefiguressuchas“Forrestal,Lovett,Harriman,Stettinius,Acheson,Nitze,McCloy,Clayton,Snyder,Hoffman—a stratum unlikely to overlook the interests of American capital inredesigning the postwar landscape.”10 The business most closelyinvolved inconsiderationofMiddleEastpolicy, includingthatapplicabletoPalestine,wastheoilbusiness.11

InMay1940,intheveryperiodinwhichCouncilofForeignRelationsmembersweredeliberatingontheeconomicdimensionsofpostwarU.S.policy, the Roosevelt administration created the Office of PetroleumCoordinator.Inthefollowingyear,FDR’sSecretaryoftheInterior,HaroldIckes, was named PetroleumCoordinator for National Defense, and in1942thatagencybecamethePetroleumAdministrationforWar(PAW).OnMarch27,1944,byDepartmentalOrder1245,theStateDepartmentestablishedaPetroleumDivision(PED)intheOfficeofEconomicAffairsthatoversaw “the initiation,developmentandcoordinationofpolicyandactioninallmatterspertainingtopetroleumandpetroleumproducts,”andmaintainedcontactwithrelatedagencies.12

The subsequent creation of the Petroleum Industry War Council(PIWC)attestedtothegrowingbureaucracythat“wasmadeupof78top-flight industryexecutives”who, inaddition to theirother responsibilities,metwithPAWexecutives,“andatthesemeetingsallthemajorproblems

andpoliciesoftheworldwideoilsituationareonthetable.TheCouncil,working with the executives of PAW, is the powerhouse of industry-governmentcooperation.”13TheseremarksweremadebyMaxBall,whowasthespecialassistanttoHaroldIckes,thedeputyadministratorinthePetroleumAdministrationforWar.

AsBallemphasizedinanessayin1945,theinternationalrangeofthePIWC’sresponsibilitiesaswellasthatofPAW“donotstopatthewater’sedge:thecooperationoftheindustryisnotcircumscribedbyournationalboundaries.EverygallonofpetroleumproductsproducedorusedbytheUnitedNationsanywhereintheworldiswithinthesphereofinterestandactivity.”14Ballestimatedthatthereweresomethirtyorfortygovernmentagenciesdealingwithoil.Amongthemwere“theGeologicalSurvey,theBureau of Mines, various bureaus of the Treasury Department, theDepartmentofJustice,theInterstateCommerceCommission,theOfficeof Defense, Transportation, Defense Plant Corporation, DefenseSupplies Corporation, the War Manpower Commission, the Office ofPriceAdministration,theWarProductionBoard,andahostofothers.”15

In the spring of 1946, Ralph K. Davies, ex-Deputy PetroleumAdministratorforWar,recommendedtothepresidentthatacoordinatingbodybeput inchargeof themultipleanddiverseagenciesdealingwithoil-relatedquestions.Davies,whohadbeenresponsibleforcreatingtheOffice of Petroleum Coordination in May 1941, was now calling for itsdissolution.Buthewasalsocallingfortheestablishmentofapermanentofficecapableofcoordinating thevasthierarchyofoil-relatedagencies.Inthatcapacity,herecommendedanewofficethatwould“operate inaliaisoncapacitywith thepetroleum industry inalloilandgasmattersofconcerntotheadministrativebranchoftheFederalGovernment.”16

Thepresidentdid,infact,followDavies’sadvice,andonMay6,1946,theSecretaryoftheInterior,J.A.Krug,announcedthecreationofanOilandGasDivisionwithinhisdepartment.RalphK.Daviesbecameitsfirstdirector. Along with the National Petroleum Council, the Oil and GasDivisionwasassignedtoconsultwiththepresidentonpetroleumpolicy.Among the duties of the new division was to amass and analyzeinformationrelevanttooilandgasoperations,includingtheavailabilityofexisting and future supplies of petroleum, on the basis of which thepresidentwouldrecommendpolicy.InDecember,DaviesnominatedMaxBalltobedirector,havingsearchedforacandidatewhowouldhaveboth

the “technical and practical training” aswell as the leadership qualitiesrequired.17WhatDavies did notwrite on this occasion, although itwasprobablyunnecessarytodoso,wasthatBall’soutlookonthequestionofprivateversusgovernmentcontrolofoilwasentirelycompatiblewiththatofthemajoroilcompaniesandcontemporaryfederalagencies,includingthoseinwhichDavieshadbeeninvolved.

UnderHarold IckesandPAW, forexample,Davies,VPofStandardOilofCalifornia,wasnameddeputycoordinator.TheorganizationoftheOfficeofPetroleumCoordinatorwasitselfmodeledalongthelinesofthepetroleumindustry.18An“industrycommitteeorganization”wassetuptoensure government policy was favorable to the oil industry, with theJustice Department complicit in arranging “to relax its antitrustproceduresbyagreeingtorulebeforehandonproposalsforgroupactionwithintheindustry.”19

MaxBall’sintimateknowledgeofthepetroleumindustry’soperationatboth the national and international levels was to have particularsignificance in his relations with representatives of the Jewish Agencyprior to May 1948, and with the Israeli government after itsindependence.Ball’sencounterswithEliahuEpstein,oneoftheprincipalrepresentativesof theJewishAgencyintheUnitedStates, inthewinterand spring of 1948 are discussed at length in part II. Suffice it to notehere that thesemeetings contradict one of the axioms of postwarU.S.policy. U.S. officials and their oil company collaborators feared theadverse effect of U.S. government support for partition and Jewishstatehoodontheirrelationswiththeoil-richregimesoftheArabworld.

Inaseminalreporttitled“AForeignOilPolicyfortheUnitedStates,”issued in 1944,Herbert Feis, former adviser on international economicaffairs in the State Department, argued firmly in favor of privateownershipofoiland itsglobalexpansion,U.S.capital investment in theoilsector,andthestaunchsupportoftheU.S.government.Accordingtothe 1975 Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee Report onMultinational Corporations, Feis’s report represented “the mostsystematic analysis of the major oil companies’ position.”20 Feismaintainedthat

the companies insist that privateenterprise is thebestmedium for oil development, andthat oil controlled by American corporate interests is equally available for the needs ofnational security with that owned wholly or in part by the United States government.Secondly, they urge that the American petroleum industry be encouraged to expand its

plansfordevelopingtheworld’soilresources.Tothisend,theyurgethatthegovernmentshouldseektosecureforAmericannationalsaccesstotheworld’soilresourcesonequaltermswiththenationalsofallothercountries; itshouldalsoaccorddiplomaticsupportaseffectiveasthataccordedtonationalsofothercountries.21

Feis called on Washington to adopt a policy capable of guaranteeingadequatesuppliesintheeventofwarwhilenotdepletingU.S.reserves.He insisted that thearrangementshe favoredwouldprovide for “(a) themaintenanceofstorage,asatbases,and (b) theacquisitiondirectlybytheUnitedStatesgovernment of proven reserves that could bequicklydeveloped.”22 He insisted that private ownership of foreign oil wouldprecludeaU.S.militarypresence,whichwouldbeachallengeto“everynear-by country.”23 And along the same lines, he was persuaded thatsuch arrangements would eliminate the risk of involvement in localpetroleumpoliticsand,moregenerally,inthepoliticsoftheMiddleEast.

Wellbefore1946andthecreationoftheNationalPetroleumCouncil,the petroleum industry enjoyed close relations with policymakers. Thecreation of institutions such as the National Petroleum War ServiceCommittee “served as a liaison between the government and the oilcorporations, helping to develop and supervise plans for supplying oilnecessaryforthewar.Inalltheseeffortscarewastakentomaintainthemarketpercentagesandpowerofthekeycompanies.”24

At its opening meeting in 1946, Interior Secretary Julius A. Krug“reassured the oil leaders that there was no intent to increasegovernmentpoweroverthem,andthattheCouncilcoulddo‘nogreatergood to the oil and gas industry than by educating people in theGovernment in the economies and the problems of the industry.’”25 Inaddition,Krugheldoutthepromisethat“youmenwillhelpU.S.withthestaffingofourOilandGasDivisiontotheendthatwewillgetthekindofpeoplewhounderstandtheproblemsoftheindustryandwhoknowhowtodoagoodjob.”26

Earlier, Feis had advocated for the expansion of U.S. oil interestsabroad, arguing that “the war has established the fact that Americanmilitary action may take place anywhere in the world, and that,particularly in any struggle involving the Pacific, control over these oilfields(andthepoliticalstatusof thisarea)mightbeofdirectconcerntoU.S.”27HencetheimportanceofexpandingU.S.oiloperations,alongwithU.S.support.TheSovietpress,reviewingU.S.andBritishoilexpansion

several years later, recognized the importance of Feis’srecommendations. They viewed them as extending beyond economicconsiderations, suggesting instead that “they may be referred to assecondary enterprises of ‘American world system of bases’ and asAmerican outposts expanding along British naval and aircommunications.”28

InitsApril11,1944,reporton“ForeignPetroleumPolicyoftheUnitedStates,” the Inter-Divisional Petroleum Committee of the StateDepartment reviewed the official justifications for relying on foreignsources of oil, repeating the claim that it was essential to conserveWesternHemispherepetroleumfor“militaryandcivilianrequirementsofstrategically available reserves,” while identifying the foreign policyimplications of such a policy.29 The excuse was hardly convincing.Domesticreserveswerenotexhausted,norweretheybeingpreservedinsome artificial manner. The explanation for focusing on Saudi ArabiarestedontheprofitsitgeneratedforU.S.oilcompanies.

The authors of the State Department committee position paper,“ForeignPetroleumPolicyoftheUnitedStates,”identifiedtheregionsofprimeimportanceforoil,namely,“thegreatdevelopedoilfieldsofRussia,Roumania, Iraq,IranandtheArabianPeninsulaaswellasthepotentialpetroleumresourcesofTurkey,theLevantineCoastalareas,AfghanistanandBaluchistan.”30ButtheprimalzoneofU.S.MiddleEastpolicywastobetheMiddleEast;astheDepartmentofStatereportpointedout,itwasin the areas encompassed by “Iran, Iraq, and the Arabian peninsulaincludingSaudiArabia proper and theSheikhdoms ofKuwait, Bahrein,QatarandTrucialOman,” that“UnitedStatespolicymustbeformulatedandimplemented.”31Iftherewasadissentingvoiceinsuchdeliberations,itcamefromGreatBritain,whoseprimacyintheMiddleEastwastobefatallyunderminedbyU.S.policy.

ThePlaceofSaudiArabiainthePostwarPetroleumOrderTheprojectofbuildingabaseinSaudiArabiaappealedtothePentagonandtheStateDepartmentbeforetheendofthewar.Theplanwaspartofafarmore

ambitiousglobalinitiativethatincludedbuildingbasesacrossNorthAfricaandtheMiddleEast.Whenitwasnegotiatedattheendofthewar,theagreementwasfortheaccordwithDhahrantolastthreeyears.In

practice,itwasrepeatedlyextended.“DuringtheColdWar,U.S.AirForcetankersoperatedoutofthebasetorefueltheB-29s,B-36s,andB-

47sthatconstantlycircledRussia’sperimeters.”32

But before the accord with Dhahran was reached, the U.S. facedBritishopposition.AccordingtoSecretaryofStateCordellHull,“wenowhavereliable,buthighlyconfidentialinformationindicatingthattheBritishdirected Ibn Saud to refuse.”33 The refusal was problematic, however,given Saudi recognition of its own interests. In the words of U.S.Secretary ofWarHenry Stimson, “both from a long and a short rangepointofviewthemostimportantmilitaryinterestinSaudiArabiaisoilandclosely following this in importance is theright toconstructairfields, theuse of air space, and the right to make aerial surveys in connectiontherewith,” and these goals would not be abandoned.34 Stimson hadfurtherevidenceofSaudirequeststotheU.S.formilitaryaid.Indeed,theSaudi monarch requested “six transport aircraft, preferably C-47s, andfourbombers,”aswellasthebuildingof“asmallarmsplantcapableofproducing 45-calibre and 7.9mm. cartridges.”35 Several months earlierU.S.Army sources inCairo hadmademodest amounts of ammunitionavailable to theSaudis. The list included “1,667 rifleswith accessoriesand350,000roundsof.30caliberammunitionwhichwasdeliveredtotheSaudiGovernmentwiththeunderstandingthatitwouldbestoredinJiddapending the Arrival of an Americanmilitarymission composed of eightofficersandfourenlistedmenwhowouldinstructtheSaudiArmyintheuse, repair and maintenance of the rifles, and of any other militaryequipmentwhichmightbedelivered.”36

In late 1944, the Saudi king called for the construction or repair ofmajor roads, forawater supplysurvey,access to radiocommunicationandcopiesofaerialsurveys,aswellasprovisionofmedicaltrainingforselectnumbersofSaudisproficientinEnglish.BythefollowingMarchtheUnitedStateswas offering to trainSaudi pilots and crew aswell as toprovide the necessary supplies and maintenance equipment, and oncompletion of its training mission, the U.S. would offer the Saudis thefieldand its installations, includingplanes. Inaddition,Washingtonwasofferingmedicalsupport.

In this context, access to base rights at Dhahran appeared all themore justified. In late November the U.S. Air Force was reported to

believethat“theacquisitionofanAmericanmilitaryairfieldatDhahran,foruseinredeploymentofourforcestotheFarEastandtoincreasetheefficiency of present military air transport operations, is considered animmediate necessity.”37 The role of themilitary airfield atDhahranwasjustifiedintermsofgreaterefficiencyinmilitaryairtransport.TheU.S.AirForce pronouncement did not address the Arabian American OilCompany(ARAMCO)connectiondirectly.Itwas,however,implicitinthestatementoftheAdHocCommitteeoftheState-War-NavyCoordinatingCommittee(SWNCC)thatdeclared“themostimportanteconomicfactinconnectionwithSaudiArabia is the presence in that country of rich oilresourcespresentlyunderconcessiontoAmericancompanies.Althoughthe War Department has an interest in Saudi Arabia because of itsgeographical locationathwart themost direct air route to theEast, it istheoilofSaudiArabiawhichmakesthatcountryofparticular interesttothearmedservices.”38

Thepolite formulationhadbeenstatedmorebluntlybySecretaryofthe Navy James Forrestal in December 1944, who recalled that “theoperationsoftheNavy,includingtheNavalairarm,inpeaceaswellasinwar, are dependent to a large degree upon the availability of refinedpetroleum products.”39 Emphasizing the importance of undeveloped oilreservesinthe“MesopotamianBasinareaofthePersianGulf,”Forrestalobserved that it was in the strategic interest of the United States topromotedevelopmentoftheseoilreservesastheyconstitutedasourceof incomparable wealth whose possession would allow Washington toexerciseglobalinfluence.

Throughout negotiations with the Saudi monarch in the summer of1945,U.S. officials recognizedSaudi sensitivity to its sovereign status.William Eddy, former oil man then U.S. minister in Saudi Arabia,explained to thesecretaryofstate that theking “insisted that theSaudiflagshouldflyovertheinlandposts,theemergencylandingfieldandtheisolated stationswhere navigational aids are to be located, though theoperations,andcontroloftechnicalservicesatthesepostswillbelongtotheUnitedStatesArmy.”40Eddyconcludedthatsucharrangementswereadvantageous in that they protected the U.S. military from “untamedtribesmen” who might otherwise think the foreigners represented aninvadingforce.41

GORDONMERRIAM:PETROLEUMPOLITICS

Among those deeply involved in the planning and coordination of U.S.policy involving oil and Palestine was Gordon Merriam, appointed byTruman to be chief of theDivision ofNearEasternAffairs in theStateDepartment in August 1945.His overall view of the status of theNearEastrevealedhisuncriticalappraisalofEuropeanimperialism.Identifyingthe Middle East, or rather the “Near East,” as “a highly dangeroustrouble-spot,”Merriam pointed to theUSSR as threatening Turkey andIran;toFrance,asfailingtoputdownindependencemovementsinSyriaand Lebanon; and to Palestine, where “disordermay break out at anytime” between Arabs and Jews.42 In this scenario, Merriam viewedWashington’s roleas theanti-imperialistprotectorofferingassistance tothosehedescribedas “for themostpart ignorant, poverty strickenanddiseased.”43 In Merriam’s view, the U.S. role was consistent with “ourhigher long-range political, economic and strategic purposes.”44 Thosepurposes were bestmet with a politics that included carefully targeteddevelopmentplans.

In May 1945, Merriam warned of Arabs and Jews becomingincreasingly “restive” with the attendant risks of violence spreadingthroughouttheregion.Hesuggestedthat“theexpendituresoflargesumsin connection with the carrying out of a far-reaching development planappliednotonlytoPalestine,butalsotoneighboringcountries,”whichhebelievedwouldalleviateviolenceandpoliticalpressuresathomeinsofaras Palestine was concerned.45 In the case of Syria and Lebanon,MerriamobservedthatalthoughtheywerestillunderFrenchmandatoryrule,theyhadappealedtotheUnitedStatesforassistanceintheformofmilitary trainingmissions.Merriamthought theirpredicament reflectedamore general problem—the ineptness of Anglo-French rule. In thatcontext, he counseled Washington to adopt a policy “based upon thepolitical, educational and economic development of the native peoplesand not merely upon the narrow immediate interests of British orAmerican economy.”46 This anticipated later economic developmentprogramsdirectedatPalestinian refugees,whichwereorganizedunderGeorgeMcGhee.

Merriam understood that Washington’s interest in the area wasexclusivelyaproductof itsresources.Inshort,U.S.policyintheMiddle

Eastwas oil policy, whichwas in the hands of a small elite group. AsWilliam Quandt pointed out years later, it represented men “mostly ofsimilar backgrounds—middle-agedmaleWASPS, often the products ofeastcoastcolleges”whohadunusualaccesstothesecretaryofstateoreventhepresident.47

Inan interviewhegave toRichardParker,Merriamreflectedon theoriginofthispolicy,recallingthat“wejustsortofgrewintoitasonethinghappenedafteranother.”48Heobserved thatLoyHendersonhadanoilmanasadviser in thedepartment: firstMaxThornburg,whowasVPoftheBahreinPetroleumCompanyownedbythetwooilgiantsthatownedARAMCO,andthenCharlesRayner,whowastheexecutiveofSocony-Vacuum and replaced Thornburg. But the crucial factor was theunderlyingrelationshipbetweenpolicymakersandoilpeople.

Wewereinclosetouchwithouroilpeople,allthewaythrough,andusedtoseequitealotofthem.Wethoughttheywereaverycapablecrowd.Theydidthatwithoutanyhelpfromusatall.Theydidn’tneedany.InfactwehadnorepresentationinSaudiArabiaatalluntiltheywerewellalongintheirdiscoveryanddevelopment.Ithink,thefirstrepresentativewehadinSaudiArabiawasParkerHart.Andthatwasnotdiplomaticrepresentation,wejustsetupaconsulateoverintheoilfieldsotheoilpeoplecouldbeserviced.Wewereinclosetouchwithouroilpeopleallthewaythrough.49

J. Rives Childs, U.S. minister to Saudi Arabia, understood the

relationship,pointingoutthat“theArabianAmericanOilCompanywasinSaudiArabiabeforethelegationatJiddaortheConsulateatDhahran,”whichexplainedwhytheSaudiking’sministerhadbecomeaccustomed“todealingwithARAMCOastheywouldwithrepresentativesofaforeigngovernment.”50 Characteristically blunt, Merriam underlined SaudiArabia’s importanceandtheurgencyofensuring that it remained in thehandsofthose“followingthepathsofdemocraticcivilizationratherthanthoseofEasterndictatorships.”51Merriam’srationaleforsupportingSauditribalism and authoritarianism outlived him. It became the consistentlyunexamined apology for a key dimension of U.S. Middle East policythroughsucceedingdecades.

InSaudiArabia,wheretheoilresourcesconstituteastupendoussourceofstrategicpower,andoneof thegreatestmaterialprizes inworldhistory,aconcessioncovering thisoil isnominally inAmericancontrol. Itwillundoubtedlybe lost to theUnitedStatesunless thisGovernmentisabletodemonstrateinapracticalwayitsrecognitionofthisconcessionasof national interest byacceding to the reasonable requests ofKing IbnSaud that hebe

assisted temporarily in his economic and financial difficulties until the exploitation of theconcession,onapracticalcommercialbasis,beginstobringsubstantialroyaltiestoSaudiArabia.52

AsMerrriam explained, the United States estimated that some $10

million per year was necessary to ensure “a reasonable security toAmericaninterestinthevastArabianoilfields.”53

Of U.S. companies, the most powerful was ARAMCO and its vastholdings in Saudi Arabia. ARAMCO constituted the center of anarchipelagoofpetroleumwealth,anditwasrunasareplicaoftheStateDepartment,withanallied intelligenceorganization, basedon theOSSmodel that dealt with the intelligence and propaganda section of theMiddle East. As Vitalis points out, “his was the institutional home ofARAMCO’s vauntedArabists and, not coincidentally,manyof the earlyCIAoperativesinSaudiArabia.”54

The easternmost part of this concession covers the Persian Gulfcoast of Saudi Arabia between Kuwait and Qatar. Bahrein PetroleumCompany, Ltd. is U.S.-owned but registered as a British company.StandardOilCompanyofCaliforniaandtheTexascompanyjointlyownboth Bahrein Petroleum and the Arabian American Oil companies.PetroleumDevelopment Ltd. (a subsidiary of the British controlled IraqPetroleumCompany)holdscurrentconcessions forallofQatarandtheTrucialcoast.Therewereindicationsasrecentlyas1941thatPetroleumDevelopmentLtd.stillheldaconcessionfor theexploitationofoil in theSultanateofMuscatandOman.55Tothis theKuwaitOilCompanymustbe added as it held “the concession for the whole of Kuwait.” Thecompany, in turn,was co-ownedby theBritish controlledAnglo-IranianOilCompanyandtheU.S.ownedGulfExplorationCompany.

Other prime areas of oil production included Iraq. Franklin DelanoRoosevelt (FDR), and later Truman, invited the Regent of Iraq, NuriPasha,toWashingtonforatwo-dayvisitwithhisdelegation.Indiplomaticlanguage, the secretaryof statedwelt on theprospectsof encouragingthe“freeflowoftrafficandcommunicationsbetweenourtwocountries.”56In practice, thismeant “direct access ofAmerican civil aviation to Iraq,and also the setting up of a direct radiotelephone and telegraph circuitwiththeUnitedStatessothatmessageswouldnothavetopassthroughother capitals.”57 The reference was to London. Nuri Pasha pointedlyaskedtheUnitedStatesto“doeverythingpossibleinordertobringabout

an increase in the extraction of petroleum in Iraq.”58 The invitationwaswelcomeasitopenedthedoorforU.S.entryintothemostsensitivezoneofoperations.

The Iranian situation differed, but Teheran also viewed the UnitedStatesasbeingoutsidetheimperialistcamp.IranturnedtoWashingtonfor assistance first in 1942 against Soviet policies in the north of thecountry, and later against moves in the south. In 1944, MohammedMossadegh—the nationalist leader theUnitedStates andBritainwouldbringdown inacoup in1953—called forabill toarrestoilnegotiationswith foreign states, citing evidence of postwar plans for the partition ofIran.By1946, theyear inwhich theexpansionofARAMCOwasbeingplanned,theadvanceofU.S.oilcorporationsintheMiddleEastinvolvedSaudi Arabia, Iraq, and Iran, with differing degrees of power andpenetration,towhichaccesstothe“ContinentalShelf”ofthePersianGulfclaimedbytheBritishmustbeadded.

The full power of American oil becamemanifestwith theARAMCOmerger thatwasconsummatedonMarch12,1947.ThedateresonatesinU.S.policyintheMiddleEastas,inadditiontoARAMCO’sexpansion,itwastheyearoftheTrumanDoctrine,thePentagontalksbetweentheUnited States and the United Kingdom that frankly delineated therespectiveprivilegesofthenearlypastandfutureimperialpower,andtheUNGAPartitionPlanforPalestine,Resolution181.59 Insum,theeventsof1947profoundlyshaped thecomingdecadeofU.S.andMiddleEastpolicywithlong-runningconsequenceswhoseoutlineswereapparenttothosefamiliarwithregionalhistoryandinternationaleconomicpolicies.

In1947,legalagreementexpandingtheCaltexgroup,whichwastheoriginalbaseofARAMCO, to includeExxonandMobilwassignedandapproved by the attorney general’s office even though its antitrustimplicationswereclear to those involved. InOctober1946, theVPandgeneralcounselofMobil,GeorgeV.Holton,hadinformedtheexecutivecommitteeofMobilofhisassessmentof thesignificanceof themerger.Accordingtotheofficialaccount,“thearrangementwouldplacepracticalcontrol of crude reserves in the Eastern Hemisphere in the hands ofsevencompanies.FiveofthemwouldbeAmericanownedandallofthelatter have substantial reserves in theWesternHemisphere also.”60Onthe basis of the same source, “our great oil interests” in Saudi Arabia,Bahrein, and, to a lesser extent, Kuwait, and givenBritain’s position in

the Gulf, the State Department recommended the expansion of U.S.commercial interests while cooperating with Britain. To this end, itproposed that the United States “encourage and support U.S.missionariesinthePersianGulfintheirmedicalandeducationalwork.”61

At the end of 1947 the Iranian government requested, withoutsuccess, that the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) increase therevenueshareallottedtoIran.62Threeyearslater,theexampleoftheso-called 50:50 arrangement set by ARAMCO in Saudi Arabia was apreemptive move by the U.S. corporation designed to blunt similaractionsonthepartoftheSaudis.ButthestorydidnotendeasilyinIran;the overthrow of PremierMohammedMossadegh in 1953was directlylinkedtotherefusalofAIOCexecutives,supportedbytheUnitedStates,toacceptthepremier’srepeatedrequestsforanegotiationofdifferencesthat included recognition of Iran’s legitimate demands for an increasedshareoftherevenueofAIOC.63

ANOTHERVIEWOFTHEPOSTWARMIDDLEEAST

Merriam’s discussion of Washington’s oil-centered policies gave noindicationofthepostwarpoliticalandeconomiclandscapeoftheMiddleEast.ItofferednoindicationoftheeconomicimpactoftheSecondWorldWar on the region, including the vast zones of discontent affecting oilworkersacrossNorthAfricaandtheArabEast.

As economistsOwen andPamuk pointed out in their contemporaryeconomic history of theMiddle East, theMediterranean was cut off toAlliedshippingasaresultofGermanintervention,deprivingtheareaofconsumergoodsaswellasagriculturaland industrialproducts.Further,Allied forces imposeddemands for “accommodation, labor, foodand, inthecaseofPalestine, theproductionofessentialmilitarysuppliessuchaspetrol cans,mines, andbarbedwire.”64Overall,with the stimulus oftheAnglo-AmericanMiddleEastSupplyCenter, industrialgrowthunderstate-ledcontrolincreased,asdidthenumbersofworkersaffected.

The largest employer of urban wage labor in Palestine until WorldWarIIwasthePalestineRailways; itsArab-Jewishworkforcepeakedat7,800in1943.ConsolidatedRefineriesinHaifabeganproductionin1940andemployedover2,000Arab,Jewish,andBritishmanualandclericalworkers. By 1944 there were 100,000 Arab nonagricultural wage

workers,about35,000ofwhomwereemployedatBritishmilitarybasesalongwith15,000Jewishworkers.65

With the end of the war came the fear of unemployment, and inLondon and Washington the alarming prospect of labor unrest andradicalization. In Egypt, as the end of war approached, an estimated250,000workerswerefired,asituationaggravatedby“sharpfluctuationsin production and intensified mechanization in the textile industry. Thecost-of-livingindexrosefrom100in1939to331in1952,andrealwagesdid not keep pace.”66 This increased opposition to Britain’s continuedoccupation and further inflamed the population against the corruptmonarchy. The resulting mobilization of radical unions prompted stateinterventionbypoliceandmilitary,leadingto“anine-daystrikeinJanuary1946 that targeted both the government and continuing layoffs in thetextile industry.”67 Further repression was aimed at studentdemonstrations against the occupation, and the National Committee ofWorkers and Students “called a general strike and demonstration onFebruary 21, 1946,” as “thousands of workers fromShubra al-Khaymajoined a crowd estimated at between 40,000 and 100,000 in theCairodemonstration.”68Itwasanexample,multipliedbymanyothers,thatwasmeaningfultoobserversoftheEgyptianuprisingin2011,aperiodwhenU.S. media coverage paid little attention to the role of labor then, orearlier,inEgypt’shistory.

InPalestine,thespringof1946provedtobeaperiodofexceptionallabormilitancywithstrikeseffectivelyshuttingdowntheoperationsofthemandatory power. “Postal, telephone, and telegraph workers wereresponsible for touching off what became an unprecedentedly broadstrike of white-and blue-collar government employees.”69 It was alsoimportantasaneffortthatjoinedArabandJewishworkers.

Therewere earlier instances of PalestinianArab labor organization,suchasthestrikesgeneratedbytheriseinthecostoflivingthatspannedtheperiodfrom1936through1945,erodingworkers’wagesandleadingtosplitsintheexistingPalestineCommunistParty.Amongthegroupstoemerge was the National Liberation League, a movement made upmostlyof“Christianintelligentsiaandthenascentworkingclass,”whoseprogram consisted of “working-class social demands, democracy, andnational liberation” that echoed communist lines.70 In 1945, the ArabWorkers’ Congress was formed from the coalition of two preexisting

movements and became “the largest and most important Arab labororganizationinPalestine,”withamembershipofsome20,000in1945.Itwas “the leadingArab union federation in Jaffa,Gaza, Jerusalem, andNazareth.”71InHaifa,itsucceededinorganizingworkersintheoilsector,theport,steel,andchemicalworksaswellasdominating“theArabtradeunion movement in Jaffa, Gaza, Jerusalem, Nazareth, and severalsmallertowns.”72

InLebanon,thesameperiodwitnessedtheorganizationofLebanesetobacco workers against the French monopoly, Regie de Tabacs. Indefiance of the Regie and the Lebanese regime that supported it,Lebaneseworkers,menandwomen,respondedbyoccupyingthefactoryandwarehouseinMarMkhayil inwhat turnedout tobeabloodystrike.Womenwereactiveasorganizersandparticipantsinthemobilizationoflabor in the tobacco industry, contributing directly to the series ofnationwide actions that followed protests by “representatives andmembers of political parties, social associations, workers’ unions andfederations”outragedbythenatureandextentofstaterepression.73Thepassageoflaborlegislationwasadirectresultofsuchdevelopments.

In Iraq, it was the Iraqi Communist Party that organized theSchalchiyyahrailwayworkerswhostruckinprotestagainstlowwagesinanactionthatlastedfrommid-ApriltoMay1,1945.Similarly, itwastheCommunist Party that mobilized the port workers of Basrah, obtainingapprovalforthelicensingoftheirunioninadvanceofanextendedperiodof laboractions.Thesituation in theoil fields,grownmoreactivesincethewar,generatedaleveloforganizinginresponsetoinferiorwagesthatculminatedinastrikeof“about5,000oilworkers,thatis,thebulkofthehandsatKirkuk.”74ThestrikebeganonJuly3.Inthedaysthatfollowed,“asthestrikespreadandincreasedinintensity,commandaftercommandcame from Baghdad to the local authorities insisting on conclusivecounter-measuresandtheuseofforceifnecessary.”75Itwasnotlongincoming, but it failed to stem the strikes that followed. In the spring of1948,amajorstrikeagainsttheIPCstationnearHadithawasorganizedbytheIraqiCommunistParty,leadingIPCtoretaliate,which,inturn,ledtothedecisionofthestrikerstomarchonthecapital.76

InSaudiArabiawhere therewasno industrialactivityoutsideof theU.S. controlledpetroleumsector,ARAMCO’sproductionwas increasedtomeet Alliedwartime needs, such as fuel in the Far East. The result

was a parallel increase in the total number of workers employed, from2,882in1943to11,892in1945,withthelatterincluding7,500workersofSaudiorigin.77SuchdevelopmenteventuallyresultedintheexpansionofARAMCO’s role in thekingdom,whichmagnified thenumberof foreignworkerswho,with nativeworkers,were not only subject to exploitationbut a form of segregation that evoked the experience of the AmericanSouth.78 The overall result was to strengthen the repressive tactics ofARAMCO and the Saudi regime, which, in turn, antagonized thosedissenters, such as the future founder of OPEC, Abdallah Tariki, whowent intoexile,whileAbdal-Aziz IbnMuammarandothersweremetedoutaharsherfate.79

Yet strikes occurred. In June 1945 the first strike againstARAMCOtookplaceattheRasTanurarefinery.Thegrievancesinvolvedfoodandharassment.ThesecondstrikeoccurredinJulyinDhahran,andthistimeinferiorsalaryandbenefitswerethebasisofprotests.ThiswasfollowedbytherevoltofItalianworkers,andthen“theentirelaborforceof9,000Arabs employed in Dhahran, Ras Tanura, and the outlying worksitesdefiedtheamirandresumedthestrikeagainstARAMCO.”80

Thestrikeproducedlimitedresultsinsofarasworkers’demandswereconcerned. What improved was the company’s surveillance of Arabworkers. Two years later, itwas estimated that “despite all the trainingprograms,about85percentofthecompany’s10,000SaudiworkerswereunskilledlaborersinthethreelowestofARAMCO’stenpaygrades.Only80 Saudis were classified as ‘journeyman’ or ‘skilled craftsman,’ andalthough a handful had been promoted to supervisor, ‘No SaudissupervisedAmericanemployees.’”81Additionalevidencefurtherconfirmsthe contempt in which Saudi workers were held by their Americansuperiors.82

ConsideringtheUSSRintheMiddleEastItwasinthecontextofapoliticallymobilizedregion,fromGreecetoIraq,thattherisksof

radicalizationimpressedU.S.officialswhofearedSovietinfluenceandintervention,particularlyintheaftermathofthewar.AsforMoscow,itspolicyinPalestinewentthroughvariousphasesthatculminatedin

supportforpartitionand,later,forJewishstatehood.

In the winter of 1940, Palestine’s chief rabbi met with Moscow’s

Ambassador to London, Ivan Maisky, who was reputed to be highlyesteemedbyMolotovandStalinforhisBritishconnections.ThepurposeofthemeetingwastoobtaintransitvisasforreligiousstudentsinPolandwhowished to emigrate toPalestine.83 Beginning inOctober 1940, theZionist movement sought contact with Soviet diplomats in the UnitedStates and the UK, as the efforts of Nahum Goldmann, thenrepresentativeoftheJewishAgencyintheUnitedStates,andU.S.RabbiStephen Wise demonstrated in meeting with Soviet AmbassadorKonstantinOumanski inWashington.Theyoffered tohaveadelegationvisit the USSR to open discussions on the situation of Polish JewishrefugeesinRussia.Thisprecededthe1941meetinginLondonbetweenIvanMaiskiand thepresidentof theWorldZionistOrganization,ChaimWeizmann. On that occasion, Weizmann discussed the future ofPalestine with the Soviet ambassador, an exchange important in thecontext of theZionistmovement’s relationswith theUSSR.Maiskiwasreported to have had no qualms in recognizing the necessity of thetransfer of Palestinian Arabs to enable Jews to settle. “Weizmannestimated that onemillionArabs have to leave [i.e., be transferred] fortwo million Jews to be settled in their place.”84 Other versions of thisexchange place the figure that Weizmann offered as half a millionenablingthesettlementoftwomillionJewsintheirplace.85

In 1942Zionist leadersmet inWashingtonwithSovietAmbassadorMaxim Litvinov and in Ankara with the ambassador to the UK, SergeiVinogradov.ThemeetingsledtothevisitoftwoSovietofficialsfromtheAnkara embassy to Palestine, where they attended a convention insupport of theSovietwar effort. Itwas preceded by the creation of ananti-fascistcommittee that inMay1942becametheLeagueforVictory,or the so-calledV League. Such contacts continued through 1943, theyearinwhichMoscowopenedembassiesinCairo,Syria,Lebanon,andIraqandMaiskivisitedJerusalemandtwokibbutziminitsvicinity.

ShortlyaftertheissuanceoftheAnglo-AmericanCommitteereportin1946,theheadoftheMiddleEastdivisionoftheSovietForeignMinistry,V. Dekanozov, who was also deputy minister of Foreign Affairs, sentAndrei Vyshinskii, the Soviet Foreign Minister, his response to theproceedings.HispositionentailedarejectionofbothBritain’spresenceinPalestine and Jewish demands for immigration. In their place, hesignaled approval of a UN trusteeship “until the formation of an

independentanddemocraticPalestine.”86Moscowappearedtobackabi-nationalarrangementinaunitaryPalestinianstateduringthisperiod,butit did not prevent Soviet officials from continuing to meet with Zionistenvoys.

Moscow’s inconsistency in no way prepared those in Washingtonkeen to grasp the direction of Soviet policy as being in support forpartition.ForthosefearfulofSovietinfluenceintheMiddleEast,suchasLoyHenderson,directoroftheOfficeofNearEasternandAfricanAffairs,the risks remained unchanged. He viewed Moscow as bent on anambitious expansion of its power, determined to penetrate Turkey andtheMediterranean,Iran,andtheGulfandtheIndianOcean.

The Soviet presence in Iran was raised at successive internationalconferences, as the competition betweenWashington andTehran overIranianoilemerged. In theopinionofGeorgeKennan, thenUSCharged’AffairesinMoscow,“thebasicmotiveofrecentSovietactioninnorthernIran is probably not need for oil itself but apprehension of potentialforeignpenetrationinthatareacoupledwiththeconcernforprestige.Theoil innorthern Iran is important,notassomethingRussianeeds,butassomething that might be dangerous for anyone else to exploit.”87 TheIranian rejectionofSovietdemands, furtherstrengthenedbyavigorousU.S.response,ledtotheUSSR’smeddlinginseparatistmovementsfromAzerbaijan to Kurdistan and the Caspian, and to its involvement inTeheran’spolarizeddomesticpolitics.

In1946,theU.S.lookedonIraniandevelopmentswithaneyetotheirimplicationsfortherestoftheMiddleEast.ItwasClarkClifford,Truman’sspeciallegalcounselwhowastoplayacrucialroleinsupportofZionistobjectives,whowarnedagainstthecourseofIranianaffairsinthatyear.In a special report, Clifford “argued that the United States should beready to use force to guard its vital interests, warning that ‘continuedaccess to oil in the Middle East is especially threatened by SovietpenetrationintoIran.’”88

Washington did not remain aloof from these developments, but itsprimary concernwas Iran’s resources thatwere largely in thehandsoftheAnglo-IranianOilCompany.The1953Anglo-AmericancouptobringdownthedemocraticallyelectedgovernmentofMohammedMossadeghin1953wasaturningpointinU.S.policyintheMiddleEast.

IntheeasternMediterranean,Washingtonfocusedontheareaofthe

TurkishStraits,fearingthatitmightbecometheSovietpointofentryintotheregion.HendersonconceivedofTurkeyas“themostimportantfactorin the Mediterranean and Middle East” from a strategic perspective,which Soviet policy aimed to exploit.89 Soviet attempts to renew theTurkish-SovietFriendshipTreaty(1925),onconditionthatAnkaraacceptjointdefenseof theDardanellesand theBosporus,antagonizedTurkeyandworriedWashingtonandLondon.ThefearinWashingtonwaslessofimminentSoviet intervention than of a desire on the part of theUnitedStates to ensure Turkey’s availability as a future base from which toprotecttheCairo-Suezregionandpetroleuminpointseast.

Likewise, if the Soviets could be denied control of theDardanelles,theirsubmarinesmightbebottledupintheBlackSea,therebyensuringmuchsaferlinesofcommunicationforAlliedforcestraversingtheeasternMediterranean. If wartime developments permitted, Turkish airfieldsmightevenbeusedto launchraidsagainstvitalpetroleumareaswithintheSovietUnionandRomania.Attheveryleast,fighteraircraftstationedin Turkey might protect Allied bombers as they ventured into SovietterritoryfromthebasesatCairo-Suez.90

While Washington’s concerns were focused on Soviet ambitions inthe region’s industrial bases and oil fields, Ankara’s tensions with theUSSR affected Turkey’s economic development, which shifted towardincreasingfreeenterpriseandopenmarkets.Washington’sinfluencewasevident in this turn, as was its intention in arming and financing theTurkish military. From Washington’s perspective, Turkey and Greeceemerged “as thesoleobstacles toSoviet dominationofa regionwhichwasinturnthelinktoAsia.”91

Henderson’sviewsofthesituationinGreecewereconsistentwithhisoveralloutlookonU.S.policyintheeasternMediterranean.Hesupportedtheright-wingGeneralTsaldarisandclaimedtohavebeeninstructedbyUnder-Secretary of State Robert Lovett to confront him withWashington’sconditionsforsupport—namely,thatheappointacoalitiongovernment. Eventually Tsaldaris was made deputy to Prime MinisterSophoulis,anarrangementthatHendersonfoundunsatisfactory.Onhisreturn to theUnitedStates,Hendersonsuggested toSecretaryofStateMarshallthattheUnitedStatesoughttohaveamilitaryadviserinGreecewho was experienced in dealing with guerrilla warfare. Henderson’ssuggestionwasapparentlyheard.

InWashington, congressional support forU.S. policy inGreeceandTurkeywasuncertain,buttheimportanceofdevelopmentsintheeasternMediterraneancametodefineU.S.policy:

TheUnitedStateswasreplacingBritisheconomicandstrategicpowerintheMiddleEast;itwas preparing for a radically more costly approach to foreign economic policy; it wasmovingtowardtheresurrectionandfinalreintegrationofGermanandJapanesepower inananti-Sovietalliance,aswellasanAmerican-ledworldeconomy;itwastransformingitsinterventionagainstLeftrevolutionintoastandardpolicyandresponse.92

2ThePalestineQuestion:1945

“…probablythemostimportantandurgentatthepresenttime.”1

FarfromthepreoccupationwiththeradicalizationofArablabor,theStateDepartment faced an altogether different problem. It was one thatinvolved European Jewish refugees, the aspiration of the Zionistmovement inPalestine, andBritish policy in thePalestinianmandate itcontrolled. Despite the State Department’s description of the Palestinequestion as “probably the most important and urgent,” Washingtonrecognized Palestine as being a British responsibility, with the UnitedStateshavingonlya limitedrole toplay.As for theEuropeandisplacedpersons,Washingtonhadnoformalpolicytodealwiththemeither.

TheStateDepartment’sNearEastDivision,itshouldberecalled,hadonly fourteen officers in 1943.2 The newly created intelligence service,the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), had an archive on Palestineconsisting of two articles, one on Arabs, a second on Jews.3 WilliamRogerLouis remarkedon the lackoforganizationalstructure indealingwithPalestine:

WithintheAmericangovernmentthereexistednostandinginter-departmentalcommitteetogive sustained attention to Palestine, nor did the president delegate responsibility tocoordinatetheviewsoftheStateDepartmentandtheJointChiefsofStaff.In1945–6theState-Navy-War Coordinating Committee gave the problem only perfunctory attention.Intelligence reportscontained information that couldbegleaned frommajornewspapers.TheSecretaryofStatetookonlyanerraticinterestinthematter.DeanAchesonasUnder-SecretaryineffectpresidedoverAmericanPalestinepolicyandattemptedtoreconciletheviewsoftheWhitehousestaffandtheareaspecialistsoftheForeignService.4

The State Department’s Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs,

establishedin1944,wasmodestlystaffed.Writingoftheearlyandmid-

1940s,EvanWilsonobservedthat“PalestinecameundertheDivisionofNearEasternAffairs,whichwasoneof thesixgeographicalorpoliticaldivisions of the Department [State Department] and which hadresponsibility for our relations with the countries of the Near orMiddleEast, the Indian subcontinent and virtually all of Africa.”5 As Wilsonexplained, fourteen officers in the divisionwere responsible for roughlythirty-nine Foreign Service officers, involving legations and consulates.Thechiefof thedivisionwasPaulH.Ailling,withWallaceS.Murrayasadviser on political relations and Gordon P. Merriam as assistant andlater chief of the division. In addition, a select number of academicfigures, including Philip W. Ireland and William Yale, and Lt. ColonelHaroldB.Hoskinsfunctionedasadvisers.

With the accession of Truman, certain changes took place in theDepartmentofState.JamesF.ByrnesbecamesecretaryofstateinJune1945, remaining in that position until 1947, at which point George C.Marshallreplacedhim.DeanAchesonbecameundersecretary,andLoyHendersonwasnameddirectoroftheOfficeofNearEasternandAfricanAffairs.

The two offices that were to be involved in matters related toPalestineweretheOfficeofNearEasternandAfricanAffairs,underLoyHenderson, and the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, under GordonMerriam. Wilson contended, and Merriam was probably in agreement,that once Truman assumed the presidency, control over PalestinianaffairswouldmovetotheWhiteHouse.

In policymaking circles, criticism of the inadequacy of planningwaspervasive.GeorgeElsey,assistanttothespecialcounseltothepresidentfrom 1947 to 1949 and then administrative assistant to the presidentbetween 1949 and 1951, recalled the limited number of “experts” thatTrumanhadathisdisposal.AccordingtoElsey,“therewereno‘experts’on foreignaffairsat theWhiteHouse.”6Someon theWhiteHousestaffdealtwithboththeDepartmentofStateandtheDepartmentofDefense,butnotintheircapacityasforeignpolicyexperts.Inaddition,therewereadvisers of an informal kindwho held no title butwere known to haveaccess to the president, such as David Niles, whom Hendersonconsidered“oneofthetrumpcardsheldbyZionists.”7InElsey’sview,thepresidentconsultedthe“SecretaryofStateandtheSecretaryofDefense,theJointChiefsofStaff,fortheadvice,theopinions,theinformation,and

the recommendations that he needed in formulating foreign policydecisions.”8 From Elsey’s perspective, the National Security Councilbecamethecenterofforeignpolicyanalysisin1947.

In dealing with the Palestine question, some maintained that theWhiteHousewasmoreattunedtodomesticpressuresthantoPalestiniandevelopments.9 Presidential advisers such asDavidNileswere viewedbyNahumGoldmann,presidentof theWorldJewishCongressand theWorldZionistOrganization,as“oneofourbestandmostloyalfriendsinWashington.”10Niles’sofficeunderPresidentTrumanhasbeendescribedas “the centre of Palestine activity in the White House.”11 Along withJudge Samuel I. Rosenman, Niles had previously worked in the FDRadministration.MaxLowenthal,whoworkedforClarkCliffordin1947–48,was credited by Truman as “the primary force behind the Americanrecognition of Israel.”12 Clark Clifford, who succeeded Rosenman asspecialcounseltothepresidentfromJuly1946toJanuary1950,wastoplay a key role as an insider sympathetic to Zionist objectives. “Nopersonal aide wasmore influential than the pro-Zionist Clifford,” writesPeterL.HahninadiscussionofTruman’sadvisers.13Hewasviewedas“the chief architect of the administration’s pro-partition position” and,along with Max Lowenthal, one of a number of conduits to Jewishcircles.14

Secretaryof theInteriorHaroldIckeswasallegedtohavewantedtobecome chair of theWashington division of the Committee to RescueEuropean Jews in 1943, a front of the Irgun (the Jewish terroristorganization in Palestine) operating in the United States. In 1944 theheadoftheAmericanJewishCongress,StephenS.Wise,wrotetoIckestopersuadehimtowithdrawfromtheorganization.15

GordonMerriamwasputinchargeofPalestinianAffairswhenhewasassistantchiefof theDivisionofNearEasternAffairs intheDepartmentof State shortly after it was established. He attributed the absence ofpolicywithrespecttoPalestinetothemannerinwhichitcamebeforetheStateDepartment.AccordingtoMerriam,“wealsogot into it (Palestine)because the British gave up their mandate in Palestine and we, andparticularly theWhiteHouse,hadbeengivingall this freeadvice to theBritish about running Palestine and preventing them from movingaggressively, because by various White House pronouncements wemade it impossible for the British to succeed in getting agreement

betweentheZionistsandthePalestinians.”16As far as the State Department was concerned, Merriam was

persuaded that “Mr.Trumanand theWhiteHousewere fightingusbutwedidn’tknowit.Becausewewerenotonthesametrackatall,andweassumedallthewaythroughthatouradvicewasbeingconsideredbytheWhiteHouse,butitneverwas.”17

Yet in late January 1945, Evan Wilson, Gordon Merriam, and FoyKohler of theDivisionofNearEasternAffairs of theStateDepartment,along with Dr. Philip Ireland and Prof. William Yale of the Division ofTerritorial Studies were responsible for several studies dealing withPalestine that Under Secretary of State Stettinius took with him to theBritishForeignOffice.18Althoughthestudieswerenotpolicystatements,theymeritconsideration.Theyrepresentanearlypronouncementinfavorof maintaining Palestine as a unitary state under a trusteeshiparrangement.

Intheiropeningmemorandumon“FormofGovernment,”theauthorsdeclared themselves to be in favor of Palestine as “an InternationalTerritoryunderTrusteeshipwithaCharter, grantedby the InternationalOrganization”19 They proposed that such a charter offer “principles forimmigration, land transfers, andeconomic development”withBritain astrustee.Inaddition,representativesoftheChristian,Jewish,andMuslimcommunities were to be represented in a Board of Overseers. Mostimportant, they argued, was “that the Arabs and Jews in Palestine berecognizedasnational communities andbegranted self-government inallareaswheretheyare,respectively,predominant.”Thereasonsofferedfor this position revealed the State Department’s vision of a futurePalestinianstate.

Thisrecommendationismadebecause:(a)iteliminatestheconflictingcommitmentsofthepast;(b)itplacesPalestineoutsidetheboundsofnationalistandimperialistambitions;(c)itprovidesthemeanstosolvebasiceconomicproblems;and(d)itwouldcreateconditionsfavorable to that cooperation between Arabs and Jews essential to the ultimateindependenceofPalestine.

Asecondmemofocusedonimmigrationandtheneedtoadjustitto“thegeneral welfare of the people of Palestine judged on the basis of theeconomic requirements of agriculture, commerce, and industry for

immigrants.”20Additional memoranda dealt with economic development and land

transfers.Theauthorsrecommended“large-scaledevelopmentprojects”designedtoavertcompetitionbetweenArabsandJews,whilepromotingproductioninazonethattheyforesawasunappealingtoprivatecapital.Asto land,theyidentifiedtheconflictbetweenthedemandsofJewsforunrestrictedaccesstolandpurchaseandtheresistancetothesamebyPalestinianArabsconcernedwith“themenacetotheArabpeasantryoffurther alienationof agricultural land.”21 Theauthors recommended thatboth Jewish and Palestinian Arab communities exercise some controlover land transfers, prohibiting them in “Haifa, Jerusalem, Safad, andTiberias,”aswellas inthe“JordanValleyandtheNegeb,”wheresomeprovisionsforsuchtransferswerenonethelesstobemade.22

Merriam,Wilson, and others who had been involved in formulatingthese proposals were not invited to meet with Jewish AgencyrepresentativesinWashington,D.C.,inthewinterof1945.Theydidmeetwith NahumGoldmann several months later. In the interim, the actingsecretary of state, JosephGrew,met with Jewish Agency officials andlearnedthattheyhadrequestedincreasedimmigrationtoPalestine.TheBritish response to similar pressure led to the British recommendationthat Libya be a possible homeland for the Jews, which elicited littlesupport in the Arab world. In this troubled period, the Merriam-Wilsonproposals were not entirely discarded, and the recommendation thatPalestine be an “international territory sacred to all three religions—Moslem,ChristianandJew”wasviewedbytheU.S.presidentasanideathatcouldbebroughttotheattentionoftheUnitedNations.23

The White House acknowledged receipt of these proposals,recommendations,warnings,andappealsandsimultaneouslyreaffirmedsome of its predecessor’s most public positions on Palestine. HenceTruman’sstatementtoEmirAbdullahonMay17,1945:“AsregardsthequestionofPalestine, I amglad to renew to you theassuranceswhichyou have previously received, to the effect that in the view of thisGovernment,nodecisionshouldbetakenrespecting thebasicsituationinthatcountrywithoutfullconsultationwithbothArabsandJews.”24

Thesamethemewasreiteratedbytheactingsecretaryofstate inapointed reminder to Truman at the end of June, in anticipation of thePotsdammeeting.FullconsultationwithArabsandJews,Grewrepeated,

was fundamental to theU.S.position.Zionistemissaries toWashingtondidnotobject toconsultationwithArabsprovidedthat theywerefreetodeterminetheirownfuture.TheheadoftheJewishAgency,DavidBen-Gurion, chairman of the executive of the Jewish Agency, along withNahumGoldmannandEliezerKaplanof the JewishAgencymade thisclear in late June 1945 in their communication with key figures of theState Department’s Division of Near Eastern Affairs, including LoyHenderson,GordonMerriam,andEvanWilson.

On June 27, 1945, Ben-Gurion declared that the Jews of Palestinewanted to be free to determine their own course, without outsideinterference, referring to Arab political figures across the region.However,healsoinsistedonthelegitimateinterestsofthePalestinians.“The Arabs of Palestine were, of course, legitimately interested in thatcountry, and there was no intention of disturbing them or calling theirrights into question. JewsandArabs had lived there in amity formanyyears,andtherewasnoreasonwhytheyshouldnotcontinuetodoso,providedtheArabselsewhereleftthemalone.”25

Ben-Gurion’sstatementwithrespecttoPalestinianArabswasbeliedby the practice of Jewish forces in Palestine. His statement, however,underscoredtheZionistmovement’sposition,whichwasthattheJewsofPalestine “had come to the point where they could no longer acceptanything less than the granting of all their demands, including theimmediate establishment of a Jewish State.”26 As for Loy Henderson’sobservation that the Arabs would likely cause difficulties if the BritishsupportedZionistgoalsinPalestine,

Mr.Ben-GurionandhiscompatriotsexpressedcompleteconfidenceintheirabilitytodealwiththeArabs.Mr.Ben-GurionsaidthatheknewtheArabswellandthattheywouldnotreallyputupanykindoffight.TheBedouinsofthedesertwere,ofcourse,goodneighborsbutitwaswellknownthattheyhadnointerestinthePalestineproblemandsotheleadersof theArabstateswouldnotbesuccessful in rallying theirpeople tosupportof theArabpositiononPalestine.27

As pressure on the administration to define its position intensified,Truman asked the British prime minister to consider allowing JewishimmigrationtoPalestinegiventhecircumstancesfacingEuropeanJewry.Throughoutthisperiod,U.S.officialsacrosstheArabworldweresendingnegativereportsofreactionstosuchaprospect.Ashepreparedforthemeetings at Potsdam, Truman was urged by the team of Near East

hands of the State Department to inquire as to Britain’s position withrespecttoplacingPalestineunderaUNtrusteeship.ItwasanoptiontheNear East team favored although it was by no means their onlysuggestion.

OnAugust24,1945,LoyHendersonsent thesecretaryofstate theplanscomposedby theDivisionofNearEasternAffairswith respect toPalestine.Hendersonindicatedthat“theDivisionhasbeenstudyingandliving with the difficult Palestine problem for many years” and wasprepared to make its experience and knowledge available to thoseinterested.28Hendersonandhiscolleaguesweresober in theirestimateofwhatproposalsmightbeacceptable toJewsandArabs inPalestine,concludingthat“nosolutionofthePalestineproblemcanbefoundwhichwould be completely satisfactory to both the Arabs and the Jews.”29Nonetheless,theyproposedfouroptions,ofwhichonehadtheirsupport.ThefourweresummarizedbyHendersonandthenofferedindetailinanadjoiningAnnex.Henderson’slistincludedthefollowing:1.Palestine:StatusasaJewishCommonwealth2.Palestine:An

IndependentArabState3.ProposedPlanforthePartitionofPalestineundertheTrusteeshipSystem4.ProposedTrusteeshipAgreementforPalestine30

HendersonmadeitclearthatheviewedthefirstoptionasdisastrousforU.S. interests in theMiddleEast.Amonghis reasonswas that itwouldviolatetheU.S.policyof“respectingthewishesofalargemajorityofthelocal inhabitants with respect to their form of government.”31 In thecontextofU.S. intervention inGreece in1946and theU.S.decision toignoreplansforaPalestinianstatein1948,Henderson’sremarkmayberead as a polite preface to the real problem, which was his fear thatsupport for a Jewish state “would have a strongly adverse effect uponAmerican interests throughout the Near and Middle East.”32 Multipleexamples followed, sufficient to make the case that Washington’sstandingintheArabworldwouldallbutcollapse.

HendersonwasbynomeanssupportiveofretainingPalestineasanindependent state, however: “For the United States to support therecognition of Palestine as an independent Arab State would almostimmediatelymeanthatwewouldbeendeavoringtoassistinsettinguparegimewhichwouldfail togivetothe largeJewishminority inPalestine

the just and equitable treatment to which that minority is entitled.”33Henderson warned that there was much “Jewish-American capital”investedinPalestinethatmightbelost.

Astothethirdoption,partition,ithadlittlesupportwhenitwasinitiallypresented by theBritish in 1938,which broughtHenderson to the last,andpotentially theonly promising, option, that of trusteeship,whichheassumedwouldappealto“moremoderateArabsandJews.”34

In his observations with respect to partition, Merriam noted that itassumedtheirreconcilabilityofJewishandArabaimswhichwouldnotbealteredbytheproposaltopartitionPalestine,andthatitwould“belikelytoarousewidespreaddiscontent in theArabandMoslemworldswhichwouldbesomewhatunfavorabletoAmericaninterests.”35 Itwasthelastoption, in favor of the trusteeship plan, thatMerriam supported, as didHenderson. Merriam’s reasons were a combination of factors thatminimizedtherisksofviolentArabprotestandofanti-U.S.actionswhilebeingacceptabletonon-ZionistJewishinterests.AsMerriamconcluded,“this would probably receive considerable support from non-ZionistJewish groups whomay be expected to look upon it as a reasonablecompromise solution.”36Merriam’s conclusion assumed the influenceofnon-Zionistgroups,apositionhedidnotelaborateonandthatprovedtobeinaccurate.

Ashort time later,Merriamsubmittedasummaryofa reporton thequestion of immigration prepared by William Yale of the Near EastDivisionoftheStateDepartment.Afterpointingoutthat“Zionistsdemandthat onemillion Jews be admitted to Palestine as rapidly as possible,”MerriamaddedthatthenumberofJewsinEuropedesirousofmigratingtoPalestinewasprobablyhalfthatnumber.37Then,reviewingconditionsin Palestine, he concluded that unless adequate assistance andprotection were provided, it was inappropriate to endorse a policy ofmass migration that would, in addition, be opposed by Arabs. On theother hand, the United States could support a policy of limitedimmigration,assumingtheBritishwouldbeinapositiontoimplementit.

AsMerriamfacedthesuccessionofconferencesandreportsbearingon the situation of European Jewish refugees, he reminded PresidentTruman thatPalestinecouldnotbe treatedexclusively in thecontextofEuropean developments. And as others recognized, Europeandevelopments—including the problem of displaced persons—could not

be treatedexclusively in thecontextofPalestine.As theconferenceatEvian in 1938 demonstrated, immigration was an unpopular option innearlyeverycountry, includingintheUnitedStatesandotheradvancedindustrializedstates.

THEEARLG.HARRISONREPORT

The situation of European Jewish refugees and their resettlement wasconsideredbyTrumanonhisreturnfromPotsdam,asherecalledinhisMemoirs.38InJune1945,Trumanmovedto“investigatetheconditionsofthose Displaced Persons called ‘non-repatriables’” in Europe, whichmeant investigating theconditions inwhichJewishsurvivorsof thewarwerekeptintheAmericanzoneofoccupationinGermany.Theresultingreport (the Harrison Report) led Truman to call for the immigration of100,000 Jews to Palestine, a response that irritated the British who,incidentally, had not been invited or consulted in the investigation thatpreceded the report. Palestinians were similarly ignored. Truman’ssupporteffectivelylinkedthepredicamentofsurvivorsoftheHolocausttoPalestine, thusunderscoringaconnection thatachieved iconicstatus intheidentificationoftheHolocaustwiththeformationofthestateofIsrael.

Instead of endorsing the report, the British recommended anotherinquiry by what became the 1946 Anglo-American Committee (AAC),which, in turn, gave way to theMorrison-Grady Plan, and in 1947 themandatory power decided to bring the Palestine case to the UnitedNations.Lessthanamonthlater,theUnitedNationscreatedtheSpecialCommitteeonPalestine (UNSCOP),whichwas toset thestage for theUN deliberations on partition. The list of successive developmentsprovides little evidence recognizing the profound human, social, andpoliticaldifficultiesinvolvedintheattempttoresolvetherefugeeproblematlocalorinternationallevels.

OnAugust31,1945,TrumansentBritishPMAttleeamessage thatunderscoredhisconvictionof thesingularhumantraumaof therefugeesituation for those who had experienced concentration camps. Thispersuadedhim to support immigration intoPalestine,whichhe claimedthe American people believed “should not be closed and that areasonablenumberofEurope’spersecutedJewsshould, inaccordancewiththeirwishes,bepermittedtoresettlethere.”39Intheinterim,Merriam

urged that plans be made for the absorption of European JewishrefugeesnotonlyinPalestinebutintheUnitedStatesandothernationsandthatArabsandJewsbeconsultedwithrespecttoPalestine.

Meanwhile, thepassageofBritain’s 1939WhitePaperonPalestineignited a nationwide campaign of pro-Zionist supporters, includingcongressional figureswho opposedBritish policies and demanded thatWashingtonendorseJewishstatehoodinPalestineasbeinginharmonywiththeBalfourDeclarationof1917.Yettherewasfarfromamonolithicbloc within the American Jewish community in the early 1940s withrespecttohowtorespondtothesituationinEurope,letalonePalestine.There were those, in addition, who feared that the predicament ofEuropeanJewrycouldbeworsenedbyovertagitation.40RabbiStephenWise, a prominent spokesman for American Zionists until he wasreplacedwith themoremilitant Rabbi AbbaHillel Silver, was the forcebehind the call in 1933 for aNewYork rally inwhich churchand laborleadersparticipatedthatdenouncedGermanpolicy.

With the expansion of the war in Europe, Roosevelt and the StateDepartment pressed Zionist supporters in the United States to modifytheirantagonismtowardBritain, includinginPalestine.ButFDRandhissupporterswerealsowellawareofthedomesticoppositiontoexpandingimmigrationquotastoallowincreasedadmissionofEuropeanJewsintotheUnitedStates.In1936,whenFDRwasreportedtohavedirected“theState Department to loosen some of its red tape and facilitate theissuance of visas to those people eligible to enter the United Statesunder the quota system,” opposition came from thosewho felt that thepresident ignoreddomesticeconomicconditions.41 Itwas in thiscontextthat Roosevelt was moved to initiate planning for an internationalconference at Evian, France, in 1938. Of the thirty-two countries thatparticipated,virtuallynonewerewillingtochangetheir immigration lawsto accommodate those in desperate plight. The resulting deferral toPalestinewasregardedbysomeastheinevitableandjustend.

WhywerethedoorstotheUnitedStatesclosedtoEuropeanJewishimmigration? The subject has led to numerous inquiries of U.S.immigration practice and restrictions, and parallel studies of StateDepartmentpositionsonPalestine,aswellasmoregeneralaccountsofpopular attitudes toward immigration in the late 1930s and 1940s. Therole of the Visa Bureau of the State Department in this period was

influenced by the racist views of Director Breckinridge Long and hisassociates.Theyopposedimmigrationreform,apositionadheredtoforavariety of reasons by those aware of the situation of European Jewry,includingAmericanJewswhofoundPalestineapreferablesolution.

ThecombinedimpactofthefailureofEvianandBritain’sadoptionoftheWhite Paper of 1939 served to intensify Zionist mobilization in theUnited States as organization of the 1942 Biltmore Conferencedemonstrated.Among theBiltmoredemandswasBritain’sadmissionofDisplaced Persons to Palestine; the granting of responsibility to theJewish Agency for immigration to Palestine; and, most important, that“PalestinebeestablishedasaJewishCommonwealthintegratedintothestructure of the new democratic world.”42 The Biltmore resolutionsbecame an integral part of the Zionist program. Adopted in NewYork,theywereacceptedbytheZionistexecutiveinJerusalemand,inOctober1942, by the Zionist Steering Committee, thus becoming part of theWorld Zionist movement’s official program. Within two years, thePalestine question was on the Republican as well as the DemocraticPartyagendas,andCongressmoved topressureBritain toabandon itsimmigrationpoliciesinfavorofZionistobjectivesinPalestine.

Before he became president, Harry S. Truman was among thoseopenlycriticalof theBritishWhitePaper,and in1941he is reported tohave“joinedtheAmericanPalestineCommitteetolendmoralsupporttoZionism.Hesigneditscommemorationofthetwenty-fifthanniversaryoftheBalfourDeclaration, andat aHolocaust ‘rescue’ rally inChicago in1943proposedtocreatea‘haven’forJews.”43

On November 26, 1945, Jacob Blaustein, then chairman of theexecutive committee of the American Jewish Committee, wrote toSecretaryofStateByrnes,requestinghisassistanceinenablingrefugeesintheAmericanandBritishoccupationzonesofGermanyandAustriatoimmigrate to the United States under existing and unfilled immigrationquotas.AsBlausteinpointedout,“duringthefiscalyear1944(July1944–June 1945), not more than six percent of the available immigrationquotasfortheEuropeanareawerefilled.”44Whileheadmittedthatitwasunclear what the figures would be for 1945, he assumed that it wouldremain low. Blaustein’s request wasmotivated by his desire to relievethosesufferingtheeffectsofthewar,butashepointedout,italsowouldservetorelievepressureonPalestineandstrengthentheU.S.positionin

the1946Anglo-AmericanInquiry.Inresponsetoanearlierclaimthattheshortage of transportation rendered such a request difficult, Blausteinreplied that the mere “insurance of visas” in the interim would sustainthoseseekingentrytotheUnitedStates.Blaustein’seffortsdidnotleadto any major revision of U.S. immigration practice, but there was nolesseningofattentiontothesituationofEuropeanJewry.

In1945,SecretaryoftheTreasuryHenryMorgenthauurgedtheStateDepartmenttoinvestigatetheconditionsofconcentrationcampsurvivorsin the American zone of Germany. Earl G. Harrison, dean of theUniversity of Pennsylvania Law School and previously wartimecommissionerofimmigrationandnaturalization,waschosenbytheStateDepartmenttoleadthecommissioninvestigatingJewishcampsurvivorsintheAmericanzoneofGermany.Hisreport,writtenforthepresidentin1945, played amajor role in shaping theWhiteHouse position on thedestinationofJewishrefugees.PeterGroseobserved that “certainalertZionistshadspottedthepotentialoftheHarrisonmissionfromthestart,”citing Chaim Weizmann, the Zionist elder statesman, and Meyer W.Weisgal asamong thosewhobelieved that “thisobjectivebut idealisticlaw professor could become an instrument for combining the politicalaspirationsofZionismwiththeplightofthesurvivingJewsofEurope.”45Whether or notHarrisonwas effectivelymanipulated from this vantagepoint,hisreportaccomplishedthisgoal.

Truman approved and appointed Harrison to undertake theinvestigation, whose results he subsequently sent to General D. D.Eisenhower, then in charge of U.S. forces in Europe, including thosemanaging the camps investigated by Harrison. Eisenhower wasunpreparedfor itscharge,whichwasthat“weappear tobetreatingtheJewsastheNazistreatedthemexceptthatwedonotexterminatethem.They are in concentration camps in large numbers under our militaryguardinsteadofSStroops.”46

Harrison’s report maintained that several distinct needs had to beaddressed in investigating camp conditions, given that they housedapproximately 100,000 Jewish refugees coming fromPoland, Hungary,Romania,Germany,andAustria.Inthefirstplace,hecounseledthattheJewish refugees be recognized as Jews and not as members of anyparticular national group; and second, that their living conditions beurgently improved, alongwith assistance in obtaining informationabout

family survivors. Third was the critical question of repatriation oremigration to a destination of their choice. As the Harrison Reportemphasized,aboveall refugeeshad tobeassisted in findingplacesofemigration.Palestinewasdescribedas“thechoiceofmost,”butwiththequalificationthatit“isnottheonlynamedplaceofpossibleemigration.”47Thequestionwaswheretogo,andwhatcountrywouldadmitthem,otherthanPalestine.

TheauthorsofthereportthenproposedthattheBritishWhitePaperof1939beamendedandthat100,000ofthedisplacedJewsbeadmittedinto Palestine. This proposal was rejected by the British, but somemembers of the British Labor Party supported the American position.They insisted, however, as did the Arabs, that the problem was aninternational one. The USSR opposed the Harrison Report, but theyhelped Polish Jews emigrate into Palestine, and they eventuallyendorsedpartition.

ThekeyquestioninHarrison’sreportconcernedthedestinationofthedisplacedJews.Thereportmaintainedthat

mostJewswanttoleaveGermanyandAustriaassoonaspossible.Thatistheirfirstandgreatexpressedwish…andmanyofthepeoplethemselvesfearothersuggestionsorplansfortheirbenefitbecauseofthepossibilitythatattentionmightthereforebedivertedfromtheall-important matter of evacuation from Germany. Their desire to leave Germany is anurgentone.Thelifewhichtheyhaveledforthepasttenyears,alifeoffearandwanderingand physical torture, hasmade them impatient of delay. They want to be evacuated toPalestinenow,justasothernationalgroupsarebeingrepatriatedtotheirhomes.48

AdmittingthatsomeJewswishingtoresettlesoughtadmissiontothe

United States, England, or South America, the Harrison Report thenaffirmed that “with respect to possible places of resettlement for thosewho may be stateless or who do not wish to return to their homes,Palestineisdefinitelyandpre-eminentlythefirstchoice.”Somecametorealize that itmightalsobe theironlychoice if theywereunable togetintotheUnitedStatesorsomecountryintheWesternHemisphere.49

TheHarrisonReportdidrecognizethatPalestine’sappealwasinparta functionof restrictive immigrationpolicies thateffectivelybarredotheroptions.ButitdidnotcallfortheamendmentofexistingU.S.immigrationlawsorreviewthehistoryofthe1938EvianConferenceanditsfailuretogenerateinternationalsupportforEuropeanrefugees.Theauthorsofthereport recommended that the United States “should under existingimmigration laws,permit reasonablenumbersof suchpersons to come

here,againparticularlythosewhohavefamilytiesinthiscountry.”50TheworseningofconditionsinEuropehadearlierledtoproposalsfor

refugeecolonizationeffortsinpartsofAfricaandtheDominicanRepublicin Latin America. Even the attempt to allow liberalization of the U.S.Immigration Act of 1924 to permit entry of 20,000 German refugeechildren failed.Despite this, theU.S. recordwasconsideredsuperior tothatofothercountries.“From1933through1945,somethinglike250,000refugeesfromNazismreachedsafetyintheUnitedStates.ThisexcludestheundergroundcollaborationforemigrationofGermanJews,arrangedbetween Gestapo and the Sicherheitsdienst, in 1938–39.”51 OnlyPalestine,which receivedapproximately 150,000 refugees, approachedtheAmerican record. In theperiod to1938,ArnoMayerpointsout that“fewer than 150,000, or 30 percent, of Germany’s Jews had eitheremigratedorgoneintoexile.Over20percentofthesewenttoPalestine,butfullyhalfoftheGerman-Jewishémigréspreferredtoseekasyluminwestern Europe.”52 Between 1933 and 1938 some 42,000 Jewish andnon-Jewish refugees had gone to Palestine, while a smaller number,30,000–35,000,hademigratedtotheUnitedStates.53

In December 1945, Truman urged various government agencies toenabledisplacedpersonstoentertheUnitedStates.Atthetime,Trumanknew that existing immigration quotas had not been filled. As DavidMcBride has argued, however, “following theSecondWorldWar, thereremainedstrongnativistsentiments inAmericabywhich themajorityofthepublicandgovernmentofficialsopposedeasingAmerica’srestrictiveimmigrationquotas thatwouldhaveallowed the resettlementofa largenumber of Displaced Persons.”54 In the spring of 1946, CongressmanWilliamStrattondidinitiatelegislationtobringsome400,000refugeestothe United States. The legislation failed to pass, but it brought aboutimmigrationreformatalaterdate.

Opposition to immigration was evident in the ImmigrationSubcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee, where SenatorChapman Revercomb of West Virginia strongly opposed such action,claimingthatitentailedrisksofcommunistinfiltration.ThevisitbyHouseandSenatemembers, includingRevercomb,toDisplacedPersons(DP)camps inEuropeconvertedsomecongressional leaders,however,withthe result that in the second session of the 80th Congress somemeasuresapprovingimmigrationwerepassed.

Roosevelt’semissaryErnestL.Morris,whovisitedGermany,insistedthat had there been adequate options only a minority of Jews in thecamps would have elected to go to Palestine. American Zionists,including Stephen Wise, insisted on Britain’s openness to Jews inPalestine and “opposed a congressional effort in 1943 to set up acommission‘toeffectuatetherescueoftheJewishpeopleofEurope,’”aconclusionconcededbyothersinlaterinquiries.55

In practice, Zionist leaders encouraged the admission of JewishrefugeesintoU.S.controlledcampsandfoundU.S.militaryleaderssuchas Eisenhower helpful in facilitating training programs in agriculture,vocational, and military training. The camps proved to be the site ofZionistmobilizationinthisperiodaswell.Inadditiontootherparamilitarygroups,the“Haganah,alsocametothecamps, initiallytohelptheDPstrainforself-defenseinthecamps,andlatertopreparecombatreserves[for]anarmyofastatejustabouttobeborn.”56

Records of the U.S. Office of Military Government for Germany(OMGUS)indicatethatinearly1948theRevisionistparty,theIrgun,wasamong thoseseeking to “recruit” in thecampsand,asdidHaganah,attimesused coercivemethods.57Prof.WilliamHaber, adviser on JewishAffairstotheAmericanSupremeCommander,wasintouchwithJewishorganizations in New York and informed them of the pressure beingexertedon refugees in theDPcamps.The responseat the levelof theU.S. secretary of state appears to have been to withhold approvingrequestsbytheU.S.militarytopermittheexitofmenofmilitaryage.

At theendof June1948,SecretaryofStateMarshalldisclosed thatthe “U.S. Army AmZone Germany has requested State-Army fordirectionsremovementDPstoPalestine.DeptsArmy-StatecablingU.S.mil authorities Germany Austria text para Vl containing immigrationprovisions truceandsimultaneouslyauthorizingexitAmZonesGermanyandAustriaofPalestinecertificateholdersspecificallyexceptingfightingpersonnel.”58 Marshall, who was secretary of state from 1947 to 1949,deferredapprovaltoallow“menmilage”toexituntilhehadheardfromthe UNmediator, Count Bernadotte, who clearly indicated that he hadneither the intention nor the time to visit the AmZone inGermany andAustria.

In 1946–47, an estimated “50,000 Jews (mostly Eastern European)immigratedtocountriesotherthanPalestine.”59But“thevastmajorityof

thepopulationof theJewishDPcamps(morethan90percent)stronglysupportedtheestablishmentofaJewishstateinPalestine.”60Yet“(morethan 60 percent) did not emigrate to Palestine/Israel and chose otherdestinations, despite the fact that at any given point in time during therelevantyears(1945–1951),Palestine/Israelwastheleastdifficulttargetlocationtowhichtoobtainpassage.”61ShortlybeforepassageoftheUNPartitionPlanonNovember29,1947,theCIAreportedontheexistenceofasecret transportsystem forJewishDPsorganizedby theHaganahthatcrossedfromEasternEuropetoPalestine.62Inthesummerof1947aspecialcommitteeofUNSCOPreportedonitsownvisittoDPcampsinGermany and Austria. Its findings and conclusions confirmed thecombination of factors identified earlier, in which emigration was theprimarywishamongsurvivorswhoconfrontedthe limitedoptions,someof whom were committed Zionists, and others who acknowledged theactivityofZionistorganizersintheirmidst.

Independently, Arab intellectuals had expressed their own views ofthemanner inwhich theJewish refugeequestionwasdealtwith in theUnited States and in Europe. Lebanese, Egyptian, Syrian, andPalestinian voices were raised against Nazism and fascism and insolidaritywiththosewhowereitsvictims.63MohamedHassaneinHeikal,thena journalistatAkhbaralYawm, recalled thatEgyptianJews “wereadvertisingtheestablishmentofcampstoaccommodatethoseJewswhohadbeenpersecutedbytheNazis.ThesewerestagingcampsinwhichtheseJewswouldstay temporarilybeforegoingon toPalestine.”64EricRouleau,theFrenchcorrespondentwhowouldlaterbecomeLeMonde’schiefMiddleEast correspondent andFrenchAmbassador toTunisandTurkey, recalled the presence ofEuropean refugees inEgypt, someofwhomhadcomefromTurkey.65

Heykal reported that Hashomer Hatzair was among the Zionistorganizations active in Egypt, but both he and Rouleau observed thatsuchactivities failed toattractanysizeableelementofEgyptianJewishsupport. According to Heykal, it wasn’t until 1946 at the BludanConferenceoftheArabLeagueinSyriathatEgyptiansbegantobecomeaware of what was taking place in Palestine. After meeting with Ben-Gurion in Palestine, Heykal reported his astonishment that the JewishleaderandJewishAgencywere“talkingopenlyaboutaJewishstate.”66

Egyptian feminists at their inaugural meeting in October 1938

addressed the significance of the failures of theEvian conference in amanner thatplaced themunconditionally in solidaritywithopponentsofNazism and fascism. Huda Shaarawi, an internationally recognizedsymbol of Egyptian feminism, spoke directly to the issue when shedeclaredthat

notasinglerepresentativeofoneoftheparticipatingstates,noteventherepresentativeofGreatBritainortheUnitedStates,hasdareddeclarethathisgovernmentwaspreparedtoprovideahaventotheserejected,shelterlesspeople,whilePalestine,towhichtheyhavenofamilialornationalties,hastakeninfourhundredthousandofthemdowntothepresentday.67

Palestinians who responded in opposition to European fascism andNazismfoundthemselvesinthepositionofsupporting“theoppressoroftheirownnation in itswaragainst theswornenemyof thosewhoweretryingtoconquertheir land.”68AccordingtoOraybArefNajjar’sanalysisofFilastin(Palestine),oneweekaftertheoutbreakoftheSecondWorldWar,itsleadingeditorialdeclaredthat

war has placed us in a new situation with regard to our relations with Britain. We areconnectedtoittodayinamatterthatismoreuniversalthanourprivatecause.Wearenotcalling on Arabs to sacrifice their cause, but we are asserting that the present conflictbetweenthedemocratic forcesanddictatorial forceshasdictatedthatwetakesideswithoneortheother.69

BynomeansdoesthisdescribethetotalityofPalestinianArabreactiontoNazismand theoutbreakofwar,whichremained littleknownamongU.S.officials,saveforthepro-NazipositionofHajAminal-Husseini.

InWashingtonandLondon,however, the focuswason theneed todetermine how to confront the Harrison Report’s findings andrecommendations,whichledtoyetanothercommitteeofinquiry.

THEREPORTOFTHEANGLO-AMERICANCOMMITTEEOF1946

The responseofBritishForeignSecretaryErnestBevin to theHarrisonReport was to call for yet another inquiry with the hope that this onewouldcontributetoreorientingtheTrumanadministrationmorefavorablytowardBritishpolicyinPalestine.Theoppositeoccurred,anditwasnotBevinbutTrumanwhogainedtheupperhandintheprocess,evenastheUnited States remained committed to Britain’s continuing role inPalestine.TheresultingCommitteeofInquirywasformallyannouncedin

November1945,anditpresented its finalreport inAprilof thefollowingyear. Far from resolving the differences the Harrison Report hadexposed, the Anglo-American Committee hearings further exposed thedepthofdisagreementbetweenZionistrepresentativesandPalestiniansandtheirrespectiveU.S.andBritishsupporters.

ThecommitteewasmadeupofrepresentativesoftheUnitedStatesand the UK, with Truman directly involved in selecting the Americanparticipants.TheexercisegeneratedpredictablecontroversyasTruman“apparently aimed at securing a ‘balanced’ committee, one that wouldrepresentbothStateDepartmentandZionistviews.”70DavidNiles,whomLoyHenderson described as the president’s adviser on Jewish affairs,selected Bartley Crum and James McDonald.71 Nahum Goldmannregarded both as good friends of the Zionist movement.72 Cohenmaintained that the connectionbetweenCrumandNilesproved critical“insecuringTruman’sgoalofarecommendedsolutiontotheJewishDPproblem.”73 State Department efforts to turn down clearance for Crumfailed,asTrumanapprovedtheselection.74AccordingtoDeanAcheson’saccount,theU.S.Committeeincluded“JudgeJosephCHutchesonoftheU.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, a fiery Texan and friend of thePresident,[who]wasAmericanchairman,flankedbyDrFrankAydelotte,formerPresidentofSwarthmoreCollege;FrankW.Buxton,editoroftheBostonHerald;WilliamPhilips, formerUnder-SecretaryofState;JamesG McDonald, former League of Nations High Commissioner forRefugees;andBartleyC.Crum,aCalifornialawyer.”75

EarlG.HarrisonprovedtobeaninfluentialmemberoftheAmericanteamaswell,largelyduetohiswell-knownreport.BritishmembersofthecommitteeincludedSirJohnSingleton;LordRobertMorrisonofthelaborparty; Sir Frederick Leggett,member of the International Labour office;Wilfred Crick, who focused on the Palestinian economy; ReginaldManninghamBuller,aToryMPdescribedas“‘devotedtotheKiplingideaof empire’ by an American member of the committee”;76 and finally,RichardCrossman,whowasaLabourMPatthetimeaswellasservingontheeditorialboardoftheNewStatesman.

Committeemembers initiallymet inWashington,D.C.onJanuary4,1946,tohearthoseinvitedtotestifyinthefirstseriesofmeetings.Inthespring they traveled to select countries in Europe, including Germany,Austria, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Italy, and Greece, where they visited

DPcampsand spokewithAlliedmilitary, political, and religious figuresbeforegoingtotheMiddleEastandvisitingPalestine,Transjordan,Syria,Lebanon,Egypt,Iraq,andSaudiArabia.

Committeememberswereinstructed1.Toexaminepolitical, economicand social conditions inPalestine

as they bear upon the problem of Jewish immigration and settlementthereinandthewell-beingofthepeoplesnowlivingtherein.

2.Toexamine thepositionof theJews in thosecountries inEuropewhere theyhavebeen thevictimsofNaziandFascistpersecution,andthe practical measures taken or contemplated to be taken in thosecountriestoenablethemto livefreefromdiscriminationandoppressionand to make estimates of those who wish or will be impelled by theirconditionstomigratetoPalestineorothercountriesoutsideofEurope.

3. To hear the views of the competent witnesses and to consultrepresentative Arabs and Jews on the problems of Palestine…and tomake recommendations to His Majesty’s Government and theGovernment of the United States for ad interim handling of theseproblemsaswellasfortheirpermanentsolution.

4. To make such other recommendations to His Majesty’sGovernment and the Government of the United States as may benecessary tomeet the immediateneedsarising fromconditionssubjectto examination under paragraph 2 above, by remedial action in theEuropean countries in question or by the provision of facilities foremigrationtoandsettlementincountriesoutsideEurope.77Thecommitteeproducedbothareportandasetofhearings.Theformerreflectedtheorientalistoutlookofitsauthors,whosecontrastingviewsofArabs and Jews had little merit other than to provide a language withwhichtojustifyitspolicyrecommendations.Itsemphasiswaslargely,butnot entirely, on the postwar situation of European Jewry, the failure ofinternational assistance and immigration reform, and the role ofPalestine. Under the headings of the Jewish Attitude and the ArabAttitude, the authors offered their observations on various aspects ofcontemporaryJewishandArabreactionsrelatedtoPalestine.

WithrespecttoJewsinPalestine,theauthorsdescribedthevarietiesofpolitical forcesatwork,butunderscoredwhat theyunderstood tobethecollectivesupportfortheestablishmentofaJewishstateinPalestine.The report described the Jews in Palestine as being caught betweenprideintheirachievementsandfrustrationattheconstraintsimposedonthembythecontinuedBritishpresence.

Committee members were not hesitant in describing the extent towhichPalestinehadbecome“anarmedcamp”with“asinisteraspectofrecent years” due to the emergence of “large illegal armed forces.”78These forces were described as the three branches of the Haganah,estimated to include between 58,000 and 62,000 fighters,79 and “twofurtherillegalarmedorganizations,”theIrgun,composedofanestimated3,000–5,000 forces, and the Stern Gang with between 200 and 300fighters.80

TheauthorsalsonotedwhattheyperceivedtobethenearinabilityofJewstoconsidertheirimpactonPalestinianArabs.ReferringtotheJewin Palestine, the report stated: “passionately loving every foot of EretzIsrael, he finds it almost impossible to look at the issue from theArabpointofview,andtorealizethedepthoffeelingarousedbyhis‘invasion’of Palestine.”81 Moreover, the authors recognized that “the JewishcommunityinPalestinehasnever,asacommunity,facedtheproblemofcooperation with the Arabs.”82 They concluded that Jews in PalestinewereunawareofthedepthofArabopposition.Iftherewasanexception,itwastobefoundintheIhudgroupthatadvocatedbi-nationalism,andinsocialistsupportersofHashomerHatzair.CommitteememberswerewellawareoftheviewsofMagnes,aswellasothersofsimilaroutlookintheLeague for Jewish-Arab Rapprochement and Cooperation. They werealsoawareofright-winggroupswho“openlysupportthepresentterroristcampaign.”83

The authors of the report did not mention Fawzi al-Husseini, thePalestinian political figure who prior to his assassination in the fall of1946 had “signed an agreement in the name of a new organization,Falastin al-Jadida (New Palestine), with the League for Arab-JewishRapprochement that had been founded in 1939 and headed byKalvarisky.”84 But they endorsed the position he advocated, whichwasthe “principle of non-domination of one nation over the other and theestablishmentofabinationalstateonthebasisofpoliticalparityandfullcooperative effort between the two nations in economic, social andculturaldomains.”85

Despite their criticism of Jewish attitudes and policies towardPalestinian Arabs, committee members were impressed by theachievements of the “pioneers” and claimed that “there had been noexpulsionoftheindigenouspopulation,exploitationofcheapArablabour

hasbeenvigorouslyopposedasinconsistentwithZionism.”86Committeemembers appear to have known little of the conditions that led to “theexpropriationbetween1920and1947ofabout26percentofPalestine’scultivated land,and theconsequentevictionofa largenumberofdirectproducers estimated in 1930 at 48 per cent of the total peasantpopulation, [that] was effected to a great extent by the use of politicalforce….”87

Turningtothe:“ArabAttitude”thecommitteerecognizedtherootsofPalestinian opposition to Zionism and British policy: “Palestine is acountrywhichtheArabshaveoccupiedformorethanathousandyears,”andwhich is therefore the basis of their opposition to Jewish historicalclaims.88 The committee also noted the fact that, unlike its Arabneighbors, Palestinian Arabs had not been granted independence.PalestinianArabsobjectedtothefailedpromisesmadebytheBritish in1939andbytheU.S.presidentin1945.Inaddition,theyobjectedtotheroleassignedtoPalestineinsolvingtheEuropeanrefugeeproblem.

The Palestinian leadership was described as divided andrepresentative of a fundamentally anti-Western political class fearful oftheadvancesofwesterncivilization.Theauthorsof the reportdepictedthe conservative, traditional, and highly restrictive operations of thispoliticalclassasbrookingneitheroppositionnorreform,aspromotinganinferior educational system, and as stalling economic development. Insum, in the words of the committee, “one witnesses in Palestine notmerelytheimpactofEuropeancultureupontheEast,butalsotheimpactof Western science and Western technology upon a semi-feudalcivilization.”89

In the report, theauthors reverted toa cultural explanation forArabattitudesclaimingthat

theArabadherestoastrictsocialcodefarremovedfromthecustomsofthemodernworld,andheisshockedbyinnovationsofdressandmannerswhichseemcompletelynaturaltothe Jewish immigrant. Thus, the sight of a Jewish woman in shorts offends the Arabconceptofpropriety.Thefreedomofrelationsbetweenthesexes,andtheneglectoffoodformasheconceivesitviolatetheentirecodeoflifeinwhichtheArabisbroughtup.90

At the first set of meetings in Washington, the committee listened tospeakers, themajority ofwhomwereAmericans speaking on behalf ofZionist, non-Zionist, or anti-Zionist organizations, although somemembers of theArab delegation spoke aswell. Arabs did address the

committeewhenmembersvisited theMiddleEast,asdidmajorZionistleaders. IncludedamongJewishpolitical figureswhospokewas JudahMagnes,whoseviewsweredebatedbothbymembersofthecommittee,such as Richard Crossman, and by Arab delegates, such as AlbertHourani.

AtthepreliminarymeetingsinWashington,committeememberswereintroduced to the findings of an economic study of Palestine whoseauthorsmaintained that Palestinian economic development undertakenby Zionist leaders benefited Jews in Palestine as well as PalestinianArabs,and,moregenerally,Arabsacrosstheregion.

The lead author of An Economic Study of Palestine was RobertNathan,formerdirectoroftheNationalIncomeDivisionoftheCommerceDepartmentandformerchairoftheCentralPlanningDivisionoftheWarProduction Board. With his co-authors Oscar Gass (Eliahu Epstein’s“economic adviser”),91 and Daniel Creamer, Nathan addressed thecommitteeanddiscussedissuessuchasPalestine’sabsorptivecapacityand its significance for immigration.92 The three had spent severalmonths inPalestinebetweenDecember1944andMarch1945studyingexisting conditions, on the basis of which Nathan concluded thatPalestine could absorb large numbers of incoming immigrants in thecoming decade. From the perspective of Zionist supporters, the maincontribution by these economists was their claim that “the Jews havebeenagreatprogressiveforceinPalestine….TheycanservethewholeMiddleEastasaprogressive,Westernizinginfluenceinthedevelopmentof modern industry, scientific agriculture, education, and politicaldemocracy.TheycanbeanoutpostofWesternculturewithoutbeinganoutpost of Western imperialism.”93 The three authors nonethelessconcededthatitwouldbedifficulttopersuadePalestinianArabstoleave,ortoapprove“landtransfer,”whichtheyregardedas“perhapsthemostdelicate questions of public policy that a development-mindedGovernmentmustconfrontinthenextdecade.”94

CommitteemembersweregivenanabridgedhistoryofArab-Jewishrelations as viewed by Arab historians and political figures, as well asintroductions to diverseU.S.Zionist andnon-Zionist organizations.ThecommitteemoveditsoperationstotheMiddleEastinthespringandmetinJerusalemonMarch6,1946.AmongthosewhotestifiedwereChaimWeizmann, David Ben-Gurion, Moshe Sharett, Golda Meir, Judah

Magnes, and two chief rabbis. Palestinians were represented bymembers of the Arab Higher Committee, Jamal al-Husayni; the ArabHigherFront,AwniAbdal-Hadi;andtheArabOffice,AlbertHouraniandAhmedShuqayri.

AmongArabdelegates,AlbertHouraniwasgenerallyviewedas themosteffectivespeaker.HewaslittleknownintheUnitedStatesuntilhisacademic career assumed importance some years later. Hourani hadpreviously headed the research department of the Arab Office inJerusalem,moving toWashingtonwhere itwasestablisheduntil itwasobligedtocloseunderpressureandrelocatetoLondonin1947.AnotherPalestinian figureof interestwasKhulusyKhairy,whotraveled fromtheArabOfficeinWashingtontoOttawain1946onbehalfoftheCanadian-Arab Friendship League, an advocate for a unitary democratic state inPalestine.95

In their final deliberations in Lausanne, members of the Anglo-American Committee offered a number of recommendations thatreflectedboththeirdespairofexistingconditionsandtheiroptimismwithrespect to the possibility of creating a different order in Palestine. ThecommitteedeclareditimperativethatthenationalaspirationsofJewsandArabsberecognizedandreconciled,whileaffirmingthatneitherJewnorArabshoulddominate;thatPalestineshouldnotbecomeaJewishoranArabstate;andthattheinterestsofthethreemajorreligionsweretobeprotected. This collective effort stands in sharp contrast to the struggleoverPalestinethatwouldmarkthecomingyears.

The committee emphatically declared that “Palestine alone cannotmeet the emigration needs of the Jewish victims of Nazi and Fascistpersecution.Thewholeworldshares responsibility for themand indeedfor the resettlement of all ‘Displaced Persons.’”96 To this end, itrecommendedinternationalcooperationtohelpintherelocationofthosedisplaced.Atthesametime,committeemembersvoicedtheiroppositionto themass emigration of European Jews, a subject raised by variousdelegates concerned with the implications of Zionism for Jews of thediaspora.

IndeclaringtheiroppositiontoJewishstatehood,committeemembersrejectedtheveryfoundationofZionism:

Further,whilewerecognizethatanyJewwhoentersPalestineinaccordancewithitslawsisthereofright,weexpresslydisapproveofthepositiontakeninsomeJewishquartersthatPalestinehasinsomewaybeencededorgrantedastheirStatetotheJewsoftheworld,

that every Jew everywhere is, merely because he is a Jew, a citizen of Palestine andtherefore can enter Palestine as of right without regard to conditions imposed by thegovernmentuponentry,andthatthereforetherecanbenoillegalimmigrationofJewsintoPalestine.WedeclareandaffirmthatanyimmigrantJewwhoentersPalestinecontrarytoitslawsisanillegalimmigrant.97

Inplaceofthis,theyurgedthatPalestineberecognizedasthehomeofbothJewsandArabs.Atthesametime,theydeclaredthat

we have reached the conclusion that the hostility between Jews and Arabs and, inparticular,thedeterminationofeachtoachievedomination,ifnecessarybyviolence,makeitalmostcertain that,nowand forsometimetocome,anyattempt toestablisheitheranindependentPalestinianstateorindependentPalestinianstates,wouldresultincivilstrifesuch asmight threaten the peace of theworld.We therefore recommend that, until thishostility disappears, the Government of Palestine be continued as at present undermandatependingtheexecutionofaTrusteeshipAgreementundertheUnitedNations.98

Thisinnowayeliminatedtheimportanceofresolvingthesituationofthe100,000 would-be immigrants into Palestine. Committee memberssupported their entry, without committing themselves to the future ofimmigration.

The Anglo-American Committee Report, predictably, ignitedpassionaterejoinders,mostofthemnegative,fromallinterestedparties.EvanWilson, amember of the original committee,wasamong the fewwhoconsidereditsfindingssoberingandwasingeneralagreementwiththem,reflectinginlateryearsthat

we in the [State] Department had reason to be aware of the force of the Zionist drivetowardaJewishstate,wecontinueduntil theendof1946,at least, tothink intermsofacompromisesolution inPalestine.Wethought thereshouldbeasolutionunderwhich, inthewordsoftheAnglo-AmericanCommitteeofInquiry,JewwouldnotdominateArabandArabwouldnotdominateJew.Inotherwords,wewerethinkingofabinationalstatelongafter the conflict between thepartieshadbecomeso complete, and their oppositions sointractable, as to put this out of the question. As men who tried to be reasonable, wethought that it should be possible to achieve a compromise, but the hard fact was thatneitherofthetwopartiesinthedisputewantedacompromise;thedepthofthenationalisticfeelingonbothsidesprecludedthis.99

Wilson aside, the response to the Anglo-American Committee Reportwasoverwhelmingly negative.Therewereexceptions, suchasEleanorRoosevelt, who at the time did not support a Jewish state. Wilsonclaimed that Truman later said that “the United States was willing toaccept theAnglo-American reportasawhole—aconsiderableadvanceoverhisearlierresponse.”100Accordingtocontemporarypresscoverage,

Truman was reported to have told the publisher of the PhiladelphiaRecord “that although he favored the creation of a democratic state inPalestine, he did not favor one based on religion, race, or creed.Palestine, he thought, had to be ‘thrown open’ to Jews, Arabs, andChristiansalike.ItshouldaspiretobeapluralisticsocietylikethatoftheUnitedStates.”101ThiswasnottheobjectiveofZionistofficialswhowerecriticalofthereportforitsfailuretosupportaJewishstate.Trumanwaspreparedtofollowupthecommittee’srecommendationsandestablishedacabinet-levelcommitteemadeupofthesecretariesofState,War,andTreasury,who,inturn,wereassignedtoselectrepresentativesfromtheirrespectivedepartmentstoworkwithsomeoftheformermembersoftheAnglo-AmericanCommitteeinimplementingtheAACreport.

THEMORRISON-GRADYPLAN

The resulting arrangement, designated the Morrison-Grady Plan,involvedBritainaswellastheUnitedStatesineffortstodividePalestine“intoaJewishprovince,anArabprovince,andthedistrictsofJerusalemandNegeb. Theexecution of the planmight lead ultimately either to aunitary,binationalstateortopartition.”102TheformulaproposedseparateBritishadministrationforJerusalemandtheNegevandcontinuedBritishcontroloverallaspectsofdomesticandforeignrelations.ItacceptedtheU.S.-backed plan to admit 100,000 Jewish DPs and called for U.S.fundingforadevelopmentprojectinPalestine.

AverellHarriman,thenAmbassador inLondon,wrotetoAchesononJuly 24, 1946, with his evaluation of the plan, pointing out howadvantageousitwouldbeforJewsinPalestine.

ProposedprovincialboundariesgiveJewsbest landinPalestine,practicallyallcitrusandindustry,mostofthecoastlineandHaifaport.Jewishlegitimatedemandsincludinglargemeasureof control of immigrationandopportunity to developnational home, havebeenmet with exception of Jerusalem and Negev. Christian interests must be taken into fullaccountinJerusalemandBethlehem,anddispositionofNegevisremainingundetermineduntilitspotentialitiescanbeascertained.103

Trumandidnotendorsetheplan,citingtheabsenceofpopularaswellaspolitical support. Nor did theU.S. president participate in the follow-upconference theBritishorganized,hoping tohavebothArabandJewish

supportforwhatwasnowknownastheMorrisonPlan.DeanAcheson,inhismemoirs, recalled thisasaperiodof “civilwaralong thePotomac,”withmembersof theAnglo-AmericanCommitteeattacking thoseof thecabinet committee responsible for the plan, and more.104 As Achesonpointedout,recriminationsaside,theMorrison-GradyPlan“hadin it themakingsofacompromise;indeed,laterontheJewishAgencysuggestedsome helpful amendments, and the United Nations Special CommitteereportofAugust31,1947,showsitsinfluence.”105

Intheinterval,LondonturnedtotheideaofaconferenceinwhichtolaunchitsMorrisonPlan,althoughboththeUnitedStatesandtheJewishAgencyrefusedtoattend.Thereasongivenbythelatterwasthefailureoftheplanto“givetheJewssufficientassurancesregardingimmigrationandautonomyineconomicmatters.”106ButunderpressureathomefromZionist supporters, Truman concluded that hewould dowell to issueastatement insupportof theemigrationof the100,000Jewishdisplacedpersons to Palestine, which he did in the context of support for apartitionedPalestine.Thestatement,issuedonOctober4,1946,cametobe knownas theYomKippur statement.Although controversy remainsregardingthemotivesforTruman’spronouncement, itwasheardasthepresident’sundisguisedsupportforpartition.107

According to EvanWilson, the Yom Kippur statement “was draftedprimarilybyEliahuEpstein(laterElath),theWashingtonrepresentativeofthe Jewish agency.” But according to Michael Cohen, the draft thatEpstein had worked on was altered in the State Department.108Nonetheless, it did not fail to be interpreted as evidence that the U.S.presidentsupportedpartition.

HowandwhyEpsteinwas inaposition todraftastatementofsuchimportanceremainssubjecttospeculation.Thesimplestexplanationliesin Epstein’s connections in White House circles with David Niles, andthroughhimtoClarkClifford,andinhisactiveroleinmeetingwithStateDepartmentofficials.Thus,whenEpsteinmetwithHenderson,Merriam,andWilsononSeptember5,heconfirmed that theJewishAgencyhadcome to theconclusion that itwasprepared toacceptpartition.NahumGoldmannmaintainsthatthroughtheintermediaryofthepresidentofthenon-Zionist American Jewish Committee, Judge Proskauer, he hadearlierpersuadedmembersoftheAnglo-AmericanCommitteetoacceptthe principle of partition as the only solution to the existing dilemma in

Palestine.GoldmannthenconsultedwithDavidNileswho,withAcheson,conferredwithTruman.“OntheafternoonofAugust9Nilesaskedmetocome tohishoteland toldmewith tears inhiseyes that thePresidenthad accepted the plan without reservation and had instructed DeanAchesontoinformtheBritishgovernment.”109

GORDONMERRIAM:CENSORED

IntheeyesofStateDepartmentofficialssuchasGordonMerriamtherewas reason for tears, but they were not tears of joy. Merriamwrote aresponse toTruman’sYomKippurstatement,butwhenLoyHendersonshowedittoDeanAcheson,heapparentlycalledforMerriam’sresponseto be destroyed.Merriam kept a copy,which he gave toEvanWilson,whodiscusseditssignificanceinhisstudyonU.S.policyinIsrael.110Onthe basis of Wilson’s account, we learn that Merriam’s daringpronouncements were, first, that the refugee problem required aninternational solution, and second, that agreement between Jews andArabs inPalestinewasaprerequisite toanypolicy.Acheson’s fear lestMerriam’s statement become public knowledge is revealing, given thenatureofwhatMerriamproposed.Merriamprovedtoberightinsofarastherefugeeproblemwasbyitsnatureaninternationalproblemthatcouldnot be satisfactorily resolved by any single state. Interveningdevelopments have served to reinforce the verity of Merriam’s secondpropositionaswell.

WilsonexplainedthatMerriamagreedwiththepresident’sinsistenceontheadmissionofthe100,000refugeestoPalestine,butheinsistedonthe limitsofsuchapolicy “so longas therewasnoworldwideprogramaimed at solving the refugee problem and so long as there was noprogress in the direction of an acceptable solution to the Palestinequestionasawhole.”111MorefundamentalwashisinsistenceonJewish-Arab consensus as the basis of any policy. Merriam’s reasons werestraightforward:

Otherwiseweshouldviolatetheprincipleofself-determinationwhichhasbeenwrittenintotheAtlanticCharter,theDeclarationoftheUnitedNations,andtheUnitedNationsCharter—a principle that is deeply embedded in our foreign policy. Even a United Nationsdeterminationinfavorofpartitionwouldbe,intheabsenceofsuchconsent,astultificationandviolationofUN’sowncharter.112

Merriamreturned to these themes inacriticalanalysisofU.S.policy inhisyear-endevaluation,whichhesubmittedtoLoyHenderson. In it,hedescribed U.S. policy as one of expediency and claimed that it wasunsatisfactorytoallpartiesconcerned.

Merriam and others in the State Department considered this U.S.policytobeinimicaltoU.S. interestsbecause“italreadyhandicapsandmay eventually jeopardize our political and other interests in the Arabworld.”113Merriampointedout that therewasnosatisfactorysolution tothemandatorystatusofPalestinesaveindependence,anindependencethatwouldhavetosatisfybothJewsandArabs.

1.PalestineisanAMandate.Assuch,itwastobepreparedforindependence.WereitnotforthecomplicationoftheJewishNationalHome,itwouldbeindependenttoday,asalltheotherAmandateshavebecome.ArabsandJewslivethereandmust,soonerorlater,cometosomesortofapoliticalagreementbasedonaminimumofmutualconfidenceandgive-and-take,iftheyaretogovernPalestine.

2. The Jewish National Home was and is a new concept, undefined. The BritishstatesmenwhoworkedouttheBalfourDeclarationthoughtthattheJewishNationalHomewouldprobablydevelopintoaJewishstate,buttheyunderestimatedormisjudgedtheArabreaction(BalfourdidnotrealizethatArabslivedinPalestine).

3.TheJewscouldrunPalestineifitwerefullofJews;theArabsifitwerefullofArabs.4.TheJewishDPproblem,aswellasthealmostuniversalJewishfeelingofinsecurity,

pressespowerfullyandperhapsirresistiblyuponPalestineinboththehumanandpoliticalsense.

5.ThereceptionaccordedbyArabs,Jews,orboth,tothereportoftheAnglo-AmericanCommittee of Inquiry, to the Grady Mission plan—indeed, to all schemes and plansproposed by third parties—strongly indicates that no third-party plan has any chance ofsuccess,unlessimposedandmaintainedbyforce.114

Merriamthenturnedtotheprinciplesthatheargued“couldappropriatelyconstitute our Palestine policy.”115 What emerged from Merriam’srecommendations was a Palestinian mandate transformed into a UNtrusteeship,withaprivilegedposition reserved forboth theTrusteeshipCouncilandtheGeneralAssembly,andacontinuingrolefortheBritish.

Merriam’sstartingpointwasthattheexistingmandate—ortrusteeship—wastobeconvertedtoindependenceassoonaspossible,withinterimarrangementsarrivedat throughArab-Jewishconsensus inaccordwithUN principles, and authorized by the General Assembly on theTrusteeship Council’s recommendation. Further, access to the HolyPlaceswould be in the handsof theTrusteeshipCouncil,workingwith

the British, while issues pertinent to immigration and land would beresolved through the institutions created with Arab-Jewish accord, andonce again subject to UNGA approval as recommended by theTrusteeshipCouncil.

Merriam’ssecondprinciplewasthecommitmentoftheUnitedStatesto“supportanypoliticalarrangementforPalestineagreedtoastheresultofthenegotiationsbetweenArabsandJewsandapprovedbytheUnitedNations.”116

Thiswasfollowedbythethirdprinciple,whichconfirmedBritain’sroleas being responsible for the security of Palestine and, through it, theregionuntilsuchtimeastheUnitedNationswasinapositiontoassumesuchaposition.

Finally, the fourth principle repeated the theme introduced earlier,accordingtowhichaUNtrusteeshipunderBritishrulewastoreplacethemandate, and the recommendations of the international Committee onRefugeeswastobetakenintoconsideration.

Here it may be useful to recall that the leadership of the JewishAgency,andBen-Gurioninparticular,werereportedtohaveconsideredtrusteeship inFebruary1947,somesixmonthsafteraccepting the ideaof partition. Ben-Gurion is reported to have suggested a possible five-year trusteeship arrangement, provided certain conditions were met,including the transfer of 100,000 Jewish refugees to Palestine in anexchangewith Lord Jowitt, theLordChancellor ofBritain.According toEvanWilson,

BenGurion,inameetingwiththeLordChancellor,LordJowitt,onFebruary13agreedtoafiveyeartrusteeshipduringwhichtheJewishAgencywouldceaseallagitationforaJewishstate, on condition that theonehundred thousandJewswouldbeadmittedat onceandthatcertainotherdemandswouldbemet.Theofferwastoo late.When itwasput to theCabinet the next day, Bevin announced that the decision had already been reached toplacethematterbeforetheUnitedNations.117

With respect to Merriam’s position, Henderson wrote to AchesonsuggestingthathereadMerriam’smemorandum,adding,“ofcoursewehave practically been forced by political pressure and sentiment in theU.S. in direction of a ‘viable Jewish state.’ I must confess that when IviewourpolicyinlightofprinciplesavowedbyU.S.Ibecomeuneasy.”118Merriam’s position in 1946 echoed that which he had co-authored inJanuary 1945, when it was permissible to make the same

recommendations,althoughitwastohavenoinfluencethenorlater.Precisely howuneasyHenderson felt aboutU.S. policy inPalestine

and the Middle East, more generally, was revealed in an undatedmemorandumhesenttoAcheson,whichappearedattheverybeginningoftheForeignRelationsVolumefor1946.Titled“AspectsofThinkingintheDepartmentofStateonPoliticalandEconomicPoliciesoftheUnitedStates in theNear andMiddleEast,” thememorandumoffered a bittercriticism of the policies of the major powers, including the UnitedStates.119 Henderson definedU.S. policy at the outset as committed tothe survival of theUnitedNations and the equality of itsmembers.Hewas critical of Washington for paying inadequate attention to theeconomicconditionsofstates in theNearEast thathadsufferedduringthewar,comparingWashington’slargessetowardBritainandtheUSSRto the little provided to the “small andbackwardpeoples.”120But itwasU.S.policytowardPalestinethatHendersonespeciallydecried:

ThespecialinterestoftheUnitedStatesinPalestinehasalsocreatedtheimpressionthattheUnitedStatesisnotonlywillingtoaidpeopleofJewishbloodinamannerinwhichitwouldnotbereadytoassistotherpeoplesoftheNearEast,butthatitispreparedtobacka political program in Palestine which is opposed by two-thirds of the people of thatcountry,andbytheneighboringcountries.121

TheresultwasinimicaltoU.S.policiesinthearea,Hendersonwarnedinhisracistcomment. Inplaceofsuchpolicies,Hendersonrecommendedholding an international conference with the major powers, includingGreatBritain,France, and theSovietUnion.Without illusionsas to thedifficultiesinvolved,HendersonfearedthatintheabsenceofsucheffortstherewasariskofwarandtheunderminingoftheUnitedNations.

Whatthenwastobedone?Henderson’spessimismwaswellplaced,unlikehisrecommendations.TheUnitedNationsbecamedeeplyinvolvedin the Palestine question, but not in the manner Henderson hadsuggested.

PARTIITheQuestionofPartitionandtheOil

Connection,1947–1948

PartIIexaminestheperiodbetweenpassageoftheNovember29,1947,partitionresolutionandthewinterof1948,whendoubtsaboutsupportforpartitionbecame increasingly important inpolicymakingcircles.This ledtotheinitiativetakenbytheJewishAgencyrepresentativeinhishistoricencounter with the director of the Oil and Gas Division of the InteriorDepartment.

Chapter3introducesthekeyargumentsthatfiguredintothedivisivedebateson thepartitionofPalestineasviewed from theperspectiveofofficials in the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency.Chapter 4 provides a key to the turbulent period that followed as theTrumanadministrationconfrontedtheescalatingviolencethatconsumedPalestine after passage of UN General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution181. Amid increasing doubts about the viability of partition, alternativeviewswereaired,includingthepossibilityofreplacingpartitionwithaUNtrusteeship. The prospect alarmed the Jewish Agency, as chapter 5indicates.ItwasinresponsetothisprospectthattheencounterbetweenthedirectoroftheOilandGasDivisionoftheInteriorDepartmentandtherepresentative of the Jewish Agency led to talk of the hitherto unlikelypossibilityofan“oilconnection,”asthischapterdemonstrates.

3TheCriticalYear:1947

WASHINGTON’SVIEWOFPARTITION

DeanAcheson,undersecretaryofstatein1947,concludedthat“1947isgoingtobeabadyearinPalestineandtheMiddleEast,withincreasingviolenceandgravedangertoourinterestsinthatarea.”1Acheson’sviewreflected Anglo-American deliberations that similarly concluded thatpostwar economic conditions in the Middle East meant increasingpoverty, depression, the intensification of class differences, and theensuing risks of regional instability and radicalization.2 The question ofPalestine served to deepen existing antagonism in the Middle EasttowardtheUnitedStates,andathomeitdidlittletotemperthedebateonthefutureofpartition.

U.S.interests—thatis,continuingU.S.oilcompanyaccesstoAraboiland defense arrangements—were under threat. Loy HendersondescribedWashington’spredicamentinfacingthedecisionoverpartitioninstarkterms:

Wearelearningthatatthisstageofindustrialdevelopmentoil,likefood,isessentialtotheoperation of our very economic life and to the maintenance of what we consider ascivilization.

In view of their economic and strategic importance the Middle East and SoutheastEurope are prizes most tempting to an aggressive and ambitious great power. Such apowermight well be able, if once in possession of the strategic facilities and economicresourcesofthisarea,todecidethedestiniesofatleastthreecontinentsandtocastadarkshadowoverthewholeworldformanyyearstocome.3

TheOilandGasJournal,whichreviewedHenderson’stalk,emphasizedthatthestrategicvalueof“thePersianGulfoilarea”wasafunctionofitspossibly more than 30 billion barrels of oil, which explained why its

control by an “unfriendly power” threatened the present and futuredevelopmentofWesternEurope,aswellasAfricaandSouthernAsia.4In1947 Henderson found himself among many in the State Departmentwho were fearful of the potential damage partition of Palestine and aJewishstatecoulddotoU.S.interests.

Opposition to partition was the common denominator among thepresident’s top advisers, including “the formidable front of GeneralMarshall,Under-SecretaryofStateRobertLovett,SecretaryoftheNavyJames Forrestal, Policy Planning Staff’s George Kennan, StateDepartment Counsel Charles Bohlen, and Marshall’s successor assecretary,DeanAcheson.”5Theirpositionwasunwavering.

ReflectingtheviewswithinthedepartmentsofStateandDefenseandtheCIA,DavidPainterexplainedthatU.S.officialsfeared

thatU.S.supportforthecreationofaJewishstateinPalestinecouldunderminerelationswith the Arab world, provide an opening for the Soviet Union to extend its power andinfluence,andleadtolossofaccesstoMiddleEastoilatatimewhentheWestneededitforEuropeanandJapanesereconstruction.6

Britain did not dispute this position, but it regarded U.S. diplomacy,notably in Palestine, as inept. They reminded their U.S. allies that forthem Palestine represented an area that included some fifty millioninhabitantslivingaside“theonlypossiblecommunicationroutesbetweenEurope,Asia,AfricaandtheFarEast.”7

Matters came to a head when the British brought the Palestinequestion to the United Nations in the spring of 1947. This led toestablishmentoftheSpecialCommitteeonPalestine(UNSCOP),whosemembers toured Palestine, Lebanon, and Europe’s Displaced Personscamps.WhencommitteemembersreturnedtotheUN,theyoutlinedtheposition thatbecame thebasis for theUNGeneralAssembly’spartitionresolution.

Inmid-January1947,FraserWilkins,whowasPalestinedeskofficer,wasamong theU.S.officialson recordashavingsupported theAnglo-American Committee Report of 1946. He did so persuaded of the“strategic and economic importance of American oil, aviation andtelecommunicationsfacilitiesinPalestineandneighboringcountries.”8

WilkinsdidnotoverlookthepopulationimbalancebetweenthefutureJewish state and its surrounding neighbors, and he recognized Araboppositiontopartition.Wilkinsnonethelesssupportedpartition,believing

that it offered a means of satisfying the “national aspirations” of bothpeoples, while excluding the Holy Places. Yet he alsomaintained that“Palestine would enjoy partial self-government under United Nationstrusteeship”9priortoachievingitsindependence.

Acheson,on theotherhand, frankly supportedpartitionas the leastundesirable option. Moshe Shertok, the future Israeli Foreign Minister,courted both Acheson and Henderson. Shertok sought to convinceAcheson to endorse the immigration of 100,000 Jews to Palestine.ShertokalsotriedtoconvinceHendersonoftheeconomicimportanceofincluding the northern part of the Negev in a future Jewish state.10HendersonandAchesonconcludedthatpartitionwouldbe“thesolutionwhich it would be easiest for the American government to support,” inlight of domestic factors and what they regarded as the inherentcomplexitiesof theproblem.11Henderson,however,wasnot in favorofpartition.

Partition was by no means the unanimous choice of Zionists inPalestineandtheUnitedStates,whereChaimWeizmannandU.S.RabbiAbba Hillel Silver clashed, the former favoring partition and the latterdemanding“aJewishstateinthewholeofPalestine.”12DavidBen-GurionandtheLaborPartyultimatelyemergedasvictorsinthedebateinwhichthetacticaladvantagesofpartitiontrumpedotheroptions.In1938,Ben-Gurion had “made the stunning acknowledgement that the entirepresenceoftheZionistsinPalestinewas‘politically’anaggression.Thefighting,hesaid,‘isonlyoneaspectoftheconflictwhichisinitsessencea political one. And politically we are the aggressors and they defendthemselves.’”13ByearlySeptember1946,theZionistExecutivemovedtoacceptpartition, thepositionEliahuEpstein reflectedwhenhemetwithHenderson and other officials in the State Department’s Near EastDivision.14

At this point in time, President Truman held that any change inPalestine required consultation with both Jews and Arabs. Incommunicating with the Saudi king, Truman affirmedU.S. respect andfriendship for thekingandhispeopleandclaimed thatU.S.support forthe Jewish National Home involved nothing inimical to Palestinianinterests.Trumanmaintained that theUnitedStates “hadno thoughtofembarkinguponapolicywhichwouldbeprejudicialtotheinterestsoftheindigenous population of Palestine.”15 The U.S. president insisted that

“we would be firmly opposed to any solution of the Palestine problemwhichwouldpermitamajorityofthepopulationtodiscriminateagainstaminorityonreligious, racialorothergrounds.”16Trumanmaintained that“responsible Jewish groups and leaders interested in developing theJewishNationalHomeinPalestinehavenointentionofexpellingnoworat a later date the indigenous inhabitants of that country or of usingPalestineasabaseforaggressionagainstneighboringArabstates.”17

Suchpronouncementswerepoliticallytactfulbutborelittlerelationtopractice as Truman moved to endorse partition. At the same time,AchesonandHendersonweredeliberatingontherisksthatsuchamoveentailed,despiteitsdomesticadvantages.

Washington insiders were critical of both Truman’s deference todomestic politics and the State Department’s narrow outlook. J. C.Hurewitz,whoservedasanexpertonPalestineintheOSS,asanofficerintheStateDepartment’sintelligencedivision,andasapoliticalofficerinthe UN Department of Security Council Affairs, warned that “Jewishterrorism thrived as never before, despite the statutorymartial law andtheexecutionofcondemnedterrorists.”18HurewitzbelievedTrumanwasmovedbyelectionpoliticstoemphasizetheadvantagesoftheadmissionof the 100,000 refugees into Palestine, even as he was inclined toliberalizeimmigrationlaws.

As for theStateDepartment,Hurewitzmaintained that it “hadneverdeveloped an integrated American policy toward the Near East, intowhich Zionism, not in itsmost extreme form to be sure, could fit.”19 Inpractice, State Department officials looked to such liberal Zionists asJudahMagnes,recognizing,however,thattheyhadlittleinfluenceontheviewsoftheZionistleadership.

In London, the government found the case for partition wanting,preferring instead to support bi-nationalism, as Bevin argued in aparliamentarydebateonFebruary25:“EithertheArabsinthepartitionedStatemustalwaysbeanArabminority,orelsetheymustbedrivenout—theone thingor theother.”Thoughhiscriticspointedout thathecouldjustaswell havedeveloped thesamecase foraJewishminority inanArab state, Bevin argued that a binational statewould best secure the“nationalhome”promisedbytheBalfourDeclaration.20

It was in April that London took the initiative to bring the Palestinequestion before the United Nations General Assembly, inaugurating a

new phase in its evolution. The UN Special Committee on Palestine(UNSCOP)wasestablishedtoexaminetheoverallPalestiniansituation,and it eventually endorsed themajority plan that favored partition witheconomicunion,theinternationalizationofJerusalem,andindependenceto followwithin a two-year period. Those favoring themajority positionincluded Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, Netherlands, Peru,Sweden, andUruguay. Theminority plan, representing the positions ofIran, India, and Yugoslavia, opposed partition and the accompanyinglanddistributionasdeprivingthefutureArabstateofessentialresources,pointingoutthat“theArabsconstituteamajorityofthepopulationoftheproposed Jewish State, and own the bulk of the land.”21 Its membersfavoredfederation.AstotheproblemofEuropeanrefugees,theyarguedthatitwas“notstrictlyrelevanttothePalestineproblem,”whichitwouldservetocomplicate.22

PalestinianArabsrejectedUNSCOP’sdeliberationsand,specifically,partition.UNSCOPthenturnedtoArabLeaguediplomats.InSeptember,membersof theArabHigherCommittee testifiedbefore theUNSpecialCommittee,offeringaplanakintotheminorityplanthat theyviewedassupportingtheintegrityofPalestineunderafederalstate.

TheUnitedStateschosetoignorethefundamentalquestionraisedbythe Arab Higher Committee—that is, the legitimacy of consideringpartition without the consent of the majority. Instead, it supported themajority plan, according to which UNSCOP assigned the proposedJewish state a population of some 1,008,800, with 509,780 Arabs and499,020Jews.23ConceivedatatimewhentheJewsofPalestine“ownedlessthansixpercentofthetotallandareaofPalestineandconstitutednomore than one third of the population,” the arrangement arousedopposition among Palestinians and other Arabs.24 And, as theminorityreportpointedout,of the threeareasallocated to theJewishstate, twoincludedregionsheavilydominatedbyArabpopulations.InthesouthernNegev around Beersheba “there are 1,020 Jews as against an Arabpopulation of 103,820,” and in easternGalilee, “the Arab population isthree times as great as the Jewish population (86,200 as against28,750).”25 The only area where Jews were in a majority was in thecenter,andwellwithinthecitiesofTelAvivandPetahTiqva.

TheconceptionofPalestineenvisagedintheminorityreportwasofaunitarystatewithaconstitutionprovidingrepresentationatthelegislative,

executive, and judicial levels in accord with population, the wholedesignedtoprotectminoritieswiththeirparticipationandconsent.FortheUNSCOP members who favored the minority position, there wassatisfaction in knowing thatpopulationssuchas those inurbancentersthatweretotallymixedwouldcontinuetoliveastheyhad.“ApartfromTelAviv,whichisatotallyJewishtown,inpracticallyalltheothertownssuchas Haifa, Tiberias and Safad, the Jewish population is completelyintermixedwith theArabpopulationand itwouldbe impossible todrawboundariesseparatingthemfromeachother.”26

Other proposals concerning European refugees were put forth byArabrepresentativesat theUnitedNations in1947.Arabambassadors,along with those representing Afghanistan, Colombia, and Pakistan,joinedinasubcommitteetoopposepartitionandproposedasolutiontothesituationofEuropeanJewishrefugees.“Thegistoftheresolution,puttotheGeneralAssemblyforavote,wasthatthetaskoffindingahomefortherefugeesshouldbeequitablyshared,”whichwasnotthecaseatthe present time, as the subcommittee members pointed to the“disproportionately large number of Jewish immigrants” absorbed byPalestineascomparedtoothercountries.27

InWashington,Hendersonwas frankly opposed topartitionand thecreation of a Jewish state. He reviewed U.S. arguments in a positionpapertitled“CertainConsiderationsAgainstAdvocacybytheU.S.oftheMajority Plan,” in which he summarized U.S. views, including thatpartition could endanger U.S. interests in aviation and petroleum. Inaddition,asHendersonpointedout, theU.S.positionwas thatpartitionrisked promoting the emergence of “fanatical extremists” in the Arabworld, simultaneously alienating those who could be useful in curbingnationalistuprisingsacrossNorthAfrica.28

Theonlyviableposition,accordingtoHenderson,wasonebasedonconsensus between Arab and Jewish moderates who might come toagreeonatrusteeshiparrangement.Severalyearslater“therecouldbeaplebisciteonthequestionofpartition,inthelightofwhichtheGeneralAssemblycouldmakeitsfinaldecisiononthisfatefulquestion.AnykindoftemporaryarrangementshouldprobablyprovideforimmediateJewishimmigrationofatleast100,000persons.”29

Hendersonreflectedondifferentfacetsofpartition,itshistorical,legal,andpoliticaldimensions,concludingthatithadnobackingininternational

law,theUNCharter,orAmericandomesticlaw.30Heidentifiedproposalsthat ignore “self-determination andmajority rule” and that recognize “atheocratic racial state” as inimical to U.S. foreign policy, insisting that“whetherpersonsareJewsornon-JewsiscertaintostrengthenfeelingsamongbothJewsandGentiles in theUnitedStatesandelsewherethatJewishcitizensarenotthesameasothercitizens.”31

Years later, in an interviewwith RichardMcKinzie, Henderson tookissuewiththeclaimthattherehadbeenanti-JewishsentimentamonghiscolleaguesintheStateDepartment.

IbelieveandIamincludingpersonnelinofficesotherthanmyownoffice,thatthoughttheestablishmentofaJewishState inPalestinebysheer forcewouldcauseendless troubleforArabs,Jews,andtheUnitedStatesandmighteventuallyevenleadtowarsinwhichtheUnited States might become involved. The Policy Planning Staff in the Department,according to my recollection, made a study of the Palestine problem which resulted inrecommendationssimilartothosemadebyus.32

Hendersonspeculatedabout key figures in theDepartment suchas

Dean Rusk, admitting that while he could not speak for him, he “wasconfidentthatDeanRuskalsothoughtthattheestablishmentbyforceofa Jewish State in Palestine would be amistake.”33 He also noted thatbothDeanAchesonandRobertLovettwere“carefulnevertoapprovetheviewsexpressedbymyoffice,theywerecontinuallyaskingforthemandencouragingustogivethemvoluntarily.”34

Hendersonwaspresentandprivytotheconflictssurroundingsupportfor themajorityplan,whichpassedwithU.S.backing.Heexplainedhisposition to Secretary of State Marshall (who had replaced Byrnes in1947) among others on September 15, 1947, when he argued thatwithoutacceptanceby theArabworld,violence,suffering,adiminishingstatus of the United States in the Arab world, and a correspondingincrease inSoviet influencewere tobeexpected.Hendersonhadbeenconsistentinhisoppositiontopartitionandstatehoodandhadsupportedthe immigration of Jewish refugees to the United States and othercountries.

SomepeoplemaythinkthatIhadnosympathyforthosepoorrefugeeslookingforaplacetogo.I,infact,haddeepsympathyforthem,butitseemedtomeatthetimethatcivilizedcountriesthroughouttheworldshouldlowertheirimmigrationbarriersandwelcomethem.TheUnitedStates,Canada,Australia, a number of Latin-American countries could havemaderoomforthem.35

Moreover, he predicted that Jews who did get to Palestine would

encounter a hostile environment and would displace Palestinians, whowould “become refugees, homeless and miserable. I used the word‘displacing’ because I could not conceive how there could bea JewishState in Palestine unless many members of the Arab majority werepushed out.”36 What Henderson was referring to was the policy of“transfer,”whichhadfiguredinthePeelCommissionReportof1937andwasnotforeigntoZionistthought.37

THEQUESTIONOF“TRANSFER”

Describing the forceddisplacementofpopulationsas “transfer”made itappeartobeavoluntaryandpacificundertaking,wheninpracticeitwasneither.ItwasnotuniquetothePalestiniancase,but itplayedacriticalroleintheevolutionofthePalestinianquestionasitwasanintegralpartofZionistplanning.InOctober1941,Ben-Gurion“formulatedablueprintfor future Zionist policy, in which he expatiated at length about thepossibilities of transfer.”38 Shertok and Weizmann were advocates oftransferaswell.

Observingthat“thereare40%non-JewsintheareasallocatedtotheJewish state,”Ben-Gurion believed that “this composition is not a solidbasisforaJewishstate.Andwehavetofacethisnewrealitywithallitsseverity and distinctness. Such a demographic balance questions ourability tomaintainJewishsovereignty….Onlyastatewithat least80%Jews is a viable and stable state.”39 Palestinians who were within theareaof theJewishstatecouldconstitutearisk,andtherefore“theycaneitherbemassarrestedorexpelled;itisbettertoexpelthem.”40Yettheidea of transfer remained “morally problematic” among Zionists,particularly as they recognized that Palestinian Arabs represented adistinct national identity that would interfere with the resettlement ofPalestinianselsewhere.41

Zionist leaderseventuallyacceptedBen-Gurion’sviewof transferasanindispensableaspectofZionistpolicy.WhatitmeantforPalestinianswasthecreationofconditionsleadingtoflightandexpulsion,whichwasattherootofthePalestinianrefugeeproblem.JosefWeitz,directoroftheJewish National Fund in charge of transfer policy, was convinced that

therewasnoroominthefutureStateofIsraelforPalestinianArabsandJews. As he wrote in 1941, “except perhaps for Bethlehem, Nazareth,andOldJerusalemwemustnotleaveasinglevillage,notasingletribe.And the transfer must be directed to Iraq, to Syria, and even toTransjordan.”42AmongthosewhowereengagedbyWeitz to implementsuch plans was Moshe Shertok. Two weeks after the declaration ofIsraeliindependence,acommitteewasestablishedtoimplementtheplanthat led to the“actualdestructionofPalestinianvillages,”asWeitz laterconceded.43

Sixty-six years later, an Israeli journalist recalled the conquest andexpulsionof thePalestinianpopulationofLyddaasanecessarypartoftheZionistrevolution,withoutwhichtherewouldhavebeennostate.44ItwasapositiontowhichBennyMorrissubscribedaswell,thenandlater.45

In1947,Bevin continued toopposepartition, basinghispositionondemographicconsiderations.HeregardedU.S.policyinPalestineasanadditionalburdenonBritain’salreadydifficultsituation.HedidnotmutehiscriticismofU.S.supportor tolerance for “the terrorists inPalestine,”who “received the bulk of their financial and moral support from theUnitedStates.”46Suchsupportextendedtoorganizationsthat“carriedonextensive publicity campaigns with the purpose of encouraging thePalestinian terrorists and the smugglers of illegal immigrants and ofdiscrediting theattemptsof theBritishGovernment tomaintain lawandorder.” Bevin conceded that efforts by his government to “prevail uponthe American Government to take steps to prevent AmericanencouragementofterroristsandillegalactivitiesinPalestine”hadfailed.47

WhileU.S.officialscontinuedtodeliberateonU.S.policyinPalestine,theJewishAgencyproceededwithplansforaclandestinemeetingwiththe king of Transjordan. Washington was aware of these plans andsupported them. On November 17, Jewish Agency officials, includingElihauSasson,EzraDanin,andGoldaMeyerson,metsecretlywithKingAbdullah of Transjordan on the border between Transjordan andPalestine.

The king agreed to the partition of Palestine as long as it did notdiscredithimintheeyesoftheArabs.HesaidthathedidnotwishtofighttheJewsortocooperatewiththeiradversariesandthathewaspreparedtohelpthemousttheMufti,HajAminal-Husseini.KingAbdullahdeclaredthat he was opposed to the establishment of a separate Arab state in

PalestineandinquiredwhattheJewishattitudewouldbeifheattemptedtoseizetheArabpartof thecountry.Therepresentativesof theJewishAgencyrepliedthat theywouldwelcomesuchastep if itwasexplainedasa temporarymeasure.Thekingaddedthathewouldbeprepared tosignanagreementwith theJews if theyhelpedhim toannex theArabpartofPalestinetohiskingdom,inconformitywithhisplantoestablishaGreaterSyria.Healso suggested that the Jewish statemight later joinTransjordaninaunion,withacommoneconomy,army,andparliament.48

Ilan Pappé points out that “the Jews never promised Abdullah thewhole area allocated to the Arab state by the UN, but asked him todecidefirst,asindeedhedid,whichpartswerevitaltohim.”49Abdullah,inturn,obtainedtheagreementofhisJewishinterlocutorsnottodisputehis selection, agreeing not to attack Jewish controlled territory. Sucharrangements, some maintained, were known to the British whoapprovedthemdespitetheirovertviolationofUNResolution181.50

Washingtonwasawareofandsupportedthesesecretarrangements.It recognized the Arab Legion’s role in Palestine and eventuallysupported recognition of Transjordan and its admission to the UnitedNations.

CRISISATTHEUN:McCLINTOCKANDTHECIACONSIDERPALESTINE

On October 11, 1947, the U.S. representative to the United NationsSpecial Committee, Warren Austin, announced U.S. support forUNSCOP’smajorityplan,addingareservation thatcameasashock tothe White House. As Austin declared, “we consider that certainamendments andmodifications should bemade in the plan in order togiveeffect to theprinciplesonwhich it isbased.”51Austinreiteratedtheview that a solution to the Palestinian problem rested with its people,while insisting on the role of the General Assembly in offering a justsolution acceptable to international opinion. Predictably, Austin’sstatementrousedastorminWashington,whereTrumaninterpreteditasdamagingtheU.S.positionandhisowncredibility.

Henderson’s office was directly implicated in the controversy.Henderson insisted on taking responsibility for the position presented,explaining in his 1973 interview that “I contributed to it, and since I

approvedthefinaldraft, Ididnothesitatetotakepersonalresponsibilityfor it when the question of authorship was raised.”52 Henderson alsopointedoutthatthefinalstatementwasacollectiveeffort“workedonbymembers of my office, of the Office of Special Political Affairs, of theLegalAdviser’sOffice,andbypersonnelfromtheeconomicareas.”53

Hendersonfurtherrecalledthatwiththeapprovalofthesecretaryandunder secretary, who had shown the document to the president,Henderson was informed that “the President had read the document,approvedit,andhadsuggestedthatitbesenttoAmbassadorAustinwiththe suggestion thatwhen he came to the conclusion that the time hadcomeforhimtodeliverthespeech,hewasauthorizedtodoso.”54Austinacted and the president reacted, but not as Henderson and othersexpected.Trumanclaimednottohavebeenconsulted.

TowardtheendofOctober,RobertMcClintock,thenspecialassistanttoDeanRusk,observedthat“if thePartitionPlanfailsofacceptanceatthis assembly [General Assembly] we shall be involved in a mostunpleasant mess.”55 McClintock thought a compromise based on theminorityreportofUNSCOPwouldencounterstaunchJewishopposition,andgivenbothU.S.andSovietsupport forpartition, itwouldhave littlechance of passage. As a result, McClintock counseled support for themajorityplan,inshort,forpartition,withamendmentstomollifytheArabs.McClintockindicatedthathehaddiscussedanotheroption,theso-calledGreater Syria scheme, with U.S. Ambassador George Wadsworth.According to Wadsworth, this plan would allow for the absorption ofPalestinian Arabs, leaving a “Jewish State in the Holy Land.”56 If thatfailed,anotheroptionwastheIraqirrigationproject,whichcouldsimilarlybe offered to Palestinians. McClintock’s cynicism was reflected in hisfurthersuggestionregardingimmigration:

AsasoptotheArabsIwouldproposethattherebenoJewishimmigrationintoPalestineinthe interim period. After all, the Jews have been waiting 2000 years to get back toPalestineandtheycertainlycanwaiteightmonthsbeforeresumptionof immigrationonacontrolledbutincreasedscale.57

More than a year before the Defense Department concluded that

Jewish military forces represented a promising element, McClintockreported that he had been informed that “theCommandos of the IrgunandSternorganizationsareexceedinglytoughandwelltrainedandthat,in sum, the Jewish military strength is considerable. Opposing this

strength it would seem that the Arabs also can muster forces whichwouldmakeupinfanaticismandcouragewhattheymightlackintraininginmodernwarfare.”58

CIAASSESSMENTSOFTHEPALESTINEQUESTION

At about the same time, the CIA cautioned against the expansion ofSoviet influenceandtheriskstoU.S. interests in theMiddleEast. In itsOctober1947report,theagencymaintainedthat

Arabdetermination to resist thepartitionofPalestine issuch thatanyattempt toenforcethat solutionwould lead toarmedconflict, presentinganopportunity for theextensionofSoviet influence.Any firmestablishmentofSoviet influence in theArabstateswouldnotonly be dangerous in itself, it would also tend to isolate Turkey and Iran. Furthermore,irrespectiveofthepossibilityofSovietpenetrationofthisarea,U.S.supportofthepartitionofPalestinemightleadtheArabstates,ontheirown,totakestepswhichwouldadverselyaffectU.S.economicandstrategicinterestsintheirterritories.59

Within amatter of days, the CIA warned that “the seemingly insolublePalestineproblem,becauseoftheever-presentpossibilityofwidespreadcivil andpara-military strife, threatens the stability not only ofPalestinebutoftheentireArabworldaswell.”60

Rightlyorwrongly,theArabsfeelthattheestablishmentofaZioniststateendangerstheirsovereigntyandindependence,andtheyarethereforedeterminedtoopposeitwithallthemeans at their disposal. Even if this opposition does not result in the immediatecancellation of U.S. oil concessions in Arab lands, it will almost certainly lead to suchunrest and instability thatSoviet infiltrationwill increaseandmayeventually achieve thesameresult.61

TheJointChiefsofStaffwereof thesameopinion,concernedlestU.S.interests in theMiddleEast and theGulf be underminedas a result ofpartition,whichwouldadditionallyenhance thepositionof theUSSR inthearea.62

TheUnitedNationsGeneralAssembly (UNGA)prepared to voteonthemajority planwith the help of high-levelU.S.manipulation of votestowardtheendofNovember.63HendersonrecalledpressurebeingputontheFirestoneRubberCompanyand itshostcountry,Liberia;Greeks inNewYork claimedsimilar pressure.Hendersonalso recalled the “greatpressure” to which he and Robert Lovett were subject to ensure UNvotes; in addition, Henderson pointed out that “Felix Frankfurter and

JusticeMurphyhadbothsentmessagestothePhilippinedelegatetotheGeneralAssemblystronglyurginghisvote.”64

DuringthesameperiodWarrenAustin’sassistant,HerschelJohnson,informedHendersonthat“thePresidenthadinstructedhim[DavidNiles]totellusthat,byGod,hewantedustogetbusyandgetallthevotesthatwepossiblycould; that therewouldbehell if thevotingwent thewrongway.”65

Onedaybefore thepassageof theUNpartitionplan,onNovember29,1947,theCIAissuedacomprehensivereviewof“TheConsequencesof thePartitionofPalestine,”whichwasunequivocallypessimistic in itsassessmentofthelikelyoutcomeofaUNvoteinsupportofpartition.Thereasons were to be found in the agency’s assessment of ZionistobjectivesandanticipatedPalestinianandArabreactions.

InthelongrunnoZionistsinPalestinewillbesatisfiedwiththeterritorialarrangementsofthepartitionsettlement.EventhemoreconservativeZionistswillhopetoobtainthewholeof the Nejeb [Negev], Western Galilee, the city of Jerusalem, and eventually all ofPalestine.TheextremistsdemandnotonlyallofPalestinebutTransjordanaswell.TheyhavestatedthattheywillrefusetorecognizethevalidityofanyJewishgovernmentwhichwillsettleforanythingless,andwillprobablyundertakeaggressiveactiontoachievetheirends.66

TheCIAbelieved thispolicywouldbepursuedatan international levelwithaZionistpropagandacampaignandArabatrocitiesintheaftermathofpartition.

The Zionists will continue to wage a strong propaganda campaign in the U.S. and inEurope. The “injustice” of the proposed Jewish boundarieswill be exaggerated, and thedemandformoreterritorywillbemadeasJewishimmigrationfloodstheJewishsector.Inthe chaoswhichwill follow the implementation of partition, atrocitieswill undoubtedly becommitted by Arab fanatics; such actions will be given wide publicity and will even beexaggeratedbyJewishpropaganda.TheArabswill beaccusedofaggression,whateverthe actual circumstancesmay be. This propaganda campaignwill doubtless continue toinfluence the U.S. public, and the U.S. Government may, consequently, be forced intoactionswhichwillfurthercomplicateandembitteritsrelationswiththeentireArabworld.67

The CIA described Palestinians and Arabs as supportive of nationalistmovements across the Arab world whose “political aims are theindependenceofallArablandsandtheestablishmentofsomedegreeofunityamongthem.”68ThisappliedtoPalestiniannationalists,whoseanti-Zionist position was supported across the Arab Middle East. This

sentiment was directed at the feared establishment of a Jewish state,which was viewed as the prelude to more extensive Jewish controlwhosepoliticalandculturalaimswereattherootofArabopposition.

TheCIAmaintainedthatreligiousmovements,suchastheIkhwanalMuslimin(MuslimBrotherhood),werecriticaltosuchforces,pointingoutthat“theArabsarecapableofareligiousfanaticismwhichwhencoupledwith political aspirations is an extremely powerful force.”69 But it issignificantthatintheagency’sviewtheproblemwaspoliticalnotreligiousinorigin.

TheArabsviolentlyopposetheestablishmentofaJewishstateinPalestinebecausetheybelieve thatPalestine isan integralpartof theArabworld. Inaddition, they fear that theJewswillconsolidatetheirpositionthroughunlimitedimmigrationandthattheywillattempttoexpanduntiltheybecomeathreattothenewlywonindependenceofeachoftheotherArab countries. They believe that not only politically but also culturally the Jewish statethreatens the continued development of the Islamic-Arab civilization. For these reasons,theArabgovernmentswillnotconsideranycompromise,andtheycategoricallyrejectanyschemewhichwouldsetupaJewishstateinPalestine.70

TheAgencypredictedthatArabgovernmentswouldnotopenlydefytheUN support for partition, although they would support the Arabs whojoinedmilitiasfightingZionism.However,theCIAalsoarguedthatJewsliving inArab stateswould be victimized by these developments, citingattacks on Iraqi Jews in Baghdad in 1941. The agency reproduced aJewishAgencystatement“thatintheeventofpartitionthe400,000Jewsin the Arab states outside Palestine may have to be sacrificed in theinterestoftheJewishcommunityasawhole.”71

In addition to its political evaluation, the CIA produced acomprehensiveanalysisofmilitary forcesoperating in theconflict.Theyconfirmed the superiority of Jewish forces with respect to numbers,organization,andequipment,withan“excellentintelligencesystem”and“high standard of security,” as well as an effective “clandestine radio”service.72

Described as being divided in three groups distinguished by “theirtacticsand in thedegreeof ruthlessnessemployed in theiroperations,”the CIA reported favorably on the largest group, the Haganah, asdefensive, with “non-extremist intentions,” and as numbering some70,000–90,000, with the capacity to mobilize a total of 200,000.73 TheIrgunwasdescribedas“rightist inpoliticalsympathy,” its followers“well

armedandtrainedinsabotage,particularlyintheuseofexplosives.”74Itsultimateaim,“anindependentstateinPalestineandTransjordan.”75TheSternGang, in turn,wasdescribedassympathetic to theUSSRdue totheir common anti-British and anti-imperialist positions. They had anestimated “400 to 500 extreme fanatics. They do not hesitate toassassinategovernmentofficialsandpoliceofficersortoobtainfundsbyactsofviolenceagainstJewsaswellasothers.”76

The contrast between Jewish and Arab forces, according to CIAassessments, was striking. The agency anticipated that the largestnumber of Arab forces engaged against the Zionists “will be between100,000and200,000, includingPalestineArabvolunteers,Beduin,andquasi-military organizations from the other Arab states.”77 Arabs inPalestine numbered roughly 33,000 men drawn from “quasi-militaryorganizationsastheFutuwwa,theNajjada,theArabYouthOrganization,and the Ikwan (Moslem Brotherhood).”78 The latter, identified as beinglocated in Egypt and Syria, were expected to send volunteers aswell,numbering some 15,000 and 10,000, respectively.79 The cumulativenumber ofArab forces fromneighboring stateswasestimatedat some223,000men,inadditiontothelimitednavalandairforcesavailable.

TheCIAemphasizedtheroleofguerrillawarfareandassumedArabsuperiority,inlargepartasafunctionofwhattheagencyperceivedtobethemoreprimitivenatureofArab fighting forcesandtheirknowledgeoftheterrain.UnliketheJews,theCIAreportmaintained,theArabwasanexperiencedguerrilla fighterand “tribesmenwill engage inactivitiesnotrequiring technical trainingorextensivecoordinationsuchasattacksonisolatedvillages,assassination,continualsnipingtopreventcultivationofthe fields, and attacks on transportation, communications, and supplylines.”80TheagencymaintainedthattheArabshadleftoverU.S.andUKarmsthatwereadequateandwerewellequippedforguerrillawarfare.

More recent estimates by scholars such as Avi Shlaim and WalidKhalidihavecontributed toourknowledgeof the imbalanceof forces inthisperiod.ShlaimstatedthatJewishforceswere“betterprepared,bettermobilized,andbetterorganizedwhenthestruggleforPalestinereachedits crucial stage than its local opponents.”81 In compiling data for theperiodJanuary15,1948,toMay15,1948,Khalididistinguishedbetweenforces trained by the Arab Liberation Army and forces sent by Arabstates.TheArabLiberationArmynumbered3,830 volunteers, ofwhich

about 1,000 were Palestinians.82 “These units entered Palestine onlygradually and over a period of four months. About 1500 entered inJanuary1948,500 inFebruary,1000 inMarchand thebalance inAprilandthefirsthalfofMay.”83ArabforcessentbyArabstatesonthedayofIsrael’s declaration of independence, May 15, 1948, “numbered 8brigades,whosetotalstrengthwasratherlessthan15,000.”84

Initsreport,theCIApredictedthattheSoviets,whosoughttheexitoftheBritishandcontinuedinstabilityinthearea,wouldfocusonprovidingarms and assistance primarily but not exclusively to Jewish forces.Instability would discourage investment and commercial activity, andalongwith partitionmight undermineU.S. involvement in the economicdevelopmentof the region.Theagencyconsidered it unlikely thatArabregimeswouldcanceloilcontracts,citingtheSaudidelegatewho,attheArab League meeting in Alley, Lebanon, announced that “the oilcompanies were private corporations and did not represent the U.S.Government,[and]opposedtheIraqidelegate’sstandthatthecontractsshouldbecancelled.”85TheSaudipositionwasdesignedtoabsolvethekingfromovertcomplicitywithWashington’sstanceinfavorofpartition.TheCIAreportconcluded,however,thatthisdidnoteliminatetheriskofhaving oil installations and “occasional Americans” attacked by“irresponsible tribesmenand fanaticMoslems,”whichwoulddiscourageArabregimesfromagreeingtofurthercontracts.86

In retrospect, theCIAmaintained that thepoliticaldisruptioncausedbypartitionwouldincreasepovertyandpoliticaldespair,thusopeningthedoor to communist propaganda. Furthermore, despite its positiveevaluationof Jewishmilitary forces, theCIAconcluded that theywouldbeunabletosurvivea“warofattrition,”andwithoutexternalassistance,theywouldnotlastlongerthantwoyears.87

In February 1948, the CIA once again reviewed the situation inPalestine,predictingapermanentconflictresultingfromtheincompatibleaimsofZionistsandPalestinianandArabnationalists. In this scenario,Zionists would fight to expand the territory under their control, and theconsequencesoftheconflictwouldextendbeyondPalestine.

PassageofUNGAResolution181

Several days before theUNGA passage of the PartitionResolution on

November29,1947,Truman“approvedapaperstatingthatthesecurityof the Eastern Mediterranean and of the Middle East was ‘vital to thesecurity of the United States.’”88 The formula was to become standardfareinofficialreferencestoU.S.policyintheMiddleEast,areminderofpriorities.

TheUNGAvotedinfavorofResolution181forpartitionofPalestineintoaJewishandArabstatebyavoteof33infavor,13against,and10abstaining.89 The nonbinding resolution recommended establishment oftwostates tobeboundbyaneconomicunion.The futureJewishstatewasallotted56percentofPalestine,andthefuturePalestinianArabstatereceived 44 percent of Palestine. The discrepancy with respect to thepopulation–landratiowasstarkasJewsconstitutedlessthanonethirdofthepopulationandownedonly7percentoftheland,whereasPalestinianArabsmadeupanestimated95percentofthepopulationandownedupto93percentofPalestinianland.TheUnitedStatesvotedinfavoroftheUNGA resolution as did the USSR, which caused consternation andconfusionamongcommunistpartiesintheArabworld,whofollowedsuit,includingthePalestinianCommunistParty.90

InPalestine, thepartitionproposalwasmetwithadamantoppositionby the Arab Higher Committee, and across the Arab worldrepresentatives of Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria,Transjordan,andYemencondemnedtheUNresolutionasnullandvoid.They vowed toadoptmeasures to “defeat theunjust partitionplanandgive support to the right of the Arabs.”91 Transjordan’s exceptionalsituation did not prevent it from taking a public stance in commonwithotherArabstates.

Strikes, demonstrations, and attacks on Jewish commercial centersand other areas accelerated with the entry of Arab volunteers. At ameetingof theArabLeagueheld inLebanon,plansweremade for thePalestinians to be responsible for their own defense, and “the Arabgovernmentswouldfurnishtheirshareofmilitaryfinancing(Egypt,42percent; Iraq, 7 percent; Lebanon, 11 per cent; Saudi Arabia, 20 percent;Syria,12percent;Iraq,7percent;andYemen,3percent)”inadditiontopromisingtostationtheirarmiesonthePalestinianfrontier.92

Pablo de Azcarate, who was to become the UN’s deputy principalsecretaryof thePalestineCommission,concludedshortlyafterpassageoftheUNGAresolutionthatwiththiseventpartitionandestablishmentof

aJewishstatewereallbutassured.93Assessments by U.S. intelligence as well as State Department

officials recognized that despite vehement expressions of opposition,neither Egypt nor Saudi Arabia was prepared to take decisive actionagainst U.S. or British interests. Egypt was simultaneously seeking tocurtail Britain’s demands for continuing access to Suez-Cairo andDhahranairfields,whiledealingwithdomesticopposition in the formoflabor strikes. In Riyadh, the Saudi monarch was keen to maintain arelationship of friendshipwith theBritish, aswell as theUnitedStates,hopingtherebytopreventtheemergenceofarivalHashemiteorder.

InsofarasZionistobjectiveswereconcerned,theleaderoftheLaborParty, Ben-Gurion, had made his position clear months earlier. In aspeechdeliveredbeforethePeople’sCouncilonMay22,1947,heasked—albeit in a rhetorical manner—whether anyone doubted that themeaning of the Balfour Declaration, the mandate, as well as themillenarian yearning of the Jewish people was to establish “a Jewishstate in thewholeofEretz-Israel.”94 Insofarasborderswereconcerned,theywerenotfinal.AcceptanceofUNRes.181wasatacticalmovethatleft the question of how to deal with problematic conditions, such asthoseinvolvingpopulation,toberesolvedbyforce.NearlyamonthpriortotheUNGAvoteonpartition,Ben-Gurionhad“addressedthequestionof how most effectively to assure the demographic basis of a futureJewish state.ThePalestinians inside the Jewish state could becomeafifth column,heclaimedandso toavoid this, ‘they caneitherbemassarrestedorexpelled;itisbettertoexpelthem.’”95

Inthemonthfollowingthepartitionresolution,Ben-Gurionadvocated“aggressive defense; with every Arab attack we must respond with adecisive blow; the destruction of the place or the expulsion of theresidentsalongwiththeseizureoftheplace.”96Theconsequences,Ben-Gurionobserved,would “increase theArabs’ fear andexternal help fortheArabswillbeineffective.”97Themeansusedincludedthedestructionof urban infrastructure and the accompanying demoralization of thepopulation,andthe“outrightintimidationandexploitationofpaniccausedbydissidentundergroundterrorism;andfinally,andmostdecisively,thedestructionofwholevillagesand theevictionof their inhabitantsby thearmy.”98

Ben-Gurion’sdiaryforDecember11,1947,reportedthat

Arabs are fleeing from Jaffa and Haifa. Bedouin are fleeing from the Sharon. Most areseeking refuge with members of their family. Villagers are returning to their villages.Leadersarealsoinflight,mostofthemaretakingtheirfamiliestoNablus,Nazareth.TheBedouinaremovingtoArabareas.

Accordingtoour“friends”[advisers],everyresponsetoourdealingahardblowattheArabswithmanycasualties isablessing.Thiswill increase theArabs’ fearandexternalhelpfortheArabswillbeineffective.TowhatextentwillstoppingtransportationcramptheArabs? The fellahin [peasants] won’t suffer, but city dwellers will. The country dwellersdon’twant to join thedisturbances,unlessdragged inby force.Avigorous responsewillstrengthentherefusalofthepeasantstoparticipateinthebattle.JoshPalmon[anadvisertoBen-GuriononArabaffairs]thinksthatHaifaandJaffawillbeevacuated[bytheArabs]becauseofhunger.99

Ben-Gurion’sentrycoincidedwithresolveonthepartofU.S.officials intheNationalSecurityCounciltoclarifyU.S.policyinPalestine.

From Jerusalem, U.S. Consul Robert B. Macatee (1946–1948)offeredhisassessmentof conditionsat theendof 1947, followedbyadescriptionoftheJewish,Arab,andBritishsituations.AsMacateewrotetoMarshall,

terrorisprevalentandnormal,life(i.e.normalforPalestine)isdisappearing.Itis,however,comparedwithwhatmaybeexpectedinfuture,aperiodofrelativequietandrestraint.ThisphasemaycontinueuntilthewithdrawaloftheBritishismoreimminentanduntiltheArabshavemademore definite plans to give effect to their determination to prevent partition.Presentoutburstsare,itisfelt,comparativelyunimportantanddisorganizedandaremerelytheinevitableconcomitantsofasituationthatistenseandwaiting.Theyarepromptedbyhatred of the Jews mixed with feelings of intense patriotism, and may be expected toincrease.100

Describing thesituationofJews inPalestine,Macateewroteof randomattacksinwhich“theyarepickedoffwhileridinginbuses,walkingalongthestreetsandstrayshotsevenfindthemwhileasleep intheirbeds.AJewish woman, mother of five children, was shot in Jerusalem whilehanging out clothes on the roof. The ambulance rushing her to thehospitalwasmachine-gunned,and finally themourners followingher tothefuneralwereattackedandoneofthemstabbedtodeath.”101Hecitedattacksontrains,thetheftoffood,theexistenceofanarmsmarket,thedesertion from British mandatory service, and the evidence ofcoordinationbetweenPalestinianandArabLegionmembers.Inatellingaside,Macateesuggested thatwhile theJewishAgencyhadnotcalledfor “organized defense,” the recent attacks that involved Mrs. GoldaMyerson, a prominent Labor Zionist, “may give the JA an excuse forsettingupanactivedefenseagainsttheArabs.”102

Uri Bialer observes that the situation in which the Jewish Agencyfound itself worsened as a result of the UN partition resolution. Theleadershipturnedtoarmsacquisition,whichledtoCzechoslovakia.Ben-Gurionhadforeseentheneedforarmsayearearlier inastatementhemade before the Judicial Committee of the Zionist Congress. InDecember1946,Ben-Gurionhadobservedthat

themajorproblemisdefense.Untilrecentlyitwasonlyaquestionofdefendingourselvesagainst thePalestinianArabswhooccasionallyattackedJewishsettlements.Butnowweconfront a totally new situation. Israel is surroundedby independentArab states…whichhave…thecapacitytoacquirearms….Whilethe…PalestinianArabsdonotendangertheJewishcommunity,wenow face theprospectof theArabstatessending theirarmies toattackus….Wearefacingathreattoourveryexistence.103

WithinamatterofmonthsfollowingthepassageofUNGARes.181,

U.S. officials conceded that outside intervention would probably benecessary for its implementation, and short of such action a radicalreconsiderationofU.S.policymightbenecessary. In response tonewsof Washington’s growing doubts about partition, the American ZionistEmergencyCouncilmobilizedsupporters to flood theWhiteHousewithmail in support of partition and arranged for state legislatures to pass“resolutions favoring a Jewish state in Palestine. Forty governors andmorethanhalftheCongresssignedpetitionstothePresident.”104

Inearly January1948,FraserWilkinshostedanexchangebetweentwo representatives from the Jewish Agency, Abba Eban and EliahuEpstein, and three key figures responsible for Near Eastern affairs,Gordon Merriam (chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs), DeanRusk (director of the Office of Special Political Affairs), and LoyHenderson (director of theNear EasternAffairsDivision). According toWilkins’s memo, Epstein and Eban visited the U.S. officials separately“for the purpose of reporting current developments with regard toPalestine and eliciting the further support of the United StatesGovernment in implementation of the recent UN recommendation topartitionPalestine.”105

HendersonwasconcernedabouttheoutbreakofviolenceattheHaifarefinery,amatterofconcerntotheBritishandtheAmericansbecauseofthe IPC oil company connection. Eban and Epstein urged the UnitedStates to issue a public statement denouncing such violence. Ebanemphasized the urgency of arming theHaganah,whichwould stabilize

thearea.U.S.officialsmayhavebeenunawareofJewish–Arabrelationsin theHaifarefinery,which“hadahistoryofclosecooperationbetweenArab and Jewish unionists” before the outbreak of violence.106Furthermore, did U.S. officials know about the attacks carried out byJewishmilitary forces that led to “the collapse and surrender of Haifa,Jaffa, Tiberias, Safed, Acred, Beit-Shan, Lydda, Ramleh, Majdal, andBeersheba”?107

4TheWinterofDiscontent:1948

RECONSIDERINGPARTITIONANDADMITTINGFAILURE

Itwasinthiscontext that inthewinterof1948,U.S.officialsdecidedtoreconsiderpartition,emphasizingthattheUNpartitionresolutionwasbutarecommendation.Itsimplementation,asRobertMcClintockrecognized,wouldsatisfyneitherJewsnorArabs.ButturningthePalestinequestionover to theUnitedNationswasnosimplematter.The riskwas that thePalestine case might then be brought before the International Court,which the State Department’s legal adviser feared. Ernest Grosscounseled Dean Rusk “not to support a motion in Security Council torefer any question onPalestine to the InternationalCourt.”1 At stake inanysuchactionwastheveryquestionofthelegitimacyofUnitedNationsGeneralAssembly(UNGA)Resolution181.

Yet therewas no disputing the cascade of negative reports comingfrom U.S. officials, such that by February 1948 there was broadconsensusthattheexistingsituationwasuntenable.Insum,McClintockandothershadnowarrivedatthepositionadvocatedbyLoyHendersonand Gordon Merriam in 1946—according to which a trusteeshiparrangementwaspreferabletoviolentstalemate.

Among themost consistent critics of partition wasGeorge Kennan,who issuedanumberof reportsonU.S.policyasdirectorof thePolicyPlanningStaff (PPS).2PPS/19ofJanuary19,1948,composedwith theassistanceofLoyHendersonandAmbassadorHenryGrady,underlinedthefactthatResolution181“leftunansweredcertainquestionsregarding

the legality of the plan as well as the means for its implementation.”3Kennan’s position reflected his fear that support for partition in theabsenceofanArab–JewishconsensuswouldendangerU.S.interests.

Palestine occupies a geographic position of great strategic significance to the U.S. It isimportantforthecontroloftheeasternendoftheMediterraneanandtheSuezCanal.ItisanoutletfortheoiloftheMiddleEastwhich,inturn,isimportanttoU.S.security.Finally,itisthecenterofanumberofmajorpoliticalcross-currents;andeventsinPalestinecannothelpbeingreflectedinanumberofdirections.4

SamuelK.C.Kopperwasamongthosepreoccupiedwiththeevident

difficultiesfacingpartition.InhiscapacityasspecialistontheArabworld,KopperwasamemberofPhilipJessup’steamofadvisersattheUnitedNations. At the end of January he wrote a memorandum arguing that“there isnoclear cut solution to thePalestineproblemwhichwouldbecompletely acceptable to all parties.”5 Kopper advocated for atrusteeship, emphasizing that the originalUNGAResolution 181was arecommendation. Under existing circumstances in Palestine, hemaintained, “there are serious doubts as to whether the Arabs ofPalestine are under any obligations whatsoever, legal or moral, to bebound by the General Assembly recommendations.”6 In place of theexisting resolution, Kopper suggested that the U.S. endorse “a newsolutionintheformof(1)atransitionaltrusteeshipor(2)aFederalStatewithliberalimmigrationprovisions.”7Shortofthis,KopperurgedtheU.S.to assume a “passive role until our policy can be altered or until thesituation makes or breaks partition as a solution.”8 Kopper’srecommendationsappeartohavehadnoinfluenceonU.S.policy.

InPalestine,membersoftheArabLiberationArmycarriedoutattacksagainst Jewish settlements and the convoys sent to assist them. ByFebruary, the number of volunteers arriving had reached some threethousand, when the “Irgun used a car bomb to blow up a governmentcenter in Jaffa,” and later placed explosives at the Jaffa Gate. Arabcivilianswerekilledineachinstance.9

Confronting these developments, U.S. Consul in Jerusalem RobertMacatee declared that “any hopes we may have held that thedisturbances immediately following the UN decision represented apassingphase,andthatmoretranquiltimeswouldsoonreturn,havenowbeen dispelled.”10 He reported that there were more than a thousand

casualties,withtwicethatnumberwounded.Palestiniangovernmentwas“inastateofdisintegration,”withdisruptionofservicesattributableinpartto the absence of Arab–Jewish cooperation.11 In the midst of this,Macatee reported that “Jewish officials say they have no doubts abouttheirabilitytosetuptheirstate,”ortodefendthelinebetweenHaifaandTelAviv,unliketheEasternGalileeandtheNegev,andthefutureofthe100,000JewsinJerusalemaboutwhichtheywereconcerned.12HelateraddedthatneitherU.S.norUNdoubtswithrespect topartition,orArabattacks,wouldfundamentallyaltertheJewishAgency’sobjectives.

Macateealsoreportedonthe“influxofuniformedandtrainedArabs,principallyfromIraqandSyria,”joinedwithothersoperatingin“Ramleh-Lydda-Tulkarm, Jerusalem and Hebron districts.”13 Those in commandwere experienced guerrilla fighters, Fawzi Kawukji and Abdul KaderHusseini. However, as Macatee reported, the Mufti was “the centralfigureon theArabstage,hisorganizationshows itself tobe ruthless inthe pursuit of its aims.”14 The Arab front would likely be weakened byinternaldivisions,Macatee indicated,pointingout thatArabmeetingsatAley,inLebanon,confirmedthelackofunityamongArableaders.

MacateewascriticalofBritishpoliciestowardtheJewishAgencywithrespecttoincreasingitsimmigrationquotas,gainingaccesstoitscapital,or toward its militias. Macatee claimed that the British refused toimplementtherecommendationsforpartition;thattheBritishpolice“havenosympathyfortheJews,andstatefreelytheiropinionthatthelatterwill‘collectapacket’”fromtheArabsoncetheBritishleave;andmanyadded“thatintheiropiniontheJewshave‘askedforit.’”15

ReportingontheJewishsituation,MacateeindicatedthatIn the fieldofoffense,which theJewishAgencyprefers to term “preventivedefense”wehaveseenall threeJewisharmedgroups inaction,Haganah, IrgunandtheSternGang.TheiroffensivesgenerallyconsistofdemolitionsofArabstrongpoints,andforaysintoArabvillageswhichtheybelievetohavebeenusedasbasesforArabguerillas.Theblowingupof the Old Serail in Jaffa (by the Stern Gang), the same type of action against theSemiramisHotelinJerusalem(bytheHaganah),andtheshootingofArabsinTirehVillage(by the Irgun) are all examples of Jewish offensives. Such activities are designed,accordingtotheJews,toforcetheArabsintoapassivestate.16

Asanexampleofarmedaction,SimhaFlapanreportedthat

the Irgun used a car bomb to blow up the government center in Jaffa, killing twenty-sixArabcivilians.Threedays later, theyplantedexplosivesatJaffaGate inJerusalem,andanothertwenty-fiveArabcivilianswerekilled.Apatternbecameclear,forineachcasetheArabsretaliated,thentheHaganah—whilealwayscondemningtheactionsoftheIrgunand

LEHI—joinedinwithaninflamingcounterretaliation.17

The day after Macatee’s report was sent to the U.S. secretary of

state,anunproductiveexchange tookplacebetweenLoyHendersonoftheOfficeofNearEasternandAfricanAffairsandFraserWilkinsof theNearEastDivisionandtherepresentativeoftheArabHigherCommitteeforPalestine,IsaNakhleh.ThelatterwantedtoknowiftheUnitedStatesplanned to pressure members of the Security Council to supportimplementation of the partition resolutionwith force, andwhat theU.S.position would be if the Security Council called for a review of thePalestinequestion.Hendersondeniedthefirstpointandclaimedtodrawablankonthesecond.

ThepresidentandthoseinvolvedinthePalestinequestionappearedto be at a turning point, privately convinced of the inevitable failure ofpartition and the need for Arab–Jewish consensus in forging a newdirection, yet reluctant to takeapublic standagainstUNGAResolution181.Overcomewith a senseof urgency,meetingswere held to definetheU.S.position,andparticipantssoughttoavoidleaksoftheseinternaldeliberations. The secretary of state refused to be drawn out on hisviews, deferring to Warren Austin, head of the U.S. delegation at theUnited Nations. Robert Lovett, under secretary of state, counseled hiscolleaguestorefrainfromtalkingshopwithoutsiders.

THEBUTLERMEMORANDUM

OnFebruary11,1948,GeorgeButlerofthePolicyPlanningStaffissueda memorandum for Lovett designed to clarify the U.S. position on thePalestine problem and to offer possible alternatives to existing policy.Butlersingledout long-termsupport forwhatbecame“the trendofU.S.public opinion and U.S. policy based thereon [that] practically forcedofficialU.S.supportofpartition.”18Heremarkedthat“publicopinionintheUnitedStateswasstirredbymistreatmentofJewsinEuropeandbytheintense desire of surviving Jews to go to Palestine.”19 And he recalledthattheUnitedStatesvotedinfavorofpartitiondespiteArabopposition,claimingthatpartitionwouldleadtosecurityandprosperity.

Arab leaders consulted by Butler included the kings of Egypt andSaudi Arabia, and General Jinnah of Pakistan. No Palestinian leaders

were consulted, a decision that reflected the indifference with whichPalestinianpoliticalopinionwasheld.

Against thisbackground, threeoptionswereconsidered: (1) supportfor the UN partition resolution; (2) adoption of a “neutral” position thatButler thought difficult for the United States to do and that meantdetachment fromUNactivities inPalestine:or (3)armed intervention insupportofpartition.IftheU.S.didnotsupportpartition,ithadtofindanalternative, which meant returning to the UN General Assembly andcalling either for an international trusteeship or a federal state, witharrangements for Jewish immigration in either case. Butler concludedthatZionistswould stronglydisapproveof thisbut thatArabstatesandtherestoftheworldwouldstronglyapprove,andtheUnitedStateswouldsecureitsinterestsandregainitsprestige.

StrugglingwiththeImplicationsoftheMemorandumWhatbecameofthismemorandum?AccordingtoU.S.sources,MarshallplannedtopresentitbeforetheNationalSecurityCouncil(NSC)asa“workingpaperbutnot

asrepresentingState’sposition.”20

RobertMcClintockisonrecordashavingadmittedatthispointthat“itwouldbeadrasticsteptoadmitthatouradvocacyonPalestineforyearspast andour recent championingof partition,wasamistake.”21But hishandwritten notes reveal his thinking that an “alternative plan [is]imperative if [a] new situation arises, including readiness [to] use U.S.forces. Trusteeship.”22 This, however,wasnot theofficialU.S. position.Thatpositionremainedconvenientlyambiguous,asinstructionsgiventothe U.S. delegate in advance of the UN Security Council meeting onPalestinerevealed.Inshort,theU.S.positionwastomaintainitssupportforUNGAResolution181withoutexercisingpressure.Asaresult,“therewould not be sufficient affirmative votes in the Security Council for itsimplementation.TheU.S.Delegationwouldbeinstructednottoexertanysuchpressure.”23

Inthedaysandweeksthatfollowed,thesamequestionsconcerningU.S. and UN policies were repeatedly reviewed. The draft reportprepared by the National Security Council on February 17, 1948, wasonly tobe “circulated to theDepartmentsofState,Army,Navy,andAirForce for comment on the consultant (‘Kennan-Sherman-Wedemeyer-

Weyland’)level,(attachedmemorandumofFebruary18byMrKennantoUnder-Secretary Lovett).” Further exchanges with George Butlerdisclosed thatLovettdidnotwant thedraft tobecirculated to theStateDepartmentandthat itwasunderconsiderationbyhigh-levelofficials inthatdepartment.

The FRUS volume which contained the draft offered only itsconclusions. This was sufficient to indicate continuing U.S. support fortheUNpartitionplanbarringexternalarmed intervention.However, theabridgeddraftalsocontainedthefollowingnotice:“ThemilitarymembersoftheStaffdonotconcurintheaboveconclusionandofferthefollowingas a substitute.”24 Themilitary members of the Staff opposed partitionand supported a special UNGA session to reconsider the Palestinequestion.TheyurgedtheBritishgovernmenttoextenditsmandate,and,morepointedly,theyindicatedthatiftheUNGAdidreconsiderPalestine,“the United States should propose the creation of a trusteeship inPalestinewiththeUNTrusteeshipCouncilastheadministeringauthority.If necessary, this proposal should include provision for an internationalforce to maintain internal order during a transitional period.”25 Theydistinguished between this kind of force and one designed to enforcepartition,whichtheyopposed.

AneditorialnoterevealedthatMajorGeneralAlfredGruentheroftheJointChiefs ofStaffmetwithTrumanand indicated his concern at thenumber of troops, estimated to be between 80,000 and 100,000, thatwould be required to implement partition. Should the United Statesundertakesuchaction,Gruentherpointedout, itwouldundermineothermilitary action in the region. In addition, he noted thatU.S. support forpartition had “pretty well disposed of the idea that the United StateswouldcontinuetohaveaccesstotheMiddleEastOil.”26

OnFebruary19,MarshallinformedLovettthat“thePresidentassuredmewhatevercourseweconsideredtherightonewecoulddisregardallpolitical factors.”27 Truman was on vacation, and arrangements weremadetosendhimthedraftof thestatementAustinwas tomakeat theUnitedNationsoncethesecretariesofstateanddefensehadreviewedit.Meanwhile, arrangements were made to bring Austin to the StateDepartment to meet with Lovett, Rusk, Henderson, Gross (the StateDepartment’slegaladviser),andButler.

The message with its enclosed “Working Draft” was labeled “Top

Secret,” but evidently it was leaked. It was subsequently found in thepapersofGeorgeM.Elsey, thenspecialassistant toClarkClifford, thepresident’s legalcounsel.NeitherCliffordnorElseyhadbeen invited tothe inner circle of policymakers to discuss the predicament that theUnitedStatesfaced.

THEELSEY-CLIFFORDMYSTERY

Sohowdidthis“urgentandtopsecret”materialendupinElsey’spapers,andofwhatimportancewasthis?The“WorkingDraft”wasmeanttobe“TopSecret”becauseitraisedtheforbiddenquestionregardingpartitionin a manner that indicated that opposition to UNGA Res. 181, thePartitionResolution,hadreachedaturningpoint.IfElseyhadthisdraft,itwasaccessibletoClarkClifford,whowasknowntohavecontactsintheJewishAgency.

TheU.S.policymakingestablishmentwassteadilymovingawayfrompartitionand towardapolicyof trusteeship.Majorpolicymakingofficialswere in agreement that the United States could no longer ignore theevidence of the failure of partition and the accompanying violence thatappeared to justify Security Council action in accord with the UnitedNations Charter. Yet, in keeping with its past position, the StateDepartmentdrafturgentlycounseledthattheSecurityCouncilattempttopersuadethepartiestocarryoutUNGAResolution181.

Absoluteclaritywithrespecttotheviewofthepresidentwasurgent.In its lengthy “Message to the President,” the StateDepartment askedTruman to pay particular attention to paragraph 8, which outlined theconditionsinPalestinethatconstitutedathreattointernationalpeace.

TheSecurityCouncil is requiredby theCharter to take thenecessaryaction tomaintaininternational peace if it finds that a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act ofaggression exists with respect to Palestine. This might arise either in connection withincursions into Palestine from the outside or from such internal disorder as would itselfconstitutea threat to internationalpeace.Although theSecurityCouncil isempowered touse, andwould normally attempt to use,measures short of armed force tomaintain thepeace,itisauthorizedundertheChartertousearmedforcesifnecessaryforthatpurpose.

AfindingbytheSecurityCouncil thatadangertopeaceexistsplacesallMembersofthe United Nations, regardless of their attitudes on specific political questions, underobligationtoassisttheCouncilinmaintainingpeace.IftheSecurityCouncilshoulddecide

thatitisnecessarytousearmedforcestomaintaininternationalpeaceinconnectionwithPalestine,theUnitedStateswillbereadytoconsultunderArticle106oftheCharterwithaview to such joint action on behalf of the Organization as may be necessary for thepurpose of maintaining international peace and security. Such consultation would berequiredinviewofthefactthatarmedforceshavenotasyetbeenmadeavailabletotheSecurityCouncilunderArticle43.28

Thepresidentwasalsoaskedtocommentonthreefinalparagraphs

of the draft that were not meant for Warren Austin, but for internaldeliberation on what was to be done in Palestine. The first paragraphspelled out the conditions under which the Palestine case would bebroughttotheUNGA,andtheimplicationsofsuchactionsforU.S.policy.Intheabsenceof

acquiescenceon thepartof thepeopleofPalestine topermit its implementationwithoutenforcement measures, and If the Security Council is unable to develop an alternativesolution, to the Jews and Arabs of Palestine, the matter should be referred back to aspecialsessionoftheGeneralAssembly.TheDepartmentofStateconsidersthatitwouldthen be clear that Palestine is not yet ready for self-government and that some form ofUnitedNationstrusteeshipforanadditionalperiodoftimewillbenecessary.29

The paragraph that followed indicated that itmight prove necessary toaskLondontoextenditsstayinPalestineasamandatorypower,giventhe difficulty of existing conditions. The third paragraph was merely astatement to the effect that the Department of State planned to takestrong diplomatic action vis-à-vis all parties concerned in an effort toobtain“animmediatecessationofviolenceandillegalactsofallkinds.”30

Thereissomeconfusionregardingtheprecisedatethetextwassentto the president. The State Departmentmessage contained a footnoteindicating that the text was dated February 23, yet the draft wastransmittedonFebruary21. “The latterpoint isdefinitelyestablishedbythecopyof themessage, identifiedasWhite4andmarked ‘urgentandtopsecret’intheGeorgeM.ElseyPapersintheHarryS.TrumanLibraryat IndependenceMissouri.MrElseywasAssistant toClarkM.Clifford;Mr.CliffordwasSpecialCounseltoPresidentTruman.”31ThedocumentinquestioncanalsobefoundinthepapersofClarkClifford.32

For Epstein and the Jewish Agency, signs that Washington wasturning away from partitionwere cause for alarm.Without knowing thedetailsoftheStateDepartment’s“MessagetothePresident,”Ben-Gurionand other Jewish Agency officials warned of the need to take urgentaction.

In a biography of Secretary of State Marshall, Forest C. Pogueindicated that “despite the extreme care exercised to keep thesediscussions quiet, rumors reached the Jewish Agency, which broughtthematoncetoLovett.”33Thepositionoutlinedinthedraftmayalsohaveinspired the rebuttal prepared by the Jewish Agency in its “Notes onPalestine,”whichbecamethebasisfordiscussionwithU.S.officials.Thesame themes figured prominently in Clark Clifford’s exchange withSecretary ofStateMarshall in the famousMay12, 1948,WhiteHousedebateonU.S.policy.

ATTHEUNITEDNATIONSANDINWASHINGTON

OnFebruary24,WarrenAustincalledontheSecurityCounciltoformafive-member committee to investigate “possible threats to internationalpeace arising in connectionwith thePalestine situation” and to consultwith thevariousparties, including those inPalestine,concerningUNGAResolution 181 and its implementation. Henderson and McClintockcounseled U.S. diplomats on how to handle the U.S. position, whileLovettdealtwithU.S.alliesattheUN.

KennancontinuedtowarnagainsttheUnitedStatesassuming“majorresponsibility for themaintenance,andeven theexpansionofaJewishstateinPalestine,”which,inhisview,wasinimicaltoU.S.interests.34Hefeared thatWashingtonwould agree to send troops to Palestine alongwith those from Soviet controlled areas, a move he believed wouldundermineU.S.strategicplanningfortheMediterraneanandtheMiddleEast.

On February 28, 1948, the CIA issued its report on “PossibleDevelopments in Palestine,” which had been “concurred in by theIntelligence Agencies of theDepartment of State, Army, Navy, and AirForceon19February.”35Astheagencydeclaredinitsopeninglines,“itisapparent that the partition of Palestine into separate Arab and Jewishstates(andanintermediaryzone),witheconomicunionbetweenthetwostates, as recommended by the United Nations General Assembly(UNGA)on29November1947,cannotbeimplemented.”36

Predicting what would happen after Britain’s anticipated departure,the agency warned that Arabs would use force to prevent theestablishment of a Jewish state, and the JewishAgencywould rely on

theHaganahaswellas the“extremistgroups” (the Irgunand theSternGang) to respond. The agency described the arming of Palestinianpartisans and themobilization of Arab forces enteringPalestine,whichwere estimated at some 8,000 men. Jewish forces were described asconducting“terroristraidsagainsttheArabssimilarintacticstothoseofthe IrgunZvai Leumi and theSternGangagainst theBritish”; both theIrgunandSternGangrejectedpartition in favorof“allofPalestine(andevenTransjordan)fortheJewishstate.”37

The CIA report concluded that the United States faced threealternatives: relianceon force to implementpartition,whichwould inallprobability include the USSR; inaction by the United Nations; orrecognition of the failure of partition and its reconsideration before theUNGA. The agency selected the last of the three options as themostlikelyandnecessary.Itmaintainedthat

tocomprehendtheoverridingnecessity forsuchastep, twofactorsmustbeunderstood;(1) that Arab opposition automatically invalidates the UNGA partition recommendations,whosebasicassumptionisArab-Jewishcooperation;(2)thatevenifaJewishstatecouldbeestablishedanddefendedbyforceofarms,itwouldhavetodefenditselfcontinuouslynotonlyagainstitshostileneighborsbutagainsttheresistanceof450,000Arabswithinitsown borders until such time as Arab nationalism no longer existed; and (3) that fullrecourse to all judicial procedures before action is taken would help to establish worldconfidenceinthefairnessandjusticeoftheUNasaninstrumentforworldpeace.38

The agency report suggested that the Security Council could ask theInternationalCourtofJusticeforadviceontheUNGApartitionresolution,and proceed with a truce. If the Security Council failed to act, thesecretarygeneralwouldbeinformedandthecasebroughtbeforetheso-calledLittleAssembly,oraspecialsessionoftheUNGA.

In London, British Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin declared that incurrent circumstances “either the Arabs in the partitioned State mustalways be an Arabminority, or else theymust be driven out—the onethingortheother.”39Bevinviewedbi-nationalismasasolution,whereassomeinWashingtonsupportedfederalism,ifnottrusteeship.Hendersonwarned against the consequences of Jewish expansion beyond theUNGAResolution181boundaries,predicting that if itoccurred itwouldleadtothousandsofPalestinianrefugeesandaJewishStatedependentonU.S.financial,political,andmilitaryaid.

ReflectingonthemoodintheStateDepartmentmanyyearslater,LoyHenderson recalled thatby theendofFebruary1948U.S.officialshad

becomeconvincedthatBritain’sexitfromPalestineinMaywouldresultinchaosand“thelikelihoodthatsomeoftheArabStatesmightsendintheirarmed forces to help their fellow Arabs. If such forces should enterPalestine in large numbers, the United States might feel compelled tosend in its forces to prevent the extermination of the Jews, many ofwhomweresurvivorsofHitler’satrocities.”40

Otherswhohavewrittenaboutthisperiod,suchasMichaelJ.Cohen,point out that by the end of February Truman was persuaded thatpartition would put U.S. interests at risk and, as a result of the chaosfollowing British withdrawal, would open Palestine to Sovietintervention.41

5TheOilConnection

Signs of a shift in the U.S. government’s support for partition had asevereimpactonZionistsentimentintheUnitedStatesandinPalestine.Despite the effective mobilization of support for partition under theumbrellaoftheZionistEmergencyCouncilinthepast,ZionistleadersinPalestine rapidly concluded that additional action was required. Theresultssurpassedexpectations:Washingtondidnotabandonpartitioninfavoroftrusteeship.JewishAgencyrepresentativesestablishedrelationswithoneoftheleadingfiguresinthevastoilbureaucracy,thedirectoroftheOilandGasDivisionoftheInteriorDepartment,therebychallengingalong-standingtaboo.

In the winter of 1948, the Jewish Agency mobilized its efforts toassesshowtorespondmosteffectivelytothecrisisinU.S.policy.JacobRobinson,thelegaladviserandcounselortotheIsraeliDelegationattheUN,warned that therewasa related risk that couldaffect the futureofAmerican Zionists in the United States. Those identified with a causeviewedasinimicaltoU.S.interests,suchasthefearedlossofU.S.oilinthe Middle East and its implications with regard to the EuropeanRecovery Plan, risked being labeled un-American, with the attendantstigma.1

This proved to be a secondary consideration in light of the effortmobilizedtocontainWashington’sincreasingoppositiontopartition.

REASSESSINGTHEAPPROACHTOU.S.POLICYMAKERS

TheAmericanZionistEmergencyCouncil(AMZEC)responsetothefear

that Washington was abandoning partition was impressive, but in TelAviv,DavidBen-GuriondecidedtoappointEliahuEpsteintocontinuethetaskoforganizingsupportforpartitionintheUnitedStates.2EpsteinandMoshe Shertok contributed to a major reevaluation of Jewish Agencypolicy toward the United States, and meetings with State Departmentofficialssoonfollowed.

Thenewlookoffered in“TheNoteonPalestinePolicy” targetedkeyaspectsofU.S. interests in theMiddleEastandfocusedonpersuadingWashingtonthatitmisunderstoodArabdependencyandJewishpromise.Arab oil producers were dependent on U.S. oil companies and thegovernment that backed them in Washington. In the Jewish Agency’snew approach, it was important to demonstrate to Washingtonpolicymakers that U.S. oil company interests were not in jeopardybecause Arab regimes were vulnerable. The fear that U.S. companiesriskedlosingtheircontractswasmistaken.

AstothepromiseofpartitionandaJewishstate,theJewishAgency’srevised strategy emphasized that U.S. relations with the future Jewishstate held the possibility of cooperation with a community of commonculturalandpoliticalvaluesthatwasfarfrombeingaliability.TheJewishstate,insum,couldbecomeanassetinU.S.MiddleEastpolicy.

OnFebruary21, 1948,MosheShertokandEliahuEpsteinmetwithUnderSecretaryofStateRobert Lovett andFraserWilkinsof theNearEastDivisionoftheStateDepartmenttodiscussclarificationoftheU.S.position.PerhapsthetimingoftheirmeetingwasaproductoftheElseyscoop, which had provided evidence of the direction of official U.S.thinkingonpartition. Inaddition toobtainingclarificationonU.S.policy,the meeting provided the Jewish Agency representatives with anopportunity todelineate their ownpositionanddemonstratehow itwascompatiblewithlong-termU.S.valuesandinterests.

Shertok wanted to know if the United States would permit armingJewishforcesandwhetheritplannedtoprovideaninternationalforcetoendorsetheUNGApartitionresolution.Lovett’sreplywasthattheUnitedStatesoperatedwithintheframeworkoftheUnitedNations.He, inturn,askedforclarificationastowhotheJewishAgencyrepresented,aswellaswhotheArabHigherCommitteerepresented.

Shertok stated that the JewishAgency had been established underthemandateasa“quasi-officialbody”thatrepresentedJewsinPalestine

andaroundtheworldthroughademocraticsystemofelections.3Shertokportrayed the Arab Higher Committee as representing only PalestinianArabs, those under the leadership of theMufti in Jerusalem.Asked byLovett whether the Jewish Agency hadmet withmembers of the ArabHigherCommittee, Shertok replied that it was pointless to do so giventheirresponsetoUNGAResolution181.

ShertokexplainedthattheUNpartitionresolutionrepresentedamajorcompromise for the Jewish Agency. “After the cutting away ofTransjordan from the area of the Jewish National Home in 1922, thepresentschemehas reduced the remainderof thatareabynearlyone-half.”4FromtheAgency’sperspective,theUNGAresolutiondeprivedtheJewishstateof its “historicheritage”bycreating“asecond independentArabstate.”5IfJewsacceptedthese“painfulandfar-reachingsacrifices,”it was on the assumption that “their political independence would berecognized,andthattheywouldbeabletoworkouttheirsalvationasafree nation in that territory, which represented the final compromisebeyond which they would not go.”6 Shertok concluded by urging theUnitedStatestorecognizetheprovisionalgovernmentanditsmilitia.

THEQUARTET

In addition to contacts with Lovett, long-range Jewish Agency strategyincluded contacting influential figures in and around the policymakingcircles. Among those active in this campaign was a quartet of keyplayers:EliahuEpstein,MaxBall, JamesTerryDuce,andRayKosloff,who laterbecameIsrael’soiladviserandthedirectorof itsoilcompanyDelek.

EliahuEpsteinwasoneof thesmallgroupofJewishArabists in theJewishAgencyhierarchy.7EpsteinlaterbecameIsrael’sfirstambassadorto the United States. He was director of the Jewish Agency’s PoliticalOfficeinWashingtonbetween1945and1948and,withMosheShertok,often met with administration officials. In November 1947 Epsteinaccompanied Dr. Chaim Weizmann to Washington to meet TrumanbeforetheUNvoteonpartition,andhedescribedhisdutiesasincluding“regularcontactwith theStateDepartmentandour friendsat theWhiteHouse.”8ClarkCliffordwasamong them,aswasDavidNiles,whohadintroducedEpsteintoClifford.9

EpsteinwasalsointouchwithFredaKirchwey,editorofTheNation,whowasa critic ofStateDepartment oil policies andbecamea strongsupporterof Israel.Kirchweywas instrumental in introducingEpstein toGaelSullivanoftheDemocraticNationalCommittee.10Epsteinwasalsoin touchwithsympathetic figures in theU.S. labormovement,asPeterHahnhasshown.11

MaxW.BallwasthedirectoroftheOilandGasDivision(OGD)oftheU.S.Departmentof the Interior,ageologistwith longexperience inandexemplary knowledge of domestic and foreign U.S. oil interests. Hisencounter with Eliahu Epstein and his offers of support established arelationship between the two men that transcended their personalrapport.

The Oil and Gas Division served as “the central oil agency of theFederal Government” and provided “advice and recommendations toother agencies of the Federal Government, to the States and to thepetroleumindustry,relatingtopetroleumpolicy.”12AccordingtotheJ.E.Jones oil newsletter, Ball was “Truman’s PetroleumConsultant.”13 In aMay1948article,BalldescribedthefunctionoftheOGDas“tokeepthePresidentinformedofsignificantdevelopmentsinpetroleummatters,andtoadvisehimofanystepsnecessarytosafeguardthenation’spetroleumfuture. (4) To coordinate, and so far as possible to unify, theadministrativepracticesandpoliciesofthevariousGovernmentagencieswithrespecttooilandgas.”14

Ball’s responsibilities as director of the Oil and Gas Division of theInterior Department included acting “as the government’s channel ofcommunicationwith thepetroleum industry.”15At theannualmeetingoftheAmericanPetroleum Institute in the fall of1948,Ball explained thatsinceestablishmentof theOilandGasDivision in1946 ithad“advised80executiveagenciesonoilandgasmatters,notcountingUNRRA.Itsmen have testified 36 times before 16 Congressional committees. Nocount has been kept of the many senators, representatives, and theircommitteesithasadvisedbyletterortelephone.”16BallremarkedthattheOGD “alone is charged with responsibility for an overall knowledge ofpetroleum affairs, and of the effect of any particular action on thecountry’spetroleumeconomy.”17

Ballemphasizedthathisrolewasonlyadvisory,butthepresident’soilconsultantwasundulymodestgivenhisconnectionsingovernmentand

thepetroleumsector.Abroadarrayofagencieswereconcernedwithoilandgasissues,including“consumingandprocurementagenciessuchasthe Armed Services” and “policymaking agencies such as the StateDepartmentandtheNationalSecurityResourcesBoard.”18Inlightofhisexperience, Ball was recognized by Dewey Short, chair of the SpecialSubcommittee investigating the role of petroleum in relation to nationaldefenseas“amanwhoperhapsknowsasmuchaboutoilandgas, thewhole petroleum industry, and the world petroleum situation, from thestatistical standpoint, as any individual alive.”19 After he retired, BallbecamethemainauthorofIsrael’sandTurkey’spetroleumlaws.20

JamesTerryDucewas the director of thePetroleumAdministrationforWarpriortobecomingthevicepresidentofARAMCO,thepreeminentU.S.oilgiantoperating inSaudiArabia.Beforehebecame“thatprivatecommercialcompany’s”maninWashington,Ducehadhadalonghistoryin U.S. oil politics, including as the PetroleumAdministration forWar’shead of foreign operations in the 1940s under Harold Ickes. As vicepresidentofARAMCO,DucewastheliaisonfortheSaudimonarchy,thecompany,andtheCIA.21

Ray (Israel) Kosloff, the youngest of the four, had a personalrelationshipwithMaxBallandprofessionalexperienceworkinginU.S.oilcompaniesthatwouldservehimwellwhenhebecameIsrael’s“influentialOil Adviser.”22 Kosloff was born into a prominent Zionist family inJerusalem in 1921.He studied economics at theUniversity ofChicagowhere he met Max Ball’s daughter Jean, whom he married. He laterworkedatStandardOilofIndianaandeventuallyreturnedtoIsraelwherehebecame“PetroleumDirectorandOilAdvisertotheMinistryofFinance—servedontheExecutiveCommitteeoftheCompany[theIsraeliDelekOilCompany]andwasinchargeofitsexternalcontractsonbehalfoftheIsraeliGovernment.”23

RayKosloffandJeanspentayear inJerusalem,andBalldescribedhisPalestinian son-in-law to a colleagueas a “red-haired economist.”24Ball recalled discussing “Jean’s article on Palestine” in late November1947,albeitwithoutdisclosingitscontents.AndonNovember29,1947,Ballmadenoteofdevelopmentsat theUN: “Got thenewson theradiothattheUNAssemblyhadvoted33to13forthepartitionofPalestine.”25Nothingmorewassaidonthesubjectinthissource.

RayKosloffwasdeniedapermanentU.S.visadespitehis father-in-

law’s efforts. Under the circumstances, he was advised to acceptnonpaying positions, as he did with the Richfield Oil Company inCalifornia,althoughhehadotheroptions,includingfromContinentalandCal-Tex.Eventually,KosloffandhiswifedecidedtoreturntoIsraelontheadviceofKosloff’s fatherwhoheld “a responsibleposition in the IsraeliTreasury,”asEliahuEpstein,whoknewthefamily,explainedtoBall.26

The encounters that brought the representatives of the JewishAgency together with Max Ball occurred against the background ofworseningconditionsinPalestineandtheagency’sgrowingconcernthatTrumanwould abandon partition. Thesewere not the principal themesdiscussedintheHousehearingsonpetroleuminthewinterof1948,butthey were inevitably part of the discussion and exposed the kinds ofissuesJewishAgencyrepresentativesaddressedintheirrevisedstrategytowardtheUnitedStates.

HOUSEHEARINGSONPETROLEUMANDTHENATIONALDEFENSE

ThehearingsoftheHouseofRepresentativesSpecialSubcommitteeonPetroleum in Relation to the National Defense of the United Statesinvolved thirty sessions, forty-ninewitnesses, and five hearings held inclosed session.27 The list of witnesses included key military, legal,administrative, and political appointees as well as representatives ofmajorU.S.oilcompanies.SecretaryofDefenseJamesForrestalopenedthe hearings on January 19, 1948. He was followed by Max Ball onJanuary20,andseveraldays laterbyJamesTerryDuceofARAMCO.Thosewhotestifiedincludedthedeputychiefofnavaloperations;chief,plansandoperations,NavyDepartment;deputychiefofstaffformateriel,Air Force; director, Naval Petroleum Reserves, Navy Department;executive officer, Armed Services Petroleum; former secretary of theInterior Harold L. Ickes; assistant secretary of Commerce; assistantsecretaryofstateforEconomicAffairs;petroleumadvisertoSecretaryofState Marshall; and a broad array of representatives of U.S. oilcompanies.

Discussion of U.S. oil policy and its bearing on U.S. policy in theregion—includingtheconstructionofTapline,whichwastobringoilfromSaudiArabiatoSidon,Lebanon—washeldinclosed,executivesession.Overall, the inescapable conclusion of speakers such as James

Forrestal,Ball,themilitaryandnavalcadres,andrepresentativesofU.S.oilinterestssuchasDucewasthataccesstotheMiddleEastwastobemaintained at any cost, given the importance of oil toU.S. policy. Therisks of instability and war in the Middle East endangered the peaceessentialtotheoperationofU.S.business.

ARAMCO Vice President James Terry Duce offered committeemembersaglobalinventoryofoil.AsDuceexplained,“strategically,fromaworldviewpoint, thereareonlyfourareasoutsideRussiaandeasternEurope which are of global importance. They are in order of theirimportance,theMiddleEast, theUnitedStates,SouthAmerica,andtheFarEast,particularlythisareainhere—mylawyerwouldremindmethatIshould say ‘in theDutchEast Indies.’”28Ducealso informed committeemembersofrecentdiscoveriesinIranbytheAnglo-IranianOilCompany,as well as in Kuwait, with the “immense field of Burgan in Kuwait—probablythelargestfieldintheworld.”29AstoARAMCO,ithad“extendedits Abqaiq field some 15 miles to the north and discovered a newproducing sand.”30 In addition, the fields ofDukan inQatarwere beingdevelopedbyanIraqPetroleumCompanyaffiliateinQatar.

Underlyingthe importanceofsuchdiscoverieswasthevital rolefuelplaysinmilitaryoperations.AsDuceexplained,“petroleumisamunitionof war, probably one of themost important and that should always berememberedwhentalkingaboutthesefieldsintheMiddleEast.”31Ducedidnotcitethefollowingfiguresonthisoccasion,butitisusefultorecallthat “between1945–1947 theU.S.Navybought$68millionworthofoilproductsfromARAMCO.”32Atthetime,thedefensesecretarypointedoutthatitwas“thecheapestoildelivered,thattheNavyeverbought,”whichcontributedtoitsappeal.33

In his testimony before the House Special Subcommittee onPetroleum and Defense, Duce offered a map of Anglo-American oilcompanies in theMiddle East, akin to a global inventory of petroleumoperations in thehandsof thedominantwesterncompanies. It isworthconsideringthescopeofsuchconcessionsandtheeconomicpowertheyrepresented.

YouwillnotefirsttheAnglo-IranianconcessioninIranownedbytheAnglo-IranianOilCo.,a British corporation. Second, there is the Iraq Petroleum Co. a group of concessionswhich includeallof Iraq,partofSyria,Lebanon,Palestine,Cyprus,Oman,Qatar,TrucialCoast, Trans-Jordan and the Hadramount. There used to be a concession to an Iraq

PetroleumCo.affiliateinSaudiArabia,butthishasbeensurrendered.Theconcessiononthe Shekhdom of Kuwait is held jointly by the Anglo-Iranian and theGulf, an Americancompany.TheSaudiArabianconcessionisheldbytheArabian-AmericanOilCo.,whosestock isownedbytheTexasCo.andtheStandardOilCo.ofCalifornia,andwill,asandwhen certain conditions are satisfied, also be owned by the Standard Oil Co. of NewJerseyandSocony-VacuumOilCo.Thedivisionofownershipwill thenbe30percent tothefirstthreeand10percenttothelast.InthecaseoftheIraqPetroleumCo.,thisstockisowned 23 3/4 percent by Shell, a British and Dutch corporation, 23 3/4 percent by theAnglo-IranianCo.,anEnglishcorporation,233/4percentby theNearEastDevelopmentCo.,whichinturnisowned50percentbyStandardOilofNewJerseyand50percentbytheSocony-VacuumOilCo. Inaddition, agentlemanby thenameofGulbenkian,who IbelieveisaBritishcitizen,ownsa5percentinterestinthecorporation.34

Duce then turned to the need for pipeline construction to facilitate thetransportation of oil across the vast distances separating Saudi Arabiaand the Mediterranean coast, explaining the rationale for preferringpipelines to tankers, while recognizing the existing opposition to steelexportsintheUnitedStates.

DeweyShort,chairofthesubcommittee,commentedontheexclusionofPalestinefromtheproposedpipelineroutes—“andweallknowwhy.”35More generally Short emphasized the necessity of consulting with “themilitary” with respect to locations for pipeline routes. Duce mentionedMax Ball as being among those with whom he planned to consult inadditiontothemilitary.Heconcededthat“theconstructionoftheTrans-ArabianpipelineandtoacertainextenttheIraqPetroleumCo.’slinehasbeen affected by the riots and civil disturbances consequent upon theUnited Nations’ decision for the partition of Palestine.”36 The majorthemes in Duce’s testimony with respect to oil transportation were theurgency of steel for pipeline construction; the transnational role ofpipelines;and the implicationsof thesedevelopments forU.S.policy inthe Eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East, Europe, and CentralAmerica.

Duce was asked to comment on the political risks facing U.S.companies, to which he replied with reference to the Saudi king’sstatement“inwhichhesaidhedidnotintendtodoanythingabouttheoilconcessionsinSaudiArabia,thatwewerehisfriends,andheexpectedto have us continue his production.”37 The committee chair was notreassured,citingPalestineandIndia,evenashecommendedDuceandhis company. Duce responded by affirming that, indeed, “peace in theMiddleEastisanessentialtothedevelopmentoftheMiddleEast.”38

THE“NOTEONPALESTINEPOLICY”

OnthedayfollowingDuce’stestimony,influentialAmericanZionistsandtheir supporters held an informal gathering inWashington. Its purposewas to determine how to persuade Washington policymakers not toabandonpartition.EliahuEpsteinandMosheShertokwerepresent, aswere two of the three coauthors of the 1946 study on the economicdimensionofZionistdevelopment,RobertR.NathanandOscarGass.39

Inthecourseofthisdiscussion,thoseidentifiedassignificanttargetsof Zionist efforts included retired Gen. William Donovan, EleanorRoosevelt, Bernard Baruch, Sumner Welles, John Foster Dulles, andHenryStimson, aswell asArthurVandenberg,ThomasDewey,RobertTaft, Paul Douglas, Adlai Stevenson, and Averell Harriman.40Complementing this listwere twooilmen,RalphDavies andMaxBall.Davies, of the American Independent Oil Company, was described as“oneofthefewoilexecutiveswhogavetheZionistsahearing.”Hewasto “be encouraged to press for Cabinet-level attention to thematter.”41Ball,whoseprofessionalidentityandpoliticalinfluencewerewellknown,wasadditionally recognizedashaving “anaggingadmiration forZionistspunk.”42

Shortly before this meeting occurred, Moshe Shertok sent Gen.Donovan, in response to his request, an elaborate statement of theJewish Agency position. It was the redesigned strategy mentionedearlier, “The Note on Palestine Policy.” Shertok indicated that Gen.Donovanwastousethisdocument“inanywayhedeemedfitwithregardtoGeneralEisenhowerorMr.Forrestal.”43

The “Note onPalestinePolicy” systematically addressed argumentsfor andagainst partition inamanner that evoked theargumentsof theleaked“TopSecret”draftproposaldiscussedpreviously.ItarguedthatiftheUnitedStatesdecidedagainstpartition,itsreputation,aswellasthatoftheUN,wouldsuffer;theconflictwouldbeextended;andBritain’sexitwouldcreateavacuumthattheUSSRwouldexploit.IftheUnitedStatesmaintaineditssupportforpartition,ontheotherhand,itscommercialandeconomicinterestswouldnotbedamagedbut,onthecontrary,wouldbeenhanced.

Eventodaythe700,000JewsofPalestineimportfromtheUnitedStatesnearlyone-halfofthe total imported by seventeenmillionEgyptians.With the establishment of the Jewish

Stateandtheinitiationoflarge-scaledevelopmentprojects,allrequiringvastquantitiesofcapitalgoods,AmericanexportstoPalestineareboundtoincreaseenormously.44

On the crucial question of U.S. oil interests, the “Note” aimed to

overturnthecommonlyheldviewthatpartitionendangeredU.S.interestsbyexposingArabdependencyontheUnitedStates.

TheparamountcharacteroftheAmericanoilinterestintheNearEastisundeniable,butitisapatentfactthattheArabStateshaveagreaterinterestinyieldingtheiroiltotheUnitedStates than theUnitedStateshas inexploiting it.Thecow ismoreanxious tobemilkedthananybodytomilkit.BybreakingtheircontractswithAmericanoilcompanies,theArabStates would incur such suicidal sacrifices that any such apprehension may be safelydismissedasgroundless.SaudiArabiaderivesthebulkof itsrevenuesfromoil royalties.Iraqwould certainly be unable to balance her budgetwithout them.Syria and Lebanon,both inacutefinancialstraits,havescarcelyanyprospectofsolvencyexcept throughtheproceedsofpipelineconcessions.NoArabcountryhasanymeansofobtaining revenuefrom oil resources except through its existing or prospective contracts with the UnitedStates.45

Thisassessmentaimedtoexposethepoliticalimpotenceofoil-richArabregimes that had nowhere to turn other than to U.S. oil companies. Itexplainedwhyoil contractshadnotbeencancelled,as “King IbnSaudstatedexplicitly some timeago thathewould inall circumstances fulfillhiscommitmenttowardstheAmericanoilcompanies.”46

As to the USSR, some in the Jewish Agency were persuaded thatfear of its exploitation of Arab opposition to U.S. partition policiesexplainedWashington’s willingness to reconsider its position. Yet theyinsistedthattheUSSRposednoseriousthreat,itcouldnotcompetewiththeUnitedStates in thearea, and its ideological orientation threatenedthepoweroftheoil-richstates.

ItwasnottheUSSRbuttheriskofArabLeagueactiononpipelinesinearly 1948 that alarmedWashington and Tel Aviv. According to PeterGrose, “early in 1948 the Arab League had decided to deny pipelinerights toAmericancompaniesunlessWashington’ssupport forpartitionwere withdrawn. The message had its impact.”47 Eliahu Epsteinresponded by arranging to meet with the director of the Oil and GasDivisionoftheInteriorDepartment,MaxBall.

MAXBALLANDELIAHUEPSTEIN:HISTORICENCOUNTERS

AccountsofthepreciseoccasiononwhichEliahuEpsteinmetwithMaxBalldiffer.Ball’sdiariesrevealthathewasintroducedtoEpsteininmid-February 1948 by Ray (Israel) Kosloff and Jean, his son-in-law anddaughter. Ball reported receiving a call from Kosloff in New York onFebruary 13 “to askwhether I would see some representatives of TheJewishAgencyforPalestinetomorroworSunday.Isaidyes.”48

OnFebruary14Ballrecordedtheencounterinhisdiary:At1:15RayandJeanbroughtinEliahuEpstein,WashingtonrepresentativeofTheJewishAgency for Palestine, and Mr. Ruffer, who was also of The Jewish Agency, and wediscussed the Middle Eastern situation, and what should be the attitude of the UnitedStatesandAmericanoilcompaniestowardpartitionandtheJewishState,until2:45whenwecontinuedthediscussionthroughlunchattheStatlerCoffeeShop.AgreedtotrytogetMr. Epstein acquainted with some of the proper officials of American companies. HeimpressesmeasmuchasanyoneIhavemetforsometime.49

According to Central Zionist records, those participating in this

meeting included “Mr Eliahu Epstein, Mr andMrs Koslov [Kosloff], Mr.Ball,hisassistant inchargeofMiddleEasternAffairs,GideonRuffer.”50Israel archives identified Israel Koslov as assistant to the president ofRichfieldOilCompanyandGideonRufferasBall’s“assistant forMiddleEasternaffairs.”GideonRuffer,who later changedhisname toGideonRafael, was a major figure in the Israeli Foreign Ministry and was anadviser to the Jewish Agency delegation at the United Nations in thewinterof1948.ThathewasalsoMaxBall’sassistant isunlikely,buthemayhaveworkedwithEliahuEpstein.

As to Ray Kosloff, Ball reported that on the same day that EliahuEpsteincalledtoarrangeformeetingswithofficialsofU.S.oilcompanies,KosloffhadcomeovertomeetCharlieJones,thepresidentofRichfieldOilCompany,athis request.51Kosloffwasoffereda jobasassistant tothepresidentofRichfield,whichBalldescribedasan“activeproducing,refining, and marketing Pacific Coast company which also markets onEastCoast,andiscontrolledbySinclairandCitiesService.”52

Kosloffalsohadoffers fromContinentalandCaltex,whichsuggeststhat major U.S. oil companies were interested in hiring someone ofPalestinianJewishoriginwhenthecourseofdevelopments inPalestinewasamajorpreoccupationofU.S.policymakers.Kosloffwasunable toobtainavisathatwouldallowhimtoaccepttheseoffers,or indeedanysalariedposition.Theoriginoftheproblem,asBalldiscovered,wasthat“theSelectiveServiceBoardconsideredPalestineneutral in1942.”Ball

soughtoutofficialshe thought couldbehelpful, but tonoavail.KosloffeventuallygaveupandreturnedtoPalestinewithhiswifeandnewbornson.

A summary of the February 14meeting between Ball, Epstein, theKosloffs, andRuffer was conveyed toMoshe Shertok on February 18.Although the author of this report was not identified in official Israelisources,itappearstohavebeenEpstein,giventhecontext.“Iopenedbysayingthatwearefightingonthreefrontsnow:theArab,theBritishandtheoilfront.Allthesethreeareunnecessarilyopposedtousandnot[in]thebestoftheirinterests.Thisappliesparticularlytotheoilfront.”53

EpsteinrecalledtellingtheU.S.official,whowasinalllikelihoodBall:Wewould like todiscusswithhim [Ball] thewaysandmeans foranapproach to theoilcompanies. Mr. Epstein continued by explaining the necessity of stability and socialprogress in theMiddleEast and the fact that theYishuv belongs to thisMiddleEasternpattern,andwewouldliketotalkthingsoverwithoilinterests,sinceweareconvincedthattheiroppositionisnotbasictowardsus,butmoreamatterofashorttermexpediency.54

Epstein’s message did not convey the brief history of the JewishAgency’s experience with obtaining oil during the mandatory period,when it relied on the then British-owned Haifa refinery that carried oilfromtheIraqPetroleumCompany(IPC).55

SeveralweeksbeforeEpstein’sencounterwithBall,therehadbeenamassacreofJewishworkersattheHaifarefinery,leadingtoitstakeoverbyJewishforces.Thesubsequentcrisis intherefinery’sproductionandtransportaffectedstatesacrossNorthAfrica,theEasternMediterranean,andtheMiddleEastinadditiontoPalestine.

Ball’s response toEpstein’s statement, according to Israeli sources,wastoexplainU.S.oilpolicybyemphasizingtheU.S.relianceonMiddleEastoilasatoolofforeignpolicydesignedtoassistEuropeinavertingacollapseofitsindustryandthefearedradicalizationofitswarwearyandimpoverished populations. The accessibility of Middle East oil, Ballexplained,wouldfreetheUnitedStatestouseCaribbeanoilfordomesticpurposes. Ball cited Forrestal as declaring that in the event ofwar theUnitedStatescouldnotguaranteeitsinvestmentsintheMiddleEast,but“aslongaspeaceexists,MiddleEastresourcesmustbedrained.”56

Balldidnotfind“draining”MiddleEastresourcesincompatiblewithhisvaunteddescriptionofU.S.oilasaprogressivefactorinthedevelopmentof the region.Nor did he explain the reasoning behind the reliance on

MiddleEasternoilasopposedtooilfromtheCaribbean,whichinvolvedthemorelucrativecharacteroftheU.S.oiloperationintheMiddleEast.Ballalsochosetosaynothing, if indeedhewasaware,ofthenatureofU.S. oil company operations in Saudi Arabia with its overtly racistcharacter and its stark prohibition against any contact with Jews orblacks.57

Instead,BallofferedEpstein theARAMCOview “thatbasicallyoil isprogressive and is interested to raise the standards of living, to bringeducation, and is interested in dealing with enlightened democraticgovernments. Social progress, raising of living standards, increases oilconsumption.”58 The State Department perpetuated the view thatARAMCO provided the “local populations with a livelihood [and]programs for health, education [and] sanitation,” and that Saudi Arabiahad “fewer Communists than any strategically located country in theworld.”59Therewasnomentionofrepression.

BallandtheauthorsoftheDepartmentofStatepaperdidnotrefertothe discriminatory practices established by ARAMCO among its SaudiandSouthAsianworkers.Theovertracismledtostrikesbetween1945and 1949 that were attributed to the communist leanings of Pakistaniworkers. James Terry Duce, when asked by the State Department toexplain the company’s deportation of Pakistani workers in 1949,explainedthat“theywerefollowersof‘theCommunistline,particularlyasregardsevilsofcapitalismandracialdiscrimination.’”60

When Ball offered Eliahu Epstein his glowing image of theachievementsofU.S.oil, itwasasapreface tohisexplanationofwhytheUnitedStatesneededstability in theMiddleEast,whichmeant that“theoilcompaniesmustavoidunderallcircumstancesantagonizingtheArabswithregardtoPalestine.”61Italsomeanthavingtodealwithfeudalregimeswithoutcomplaint.AsBallemphasized,theUnitedStatesfacedanoil shortage thatwould increase,making itall themore important todevelop oil from the Middle East, which would be used to “preventEuropean industry from collapsing and falling to Communism or thedogs.”62Underthecircumstances,partitionwasnotinU.S.interests,theconclusion to which Ball pointed indirectly, citing “an importantpersonality”whoremainedanonymous.

In response to such arguments, Epstein moved on another front,trying to persuadeBall that theU.S.withdrawal of support for partition

would be interpreted by Arabs as a sign of weakness that would beintoxicating.

AnArab triumphover theU.N.bydefeating theJews inPalestineandsubjugating themwouldbedetrimentaltotheWesterninfluenceintheMiddleEastbecauseitwouldincreaseArabself-reliance,demandsandbargainingpower,whereastheimpositionofthewilloftheU.N.bytheloyal implementationofthepartitionschemewouldhaveasoothingeffectonthe Arabs andmake them regain their right sense of proportion. Palestine serves as aunifyingfactorandassuchincreasesthepowersoftheArabs,whicharesplitoverallotherissues.WesternappeasementpolicyhasmadetheArabsbelievethattheyconstituteabigpower,whereasineffecttheyareweakduetotheirbackwardstateofsocial,economicandpolitical development. Firmness, coupled with fairness will makemore of an impressionupontheArabsthanweaknesscoupledwithreason.63

As an example, Epstein offered the case of Syrian opposition to

ratifying an agreement that would allow the construction of Tapline,attributing this to the absence of a government majority in Parliament.Epstein’spurposewas toemphasize theadvantages thatwouldaccruetotheUnitedStatesshouldpartitionandstatehoodbeimplemented.

TheYishuv isaWesternprogressive factor,whichwillbeagreatstimulant toanysocialprogress in the Middle East, which will open new commercial markets. The fact of thepresenceofskilledlabourinPalestinebroughtusanoffertoworkforBritishoilcompaniesinAbadan,Persia,duringthewar.Thuswedidnotonlyparticipate in theconstructionofnew refineries, with some 500 Palestinian technicians, but also cooperated in thesupervisionoflocallabourtopreventsabotage.64

The exchange then turned to the Negev and its oil potential. Ballobserved that there had been exploratory drilling inGaza and Kurnub,butitscommercialpossibilitieswerenotyetclearandprospectingforoilwas difficult. Nonetheless, Ball indicated that if oil were to be found itwouldbesignificantasthe“exploitationofoilsoneartotheshoresoftheMediterraneanwould change thewhole oil position in theMiddle East,whichisnotonlyaquestionofresources,butalsooftransportfacilities.”65Epstein added that Ball was under the impression that “people havebeguntothinkofexploitationofNegevoil,moreparticularlyoftheSinaioil.”66InApril1949,BallnotedinhisdiarythatEpsteinhadinformedhimthat “aman is here from Israelwhowants to talk tome [Ball] about ahighlyimportantnewmineraldevelopmentintheNegev.”67

Returning to the earlier period, Israeli sources claim that Max Ballrecommended that “we [Jewish Agency representatives] should have

franktalkswiththeleadingoilpeople,themanatthetopandnotthefieldworkers.”68

These topmenare people of visionwho knowand understand verywell the social andeconomicaspectoftheproblem,andknowthattheraisingoflivingstandardsisbeneficialtotheirinterests.Thesepeoplearenotguidedbyanykindofanti-semitism,buttheyknowthatatpresentthetensesituationintheMiddleEastnecessitatestheirbeingverycarefulwithregardtoArabsensitivity.

Ball suggests meetings between our people and the following three: Terry Duce(ARAMCO), Charlie Harding (Director of Socony Vacuum, in charge of Middle Easternoperations), Sumer (Vice-President of Standard Oil in New Jersey). Ball expressed hiswillingnesstoadviseusandextendanyhelptouswhereverhecan.HeisveryanxioustohaveanopportunitytomeetMr.Shertok.69

Shertokrecognizedtheimportanceoftheseexchangesbutremained

persuaded that oil still operated against Zionist interests. As Uri Bialerpoints out, “not only were the Yishuv leaders inexperienced on oilmatters: they considered it as axiomatic that British and American oilinterestswouldgenerateanti-Zionistpolicies.”70WhatledShertoktohaveameasure of hopewashis conviction that those in charge of decisionmakinginWashingtonintendedtostandbytheUNresolution.

InWashingtonEpstein continued to turn to Ball for assistance. Ballnoted that “Mr Epstein called up as agreed about arrangements formeeting officials of American oil companies operating in Middle East.ToldTerryDuceoutof townandCharlieHardingoutofcountry.”71 It isnot clearwhether the vice president of ARAMCOwas avoiding such ameeting or agreeable to it in principle. Ball’s relations with Duce werefriendlyandprofessional.InlateJanuary1948,Ballrecalledthathehad“got somedope fromTerryDuceonMiddleEast situation.Hepredictsall-out war as soon as British withdraw in May.”72 The prediction wasmadeatabout thesametimeas theHousehearingsonpetroleumandthenationaldefensepreviouslydiscussed.

FacedwithwhatheconsideredacampaignagainstARAMCO,DucedidnothesitatetowarntheStateDepartmentthat“LeftWingandZionistAmerican Press is preparing a smear campaign against him and hiscompany.”73FredaKirchwey,editoroftheliberaljournalTheNation,wasidentified as being critical of Duce’s activities.74 Such incidents did notdiscourage Duce from agreeing to meet with Epstein, although themeetingtookplaceafterIsraeldeclareditsindependence.

In the intervening period, Ball made note of the request by EliahuEpsteinforanappointment.OnMarch11,Ball’srecordofhisexchangewithCharlieHardingofSocony-Vacuumindicatedthat theydiscussedaprojected pipeline in Iran that required licenses for steel export. Withregard to “the desire of Mr. Epstein to discuss the Middle Easternsituation[,]CharliewillbegladtohavelunchwithMr.Epsteinbutnotuntilafterthepresentsituationhasquieteddownabit.”75

Epsteindid, indeed,come toBall’soffice,althoughnot tomeetwithHarding.Thetwomendiscussedthe“situation,”areferencetoeventsinPalestine,aswellasthe“Kosloffcase.”WhatBallandEpsteinsaidwithrespecttodevelopmentsinPalestineorothermattersrelatedtoEpstein’sinterestinhavingaccesstoU.S.oilcompanieswasnotrecordedinBall’sdiariesorIsraelisourcesthathavebeenmadepublic.Thereisarecordof the two talkingofmorepersonalmatters,namely,RayKosloff’s visaproblem. However, Israeli sources indicate that Epstein and Ball’sdiscussion of oil and Palestine was conveyed to the Jewish Agencyexecutive in a summary of the “Position of the Oil Companies in thePalestineQuestion.”76 The reviewof that exchangewassentonMarch17, 1948, more than two months before Israel’s independence, in aperiod of heightened tension over the continued criticism of Jewishmilitaryactivity inPalestinebyU.S.officialsandWashington’stendencyto lean toward trusteeship. Epstein reported that he had talked “with ahighofficialof theAmericanGovernmentwho iscloselyconnectedwiththe AmericanOil Companies in this country and abroad, andwho hasintimatepersonalcontactswithmostofthehigh-rankingexecutivesinoilcircles.Heiswelldisposedtowardsus,andhisviewscanbeconsideredas fully reliable andauthoritative.” Theunnamedofficial,whomwe cansafelyassumewasMaxBall,wasunequivocalaboutwhattoexpect:

[T]hereisnottheslightestchanceforustocometoanunderstandingwithARAMCOandotherOilCompaniesoperatingintheMiddleEastuntiltheJewishStateisestablishedbothdefactoanddejure.TheOilCompanies’policiesarebasedonpracticaladvantages,thuswhen the Jewish State becomes a reality, they will be the first to approach us for thebenefitoftheirpresentandprospectiveoperationsintheareaoftheJewishState.77

Epstein then reported on what may be considered his peak

achievement. Two months before Israel’s independence, Truman’srecognitionofthenewstate,andtheStateDepartment’sreevaluationofits prior position, Epstein (who would become Israel’s first U.S.

ambassador)wrotetotheexecutiveoftheJewishAgencytoinformhimthat his “informant” thought the new state would fit in the plans beingprojectedfortheMiddleEast.

My Informant told me that he gathered from some of his recent conversations with apolicymakingmemberoftheARAMCOBoardofDirectorsthattheyareseriouslythinkingaboutextensiveschemesofeconomicandsocialdevelopment intheMiddleEast.Theseplans are hardly philanthropic pursuits, but are considered as a safeguard againstCommunism,whichhasgoodprospectsofgaininggroundinthebackwardArabcountriesifsocialandeconomicprogressareartificially repressedby thepresent rulingclasses inthose countries. A special Committee was set up recently by ARAMCO to study thisquestionandtopresenttheirobservationstotheBoardofDirectorsoftheCompanyandtotheStateDepartmentforconsideration.

My informant believes that the Jewish State will fit very well into such a scheme ofdevelopment,andourcontributionswillbeofgreatvaluetotheCompanyandwillraiseourprestigeintheirowncirclesandtheStateDepartment.78

TojudgebyEpstein’sreporttotheJewishAgencyexecutive,hehad

learned from his “informant” that the above contributions of the futureJewish state would raise its prestige in oil company circles and in theState Department. Max Ball, who can be assumed to have been theinformant, had significant contacts in both spheres, but particularlyamongthosewithan interest inoil.Hisreassurancesuggestedafuturerole for the Jewish state that was sufficient to alter its perception asfundamentallyinimicaltoU.S.interestsintheMiddleEast.

Epstein added that Ernest Bevin was interested in similardevelopmentprojectsandhadinstructedBritishexpertstopursuethesematters with their American colleagues, with the idea of jointdevelopment in theMiddleEast. Ball had further informedEpstein that“the Oil Companies would be ready to spend large funds to subsidizethese schemes, as amatter of insurance for their huge investments inthatpartoftheworld.”79

In short, the oil companies anticipated that development projectscouldfunctionasaneffectivemeansofcontainingoppositionmovementsandmovements for change across the oil producing states and, moregenerally, the Middle East. Ball envisioned the future Jewish state asplayingausefulrole inthiscontext, forwhichheofferedhisassistance,suggesting “that soon after the establishment of a Jewish ProvisionalGovernment, anattempt bemade tomeet, at least informally, someofthe top-rankingexecutivesofARAMCOand to frankly reviewwith them

thesituation,aswedid inourconversation.”80The“informant” indicatedthat“hewouldbegladtobeofanyassistancetousinthismatter.”81

After May 1948, James Terry Duce “agreed to have Ball set up ameetingwith IsraeliambassadorEliahuElath [formerlyEpstein], thoughhe toldBall thatARAMCO’sSaudiArabianconcessionwasconditionedon not doing business with the Israelis.”82 According to Citino’sinformative essay on “Postwar American Oil Policies and theModernization of the Middle East,” “Duce hoped that regionaldevelopmentwould help to addressArab-Israeli tensions, and he gaveadvicetoBallaboutthedevelopmentofnaturalgasresourcesinIsrael.”83

Intheinterveningmonths,theU.S.AmbassadortoSaudiArabiahadconveyedsignificantinformationregardingthepositionsofthemonarchsofTransjordanandSaudiArabiainrelationtothequestionofPalestine.TheiroutlookwasasourceofcomforttoU.S.oilcompaniesaswellastotheStateDepartmentandtothefutureJewishstate.

InearlyMarch,J.RivesChilds,theU.S.AmbassadortoSaudiArabia,informedSecretary ofStateMarshall that hehad learned somethingofKing Abdullah’s view of the Palestine conflict from Azzam Pasha, thehead of the Arab League. The king reportedly viewed the Palestinestruggle as a civil conflict and urged fellow Arab regimes to avoidexacerbatingit.

Azzam Pasha informed me today that after conferring with King Abdullah it had beenagreed that he, Azzam, should send a circular telegram to Arab states cautioning themagainstmakinganystatementsorcommittinganyactswhichmightbe interpretedbySCas threat internationalpeace.HehadpointedoutPalestinianconflictwasciviloneand itwasmost important fromArabstates’own interestnotdoanythingwhichwouldgiveSCoccasion use force in Palestine. Azzam indicated he understood and was in thoroughaccordviewpointexpressedbyDepartment.84

The CIA had previously reported on the Arab League political

committee meeting in Alley, Lebanon, in October 1947, at which “theSaudiArabian, stating that theoil companieswereprivate corporationsanddidnotrepresenttheU.S.Government,opposedtheIraqidelegate’sstandthatthecontractsshouldbecancelled.”85Thereferencewastothefeared cancellation of oil contracts with U.S. companies. The formulaproposed by Saudi Arabia was clearly a means of distinguishingcommercial from political relations, thus justifying the retention of thelatterandprofitingfromtheformer.

Duceaswell asChildshada clearunderstandingof theunderlyinginterests of the parties involved, those of Saudi Arabia as well as theUnited States and ARAMCO. For Saudi Arabia, significant long-termprofitswereatstake;fortheUnitedStates,andmoreparticularlyfortheJoint Chiefs of Staff, Dhahran in Saudi Arabia was the location of amilitarybasethatwasconsideredimportanttoU.S.strategicplanningfortheregion.AsforARAMCO,itfueledU.S.policyinEuropeandJapan,asin theMarshallPlan,which innowayeliminatedtherisksposedbythePalestine problem. But as the exchange between Ball and Epsteinrevealed, ARAMCO’s vice president was prepared to meet with therepresentativeof thefutureJewishstatewhenhejudgedthetimetobesuitable.

Fromthisvantagepoint,thefutureoftheJewishstateappearedmorepromisingthanexpected.AsEpsteindiscovered, throughthe invaluableassistanceofMaxBall,majorU.S.oilcompaniesoperatingintheMiddleEastwerenotcategoricallysetagainstthem,whichwasinterpretedasanindicationoffutureinterest.WhetherEpsteinwasprivytoU.S.diplomacyin Saudi Arabia is another matter. In retrospect, however, the politicalimplicationsofthesefactorsforU.S.policyandforArabpoliticsisdifficulttoexaggerate.

Epstein’s laborious and successful lobbying through the winter of1948 coincided with a period of skepticism, if not outright pessimism,among policymakers concerning the viability of partition. Indeed,Epstein’sexchangeswithBallwerefranklyincompatiblewiththeoutlookofpolicymakers that increasinglypressed theUN for clarityonwhetherthePalestiniansituationconstituteda risk to internationalpeace. In thisenvironment,trusteeshipemergedasapossiblealternative,butitservedtodeepen theantagonismbetweenadvocatesandcriticsofpartition inpoliticalcirclesinWashington.

Epstein’s experience and his connections with Max Ball and ClarkCliffordwerenotirrelevanttothesedevelopments.Theywouldultimatelyweigh in on the side of the advocates of partition. Clifford’s ability toexercise influence in White House circles, where he disseminated theJewish Agency strategy developed in the “Notes,” appeared to beeffectiveinaddressingthefearofpartitionendangeringU.S.oilinterestscommontoU.S.policymakersinvolvedinPalestineandtheMiddleEast.ButitwasEpstein’srelationshipwithMaxBallthatwascriticalinthelight

ofBall’s vast network of responsibilities and connections across the oilandgassectorsthatwereessentialtodomesticproductionandnationaldefense.Ball’sviewofEpsteinandtheextent towhichhebelievedthatthe Jewish Agency and its successor would be a good “fit” with U.S.policy in theMiddle East, notably that related to its regional oil policy,contradictedtheperceptionoftheJewishAgencyasendangeringU.S.oilinterests.Ball’sattempt toopenthedoor tocontactswithmajorU.S.oilexecutivesdefied suchperceptions, amatter of no small importance inthe period leading up to Israel’s unilateral declaration of independenceand—as later chapters indicate—the reassessment of U.S. policytowardsIsraellaterundertakenbytheStateDepartment,theJointChiefsofStaff,andtheDefenseDepartment.

In 1951, after Ball had retired and become a private consultant, heandhis sonwereengagedby the Israeli government towritea specialreport on Israel’s oil and gas prospects and the possibility of attractingU.S.oilcompaniestoinvestigatethem.

PARTIIIBeware“AnomalousSituation,”1948

Part IIIcontinues theanalysisofU.S.policy inresponseto thestruggleoverPalestinethatwasintensifiedintheperiodbetweenthepassageofUNGAResolution 181 of November 29, 1947, and U.S. recognition ofIsrael’sunilateraldeclarationofindependenceonMay14,1948.Chapter6 reveals the deepening apprehension among State Department andIntelligence officials about the prospects of implementing the UNGArecommendationforpartition.ThechapteralsoincludesevidenceofwhatWashington knew regarding the flight and expulsion of PalestinianrefugeesintheperiodprecedingIsrael’sindependence.

Chapter 7 indicates the extent to which there was ever-broadeningagreement among policymakers, including the president, that theimplementation of partition was unlikely in the absence of a credibleArab–Jewishconsensus.ThisgaverisetothemovementforatruceandforthereplacementoftheexistingpartitionresolutionwithaUN-backedtrusteeship program, which was conceived as an interim measurepending resolution of major differences between the parties to theconflict.

Chapter8describesthehistoricdebateorganizedintheWhiteHousebetween a select group of advisers and officials on U.S. policy inPalestine, which was rendered irrelevant by Israel’s declaration ofindependence on May 14, 1948. President Truman’s decision torecognizeIsrael,inturn,stunnedU.S.officialsattheUnitedNationswhowere preparing to offer the U.S.-backed trusteeship proposal forconsideration. The resulting disarray is familiar to historians of thisperiod, but far less attention has been paid to the evidence that theUnitedStatesunderstood thedisparityof forceson thegroundand the

likelyhumantollofwar.

6TheTransformationofPalestine

FromPartitiontoExpulsion

ISRAEL’SNEWHISTORIANSANDPLANDALET

Describing the activity surrounding thePalestine question at theUN inthis period, Pablo de Azcarate, secretary of the Palestine ConciliationCommission, woefully observed that the cascade of proposals,counterproposals,andamendmentsvoicedintheGeneralAssemblyandrelated committees and subcommittees had lost “all contact with thepalpitatingandpainfulrealityinPalestine.”1Thatrealitycontributedtotheweakness of a Palestinian political class previously undermined by theimpactoftheBritishrepressionofthe1936–1939rebellion,asaresultofwhichPalestinianleadershipwassubordinatedtotheArabLeague,itselfdividedandmilitarilyunpreparedtoactinPalestine.

The “palpitating and painful reality in Palestine” to which Pablo deAzcaratereferredincludednotonlythemassacreatDeirYassinbuttheexpulsionofPalestinian refugees fromHaifaandJaffaandsurroundingvillages. The cumulative impact of these developments reinforcedWashington’scommitment toa truceand the introductionof trusteeshiparrangementsinPalestineinanefforttocontaintheviolence.

TheUnitedNationsmayhavelostcontactwithrealityinPalestine,butthatwas not the casewithRobertMcClintock or theU.S. consulswhoprovidedU.S.officialswithevidenceofdevelopmentsontheground.TheU.S. source in which McClintock’s memorandum to Lovett appearsindicates that it was not sent. Was it considered too strong anassessmentofJewishAgencypoliciesandintentions?

Certainly, therewasnoattempt tomaskwhatU.S.officials knewof

the balance of forces in Palestine in 1948. McClintock opened with asharp reminder that theJewishAgencyhad refused toaccept theU.S.proposalfortrucenegotiationsinPalestine.Heinterpretedthisasasignthatitis

the intentionof theJews togosteadilyaheadwith theJewishseparatestateby forceofarms.While it is possible that Arab acceptance of our proposalmight place the JewishAgency in such a position vis-a-vis public opinion that it would have to go through themotionsoflookingforatruce,itseemsclearthatinlightoftheJewishmilitarysuperioritywhichnowobtains inPalestine, theJewishAgencywillprefer toroundout itsStateafterMay15andrelyonitsarmedstrengthtodefendthatstatefromArabcounterattack.2

McClintockbelievedthiswould leadtheSecurityCouncil to look into

the legitimacyof Jewish attacks. In the scenario thatwould result, “theJewswillbetheactualaggressorsagainsttheArabs.However,theJewswillclaimthattheyaremerelydefendingtheboundariesofastatewhichweretracedbytheUNandapproved,atleastinprinciple,bytwo-thirdsofthe UN membership.”3 Hence, the United States would face the“anomalous”situationinwhichitwouldbefacedwithdomesticpressuretosupporttheclaimsoftheJewishAgencyagainsttheArabs—apositionthatwas“morallyindefensible.”4

The pattern of attacks was not anomalous, however, as some ofIsrael’sNewHistorianshavepointedout intheirstudiesofIsrael’sstateformation. The so-called Plan Dalet was an inseparable part of theextensionofJewishcontroloverPalestine,where “from1April1948 tothe end of the war, Jewish operations were guided by the desire tooccupy the greatest possible portion of Palestine,” as Ilan Pappé haswritten.5Others,suchasSimhaFlapanandAviShlaim,haveconfirmedthat the plan in question was designed to ensure the expulsion ofPalestinians and achieve a homogeneous Jewish state. The ensuingdevelopments, in retrospect, were of major importance in shaping thefateofPalestinianArabsandtheIsraelistate.

AviShlaimobservedthatthenoveltyandaudacityof theplan lay in theorders tocaptureArabvillagesandcities,somethingtheHaganahhadneverattemptedbefore.AlthoughthewordingofPlanDwasvague,itsobjectivewastocleartheinteriorofthecountryofhostileandpotentiallyhostileArabelements,andinthissenseitprovidedawarrantforexpellingcivilians.6

SimhaFlapan,whoexposedthefoundationalmythsofIsrael’sorigins,

described Plan Dalet as including “the destruction of villages, the

destructionofarmedenemy,and,incaseofoppositionduringsearches,the expulsion of the population to points outside of the borders of thestate.”7

BennyMorris,ontheotherhand,hasarguedthat therewasnothingsystematicabout theexpulsionof Israel’sPalestinian inhabitants in thisperiod. Their situation, he has argued,was a product of war. BetweenApril and June 1948, when Plan D was in operation, some 200,000–300,000Palestinian refugees fled orwere expelled fromPalestine.Butaccording to Morris, “Plan D was not a blueprint for the expulsion ofPalestine’sArabs.Itwasgovernedbymilitaryconsiderationsandgearedto achieving military ends.”8 Yet, as Morris points out in the samepassage,“giventhenatureofthewarandtheadmixtureofpopulations,securingtheinterioroftheJewishStateanditsbordersinpracticemeantthe depopulation and destruction of the villages that hosted the hostilemilitiasand irregulars.”9Morris’sargumentsuggests that theprocessof“securingtheinterior”wasamilitaryoperation,whereashisownresearchand that of others has demonstrated the extent to which such anoperationwas theexpressionof apolitical objective, asZionist leadersrecognized.10

In1988PalestinianhistorianWalidKhalidibasedhisanalysisofPlanDalet on the official history of the Haganah and reported the followingguidelinesandintendedtargets.

EnemyCitiesWillbeBesiegedAccordingtotheFollowingGuidelines:1.Byisolatingthemfrom transportation arteries by layingmines, blowing up bridges, and a system of fixedambushes….3.Bydisruptingvitalservices,suchaselectricity,water,andfuel,orbyusingeconomicresourcesavailabletousorbysabotage.11

KhalidiidentifiedthesuccessionofZionistmilitaryplansdrawnupby

the Haganah for the period 1945 to 1948 as including “Plan B(September, 1945). The ‘May, 1946, Plan’ and its two appendices ofOctober and December, 1946, respectively, the ‘Yehoshua (JoshuaGlauberman) Plan’ [early 1948], and ‘Plan Dalet’ [Plan D], finalized onMarch 13, 1948.”12 AsKhalidi concluded, it was “not easy to visualize,after reading the last two, how thePalestinian state under the partitionplancouldhavesurvivedtheirimplementation.”13

PlanDaletwasbuiltonthepracticeofpopulationtransfer,whichhadits roots inEuropeanpolicy in the interwarperiodandwasregardedas

“an expedient (albeit extreme) method for resolving ethnic conflicts.”14Israel Shahak maintains that “although isolated, early expressions ofsupportfortheideaof‘transfer’amongZionistsweremadein1937,atatime when the Zionist movement in Palestine was gaining strength.”15Theideaoftransferwasimplicit inBritishplansforPalestinebeforetheBritishLaborPartyrecommendedthetransferofPalestinianArabsoutofPalestinein1944.

Zionist leaders,withDavidBen-Gurionchiefamongthem,supportedthe transfer ofArabs out ofPalestine in the 1930s, initiallymaintainingthatthiswastocomeaboutasaresultofagreementwiththeArabs,onlyto admit that “few, if any, of the Arabs would uproot themselvesvoluntarily;thecompulsoryprovisionwouldhavetobeputintoeffect.”16

It appears that the Peel Commission’s (1937) proposal regardingtransfer“originatedfrom,andhadbeensecretlyconveyedby,topJewishAgency leaders, including Ben-Gurion, Moshe Shertok (later Sharett),andWeizmann.”17 TheU.S. consul in Jerusalem in this period,GeorgeWadsworth, isreportedtohavebeenawareofthisplananditsplaceinBritishthinking.18ItremainedanobjectiveoftheZionistmovementintheyears preceding the UNGA partition resolution in 1947, before beingimplementedinthecourseofthe1948struggleforPalestine.

Inan interviewhegave toAriShavit in themainstream Israeli dailyHa’aretz in 2004, Benny Morris confirmed Ben-Gurion’s support fortransfer.

FromApril1948,Ben-Gurionisprojectingamessageoftransfer.Thereisnoexplicitorderof this inwriting, there isnoorderlycomprehensivepolicy,but there isanatmosphereof[population]transfer.Thetransferideaisintheair.Theentireleadershipunderstandsthatthisistheidea.Theofficercorpsunderstandswhatisrequiredofthem.UnderBen-Gurion,aconsensusoftransferiscreated.19

Tothequestionastowhether“Ben-Gurionwasa‘transferist’,”Morris

replied, “of course. Ben-Gurion was a transferist. He understood thattherecouldbenoJewishstatewithalargeandhostileArabminorityinitsmidst.Therewouldbenosuchstate.Itwouldnotbeabletoexist.”20

TheSovietUnionwasreportedtohavebeensympathetictotheideaoftransferintheearly1940saswell.ChaimWeizmann,presidentoftheWorldZionistOrganization,metwithSovietAmbassador IvanMaiskii inLondonin1941.AccordingtoMaiskii,Weizmann“hadproposed‘tomove

a million Arabs…to Iraq, and to settle four or five million Jews fromPolandandothercountriesonthelandwheretheseArabswere.”21IftheSoviet ambassador expressed surprise, it was not to the principle oftransferring Arabs out of Palestine but to the sheer number of thosewhomWeizmannproposedtomove.

Inretrospect,PlanDaletbuiltonthefoundationsofthetransferpolicyandtherejectionofrepatriation.TheconnectionbetweentransferandtherejectionofrefugeereturnwasclarifiedinJune1948whenMorrisreportsthat three major figures of the Yishuv—Yosef Weitz of the JewishNationalFund,EliasSassonoftheForeignMinistry’sMiddleEastAffairsDepartment,andEzraDaninintheIntelligenceServiceoftheHaganah—submitted a comprehensive proposal to Ben-Gurion pressing thegovernment toresolveagainstallowingareturnof theArabrefugeestotheir homes. The three executives, who the previous month had setthemselves up as the unofficial “TransferCommittee,” outlinedawholerangeofstepstoensuretherewouldbenoreturnofthePalestineArabs(about300,000to400,000thusfar)whohadfledorbeenexpelledfromIsraeli-heldterritory.Thecommittee’ssecondproposal(comingafteronecallingforthedestructionofabandonedArabvillages)was“topreventallcultivationof landby [Arabs], includingharvesting, collection [of crops],olive-picking…alsoduringdaysof‘ceasefire.’”22

Morris observes that the “growing pressure by local militarycommanders foraclear-cutpolicy” resulted inGeneralY.Yadin issuingordersprohibiting the returnof refugees toharvest their crops.23Again,Morris points out that foreign observers criticized such developments,and then in a telling phrase he states the following: “But—unlike Ben-Gurion’s internal Yishuv critics, from MAPAM [the semi-Marxist UnitedWorkers Party]—these observers failed to grasp that these ‘local’incidentswerepartofanationalpolicyanddesignwithaclearstrategic-politicalgoal.”24

THOMASWASSONONDEIRYASSIN

U.S. officials may not have known the origins of Plan Dalet, but theyreceived news of attacks designed to empty villages, such as thosecarriedoutonDeirYassin.ItwastheU.S.consulinJerusalem,ThomasC.Wasson,whocabledthesecretaryofstatewithnewsoftheIrgunand

SternGangattackonthevillageofDeirYassinthattookplaceonApril9.Wasson sent Secretary of StateMarshall a confidential report onwhathad transpired. He observed that the attack was preceded by a bitterstruggleoverthevillageofCastel,wherePalestiniansfoughtunderAbdal-QadiralHusseini,whowaskilledonApril9, thedayof theattackonDeir Yassin by the Irgun andSternGang. The latterwas “located in alargely Jewish area in the vicinity of Jerusalem and had signed anonaggression pact with its Jewish neighbors as early as 1942. As aresult, its inhabitants had not asked the Arab Higher Committee forprotectionwhenthefightingbrokeout.”25AccordingtoIsraelisources,thevillagersofDeirYassinhadturneddowntheofferofhavingArabfighterspresent in order not to disturb their relationship with their Jewishneighbors.26

Wassonreportedthefollowing:

Earlymorning April 9 combined force Irgun and SternGang number over 100 attackedArab village, Deir Yasin, several miles west Jerusalem. Attackers killed 250 persons ofwhomhalf,bytheirownadmissiontoAmericancorrespondents,werewomenandchildren.AttackcarriedoutinconnectionbattlenowstillinprogressbetweenArabsJewsonroadsleadingtoJerusalemfromTelAviv.

Arabreaction toattackhasbeenviolentandemotions,alreadyathighpitch followingdeath April 8 of Abdul Kader Husseini [Abd al-Qadir al Husseini] (Arab Jerusalemcommander) during Arab attempt retake village captured by Haganah, now at burstingpoint.OfficerConGenvisitingHusseinKhalidi,secretaryArabHigherExecutive,April11,found him still trembling with rage and emotion and referring to attack as “worst Nazitactic.”

As indignation, resentment and determination to avenge Deir Yasin spread amongArabs, we believe, chance for ceasefire and truce increasingly remote. With growingcriticism in Irgun and Stern Gang circles over Haganah leadership further attacks thisnaturecanbeexpectedandArabswillreactviolently.27

The head of the International Red Cross in Palestine, Jacques de

Reynier, reported that “therehadbeen400people in thisvillage;aboutfifty of them had escaped, and were still alive. All the rest had beendeliberatelymassacred incoldblood.”28Arabscholarsmaintain that theevent of Deir Yassin “became the single most important contributoryfactor to the 1948 exodus.”29 The reports of the Haganah IntelligenceServiceconfirmeditsimpactaswell.30Ben-GurionhimselfnotedthatDeirYassin had propelled flight from Haifa.31 Morris reports that retaliation

followed several days later in an ambush of “a ten-vehicle Haganahconvoy”on itswayto theHadassahHospitalonthecampusofHebrewUniversity.32

When he became Washington’s first ambassador to Israel, JamesMcDonald was an unconditional supporter of Israeli policies and anapologist for its expulsion of Palestinians, whom he viewed along withotherArabsasinferior.ThecaseofDeirYassin,inMcDonald’sview,wasan exception. Relying on the Israeli justification for Palestinian flight,McDonaldexplaineditasapanicresponseinducedbythedepartureofwell-to-do Palestinians, as well as “provoked by lurid tales of Jewishsadism issuedby theMuftiandhis followers,whopresumably intendedto whip the Arab population up to resisting the Jews.”33 The approachfailed, McDonald wrote, citing the case of Deir Yassin as “the onlyJewish-executedmassacreof thewar(the IrgunraidonDeirYassinonApril 9, 1948, inwhich theArabvillagewasdestroyed togetherwith itsinhabitants,womenandchildren included),weresufficient tosetoff theflight.Superstitiousanduneducated,theArabmassessuccumbedtothepanicandfled.”34

Deir Yassin was not an exception, as Israelis recognized. Amongother cases was that of Duweima, near Hebron, carried out some sixmonthslaterbymembersoftheSternGang.35

In 1949 in a heated discussion between various members of theIsraeli parliament on whether Israel should permit 100,000 Palestinianrefugees to return, theexampleofDeirYassinwasbroughtup.Amongthosepresentwasamemberoftheright-wingHerutpartywho,onbeingcriticized forhisproposedwayofdealingwith theprospective returningrefugees,wasaskedifhewasplanninganotherDeirYassin,towhichhereplied“ThankstoDeirYassinwewonthewar,sir!”36

OnApril9,HendersonandLovettdidnotyetknowwhathadoccurredin Deir Yassin, but they were concerned about “the extreme publicpositionstakenbytheJewishAgencyandtheArabHigherCommittee,”making a truce unlikely after May 15. They agreed to contact JudahMagnes,of theHebrewUniversity inJerusalem,andAzzamPasha, theheadoftheArabLeague,forassistanceindealingwiththedeterioratingsituation.37 Magnes was a U.S.-born reform Rabbi in Jerusalem whosupported a binational-state along with others such as Martin Buber.MagneshadlittleinfluenceintheexecutiveoftheJewishAgencybutwas

welcomed inU.S.policymakingcircles,althoughhedoesnotappear tohavehadanyinfluenceonU.S.policyeither.

OnApril10,HendersoncontactedWassoninJerusalem,askinghimtocontactJudahMagnesforhelpininfluencingtheoutlookofJewsandArabsinaccordwitha“conciliatoryattitudesuchasyours.”38

Gravestdangerexists thatunlesssuccess isachieved inUNefforts tobringabout truceand an arrangement whereby interim governmental machinery will be provided forPalestine after May 15 chaotic conditions involving great loss of life and property willprevailinPalestine.Atnotimehastherebeenagreaterneedforcourageouslyconciliatoryattitude such as yours on part of both Arabs and Jews. If such attitude is to prevailcooperation on part of moderate and conciliatory Arabs and Jews is essential. It isthereforehopedthatyoueitheraloneoraccompaniedbysuchotherJewishleadersasyoumayconsiderappropriatewillcometoU.S.atearliestpossiblemoment.39

Henderson informedMagnesof theadvisabilityofhiscomingasa freeagent,andnotunderU.S.auspicessothat“everyoneunderstand[s]thatyouhaveafreehand.”40

AtthesametimeTrumanreceivedaletterfromWeizmannwarningoftheriskstotheJewishpeopleiftheyfailedtobegiventherighttoobtainarms.41Henderson,intheinterim,contactedtheU.S.EmbassyinCairo,solicitingassistancefromAzzamPashaoftheArabLeague:

If this disastrous situation is to be avoided counsels ofmoderate Arabs and Jewsmustprevail.Wethereforefeel it is importantthatthereshouldbewiderrepresentationofwiseand temperateArab leadership inU.S.atpresent time. I urge therefore that youplan tocome to U.S. at earliest possible moment either alone or accompanied by other Arableaderswhomyouconsidermightbehelpfulinthisemergency.42

TheU.S.ambassadorsentHendersonasoberingstatement,warning

himthatEgyptianofficialsdidnothavemuchfaith inU.S.policy.Ashepointedout,theEgyptianprimeministerwasskepticalofAmericanpolicyanddoubtfulthattrusteeship,shoulditpass,woulddoawaywithpartitionplans. Under the circumstances, the Arab League was reported to beprepared tocall foranextensionof theBritishpresence.AzzamPashadeclared himself to be in favor of the U.S. position but was uncertainaboutvisiting theUnitedStates,which theSaudi foreignministerurgedhimtodo.

In Palestine, the Haganah leadership condemned Deir Yassin, butMenachemBegin,whosepartywasresponsible,pointedtothecollusionoftheHaganahRegionalCommand.Beginemphasizedthat“DeirYassin

wascapturedwiththeknowledgeoftheHaganahandwiththeapprovalof its Commander.”43 It was not the only such attack, according to aHaganahhistorianwhoclaimedthatit“wasinlinewithdozensofattackscarriedoutat that timeby theHaganahandPalmach, in thecourseofwhich houses full of elderly people, women, and children were blownup.”44

Three days after the Deir Yassin massacre, the General ZionistCouncil issued a declaration the State Department subsequentlyrequestedthatWassonsendtoWashington.Itreadasfollows:

Wehavedecided,relyingontheauthorityoftheZionistmovementandthesupportoftheentireJewishpeople,thatupontheterminationofthemandatoryregimethereshallbeanendofforeignruleinPalestine,andthatthegoverningbodyoftheJewishstateshallcomeintobeing.

ThestatewhichtheJewishpeoplewillsetupinitsowncountrywillguaranteejustice,freedomandequalityforallitsinhabitantsregardlessofreligion,race,sex,orlandoforigin.It isouraimtomakeitastateinwhichtheexilesofourpeoplearegatheredtogether, inwhichhappinessandknowledgeshallprevailandthevisionoftheprophetsofIsraelshallillumineourpath.

Atthishour,whenbloodshedandstrifehavebeenforceduponus,weturntotheArabsin the Jewish state and to our neighbours in adjacent territories with an appeal forbrotherhood,cooperationandpeace.Weareapeacefulpeople,andweareheretobuildin peace. Let us then build our state together, as equal citizens with equal rights andobligations, withmutual trust and respect, each with a true understanding of the othersneeds.

Ourlivesarededicatedtodefendingthelibertyofourpeople.Iffurthertrialsandbattlesareinstoreforus,weshalldefendwithallourmighttheachievementuponwhichweplaceourhopes.

Rightisonourside.Withusarethehopesofthepastgenerationsofourpeople.Withusistheconscienceoftheworld.Withusaredepositedthetestamentofthemillionsofourmartyreddeadandtheresolutewilltoliveofthemillionswhohavesurvived.Thesanctityofourmartyrsandheroesrestsuponus,andtheGodofourFatherswillhelpus.45

At about the same time U.S. officials were learning of the Zionist

pronouncements regarding the futurestate, theyheardaboutanumberof alarming developments affecting Haifa and surrounding areas. It isdifficult to exaggerate the impact the struggle over the city had onPalestinians as their flight and their inability to return to their homesbecameknownbeyondthecity’slimits.

Britishauthoritieshad indicated their intentions towithdraw from theport city, as well as its airport and main roads, irrespective of conflictbreaking out between Arabs and Jews. Their only concern was tosafeguardtheirtroopsintheprocessofwithdrawing.Palestinianhistorian

Walid Khalidi later revealed that there had been an Anglo-Zionistagreement concerning Haifa, according to which the British agreed tocedecontrolof thecity to theHaganah inexchangeforBritain’ssecureexit. The results proved devastating to Arab inhabitants who were“entirelycutofffromtheoutsideworld.BritishroadblocksontheroadstoJaffa, Nazareth, Acre, and Jenin stopped and pushed back Arabreinforcementsfromtheneighboringvillages.”46

Then,between“April12and17Haganahforcesattackedvillages inthe neighborhood of Tiberias, and on April 18 Tiberias itself fell.”47 Its5,300residentsfledasaresult,whichDonaldNeffmaintainsbegan“thePalestinianrefugeeproblem.”48What followedwasthedesperatecall toAbdullah from General Ismail Safwat and Shukry Kuwatly to interveneandsenditsLegionnairestohaltthemassacres.

AUBREYLIPPINCOTTANDHAIFA

U.S. sources claimed that Arabs had been urged to flee Haifa. Thisinformationlaterturnedouttobefalse,butitcontinuedtocirculate.49AsJoelBeininpointedout, “fordecades, thestateof Israel,and traditionalZionisthistorians,arguedthat thePalestinianArabsfledonorders fromArabmilitary commanders and governments intending to return behindthegunsofvictoriousArabarmieswhichwoulddrive theJews into thesea.”50 The claim thatHaifa’sArabpopulationwasordered to leavebyArab leaders has been challenged as propaganda by Palestinian andIsraelisources.51

AsthestudybyWalidKhalididemonstrates, the leadersof theArabHigher Committee (AHC) had no intention of asking Arab leaders toevacuate their populations. In mid-April 1948, Walid Khalidi, acting asprivatesecretarytoDr.H.F.Khalidi,thensecretary-generaloftheAHC,visited Cairo after themassacre at Deir Yassin. His instructions to theArabHigherCommitteeexpressed itsviewswithrespect to thesecurityofmajorPalestinian towns.Thememorandumstated thatArabdefensein Palestine should be based primarily on the three mixed towns ofJerusalem,Jaffa,andHaifa,whichwereunderimminentthreatofZionisttakeover.Inthesecretary-general’sview,theirfallwouldresultnotonlyinthe expulsion of their inhabitants but also in the collapse of Arabresistance inall theneighboring ruralareas.Hestrongly recommended

that a force of 1,500 trained men (soldiers in civilian garb), suitablyequipped, immediately be dispatched to each of these cities. This, hewarned, was the minimum force necessary to protect these cities andtheirinhabitantsinthefaceofZionistattack.52

Israeli sources have confirmed the efforts of the Arab HigherCommittee to prevent Arab flight. According to Simha Flapan, “recentpublication of thousands of documents in the Israeli state and Zionistarchives,aswellasBen-Gurion’swardiaries,exposethe‘order’theory”asfalse.Theyindicate,instead,“theconsiderableeffortsoftheAHCandthe Arab states to constrain the flight.”53 “[H]undreds of thousands ofothers, intimidated and terrorized, fled in panic, and still others weredriven out by the Jewish army, which, under the leadership of Ben-Gurion, planned and executed the expulsion in the wake of the UNPartitionResolution.”54

InWashington,thesecretaryofstatereceivedcablesfromHaifasentbyU.S.ConsulAubreyLippincott,whodescribedthefightinginthecity:

1.ThelocalArabsarenot100%behindtheirpresenteffort.Thosewhoarefightingareinasmallminority.

2.AlargenumberofArabsinthiscountryareentirelydependingonoutsideforcestosettlethisdispute.

3. Such forces as the Arabs have are quite amateur. Although they have someorganization, the essential discipline for such an organization is lacking. Their sense oforganizationalsupplyandtacticsisalmostnil.

4.ForthetimebeingweshallprobablyseelargeJewishsuccessesinthefield.Unlessthe Arabs get some organization and training, theywill be a veryminor obstacle to theJewsonthebattlefield.Ifoutsideforcescomein,thewholematterisadifferentstory.Hereagain,however,therearesignsofdisorganization,andtherehavebeenasyetnosignsofdisciplineandtrainingcomparabletothatoftheJews.55

Inhissecondcable,Lippincottprovidedadditionalinformation:

JewattackonArabHaifanightofApril21–22completesuccess.AllHaifaoutsideBritishcontrolbeingrapidlyconsolidatedJewhands.BritishnowcontrolsmallsectioneastHaifa,portarea,airport,mainroadtoMt.Carmel

andmilitary zone east and Carmel ridge. Arab areas now being evacuated after Arabsrefuse meet Haganah truce team which reportedly call for complete surrender arms,equipment, all food supplies, deportation “foreign” Arabs, and surrender to Jews of allformerNazis.ArabfamiliesnowleavingentirecityandrefugeeingtovillageswestofHaifawithtwothousandwomenandchildrenreportedfledtoAcrebysea.

Haifa now undoubtedly completely Jew controlled. British say cannot interfere Jewoccupation all areas if Jews do not impede British movements on roads and in areasnecessaryforevacuation.

Arab leaders and men proved poor and totally inadequate deal with Jew forces.SurvivorsclaimBritishpreventedsevenhundredreinforcements fromenteringcityduring

battlealsoclaimAbdullahpromisedhelpwhichBritishalsostopped.Arab forcesentirelydispersed.Leadersreportedlyleftbeforebattleoccurred.

Most appreciations situation express general feeling Jews will keep Haifa under fullcontrol some months. Haganah bringing slightly disrupted public utilities in control withJewishstaffsorderedrunpostofficetelephoneandelectricity.56

Haifa’s impact transcended the devastated city limits. It was

immediately felt insurroundingareasattackedbyHaganah forcessuchasBaladalSheikh,Hawassa,Tira,andAcre,where“of thecity’ssome13,400Arabresidents,onlyabout3,000remained,includingtherefugeesfromthesurroundingvillages.”57Jewishforcesproceededtoreorderthecity, concentrating the remainingArab residents in specified areas andrazingtheirhousesinademolitionprojectdesignedtopavethewayforsettlingJewishrefugees.AstoHaifa’sArabpopulation,“therewereonly8–10,000Arabs left inHaifaoutofanormalpopulationofsome50,000andlaterthatnumberwasfurtherreduced.”58

On June 23, Lippincott’s third cable concerning Haifa reachedWashington. The Honorary Spanish Vice Consul Victor Khayyat, whowasalsoaU.S.citizen, told theU.S.consul that therewereonly1,500ArabsremaininginHaifa.OnJune23,LippincottsentKhayyat’saccounttothesecretaryofstate.

1. All Arabs who remained Haifa being thoroughly screened by Jewish authorities,requiredobtainidentitycardsandmustswearallegiancetoIsraelstate.

2. Arabs who return Haifa are considered illegals. These also required take oathallegiance Jewish state. Result is remaining Arabs determined leave. Khayyat informedthat he had recently arranged for departure seven sailing vessels for Lebanon eachcarrying average 120 persons passage free. One additional vessel scheduled leavetwenty-secondendingoperation.KhayyatsaiddepartureswerearrangedwithassistanceBritish commandosnow controlling port.Approximately 1500Arabs nowHaifa.Of thesesomeexpectedinfiltrateNazarethandothertownsinnearbyArabcontrolledareas.59

Inaddition,theSpanishconsulconfidedtoLippincottthathewas“issuing‘emergency certificates’ for all Arabs applying” for entry into Syria orLebanon.Lippincott,inturn,wantedtoknowwhatordershadbeengivenby Jewish authorities “with regard [to] refusing Arabs return HaifaKhayyatsaid‘wordwasjustpassedaround.’”60

Golda Myerson (Meir), then a high official in the Jewish Agency’sPoliticalDepartment,visitedHaifa“afteritsconquest”andreportedthat

itisadreadfulthingtoseethedeadcity.NexttotheportIfoundchildren,women,theold,waitingforawaytoleave.Ienteredthehouses,therewerehouseswherethecoffeeandpitabreadwereleftonthetable,andIcouldnotavoid[thinking]thatthis,indeed,hadbeenthepictureinmanyJewishtowns[i.e.,inEuropeduringWorldWarII].61

Reflecting on permitting Palestinian Arabs to return to their villages,Myerson remarked that she was not among those favoring such anoutcome.ShedescribedthosewhoadvocatedforthePalestinians’returnas “extremists.” She agreed with Ben-Gurion that the Arabs who hadchosentoremainweretobetreated“withcivilandhumanequality,‘butitisnotourjobtoworryaboutthereturnof[thosewhohadfled].’”62

U.S. and British officials were alarmed that Haifa, with the secondmostimportantoilrefineryintheMiddleEastafterAbadan(Iran),shouldbe the scene of unprecedented political turmoil. They were concernedwith the future of the Iraq PetroleumCompany (IPC) refinery that hademployed“some1,700Araband270Jewishmanualworkers,inadditionto190Jewish,110Arab,and60Britishclericalworkers” in late1947.63The employees had participated in struggles that brought Arab andJewishunionstogetherandwerereportedtohavesignedanagreementto maintain peaceful relations within the refinery. Such relations weremaintaineduntil severalmonthsbeforeDeirYassin,whenanattackbythe Etzel (Irgun) on Palestinian workers outside of the Haifa refinerysparked retaliation against Jewish workers inside the refinery. This, inturn,wasfollowedbyaHaganah/PalmachattackontheArabvillagenearHaifaatBaladal-ShaykhaswellasHawasa,wherePalestiniansknowntoworkintherefinerylived.

In mid-June, the defense minister of Iraq informed the British inBaghdadthat“HaifaismostimportantPalestineproblem.”Heexpressedthe view that if Haifa cannot be an Arab state it must be a free port;otherwise the pipeline would have to be relaid through Syria andLebanon because, although the Iraqi economy is dependent on oilroyalties,Iraq“couldnottolerateoutletforitsoilbeinginJewishstate.”64

Severaldayslater,inaverydifferentenvironment,SecretaryofStateMarshall lost no time in speculating on the potential benefits of thetakeover of the refinery in Haifa, fantasying that it provided reason forreconciliation and “mutual accommodation which may serve as aconstructiveexampleofhowJewsandArabscanmanage togetalongpeaceablythroughoutallofPalestineandtheNearEast.”65Butthatwas

nottheprincipallessontobelearned.Marshallcalculated,asdidBevin,that above all the refinery had to be put back into operation, and UNMediatorBernadotteshouldbesoinformed.MarshalldiscoveredthattheProvisionalGovernmentofIsrael(PGI)hadbeenengagedindiscussionswiththeBritishForeignOfficeregardingtherefineryandthat“PGIwouldnot object if representative of Mediator controlled production in Haifarefinery,Arabsreceivinga fairshareofoutput.”66AsMarshall remindedthe U.S. ambassador to the UK, it was important for the mediator to“keep in mind importance of Haifa production going to ERP and tolegitimatecivilianrequirementsofNearEast,includingIsrael.”67MarshallarrangedforthesamemessagetobeconveyedtoJerusalem,Cairo,andtotheFrench,whowereurgedtoconveyittotheUNmediator.

In earlySeptember, the assistant chief of thePetroleumDivision ofthe State Department described the U.S. position as supporting thereopening of theHaifa refinerywith Iraqi crude oil.Washington arguedthat “the gain in terms of world oil supplies would be substantial. Thecooperation of Arabs and Jews, which would be necessary to theoperation of the refinery, would provide an important precedent forcooperationinothermatters.”68Butasthesamesourceindicated,therewaslittletowarrantsuchhope.Apparently,theUnitedStateshadbeenintouch with the mediator, British officials, Israelis representing theProvisional Government, as well as oil companies, but U.S. efforts toreopen the refinerywerenotsuccessful. Iraqisopposed thepassageofoil to Haifa while the refinery remained under Jewish control. Jews, inturn,appeared reluctant “topermit thedegreeof internationalcontroloftherefineryanditsoperationwhichwillsatisfytheIraqiwishes.”69

The experience of the closure of the Haifa refinery led the JewishAgencyto investigateotherpossiblesourcesof fuelpurchase, includingfrom the Soviet Union. Uri Bialer points out that the Jewish Agencyconducted negotiationswith theSoviets in the spring of 1948. “Israel’soverture to Moscow and its readiness at that time, whatever theconsequences, to facilitate Soviet infiltration of the oil business in theMiddle East, thereby breaking the West’s monopoly remainedunparalleled until 1954.”70 But matters did not end well as difficultiesemerged in arranging for a tanker to carry the oil, which effectivelyunderminedthecontractthatwasthencancelled.

Intheinterim,inlateDecember1948,afterIPCfailedtoconvincethe

Iraqi regime to permit it to carry oil through Haifa to some of theneighboringstates,westernofficialswhosecompanieswererepresentedin IPC interceded to ensure there was oil for theMarshall Plan. As ofDecember29,U.S.sources reported that “nodecisionhasbeen taken,and none can be favorably decided upon until theGovernment is fullysatisfied that the Zionists at Haifa, shall not derive any benefitwhatsoeverfromIraqioil.”71

U.S.aswellasIsraeliinterestintheIraqioilconnectionhaspersistedinto the present day. In the summer of 2003, severalmonths after theU.S. invasionof Iraq,Ha’aretz reported that thePentagonasked Israel“tocheckonthepossibilityofpumpingoilfromIraqtotheoilrefineriesinHaifa.”72 In April 2003, the Guardian reported on plans designed toreconstruct the 1948 pipeline. At that time, Bechtel was to build thepipeline.Theprojectwasnotonly tosafeguardIsrael’soilsupplybut toensureasupplyofU.S.oiloutsideofSaudiArabia.73

Within several days of the 1948 upheaval in Haifa, Arab leadersplanned to meet in Cairo to discuss the implications of what hadoccurred. The U.S. ambassador made it clear to Washington thatEgyptianforceswereinnoconditiontofight,buttheywereworriedaboutthedomesticimpactofdefeatatthehandsofJewishforces.Theregimeitself was concerned not to antagonize Britain, yet it was in need oftroops todealwithstrikesandnationalistactions,aboveall fearful “thatArab forcesmight prove ineffective in protectingPalestinians, thereforepermanentlydamagingArabcauseinPalestine.”74

ThoseconsideredmostlikelytoprovidethecoreelementsofanArabmilitary forcewereTransjordan, Iraq, andSyria,with token forces fromLebanon. Egypt would limit itself to providing financial assistance untilBritain’sdeparture fromPalestine.ThePalestinians,on theotherhand,werebelievedtobeunarmed,politicallydivided,andlackinginleadershipcapableofassessingtheforcetheyfaced.75

LOWELLPINKERTONANDJAFFA

Jaffa, “the Arab enclave” embedded in the area allotted to the Jewishstateinthe1947UNpartitionagreement,hadbeenunderattackbytheIrgunsincetheendofApril1948althoughfightinginthecityhadbegunearlier. The Irgun attack against theManshiya neighborhood led to the

flight of its population in the direction of Jaffa. The Haganah attackedvillagessurroundingJaffa,expelling their inhabitants.SirHenryGurney,chiefsecretaryof thePalestineGovernment,describedIrgunattacksas“indiscriminately aimed at civilian targets” and as being “designed tocreatepanicamongthepopulation.”76TheBritishremained incontrolofJaffaanddemandedaceasefire,threateningtocounterattack.Reportingonthisperiod,theBritishcommanderinJaffa,GeneralMurray,described“ascenewhich Inever thought tosee inmy life. Itwas thesightof thewhole population of Jaffa pouring out on to the road carrying in theirhandswhatever they could pick up.”77 According toMurray, “[i]t was acaseofsheerterror.”RejectingclaimsthatresidentsfledoninstructionsfromArableaders,Murraywrotethat“[t]hesepeoplehadterrorwrittenontheirfacesandtheycouldn’tgetontheroadtoGazaquickenough.”78

In April 1949, the U.S. minister to Lebanon, Lowell C. Pinkerton,submitteddocumentshehadreceivedfromtheExecutiveCommitteeofthe Jaffa and District Inhabitants Council to Secretary of State DeanAcheson, which he copied to the American member of the PalestineConciliation Commission (PCC), Mark Ethridge. “Jaffa and District”included the three towns of Jaffa, Ramleh, and Lydda, as well asadjoiningvillages.AsPinkertonwrote, themembersof thecouncilwere“menwhowereresponsibleformuchoftheformercommercialactivityofJaffa.”79 Their purpose was to mobilize efforts for assistance and toinformtheUnitedStatesofthedesperateconditionsofrefugeeswhohad“lostalmostallunderstandingfromtheworld.”TheysoughttoremindtheUnitedStatesoftheinjusticeofdisplacingapeoplefromitshomelandinanefforttofindahomefor“thewanderinganddisplacedJew.”80

Pinkerton’ssubmissionoftheencloseddocumentstoMarkEtheridgeandthePCCresultedintheirbecomingpartofthatcommission’srecord.Inpresenting thesamematerial toAcheson,Pinkertonhadalsoplacedthem in theStateDepartment record.Thedocumentsdescribedeventsthatoccurred inApril 1948.Pinkerton submitted them toEtheridgeandAchesoninApril1949.

First,wewoulddrawtheattentionoftheGovernmentoftheUnitedStatestothefollowingimportantfact:namely,thattheconflictdidnotoriginallyincludeorinvolvesuchaquestionasthereturnofrefugees; thepopulation itselfneverenvisagedsuchapossibility.Ontheonehandalargenumberofpeopledidnotleavetheirhomesvoluntarily,butwereexpelledbyorderof theJewishcommanderswhentheyenteredtheir townsandvillages(Ramlehand Lydda), andwere prevented from taking any of their belongingswith them.On the

otherhand, theconditionswhichprevailedshortlybefore the terminationof theMandaterendereditimpossibleforalargesectionofthepeopletoremaininhomesandlands.For,that would have meant the destruction of a large number of them, since they did notpossessarmswithwhichtodefendthemselves.81

The Jaffa and District Council representatives asked that the UnitedStates support the desire of the refugees to return home immediately,underlining the appalling conditions in which such refugees lived andtheirdesiretosavetheirpropertyandensurethesurvivaloftheircrops.TheJews,theyargued,undertheguiseof“innocentregulations,”wereineffect“bentondestroyingArabpropertyandblockingtherightofreturn.”

[I]tisnowknownthattheJewshavedestroyedhouses,andinsomecaseswholequarters,under the misleading and apparently innocent pretenses of making public gardens andotherimprovements;theyhaveoccupiedArabhomesandusedupeverythingthatwasleftinthem;theyhavedeliberatelydestroyedwaterpumpsinAraborangeplantations,sothatthetreeswouldgowithoutirrigationandthereforedie,therebyreducingthevalueoftheseplantations.82

FromBeirut,theJaffaEmergencyCommitteepressedtheUnitedStatesto“useitsinfluencewiththeJewishauthoritiesconcerned”toallowthosecitrusplantationownerswhoremainedinJaffa,aswellasthosewholeftto return, to salvage their fragile crops as “the orange tree is a verydelicatetree”andithadbeenneglectedforthepastyear.83

As they reminded U.S. officials, “the citrus industry represents thegreatestsingleitemofPalestine’swealth,”addingthatabout54percentof the plantations were Arab owned. Yet, as the committee memberspointedout, “almostall thecitrusbeltwas included in theJewishPart,”referringtotheareaallottedunderthe1947partitionplan.Reviewingthatplan, they recalled its highly uneven allotment of land: the Jewishcommunity, which had then constituted roughly 30 percent of thepopulation,obtainedover70percentofPalestine,whichincludedroughly95 percent of irrigable land, “leaving only about 5% to theArabs”whoweregiven“thearidmountainswhichdonothaveenoughdrinkingwaterforthepeopleinthesummer,nottospeakofagriculture.”84

With evident bitterness, the Jaffa delegation questioned whetherinternationallawexisted.Ifso,theyasked,whatwasitsmeaningintermsof the1947partitionplan that theybelieved tobe “an international law”calling for human rights in addition to partition? The Jaffa and District

Council representatives repeatedly expressed the hope that theUnitedStateswouldactinaccordwiththeidealexpectedofit.

Membersof the JaffaEmergencyCommittee signedwhat, in effect,was a surrender agreement with the Haganah that was labeled“InstructionstotheArabPopulationbytheCommanderoftheHaganah,Tel Aviv District,” dated May 13.85 Palumbo claims that the committeeconsultedwithAbdullahandthesecretarygeneraloftheArabLeague,86butMorris alleges that several of itsmembers hadgone toTelAviv to“smooththewayfortheJewishtakeoveranddiscussterms.”87

ThesignatoriesincludedAhmadEffendiAbuLaban,SalahEffendiElNazer, Amin Effendi Andraus, and Ahmad Effendi Abdul Rahim. Theydeclared Jaffa “an undefended area,” and in their capacity asrepresentatives of “all Arabs in the area,” they agreed to carry out allinstructionsgivennowandinfuturebythecommanderoftheHaganah,Tel-Aviv District, or any officer he designated; and they acceptedresponsibility for the same.Thiswas followedby the declaration “IT ISUNDERSTOOD[capsinoriginal]thattheHaganahalwaysdoesrespectandwill respect theGenevaConventionandall InternationalLawsandUsagesofWar.”88

The agreement opened with the warning that “any shot fired at aJewish area or at a Jew or at any member of the Haganah, or anyresistancetothem,willbesufficientreasonfortheHaganahtoopenfireattheOffender.”89Arms,munitions,andothersuchequipmentweretobeturnedovertotheHaganah,aswellasinformationconcerning“minesorbooby trapsoranysimilardevices,”withseverepunishment threatenedintheeventofviolation.

AllmalesintheareadefinedintheAgreementwillconcentrateintheareabetweenFeisalStreet, Al Mukhtar Street, Al Hulwa Street and the Sea until every body has identifiedhimselfunderarrangements,theparticularsofwhichwillbenotifiedlater.

Duringthistime,anymalefoundoutsidethisareawillbeseverelypunished,unlessinpossessionofaspecialpermit.90

Withtheexceptionofthoseidentifiedas“dangeroustothepeaceand

security of thearea,”who risked internment, those seeking to return totheir homes would be free to do so provided they carried the properidentificationandtheirhomeswerenot“inanareawhichwillbedeclared

asamilitary enclosure.”91 Therewas to beno seizureof property, andanyremovalofpropertyhadtohaveofficialapprovalbyHaganahforces.

Inreality,“itisnowknownthattheJewshavedestroyedhouses,andin some cases whole quarters,” the elected Executive Committeereported.92 They hadmore to say in a sober warning: unless action istakenimmediately,“manyoftherefugeeswillbedriventoespouseideasandprinciplestotally inimical togoodorderandsocialstability,andthatunless they are effectively resettled in their own homes and lands, thepeacesoughtforinthispartoftheworldwillneverreign,eventhoughitmightappearonthesurfacethatthetroublehadsubsided.”93

Shortlyafter thecollapseofJaffa, the“Chiefof theJewishAgency’sDepartment of Immigrant Absorption, went to see how many newimmigrantscouldbesettledinthetown.”94

InlateMay,anIsraeliofficertestified,“Isawsoldiers,civilians,militarypolice, battalion police, looting, robbing, while breaking through doorsand walls.”95 Twomonths later, “Jaffa’smilitary commander repeatedlycomplainedthatnavysoldiershadbrokenintoseveralhomes,beatentheownersandrobbedthem.Afewdayslater,acatholicchurchwasbrokenintoandsilverchalicesandcrucifixeswerestolen.”96Inthesameperiod,RedCrossofficialsdemandedameetingwiththemilitarygovernorafterthey “discovered a pile of dead bodies” that, according to the militarygovernor, “hadprobablybeenshotby Israeli soldiers for not complyingwiththeirorders.”97

In June, theHaganah’sHighCommand sent an official to look intoreportsofviolenceandvandalism.AbrahamMargalitreportedthat“therearemany violationsof discipline, especially in theattitude to theArabs(beating and torture) and looting which emanate more from ignorancethanmalice.”98

In July, themilitary governor of Jaffa,YitzakChizik, resigned in theface of “the uncontrollable ongoing crusade of pillage and robbery.”99Whenthecity fell, “itsentirepopulationof50,000wasexpelledwiththe‘help’ofBritishmediation,meaningthattheirflightwaslesschaoticthaninHaifa.”100

7TruceandTrusteeship

WORKINGTOWARDATRUCEANDTRUSTEESHIP

In the atmosphere of heightened tension generated by theDeirYassinmassacre,U.S.officialswereincreasinglymovedtoactagainstpartitionand in favor of trusteeship. Within a matter of months, the U.S.administration was prepared to join with others in an effort to promoteboth a truce and a trusteeship arrangement under UN auspices.EvidenceofTruman’ssupport forsuchamove ison therecord,asarehis parallel promises to ChaimWeizmann of U.S. support for partitionand a Jewish state. By the end of February, Truman had becomeconvinced that partitionwouldnot be implementedwithout force,whichhewasunwillingtoapprove.Onthis,thepresidentandStateDepartmentofficialswereinaccord.

TheproblembecamemoreacuteasSecretaryofStateMarshallandU.S.officialspreparedforBritain’sdeparture.Marshallincreasinglyusedthe language of trusteeship in rehearsingwhatAustinmight say at theUNinthewakeofBritain’sexitfromPalestine.Marshallproposeddraftsof statements that took as their starting point the Security Council’sadmissionoftheinabilitytoimplementpartitionwithouttheuseofforce.Undersuchcircumstances,MarshallinstructedAustintorecommendthata special UNGA session be held to consider “that until the people ofPalestinearereadyforself-governmenttheyshouldbeplacedunderthetrusteeshipsystemoftheUnitedNations.”1

Examining Marshall’s statements to U.S. officials on the subject ofpartition and its alternatives, Robert McClintock was convinced, as hetoldLovett,thattheUnitedStateswouldsoonbefacingaspecialUNGA

session with trusteeship the probable outcome. Under thosecircumstances,“anewthreatofJewishattemptsbyviolencetoestablishade factoState inPalestine”wouldreplace theprevious threatofArabaggression.2

SensingtheacceleratingchangeinthedirectionofU.S.policy,ClarkCliffordremindedthepresidentofhislong-standingU.S.commitmentstopartition and statehood, and the extent to which these protected U.S.interests.Somehaveargued that the timingofClifford’s remarks to thepresidentwasafunctionofhisresponsetorumorsofheighteningtensionbetween the USSR and the United States, and even the possibility ofwar.3 Others disputed the veracity of the claim. Clifford, however,maintained that supporting partition was the best way of excluding theUSSRfromPalestine.

In preparing his presentation to the president, Clifford had theassistanceofMaxLowenthal,attorneyandZionistsupporter,andEliahuEpstein.EpsteinhadpreviouslyconfrontedLovettwithIsrael’sresponseto U.S. fears of partition. As discussed earlier in connection with theElsey scoop, Epstein may well have been informed of the extent ofinternal discontent in policymaking circles. Clifford, in turn, was joiningtheargumentinsupportofpartitionandevokingsomeofthethemesthathadappearedinthe“NoteonPalestinePolicy.”HedescribedtheUnitedStatesasbeing“intheridiculousroleoftremblingbeforethreatsofafewnomadicdeserttribes.Thishasdoneusirreparabledamage.WhyshouldRussia or Yugoslavia, or any other nation treat us with anything butcontempt in light of our shilly-shallying appeasement of the Arabs.”4Clifford insisted that “not only is partition in conformitywith establishedAmerican policy, not only is partition the only hope of avoidingmilitaryinvolvement of the United States in the Near East, but, in addition,partition is the only course of action with respect to Palestine that willstrengthenourpositionvis-à-visRussia.”5

In the very different political environment of the UN,Warren Austinattempted toestablishcontactwithArab leaderswhowerecalling foraclarificationofWashington’sposition.Austin’sexchangeswithFarisBeyel-KhouriofSyria,CamilleChamounandCharlesMalikofLebanon,andMahmoudFawziBeyofEgypt revealed that “insofaras theArabstatesareconcernedtheywouldbewillingtosuggestpossiblesolutionstothePalestineQuestionwhich in the judgmentofMr.Wilkinsandmyselfgo

furtherthananypreviouspositiontakenbytheArabstates.”6Arabstateswere willing to consider three options, in two of which “a democraticconstitution andgovernment”was the first condition cited (unitary stateand federal or cantonized state). The third option was trusteeship. Allthreeoptionsinvolved“constitutionalorganization;b.immigration,andc.guaranteesforminorities.”7

In addition, Austin reported learning that “moderate elements in theArabstatessuchasKingIbnSaud,AzzamPasha,Secretary-GeneraloftheArabLeague,NokrashiPasha,PrimeMinisterofEgyptandothers”were eager to eliminate “theMufti and the extremist Arab elements inPalestine” and to move toward a “moderate solution of the PalestineQuestion.”8 These delegates also recommended that the EuropeanrefugeeproblembeturnedovertotheUnitedNations.

Austin gave no indication of the covert arrangements betweenAbdullah and the Jewish Agency leadership. He may not have knownthat Abdullah’s prime minister, along with Sir John Bagot Glubb,commander of the Arab Legion, had met with Bevin in London onFebruary 7, 1948, and had arrived at a plan that was subsequentlyimplemented. According to Abu al-Huda, the Transjordanian primeminister, itconsistedofaproposal “tosend theArabLegionacross theJordan when themandate ended and to occupy that part of PalestineawardedbytheUNtotheArabsthatwascontinuouswiththefrontierofTransjordan.”9 Bevin found the arrangement entirely satisfactory.Washingtonwouldendorseitaswell,preferringit totheUNGApartitionresolution’s recommendation for a Palestinian state linked in economicunionwithaJewishstate.

Another dimension to developments in Palestinewas addressed byErnestA.Gross,U.S.legaladvisertothedirectoroftheOfficeofUnitedNationsAffairs.InthevacuumthatwouldbeleftwithBritain’sdeparture,GrossremindedU.S.officialsthat“localagenciesofadministration”mightarise that would “assume a governmental character and secureinternationalrecognition,thusachievingstatusasmembersofthefamilyof nations, with corresponding rights and duties.”10 This was anunmistakable reference to the political and administrative infrastructureorganizedbytheYishuvinPalestine.

Such considerations may well have sharpened Marshall’s desire toclarify President Truman’s position. On March 20, Marshall addressed

the Palestine question at a press conference on the west coast. Hereferred to the policy proposed on the previous day byWarrenAustin,whichMarshallsupported.

I recommended it to thePresident,andheapprovedmy recommendation….TheUnitedStates suggestion is that a temporary trusteeship should be established in order tomaintainthepeaceandtoopenupthewaytoanagreedsettlement.ThistrusteeshipitselfwouldbeestablishedwithoutprejudiceinanywaytotheeventualpoliticalsettlementwhichmightbereachedforPalestine.11

However, as the State Department learned, Truman had met with Dr.ChaimWeizmanntheeveningpriortoAustin’sUNspeechand“assuredhim[Dr.Weizmann]thatwewerenotchangingourpolicywithrespecttoPalestine. Thenwithin less than twenty-four hours, Ambassador Austinhad made the speech that represented a complete reversal of ourattitude.”12

Where,then,didTrumanstand?InthecourseofanexchangeattheUN,Lovettattemptedtoclarifythepresident’sposition.HerecalledthatiftheU.S.failedtogetsupportforpartition,Trumanhadindicatedthat“wecould take the alternative step. That was perfectly clear. He said it toGeneral Marshall and to me.”13 As Lovett told McClintock, “there isabsolutelynoquestionbutwhat thePresidentapproved it.Therewasadefiniteclearancethere.IstressitbecauseCliffordtoldmethePresidentsaidhedidnotknowanythingaboutit.”14

In this unsettled atmosphere, Clifford called for lifting the armsembargo to Palestine at the very time that Marshall and the StateDepartmentwereworkingtoward“thelayingdownofarms,thecessationof the illegal entry of either Arabs or Jews and of the cessation of allsmugglingofarmsintoPalestine.”15

In an effort to arrange for a truce, U.S. officials consulted with theJewish Agency about meeting with members of the Arab HigherCommittee, but hadno success.MosheShertok denouncedboth truceandtrusteeship, insistingthattheUnitedStatesfailedtounderstandtheresponsibilityof theArabstates for theviolence the trucewasallegedlydesigned to contain. As to trusteeship, Shertok pointed out that it wasinappropriategiven thatpreparationswereunderway forestablishmentoftheProvisionalCouncil.

Nonetheless, in early April, weeks prior to Britain’s departure from

Palestine, the State Department produced a “Draft TrusteeshipAgreement for Palestine” that assumed the form of a constitutionaldocumentforaunitarystate.16Whatisstrikingaboutthisdocumentistheextenttowhichitechoedthe“[p]rinciplesunderlyingtheconstitutionofaunitaryState inPalestine,” recommended in the1947minority reportofsubcommittee2oftheUNAdHocCommitteeonPalestine.However,thelaterdraftwent further in itscoverage.17SecretaryofDefenseForrestalwas asked for his assessment of the forces that would be needed toimplement such an agreement, and he provided this assessment onseveraloccasions.

Several weeks later, Austin was authorized to present the draftproposalbeforethefirstsubcommitteeoftheUnitedNations,whichhadinitially supported partition. The proposal envisioned an egalitariansociety organized under bi-national auspices and operating under UNauthority.Asstatedinarticle4ofthe1948U.S.draft,“Theadministrationwill be conducted in such a manner as to encourage the maximumcooperation between JewsandArabs inPalestine leading to a formofself-government which will be acceptable to both communities.”18Provisionsforabicamerallegislaturereflectedthesameintention.

The draft also defined conditions determining eligibility forcitizenship.19 There was to be no discrimination on the basis of “race,religion,languageorsex,”andnorestrictionwouldbeplacedonthe“freeuse by any person of any language in private intercourse, in religiousmatters, in commerce, in thepressor inpublicationsof any kind,oratpublicmeetings.”20Onthecontroversialquestionofimmigration,theU.S.draft proposed theadmissionof JewishDisplacedPersons (DPs), theirnumber tobedeterminedby the InternationalRefugeeOrganization forthe first two years of the trusteeship’s operation. Following that period,immigration was to be open to all, but the number admitted was leftblank,apparentlyaconcessiontoZionistpositions.

On the question of land policy, article 31 prohibited discriminatorypracticeswith respect to land purchase or use, additionally underliningthe importanceofprotecting“the interestsofsmallownersor tenants incasesof transferofarableorgrazing lands.”21Thereferenceapplied toBedouins, among others, deemed vulnerable under existing partitionplans. Finally, the assurance of equality, as opposed to privilegedaccess, in “economic, industrial and commercial” undertakings in

Palestine addressed ongoing concerns articulated in the report of UNsubcommittee2.

TheU.S.consulinJerusalemreportedthat“theJewishAgencydoesnotfindinthedraftagreementevenabasisfordiscussion,sinceitdoesnotprovideforestablishmentofJewishstate.”22Shertok,speakingbeforetheSecurityCouncilonApril1,suggestedconditionalacceptanceofthetruceinsofarasitassumedimplementationofthepartitionresolution,andtotalrejectionofthetrusteeshipproposalas inappropriatefor“acountryripe for independence.”23 As for Arab delegates, U.S. sources citedMahmoud Fawzi Bey of Egypt as rejecting a truce if it was linked topartition,butotherwisesupportingit.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had consulted with Admiral Sidney W.Souers, executive secretaryof theNationalSecurityCouncil;W.StuartSymington,secretaryoftheAirForce;andMajorGeneralLaurisNorstad,deputy chief for operations of the U.S. Air Force. Forrestal met withWilliam Leahy, fleet admiral of the U.S. Navy and chief of staff to thecommanderinchiefoftheArmedForces,todeterminethearmy,naval,andairrequirements“tobesuppliedfromoutsideofPalestineinordertomaintain law and order under a temporary trusteeship, including anynecessaryactiontocontrolborderstopreventtheillegalentryofpersons,either Jewish orArab, fromother countries.”24 Leahy urged that Britainparticipateand,inaddition,herecommendedthatFrancejoin.Indifferentto France’s colonial role in Syria, Lebanon, and the Maghreb, U.S.officialssubsequently turned toEgypt, requesting itsparticipation in thesamejointeffort.

Twoweeks later, thesecretaryofdefenserenewedhisconcernwiththe limits of American military capacity and the risks of a U.S.“commitment to undertake a proportionate share of the burden ofproviding the police forces required during a truce and temporarytrusteeship in Palestine.”25 The Joint Chiefs of Staff estimated that theUnitedStateswouldhavetoprovidesome50,000troops,whichForrestalargued“representssubstantiallyourentirepresentgroundreserve,bothMarine and Army.”26 The defense secretary suggested that such acommitment involved a reassessment of U.S. plans for such diverseareasasItaly,Greece,Turkey,Iran,andChina.

THE“CANCEROUSPALESTINIANSITUATION”

AccordingtoAbbaEban,“thePresidenthadgivenWeizmannaspecificcommitmentthathewouldworkfortheestablishmentandrecognitionofaJewishstateofwhichtheNegevwouldbeapart.”27WhenhemetwithAmbassadorAustin andPhilip Jessup,whowasU.S. representative totheSpecialSession of theGeneralAssembly,Weizmannasked for anexplanationofU.S.policy.“WasitfearoftheArabs?Wasitoil?OrwasitfearofRussia?HesaidtherewasnoreasonwhatevertofeartheArabs.They were woefully weak. The Arabs could do nothing with their oilexceptsellittotheU.S.”28

Further, as Austin pointed out, if the General Assembly failed toobtain the necessary two-thirdsmajority to alter existing UN policies—thatis,partition—then“theJewswouldhavethelegal,andifnotthelegalcertainly the moral right to go ahead with their plans to establish theJewish state.”29 Weizmann, however, appeared to be more open totrusteeship than expected. He indicated “that trusteeship might bebeneficialtotheJews,andalsoprovideanopportunityforcooperationofthe closest kind between Jews andArabs, ending in due course to anagreed political settlement.”30 This was not the position generallyconveyedbyIsraeliofficialstoWashington.

OnApril17,theUNSecurityCouncilpassedResolution46byavoteof9to0,withtheUSSRandUkraineabstaining,insupportofatruceinPalestine that urged the cessation of violence while condemning theentryofillegalarmsandfighters.

InWashington,preparationswerebeingmade forAustin toaddresstheUNinwhichhewouldrelaytheU.S.agreementtocontributeapartofthe forces (some 45,000 troops) necessary to implement truce andtrusteeship.AtthesametimetheU.S.ambassadorinCairosentnewsoftheArabLeague’spositivethoughconditionalresponsetoanarmisticeortruce.ItwasnottobeusedasacovertoallowthearmamentoftheJewsand was interpreted as a step toward a final settlement.31 But Arabofficialsunderstoodthatthearrangementsfortrusteeshipweredesignedto be temporary, leading them to fear that Washington continued tosupportaJewishstate. InJerusalem,ConsulGeneralWassonreportedthat “the Jewish Agency does not find in the draft agreement even abasis for discussion, since it does not provide for establishment of a

Jewishstate.”32In the midst of these developments, Henderson sent Lovett a

memoranduminwhichhereferredtothe“cancerousPalestinesituation”asathreattoU.S.securityandglobalpeace,urgingWashingtontodealwith it “as one of our most vital and urgent international problems.”33CurrentU.S.policy,hepointedout,assumedthatWashingtonwouldonlyact within UN parameters, endorsing the UNSC call for a truce andbackingtheideaofGeneralAssemblysupportoftemporarytrusteeship.Elaborating on what the UN faced, Henderson addressed the nationalandinternationaldimensionsofthePalestineproblemandcalledfortheUnitedStates toremovethis issue fromdomesticpolitics.HeurgedtheU.S.presidentandsecretaryofstate toactonCongressandAmericanJewishopiniontohastenaresolutionoftheconflictlestitimperilpeaceinthe Middle East and U.S. security. Henderson urged Britain and U.S.alliestoassistinthisgoalinnolessstringentterms.

Fearing that the UN might not agree to the U.S. proposal andassuming that the situation in Palestine would only worsen in theabsenceofatruce,Hendersonsubmittedanotherproposal,thisoneforatrusteeshipplancoveringJerusalem.TheproposaldefinedtheJerusalemareaasinclusiveofJerusalemanditssurroundingtownsandvillages.Itwentontoaddthatit“shouldalsoincludetheareaofPalestinebetweenJerusalem and the Mediterranean and should include the ports of TelAviv and Jaffa and the airport at Lydda in order to prevent the inlandisolationofJerusalemanditsenvironsandtoprovideaccesstotheseaand the outside world.”34Washington agreed to aid in providing policesupportand,“asalastresort,”toactalone,albeitwithUNauthorization.When Secretary of State Marshall sent Rusk a draft of the proposedtrusteeshiparrangements forJerusalem, the identificationof theareaofJerusalemwasleftblank,withreferencetoanattachedmap.35

While U.S. proposals for Jerusalem were being drafted, WarrenAustin was sending “Top Secret” messages from the UN of possiblebreakthroughsontheaggravatedquestionofatruce.AttheendofApril,Austin was engaged in personal diplomacy and made it clear to allconcerned that his were not official exchanges, but he clearly feltencouraged by his encounters on April 25 with Joseph Proskauer,presidentoftheAmericanJewishCommittee(AJC),andMahmoudFawziBeyoftheEgyptiandelegation,whowasalsodescribedas“spokesman

fortheArabLeague.”36ProskauerwasnotarepresentativeoftheJewishAgency in Palestine, but he was a highly respected figure in the AJC,whichwasamongthemoremoderateAmericanJewishorganizationsinitspositionsonPalestine.37

Austin assured Marshall that “both Proskauer and Fawzi Bey havebeensufficientlyreceptivetoencourageafurthereffortalongtheselines.Forexample,FawziBeynowhaspermissionfromCairo(whichhesaysmustmeantheArabLeagueaswell)tositdownwithago-betweenandJewishrepresentativesforaninformaltalknotinvolvingacommitmentonhis part.”38 Even if such efforts failed, Austin remarked, they meritedrecognition,muchasdidthe intransigenceof thosewhoopposedthem.AustinwentsofarastospeculatethatMarshallmightonedaytaketheinitiative and expose such opposition to encourage andmobilize publicopinion in favor of a truce. Marshall, in fact, made reference to theinformaleffortsinvolvedinasubsequentpressconference.

Austin also reported on his success in promoting the idea oftrusteeshipamongmembersoftheSaudidelegationwhowerepreparedto consider it, provided that “articles on immigration, land policy, andtermination can be drafted more specifically.”39 If Arab fears wererecognized,PrinceFeisaloftheSaudidelegationmaintained,“therewasagoodchancethat,withUnitedStatesandArabinfluenceandsupport,trusteeship would get a two-thirds vote in the General Assembly.”40HendersonremindedFeisalthat“ArabandJewishpositionswerestillfarapart”beforeaskinghimwhether“theArabshadbeenintouchwithanymoderateJewssuchasDr.Magnes.TheMinisterindicatedthattheyhadnot.”41

OnApril 22, Henderson, in his capacity as director of theOffice ofNearEasternandAfricanAffairs, sent Lovett a lengthymessage ladenwith ominous warnings and urgent recommendations for the daysremaining before Britain’s departure from Palestine. As Hendersonsoberlystated,“anykindofan internationalarrangementwhichwemayeffectforpreservingworldpeaceonabasiswhichwouldbecompatiblewiththesecurityof theUnitedStates is lackinginsubstancesolongasthecancerousPalestinesituationcontinuestodevelopunchecked.”42

HendersonwarnedthatWashingtonwouldnotactalone.ItwassupportingtheSecurityCouncil’scallforatruceinPalestineandbelievesthatatemporarytrusteeship for Palestine should be established by the General Assembly which wouldprovideinterimgovernmentalmachineryinPalestinefollowingtheterminationoftheBritish

MandateonMay15andwhichwouldbewithoutprejudicetotherights,claimsandpositionof the Jews and Arabs of Palestine and without prejudice to the eventual politicalsettlementforPalestine.43

There was another aspect of Henderson’s review of U.S. policy in

Palestine—namely, his insistence that it be withdrawn from domesticpolitics, which he believed were being influenced by extremist Zionistpositions.OnApril22,1948,Hendersoncalledonthosehedescribedas

the moremoderate Jews in this country to break the hold which a minority of extremeAmerican Zionists now has on American Jewry so that Jewish leaders in this country,insteadof continuing topushPalestine Jews intoanextremelynationalistic position,willendeavor to impressupon themthe importanceofassumingareasonableandmoderateattitudeofcooperationwiththeArabs.44

TothisHendersonaddedthewarningtoArableaders,includingthoseinthe Arab League, “that unless they on their part are willing to adopt aconciliatory and reasonable attitude of cooperation with the Jews, thesecurity and prosperity of the whole Middle East will be gravelythreatened.”45

MARSHALL,McCLINTOCK,ANDRUSKANDPROPOSALSFORATRUCE

At theendofApril,MarshallsentAustinaproposalwherebyJerusalemwouldbeplacedunderaUNtrusteeshipaccord.McClintock,onbehalfoftheStateDepartment,submitteda“TextofInformalTruceProposalsforPalestine” to Lovett.At theUN,McClintock reported toLovett thatwiththe exception of the article that dealtwith immigration, all others “havebeenprovisionallyagreedupon,subjecttoapprovalbytheirprincipals,byrepresentativesoftheJewishAgencyandtheArabLeagueinNewYorkCity.”46 But it quickly became clear that article 10,which dealtwith theproposed immigrationof4,000JewishDisplacedPersons intoPalestineeverymonth,elicitedstrongobjectionsonthepartoftheJewishAgency.

Moreover, Shertok objected to a truce as blocking statehood andextendingBritain’spresenceinPalestine.EliahuEpstein,inturn,stated,“the Jewish State already exists and the Jews have no use fortrusteeship,” and further, “no foreign troops are necessary. The Jewsneed arms and diplomatic action to prevent the invasion of outside

countries.”47MeetingswithSaudi,Syrian,Iraqi,Egyptian,andLebanesedelegates

provednolesssoberingastheyvowedpermanentoppositiontoJewishimmigration unless certain conditions were met. These included therequest that immigration cease after the truce; that the number ofimmigrantsremain1,500permonthandnotmore;andthatyoungmalesbe excluded from the lot of immigrants. In exchange for the aboveconditions, Prince Feisal maintained that “the Arabs would promise tocurbtheArabpeopleandtoacquiescealthoughtheycouldnotsignanydocuments.ThisaccordingtoPrinceFaisalwasfranklyallthatcouldbedoneatthistime.”48

Inanattempt tosalvage the truceandprior to learningofShertok’sresponse,DeanRusk proposed to Lovett that temporary arrangementsundertheSecurityCouncilTruceCommissionbepursued.Thesewouldallowbothparties flexibilitywhilecommitting themtoa truce.Ruskwaspersuaded that Nahum Goldmann and Moshe Shertok would beamenable to such proposals, unlike more militant American Zionists.49ButRuskunderestimatedShertok’sobjections,whichweremadetobothMarshallandRuskinAprilandMay.AsShertokexplained,

themainobjectionsasIsawthemwere:first,thattheproposedtruceentailsthedefermentof statehood and renders its attainment in the future most uncertain, thereby gravelyprejudicing our rights and position; second, that as the effective operation of the truceobviously involves the presence and the use in Palestine of a considerable force, wecannotbutassumethattheintentionistokeeptheBritishforcesinoccupationandcontrolofPalestine.Iwasalsogreatlyconcernedaboutthegrossinequalityunderwhichwewouldbeplacedasregardsarmsandmilitarytraining: theArabstateswouldbeentirely freetoacquirearmsandstock-pilethemforeventualuseinPalestineagainstus;PalestinianandotherArabswouldbefreetotrainenmasseinanyoftheneighboringcountries;wewouldbeprecludedfromeitheracquiringarmsabroadorfromanylargescaletraining—trainingwhichwecouldonlyorganizeinPalestine.

Wearemostvitallyinterestedinatruce,but,witheverydesiretobehelpful,Iamsureyouwillappreciateouranxiety toprotectourselves from thegravedangerswithwhich itmayconfrontus.50

Ruskwasnonethelesspersuaded that theonlystumblingblockwas

immigration,forwhichhehadasolution.Rusk’ssolutionentirelyignoredtheArabpositionbyproposingthefigureof4,000DisplacedPersonspermonth,theJewishAgencyfigure.Underthecircumstances,hisproposalthattheSecurityCouncilTruceCommissionarbitratethematterwasnotpromising.RuskreportedthathehadwarnedTrumanthatitwaspossible

“thattheArabswouldacceptthetruceandthatJewswouldnot,andthatthey might create difficult problems for him.” Apparently the presidentreplied to this, stating that “if the Jews refuse to accept a truce onreasonablegroundstheyneednotexpectanythingelsefromus.”51

Trumanwasadamantaboutwantingatruceandasherespondedinthesamepassage,“telltheArabsthatourpolicyisfirmandthatwearetrying to head off fighting in Palestine. Remind them that we have adifficult political situation within this country. Our main purpose in thispresentsituationistopreventawar.”WhatTrumandidnotmakepublic,or indeed convey to his advisers, save for one,was that in addition tocommittinghimself topreventingwar, theU.S.presidenthadcommittedhimselftosupportingandrecognizingaJewishstate.This,attheendofApril, was what Truman communicated to Chaim Weizmann throughSamuel Rosenman. “On the 23rd April Weizmann was told that thePresident would do all in his power promptly to recognize the Jewishstate, if the United Nations would continue to support partition.”52Apparently,thisexchangeremainedunknown,orlargelyunknown,totheJewishAgency,theForeignOffice,andtheStateDepartment.53

FromCairocamenewsthattheArabLeaguewaspreparedtoaccepta truce in Jerusalem to protect holy sites. But the Palestine TruceCommission sent a very different message regarding the situation inPalestine, which it described as deteriorating, with government officesclosing,communicationssystemscollapsing,andtheairportinLyddaoutofcommission.“JA[JewishAgency]actingasageneralorganizingbodyfor Jewish areas and attempting to replace suspended governmentalactivities,” and by contrast “Arab areas are depending on municipalauthorities within the townships and villages without any centralauthority.”54 The commission expected worse to come, warning that“operations on larger and more important scale than Haifa expectedshortly.”55Itspredictionprovedtobeaccurate.

InCairo,theU.S.ambassador,citingtheprimeminister,reportedthatEgyptian troops were needed to counter what it viewed as a possiblecoupcoming fromnationalist forces.Therewasageneral senseof theinadequacyofEgyptianforcesandfearoftheirdefeatifsenttoPalestine,with resulting harm to the Palestinian cause. Iraq attempted to bolstersupport for Transjordan, but Baghdad as well as Beirut turned to theUnited States for assistance, the latter for economic development

programs.In meetings with members of the Saudi delegation that included

PrinceFeisal,SheikhHafizWehba,andSheikhAlireza,theobjectivesoftheU.S. trusteeshipagreementaswellas thequestionsof immigrationand land policy were raised. Feisal questioned the lack of U.S.recognition, as evident in the trusteeship agreement, of thePalestiniancapacity for self-government. Feisal subsequently requested ameetingwithHendersontodiscussthesequestions.

Marshall, in turn, was preoccupied with the possibility of Arabintervention in Palestine. If this occurred, he reflected, “we do not seehowU.S.Govt couldavoid takingenergeticposition inUNpointingoutthat invasion is violation ofCharter and insisting that appropriate stepsincludingifnecessarydispatchofforcesunderauspicesUNbetakentoejectinvaders.”56Butitwasalsobecomingclearthatthestructureofthefuture Jewish state was virtually in operation, and some UN officialsbelieved that Britain favored the better organized Jewish forces at thisstage. In the opinion of Pablo deAzcarate, by the beginning ofMarch1948,theexperiencedhandsoftheJewishAgencywererunninga“statein embryo, capable of undertaking the administration of the mosttechnically complicated public services (including, naturally, the policeandthemaintenanceofpublicorder)withasmuch,ifnotmoreefficiencythanthesameorgansoftheMandatoryPower.”57

On May 1, two weeks before the assigned date of the Britishwithdrawal,theJewishAgencycabledtheSecurityCouncilwithclaimsofanArabinvasionofPalestine,promptingMarshalltorequestverificationfromU.S.officers inthefield.FromJerusalem,WassoncabledbackonMay 3, reporting the British disclaimer of such a charge as “completemoonshine,”astheypointedtoArabmilitary“dribblingin”whosestrengthwasvariouslyestimatedtobefrom7,000to10,000menwhohadbeentrained in neighboring countries but who did not make up a coherentforce.58 Little more was expected, according to the British, until theirdeparture. In the interim, the United States confirmed that Arab forceshad been put on alert and that “about 650Egyptian andNorth AfricanvolunteershadcrossedintoPalestinewithinthelasttendays.”59

On April 30, Austin sent Marshall a telegram from the “PalestineTruceCommissiontoSCPresident”withoutidentifyingitsauthor.60Itmayhave beenwritten byWasson,who in the interim had been named by

Truman as U.S. Representative to the Truce Commission. AlthoughawaitingSenateapproval,onMay3WassonsentMarshall a reportonconditionsleadingtothecollapseofthePalestiniangovernment.

Palestine Government has generally ceased to function and central public services nolongerexist.InJewishareasJewshavetakeneffectivecontrolandaremaintainingpublicserviceswithin thoseareas.PreparationsforestablishmentJewishstateafter terminationmandatearewelladvanced.ConfidenceinfutureathighpeakandJewishpublicsupportfor leaders overwhelming. InArab areas onlymunicipal administration continueswithoutany central authority. In Samaria food and gasoline are in very short supply. Moralefollowing Jewish military successes low with thousands Arabs fleeing country. Lastremaining hope is in entry Arab regular armies spearheaded by Arab Legion…. UnlessstrongArab reinforcementsarrive,weexpectJewsoverrunmostofcityuponwithdrawalBritishforce.61

WassondescribedJewishforcesasadoptinga“defensiveoffensive”

role whose main purpose was improvement of their positions and theliquidationof “Arab interference.”62TheHaganahand Irgunpersisted in“aggressiveand irresponsibleoperationssuchasDeirYassinmassacreandJaffa,”Wassonreported,observingthattheywererepudiatedbytheHaganahonlyiftheyfailed.63

Wassonpredictedan“all-outoffensive”bytheHaganahafterMay15.TheBritishandothers,heinformedthesecretaryofstate,“believeJewswillbeablesweepallbefore themunless regularArabarmiescome torescue.WithHaifaasexampleofHaganahmilitaryoccupation,possibletheir operations will restore order.”64 In the period that followed, theliquidationofArabvillagesinvolvedasmanyas100massacresin1948–49alone.65

FACINGAN“ANOMALOUSSITUATION”

OnthesamedaythatWassonsentouthisassessmentofthesituation,LovettinformedtheU.S.EmbassyinLondonofstepstheU.S.delegationwas planning to take at LakeSuccess. Therewas to be an immediateten-daycease-fireasofMay5;aten-daydelay inBritain’sdeparture;aten-day break in the UNGA Special Session; and the transportation ofselectedrepresentativesoftheArabHigherCommittee,Arabstates,theJewishAgency,andmembersoftheSCTruceCommissionfromFrance,Belgium,andtheUnitedStatestofacilitateactiononthetruce.66

Shertok rejected what he described as the “somewhat spectacularproceedings,”insistingthat“peacecaninpresentcircumstancesbestbeachievedbyanunconditionalagreementforanimmediate‘ceasefire.’”67If the Arabs agreed to such, Shertok indicated the Jewish authoritieswould do the same. In themidst of these exchanges, theUNGeneralAssembly’s First Committee proceeded to approve a proposal dealingwiththeestablishmentofaprovisionalregimeinPalestine.

The response to Shertok’s rejection of the U.S. initiative led U.S.officials to conclude that the Jewish Agency would proceed with itsintention“togosteadilyaheadwiththeJewishseparatestatebyforceofarms.”68 McClintock reasoned that “in light of the Jewish militarysuperioritywhichnowobtainsinPalestine,theJewishAgencywillpreferto round out its State after May 15 and rely on its armed strength todefendthatstatefromArabcounterattack.”69Hisviewswerereflectedinthe unsent memorandum, written in the name of Dean Rusk, whosespecialassistantMcClintockwasatthetime.

If these predictions come true we shall find ourselves in the UN confronted by a veryanomaloussituation.TheJewswillbetheactualaggressorsagainsttheArabs.However,theJewswill claim that theyaremerelydefending theboundariesofastatewhichweretracedbytheUNandapproved,atleastinprinciple,bytwothirdsoftheUNmembership.ThequestionwhichwillconfronttheSCinscarcelytendays’timewillbewhetherJewisharmedattackonArabcommunitiesinPalestineislegitimateorwhetheritconstitutessuchathreattointernationalpeaceandsecurityastocallforcoercivemeasuresbytheSecurityCouncil.70

The above predicament would be intensified, McClintock suggested, ifArabarmiesenteredPalestine,leadingJewishforcestoclaim“thattheirstate is the object of armed aggression and will use every means toobscurethefactthat it istheirownarmedaggressionagainsttheArabsinsidePalestinewhichisthecauseofArabcounterattack.”71WhatwouldtheU.S.positionbe,McClintockaskedrhetorically?

Therewillbeadecidedeffort,given thiseventuality, that theUnitedStateswillbecalleduponbyelements inside thiscountry tosupportSecurityCouncilactionagainst theArabstates.To takesuchactionwouldseemtome tobemorally indefensiblewhile, from theaspect of our relations with the Middle East and of our broad security aspects in thatregion, it would be almost fatal to pit forces of the United Sates and possibly RussiaagainstthegovernmentsoftheArabworld.72

ThepositionattributedtotheJewishAgencywas,infact,thatadoptedattheUNbyMosheShertok.

Faced with what he termed “this almost intolerable situation,”McClintock’s response was telling. His criticisms aside, he urged theUnitedStates,withtheBritishandFrench,tointervenebypromotinganaccordbetweenAbdullahand theJewishAgency.TheplanMcClintockenvisioned was designed to assuage Washington’s Arab allies.Accordingtohisaccount,AbdullahwouldgrantAqabatoKingIbnSaud,the Syrians would be mollified by “some territorial adjustment in thenorthernpart, leaving theJewsacoastalstate running fromTelAviv toHaifa.”73 Abdullah, however, was not mollified after learning of DeirYassin,whichinspiredhimtothinklessofpartitionthanofgrantingJewsaplaceinaunitarystatewheretheycouldhave“fullArabnationalityinaunitary state sharing all that we share while yet enjoying a specialadministration inparticularareas.”74To thisAbdullahadded thehopefulmessage, “Thuswillend theslaughterand thepeoplewill live inpeaceandsecurityforever.”

In the midst of these developments, Judah Magnes arrived inWashingtontomeetwithSecretaryofStateMarshall,asforeseenintheinvitationthathadbeenissuedinearlyApril.75Magnes,aU.S.-bornrabbiliving in Jerusalem, was welcomed as a moderate, though he wasunderstoodtohavelittleinfluenceamongZionistleaders,whetherintheUnited States or in Palestine. U.S. officials were also partial towardNahum Goldmann, viewing him as another moderate Zionist who wasclosertotheZionistestablishmentbutdidnotwieldsignificantinfluence.

Marshallwasnonetheless interested inMagnes’sassessmentof thesituation inPalestineandeager forhim tomeet thepresident.Magneswas blunt about the prospects of implementing either trusteeship or atruce, although he believed the former offered the only way out of theexisting quagmire, whether it assumed the form of individual states,cantons, or provinces in a federal arrangement. What mattered wasforging an agreement between the parties, without which, Magnesinsisted,nosettlementwouldwork.Anattemptatworkingouta federalarrangement had, in fact, been tried and failed, as the U.S. effortrevealed. Further, both the Jewish Agency and the Arab HigherCommittee rejected trusteeship, although both accepted a truce inJerusalemasofMay2,1948.

When he arrived in Washington, Magnes had little hope short ofWashington cutting off funding to the Jewish Agency. He depicted theJewishcommunityinPalestineas“anartificialdevelopment”andarguedthat“theHaganahcosts$4millionamonthtorun.Hewascertainthat,ifcontributions from the United States were cut off, the Jewish warmachineinPalestinewouldcometoahaltforlackoffinancialfuel.”76Herecommended cutting off financial contributions to Palestine and Arabstates,butrecognizedtheprecariousfinancialconditionofSyriaandIraq.

As McClintock recalled, Magnes reported that “he had lived inJerusalem for 25 years. He knew its people, both Arabs and Jews,perhapsaswellasanylivingman.Heassuredmewithgreatconvictionand intensity that the populace of Jerusalem—Arab and Jew alike—isheartilysickof thesituation inwhichtheyfindthemselvesandthat theirburningdesireispeace.”77MagnespointedoutthattherewereArabandJewish police and municipal councils, but some other public serviceswere in need of restoration, such as the water supply. He appearedconfident that a UN officer would succeed in carrying out suchresponsibilities, assuming that he was protected by a bodyguard, andthathewas“preferablyamanfromareligiouscallof life.”78Thereasonforprotectionwasthat“therewasalwaysthedangerofphysicalviolence,since the young Jewish zealots believed fanatically in their cause andweretrulyidealisticinthethoughttheyhadamissiontorestorethelandof the Jews to its people.”79 Among thoseMagnes suggestedwereDr.BromleyOxnam, the former president of theCouncil of Churches, andCharlesTaft,thecurrentholderofthatposition.

Magnes endorsed trusteeship proposals that the United States hadproposed, but he was critical of what he viewed as Washington’sexcessively apologetic approach toward Jewish forces. He viewedtrusteeshipastheonlyavailableoption,notingthat“itcouldbemadeupof states, as in the federal union, or it could consist of cantons orprovinces inhabited by Jews and Arabs separately.”80 He urged theUnitedStatesto indicatethat theresultingsettlementwastobeworkedoutbyArabsandJews,otherwisetherewouldbenosolution.

Before leaving, Magnes requested permission to pose a bluntquestion: “Do you think there is any chance to impose a solution onPalestine?” “I [Marshall] replied that imposition of a regime implied theuseofforce.Itwasclearasdaylightthatothergovernmentswereeager

tosidestepandleaveUncleSaminthemiddle.Ididnotthinkitwaswisefor the United States alone to take the responsibility for militarycommitments inPalestinebut Iwouldbegladtogivethismatter furtherthought.”81 The secretary of state commended Magnes for “the moststraightforwardaccountonPalestineIhadheard,”onthebasisofwhichheaskedMagnes if hehadplans to seeTrumanand thereuponurgedMcClintocktoarrangesuchameeting.

THELINESAREDRAWN

Magnes’s visit coincided with a period in which the lines wereincreasingly sharply drawn between critics and supporters of partition.Among the critics were figures such as Warren Austin and his morecautious colleagues—Acting Secretary Lovett, McClintock, and Rusk.Partisans of partition includedClifford and JohnHorner, adviser to theUNdelegationattheSecondSpecialSessionoftheGeneralAssembly.

OnMay4,WarrenAustinsubmittedthestatementhewantedtomakebeforetheUNtoDeanRuskforapproval.Itopenedwiththeobservationthat existing conditions in Palestine made it impossible to implementpartitiononMay15,hencetheneedto“suspendNovember29resolutionand to support SC truce terms.”82 Lovett objected and, as McClintockreported,contactedDeanRuskandJohnC.Ross, thedeputy toAustinat the United Nations, to emphasize that “our principal effort at themomentshouldbeonthetruceandcease-fire,”althoughasMcClintockadded, “one of the articles of the proposed truce did, in fact, includeprovision for suspending the effect of the resolution of November 29,1947,forthedurationofthetruce.”83Ruskagreedwiththeurgencyofatruce, persuaded that in its absence Britain’s withdrawal would befollowed by the mobilization of each community, the concentration ofIslamic and Arab support for the Palestinians, and a long attrition warbetween Jewish and Arab states in which control in the Jewish sectorwouldpasstoJewishextremists.Ruskpredictedthattherewouldbeanincreaseofanti-SemitismintheWest.

Withinaweek, theStateDepartmenturged thepresident tosupporttheSecurityCouncil’struceeffortsaswellastheUNGeneralAssembly’sappointment of aUNCommissioner for Palestine.U.S. supporters hadfew illusions as to the feasibility of implementing the truce. As Rusk

argued,Itseemsifwegobacktowhatweareafter,ithasbeenallalongapeacefulsettlementofthisthinginPalestine.AslateasMarch17weweretryingtofindsomeinklingofsomesortofagreementbetweentheJewsandtheArabswiththehelpoftheSecurityCouncil,withsomeeffort toadjust thepartitionplan inwhat theywouldaccept,butwewentblack-outbecausetheArabswouldnottalkaboutit.SoweshiftedonMarch19,thewholeemphasis,toastraighttruce.ThattrucewouldhavetakenusbeyondMay15andbeyondtheperiodwhentherewasnogovernmentinPalestine.Ifwehadgottenatrucewewerepreparedtogo in on a trusteeship to formalize the truce arrangement and for that we madesuggestionstovariousgovernmentsaboutgoinginwithustoestablishthistrusteeship.84

Rusk’sconcern,sharedbyothers,was the futureofPalestine in the

aftermath of Britain’s exit. But something had changed: “there is acommunity in existence over there, running its own affairs.”85 Ruskunderstoodthat“theboss”wouldneveropposearequestforassistanceif itmadeadifference.Ashephrasedit,“Idon’tthinkthebosswilleverputhimselfinapositionofopposingthateffortwhenitmightbethattheU.S. opposition would be the only thing that would prevent it fromsucceeding.”86Bycomparison,RuskenvisionedthesituationontheArabsideasequivalent to thestatusquo, indicating thathewasuncertain inwhat direction Arabs would go, and whether or not they would “inviteAbdullahin.”87 Inanycase,asRuskconcluded,theUnitedStatesfacedArabsandJews,“eachfairlyresponsibleforitsowncommunitybutwithapoliticalsettlementwhichhas tobenegotiatedbecauseyouhavethesesucceeding claims.”88 In this situation, Rusk recommended that theUnited States focus on obtaining an international trusteeshiparrangementforJerusalem.

In the course of his review, Rusk described Lovett as eager for a“cleanbreakofall thesenegotiations,”adding thatastatementonU.S.effortssincemid-Marchwouldbeuseful.

Inotherwords,wehave literallydoneourdamndestonthis thing.Nowif itdoesn’twork,wecertainlyaren’tgoingtotakethisthingonourownbackssinglehandedanditisnotuptoustocontinuetobatourbrainsoutonthetheorywearesolelyresponsibleforwhattheGeneralAssemblydoesonthissituationandwhatactiontheAssemblytakeshasgottobesomethingwhichiseitheraprovisionalorfinalsolutionofthisthing.89

Clark Clifford agreed that things had changed in Palestine, but he

remainedsteadfast insupportofrecognizingtheJewishstate,whichheregardedas“consistentwithU.S.policyfromthebeginning.”90Hehadan

ally in John Horner, adviser to the U.S delegation at the UN. In amemorandumonthe“FutureofPalestine,”HornerwarnedthatmanyattheUnitedNationswereskepticalabout theconsistencyofU.S.policy,advocatingthatitsupportpartitionandfocusonkeepingtheUSSRoutofthe Middle East and mending its relations with the U.S. Jewishcommunity.

Horner also called “for the annexation by the Kingdom of Trans-Jordan of that part of Palestine which the November 29 scheme hadintendedtobeaseparateArabstate.”91Hisreasoningwas,

(1)thatitwouldbeacceptabletotheJews,(2)thatitprobablywouldbeacceptabletoKingAbdullah, (3) that it isnotbasically incompatiblewith theNovember29 recommendation,(4)thatitoffersarelativelypermanentsolution,(5)thatitwouldcreateaviableArabstatein the enlarged Trans-Jordan thereby achieving the objectives of the economic unionproposal of November 29, (6) that it would effectively eliminate the Grand Mufti ofJerusalemandhisfollowers,and,mostimportant,itwouldfaceuptotheinescapablefactthataZionistStatealreadyisinbeinginPalestine.92

HornerrecommendedthataplebiscitebeheldamongPalestinianArabson the question of “unionwith Trans-Jordan.”93 No such plebiscitewasheld, norwas there any evidence to demonstrate that, if held, itwouldprove Palestinian support for absorption into Transjordan. Hornerseemedobliviousof thedifferencesbetweenJordanianandPalestinianpolitics and society. He proposed that the “exchange of populationsbetweenTrans-JordanandtheZioniststate”takeplace,referringtopastprecedents, as in the case ofGreece and Turkey after the FirstWorldWar.94WiththeprovisionofgenerousUNandU.S.aidanddevelopmentprojects, Horner foresaw the establishment of “two ethnically separatestates which would have their origin in agreement between the twogroups.”95

Clifford,unlikeHorner,focusedontheexistenceofaJewishstateinPalestine. InClifford’s private papers is a statement by Truman “of hisintention to recognize the new Jewish State in Palestine as soon as itcomes into existence.”96 In Clifford’s view, developments in Palestinewere irreversible insofaras theJewishstatewasconcerned.Moreover,the United States could use them to its advantage by “an immediatestatementbythePresidentthatheintendstorecognizetheJewishstatewhenitisproclaimed.”97

While U.S. officials were debating what to do at the UN, ThomasWasson, the U.S. member of the Truce Commission, reported from

JerusalemthatbothJewsandArabsweremakingitdifficulttoimplementthe cease-fire, but that the Truce Commission would continue to seektermsforatruce.

8RecognitionandResponse

THEMAY12DEBATE

OnMay 12, 1948, Truman invited a number of key State Departmentofficials,aswellas thosewhowere identifiedonlyas“WhiteHouse,” todiscussU.S.policy inPalestineandassisthim inmakingadecisiononthe issues. At this historic debate, George Marshall, Robert Lovett,FraserWilkins, and Robert McClintock faced off against Clark Clifford,David Niles, and Matthew Connelly.1 Truman was initially moved tosupport Marshall, but his response to Israel’s unilateral declaration ofstatehoodonMay14didnotreflectMarshall’sposition.

TheeventsofMay14altered thegeographical andpoliticalmapofPalestineandtheMiddleEast,andwithitthebalanceofmilitarypowerintheregion.Washingtonwasunprepared,andtheBritish lookedon theirAmerican colleagues as woefully inept in their contradictory policies.WorkingthroughahighlychargedandunforgivingpoliticalatmosphereinWashington,Truman’sdecisiontorecognizeIsraelundercutthepositionoftheU.S.delegatetotheUN,WarrenAustin,whohadbeenoperatingon the assumption that the United States supported a cease-fire andtruceinPalestine.

OnMay11,ClarkCliffordadvisedtheJewishAgencyrepresentativeMosheShertok to goaheadwith plans for independence.According toIsraeli sources, Shertok was told that “Clifford advised we go firmlyforward with planned announcement of State,” and that “Presidentconsidering recognition,” even though, as the same sources stated,LovettandDeanRuskwerereportedtobehostile.2Thathostilitydidnotprovetobepermanent.

David Ben-Gurion’s reflections of this period were revealing of theZionistleader’sunderstandingofU.S.policy:

At the beginning of May, some of the great world figures, including General Marshall,warnedusnottoestablishtheStateofIsrael.Andthereweregoodfriendswhotoldusthatwe had no alternative but to acceptMarshall’s views. It seems, superficially, that theseadvisors were right.Marshall was backed by a gigantic force, which no Jewish force inIsraelorelsewhereintheworldcouldwithstand.WewouldnothavehadtheleastchanceifwehadgonetofighttheAmericanArmy.WhenwefailedtoacceptMarshall’sviews,itwasnotbecausewethoughtourforceswerestronger;wecouldnothavebeensofoolish.WeactedaswedidbecausewedoubtedwhetherMarshallwaswillingtoutilizetheforcesherepresented toprevent theestablishmentof theStateof Israel.TheStatewassetup inoppositiontoMarshall,andtheAmericanArmywasnotusedagainstus.Haditbeen,theState would have been destroyed at once. However, the very opposite happened: theUnitedStatesimmediatelyaccordeddefactorecognitiontotheStateofIsrael,althoughithadnotyetrecognizedIsraeldejure.3

TheZionistleaderconcludedthat“thosewhoadvisedusnottoestablishthe state did not err in their evaluation of the forces that stood behindMarshall;theydidnotexaggerateit[in]theleast;theyerredinthattheycould not differentiate between what the American representative saidandwhattheAmericanGovernmentwoulddo.”4

In preparing for theMay 12 debate, Clifford offered a view of U.S.policythatechoedtheargumentstheJewishAgencyrepresentativeshadcirculated earlier.Clifford had the assistanceofMaxLowenthal, formercounsel to the Interstate Commerce Committee, who prepared a topsecret file for Clifford dated May 11 marked with this warning: “Clark:Please do not let anyone else read this dynamite,” signed Lowenthal.5The“dynamite”consistedofevidencethatMarshall,reputedtobehostileto recognition of the Jewish state, hadmet with Shertok and indicatedinterest in the possibility of an accord between the future Jewish stateandAbdullahofTransjordan.

Onthebasisofthisdisclosure,itappearedthatthesecretaryofstatewas prepared to support the future recognition of the Jewish state.Hence,theprincipalfigureinthepolicymakingcircleallegedtobehostileto the recognition of Israel was exposed as sympathetic—providedcertainconditionsweremet.Thoseconditionswere, in fact, identified inthe covert report that Clifford received. “Mr. Shertok’s WashingtonrepresentativeprivatelyreportsthatSecretaryMarshall twicesaid: thereisnothing Iwould likemore thansuchanagreementbetweenAbdullahandtheJews.”6

Lowenthal’ssecretdataincludedotherinformation,suchastheextentof Jewish military preparedness, arms, and the mobilization of Jewishyouth. It disclosed “that the Jews have youths of military age in Italy,North Africa, Germany, Yemen, France, Cyprus, all picked for priorimmigration.”7 The number of volunteers and their means of reachingPalestine was unclear: “despite a naval blockade that may be set byAmericanshipsofwar?”8ThisledLowenthaltoquestionwhatU.S.policyshouldbe.

Lowenthal’s secret file also contained information about the BritishForeign Office. According to this source, the British were prepared torecognize the Jewish state,which it regardedasabulwarkagainst theUSSR.Inaddition,aprominentLaborPartyfigurewascitedspeakingof“the heavy financial investments in Jewish Palestine now beingnegotiated by bigBritish concerns, and the doubled and tripled currentcreditsnowbeinggrantedbysuchconcernsasHambrosBankofLondonto business in Jewish Palestine,” with the Foreign Office’s approval.9Accompanying this report was a letter from the head of the PalestineEconomicCorporation, JuliusSimon, indicating that “this corporation isone of severalwhich supplymillions of dollars of capital on loan or asinvestmentfortheup-buildingofPalestine.”10

On the day of the historic debate, Lovett opened with his ownrevelations concerning the prospective Jewish Agency–Transjordanaccord.HereportedonavisitbyMosheShertok,whoinformedhimandSecretary ofStateMarshall of themomentous developments regardingAbdullah’s plans with respect to Palestine. Lovett maintained that theimpact of this development, in conjunctionwith the evidence of Jewishmilitarysuccessesinthefield,convincedtheJewishAgencythatatrucewasunnecessary.11TothisMarshalladdedthathehadwarnedShertokof the dangers in basing “long-range policy on temporary militarysuccess.”12Further,hewarnedShertoknottorequestU.S.helpifthingsdidnotworkout,givenWashington’sadvancewarning.

WhenCliffordwasinvitedtopresenthiscase,hebeganbyobjectingto U.S. support for a truce in Palestine, arguing that it had beensuperseded by “the actual partition of Palestine” that had taken place“withouttheuseofoutsideforce.”13HerecommendedthatthepresidentrecognizetheJewishstateandinstructU.S.representativesattheUnitedNationstodothesameoncethemandatewasterminated.

LovettremindedtheWhiteHouseCounselthattheUnitedStateswascurrentlyamemberoftheUNTruceCommission,andhedecriedsupportfor a state whose borders had not been internationally recognized. HealsocriticizedClifford forexploiting thePalestinianquestion indomesticpolitics, remarking that the question of recognition of the Jewish state“was a very transparent attempt to win the Jewish vote,” though heclaimedthatitwouldbackfire.14

OnMay13,MarshallsentareportonPalestineandtheArabregionto U.S. diplomatic offices in London, Jerusalem, and across the Arabworld,commentingonthecomparativeweaknessofArabregimes,whichimpairedtheirabilitytoactinPalestine.However,MarshallalsoobservedthelimitsofJewishimpunitytowardArabs.Inthelongrun,heargued,“ifJews follow counsel of their extremists who favor contemptuous policytowardArabs,anyJewishStatetobesetupwillbeablesurviveonlywithcontinuousassistancefromabroad.”15

From Jerusalem Thomas Wasson reported on the jubilation of theJewish population in anticipation of Britain’s exit and the imminentdeclarationofindependence.HedescribedJewishauthoritiesasstayingwithin the boundaries defined by the November 29, 1947, UNGAResolution181.ButWassonalsotooknoteoftheresponseofaJewishofficialtoanAPcorrespondentwhoinquiredaboutthefateofResolution181ifArabstatesinvadedPalestine.TheJewishofficial’sresponsewasthat“Ben-GurionhadalwayssaidthatmainaimofJewswastogetallofPalestine.”16Wassoninsisted,however,thattodatehehadnoevidenceofJewishforcesabandoningtheUNpartitionresolutionboundaries,eventhough“mostobserversbelievethatJewsarewinningfirstroundatleastoftheirbattleandwilldesireconsolidatepositions.”17

Wasson sent the following assessment of Arab resistance inPalestine,theanticipatedresponseofneighboringArabstates,aswellasAbdullah’sinformalaccordwiththeJews.

Arab opposition to Jews in towns has completely disintegrated. Haifa is under Jewishdomination;Jaffaisadesertedcityandhasbeendeclared“opencity”;andtheArabshavebeengivenmuchneededbreatherbycease-fire.ItisnotbelievedJerusalemArabswouldbe able to prevent much opposition to Jews if latter decided to occupy city. MostrepresentativeArabshave fled toneighboringcountriesandArabsofauthorityare foundonly after most diligent searching. Consequently truce and cease-fire talks are greatlyhampered and slowed down. It is possible Arabs do not wish to be placed in difficultpositionofhavingtomakedefinitedecisionswhichwouldbepublicadmissionoffactthat

Jewshaveupperhand.Perhapstheyhopeeventswilldecidefuturecourseofpolicy.WebelieveArabLegionandpossiblyotherArabarmieswillmarchintoArabareasofPalestineafter terminationofJanuarydatebutwillnot riskmajoroperationwithJews.EvidenceofinformalarrangementsbetweenJewsandAbdullahshouldnotbeoverlooked.Abdullah’sdesireforadditional territoryand lucrativeneighboraswellashispresentstrongpositionwithfellowrulersmaymakesuchagreementpossibleofexecution.18

LovettmetwithCliffordafterMay12toexpressuneasinessaboutthe

outcome of the debate. According to Jonathan Daniel’s study of thepresident, Clifford succeeded in convincing Truman to insist onimmediaterecognitiontopreemptrecognitionbyPolandandtheUSSR.19Lovett’saccountofhisconversationwithClifforddiffered.Heemphasizedthatherepeatedlyaskedforadelay inrecognitionforseveral importantreasons.ThefirstwastoallowtheJewishAgencyExecutivetosubmititsappealforrecognitiontoWashington;thesecondwastohavethetimetoinform U.S. allies; and the third was to give the president andpolicymakers time to informU.S.officials, including thoseat theUnitedNations, where havoc would ensue on the announcement of U.S.recognition of Israel. Unable to influence the course of events, Lovettadded sardonically, “I can only conclude that the President’s politicaladvisers,havingfailedlastWednesdayafternoontomakethePresidenta father of the new state, have determined at least to make him themidwife.”20

THEIMPACTOFTRUMAN’SRECOGNITIONOFISRAEL

On May 14, Eliahu Epstein, acting as agent of the ProvisionalGovernmentofIsrael,sentTrumanaletterannouncingtheproclamationof the new state. Epstein had acted on the instructions given byClarkClifford concerning how to request U.S. recognition. The new state,Clifford had pointed out, was to “claim nothing beyond the boundariesoutlined in the UN resolution of November 29, 1947, because thoseboundarieswere theonlyoneswhichhadbeenagreedtobyeveryone,includingtheArabs,inanyinternationalforum.”21

OnMay14,1948,Epsteindelivered the following letter toPresidentTruman:

MydearMr.President:

I have the honor to notify you that the state of Israel has been proclaimed as anindependent republic within frontiers approved by the General Assembly of the UnitedNations in itsResolution ofNovember 29, 1947, and that a provisional government hasbeenchargedtoassumetherightsanddutiesofgovernmentforpreservinglawandorderwithintheboundariesofIsrael,fordefendingthestateagainstexternalaggression,andfordischarging theobligationsof Israel to theothernationsof theworld inaccordancewithinternational law.TheAct of Independencewill becomeeffectiveat oneminuteafter sixo’clockontheeveningof14May1948,Washingtontime.22

The declaration concluded with the statement that Epstein had been“authorizedbytheprovisionalgovernmentofthenewstatetotenderthismessageand to express the hope that your governmentwill recognizeandwillwelcomeIsraelintothecommunityofnations.”23

Epstein’s statement, however, did not correspond to the position ofthe“ProvisionalAdministration”onthekeyissueofdefiningboundaries.On May 12, in accord with Ben-Gurion, the Provisional Governmentvoted that “the boundaries of the state should not bementioned in theDeclaration of Independence.”24 In a departure from Epstein’sdeclaration,Ben-GurioneliminatedanyreferencetotheUNpartitionplanin the statement read on May 14 declaring Israel’s independence atmidnight.

Simha Flapan reports that “Epstein was probably aware of thediscrepancy between his statement to Truman and the decision of thePeople’s Administration not to mention borders, because he cabledSharett thesamedaytoexplain thathehadbeenadvisedbyfriends inthe White House to mention the November borders.”25 OtherrepresentativesoftheJewishAgencyinLondonandtheUnitedNationswere reported to have called for a correction favoring mention of theNovemberborders,asEpsteinhaddone.

Other developments in Palestine appear to have escaped notice inWashington.A“stateofemergency”wasannouncedinPalestineonMay14, and “all combatant units received orders to execute Plan D [PlanDalet],” which succeeded in the conquest of “about 20,000 squarekilometers of territory (compared with the 14,000 square kilometersgrantedthembytheUNPartitionResolution)andcleansedthemalmostcompletely of their Arab inhabitants.”26 There was no indication thatMarshallwasawareofanyof thiswhenhe informedMr.Epsteinof theU.S.president’srecognitionoftheProvisionalGovernmentofIsrael.

On May 15, Secretary of State Marshall duly responded to Mr.

Epstein:DearMrEpstein: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter ofMay 14,1948andtoinformyouthatonMay14,1948at6:11pm,Washingtontime,thePresidentofthe United States issued the following statement: “This Government has been informedthataJewishstatehasbeenproclaimedinPalestine,andrecognitionhasbeenrequestedbytheprovisionalgovernmentthereof.

“TheUnitedStatesrecognizestheprovisionalgovernmentasthedefactoauthorityofthenewStateofIsrael.”

Sincerelyyours,G.C.Marshall27

OnMay16,LoyHendersonproposedthattheUnitedStatesreplyto

EliahuEpstein’slettertoTrumannotifyinghimoftheproclamationoftheStateofIsraelwithaseriesofquestions,oneofwhichdealtwithborders.Henderson suggested that “at the appropriate time” the United Statesmighttakethepositionthatits“defactorecognitiondoesnotnecessarilymeanthatwerecognizethatthefrontiersofthenewJewishstatearethesameasthoseoutlinedintherecommendationoftheGeneralAssemblyofNovember29,1947,thatthoseboundarieshadbeendeterminedupontheunderstandingthattherewouldbeaneconomicunionofallPalestineand a special international regime for Jerusalem.”28Henderson pennedhismemorandumafterTruman’s statement of recognition. Its tonewasone of deference and understanding that boundaries were, in effect,susceptibletochangeinaccordwithalteredconditions.Wasthisacoverfor Ben-Gurion’s position, which was that the boundary was wherepeopledeterminedittobe?

TheMinisterofJustice in thenewstate,PinhasRosen,asked foraclarificationofbordersintheDeclarationofIndependence,towhichBen-Gurion replied that “if we decide here that there’s to be nomention ofborders, thenwewon’tmention them.Nothing isapriori [imperative].”29Rosen’s responsewas that the question at handwas a legal issue, towhichBen-Gurionrepliedthat“thelawiswhateverpeopledetermineittobe.”30 Ben-Gurionmade it clear that he agreed with Haganah Chief ofStaffIsraelGaliliwho,onApril8,1948,declaredthat“thebordersofourstatewillbedefinedbythelimitsofourforce….Thepoliticalborderswillbe those of the territories that we shall be able to liberate from theenemy;theborderswillbethefruitofourconquests.”31

DeanRusk later recalled the sequenceof events onMay14 at the

UnitedNations.HereceivedacallfromClarkCliffordinforminghimoftheprecise time the State of Israel would be declared; the United Stateswould then recognize the new state.Ruskadded thatClifford also toldhimthat“thePresidentwishedmetoinformourDelegationattheUnitedNations,”towhichRuskrepliedthat“thiscutsacrosswhatourDelegationhas been trying to accomplish in the General Assembly underinstructions and we already have a largemajority for that approach.”32RuskthencalledWarrenAustin,whowasintheGeneralAssembly.Onlearningthenews,Austinleftanddidnotreturn,whichRuskinterpretedasAustin’swayof informing theUNAssembly that “thiswas theactofthePresident inWashingtonand that theUnitedStatesDelegationhadnotbeenplayingadoublegamewithotherDelegations.”33WhenPhilipJessup took the podium at theGeneral Assembly to confirmwhat hadoccurred,Rusk said theAssembly “was then in pandemonium.”34Ruskwas instructed by Marshall to go to the UN to “prevent the U.S.Delegationfromresigningenmasse.”35

The damagewas not easily contained. AsAustinwrote toMarshallseveraldayslater,U.S.recognitionofIsrael“hasdeeplyunderminedtheconfidenceofotherdelegations inour integrityand[that] this isa factorwhich theDepartmentwillwant tokeep inmind in the immediate futureand for some time to come.”36 Moreover, for many delegations,Washington’s act of recognition “constituted reversal of U.S. policy fortruce plus trusteeship as urged in special session ofG.A. and, in laterstages, U.S. compromise resolution laying stress on truce plusmediation,” to which Austin added further implications of this U.S.action.37

WithinamatterofhoursafterWashington’srecognitionofIsrael,U.S.officials in Cairo and Jidda cabled ominous warnings of the Arabresponse.BritishofficialsquestionedthelegitimacyoftheIsraeliactioninlight of the 1947 UN resolution: “Foreign Office view is that it is notcorrect to consider that the29November resolutionestablishesa legalbasisforcreationofaJewishstate.”38UNSecretaryGeneralTrygvieLie,apprehensive about the future of the UN, informedMarshall and otherSecurityCouncilmembersof theEgyptiangovernment’sannouncementof its planned intervention in Palestine. The Arab League issued aparalleldeclaration,endorsingaunitary,democraticstateinPalestineforallofitsinhabitants.

Why did Truman recognize Israel, and why did he do it soprecipitously? It is easier to answer the second question, with itssuggestion of competition with the USSR, than the first, whoseexplanation covers a range of possibilities. For some, the domesticpolitical environment was key, meaning that electoral politics played arole inTruman’sdecision toact.Butdomesticpoliticswerenotentirelyseparated from international affairs. The impact of the Second WorldWar, the Holocaust, and the activity of Zionist forces in Europe, theUnited States, and Palestine provide a potent example. But there wasalsothequestionoftheroleoftheColdWar,particularlytheconcernwithwhetherornotapro-AmericanJewishstatewouldbeanassetinpostwarplanning.

Writingin1994,DouglasLittlepointedoutthat“America’sroleinthecreationof the Jewishstatehas receivedmore scholarlyattention thanalmostanyotherdiplomatic issueintheimmediatepostwarperiod.”39 Inhis analysis of the question, Little emphasized domestic factors,suggesting, in addition, that Truman believed recognition would put anendtotheconflictandwouldarrestSovietentryandcommunistinfluencein the region.40 Many accounts emphasize a combination of domesticpolitics;thepresident’sreligious,moral,andhumanitariansentiments;hisclosepersonaltieswithJewishfriendsandcolleagueswhowereZionistsupporters; and, finally, the commitment to recognize the Jewish statebeforetheexpectedSovietmovetodothesame.41

MichaelJ.CohenarguesthatTrumanwasmovedbythesituationofthe Jewish Displaced Persons (DP) in the camps described by EarlHarrison.42 In combinationwithother factors, suchasdomestic politics,Truman moved to support “refugee Zionism,” approving Jewish DPimmigrationtoPalestine.ButCohenpointsoutthat“thisneverledhimtosupporttheZionistgoalofaJewishstate.HisaidesintheWhiteHouseand the march of events in Israel itself, not conviction, influenced hisdecisionsonPalestine.”43

WilliamRogerLouismaintains,inkeepingwithaTrumanbiographer,that the impact of the Holocaust and domestic pressure provedirresistible.44 Others, such as Peter Hahn, have underscored theimportanceofpublicsupportintheUnitedStatesforpartitionandtheroleofeffectivelobbying.45

Omitted inexistingexplanationsandspeculationregardingTruman’s

decisionisanyreferencetotheinteractionbetweenMaxBallandEliahuEpstein. Ball was not part of the policymaking establishment, but hisprestige among those concerned with petroleum and national defensesuggeststheneedforfurtherinvestigation.Ball’sencounterswithEpsteingavehimaviewoftheJewishAgency’sobjectives,includingitsdesiretobe regarded as an asset rather than a liability in U.S. regional policy,whichBallappearedtopromote.

Given the pervasive concern with U.S. policy toward Palestine andthefearthatU.S.supportforpartitionwouldendangerU.S.oil interests,Ball’smeetingswithEpsteinseemedtoopenunforeseenpossibilities.Atleast, they invitedtheU.S.oilcompanyexecutives,whowerediscreetlyresponsive to Ball’s invitations to meet with the Jewish Agencyrepresentative, to think pragmatically about future possibilities afterindependence.

Inaddition,givenEpstein’srelationswithClarkClifford, it ispossiblethat the president’s legal counsel was aware of these exchanges, andthat they figured in his calculations, much as did the “top secret”information regarding Secretary of State George Marshall that MaxLowenthal provided. The combination covered many critical areasrelevanttoU.S.policy.

THECONTINUATIONOFWAR

For Truman and his advisers, the question of what would happen inPalestine after Britain’s departure was a major preoccupation. It wasused to rationalize immediate recognition of the Jewish state byWhiteHouseadvisersandtojustifyurgentsupportfortruceandtrusteeshipbythemajorityof thepolicymakingelite.BeforeBritain’sexit, however,asU.S. officials in Palestine recognized, the framework of a Jewish statewasinoperation,whereasPalestinianforceswereindisarray.

With Israel’s declaration of independence on May 14 and Britain’sdepartureonMay15,thesecondpartofthewar,whichhadbegunwiththepassageofUNGAResolution181,wasunderway.Itwouldendwiththeinaugurationofarmisticeagreementsdesignedtoprepareforthefinalsettlementoftheconflict,butnosuchfinaleoccurred.Failuretocometoa final settlement reflected conditions on the ground: the comparativemilitarystrengthofJewish,Palestinian,andArabforces;theeffectofthe

destruction of Palestinian urban centers; the accompanying flight andexpulsion of Palestinian refugees; and Israel’s expansion of territorialcontrol.

AviShlaimdescribedthewarof1948as“long,bitter,andverycostlyinhuman lives. It claimed the livesof 6,000soldiersandcivilians,or 1percentoftheentireJewishpopulationofaround650,000.”46Ze’evMaoz,by contrast, argued that Jewish forces were inadequately equipped,lackedtraining,andthattheirleadingcommanderspredicted“thechanceofsurvivalof theJewishstateasevenatbest.”47AviShlaimprovidesadifferentview:

[I]nmid-May1948thetotalnumberofArabtroops,bothregularandirregular,operatinginthePalestine theaterwasunder25,000,whereas the IDF[IsraelDefenseForces] fieldedover 35,000 troops. By mid-July the IDF mobilized 65,000 men under arms, and byDecemberitsnumbershadreachedapeakof96,441.TheArabstatesalsoreinforcedtheirarmies,buttheycouldnotmatchthisrateofincrease.Thus,ateachstageofthewar,theIDFsignificantlyoutnumberedalltheArabforcesarrayedagainstit,andbythefinalstageofthewaritssuperiorityratiowasnearlytwotoone.48

SimhaFlapandescribedthesituationfacingJewishforcesinthefirst

monthfollowingtheArabinvasionas“largelydefensive.”49TendaysafterIsrael’s declaration of independence, the first Messerschmitts arrivedfrom Czechoslovakia and were assembled by Czech technicians. Ashiploadofriflesandcannonswasalmostathand.Ben-Gurioncalledthis“thebeginningoftheturningpoint.”OnMay24,hetoldthegeneralstaff,“Weshould[now]preparetogoover totheoffensive.”ByJuly8,Yadinreported“attheterminationofthefirsttruce,wetooktheinitiativeintoourown hands; and after that we never allowed it to return to the Arabforces.”50

Flapan estimates that a total of 5,708 Jewish forces were killedbetween November 29, 1947, and March 10, 1949. Of this number,“more Israeli soldiers diedwhile attacking thanwhile defending againstattacks by Palestinians and Arab armies”; 1,581 Israelis were killedfighting within the UNGA partition resolution’s borders, as opposed to2,759killedoutsideoftheselines.51

According to Ilan Pappé, within days of Britain’s withdrawal, Arabforces

enteredPalestine and attacked Jewish settlements in the north and south. At the sametime an Egyptian contingent began a long journey along the coast and into the NegevcapturingareaswhichinthepartitionresolutionhadbeendesignatedtotheJewishstate.AnotherEgyptian contingentwas stationed in theBethlehemarea and capturedKibbutz

RamatRahel. Tel Avivwas bombarded from the air by Egyptian aircraft and JerusalemremainedcutofffromthecoastbyPalestinianandLegionforces.TheSyriansmeanwhilesucceededinestablishingabridgeheadintheJordanValley,whereastheIraqis,whohadfailed to do so, entered Samaria thereby facilitating the annexation of that area toTransjordan.OnlyAbdullahfrustratedthegeneralArabwarplanbyconcentratingmostofhis troops in thevicinityof Jerusalem, rather thanhaving them join forceswith theArabarmiesinthenorth.52

One day after Britain’s withdrawal, U.S. Minister Lowell Pinkerton inLebanon sentWashington a statement from the Arab League PoliticalCommitteedescribingthesituation:

[M]ore than quarter million Arabs have been compelled by Jewish aggression [to] seekrefugeinotherArabcountries,andPalestinehasbeenleftwithnoadministrativeauthority“entitled to maintain and capable of maintaining a machinery of administration of thecountryadequateforthepurposeofensuringdueprotectionoflifeandproperty.”53

Members of the Muslim Brotherhood and Egyptian volunteers had

gone to Palestine before the government officially declared itsdetermination to enter the war on the eve of Britain’s departure.MohamedHassanein Heikal, whowas to become a renowned politicaljournalist,describedwhathefound.

TheEgyptianarmyhadenteredPalestine.Butnooneseemed to realize that theywereenteringawar,norwerethereenoughmapsofPalestineforthetroops.Worse,thetroopsweretransportedinoldandbrokentouristcarsprovidedbyatravelagency.Theydidnotknowthedirections,sotheywereforcedtofollowtherailroadtrack.

TheEgyptianarmyenteredthewarwithoutreallyknowingwhatitwasfacing.54

Inhisnotes to “Nasser’sMemoirsof theFirstPalestineWar,”Walid

Khalidiobservedthatthebulkof theEgyptianarmywasheldbackinEgyptforavarietyofreasons: indecisionabout intervention, localsecurityconsiderationsandutterorganizationalunpreparedness.The Secret Report on Military Operations…estimates, for example, that 60 percent oftransport available was unoperational, and that the lack of equipment for the reservesreached90percentincertaininstances.55

GamalAbdelNasser,senttoPalestineasastaffofficer,recalledthe

woeful lack of preparation and the utter confusion of orders thatcontributedtothefeelingthatthiswasa“political”war.Hisfellowofficerswereconvincedthat

thiscouldnotbeaseriouswar.Therewasnoconcentrationofforces,noaccumulationofammunitionandequipment.Therewasnoreconnaissance,no intelligence,noplans.Yettheywereactuallyonthebattlefield.Theonlyconclusionthatcouldbedrawnwasthatthis

wasapoliticalwar,orratherastateofwarandno-war.56

On May 14, Nasser received orders from Cairo to move against

Dangour.Herecalledthattherewasnotimetocarryoutareconnaissanceoftheobjective,norwasanyinformationavailable about this objective. There was one Arab guide whose task was to lead thebattaliontothesiteofthesettlement.Theguidehadnoinformationaboutthefortificationsofthesettlementoritssystemofdefences.Suchinformationashedidpossesswasvagueandunspecific.57

An Israelimemberof the IsraeliPalmach later recalled theentryof theEgyptian army in a landscape of utter impoverishment and militaryunpreparedness.

WhentheEgyptianarmyarrived,itwasacompletelydifferentsituation.TheEgyptianarmyarrivedwhenwehadwipedoutallArabresistancewhichwasn’tthatstrong,itwouldbeanexaggeration to say we fought against the Palestinians…in fact there were no battles,almostnobattles.InBurayrtherewasabattle,therewerebattleshereandthere,furtherupnorth.But therewerenobigbattles;why?Because theyhadnomilitary capabilities,there[they?]weren’torganized….58

Inthenorththeyfought.Inthesouththeydidn’t,theydidn’thaveanything.Theyweremiserable,theydidn’thaveanywheretogo,oranyonetoask….59

ThefirsttimeIenteredKawkabaandBurayrIwasamazedbytheirpoverty.Therewasnothingthere.Nofurnitureandnonothing,therewereshelvesmadeofstrawandmud,thehousesweremadeofmudandstraw.Theylivedthereforthousandsofyearswithoutanychanges, and the only thing that happened to them was the disaster of the Nakba in“Tashah”[1948].60

IntheperiodleadinguptoandafterMay15,Jewishforcesattacked

majorurbanaswellasruralareas.ArabpopulationswereeitherexpelledorfledinJaffa,Haifa,Lydda,Ramla,Acre,Safad,Tiberias,Bayson,andBir Sabi’, which collectively represented “those Palestinians with thehighest levels of literacy, skills, wealth and education.”61 An estimatedsixty-four villagesbetweenTelAvivandHaifawereeitherdestroyedoroccupiedinthisperiod.Twovillagesweresparedtoprovideworkersforneighboring Jewish settlements.62 By 1949 and the conclusion ofarmisticeagreementsbetween Israeland itsneighbors, “more than400of the over 500Arab villages in Palestine had been taken over by theIsraeli victors.”63 According toWalid Khalidi’s study,All That Remains,418villagesweredestroyedinthecourseofthewarin1948.64

Safad and the surrounding villages in Galilee had a population of

10,000 to 12,000Arabs and approximately 1,500 Jews. This areawasassignedtotheYishuvintheUNpartitionplan,andfightingthereledtomassivedestructionanddemoralization,andwith it flightorsurrender.65According to Yigal Allon, the Palmach officer assigned to the EasternGalilee, the object was to rid the area of Arabs before the anticipatedArab invasion thatwasassumedto followonBritain’sdeparture.Onanearlier reconnaissance trip, “Allon concluded that clearing the areacompletelyofallArab forcesand inhabitantswasthesimplestandbestwayofsecuringthe[Syrian]frontier.”66InAllon’swords,“theechoofthefallofArabSafadcarriedfar….TheconfidenceofthousandsofArabsoftheHula[Valley]wasshaken….Wehadonlyfivedaysleft…until15May.We regarded it as imperative to cleanse [of Arabs] the interior of theGalilee and create Jewish territorial continuity in the whole of UpperGalilee.”67

Acre,inthewesternGalilee,felltoHaganahforcesbetweenMay13and May 18. After Jaffa, Acre was “the first major town outside theterritory allotted to the Jewish state to fall to the Haganah forces,” asMustafaAbbasi remindsus.68 Ithadpreviouslybeen thedestination forrefugees fleeing Haifa and surrounding villages, which aggravatedconditions when Acre was attacked by Haganah forces in late April.AccordingtoaPalestinianresidentofAcre,thepopulationhadincreasedfrom approximately 12,000 to some 50,000 people. Under siege, Acrewas further devastated by “fear, dirt and hunger and disease andepidemic,” in the words of Moshe Carmel, commander of the Carmelibrigade.69 The final siege of the city, undertaken by the same brigade,reportedthat“theobjectiveistoattackthecitywiththeaimofkillingthemenanddestroyingpropertybyburningandtosubduethecity.”70

OnMay17,WarrenAustin, theU.S.delegateat theUnitedNations,arguedthattheSecurityCouncilshoulddeclarethesituationinPalestinea threat to peace under article 39, and under article 40 should call forcessationofallmilitaryactivitiesinPalestineinadvanceofestablishingatruce. Austin followed this with a list of questions for Arab and Israeliforces,askingtheformerwhether“armedelementsofyourarmedforces,orirregularforcessponsoredbyyourGovernments,[were]nowoperatingin Palestine?”71 The Provisional Government of Israel was asked whatarea it actually controlled and whether it had “armed forces operatingoutsideareasclaimedbyyourJewishState.”72

APPOINTINGAMEDIATOR

OnMay20,CountFolkeBernadottewasappointedtheUNSCmediator,and he proceeded towork toward a cease-fire and truce, aiming for acomprehensivesolution.Heenvisionedasettlementthatcorrespondedinsome respects to that outlined in UNGA Resolution 181, with its twostatescollaboratinginaunionthatwentbeyondeconomicconsiderationstodealwithissuessuchasimmigrationandrefugeesandmattersrelatedtoforeignpolicy.Heproposed“thatrecognitionbeaccordedtotherightof residents of Palestine who, because of conditions created by theconflict there have left their normal places of abode, to return to theirhomeswithout restriction and to regain possession of their property.”73Thiswas theprelude towhat became the reference to the “Palestinianrightofreturn,”asexpressedinUNGAResolution194onDecember11,1948.

Bernadotte’sproposalsincludedthefollowing:1.InclusionofthewholeorpartoftheNegebinArabterritory.2.InclusionofthewholeorpartofWesternGalileeinJewishterritory.3.InclusionoftheCityofJerusaleminArabterritory,withmunicipal

autonomyfortheJewishcommunityandspecialarrangementsfortheprotectionoftheHolyPlaces.

4.ConsiderationofthestatusofJaffa.5.EstablishmentofafreeportatHaifa,theareaofthefreeportto

includetherefineriesandterminals.6.EstablishmentofafreeairportatLydda.74

The territorial changes Bernadotte proposed, which would havealtered previous arrangements stated in UNGA Resolution 181, wererejectedbyArabsaswellasIsraelis.Thelatterwerepersuadedthattheyundermined itssovereignty;and the formerwereunprepared toaccedeto arrangements they viewed as enforcing partition and enhancingAbdullah’s power. The UN mediator responded to Israeli charges byoffering “an explicit recognition of the right of Israel to exist” in hissecond,revisedproposal.75AsforJerusalem,Ben-Guriondeclaredthatit“was no longer a political question but essentially one of militarycapabilityandthat,likeanyareathatwasunderthecontroloftheIDF,itformedpartofthestateofIsrael.”76

The Israeli response to themediator’s proposalswas influenced bydevelopmentsonthegroundaswastheresponseoftheArabstates.AtthebeginningofJune,Israeliswere“incontrolofthemixedArab-JewishtownsinPalestinethat theyhadcaptured inApril; theyhaddrivenbacktheinvadingArabarmiesfromthenorthofPalestine;andalsocausedanEgyptiandebacleinthesouth.”77

Toward theendofMay, theUNmediator’splansweredisruptedbyanotherdevelopment—namely, theattack,occupation,andmassacreofthevillagersofTantouraonMay22–23,1948.Atabout thesametime,U.S.ConsulWasson in Jerusalem sent amessage to the secretary ofstate, indicating that it had become “extremely difficult [to] get in touchwith prominent and representative Arabs but such Arab reaction toAmericandefactorecognitionofIsraelashasbecomeavailabletousisthat [the] United States has betrayed Arab states.”78 Arab sentimenttowardtheUnitedStateswasdescribedasbeingofextremebitterness,reinforced by the anticipation of military defeat and political collapseleadingtoradicaldisorder.AsfarastheJewswereconcerned,Wassonreported that those inJerusalemfaced the“immediateandgrim taskofwarfare.”79WhattheyexpectedfromtheUnitedStateswassupport.

THOMASC.WASSON:U.S.CONSULASSASSINATED

Wasson did not live to see the results of U.S. policy. He wasassassinatedonMay22,1948.Thetrucehehadworkedforwasfinallyaccepted by Israelis and Arabs on June 11. The United Nations wasapprisedoftheshootingoftheU.S.consulinJerusalem,whowasalsoamemberoftheUNSCTruceCommission.“Followingforyourinformationis the report just received from the American Consul in JerusalemRegardingtheshootingofThomasCWassonU.S.ConsulGeneralandU.S. Representative on the Security Council Truce Commission.”80DetailsofWasson’sassassinationreportedintheUnitedStateswerefewand contradictory.81 Either Washington did not investigate theassassination, or its findings were and remain classified. The SecurityCouncilwas informedof theattack,butPablodeAzcarate,chairmanofthePalestineCommission,reportedthathe

never foundoutwhether theSecurityCouncil adopteda special resolutionor expressedtheirfeelingsinanyotherwayaboutthetragicdeathoftheAmericanmemberoftheTruce

Commission. In any case, theCommission never received any communication from theSecurity Council about themelancholy incident and this silencemade a deplorable andpainfulimpressiononusall.82

BecauseWassonwaskilledwhileamemberof theTruceCommission,Azcarateadded that “hehad therefore, the tragicprivilegeofbeing thefirstvictimsacrificedtothecauseofpeaceinPalestine.”83

InanoralhistoryinterviewwithStuartW.Rockwell,officerincharge,Palestine-Israel-Jordan Affairs, 1948–1950, Richard D. McKinziequestioned theU.S.officeraboutconditions inJerusalemat the timeofhis appointment. Rockwell had come from Ankara and described theatmosphereinJerusalemaspoliticallyandphysicallytense,recallingthat“welosttheConsulGeneral,whowaskilledbyasniperandwelosttwoothermembers of the staff by shrapnel and various other accidents ofwar.”84

Well,weresidedintheYMCAandworkedintheConsulate,whichwasrightonthefrontlinesbetweenJewishNewCityandtheOldCity.Irecallthatoneday,whenIwasgoingforlunchattheYMCAfromtheConsulate,Icrossedasmallstreetthatborderstherearendofthe Consulate, and I encountered Mr. Wasson coming from a meeting of the TruceCommissionattheFrenchConsulateGeneral.AndjustasIcrossedtheroad,Iwasfiredonbyasniper,andIsaidtoMr.Wasson,“Watchout;thisarea”(whichwaswithinsiteoftheOldCitywall)“iscoveredbysnipers.”

He [a reference toWasson] said, “Thank you for thewarning; I havemybullet proofveston.”

So,Iwentonmywaytolunch,andIsubsequentlylearnedthatwhenhecrossedthatstreethewas firedonby thesniper,and thebulletstruckhim in the topof theshoulderwheretherewasnoplating.Itwentintohimdiagonally,andthenhitthebulletproofvestonthe inside and ricocheted back into him. And he died in about three hours. But it wasobviously the sameman, and, judging from the angle of the bullet, it seemed tome hemusthavebeeninoneoftheabandonedbuildingsontheIsraeliside,ontheJewishside,ofthefrontline.Hemusthavegotteninthere,somehow.85

The State Department acknowledged Wasson’s death by paying

tributetohis“‘greatability, judgment,andcourage’andpointedout thatalthoughincarryingouthisdutieshehadhadtopassconstantlythrough‘bulletsweptstreetsandbattlelines,’hehadneveroncementionedinhisreportsthephysicaldangerstowhichhewasexposed.”86

The overall mood of U.S. diplomats at this juncture was grim. ThenewsconveyedtoWashingtongavelittlereasonforhope.InJerusalemat the end of May, U.S. Vice Consul Burdett was reporting onunconditional surrender of Jews in the Old City, where some “2000

women, children, old and religious people to be evacuated to Jewishquarters new Jerusalem under supervision International Red Cross,”while 300 men considered of military age were sent to Amman asprisonersofwar, and those seriouslywoundedwere takenover by theInternationalRedCross.87Writing fromSaudiArabia, thevicepresidentof ARAMCO sent news that King Ibn Saud “indicated that he may becompelled, in certain circumstances, to apply sanctions against theAmericanoil concessions.”88TheSaudi regimewasprepared toacceptanyArabLeaguemoveonsanctionsagainstU.S.interests.Fourmonthslater,membersoftheSaudidelegationattheUNweredescribedbyU.S.officials as opposed to the Bernadotte plan and expecting a similarresponsefromotherArabstates.

Late in June, theSaudi kingwas reported tohavewarned theU.S.ambassador that “if hostilities renewed and U.S. pursues policysusceptibleinterpretationassubstantialdeparturefromoneneutralityasbetweenIsraelandArabsvigorouscounteractionmaybeanticipatedbyArab League with which SAG [Saudi Arabian Government] willconform.”89 There could well be sanctions in addition to “(a) transferDhahran air base to British; (b) cancellation ARAMCO concession; (c)break in diplomatic relations.”90 None of these threats was carried out,andU.S.–SaudirelationsimprovedaftertheArabdefeat.91

ReportingfromCairoattheendofJune,theU.S.consulinformedthesecretaryof state thatAmirFaisalofSaudiArabiaandMardamBeyofSyriawereadamantlyopposedtoBernadotte’sterritorialplans.MardamBey feared that the arrangements “would make Transjordan a Jewishcolony through joint economic functions and constitute even greatermenace to Arab world. Both clearly indicated opposition toaggrandizement of Abdullah.”92 As for the Emir, he reminded the U.S.charge that “Arabs could impose sanctions, including cancellation oilconcessions,”thatcouldsubsequentlybeofferedtootherstates,citingasexamples “Belgium, Italy or even Russia.”93 This was accompanied bythreatsofwar,whichmaterializedinJulywhenEgypttooktheleadinthecampaignagainst Israel thatsucceeded inexposing theweaknessesoftheArabmilitary.

Similarwarningshadbeen received from theU.S.minister inSaudiArabia only days earlier, when J. Rives Childs reported that the kingcouldnotacceptaPalestinesettlementthat involvedIsrael,andthathe

would align Saudi policy with that of the Arab League, which mightinvolvetheimpositionofsanctionsagainsttheUnitedStatesshoulditfailtomaintainapositionofneutralitybetweenArabsandIsraelis.InadditiontoabreakinU.S.–Saudirelationsatthediplomaticlevel,sanctionsmightinclude Dhahran becoming a British (not American) base and theARAMCO concession being cancelled. Childs must have known thathoweverdramaticthesethreatswere,therewaslittlelikelihoodthattheywouldbecarriedoutgiventheSaudiregime’seagernessforU.S.aidandsupport.

This was not the only warning the secretary of state received. OnJune25,ViceConsulBurdett inJerusalemsentthesecretaryofstateacopyofa“MemorandumoftheCease-Fire”fromtheSternGang,whichhad been left at the U.S. Consulate.94 Accusing states that “party tointriguesofBritishpolicy,”whichwasdesigned to “whittledownalreadyshrunkenJewishstate,”theSternGangclaimedthat“Americans,French,Belgians, Swedes, are all in effect acting as British agents to fulfill aBritishmission.”95Theonlystatesexcludedfromthislistofguiltypartieswere the Soviet Union and states of Eastern Europe. In Washington,suchnewsworriedofficialsconcernedwithIsraeli–Sovietties,aswellasthoseafraidthattheIsraeliProvisionalGovernmentwasunabletocontroltheIrgunandtheSternGang.

These fears were superseded by the practical necessity ofreconsidering U.S. policy toward Israel and Palestine in light of themomentousdevelopmentsof thepreviousmonths.Howmuchchangedandwithwhateffect?

PARTIVRethinkingU.S.PolicyinPalestine/Israel,

1948

Chapter9considersWashington’sreactionto themomentousevents inthe region, a reaction that involved the reassessment of U.S. policytoward IsraelandPalestineasa resultof thestruggleoverPalestine in1948. It provides a new look at some major figures who had beenseverely critical of partition but emerged as stalwart defendants of thenewstate.Amongthemwerethosewhocalculatedthat thenewstate’smilitarystrengthcouldproveusefultotheUnitedStates.TheCIA,whilerecognizing Israel’s military, predicted that Tel Aviv would continue toexpanditsmilitaryandviolatetruceefforts.

Chapter10examinestheU.S.andtheUNrecordof,andresponseto,Israeli expansion and the expulsion of Palestinians, who increasinglyswelledtheranksofrefugees.U.S.sourcesalsoprovideevidenceoftheIsraelidenialofresponsibilityforthecreationoftheproblem,whichledtoIsrael’s categorical rejection of repatriation. This chapter contributessignificantly to our understanding of Washington’s response to thePalestinian refugeeproblemand the role it played in relationsbetweenIsraelandtheUnitedStates.

Chapter11setstherecordstraightwithregardtotherefugeeproblemand theviewsofStateDepartmentofficialsand theCIA.However, thischapteralsoexposesthemannerinwhichWashingtondeferredtoIsraelipolicies,adoptingamore“realistic”viewofIsrael’ssituationwithrespecttoterritoryand,eventually,torefugees.

9ReconsideringU.S.PolicyinPalestine

DEFININGU.S.POLICY

U.S. officials dealing with Palestine clearly understood that the UnitedStateswasfacinganeworderintheMiddleEast.Hencetheurgencyofdefining U.S. policy in the aftermath of Britain’s exit and Israel’sdeclaration of independence. Declaring their recognition of the newstate’s sovereignty, the heirs of Wilsonian diplomacy were lessconcerned with affirming support for the principle of self-determinationthantheywerewithdraftingmapsforterritorialexpansionandpopulationtoensureahomogeneousJewishstate.Intheprocess,theyconfrontedmajor political and legal questions, such as the continued validity ofUNGAResolution181,whichtheyreconsideredinamannerfavorabletoIsrael. Their rationale was that developments on the ground had soprofoundly altered the political reality facing the region that the UNGAresolution of November 1947 was very nearly irrelevant. In practice,however, the same UNGA resolution continued to figure in Anglo-American,U.S.–Israeli,andU.S.–Arabdeliberations.

Among the dramatic characteristics of Washington politics in thisperiod was the evident shift in outlook of officials who had previouslybeenardentopponentsofpartitionandstatehoodbutwhonowemergedasitsequallyardentdefenders.UnlikeGordonMerriam,whoquestionedwhy Palestine was not granted independence, most State Departmentofficials involved in the Palestine question accepted Israel’s goal of ahomogeneous Jewish state with a minimum of Palestinian Arabs. LoyHenderson,GeorgeMarshall,andRobertMcClintockwereamongthosewho now supported population “transfer,” as did Philip Jessup, whose

analysesoutlinedthelogicoftheU.S.policy.Within twoweeksof Israel’sdeclarationof independence, thePolicy

Planning Staff signaled the importance of developing a policy onPalestineforsubmissiontothesecretaryandundersecretaryofstate,aswellastotheNationalSecurityCouncil.Inmid-July,Merriam,whowasamember of the Policy Planning Staff, reminded his colleagues that theUnitedStatesdidnothaveaPalestinepolicy,but “wedohaveashort-term,open-endedpolicywhich isset fromtime to timebyWhiteHousedirections.”1Merriamopposedthispolicyashisviewsmadeclear.

U.S.officialsfacedtheneedtoredefineitspolicytowardIsrael,ArabPalestine, and London, where long-standing differences compelledattention.HendersonwasamongthosepersuadedthattheBritishcouldbeusefulinpersuadingArabstatestoaccepttheexistenceoftheJewishstate. Jessup, on the other hand, was skeptical of the British role,convincedthatBritishinfluenceinPalestinewaslimited,eventhoughtheBritishhada“better ‘feel’ forthePalestineproblem”thandidtheUnitedStates.2

One of the more dramatic shifts in outlook following Israel’semergence was that of Loy Henderson, for many the symbol of U.S.State Department opposition to partition and Jewish statehood.Henderson, in fact, was exiled as a result of his views and appointedambassador to India in August 1948. As he explained in his interviewwith Richard D. McKinzie in 1973, he had been identified with “thenefarious‘pro-Arab’groupintheStateDepartmentwhohadopposedtheestablishmentofsuchaState,” referring to Israel.3Hendersonadmittedthat hehadbeenwarned that hewas “makingpowerful enemies”asaresultoftheviewsheexpressedbetween1945and1948.4 In“thelatterpartof1947andthefirstsixmonthsof1948,thousandsofletterscameintotheStateDepartmentdemandingmyimmediatedismissal.”5Bymid-1948,hispresence in theStateDepartmenthadcome tobeseenasaliability, both for the department and for the administration.Yet he andothers dealing with Palestine and the Near and Middle East in thesummerof1948arguedthat“theJewshad,infact,astate,andwehadrecognized it. We would probably follow a policy of continuing torecognizeitunlesstheZionistsoftheirownaccordmergedit intosomeother entity.”6 Insofar as territory was concerned, Henderson believedthat“if therewereboundarymodificationsintheNegev”thatrecognized

thevalidityofthePalestinianposition,“wemightfinditnecessarytoaskforaquidproquosuchasthecessionofWesternGalileetotheJewishState.”7

On June 19, Lewis Douglas, the U.S. ambassador to the UnitedKingdom,senttheU.S.secretaryofstatenoticethattheBritishhadgivenuptheirsupportforafederalstateinPalestine.TheBritishhadcometoappreciate “the contrast between the efficiency displayed by Jews insettingupIsraelandindefendingit,andtheArabcounter-performance.”8SecretaryMarshallwas impressedandwrotea letterofappreciation totheBritishForeignOffice.

FollowingU.S.recognitionofIsrael,thesecretaryofstateemergedasanadvocateforIsraelandthe“enlargedTransjordan”withwhichitmightenter intoacustomsunion.9Thiswas the“topsecret”messageCliffordhad discovered when preparing for the May 12 debate with Marshall.KingAbdullahhad,infact,informedtheU.S.viceconsulinJerusalemofhissupportforan“endtopresenthostilities.”BurdettreportedtoMarshallthatAbdullah“indicateditwouldstillbepossibleforArabsJews[to] livetogether[in]Palestine.SaidhedidnothateJewsdidnotwishmakewaron themand stated thatwar had been forced on him byArab Leaguewhichhadplacedentireresponsibilityonhim.”10

Reflecting on the evolution of his views, Marshall described U.S.policy,asofJune19,inthefollowingterms:

DeptisrapidlyevolvingitslineofpolicyrefuturesettlementofPalestineproblem.Foryourown info and not for use as yet with UK officials, our thinking—conditioned by fact ofrecognitionofStateof Israel—is thatbestsolution forasensibleadjustmentofPalestineproblemwouldbetore-drawfrontiersofIsraelsoastomakeacompactandhomogeneousstate; remainder of Palestine to go largely to Transjordan with appropriate transfer ofpopulationswherenecessary;Jerusalemtoremainaninternationalentitywithfreeaccesstooutsideworld;boundariesofIsraelandenlargedTransjordantobeguaranteedmutuallybetween themselves and UN; and economic prosperity of region to be enhanced by acustomsunionbetweenIsraelandTransjordan.11

As did other U.S. officials, with the exception of Henderson, who wasconcernedwith the consequencesof transferringPalestinians,Marshalldoesnotappeartohaveentertaineddoubtsonthissubject.HecontinuedtosupporttheUNtruceandendorsedCountFolkeBernadotte’seffortstoorganizeaconferenceatRhodes.AshewrotetoErnestBevin,hehopedthat “a final settlement [could] be evolved without recourse tosanctions.”12

On June 23, 1948, Robert McClintock submitted his proposal for arevised U.S. policy under the title “Peaceful Adjustment of the FutureSituation of Palestine” to the associate chief of the Division ofInternational Security Affairs, Harding Bancroft, as well as to LoyHenderson,Robert Lovett, and the secretary of state.McClintock,whohadbeencriticalaboutpartition,asRuskhadbeen,nowemergedasafrontline defender of Israeli sovereignty. McClintock was prepared todefertothenewstatewithrespecttoterritorialandotherchangesandtoendorsethetransferofPalestinianstoensureahomogeneousstate.

ThepolicyoftheAmericanGovernmentinthisregardhasbeenconditionedsinceMay14bytherecognitionthatdayoftheProvisionalGovernmentoftheStateofIsraelasthedefactoauthorityinthatnewrepublic.Becauseoftheactofrecognition,UnitedStatespolicywithrelationtothePalestinesettlementispostulateduponthecontinuingexistenceoftheStateofIsrael.ThesovereigntyofIsraelisafactsofarastheUnitedStatesisconcernedand thisgovernmentcouldnotagree toanydiminutionof itssovereigntyexceptwith theconsentoftheGovernmentofIsrael.13

McClintockdidnotquestiontheextensionofIsraelisovereigntyashe

had endorsed the need to redraw Israel’s borders as a necessaryrevision of the 1947UNGApartition resolution.Nor does he appear tohavequestionedtheincorporationofHaifa,Jaffa,Lydda,andRamleintothe Jewish state, overlooking the bitter fighting and expulsions ofPalestinians that had taken place in these areas. As to the future ofHaifa,McClintockstressed that “Haifa isan integralpartof thestateofIsrael”and that itoffered“auniqueopportunity forpracticalcooperationbetweentheArabsandJews,sinceonesidecontrolsthecrudeoil,andtheothertherefiningcapacity,whilebothsidesneedthefinalproduct.”14McClintock apparently had no knowledge of prior Arab–Jewish laborrelations in the refinery that had demonstrated cooperation in differentpoliticalcircumstances.McClintockconcluded,however,withthethoughtthat“thehabitmightspreadtootherareas.”15

Inturningtothepartitionresolution’sreferencetoaPalestinianstate,McClintockadopted theposition that “it isnowclear in the lightof factsandeventswhichhavesupervened that therewillbenoseparateArabState and no economic union as envisaged in the General Assemblyresolution.”16Inthis,McClintockmadenoattempttoarguethattheUNGApartitionresolutionretainedanyvalidityundercurrentcircumstances.Theoperatingassumption,inhisview,wasthatthetimehadcomefora“new

drawing of the frontier which circumscribes the State of Israel.”17McClintock then proposed a return to the boundaries proposed in thePeelCommissionReport(1936),followingwhichatransferorexchangeofpopulationswouldtakeplace“sothattheStateofIsraelwouldcontainmostoftheJewsofPalestineandtheArabswouldresideinpurelyArabareas.”18Sucharrangements,accordingtoMcClintock,wouldresult inastate “possessingan improvedeconomicpatrimony,”19 and it offered “asensibleterritorialsolutionforthePalestineproblem.”20

What Palestinians thought of such solutions did not figure inMcClintock’scalculations.Onhismap,ArabPalestinedisappearedunderTransjordan’scontrol.SyriawasgrantedSafedinthenorth,SaudiArabiahad the port of Aqaba in the south, and Egypt and Transjordan weregranted “territorial adjustments” in the Negev.21 Jerusalem was to be“administered by theUnitedNations as a separate international entity,”and, assuming agreement by Israel and Transjordan, Haifa and Jaffaweretobecome“freeportfacilities.”22

McClintock concluded that a sensible territorial solution for thePalestine problemwould be to redraw the frontiers of Israel tomakeacompactandhomogeneousstate.TheremainderofPalestinewastogolargely to Transjordan with appropriate transfers of populations wherenecessary. The formula relevant to the transfer of populations echoedMarshall’s statement of June 22. Jerusalem was to remain aninternationalentitywithfreeaccesstotheoutsideworld.Theboundariesof the two new states were to be guaranteed mutually betweenthemselvesand theUnitedNations,and theeconomicprosperityof theregion was to be enhanced by a customs union between Israel andTransjordan.23

TheadvantagesofsucharrangementsinMcClintock’sviewwerethattheywouldcontain“thewiderpretensionsoftheJewishrevisionistsandsuchfanaticsasthoseoftheIrgunwhohavepretensionstotheconquestofTransjordan.”24AsforRabbiJudahMagnesandhis ideaofa“UnitedStates of Palestine” with joint Arab and Jewish jurisdiction,McClintockconcludedthattheJewishstatewouldnotbesympathetic.25

Operating in the radically changedenvironment following theeventsof May 1948, the UNmediator, Count Folke Bernadotte, produced hisownassessment ofwhatwas to bedone to ensure a resolution of theconflict. Inpractice, themediator’sproposalspleasedneitherArabsnor

Israelis,althoughMarshalldeclared themtobe fairevenashisdeputy,John Foster Dulles, effectively blocked their acceptance. After initiallyfindingthemediator’spositionworthyofsupport,Trumanturnedagainstitduringtheelectioncampaign,onlytoreturntoitatalaterstage.

JESSUP’SANALYSISOFTHEUNITEDSTATES,ISRAEL,ANDTHEARABS

Philip Jessup’s analysis of developments in Palestine/Israel and theregionas awhole did not differ radically from that of his colleaguesorsuperiors in the State Department. Generally, they exhibited limitedknowledgeoftheArabworldbeyondtheprizedoil-richregimesofSaudiArabia and the Gulf. For the rest, they seemed to know little of theintenseextentofpoliticizationacrosstheArabworldortheroleofradicalpoliticalmovementsintheregion.Jessup’sstartingpoint,asthatofmostU.S.officials,wasPalestineintheyearsfrom1945through1947andtheupheavalof1948.TheU.S.presidentandhisadvisersweresensitivetothe domestic political impact of Zionist activity, whereas many StateDepartment officials dealing with Palestine, Israel, and the Arab worldwereprimarilyconsumedwiththeimpactofinstabilityonU.S.economicinterestsandtheattendantrisksofSovietinroads,buttheyhadabundantevidenceoftheimpactofZionistdevelopmentsonPalestinianArabs.

IntheheadyatmosphereofIsraelafterMay1948,compliantregimessuch as that of King Abdullahwere regarded favorably inWashington,whileotherArabstateswerejudgedintermsoftheirresponsetoIsrael’semergence.Israelwasnewlyappreciatedasastatewithanexperiencedand disciplined political class, an impressivemilitary, and a worrisometendencytoturntowardtheUSSR.

OnJune30andJuly1,1948,Jessupintroducedatwo-partanalysisdesigned to assist in the formulation of U.S. policy “with regard to the‘peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine.’”26 WhatemergedfromhisevaluationwasthesensethatthenewstatecouldbeapositivefactorinU.S.regionalplanning.

JessupdeclaredthatthestateofIsraelwas“nolongeraspeculativepropositionbutahardpoliticalrealitythatneitherwe,northeBritish,northeArabs,noranyoneelsecouldescapeeven if theywanted to.”27HeviewedIsraelaspoliticallystrongandcapableofcontrollingitsdissidents.

JessupconcludedthatincomparisonwithitsArabneighbors,Israelwas“morethanamatchformostofArabstatesputtogether.”KingAbdullahwastheonlypossibleexceptionas“noneof theotherArabstateshavearmedforcesavailablewhichcanevenbegintocompareinorganization,efficiency,andnumberswiththeHaganah.”28

TurningtothePalestinians,Jessupsuggestedthat“weshouldmakeupourmindwhetherwefavorestablishmentofaPalestinianArabstateorextensionoftheboundariesofTransjordantotakeintheArabareasofPalestine as those areas may be determined.”29 He favored the lattercoursebecauseArabslackedleadershipandwere“poorlyorganizedandequippedfrom[a]militaryviewpoint.”30Jessupgavenoindicationthatheor anyone else inWashington had consultedwith Palestinian Arabs todetermine their viewsonbeingplacedunderAbdullah’s control.AsAviShlaimpointedout,

the most sophisticated among them saw little attraction in the political despotism ofTransjordan,dependentasitwasonthevolatiletemperoftheking.Theywerealsoawareof the economic non-viability of Transjordan and realized that Arab Palestine andTransjordan together would be even less of a going concern. Hence their opposition toTransjordanianruleandinsistenceonaunitarystate.31

The same view was expressed by Palestinians to Elias Sasson, whooffered David Ben-Gurion and Moshe Sharett his proposals fornegotiationswith Palestinians in place of the deal with Abdullah in thespringof1949,buttonoavail.

Theabsenceofadequate leadershipwasroutinelyrepeatedbyU.S.officials in theirdepictionofPalestiniansandArabsasawhole, therebyjustifyingtheirviewofAbdullah’stakeoverofArabPalestine.NoattentionwaspaidtotheroleofpastBritishpoliciesthatdecimatedthePalestinianleadership in response to its opposition to the Peel Commission’srecommendationof partition in 1936.Theensuing revolt between1936and1939washarshlyrepressedbymandatoryauthorities.TheresultingstruggleledtothedestructionofthePalestinianpoliticalclassaswellastotheisolationofPalestinianvillagesandtowns,whichwereleftwithoutarmsor leadersandwerepracticallydevoidofArabsupport later in the1940s.32Britain’sattempttoassuagePalestinianArabhostilitythroughitssubsequent passage of the White Paper with its limitation on ZionistimmigrationtoPalestineonlyservedtoexposethedeeprootsofconflictinPalestine.

From 1947 to 1949, Palestinians were confronted by a “dividedleadership, exceedingly limited finances, no centrally organizedmilitaryforces,andnoreliableallies.”33ThiscontrastedsharplywiththesituationoftheJewishcommunityinPalestine,whichwasbolsteredbytheZionistmovementthatwasfurthermobilizedasaresultoftherevelationsoftheHolocaust. Inretrospect, theeventsofMay1948gaverisetoagradualawakening and sense of identity among Palestinians, despite theirseparationacrossstates thatoffered themneithercitizenshipnorequalrights.

In his assessment of the conditions in post-1948 Palestine, Jessupdescribed the “vacuum” left byBritain’swithdrawal as filled, in part, by“proclamationof Israel,whichmightbedescribedasanextra-legalact,and by outbreak of violence and hostilities on a serious scale.”34Nonetheless, Jessup maintained the new state was a “responsiblememberof the internationalcommunity”andwouldeventuallymaketheconcessions necessary for a peaceful resolution of the situation inPalestine.

Therewaslittleevidenceofthisinthesummerof1948whenJessupdiscussed Israel’s situation with Abba Eban, who informed Jessup ofIsrael’sviewthattheterritoryitheldwasbased

on theNovember29 resolutionandonde factomilitarycontrol.Wehaveexpressed thepersonalviewtoEbanherethatIsrael’slegalcaseundertheNovember29resolutionwithrespecttoboundariesisrelativelyweak.Alsopersonally,Ebanhasineffectadmittedthisandindicatedtheyconsidertheirdefactopositionresultingfrommilitaryoperationsmuchstronger.On the latterpoint,Ebanclaims that Israel is inde factocontrolnotonlyof theNovember29territorybutalsoofwesternGalilee.35

JessupdidnotquestionEban’swish that theUnitedStates“support

the ‘territorial integrity’ of Israel,” but then Jessup and the ProvisionalGovernment of Israel were not entirely in accord on territorial matters.Jessup believed that the Negev should go to Transjordan, and thewestern Galilee to Israel, even though he conceded that if the Negevturned out to be rich in resources, arrangements for joint developmentcouldbemade.Inshort,JessupwaspreparedtoenvisagemodifyinghispositioninIsrael’sfavor.

Overall,JessupviewedIsrael’s“superiororganizingability;efficiencyandresources,bothhumanandfinancial”asfactorsthatwouldenhanceits economic development as opposed to that of the Arab states.36 He

recognized the possibility of Israeli expansion and the further enmity itwouldarouseamongArabregimes.Hisresponsewastoemphasizetheimportance of promoting economic development and Arab–JewishcooperationsimilartowhathebelievedwouldtakeplacebetweenIsraelandTransjordan.

Jessupwasalso interested in thepossibilityofencouragingregionalpolitical cooperation between Israel and its neighbors. Sucharrangements would address Arab fears of Israeli expansion, althoughJessupwaspersuaded that Israel’sneighbors(citingSyria inparticular)wereprimarilyconcernedwithTransjordan’spotentialexpansion.Inthatvein, Jessup thought the idea of “nonaggression and mutual defensepacts” between Israel andher neighbors could transformArabpolicies.JessupspecificallypointedtotheArabLeague,speculatingthat itmightbemovedtochangefromanorganization“basedonracial,religiousandnationalist lines, into a politicallymatureorganizationalong the linesoftheWesternEuropeanUnionandourownarrangementsintheWesternHemisphere.”37

Jessup apparently had little knowledge, let alone understanding, ofEuropean imperialism and its effect on the Middle East. Instead,identifying U.S. interests in the evolving situation, Jessup stressed theimportanceofpeaceandstability,aswellastheexclusionoftheUSSR.Unlike theStateDepartmentMiddleEastspecialistswhowere farmoreanti-Sovietinoutlook,JessupdidnotbelievethattheUSSRrepresentedan imminent threat to U.S. interests in the region. He nonethelesssubscribed to the view of a dangerous Soviet influence in Greece,Turkey,andIran.Heremainedconvinced,however,that“althoughtherearesomeindividualsintheArabcountriesinclinedtowardscommunism,for religious reasons, as well as because of the low economic andcultural levelof themassesof thepopulationof theArabcountries, it isnot apparent that communismhas any substantial following among themasses.”38

On the other hand, Jessup was preoccupied, as were other StateDepartmentand Intelligenceofficials,with the risksofSoviet inroads inIsrael.TheideologicalorientationoftheSternGangworriedthem,asdidwhattheyperceivedtobetherisksofneutralisttendenciesintheIsraeliProvisionalGovernment (PGI). Jessup argued against subjecting Israelto excessive pressure because he feared that it risked turning Israel

against the United States and theWest. He argued that Israel was aresponsiblemember of the international community, unlike Arab stateswhohadevidenceof itsviolationsof international law,claiming that thePGI “have shown dignity and strength in UN. There is no reason tobelieve they will not be willing to make concessions, even substantialones, in interest of a peaceful adjustment of future situation ofPalestine.”39

Jessupeitherdiscountedorwasunawareofwhatwashappening inPalestine.Heseemingly ignoredU.S. consular reports inpromotinghisview that thegovernment inTelAvivshouldnotbesubjected tounduepressure.

IfinprocessofnegotiationPGIispushedtoohardtoacceptarrangementsintolerablefromtheir point of view, [it] seems clear that this will increase its difficulties in dealing withCommunist-inspired dissident elements andwill also force it to relymore extensively onRussiansupport.40

ThePGI,accordingtoJessup,recognizedthatitwastoitsadvantagetobeassociatedwith theUnitedStates rather than theUSSR.AsJessupargued, “if in effect Israel is thrown into arms of Soviet Union it couldbecome a force operating to very great disadvantage to U.S., UK andother western powers, and to Arabs.”41 On the other hand, “if fairlytreated, [Israel] could become a force operating to our own advantageand to advantage of Arab countries.”42 “Fairly treated,” in Jessup’sinterpretation, as in that of otherStateDepartment officials,meant thatWashington should cease pressuring Israel on issues such as thePalestinianrefugeeproblem,ortheillegalacquisitionof land.ThesamepositionwaslatertakenupbytheJointChiefsofStaff.

Jessupenvisionedtheadvantageof IsraelbeingassociatedwiththeUnitedStatesintermsofitspotentialcontributiontoU.S.strategy.

Israelisalsoinstrongmilitaryposition,perhapsstrongerthantheythoughttheymightbe.Frompointofviewofnumbers,organization,disciplineandefficiencytheyaremorethanamatchformostofArabstatesputtogether.AbdullahhasonlyveryeffectiveforceonArabsideandeffectivenessof this force isalmostundoubtedlydue toBritishelements. IsraelhasbeensuccessfulinholdingitsownpositionsandbeyondthishasestablishedeffectivecontrolofwesternGalilee.43

Onthebasisoftheseconsiderations,JessupconcludedthatIsraelcould

beanassetinU.S.regionalplanning.

From the strategic viewpoint we assume that Palestine, together with the neighboringcountriesisamajorfactorpresumablyinanyfuturemajorconflictthisregionwouldbeofvital importance to U.S. as a potential base area and with respect to our lines ofcommunication.Presumablyalsotheoilresourcesoftheareaareconsideredvital.Itisourfeeling that this last pointmaynotperhapshavebeendealtwithadequatelyand franklyenoughinofficialandpublicdiscussionofthePalestinequestion.

FromtheeconomicviewpointitisprobablethatwiththeexceptionofoilourtradeandothereconomicrelationswithPalestineandtheotherNearEastcountriesarenotdirectlyofanysubstantial importance. Indirectly, however, theeconomicstabilityanddevelopingprosperityofPalestineandtheMiddleEastareaunderpeacefulconditionscouldmakeavery substantial contribution to the economic recovery of the world generally and thuscontributetotheeconomicwelfareoftheU.S.Withrespecttooil,werecognizethattheoilsupplyfromtheareaisofgreatimportanceintheEuropeanrecoveryprogram.Wereitnotfor this factor,however,andthestrategic importanceofoil,weshouldprobablynotallowthe economic importance of this commodity to condition our judgment substantially withregardtoPalestine.44

Where did the Arab states fit in this order? Their location and

resourcesaccounted for their importance inJessup’sanalysis,but theirinabilitytoaccepttheJewishstateaccountedfortheirincompatibilitywithU.S.policy.That incompatibilitywasexplained in termsofArabpoliticalimmaturityandeconomicunderdevelopment.

Arab countries are also relatively new states participating in international affairs on theirown responsibility for a very short period. Froma political viewpoint, both domestic andinternational,theyarerelativelyimmature.Fromeconomicandculturalviewpoints,theyarerelativelyunderdeveloped.45

Jessupconcluded that in the lightof their inability toaccept theJewishstate,theArabswereresponsibleforperpetuatingregionalinstabilityandincreased Soviet and communist influence in the region. Hence thecomparative value of Israel in U.S. strategy and the importance ofpursuingpoliciesthatwouldensureitspro-Westernorientation.

Although written in a period of continued Israeli expansion duringwhich the White House and U.S. officials expressed frustration withIsrael’s repeated rejection of Palestinian refugee repatriation, Jessupmaintained that the Provisional Government of Israel “fully recognizesresponsibilitywhichgoalongwithstatehood.ItisourimpressionthattheydesiretoliveasagoodneighborwithsurroundingArabstates.”46

Unable or unwilling to comprehend the Palestinian and Arabopposition to Israel, Jessup relied on mythical claims that served hispurpose.HestatedthatArabshavebeen“accustomedforsolongtolookuponJewsasrootofallevilthatitisdifficultforthemtoseecontributionsforgoodthatJewsmightmakepolitically,economically,andculturallytowelfareofArabs.”47CorrectingthisoutlookwasaprerequisiteofpeaceinJessup’s view. “[I]f even a small number of Arab leaders would beconvincedofdesirability from theirownviewpointofadoptingapositiveratherthananegativeattitudetowardsIsrael,”therewouldbehopeforasettlement.48OthershadclaimedthatZionismandIsraelcouldcontributeto Arab welfare, as in the study of Palestine by Nathan, Gass, andCreamer,citedearlier.49JessupwentfurtherandsuggestedthattheArabinability to deal with Israel was “a complex psychological problem,”turning to psycho-cultural apologetics as a way of deflecting attentionfromtherootsoftheproblem.

The Zionist leader who became primeminister was less inclined toblamepsychologythanpoliticalconditionsfortheIsraelivictoryandArabdefeat in 1948. As David Ben-Gurion declared, “let U.S. recognize thetruth: we won not because our army is a performer of miracles butbecausetheArabarmyisrotten.Isthisrotboundtopersist?IsanArabMustafaKemalnotpossible?”50

ForJessup,theproblemremainedArabblindness,orwhathetermedtheArab“blindspot.”

The immaturity of Arabs is revealed in blindspot which prevents even more moderateArabsfromrecognizingexistenceofIsraelasapoliticalfact.Becauseofthisblindspotthemore extreme Arabs seem determined to continue their efforts to eliminate the Jewishstate.WhileadmittingthatArabsmightcontinueaformofguerrillawarfareformanyyearsagainsttheJews,itseemsaxiomatictoU.S.thatArabscouldnevereliminateJewishstatewhich,failingsupportfromU.S.andotherwesterncountries,couldgetsupportfromSovietUnion, and the eastern European countries.Moreover, evenmoremoderate Arabswhoconsiderthemselves“realistic”andarethereforepreparedtorecognizeexistenceofIsraelareneverthelessapparentlyholding to line thatJewsmightbebrought toagree (if therewere sufficient pressure by U.S.) to a drastically reduced territory and impairedsovereignty.WeconsiderthateventhismoderateArabviewpointisunrealisticbecausewedo not feel that Jews will accept any substantial reduction of territory withoutcompensation, nor any impairment of their sovereignty. Furthermore, we doubt whetherU.S.wouldbelikelytobringanypressureatalltobearuponthemtotheseends.51

McCLINTOCK’SINTERPRETATIONOFTHENEWSITUATION

As Jessup completed his second comprehensive analysis andrecommendations forU.S.policy,RobertMcClintock submittedhisownlengthy“CheckListonPalestine”toDeanRusk.ItincludedMcClintock’sexchanges with George Kennan of the Policy Planning Staff andMcClintock’s personal assessment of the possibilities of achieving asettlement.McClintocknotedthatKennansubmittedhisreport toLovettwho, in turn, sent it toMarshall. The report did not reach theNationalSecurity Council, but McClintock’s view of the situation was circulatedamongpolicymakers.

Without compunction, McClintock argued in favor of redrawing thefrontiers“tomakeacompactandhomogeneousstate, theremainderofPalestine to go largely to Transjordan with appropriate transfers ofpopulationwherenecessary.”Jerusalemwastoremain“aninternationalentity”with openaccess, and the JewishandTransjordan statesalongwiththeUNwouldguaranteetheirboundaries.52Finally,acustomsunionwould be established between the states. This echoed Marshall’sposition, and was the position to which McClintock had earliersubscribed.

McClintockwasconcerned that theUnitedStatesmightbecome thescapegoat forArabhostility in thewakeof theArabdefeat inPalestine.Tothisherespondedwithovertcontempt.

As for the emotion of the Arabs, I do not care a dried camel’s hump. It is, however,important to the interestsof thiscountry that these fanaticalandover-wroughtpeopledonotinjureourstrategicintereststhroughreprisalsagainstouroil investmentsandthroughtherecisionofourairbaserightsinthatarea.53

Some years later, George Kennan gave vent to similar sentiments,

albeit otherwise clothed, lamenting the State Department’s failure tocome to gripswithwhat he described as “the depth of irrationality anderraticism of that region’s inhabitants—particularly evident among itsintellectuals—in responding toWestern ideas and political purposes.”54Kennan’s reduction of political opposition to deviant psychology wasdesigned to mask the popular expression of anti-Americanism that inKennan’s terms was a symptom of “psychological reactions and theoriginsofvariousformsofneurosis.”55

THEVIEWFROMTHECIA

In July, the Central Intelligence Agency offered its evaluations of theevolving situation in Palestine. It was similar, in some respects, to theview from theStateDepartment, particularly in its concernwith Israel’sfuture isolation and dependence on external support as a result of thecontinuedconflict.56

Asked by the Office of the Defense Secretary to estimate thedurability of the July 18 truce in Palestine, the CIA respondedpessimistically.ItconfirmedthatIsrael’sviolationsoftheprecedingtrucehad allowed it to improve its military situation and anticipated that thecurrent trucewouldbesimilarly violated in theabsenceofenforcementmeasures.Theagencyassumed that “theJewswill,asbefore,bring inmen,aircraft, andheavymilitaryequipment;presentArabopposition tothetrucewillthenbecomeintensified,andtheArabswillprobablyreopenhostilities.”57

Asaresult,theCIAreportcontinued,theIsraelistatewouldbefurtherconsolidatedand theArabgovernments that didnot recognize itwouldbe further weakened. Should the existing truce be enforced, somemovementonthisscoremightbepossibleifmoderateArabgovernmentssurvived.Buttheagencynotedthatevensuchgovernmentshopedforarevisionofthepartitionresolution,whereastheIrgunandtheSternGangwouldnottolerateanycompromise,whetherbyBernadotteorasagreedtobytheProvisionalGovernmentofIsrael.

Within two months of Israel’s declaration of independence, thedisparity between Israel’s military capacity and that of Palestinian andArab forces had become stark. According to the Agency, Israel hadapproximately97,800military forces, consistingofHaganah, Irgun,andtheSternGang.ThetotalforalltheArabstates—includingTransjordan,Iraq, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and “Irregulars”—wasbelieved to be 46,800.58 Egypt had the highest number of forces with13,000; Iraq and Transjordan each had 10,000; Syria had 2,500;Lebanonhad 1,800;SaudiArabia had 3,000; and the “irregulars”wereestimatedtobe6,500.AlloftheArabforcesweredescribedasbeing“in”or“near”Palestine.59

The CIA concluded that “the truce resulted in so great animprovementintheJewishcapabilitiesthattheJewsmaynowbestrongenough to launcha full-scaleoffensiveanddrive theArab forcesoutofPalestine.”60 The cumulative effect of these developments, in theCIA’s

estimate,was thatArab forces“couldnotcontinue to fight,evenon thepreviousmoderatescale,formorethantwotothreemonths.”61

AttheendofJuly,theCIAestimatedthat

themilitarysituationon18July,thebeginningofthesecondtruceinPalestine,showsthattheJewshavemadesubstantialgainsduringthenine-dayperiodoffightingbetween9Julyand18July.(Seemap)62DuringthatperiodtheJewscapturedLydda,RamleandRaselZin,therebyremovingthedangerofanArabthrustonTel-Aviv.InthenorththeytookthestrategicArab-ChristiantownofNazarethandconsolidatedtheirpositionsalongtheroadsbetweenJerusalemandTel-Aviv.TheonlysuccessfulArabactionduringthatperiod, theIraqiadvancenorthfromJenintowardAfule,washaltedbythetrucebeforeanysignificantgainwasmade.63

TheCIA said nothing about the nature of the fighting in Lydda and

Ramle,norabouttheexpulsionofPalestiniansthatfollowed.Howcoulditnot have known what had occurred? The CIA observed Israelconsolidating its positions both along the Lebanese border, where itsforceshadmoved,and“throughoutsoutheastintotheEgyptian-occupiedarea near Isdud and widened and strengthened the strip of Jewish-controlled territory along the roads between Jerusalem and Tel-Aviv.”64Arab action in this period was limited to an “Iraqi advance north fromJenintowardsAfule,”whichwaseffectivelystopped.65

Avi Shlaim stated that Israeli forces “captured parts of WesternGalilee and Lower Galilee. In the south they captured a number ofvillagesandwidenedtheirholdonthenorthernNegevapproaches.”66Inadditiontothe250,000to300,000Palestinianrefugeeswho,inthetimebetweenApril andmid-June, had fled or had been expelled, continuedIsraeli operations resulted in the expulsion of an additional 100,000refugees. Israeliactionwasnot limited in thisperiod,as Israelisourcesrevealed.

OnJuly12,1948IsraelisoldiersbattlingtheArabLegionandlocalirregularsinthetownsofLyddaandRamle,justsouthofTelAviv,wereorderedtoemptythetwotownsoftheirArabresidents.Over twodays,between50,000and60,000 inhabitantsweredrivenfromtheir homes.Manywere forced to walk eastward to the Arab Legion lines; others werecarried in trucks or buses. Clogging the roads, tens of thousands of refugeesmarched,sheddingtheirpossessionsalongtheway.

The expulsions, conducted under orders from then-Lt Col. Yitzhak Rabin, were anelementofthepartialethniccleansingthatridIsraelofthemajorityofitsArabinhabitantsattheverymomentofitsbirth.67

ByJuly13,Lyddawasthesceneof“acontinuouscurfewwithhouse-to-housesearches,around-upofable-bodiedmalesandtheseparationoffamilies, lack of food and medical attention, the flight of relatives,continuousisolationintheirhousesandgeneraldreadofthefuture.”68

According to IsraelihistorianBennyMorris, “thebulkandendof theexodus from Ramle and Lydda took place on 13 July. Many of theinhabitantsofRamleweretruckedandbussedoutbyKiryatitroopstoAlQubab, fromwheretheymadetheirwayonfoot toArabLegion lines inLatrun and Salbit. Others walked all the way. All Lydda’s inhabitantswalked,makingwaytoBirtNabalaandBarfiliya.”69

TheCIAmaynothavebeenprivytoIsraelimilitaryplanning,butwhatexplains its silence in the faceof theevidenceof Israel’sexpulsionsofPalestinians? The CIA concluded that the truce benefited “Jewishcapabilities”tosuchanextentthatitalteredthe“previouslyheldestimateoftheprobablecourseofthewarinPalestine.”70

As to the “Reaction of Arab Peoples,” the agency suggested that“seriousJewishviolationsof the truce (particularly thebombingofArabcities)wouldfurtherinflameArabpublicopinionandmakeitmoredifficultfor the Arab governments to continue the truce.”71 Inadequateenforcementofthetrucewouldnotonlyfailtobringaboutacompromisebut would enable Israel to enhance its military power while Arabweaknessesgrew.Ifthetrucewasimplemented,theagencymaintainedthatmoderategovernmentswouldsurvive,althoughitpredictedthatArabregimesmightwellbeoverthrown,turningagainsttheUnitedStatesandtowardtheUSSR.

The agency predicted a shift in Soviet strategy following Britain’sweakened influence in Arab states. Rather than continuing to support“Jewish independence,” the USSR would begin to attack “U.S.imperialisminIsrael”andpromisemilitaryassistancetotheArabstates.72

10ThePalestineRefugeeProblem

THEORIGINOFTHEPALESTINIANREFUGEEPROBLEM

NosingleissueintheevolvingrelationshipwithIsraelwasmoretroublingto U.S. officials than Israel’s rejection of responsibility for creating thePalestinian refugee problem and its accompanying rejection of theprospectforrefugeerepatriation.1EvenastheUnitedStatesincreasinglydeferred to Israeli policies, such as the transfer of Palestinians out ofJewish controlled areas to satisfy the objective of creating ahomogeneous Jewish state, U.S. officials insisted that the increasingrefugeeproblemwasoneoftheprincipalcausesofthecontinuedconflictin Palestine. Washington remained adamant and, at the same time,chose to remain impotent in responding to Israel’s repeated denial ofresponsibilityandrejectionofrepatriation.

From the president to the secretary of state and his subordinates,there was no disputing this position. It applied as well to the U.S.ambassador to Israel, JamesMcDonald, otherwise supportive of Israelipolicies.AttheendofJune,McDonaldsentGeorgeMarshallanaccountofIsrael’spositiononthepossibilityofrefugeerepatriation.

ForeignMinisterShertokinspeechinTelAvivonJune15formallystatedpositionofPGIthat there can be no mass return of Palestinian Arabs to Israel until general politicalsettlementandendofwar.ShertokspeechalsostatedthatArabscouldnotreturnexceptas full citizens Jewish stateacknowledging its authority and sovereignty.Referencewasalso made to screening. Israeli Foreign Office representing Jerusalem indicated thisspeechdoesrepresentstatedpolicyofPGIandassuchisshiftfrompreviouspolicy.

Consulate General believes that majority of Arabs now refugees from areas withinIsraelwillneverreturnunderconditionsandthattheirbitterness,alreadydeeprooted,will

only be increased by PGI statement. So far, however, Palestinian Arabs with whomConsulateGeneralofficialshavetalkedhavenotcommentedonShertok’sstatement.2

TheCIAreportedthatbetweenJuly9andJuly18the“Jewscaptured

Lydda, Ramle, and Ras el Zin” in operations that “were designed toinduce civilian panic and flight—as a means of precipitating militarycollapseandpossibl[y]alsoasanend itself.”3BennyMorrisgoeson tosay that the attacks on Lydda and Ramle “result[ed] in the almostcompleteexodusoftheirinhabitantstoArab-heldterritory.”4

Inmid-July,Shertoksentexplicit instructions telling Israelidiplomatshow to respond to questions about refugees. In part, the necessity forsucharesponsewasaproductoftheUNmediator’spronouncementsonthesubject.OnJune27,CountFolkeBernadotte“demandedthatIsraelrecognize the ‘right of the residents of Palestine who, because ofconditionscreatedby theconflict there,have left theirnormalplacesofabode, to return to their homes without restriction and to regainpossession of their property.’”5 Bernadotte subsequently acknowledgedthatthisobjectivemightwellbeunderminedbythedestructionoftheveryhomestowhichtherefugeesaspiredtoreturn,andbythemoregeneralchangesthathadoccurredinIsraelandamongthePalestinianrefugeesthemselves.

MosheSharett(formerlyShertok),6Israel’sfirstforeignminister,wroteto NahumGoldmann describing the desperate flight of Palestinians asconstituting

themostspectaculareventinthecontemporaryhistoryofPalestine—morespectacularinasense than the creation of the Jewish state—is the wholesale evacuation of its ArabpopulationwhichhassweptwithitalsothousandsofArabsfromareasthreatenedand/oroccupiedbyusoutsideourboundaries.Idoubtwhetherthereare100,000ArabsinIsraeltoday.Thereversiontostatusquoanteisunthinkable.Theopportunitieswhichthepresentposition opens up for a lasting and radical solution of the most vexing problem of theJewishStatearesofar-reachingastotakeone’sbreathaway.Evenifacertainbacklashisunavoidable, wemustmake themost of themomentous chancewithwhich history haspresentedussoswiftlyandsounexpectedly.7

ButasotherIsraeliofficials, includingYosefSprinzak,secretarygeneralof the Histadrut, understood, the key question was, “Who made thishistory?”

The question is whether the Arabs are [being or have been] expelled or not…. This isimportanttoourmoralfuture….Iwanttoknowwhoiscreatingthefacts[ofexpulsion]?And

thefactsarebeingcreatedonorders.Whowasresponsiblefororderingtheexpulsions?8

SpiroMunayyer, whowas a Palestinian paramedic in Lydda at this

time,confirmedthat“ofthe50,000peopleinourcityafewdaysbefore,including both regular inhabitants and refugees, only about 500remained.”9 It turnedout “thatanother500peopleorsowerestill livingneartherailroadstation.Theoccupationauthoritieshadkeptthemthereto run the station and operate the trains so as to transport food andmunitionsfortheIsraeliarmy.”10

OnthesamedaythattheCIAsentitsreporttoWashingtondescribingIsrael’scaptureofLydda,Ramle,andRaselZin,PhilipJessupsentthesecretary of state a letter he had received from the Israelis (Comay)statingtheofficialpositionoftheProvisionalGovernmentofIsraelontherefugeequestion.TheclaimwasthatPalestinianflightwasaresponsetoArabordersandtheproductofwar,inthisinstancetheArabinvasionofIsraelonMay15.

TheGovernmentofIsraelmustdisclaimanyresponsibilityforthecreationofthisproblem.ThechargethattheseArabswereforciblydrivenoutbyIsraelauthoritiesiswhollyfalse;onthecontrary,everythingpossiblewasdonetopreventanexoduswhichwasadirectresultof the folly of the Arab states in organizing and launching a war of aggression againstIsrael.The impulseof theArabcivilianpopulation tomigrate fromwarareas, inorder toavoidbeinginvolvedinthehostilities,wasdeliberatelyfosteredbyArableadersforpoliticalmotives.TheydidnotwishtheArabpopulationtocontinuetoleadapeacefulexistenceinJewish areas, and they wished to exploit the exodus as a propaganda weapon insurroundingArabcountriesand in theoutsideworld.This inhumanpolicyhasnow facedthe governments concerned with practical problems for which they must assume fullresponsibility.11

Amnon Kapeliuk described a very different account drawn from Israelisources.

A twenty-four page report from themilitary intelligenceSHAI (information service) of theHaganah dated 30 June 1948, affirms that “70 percent of the refugees had abandonedtheir homes at the time of the firstwave (up until 1 June 1948) because of hostile actscommitted by the Haganah, Irgun, and the Stern group.” This first wave involved some400,000people.Thesecondwave,ofsome300,000,setout forexilebetweenJuneandDecemberof1948.Itwasthusthatanumberofcitiesandabout250villageswereemptiedof their inhabitants. The two main reasons for the Palestinian exodus of 1948 wereexpulsionbytheIsraeliarmyandfearofmassacre.12

Israel’s response to the U.S. and UN demand for repatriation was

accompanied by confirmation that the land and property to whichPalestinian refugees aspired to return was no longer available, havingbeenassignedtoincomingJewishrefugees.

Fearful of the consequences and persuaded that Israel’s positionblocked any resolution of the conflict, U.S. officials urged the PGI toaccept repatriation or at least to make a symbolic gesture toward itsacceptance.Washington’s ambassador to Israel, JamesMcDonald, ontheotherhand, justified Israeliactionsexcept forDeirYassin,whichhesawasanexception.13

McDonald reported that Israelis insisted that the refugee problemwouldhave toawait themorecomprehensivesettlement,although theywere prepared, in accord with UNGA Resolution 194, to providecompensation for abandoned land “only if its counterclaimswere takenintoaccount,andonlyiftherewererealpeace.”14McDonaldrecognized,however, that Jewish immigrants had already settled in formerlyPalestinianhomes,makingrepatriationproblematic.

DespiteMcDonald’ssympatheticviewof Israel’sposition,hedecried“a certain lack of imagination and humanity. What was wanted was amore humane, a more creative approach—one that would havepreservedsecuritybutstillallowedforpositiveaction.Suchanapproachwaslacking.”15Hemaintainedthat“nooneofthebigthree—Weizmann,Ben-GurionorSharett—seemedtohavethoughtthroughtheimplicationsof the tragedy or of Israel’s lack of concrete helpfulness.”16 McDonaldclaimedthatSharettthoughttheproblemamatterofArabresponsibility,whereas Ben-Gurion “held out some hope for large-scale repatriationonce there was formal peace.”17 Chaim Weizmann, in turn, wasdescribed as “speaking to me emotionally of the ‘miraculousoversimplification of Israel’s tasks,’ and cited the vaster tragedy of sixmillionJewsmurderedduringWorldWarII.”Hewondered“whatdidtheworld do to prevent this genocide? Why now should there be suchexcitement in the UN and theWestern capitals about the plight of theArabrefugees?”18

In Washington, Truman himself was moved by the situation of thePalestinianrefugeesandeagerforsomeindicationofIsraeliflexibility,aswere Marshall and the high-ranking officials of the State Departmentresponsible for the Middle East, as well as those in the DefenseDepartmentandtheCIA.TheyunderstoodthatArabregimeswouldface

substantialdifficulties indealingwiththevastscopeof theirunexpectedinflux,recognizingthatitwastangibleproofofArabmilitarydefeat.

On August 31, 1948, the CIA issued its assessment of “PossibleDevelopmentsFrom thePalestineTruce” in response to the request ofthe secretary of defense. Among its conclusions was a dire statementconcerningPalestinianrefugees.

ThemostseriouspopulationupheavalsincetheterminationofWorldWarII,hasbeentheexodus of Palestinian Arabs from Israeli-held areas. The Arab refugees, conservativelyestimatedat330,000,exceed innumber theJewishDP’s inEurope.TheArabcountrieshave neither the economic resources nor the political stability to absorb such largenumbersofdestituterefugees.Israel’sdecisionnottoallowtherefugeestoreturntotheirhomeshasgreatlyexacerbatedArabbitternessagainsttheJews.19

ThecontrastbetweenthePalestinianexodusandtheinfluxofJewsintoIsraelwas recognizedby virtually all officials, includingBernadotte.FortheCIA, theadmissionofsome125,000Jews into Israelby theendof1948explained “in largepart Israel’s refusal to readmitArab refugees,”aswellasitsdesireformoreland.20DeanRusk,directoroftheOfficeofUNAffairs,suggested itappropriate to remind Israeli representativesattheUNofthestrikingdisparitybetweenIsrael’scapacitytointegratenewimmigrants and its refusal to consider the repatriation of Palestinianrefugees.Ruskadded,asdidotherU.S.officials,thatcontrarytoIsraeliclaimstherefugeesconstitutednorisktoIsrael’ssecurity.

The sameargumentwasoffered byUNmediatorCountBernadottewho, in early August, reported through the U.S. Charge in Egypt(Patterson) “that he was making progress in obtaining acquiescenceexistence Israeli state if not its formal acceptance by Arab states.”21According to Bernadotte, both the prime ministers of Transjordan andLebanon “sought speedy decision. Azzam Pasha also apparentlyconvincednecessity toadmitexistenceJewishstatealthoughnotreadyto make statements now since he believed time should be given forpreparation public opinion.”22 Bernadotte conceded that therewould begreater resistance from Syrian and Iraqi officials. The mediatornonetheless considered his efforts promising in this regard, unlike hisattempttopersuadeIsraeltoactonthequestionofrepatriation.

Bernadottedeclaredthat the“condition[of]300,000to400,000Arabrefugees without food, clothing and shelter was appalling.”23 He

expressed thehope thatprivatewelfareorganizationswouldassist,butthe basic problem was their eventual return to their home. In thisconnection,Bernadotte saidPGIwas “showing signs of swelled head.”WhenBernadotteconfrontedtheIsraeliforeignministerwiththeneedtoallowPalestinianrefugeestoreturnhome,herespondedthat“politicallyPGIcouldnotadmitArabrefugeesastheywouldconstitutefifthcolumn.EconomicallyPGIhadnoroomforArabssincetheirspacewasneededforJewishimmigrants.”24

Bernadotte added that Palestinian homes in Ramle had theirbelongings removed and redistributed to Jewish immigrants. Inconfronting Sharett with some of these problems, the UN mediatorindicatedthatSharettrepliedthathisgovernmentmaintainedtherighttoreplacePalestinianrefugeeswithJewscomingfromArabcountries.25TothisBernadotterepliedthat“itseemedanomalyforJewstobasedemandfor Jewish state on need to find home Jewish refugees and that theyshoulddemandmigrationtoPalestineofJewishDP’swhentheyrefusedtorecognizeproblemsofArabrefugeeswhichtheyhadcreated.”26

The U.S. Charge in Egypt (Patterson), who conveyed the UNmediator’s views to Marshall, described Bernadotte’s proposals to theArabs. In addition to acknowledging the existence of the Jewish state,they included the possibility of resuming war; accepting UNGAResolution 181; or having Arab states partition Arab Palestine amongthemselves.Bernadottewasinfavorofthelastoption,whilerecognizingcontinued Israeli expansion as “it demanded all Galilee by right ofconquest,corridor fromJerusalem toTelAviv,and the returnofNegebasanareapromisedIsraelinpartitionscheme.”27

MARSHALL,RUSK,LOVETT,ANDTHEUNMEDIATOR

Bernadotte’s views impressed Secretary of State Marshall, as well asDean Rusk and Robert Lovett, all of whom were in accord with themediator’s position on Jerusalem, the fate of the refugees, and thegeneral contours of a settlement.Marshall also supportedBernadotte’sgoal of having foreign observers “in strategic positions evacuated byJews and Arabs by mutual agreement, such as Mt Scopus, VictoriaAugusta Hospital, and water pumping station at Latrun.”28 He saw noreasonfortheUnitedStatestoobjecttoparticipatinginsuchaprogram,

althoughtheJointChiefsofStaffdisagreed.WhereMarshallwasatoddswithBernadottewasonthelatter’swish

to bring the Palestine question to the UNGA. Marshall preferred thatIsraelandTransjordan reachanaccord throughdiplomaticmeans,andthenbringthataccordbeforeArabstatesfortheirapproval.Withregardto the refugee problem, Marshall identified private, nongovernmentalorganizations who could assist in thesematters, pointing out that U.S.funds were currently unavailable for Palestinian refugees. The StateDepartmentsubsequentlyadoptedaplantoraisecontributionsfromtheUNGAthroughthemediatorandtheInternationalRefugeeOrganization(IRO), with Washington playing an increasingly important role inattractingnongovernmentalsourcesofassistance.

AmongtheagenciesthatrespondedtotherefugeecrisiswastheWarReliefServicesofNationalCatholicWelfareConference; theNearEastFoundation working in Syria and Lebanon; the International Children’sEmergencyFund;andAmcross,theAmericanRedCross.Thelatterhadcommitted to provide “14,000 dollars to cover 20 tonsDDT specificallyrequested by Bernadotte, and has now authorized additional 200,000dollars medical supplies for immediate shipment Near East.”29 TheFederal Council of Churches, the Christian Rural Overseas Program,American Middle East Relief Incorporated, Lutheran World ReliefIncorporated,andtheU.S.oilgiantsARAMCOandBechtelcontributedtothegeneralefforttoassistrefugeesaswell.

It was in August 1948 that “serious American pressure” on Israelipolicies toward the Palestinian refugees led to what Eliahu Elath(formerlyEpstein),whowasnowIsraeliambassadortotheUnitedStates,described as undermining U.S. public opinion. Elath claimed to bepuzzled by theU.S. response, as “all hostile forces unite in publicizingandsheddingcrocodiletearsregardingplightArabrefugees.”30Itwasnothostile forces alone, however, that pressed for action on this score, asAmbassador McDonald’s efforts to obtain agreement from Ben-Gurionindicated.

Onlyaweekearlier,onAugust14,MarshallsenttheU.S.EmbassyinLondonhisimpressionsofBernadotte’sviewsonIsraelipoliciesonlandandrefugees.HispositionwassimilartowhatheandErnestBevinhaddiscussed earlier. With respect to land, Marshall indicated “BernadottethinksthatJewsshouldbegivenvaluablelandsinwesternGalileewhich

they now hold by virtue of military conquest but in return for thisacquisitionshouldpermitArabs to takeovermostofNegev.”31Marshallagreed with Bernadotte that the refugee question was basic to asettlementof theconflict.He repeatedhisposition inacommuniqué totheU.S.EmbassyinLondon.

With ref to economic, politicalmilitary factors in connectionwith returnArab refugees toIsrael,weappreciatesecurityconsiderationsgoverningPGIattitudebutbelievethatundersupervisionMediatorsubstantialnumberrefugeessodesiringcouldbepermittedgraduallyreturn their homes and resume occupations without prejudicing maintenance internalsecurity Israel. From economic viewpoint, Israel now demonstrating ability absorb largenumbersEuropeanDPsmonthly.ItwouldthereforebeunfortunateforPGI,bycontinuingrefusepermitArab repatriation, to create impression that assimilation Jewish immigrantswastakingplaceatexpenseformerArabinhabitantsIsrael.Frompoliticalstandpoint,PGIactiontopermitgradualreturnArabrefugeeswouldprovideArabswithtangibleassuranceofPGIdesireestablishcooperativerelationswithArabstatesonlongrangebasis.

WeconsideroverallsolutionArabrefugeeproblemintrinsictofinalsettlementPalestineproblem,butbelieveincreasinglycriticalnaturerefugeeproblemmakesitessentialthatatleast partial return of refugees should be permitted for those so desiring prior toachievementfinalsettlement.Moreover,webelievePGIassistanceinalleviatingsituationwouldsubstantiallyimprovechancessecuringearlypeacefulsettlementPalestineproblem.Conversely,PGIfailuretocooperatebypartialrepatriationrefugeesmightcreatedifficultiesfor265,000JewspermanentlyresidingArabstates.32

Marshall recommended that the Security Council ask Bernadotte to

provideanassessmentofthetotalnumberofrefugees,theirlocation,aswell as an assessment of what their returnwould entail. His own viewwas that the major problem was material, assuming that Israel waspreparedtoallowrepatriation.By1948–49,“thebestestimatesarriveatbetween 750,000–800,000 refugees. Or about 85% of the PalestinianpopulationfromwhatbecamethestateofIsrael.”33

Inmid-August,MarshallwrotedirectlytoTrumantoexpresstheStateDepartment’s concern about Israel’s assumption of “amore aggressiveattitudeinPalestine.”34

TheDepartmenthasnotedevidenceofhostilityofIsraelisinPalestinetowardsthemilitaryobservers serving under Count Bernadotte; the inflammatory speeches of the IsraeliForeignMinister, Mr. Shertok, with regard to alleged “rights” of Israel in Jerusalem; themilitaryoccupationbyIsraelofmuchoftheJerusalemarea;andtherefusalof theIsraelimilitarygovernorinJerusalemtocooperatewithCountBernadotteindiscussionsregardingthedemilitarizationofJerusalem.TheDepartmenthaslikewisenotedincreasingevidenceofsystematicviolationsoftheUnitedNationstrucebytheforcesofIsrael,includingforward

movementofIsraeliforcesfromagreedtrucepositions,continuedsnipingandfiringagainstArabpositions;andconclusiveevidenceof theorganized transportofarmsshipments toPalestinefromFrance,ItalyandCzechoslovakia.Furthermore,theIsraeliForeignMinisterhas officially proclaimed that Israel will not accept, pending negotiation of a final peacesettlement, the return of the approximately 300,000 Arab inhabitants of that part ofPalestine now comprising the Jewish State who fled from their homes and are nowdestituteinnearbyArabareas.35

Marshall suggested that Truman discuss U.S. concerns with the

Israeli representative of the PGI, while emphasizing that “the UnitedStates is thebest friendof Israel.”36Marshallwasconcerned that Israelwould “resume hostilities” just as Washington was considering itsrequest, favored by the president, for a loan from the Export-ImportBank.37

On August 20, 1948, Dean Rusk, the director of the Office of UNAffairs,sentLovettanelaboratestatementonthesubjectofrefugeesinwhich he included three recommendations that had been approved byTruman,thethirdofwhichwas:

That,aspartofthisgovernment’sdiplomaticparticipationinsecuringapeacefulsettlementof the Palestine problem, it urges upon the Provisional Government of Israel and othergovernments concerned the need for repatriating Arab and Jewish refugees underconditionswhichwillnotimperiltheinternalsecurityofthereceivingstates.38

RuskinformedTrumanaboutexchangesthathadtakenplaceonthe

questionofPalestinianrefugees,includingBernadotte’sviewthat“averylarge proportion of the 330,000 Arabs who fled from their homes inJewish Palestine to other areas should return to those homes. A verylargepercentageoftheserefugeesconsistofchildren,womenandagedwhoundernostretchoftheimaginationcouldberegardedasasecuritythreatagainstIsrael.”39TheUNmediatordescribedtheirsituationasoneof utter desperation. “They exist in terms of utmost destitution and ifadequatereliefisnotforthcomingortheyarenotreturnedtotheirhomesa large proportion will die before the end of winter.”40 Rusk repeatedBernadotte’s statement that many Palestinian homes seized had beenturnedover to Jewish immigrants.Rusksuggested that Israelmight beusing the refugee problem as leverage in the context of a futuresettlement.

In response to the Israeli claim that political and economic factorsprecluded repatriation outside the framework of a settlement, Ruskinsisted that Truman convince Eliahu Epstein that “if the Provisional

GovernmentcontinuestopreventtherepatriationofArabrefugees,itwillstrengthen thealreadyprevalent impression that theentry ofEuropeandisplaced persons is being accomplished at the expense of the formerinhabitantsofIsraeliterritory.”41RuskadvisedTrumantoremindEpsteinthat repatriation under Bernadotte’s supervision would not constitute arisk. Repeating what had become the American formula, Ruskemphasized that repatriation would serve as evidence of Israel’swillingness to cooperate with the Arabs, and thereby improve thechancesofarrivingatasettlement.TheIsraeligovernmentwasalreadymoving to settle Jewish immigrants on Palestinian land at this time,however.

InAugust1948,theMinisterialCommitteediscussedcreationofsixty-onenewsettlements.Thesettlingauthoritiesrecommendedthatonlythirty-twoofthem,onsome30,000acres,bebuilt for the timebeing.Of those lands,some14,500acresbelonged toArabs,5,000acrestothegovernment,and5,000acrestootherowners,chieflyGermanandinonecasetheWaqf.Onlyabout5,000acresbelongedtoJews.TheministersconsideredthefutureoftheArab inhabitantsandmadesuggestions for transferring them legally.TheministerofAgriculturedescribedthelegalarrangementsas“afiction.”42

InWashington,farfromsuchscenes,MarshallandRuskcontinuedto

support Bernadotte’s position and to urge the president to confront theIsraelisonkeyissuesasMarshallhadpreviouslydone.Workingthroughseparate channels, U.S. Ambassador James McDonald returned toWashington for a visit and checked in with the president, StateDepartment colleagues, andClarkClifford, among others. He informedClifford of Israel’s frustration with U.S. support for the truce and itsskepticismwithregardtotheUNmediator,whomMcDonalddepictedaslacking credibility. On meeting with Truman, McDonald intervened onbehalf of Eliahu Epstein who had complained to him about the UnitedStates having decided to withhold the loan to Israel from the Export-ImportBank. Itwasreinstated inshortorder.The$100million loanhadbeenrequestedbyShertokinearlyJune.

Referring to difficulties and differences between U.S. officials andIsrael on questions of refugees and more, McDonald was clearlyfrustrated with his visit. He had hoped to obtain greater clarity withrespecttoU.S.policy,buthefailedtodoso.Perhaps,hewrote,hehadfound“thekey to thewholeproblem inachancecommentwhichLouisJohnson,thenSecretaryofDefense,hadmadetomeinatalkaboutour

military representation. ‘Israel is important strategically and we mustsupport her. But they ought to try to take some more refugees in.’”43Johnson’sphrasepointedtoadimensionofU.S.policytowardIsraelthatwasseldomopenlydiscussed.TheencounterexposedU.S.prioritiesandthesecondary importanceof thePalestinianrefugeeproblem.However,there was no lessening of its importance in the exchanges of StateDepartmentofficialsfromthesecretaryofstatetohissubordinates.

At theendofAugust,Marshallwas incontactwithMcDonaldaboutthetruce.AsMarshallstated,

the truce is a necessity to any hope for a peaceful settlement and the present evidentaggressive tendencies of the Israeli Government to capitalize to the limit on militaryadvantages, real and anticipated, is bound to have unfortunate results where a moreconservativecoursecanwellleadtoasettlementadvantageoustothatGovernment.44

Marshall contacted McDonald again on September 1, at which timeMcDonald referred to the Israeli advocacy of direct negotiations whilesteering clear of what Marshall regarded as essential steps, includingthoserelatedtothetruce, thedemilitarizationofJerusalem,therefugeeproblem,andtheproblemofborders.

Marshall could not avoid the refugee question, particularly as heattributed responsibility for it to Israeli actions, as in the occupation ofHaifaandtheinvasionofJaffa.

Arabrefugeeproblemisonewhich,asyouquotePGIassaying,diddevelopfromrecentwar in Palestine but which also began before outbreak of Arab-Israeli hostilities. AsignificantportionofArab refugees fled from theirhomesowing to JewishoccupationofHaifa on April 21–22 and to Jewish armed attack against Jaffa April 25. You will recallstatementsmadebyJewishauthoritiesinPalestinepromisingsafeguardsforArabminorityinareasunderJewishcontrol.Arabrefugeeproblemisoneinvolvinglifeordeathofsome300,000people.The leadersof Israelwouldmakeagravemiscalculation if they thoughtcalloustreatmentofthistragicissuecouldpassunnoticedbyworldopinion.Furthermore,hatred ofArabs for Israel engendered by refugee problemwould be a great obstacle tothosepeacenegotiationsyousayPGIimmediatelydesires.

InthelightoftheforegoingIdonotconcurinyourconclusionthat“Jewishemphasisonpeace negotiations now is sounder than present U.S. and UN emphasis on truce anddemilitarizationandrefugees.”45

Marshall reminded McDonald of U.S. efforts to forge a settlement,

adding that Washington had the impression that the ProvisionalGovernmentwasnotonlybentonobtainingwhatUNGAResolution181

had decreed but “such additional territory as is now under militaryoccupation by Israeli forces, including the rich area of western Galileeand a portion of Jerusalem.”46 Marshall acknowledged that the UnitedStateswasawareofthedifficultiesposedby“extremists,”butitwantedtohave “some indication of the true intentions of PGI in respect to theirterritorialclaims.”47Atthesametime,thesecretaryofstateconcededthatthe new state “should have boundaries which will make it morehomogeneousandwell integratedthanthehourglassfrontiersdrawnonthe map of the November 29 Resolution.”48 Marshall was in favor ofIsraeli expansion into the Galilee, which he conceded Israel held inoccupation,butonlyinsofarasitwaspreparedtoreturn“alargeportionoftheNegevtoTransjordan.”49

Thequestionofterritorialexpansionwasdirectlyrelatedtotheissueof boundaries, or “permanent frontiers,” whichMarshall and Bevin haddiscussed. The two disagreed on the contentious issue of bringing thePalestiniancasebeforetheUnitedNations.MarshallquestionedwhethertheUNSecurityCouncilhad thepower todetermineboundariesand toapply sanctions. But the underlying fear among U.S. officials was thatbringingthePalestinecasebacktotheUnitedNationsriskedopeningthePandora’sboxofquestionsconcerningtheverylegitimacyofthepartitionresolution.

As Marshall told McDonald, given U.S. skepticism about thepossibility of bringing Jews and Arabs together for direct negotiations,Washington “would be content with acquiescence of the parties to anequitablesettlement.”50McDonalddulyconveyedMarshall’squestionstothe Israeli government, on whose behalf Sharett responded. Herecounted his trip to Paris and meetings with Syrian and Lebaneseministers aswell as theminister toGreat Britain fromTransjordan.Hedescribed howAbdullah had indirectly let him know “that hewasmostanxious for peace with the Jews.”51 Nothing came of this at the time,whichSharettattributedtoprobableBritishpressureonAbdullah.

Theremayhavebeenotherfactors,asrevealedbyAzmiNashashibi,brigadier in the Arab Legion, who outlined conditions permitting directtalks in what the U.S. consul in Jerusalem described as “TransjordancontrolledRamallah radio.”52Nashashibiwas reported tohavesaid that“ArabsmightconsiderdirecttalkswithJewsunderfollowing‘conditions’:Jews return to areas held before November 29, return of all Arab

refugees,paymentbyJewsfordamages.JewsnotattempttodictatetoArabs.”53

TheU.S.consulgeneralremarkedthatalthoughtheaboveconditionswere“inacceptable,[the]speech[was]significantasfurtherindication[of]possibleArabwillingness [to]negotiatedirectlywithJews.”54The Israeligovernment found the conditions unacceptable, whether in relation torefugees,boundaries,orcompensation.

Itwas also clear to theAmericans, theBritish, and the Israelis thatKingAbdullahwas in a position so vulnerable in relation to otherArabregimesastounderminetheimpactofwhateverhemightdoinrelationto Israel. The U.S. ambassador to London sent Marshall a report ofBritain’s position, in which he explained that the perception of “‘Rabbi’Abdullah”hadtobeseenasindependentofforeignsupport,aswellasinsolidaritywithArableadersifTransjordanwastobeusefulinreachingasettlement.55

Insofar as the Palestinian refugees were concerned, David Ben-Gurion,theIsraeliprimeminister,madeitclearthat“hesawnopossibilitymass return refugees until peace settlement effected and thatcomprehensive solution must wait on peace.”56 Sharett, in turn,distinguishedbetweenaninterimasopposedtoapermanentsettlementoftherefugeeproblem,thelattertobeinArabareas,inwhichIsraelwaswillingtoassist.Inaddition,SharettindicatedthattheIsraeligovernmentwouldconsider“individualfamilyhardshipcases,”althoughhewasvagueon thesubject,asMcDonaldpointedout.57Ben-Gurionalsochallengedwhat he viewed as unwarrantedU.S. contestations of Israeli controlledterritory.

MarshallhadevidenceofdifferentArabresponses,includingfromtheEgyptianrepresentativetotheUNFawziBey,whohadearliersuggestedthattheprincipleofself-determination,ifappliedtotheJewishandArabpopulations of Palestine, might be promising. Neither Israeli nor U.S.officialssharedFawziBey’soptimismaboutalternativepossibilities;noneventured to speculate on what self-determination for Arabs and Jewsmightlooklike.

In 1982 Seth Tillman, a member of the Senate Foreign RelationsCommittee’s professional staff and its Subcommittee on Near EasternandSouthAsianAffairs,brieflydiscussedtheapplicabilityoftheprincipleof self-determination to Palestine.He concluded that theUnitedStates

wasnecessarilyambivalenttowarditsapplication,“therebeingnowaytoreconcile Zionism with the self-determination of an establishedpopulation.”58 Yet, as Tillman pointed out, successive administrationsreiterated support for it, in principle. Tillman’s account also included agrimportraitofaPalestinianrefugeecamphevisitedinBeirutin1970.59

BERNADOTTE’S“SEVENBASICPREMISES”

The “ProgressReportof theUnitedNationsMediator inPalestine”waspresentedtotheUNonSeptember16,1948,intheformof“SevenBasicPremises.” The following day, McDonald, U.S. consul general inJerusalem,sentareporttotheU.S.secretaryofstateannouncing“CountFolke Bernadotte, United Nations Mediator on Palestine, brutallyassassinatedbyJewishassailantsofunknown identity, inplanned,coldbloodedattackinthenewcityofJerusalemat1404GMTtoday,Friday,17 September.”60 On September 18, the consul general informed thedepartment that the “general assumption of UN observer group, thisofficeandJewishmilitaryauthorities,[is]thatassassinswereofterroristgroup,LHY,commonlyknownasSternGang.”61

Inadditiontothepredictableshock,theresponseinWashingtonandLondontoBernadotte’sassassinationwastoreaffirmthevalueoftheUNmediator’sefforts,asexemplifiedbyhisreportonthePalestineproblem.Secretary of State Marshall declared it a “generally fair basis forsettlement of the Palestine question,” urging the parties concerned toacceptit.62Marshallpointedoutthatnoplanwouldsatisfyallparties,and,indeed,noneofthepartiesfounditsatisfactory.Abdullah,whohadbeenfavorably inclined, decided against it in response to the negative Arabconsensus.

In Washington, however, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reproduced themediator’s “basic premises,” with the secretary of state’s supportivestatement.ButasMcClintockindicated,tremendouspressurewasbeingappliedbytheAmericanZionistEmergencyCouncilagainstBernadotte’sproposals.Theresult,McClintockwarnedRusk,whowas then inParis,wasthattheUnitedStateswouldprobablyhaveto

adjustoursightsatleasttothepointofagreeingthattheterritorialrecommendationsoftheMediatorbemodifiedinfavorofIsraeltotheextentofgivingtheJewishStateasalientintotheNegevwhichwouldincludemost,ifnotalloftheJewishsettlementsinthatarea.Suchasalientwouldnotextend further than theGaza-BeershebaRoadandwould in factput

U.S.inpreciseaccordwiththeproposedterritorialsettlementwhichwasapprovedbythePresidentonSeptember1.63

ThispositionhadpreviouslybeenrejectedbyBernadotteandtheBritish,with the UN mediator insisting that “the responsibility was to proposeterms founded on strict justice.”64 McClintock indicated that he wasprivately in accord, but he rationalized supporting Israel’s desire tocontroltheNegev,whichwouldgiveIsrael“atokenholdinginthatarea,”asapoliticallysounddecision.65

What of the UNmediator’s report and its “Seven Basic Premises”?Criticized by Israel for an inadequate recognition of Israeli sovereignty,BernadottehadreaffirmedrecognitionofIsrael.Inaddition,hehadstatedhis support for “the principle of geographical homogeneity andintegration, which would be the major objective of the boundaryarrangements”tobeimplemented.66These,theUNmediatorhadadded,“should apply equally to Arab and Jewish territories, whose frontiersshouldnot,therefore,berigidlycontrolledbytheterritorialarrangementsenvisagedintheresolutionof29November.”67

Bernadotte had indicated that in the absence of Arab and Jewishapproval,theUNwouldproceedwitha“technicalboundariescommissionappointed by and responsible to the United Nations.”68 The resultingboundaries,asBernadottehad indicated,weredesigned tomake them“more equitable, workable and consistent with existent realities inPalestine.”69

(i)TheareaknownastheNegeb,southofalinerunningfromtheseanearMajdaleast-southeasttoFaluja(bothofwhichplaceswouldbeinArabterritory),shouldbedefinedasArab territory; (ii) This frontier should run from Falujah north northeast to Ramleh andLydda(bothofwhichplaceswouldbeinArabterritory),thefrontieratLyddathenfollowingthelineestablishedintheGeneralAssemblyresolutionof29November;(iii)GalileeshouldbedefinedasJewishterritory.70

TheUNmediator also supported Abdullah’s takeover of Palestinian

Arab territoryoutsideof Israelicontrol,whileclaiming the importanceofconsultationwithPalestinians.Bernadotte’sjustificationforsuchapolicywas that thereexisteda “historical connexionandcommon interestsofTransjordan and Palestine,” which made it preferable to otherarrangementswithArabstates.71

Bernadotte affirmed that his position involved no denial of the

existenceofPalestinianArabsasaseparatepeople.Onthecontrary,heaffirmed that the “Arab inhabitants of Palestine are not citizens orsubjects of Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and Transjordan, the Stateswhich are at present providing them with a refuge and the basicnecessities of life.”72 But he also recognized the transformation ofPalestine that had occurred since his June 27 report. There was nolonger talkof twostates; instead, therewasanurgency focusedon thehumanitarian crisis of Palestinian refugees. He repeatedly emphasizedthat“thechoiceisbetweensavingthelivesofmanythousandsofpeoplenow or permitting them to die,” a choice in which the UN and itsspecializedagencies,Arabstates,theProvisionalGovernmentofIsrael,andvoluntaryagencieswouldhavetoplayadecisiverole.73

AmongU.S. journalists covering the refugee problem,DanaAdamsSchmidt, writing at this time from Damascus, offered an account thatcorresponded to Bernadotte’s description of the impoverished state ofPalestinian refugees: “most of them [are] huddled under trees in tents,shanty townsandslumsofArab lands,surrounding Israeli-heldpartsofPalestine.”74

AnticipatingwhatwouldbecomeofUNGAResolution194,passedbytheUNGeneralAssemblyonDecember11,1948,Bernadotte’s“SevenPremises”includedthe“Rightofrepatriation,”whichaffirmed“therightofinnocent people, uprooted from their homes by the present terror andravages of war, to return to their homes,” a position that he urged beimplementedwithguaranteesofcompensationforthosechoosingnottoreturn.75

Among Bernadotte’s “premises,” Jerusalem was to be “accordedspecialandseparatetreatment.”76

TheUNmediatormaynothavehada fullaccountof thenumberofPalestinian villages destroyed and urban centers fallen and largelyemptied of their Palestinian inhabitants by 1948. Palestinian historianWalidKhalidi stated that “418Palestinianvillages [were]destroyedanddepopulated in the1948war.”77 Inaddition, there “was the fall ofmorethan a dozen of the major urban centers of the Palestinian people—townsexclusivelypopulatedby them(Acre,Beersheva,Baysan,Lydda,Majdal, Nazareth, al-Ramla), others where they were either the vastmajority (Safad)orhadsubstantialpluralities (Tiberias,Haifa,andWestJerusalem),andtheirancientseaportJaffa.”78Khalidiaddsthatwiththe

exceptionofNazareth, “theseurbancenterswerealsoemptiedof theirPalestinian residents.”79 The 418 villages destroyed “constituted almosthalf of the total number of Palestinian villages that existed within thebordersofMandatoryPalestineontheeveoftheUNGeneralAssemblypartitionresolutioninNovember1947.”80

Of the Palestinian villages that remained within Israel, “over 80percent of the lands of these Palestinian/Israeli citizens who never lefttheirhomeshavebeenconfiscatedsince1948andputat theexclusivedisposalof theJewishcitizensof thestate.”81Recentefforts to reframethe “Roots of Palestine and Israel,” which attest to the historydocumented by Palestinian historians, may be found in the projectTowardsaCommonArchive,organizedby the Israeli nongovernmentalorganizationZochrot.82

11TheStateDepartmentontheRecord

REFUGEES,BOUNDARIES,ANDJERUSALEM

In the fall of 1948, following Count Folke Bernadotte’s assassination,George Marshall, Robert Lovett, and the State Department came outstronglyinsupportoftheformerUNmediator’sproposals,payingspecialattentiontothekeyissueshehadaddressed:boundaries,refugees,andJerusalem. Differences aside, U.S. Ambassador to Israel JamesMcDonald joined his voice to those decrying the condition of thePalestinianrefugees.U.S.consulinJerusalemWilliamBurdett,whohadpreviously reported sympathetically on the situation of Jewish settlersfacingPalestinianattacks,wasnowsendingevidenceofIsraeliterritorialexpansionandthecontinuedattacksandexpulsionsofPalestinians.

The fall of 1948 was a period of intense activity on the political,diplomatic,andmilitarylevels.InWashingtonattheendofOctober,theU.S. president made it clear that he wantedminimal action during theelectionperiodandshortlyafterthatwasonrecordasbeingpreparedtoapproveatruceinPalestine.Truman’spositionreflectedhisdeferencetodomesticpoliticalpressures,towhichthesecretaryandundersecretaryofstateandothersengagedinIsraeli–Palestinianissueswereobligedtoabide. Once election fever passed, U.S. policy continued to beconstrainedbyfactorsthatwerenotimmediatelyapparent.

AttheUnitedNations,themoodwasverydifferent.TheUNmediator“had visited refugee camps in Palestine and had seen for himself theappalling conditions there” before he presented his progress report onthePalestiniansituationtotheGeneralAssemblyinSeptember.1TheUNsubsequentlyadoptedBernadotte’srecommendationswithrespecttothe

rightofrefugeestorepatriationandcompensation,asUNGAResolution194confirmed.

OnOctober15,SecretaryofStateMarshallwrotetoActingSecretaryRobert Lovett, asking for his and the department’s comments on aresolution that he, Harold Beeley, and Ralph Bunche had worked ontogether.2 Marshall explained that he was planning to present it to theU.S.delegationattheUN.ThecompositedraftwasarestatementoftheUNSecurityCouncilresolutionofJuly15,1948(Document/S902),whichcalledforanendtomilitaryactionandthemaintenanceofthetruce,withthe objective of promoting a resolution of the conflict. It was the sameresolution that called for the creation of the Palestine ConciliationCommission. The importance of Marshall’s statement rested in itsidentificationofU.S.policywiththeUNresolution.

Amongthe initiativesofferedunder theGeneralAssembly resolutionfollowingIsrael’sindependenceonMay14,1948,wasResolution186(S-2),accordingtowhichtheUNmediatorwasgiventhepowerto“exercisecertain functions including the use of his good offices to promote apeacefuladjustmentofthefuturesituationofPalestine.”3

On October 16, 1948, Secretary of State Marshall informed LovettfromParisthattheGeneralAssemblyacknowledgedhavingreceivedthelateCountBernadotte’s progress report (DocumentA/648). In addition,the Assembly acknowledged the UNSC Resolution of July 15, 1948(DocumentS/902),whichordered thegovernmentsconcerned toceasemilitaryactionand toabideby the truce.Marshall’sstatement indicatedthat the United States had accepted the UNSC resolution of July 15,1948,whose contentswere then reviewed. It included reference to theestablishment of a “conciliation commission” that was “to makearrangementsforthetransitionfromtheexistingtrucetoaformalpeaceor armistice in Palestine,” and until that time to support the existingtruce.4

The conciliation commissionwas to “appoint a technical boundariescommissiontoassistindelimitingthefrontiersinPalestinebasedonthespecificconclusionsoftheUNMediator,”towhichtheauthorsofthedraftresolution added the phrase “subject to such adjustments as maypromoteagreementbetweentheArabsandtheJews(withoutalteringthegeneral equilibrium of the Mediator’s conclusions), and taking intoaccount thenatureof the terrainand theunityof villageareas.”5Some

viewed it as among the most important attempts to achieve a peacesettlement.6

Withoutmentioning Transjordan or King Abdullah by name, theUNresolution described the future of Arab Palestine, recommendingconsultationwithArabs, includingPalestinians, aswell asplans for theprotection of Holy Places, with Jerusalem “placed under effective UNcontrolwithmaximum feasible local autonomy for theArabandJewishcommunities,” andwithproposals formorepermanentarrangements tobebroughttotheforthcomingsessionoftheGeneralAssembly.7

Amongitsmostcontestedrecommendationswasitem12concerningrepatriation:

Recognizes the right of the Arab refugees to return to their homes in Jewish controlledterritory at the earliest possible date; and the right of adequate compensation for thepropertyofthosechoosingnottoreturnandforpropertywhichhasbeenlostasaresultofpillageorconfiscationorofdestructionnotresulting frommilitarynecessity;and instructsthe conciliation commission to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement, andeconomic andsocialrehabilitationoftheArabrefugeesandthepaymentofcompensation.8

ThedayafterMarshallwrotetoLovett,JamesMcDonaldwasmoved

towritedirectlytoTrumanexpressinghisfearlesttheexistingsituationofPalestinianrefugeesfailtobeproperlyaddressed.McDonaldwarnedofa“tragedy reaching catastrophic proportions.”9 He condemned existingreliefeffortsandresourcesaswastefuland inadequate,adding thatUNofficers involvedwerenot toblame;“it is thesystemwhich isat fault.”10Heremindedthepresidentthathespokeonthebasisoffifteenyearsofexperienceinworkwithrefugees,warningthatof400,000refugees,onefourthoftheelderlyandthechildrenwoulddieintheapproachingwinteras they were without food or shelter. “Situation requires somecomprehensive program and immediate action that dramatic andoverwhelmingcalamitiessuchasvastfloodorearthquakewouldinvoke.Nothinglesswillaverthorrifyinglosses.”11

McDonald recommended that the InternationalRedCross takeoverresponsibility for the refugees, and he urged that Stanton Griffis, thenU.S. ambassador to Egypt, be appointed its director. Griffis was dulynameddirectorandturnedtotheLeagueofRedCrossSocietiesaswellastheAmericanFriendsServiceCommitteeforassistance.

Throughout this period, Washington remained sensitive to thechangingbalanceofpowerintheregion.Israel’smilitarysuperioritywas

enhancedby thecovertentryofCzecharms,and theparallelembargoon Arab arms that left even the vaunted Arab Legion in “a position ofrelative impotence,” as British and U.S. officials recognized.12 Withtensions constantly rising and Britain fearful lest its position inTransjordanandEgyptbefatallyunderminedbythefailuretoarriveatasettlement in Palestine, U.S. officials attempted to persuade Israel toaccept territorial compromise. The process failed, leaving StateDepartmentofficialsaswellasconsulsandministersacross theMiddleEastandattheUnitedNationsincreasinglybitterattheroutinemannerinwhichtheirrecommendationswereignored.

By mid-to late December, there was ample evidence of Israeliviolations of theUN truce and an escalation of thePalestinian refugeeproblemthatlefttheprospectofasettlementnullandvoid.FromLondon,U.S. Ambassador Lewis Douglas sent an extensive report of Britishviews, including those concerning the Palestinian situation, as well astheirimpactonAnglo-ArabandSovietrelations.

IntheeyesofLt.GeneralTempler,vicechiefoftheImperialGeneralStaff,theSoviets“managedtotransferPalestineintothespearheadofitsattempt to disrupt ME and make it untenable for U.S.-UK defensepurposes.”13 In Templer’s view, they did not have far to go given theexistingdisruptioncausedbythefailuretoresolvethePalestiniancrisis.AsidefromestablishingalargeSovietmissioninTelAviv, inadditiontooneinLebanon,Templerbelievedthat“Communistheadquarters”wouldeventuallybeinIsrael,andArab–Jewishcooperationwouldbefurtheredthrough communists. Further, Templer was persuaded that the SovietUnionwaseffectivelypromotingrevolutionaryfervoramongdisillusionedArabs, convinced that “even if present ArabGovernments survive theirdisillusion with West (ie. U.S. and UK), vapid UN handling Palestineproblemmaycause them to look formorepurposefulworldpoweranddecidethisisU.S.S.R.”14

Templer also took note of Israeli relationswith the Eastern bloc. Inaddition to arms from Czechoslovakia, “Palestine turmoil has stoppedHaifaoildockandrefinerytocostERPandtopossiblebenefitRumaniawith which PGI is discussing oil supplies.”15 To make matters worse,Templerpointedoutthatthe“JewishthrustintoNegevhasforfirsttimeinhistorysplitArabworld;thereisnownopracticablelandcommunicationbetween Egypt and other Arab states—a feat never achieved even by

Crusaders.”16

WARNINGSFROMLONDON

When sending his report to Washington, U.S. Ambassador Douglasconcludedwithamessagehehadpreviouslysent,recommendingthatitbe shown to Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg of Michigan, chair of theSenate Foreign Relations Committee. The message was brief andpointed: theUnitedStateswas ignoring the danger represented by thePalestinesituation.

Palestine situation is probably as dangerous to our national interests as is Berlin. Thedangerofthelatterhasbeenplayedupintheheadlines.Thedanger(notthesituation)ofthe former has been ignored in the headlines. I have sometimes thought that thisconcealmentof thedanger inPalestinehaspermitted theSoviet toplayhergame in theMiddleEastwithoutattractingattention.17

The very next day Lovett underscored Douglas’s concern in a

messagetoMarshall inwhichhepointedtothe“increasinglybelligerentattitude[of]Israelis”and,onthehomefront,thedangersstemmingfromthe fact that both major U.S. political parties avowed their support forIsraeli claims.18 Lovett made it clear that from Douglas’s perspective“matters of greatest urgency requiring full agreement appear from thisdistance to be action to be taken in event continue truce violations,positionon frontiers—especiallyNegeb,statusJerusalem,Arabrefugeeproblem,provisionofUNsupervisory forceandmakeupanyUNpoliceforce.”19Hedidnothesitatetoaddthatheregardedthepracticewherebyagreed-uponpositionswere“suddenlyalteredorrevoked”asintolerable—areferenceto theWhiteHouseand itsadvisers—andhewascandidabout the environment in Washington, as he declared, “it has beenabsolutehellhere.”20

OnthesamedaythatLovettwrotetoMarshall,EliahuEpstein(Elath)sentMosheSharett,Israel’sforeignminister,theninParis,alistofissuesonwhich “influential friends” inWashingtonwereatwork.The resultingsituationmayhavecontributed to thehell thatLovett described,buthewasamongthosewhosuccumbedtosomeofthepressurethatEpsteinoutlined.

AccordingtoEpstein’sletter:

Renewed efforts influential friends obtain Truman’s support for: (1) no changes Israelifrontierswithoutourconsent;(2)dejurerecognition;(3)immediategrantingloan;(4)activesupportouradmissionUNagainproduced immediate results.StrongpressureexercisedonDeweyforstatementwhichinspiteofcounter-pressurebyStateDepartmentmayforceTrumanactbeforehelauncheshiscampaignNewYorkStatethisweek.21

Defense Secretary Forrestal was increasingly concerned with thedomesticusesofthePalestinequestion,aswashisfriendandcolleagueRobert Lovett. It was Lovett who gave Marshall an indication of howdomestic politics, specifically the upcoming national elections, affectedPalestine policy, sending him Truman’s “personal and top secret”message.

(1)PresidentagaindirectseveryeffortbemadetoavoidtakingpositiononPalestinepriortoWednesday[Nov3].IfbyanychanceitappearscertainvotewouldhavetobetakenonMonday or Tuesday he directs U.S. Del to abstain. (2) On Wednesday or thereafterproceedonunderstandingofAmericanpositionpreviously takenasregardstruce inMayandJulyresolutions.22

Intheinterim,theBritishexpressedhopethattheUnitedStateswould

not endorse Israel’s request for admission to the United Nations if itviolated the truce as well as the hope that the arms embargo bemaintained. Israeli truce violations were on the record and continuedthrough the end of the month, when Israeli forces entered southernLebanon.

Israeli sources reveal that several days after a UN cease-fire wasdeclared (October 23), “truce violations triggered a succession of IDF‘nibbles’ at Egyptian-occupied areas, with the IDF occupying additionalvillages, includingBeitJibrin,alQubeibaandDawayuma,intheHebronfoothills, and Isdud and Hamama along the coast.”23 The village ofDawayumahadofferedlittleresistance,accordingtoIsraelisources,butbecamethesiteofamassacre.

THEU.S.CONSULINJERUSALEM

William Burdett, the U.S. consul in Jerusalem, was reported to haveheard of the attempt by UN officials to enter Dawayma. After makinginquiries, on 6November, he reported toWashington, “investigation by

UNindicatesmassacreoccurredbutobserversareunable todeterminenumber of persons involved.”24 Israelis were aware of what hadtranspired.AharonCizling, agricultureminister, is reported to have toldtheCabinet, “‘I feel that thingsaregoingonwhicharehurtingmysoul,thesoulofmyfamilyandallofushere.’ProbablyreferringtoDawayma,headded, ‘Jews toohavebehaved likeNazisandmyentirebeinghasbeenshaken.’”25

Benny Morris reported that “the American consul-general inJerusalemreported that ‘500to1,000Arabs’hadreportedlybeen ‘linedupandkilledbymachinegunfire’after thecaptureof thevillage.”26Thesurvivors of Dawayma, along with thousands of other Arabs from theNegev, fled to Egyptian controlled Gaza where an estimated 213,000refugeeswereheld.27

AccordingtoastudybytheAmericanFriendsServiceCommittee,thenumber of Palestinian refugees entering the area of the Gaza Stripcontinued to increase from “83,000 (September 1948) and 250,000(December1948).ByDecember1949,athoroughcensusbyvillageandtown of origin had been taken and the number of refugees wasestablished at 202,606.”28 In September 1948, the All-PalestineGovernmentwassetupinGaza,butitdidnotsurvivebeyondDecember.ItwastakenoverbyAbdullahandthenrelinquishedtoEgyptagainwhenitsignedthearmisticewithIsrael.29SubsequentIsraeliplanstotakeovertheGazaStrip,albeitwithoutanyexchangeof territory intheNegevforEgypt,wererejectedbyIsraelandEgypt.Asaresult,theUNReliefandWorks Agency (UNRWA) became responsible for establishing someeightrefugeecampsinGaza.

By the end of October 1948, “the entire Galilee fell into Israelihands.”30 Israeli sources revealed that the so-called Operation Hiram“saw the biggest concentration of atrocities of the 1948 war. Someservedtoprecipitateandenhanceflight,some,as inEliabun,werepartandparcelofanexpulsionoperation;butinotherplaces,thepopulationremained in situ and expulsion did not follow atrocities.”31 Altogether,IsraeliattacksinOperationHiramandYoavresultedintheexpulsionandflight of some 200,000 to 230,000 Arabs, including Palestinians andLebanese.32

In Washington, the under secretary of state received requests forassistance.DidheknowofthepresenceoftheU.S.AirForceCaptainE.

J. Zeuty in central Galilee in this period?33 There were other UNobserversintheareaaswell,buttheirpresencedoesnotappeartohavehadarestrainingeffect.

WASHINGTON,BEIRUT,ANDTELAVIV

OnOctober30,1948,EliahuElathwrotetoMosheSharettaboutIsrael’sefforts topressureWashingtonon itsbehalf. InearlyNovember,Lovettconfronted Israeli officials Michael Comay, Israeli representative at theUnitedNations,andEliahuEpstein(Elath),thenheadoftheUNmission,aboutIsrael’scontrolofterritory.

IsaidthatiftheIsraelisintendedtoclaimWesternGalileeandJaffaaswellastheNegev,theirclaimstotheNovember29territorycouldnotthenbejustifiedonthegroundsofrightandjustice.IsaidthatitseemedtomethatifIsraeldesiredtoretaintheNegevshewouldhavetogiveupWesternGalilee.34

LovettmadeitcleartoComayandEpsteinthatsanctionswereanoptionas “theUnitedNations could not continue to be disregarded.”35Comaywasnotmovedbytheactingsecretary’sobservationthat“itwouldmakea most unfortunate impression if Israel in the triumph of its militaryvictories,shouldadoptanuncompromisingattitude.”36Herespondedthathis government considered “the territory allotted to Israel by theNovember29 resolutionasbelonging to Israelby right,andconsideredthattheterritorymilitarilyoccupiedoutsideofthisareacouldbeamatterfor discussion.”37 Lovett’s reply was unusually blunt this time, elicitingwhatappearedtobeaconciliatoryresponsefromEpstein.

Isaidthatonecoulddiscussallonewantedto,butthefactwasthattheretentionbyIsraelof Western Galilee as well as the territory allotted to Israel under the November 29resolutioncouldnotbejustifiedonthegroundsofrightandjustice.MrEpsteinsaidthatthepositionIhaddescribedwasentirelycorrect,andthattheProvisionalGovernmentofIsraelwishedtoabidebydecisionsoftheUnitedNations.38

But theheadof the Israelimission to theUNwenton toclaim that theUnited Nations was to blame for encouraging Arabs to reject directnegotiationswith Israel.Epstein’s responsewaspartofamoregeneralIsraelirebuttalofchargesemanatingfromtheUnitedStatesandtheUN.This attempt to contain what Israeli officials viewed as unacceptable

pressureswouldproveeffective.Comay prepared a list of government officials, labor leaders, and

media executives that he and Epstein saw inWashington during theirvisitbetweenNovember6andNovember13.

TogetherwithEliahuEpstein, Ihad talkswithvarious individuals inWashington,suchasLovett,OscarEwing,FederalSecurityAdministrator;CharlesBrennan, theSecretary forAgriculture;DavidNiles,SumnerWelles;andElliston,EditoroftheWashingtonPost.WhileinNewYork,Italkedtoanumberofourfriends,suchasFredaKerchwey;ThackreyoftheNew York Post; Herbert Bagard Swope; George Backer; Turner-Catledge, ManagingDirectoroftheNewYorkTimes;DavidDubinsky,thelabourleader,andPotofsky,anotherJewishlabourleaderinthetopcirclesoftheCIO.Inaddition,IhadPressConferencesinNewYorkandWashington,whichweregivenafairamountofcoverage.39

OnNovember9,Lovett receivedasecretmemofromWellsStabler,

who had temporarily replaced the late ThomasWasson, informing himthatAbdullahhadsenttheEgyptiankingamessageindicatingthatmanyPalestinianArabshadapproachedhimaboutendingthewarandarrivingatasettlement.

NumbersofdelegationsofPalestineArabs,residentsof townsaswellasrefugees,haveapproachedKinginpastweeksrequesting,andsomeevendemanding,thatheundertakenegotiations.Whileprobablyidlethreats,severaldelegationshavesaidthat ifKingwouldnotnegotiatewithJews,theywould.40

U.S.officialsalsorealized thatnootherArab leaderhadvolunteered tosupportAbdullahlesttheybeconsideredtraitorsfordoingso.

On November 10, Truman discussed U.S. policy with respect toterritory with Lovett and the U.S. ambassador to London. TrumanappearedtoacceptIsraelipressuretoceaseanddesistmakingdemandsonTelAviv.WasittheelectionandthefearofDewey’sstandthatmovedTrumantodefer to Israel?Whatever thecase, thepresident’sresponsebecamethemodelforothersinthepolicymakinghierarchytofollow.

In explaining the president’s stand, Lovett stated that “in plainlanguage, the President’s position is that if Israel wishes to retain thatpartofNegevgranteditunderNov29resolution,itwillhavetotaketherest of Nov 29 settlement whichmeans giving up westernGalilee andJaffa.”41ButTrumanaddedtherefrainthatmodificationsintheNovember29,1947,resolution“shouldbemadeonlyiffullyacceptabletotheStateof Israel.”42 The president’s qualificationwas straightforward; less clear

werethelong-rangeconsequencesofTruman’sdeferral.TrumanreturnedtotheformulaaccordingtowhichIsrael“mightwell

consider relinquishingpartofNegev toArabStatesasquidproquo forretaining Jaffa and western Galilee.”43 Not only did Truman repeat theproposition that a more homogeneous arrangement was preferable tothat in the November 1947 resolution, but he suggested that Israel’sretention of the Galilee in exchange for the Negev would beadvantageousgivenhowrichtheformerterritorywasincomparisonwiththelatter.44

OnNovember 11, the day following Truman’s statement of deferralwithrespecttoIsrael’sdemand,LovettturnedtotheIsraelioccupationofvillagesinsouthernLebanon.InresponsetothecomplaintbroughtbytheLebanese government, Lovett expressed concern but took no action“overreportedoccupationby Israeli forcesarea insouthernLebanon.”45Lovett’sexplanationwasthattheStateDepartmentfeltitinappropriatetointervene because this issue involved “incursion into its [Lebanese]territory by external forces.”46 Lovett suggested to the U.S. legation inBeirut that “if reports are indeed true that Israeli forces are now onLebaneseterritory,”thequestioncouldbetakentotheSecurityCouncil.He then indicated to the Lebanese president that there was a draftresolution under consideration in the Security Council that might beapplicable. Lebanese President Khoury understood and actedaccordingly,downgradinghisrequestforassistancetounofficialbecause“hedidnotwishtobeplacedinapositionofenteringformalnegotiationsconcerning any phase of the Palestine problem.”47 This exchangereflectedthelimitedleverageexercisedbytheLebaneserepublic.

Onemonth later Lovett raised the question of Lebanon with EliahuEpstein,whohadcometoWashingtontoconsulton Israel’sapplicationforUNmembership.

IpointedoutinthisconnectionthatwehadrecentlyagainbeenapproachedwithregardtotheIsraelitroopsonLebaneseterritoryandaskedMr.Epsteinifhecouldtellmeanythingabout it. I said that if Israel troopswere in theLebanon itwouldundoubtedlyserveasabasis for furtherArab charges in theSecurityCouncilwhichmight, as in the case of ElFaluja, have a continuing adverse effect on Israel’s application for membership. Mr.Epstein said he had no recent information and was not informed on the subject butunderstood Israeli troops were on Lebanese territory because Syrian troops were inoccupationof Israeli territory.Mr.Epsteinsaidhe realized thiswasnotananswer tomyquestionbutthatitwasthebesthecouldgivemeatthistime.48

Lovett persisted in his cautious mode, but in London, where PrimeMinister Clement Atlee had the same information regarding IsraelioccupationofsouthernLebanon,theresponsedifferedintone.

Atleeconsidered Israel’soccupationanexampleof Israel’s violationoftheexistingtruce,whichhesharplycriticized,alongwithanumberofother worrisome developments. In mid-December, Lebanese PresidentKhourymetwithLowellPinkerton,theU.S.ministerinLebanon,toreviewthematter.AsPinkertonreportedtoLovett,“he[Khoury]isworried.Whilehe favors and will support Arab cooperation with newly createdconciliation commission, he said other members Arab League willconsider his support as strange so long as Jews continue [to] occupyLebanon.”49 But the Lebanese president also understood that “anyLebaneseattempt[to]forciblyremoveJewswouldresultinreopeningofhostilitiesgenerallywhichLebanondoesnotdesireandisnotinpositionto pursue.”50 What Khoury was asking, as Pinkerton explained, wasevidenceofU.S.supportforLebanon.

FromLondon,U.S.AmbassadorDouglashastenedtoinformLovettofthepoliticalurgencyofWashingtonandLondonstandingtogetherontheBernadotteplan.Anythinglesswouldendangerthenecessarytwothirdsvote in the General Assembly. Ambassador Douglas reminded LovettandTruman thatBritainhaddramatically altered its policy inPalestine.ButtheBritishalsoremindedWashingtonthattheyhadcommitmentstoAmmanandCairo. If thesestateswereunder threat,Britainwould finditself in a veryawkward situation in relation to theUnitedStates, but itwas no less important that its entireMiddle East position risked beingundermined.

THEUNITEDSTATESANDTHEREFUGEEQUESTION

OnNovember15,1948,MarshallproposedacomprehensivestatementofU.S.policy thatwas theproductofa jointeffortwith thepresident. Itaddressed the issues regarded by the highest officials of the U.S.policymaking elite as critical to the resolution of the conflict. TheresponseamongU.S.officialsattheUNandinWashingtonwasoneofprofoundpessimism,ifnotovertcriticism,atastatementthatappearedtomake a mockery of their efforts, including UN resolutions that

Washingtonhadendorsed.Marshall’sstatementopenedwiththepronouncementthattheU.S. considers that Israel should nowbe dealtwith as a full-fledgedmember of thecommunity of nations. It follows that Israel should be entitled to the normal attributes ofindependentstates; itshouldnow, forexample,have fullcontrolover immigration into itsterritory; its economic arrangements with neighboring areas should be on the basis oftreatyorotheragreement.51

ThePalestinianstaterecommendedinthepartitionresolutionwasno

longerconsideredviable,hencetheplansto incorporateArabPalestineinto Transjordan. Marshall envisaged this process as involving theconsensusofPalestinians. Inpractice,Palestinianswerenotconsulted.As to boundaries, the secretary of state’s statement was deliberatelyvague save that they were to conform to the November 29 partitionresolution to the extent possible, and if not, that they be subject toconsultationbythePalestinianConciliationCommission(PCC).

On the day Marshall issued his policy statement, Dean Rusk sentLovettasecretmemoalertinghimtothefactthatthestatementhadbeenagreed to by the entireU.S. delegation, saveWarrenAustin,whowasstillhospitalized.52RuskaddedtherevealingmessagethatthepurposeofissuingthestatementwastocontaintheoppositionoftheU.S.delegationat the UN. Within a matter of hours, however, Robert McClintockinformedtheactingsecretarythatthestatementhadbeen“unanimouslyadoptedbyourDelegationinPariswithmuchmisgiving.”53Hedescribedthe“workingpaper”as“thelowestcommondenominatorwhichwouldwinagreement among the strong personalities composing our Delegation,”pointingoutthatitwouldnotbeausefulguideattheUN.54

McClintockwaspersuadedthatMarshall’sproposalsechoedthoseofthe Israeli government.McClintockargued that “ourDelegationwill finditself as amatter of practice recommending to the Assembly preciselywhatMr.ShertokaskedforintheconclusiontohisspeechofNovember15.IrecallthatthePresidentsaidtoyouthat‘IftheJewsholdmetomycontract, theywill have tokeep theirs.’”55Moreover,McClintockpointedout that in endorsingMarshall’s statement, theUnitedStateswould beignoringpreviousstatementsofU.S.policywithwhichthisstatementwasnotinaccord.Attheleast,McClintockargued,aneffortshouldbemadetoincorporateanintroductorystatement“referringtotheNovember29thresolution and the Bernadotte Plan, with the operative part of the

resolution recommending a territorial settlement to be worked out,invokingthegoodofficesoftheConciliationCommission.”56

Britain’sresponsetothestatementwasnegativeandwouldremainsoin the coming days despite efforts to reformulate theU.S. position.OnNovember 22, Lovett sent a communication to the U.S. delegation inParis inwhichhepointedout that inhisview theBritishwere rigidandfailed to recognize that theconditions thathad led theUnitedStates tosupport the Bernadotte plan no longer prevailed “as result of militaryoperationsandpoliticalconditionsincountriesconcerned.”57

Inshort,LovettacceptedIsrael’sargumentsthatitscontrolofterritorydetermined itsboundaries.Herelayedhisefforts toconvincetheBritishthattherewere“recentsignificantindicationsofIsraelistatesmanshipandmoderation,” as in the case of its “deference to Mediator’s order forwithdrawalfromNegevtoOct14positions.”58

DifferencesbetweenWashingtonandLondonaswellasamongU.S.officialspersistedoverproceduralandsubstantivematters.Forexample,there was the question of Israel’s request for U.S. support of itsapplication for UN membership. The U.S. minister to Tel Aviv, JamesMcDonald,wasdiscovered tohavegonedirectly toTruman,bypassingtheStateDepartmentandJohnFosterDulles,tourgeTrumantoreininthe latter and unconditionally affirm U.S. support for Israel’s UNadmission.TheBritishwereopposedtoIsrael’sapproachandtiming,andDean Rusk, in whose name Dulles wrote to Marshall from Paris,suggested that Truman remind David Ben-Gurion that Washingtonbelieved the time was right to move toward a final resolution of theconflict.SomeUNSecurityCouncilmemberswerepreparedtocooperatealongtheselinesprovidedIsraelplannednofurthermilitaryoperations.

John Foster Dulles, acting chair of the U.S. delegation in Paris,observed that Arab delegations were puzzled that a state withoutinternationally recognized borders was eligible to apply for UNmembership. On November 29, Dulles reported that “Dean Rusk wasconvinced that the U.S. must support Israel’s membership, as well aspersuadeArabstatesofcontinuingU.S.interestinothermatters.”59

In Washington, Truman celebrated the first anniversary of UNGAResolution181bysendingalettertoIsraeliPresidentChaimWeizmannreaffirming his support of Israeli retention of the Negev. As the U.S.presidentsaid,“Iagreefullywithyourestimateoftheimportanceofthat

area to Israel, and I deplore anyattempt to take it away from Israel.”60Truman’s personal letter to Weizmann also reviewed other aspects ofU.S.policy,whilepointingoutthathehada“mandate”toimplementtheprogramof theDemocraticParty, including itspositionon Israel.61Wasthis a none-too-subtle reminder of the president’s bowing to domesticpressuresmanipulatedbyTelAviv?

OnDecember1,Lovettsenta letter totheU.S.Embassy inLondonreiterating the U.S. position on territory. Israel could not hold bothwesternGalilee and Jaffa and theNegev. If Israel chose to hold on towestern Galilee and Jaffa, then “it would be desirable that southernIsraeli border be extended to thirty-first parallel within that portion ofNegev allotted to Israel under Nov 29 resolution.”62 However, thatreminderwasprecededbyanotherwhichvirtuallynullifieditinsofarasitdescribedtheU.S.attitudeas“basedonviewmatterisoneforsettlementby negotiation, either directly bet parties or through ConciliationCommission,anduponpremisethatmodificationsofNov29boundariesof Israel should bemadeonly if fully acceptable to Israel.”63 ItwasnotonlywithrespecttoboundariesthatWashingtonwastodefertoIsrael,asthecaseforrepatriationdemonstrated.

OnDecember4,Washingtonwas informedof theSecondPalestineArabConference,whichwas takingplace inJerichowith themayorsofHebron, Bethlehem, and Ramallah, and the military governors of alldistrictsinPalestine,aswellasthemilitarygovernorgeneraloftheArabLegion. Its members agreed to the unity of Arab Palestine andTransjordanandrecognizedAbdullahasitsking.Abdullahwasreportedto have declared that hewould seek the views of Arab states, amereformality.

InafootnotetothecommuniquébetweenWellsStablerandLovettonthesedevelopments, thekingwasreported tohave indicatedthatwhenofficially informed of the “Jericho resolutions” he would “‘proclaimannexation Arab Palestine to Transjordan.’ The King indicated furtherthat ‘he would also announce his readiness to negotiate settlement ofPalestinequestionwithanyone,evenJews.’”64

WritingfromLondoninthisperiodwasLewisJonesJr.,firstsecretaryoftheUKembassy.InearlyDecember,JoneswrotetothedirectoroftheOffice of Near Eastern and African Affairs, Joseph C. Satterthwaite.“DearJoe:Iwritetoyouatanotheroneoftheperiodiclowwatermarksof

Palestine.TheboysinParisfromJackRossdownfeelcompletelysunkandImustsayIsharetheirfeelingbecausewewereonagoodbicycleuntilsomebodylettheairoutofthetires.”65AsJonesexplained,hewould“blush to report” what his friends in the Foreign Office were saying.Although the British claimed not to wish to take a “further initiative onPalestine,”theywouldfindthisdifficultgiventheirinterestsintheregion.JonesthenofferedhisversionoftheForeignOfficeposition.

UNGAhasmadehashofourfinetheoryofacquiescenceandtheresolution(ifwegetone)willbeonlyalittlebetterthannoresolutionatall.AkindofchaoswillensueinPalestine:the Jews will expand their holdings in Palestine in a relatively ordered fashion and theArabs,withoutanyformalbasis,willshapethemselvesintonewlinesofoccupation.Opennegotiations betweenArabs and Jews aremost unlikely for the next fewmonths, eitherwith or without the Conciliation Commission. Moreover, UK cannot advise the Arabs tonegotiateunlessUKisconvincedthatArabshaveasportingchanceofgainingsomethingfromsuchnegotiations.UnreservedU.S.supportforIsrael’sterritorialclaimsmakessuchnegotiationsdifficult.66

Jones’sfantasywasnotfarfromreality.

On December 7, Lovett informed the U.S. delegation at the UnitedNations of the White House position on Palestinian refugees. LovettexplainedthattheUnitedStateswouldannounceitscontinuedsupportoftheNovember19GeneralAssemblyresolution insupportofPalestinianrefugees.

In the words of UN Resolution 212 (111) of November 19, 1948,“Assistance to Palestine refugees,” the “ActingMediator, in successiveUNreportsofSeptember18,1948andOctober18,1948,drewattentionto the increasingly dire condition of Palestinian refugees for whomassistance was a matter of life or death.”67 The situation had onlyworsened in the intervening period, a condition whose consequenceswere inseparable from the resolutionof theconflict. “[T]healleviationofconditionsofstarvationanddistressamongthePalestinerefugeesisoneof theminimum conditions for the success of the efforts of the UnitedNations to bring peace to that land,” a quest that fell short of itsobjective.68

The UN resolution assumed that close to $29.5 million would benecessary toprovide for the500,000refugees for theperiodDecember1, 1948, toAugust 31, 1949, excludingmoneys for relatedexpenses.69Truman recommended that Congress approve 50 percent of the total

budgetproposed,althoughnomorethanitsshareof$16million.Bytheendof1948,Arabcontributionshadreached$11million.

OnDecember11,1948,theUNGApassedResolution194(111),the“ProgressReportoftheUnitedNationsMediator.”70AsSalimTamariandEliaZureikpointoutintheirstudyofPalestinianrefugeearchives,theUNConciliation Commission established by the UN resolution “wasinstructed by the UN to facilitate the repatriation of the refugees, theirresettlement, rehabilitation, andeconomic compensation. Implicit in thismandate was the need to carry out valuation of refugee property.”71Among the legaciesofUNGAResolution194was theestablishmentoftheUnitedNationsRelief for PalestineRefugees (UNRPR),whichwassucceededbytheUNRWA,theUnitedNationsReliefandWorksAgency,“the longest serving refugee organization dedicated to one specificgroup,”which survived thewarsof 1948, 1956, 1967, 1973, and1982,andthosethatfollowed.72

At the end of December 1948, Lovett addressed the question ofrefugeerepatriation,pointingoutthattheUnitedStateswouldattempttopromote“thepurposesenvisagedinthisresolution.”However,LovettfeltitwasimportanttoconsiderthatIsraelwouldrefuseto“acceptthereturnof all those Arabs who fled from territory under Israeli control or thatmanyofthosewhofledwillnotwishtoreturntotheIsraelistate.”73LovettwasrepeatingwhatheandotherU.S.officialshadrepeatedlybeentoldbyIsraelileaders,whorejectedresponsibilityfortherefugeeproblemandviewedrepatriationasdangerous to Israel’ssecurity.Meanwhile,EliahuEpstein was in touch with American Zionists in the United States todiscussaprojectedplanforthe“transfer”ofPalestinianstoIraq.74

IncludedasafootnoteinLovett’smessagewasamapindicatingthenumbersandlocationofrefugees:75160,000–220,000NorthernPalestine200,000–245,000SouthernPalestine75,000–80,000Transjordan100,000–110,000Syria90,000Lebanon5,000Iraq8,000Egypt

7,000Israel

7,000Israel

Lovett askedU.S. officials in the various capitalswithwhich hewas incontacttoinformhimoftheimpactoftherefugeepresence.Thenewshereceivedwasalarming.

InCairo, thedistinctionwasmadebetween theapproximately8,000refugeeswhoconstituted“asizabledrainontheEgyptiantreasury”andthe “roughly 250,000 refugees now in the Egyptian occupied area ofPalestine.”76 If the latter groupenteredEgypt, the effectwould be nearcatastrophic.

ThereisampleevidencethattheEgyptianGovernmenthasdecidedthattherefugeesarenotinEgypttostay.TherefugeeshavebeenkeptisolatedinthedesertonthefarsideoftheSuezCanalwhereastrictguardismaintainedovertheircamp.Nonewrefugeeshavebeenallowed tocome toEgyptsince lastMayand theGovernmentpredicates itswholeapproach on forcing the refugee problem on the Jews and the United Nations to thegreatestextentpossible.77

ThenewsfromAmmanwasnolesssobering.

Amman informed, on February 3, that the continued presence of 89,000 refugees inTransjordanand302,000 inArabPalestinewouldadverselyaffectbothareas“inseriousway through constant drain on almost nonexistent resources” and that the areas underTransjordaniancontrolcouldonlyassimilatea“verysmallnumberrefugeesunderexistingconditionssincemoney,jobsandotheropportunitiesscarce.”78

InBeirut, thepresenceof some90,000 refugees risked thepolitical

andeconomicstabilityof thecountry.“Thecontinuedpresenceofsome90,000 Arab refugees…would almost undoubtedly be consideredunacceptable by the Government and an unbearable burden.”79Economic conditions were poor and discouraged the prospect ofabsorbing large numbers of refugees. Further, there was the politicallysensitivequestionoftheconfessionalsystemandthepotentialimpactofabsorbinglargenumbersofPalestinianMuslims.Israelwaswellawareofthis. In its policies in the south of Lebanon, it had favored LebaneseChristians.

InDamascus,80,000to100,000refugeesweredescribedaslivingona“cashdoleandfoodstuffssuppliedtothem,”astheywereinastateof“utter demoralization and impoverishment.”80 The government was

unabletosustainitsreliefmeasures.ThesituationinBaghdaddifferedinthatthetotalnumberofrefugees

wasestimatedtobe5,000,althoughtheywerereportedtobelivinginastateofeconomicdistress,whichmeantthatnoadditionalrefugeeswereconceivableatpresent.

AstoSaudiArabia,“uptothepresent,noArabsfromPalestinehavesoughtrefugeinSaudiArabia.”81

FromWashington’sperspective, the situationat theendof the yearheld little encouragement. The process of defining and refining U.S.policyinthewakeofIsrael’semergenceledtothereassessmentofU.S.policy in a fundamentally altered environment. This reassessmentinvolved a shift from a critical to a supportive stance vis-à-vis thesovereigntyof thenewstateaswellasa reconsiderationofU.S.policytoward the key issues Washington recognized as obstacles to theresolution of the Arab–Israeli conflict: refugee repatriation, territorialexpansion,andthefutureofJerusalem.

It becameclear that thereweremajor differencesbetween thoseatthehighestpolicymakinglevelsandtheirsubordinates.Thewideninggapbetweenthesecretaryandundersecretaryofstate—whowerepreparedto compromise U.S. and UN positions, as Marshall’s draft proposalindicated—andtheresponsesofMcClintock,GordonMerriam,andMarkEthridge, for example, was instructive. Internal differences were notsurprising in and of themselves. The questionwaswhat accounted forthe shift at the top, whose influential figures accepted the president’sdeferral policy legitimizing Israel’s rule of forcewith respect to territory,boundaries,andrefugees.

The combination of a number of factors deserves attention. First,evidence of external pressure from Tel Aviv directed at arresting thepresident’scriticalstance toward Israelipolicies;second, theeffort fromthe same source directed at influencing Israel’s friends inWashington,along with media and labor, in an effort to influence domestic politicsduring the campaign season; and third, recognition of the role of thepresident’slegalcounsel,along-standingsupporterofIsraelandamongthose actively committed to the president’s reelection against theRepublicancandidate.82

Electionpolitics,evidenceof Israelipressure,and theexploitationofdifferenceswithinthepolicymakingestablishmentandthosewithaccess

to thepresidentundeniablyaffectedthepresident’spronouncementsonIsraeland theconflictwithPalestineand theArabworld.But theywerenottheonlyforcesatwork;norweretheythedecisiveforcesthatshapedU.S.policyatthisjuncture.

TheimportanceofthechangingassessmentsofIsraelandtheMiddleEast by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the secretary of defensefollowingMay14,1948,cannotbeoverestimated.Forreasonsunrelatedtodomesticpolitics,theJCSconcludedthatIsrael’smilitaryjustifiedU.S.interest, and such interest merited lowering the pressure on Israel toensurethatitturnedawayfromtheUSSRandtowardtheWestandtheUnitedStates.Thepracticaleffectofsuchapolicywas to reinforce thedynamicofdeferral,withimplicationsthattranscendeddomesticpolitics.ThisaffectedU.S.relationswithIsraelandthePalestiniansandwiththeArabworldaswell. It remains tobeseenhowtheDefenseDepartmentandtheJointChiefsofStaffwouldviewthissituation.

PARTVTheEndastheBeginning,1948–49

Theopeningchapterof the finalpartof thisstudyexamines the roleofthe Palestine Conciliation Commission (PCC) in relation to the majorissues raised during the armistice negotiations and the LausanneConferencethatfollowed.Chapter12revealsthefrustrationsoftheU.S.delegate to the PCC at the LausanneConference and his conclusionswithrespecttothefutureoftheconflictandIsrael’sresponsibilityfortherefugeeproblem.

Chapter 13 describesWashington’s reluctance to engage Israel onthis and related issues, which was not the result of caution but ofpriorities that in practice excluded alleviating—let alone resolving—thePalestinian refugee problem. The view from the Pentagon is critical inunderstandingthelogicofthispolicy,which,ineffect,legitimizedIsrael’suseofforce,itsexpulsionofPalestinianrefugees,itscontroloverterritoryheldbyforce,anditsstandonJerusalem.

Chapter14demonstratesthatU.S.supportforIsraeldidnotendangerU.S.oil companyoperationsor, indeed, their capacity toexpand in thearea. This outcome was contrary to predictions from insiders ofpolicymaking circles and outsiders at the time. The final chapterconcludesbyexaminingtheextraordinaryroleMaxBallplayedonbehalfofIsraelafterhisretirementfromoffice.

12ThePCC,Armistice,Lausanne,and

PalestinianRefugees

ARMISTICEWITHOUTPEACE

Israel’s unilateral declaration of independence on May 14, 1948, wasfollowedbyWashington’simmediategrantingofdefactorecognitionthatwasraisedtodejurestatusonJanuary23,1949.Israelwasacceptedasamemberof theUnitedNationsonMay11,1949.Workingthroughtheactingmediator appointed by theUnitedNations,RalphBunche, Israeland its neighbors signed a series of armistice agreements betweenJanuary and July of 1949. The agreements were negotiated betweenIsrael and Egypt, Lebanon, Transjordan, and Syria, The LausanneConferenceoverlappedwithsomeof thesenegotiations,as itsought tomove from armistice to permanent settlement, with the PalestineConciliationCommissionplayingaleading,ifpermanentlyfrustrated,roleintheseefforts.

The Palestine Conciliation Commission (PCC) was formed at thebeginning of 1949 with a three-member directorate including MarkEthridge (United States), Claude de Boisanger (France), and HusaynJahed Yalcin (Turkey). Ethridge was the publisher of the LouisvilleCourier Journal, and, during the Roosevelt administration as JamesForrestal recalled, he had “been in Rumania and Bulgaria under StateDepartmentauspices.”1Ethridgehadaliberalreputationonquestionsofrace and class and was outspoken in his views. He was named byPresidentTrumantothePCC,wherehefoughtforrecognitionofUNGAResolution194.

The armistice agreements negotiated by Ralph Bunche, CountBernadotte’s successor, began under United Nations auspices in thewinter of 1949. On January 4, 1949, John C. Ross, deputy toWarrenAustinat theUnitedNations,contactedbothDeanRusk,directorof theOfficeofUNAffairs, andJosephSatterthwaite, directorof theOfficeofNearEasternandAfricanAffairsintheStateDepartment(replacingLoyHenderson), with promising news. According to Ross, Ralph Bunche’srepresentative in Cairo, Pablo de Azcarate, revealed that Egypt waspreparedtoengageIsraelindirecttalksprovidedIsraelcompliedwiththeUNcease-firearrangements.BuncheregardedthisasasignificantmovethatshouldnotbemissedbecauseitcouldencourageotherArabstatestofollow.

RossreportedthatBunchhadinstructedhisrepresentativeinTelAviv“tosoundoutIsraelisonholdingahighlevelconferenceonRhodeswithcivil and military authorities of both Israel and Egypt under UNchairmanship.HethinksTransjordancouldrelativelyeasilybepersuadedtojoinsuchaconference.”2

Several weeks later, U.S. officials concluded that “a number of theArableaderswouldliketogetoutofthePalestinesituationasgracefullyaspossible.”3U.S.officialsbelievedthat“mostoftheArableadersseemtorealizethattheircauseagainsttheestablishmentofaJewishstateinPalestine is nowhopeless.”4 Further, as theU.S. delegateon thePCCknew, Arab states were eager to normalize relations with the UnitedStatesandtoobtainfinancialaidintheprocess.

When difficulties threatened talks with Egypt, Philip Jessup urgedSecretary of State Dean Acheson to warn the Israeli representative inWashingtonoftheirpossiblecollapse“unlessthereissomemodificationoftheIsraeliposition.”5AlthoughinsistingonIsraeliaction,U.S.officials,includingRobertLovett,madeitcleartoMarkEthridge—thenonhiswayto the Middle East to take up his role in the PCC—that major movesinvolving Israel would have to be cleared with the Israeli government.Suchclearancewasnotofficialpolicy,butitbecameanunofficialpracticethatmeantadeferraltoIsraelipositions.

AgreementwasreachedbetweenIsraelandEgypt,andthefirst inaseriesofarmisticeaccordswassignedonFebruary24,1949.Twoissuesdominated the agreement: Egyptian military control of Gaza and thepresence of Egyptian troops in the Negev. Gaza held some 300,000

PalestiniansandremainedunderEgyptiancontrol,butitwasnotofficiallyannexed. Israel, in turn, retained military outposts surrounding Gaza.AccordingtoIsraelisources,

thearmisticeagreementwithEgyptwasbasedprimarilyontheexistingmilitarysituation.IsraelhadtoagreetoanEgyptianmilitarypresenceintheGazaStrip,andtowithdrawherown forces from the area of Beit Hanoon and the sector near the Rafah cemetery.However,shewasallowedtokeepsevenoutpostsalongtheStrip.6

Ilan Pappé has pointed out that the armistice revealed a change inEgypt’spreviouspositioninsupportofPalestiniannationalismduringtheperiod of the all-Palestine government inGaza, and its position on theNegev.BysigningthearmisticeaccordwithIsrael,Cairoindicatedthatitfavored a separate agreement with Israel.7 Prime Minister Ben-Gurionwroteinhisdiary,“afterthecreationofthestateandourvictoriesinbattle—thisisthegreateventofagreatandmarvelousyear.”8

Throughout this period, Washington insisted on the importance ofmaintaining close relations with London. In early January, the Britishwantedclarificationof theU.S.positionon territorialquestionsaffectingEgypt as well as Transjordan. Acting Secretary of State Robert Lovettinsisted that Washington’s policy had been clarified in 1947 when itaccededtoUNGAResolution181.IncompliancewithUNGAResolution194, if Israel retained areas assigned to the Arab state, it would beexpected to offer proper compensation. London was not reassured.Washington, in turn, claimed that British officials failed to grasp theimportanceofnotkeepingIsraelin“astraitjacket”insofarasterritorywasconcerned.

Lovett responded by emphasizing the importance of promotingIsrael’swestern orientation, a theme that assumed importance inStateDepartment arguments and was appreciated by Pentagon sources aswell.LovettremindedtheBritishthat

real strategic security lay in encouraging development in Israel of a westward outlook.Confining Israel ina straitjacketandsurrounding thisnewnationwitha circleofaweakArab enemies kept in a ring only by Brit armed assistance, would inevitably result increation of a hostile state which would turn almost automatically toward USSR…. Realsecurity therefore lay not in any particular road inNegev but in attitude of Israel, whichwouldbeconditionedbyattitudeofGreatpowers.9

Cultivating that “attitude” in a manner conducive to U.S. interests wasimpliedbyLovett’sstatement.

With respect to Israel–Transjordan relations, Washington receivedwhatappears tohavebeenasteadystreamof information fromEliahuSasson,thechiefIsraelifigureinvolvedinthosenegotiations.AsreportedbyU.S.AmbassadorJamesMcDonaldandtheU.S.consulinJerusalem,Sasson’s information revealed virtually no areas of disagreementbetween the two parties. Abdullahwas a self-confidentmonarch eagerfor U.S. support to supplant that of the British. Persuaded that Arabregimes including Syria, Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen wereapprovingof,oratleastpreparedtofollow,him,Abdullahwasconfidentthat the Palestinian refugees constituted no problem at present andwould“solve itself”afterpeace.As tohisownrule,Abdullahapparentlybelieved that elections were unnecessary in his country because “herulesandParliamentcarriesouthiswill.”10

This was the King who was “anxious speedy peace negotiationswhichshouldfollowimmediatelyafterarrangementarmisticewhichinhisopinionshouldinvolveslightdifficulty.”11HisviewofBritain’srolewasthatitinterferedinordertopressureneighboringcountriessuchasSyria.AsforJerusalem,AbdullahwaspreparedtopartitionthecitywiththeIsraelisrather than to consider the idea of internationalization, which wassupportedbytheUnitedStatesandtheUN.

In offering this account, U.S. Ambassador McDonald made noreferenceto the fact that Israel’smoveto incorporatepartofJerusalemwasinoppositiontoUNpolicy(UNGAResolution194),whichsupportedinternationalization, a positionWashington endorsed. Israel did not, asU.S.ConsulBurdettreportedtoAcheson.

[U]nder Israeli theory all territory allotted by Nov 29 U.N. Resolution to Israel is IsraeliterritoryregardlesswhetheroccupiedbyIsraelorArabforcesattimetrucewentintoeffect.ThereforepresenceArabforceonsuchterritoryis“invasion.”AtsametimeIsraelmaintainsrightofconquesttoterritoryallottedArabsbyNovember29GAresolutionandnowheldbyits forces. ConGen unable reconcile claim Arab occupation is “invasion” while Israeloccupationisnot.12

Israel’s foreign minister Moshe Shertok explained his government’sposition to themembersof thePCCasa functionof Israeliexperience,which taught Israelis that they could only rely on themselves forprotection. Further he stated that “Jerusalem to all practical intent andpurposeisnowpartofIsrael.PGIdoesnotdenyitsintenttokeepit.”13

ShertokofferedIsrael’sunderstandingoftherefugeeproblemaswell,emphasizing that in its view Palestinian refugees had fled voluntarily,albeitencouragedbytheBritish.

If refugeeshadstayed in Israel,PGIpolicywouldhavedevelopeddifferently.Since theyfledvoluntarilyandatBritishinstigationPGIpolicyhasbeenbasedonstatusquo.ExoduswasprimarilycausedbyaggressionofArabstates.ReturnnowwouldunderminesecurityofIsraelandwouldimposeimpossibleeconomicburdenonIsraeltointegraterefugeesinIsraelieconomy.Arabrefugeesareessentiallyunassimilable inJewishIsrael.Effortscannowbemade indirection radical soundsolution, namely integration in neighboringArabstates, especially Iraq, Syria and Transjordan which Shertok claims are underpopulatedandrequiremorepeopleanddevelopmenttofilldangerousvacuum.14

Ethridge described Israel’s intentions as “unyielding.” He consideredShertok’s statement as offensive insofar as the PCC was concerned,admitting that he hoped that Israel would “adopt more humanitarianmeasures”thatwouldserveitsowninterestsaswellasthoseoftheArabstates.15

InMarch1949,BurdettreportedtoWashingtonthattheIsraeliprimeministerhaddeclaredthat“JerusalemwaspartofJewishstate,andtherewas no difference between Jerusalem and other part of Israel. Worldrecognition would be sought for this.”16 Within a day of Burdett’smessage, Wells Stabler wrote that Transjordan, “facing realistically itspresentpositionvis-a-visIsrael,wouldbewilling[to]concludepeacewiththat country notwithstanding developments in Negev, there isconsiderable question as towhether Israel will cease its aggression atthispoint.”17

OnMarch11,1949, IsraelandTransjordansignedageneralcease-fire agreement. On March 30, “in the presence of the Israeli andTransjordanian delegations in Rhodes and the entire Transjordaniancabinet, but with no Israeli ministers present, the formal armisticebetween Israel and Transjordan was signed.”18 The armistice signifiedofficialIsraeliapprovalforTransjordan’sannexationoftheWestBank,inexchange for which Israel obtained the area known as the “LittleTriangle.”19Inaddition,aspecialcommitteewascreatedtocarryoutthepartition of Jerusalem, which was crucial to Israeli–Jordaniandeliberations.

From Jerusalem on April 8, U.S. Consul Burdett reported on the“extreme bitterness and resentment among Palestine Arabs over

signature Israel Transjordan armistice. Particularly angered overprovisionsinArticle6forturningovertoJewsareaintrianglecontaining16villagesandreportedly35,000inhabitants.”20However,asAviShlaimhaspointedout,fromthedistinctperspectivesofTransjordanandIsrael,the armistice agreement represented “a major victory for Israelidiplomacy”and“amajordiplomatictriumph”forKingAbdullah.21

The Israeli–Lebanese armistice followed, marked by Lebanon’sbitternessaboutWashington’srefusaltopressureIsraeltowithdrawfromitsoccupationofsomefourteenvillagesinthesouthofLebanon.WarrenAustinwarnedIsraeltochangeitspositionorhewouldbringthesituationtotheattentionoftheSecurityCouncil.

Lebanese agreement held up solely by Israeli intransigeance on question of removingIsraeliforcesfromLebanonterritoryevenafterthearmisticeagreementwouldbesignedinwhichLebanonwouldgivesolemnpledgethatitsterritorywouldnotbeusedbyanypartyforanywarlikeactsagainst Israel. IsraeliswishLebanese tosignagreementsanctioningIsraeliforcesinLebanonuntilSyrianegotiatesanagreement,thatis,foranindeterminateperiod.

Ihave informedShiloahyesterday inmostemphatic terms that Israeliposition in thisregardisutterlyunreasonableandthatifitisnotchangedbeforeendofthisweek,Imustreport to SC that Israelis are deliberately blocking Lebanese agreement in apparentattempttobringpressureonSyria.22

Austinwaspreparedtowithdrawfromboththenegotiationsinvolving

Israel and Lebanon barring a change in Israel’s position. Apparently,AustinwasunawarethatIsraelwasconductingitsownnegotiationswiththeLebanese,whoinformedtheirIsraelicounterparts“thattheywerenotreallyArabsandthattheyhadbeendraggedintothePalestineadventureagainsttheirwill.”23ThisconfessioncouldnothavecomeasasurprisetoIsraelis,whohadlongcontemplatedanaccordwithLebaneseMaronites,andeven theprospectsofaMaronitestate inLebanonwithwhich theycouldbeallied.IsraelandLebanonsignedanarmisticeaccordonMarch23.

Twomonthslater,SassonandZalmanLiff,whoworkedinDavidBen-Gurion’sofficeas “Adviseron territorial anddevelopmentmatters,”metwithmembersoftheLebanesedelegationatLausannetoreviewissuesrelated to refugees, territory, and other elements affecting relations ofArab states and Israel. According to the Israeli summary of this

exchange, the Lebanese delegates “admitted that the refugee problemwas of secondary importance and thatmany of the refugeeswould beabsorbedintheArabcountries.Exploitationofthisissuewasofatacticalnature,theArabs’mainconcernbeingthesizeofIsrael’sterritory.”24

DeanAchesonmetwithLebaneseMinisterCharlesMalik,whowasunderstood to be pro-Western, eager to strengthen Lebanese–U.S.relations,andeagertoobtainfundingfromtheInternationalBank.Malikdid not hesitate to tell Acheson that the Lebanese feared Israel. Malikwas straightforward in telling the U.S. secretary of state that, althoughLebanon was “an oriental country which identified itself with WesternChristian civilization,” Lebanon not only feared the Islamic world butIsrael as well. Acheson asked whether this was the result of “thepressureofcontinuedJewishimmigrationintoPalestine,”towhichMalikreplied in the affirmative, indicating that continued immigration wouldincrease Israel’sstrength in the region.25Given Israel’spowerful friendsin theworld, its influencewould beenhancedbecause “Zionismwasadynamic force and the people of Israel were energetic and possessedindustrialandotherpotentialstoafargreaterdegreethantheArabsnowhave.”26MalikrequestedacommitmentfromtheUnitedStatestoprohibitfurther Jewish immigration into Israel and tomaintain the statusquo inthe Middle East, which required western support for economic andculturaldevelopmentoftheregion.Acheson’sreplywasapoliterejectionofacommitmentthatthesecretaryclaimedtheUnitedStateswasnotyetreadytomake.Nonetheless,hepromisedtolookintoLebanon’sfears.

Several days later, Acheson received a communiqué from EthridgethatechoedMalik’srequest,confirmingthat“wearenotinpossessionofany assurance that could be given Arabs that any settlement on anyquestion will be respected. As previously reported, this was a majorthemeofArabsduringourtourofcapitals.”27

Syriaunderwentacoupwhilethearmisticewasbeingnegotiated.TheSyrianpresidentandprimeministerwerearrested,and theconstitutionwas suspended in a coup closely tied to U.S. intelligence efforts toensureSyria’sacceptanceof thepipeline (TAPLINE)deemedessentialtoARAMCO’soperations inSaudiArabia.PresidentQuwwatli,whohadnotaccededtotheconditionsforTAPLINE,wasreplacedbyHusniZaim,whodid.28Zaimdidnotsurvivefor long,however,nordidtalkofSyria’sabsorption of Palestinian refugees in exchange for financial aid. The

successofthecoupspurredothernegotiationsoveroil inAbadan,Iran,whoseinvestorsincludedtheAnglo-IranianOilCompanyandtheKuwaitOilCompany.ThelatterwaspreparingtobepurchasedbyStandardOilCompanyofNewJerseyandtheSocony-VacuumOilCompany.

David Ben-Gurion’s distaste for the Syrian leader impeded Israeli–Syrian negotiations, which faced difficulties over issues of land andwater.Ben-Gurionreportedlybelieved“thatZa’imhadbeenformonthsifnotyears (before1949),aYishuv intelligence ‘asset’ (ashewasaCIA‘asset’), and it is probable that Za’im even received Israeli funding.”29Contrarytothis,theU.S.ambassador,whomaynothavebeeninformedonthesubject,maintainedthat theSyrianregime“nowoffersbestArableadership in reaching overall peace settlement.”30 The ambassador’soptimismprovedmisplaced.

Reflectingontheoverallsignificanceofthearmisticeaccords,Israel’sprimeministerandforeignministerbothconcludedthattheyheldpositiveadvantagesforthenewstate,althoughtheyhadnoillusionsabouttheiradequacyinplaceofafinalagreement.However,fortheprimeminister,theywentfarenough.Morewouldhaveinvolvedcompromise,whichhewasunwillingtocontemplate.

At the Lausanne Conference that opened in the spring, the Israeliforeignminister instructedtheIsraelidelegationthat“controlover Israelisovereign territories, hitherto dependent on a shaky balance of armedforces,isnowreaffirmedbyagreementsbindingontheotherpartiesandendorsed by the U.N.”31 Sharett declared that the new situation freedIsraelfromtheneedforapermanentsettlementinthatitprovidedforthe“stabilization of the boundaries and a guarantee against renewedaggression.”32But he conceded that “itwouldbeadelusion to imaginethatastateofarmisticeisinitselfsufficientandthattheideaofaformalpeace treatymay be abandoned as irrelevant and nonessential.”33 TheabsenceofsuchwouldleaveIsraelisolated,“analienbodyintheMiddleEast”whosepotentialdevelopmentwouldbereduced.34

InBen-Gurion’sview,thearmisticeagreementsweresufficient,andtogobeyondtheminvolvedcompromiseshewasunwillingtomake.

PeacewiththeArabwascertainlysomethingBen-Guriondesired,butitwasnothismainpriorityat thisparticular time.His topprioritieswere thebuildingof thestate, large-scaleimmigration, economic development, and the consolidation of Israel’s newly wonindependence.Hethought that thearmisticeagreementsmet Israel’sessentialneeds for

external recognition, security, and stability. He knew that for formal peace agreementsIsraelwouldhavetopaybyyieldingterritorytoitsneighborsandbyagreeingtothereturnof a substantial number ofPalestinian refugees, andhedid not consider this as a priceworthpaying.WhetherBen-Gurionmade the rightchoice isamatterofopinion.Thathehadachoiceisundeniable.35

Ben-Gurionwasreportedtohavebeenmorethansatisfied,althoughhefacedapublicthataccusedhimofdefeatistpolicies,theexpressionofapublicmoodhardenedbythetollofwar.“Some6,000Israelishaddiedinthewar,or1percentofthetotalpopulation.”36

J.C.Hurewitz,PalestineexpertintheOfficeofStrategicServicesandlater in the intelligencedivisionof theDepartmentofState,summedupIsrael’s position after the armistice agreements as constituting amajorachievement,whichdidnotmeanpeace:

ThearmisticelinesleftinIsrael’sdefactopossessionalmostalltheterritoryoccupiedbyitstroopswithintheboundariesoftheformerPalestineMandate:theentireGalilee,theNegev(includingBeershebabutexcludingal-’AwjaandtheGazastrip),theCoastalPlain,andasizablecorridortoJewishJerusalem.37

As Hurewitz pointed out, the efforts of the members of the PalestineConciliation Commission to move the parties from the armisticeagreementstoamorecomprehensivepeaceconferencefailed.

Bythis time, theUnitedStateshadeffectivelyreplacedBritain,eventhoughU.S. officials repeatedly emphasized the importance of the twopowers adopting a common stance. While bilateral negotiations overarmistice accords were ongoing, Washington focused its attention onthree issues thatwerekey to the resolutionof theconflict: the futureofJerusalem, repatriationof thePalestinian refugees,and thequestionofpermanentboundaries.

LAUSANNEANDTHEREFUGEEQUESTION

The conferenceheld in Lausannewas technically a continuationof thearmisticetalks.ItwasdesignedtoprovidethevenueforthenextstageinIsraeli–Arab relations,with thearmisticeaccords forming thebasisofalasting settlement. It offered the opportunity for informal bilateral talksbetweenIsraelandvariousArabdelegates.

Israel’spositionatLausanne,includingthemultiplebilaterialmeetingswithvariousgroupsofPalestinianrefugees,heldoutwhatWalterEytan,

oneofIsrael’sdelegatesatLausanne,regardedaspossiblyallowingforsomeaccord.ButasAviShlaimpointsout,“neitherSharettnoranyotherprominent Israeli leader genuinely desired the establishment of anindependentPalestinianstateinthespringof1949.”38

For Washington, and more specifically for the U.S. delegate MarkEthridge and his colleagues Claude de Boisanger and Huseyin JahidYalcin fromthePCC, thecriticalproblemwas the familiarone involvingPalestinian refugee repatriation. Ironically, the course of the LausanneConference coincided with release of the State Department’s mostcomprehensive report to date on the U.S. position on Palestinianrefugees, which reiterated its endorsement of Palestinian refugeerepatriation.

Ethridgedenounced Israel’sdenialof responsibility “in faceof Jaffa,Deir Yassin, Haifa and all reports that come to us from refugeeorganizations that new refugees are being created every day byrepression and terrorism.”39 But the problem was not only one ofacknowledgingresponsibility,asLovettdiscoveredfromtheU.S.consulin Jerusalem. The Israeli defenseminister,MosheDayan, hadmade itclear that there was nowhere to which the Palestinian refugees couldreturn.AccordingtoU.S.ConsulBurdettinJerusalem,Dayan

admittedArabquartersJerusalemheldbyJewscompletelysettledbynewimmigrantsandbecomingthoroughlyJewish.AssertedPGIwouldhavegreatdifficultyforcingpeoplemovefrom homes now consider theirs and Army would probably be required use force withadversepoliticalrepercussions.StatedifreturnofcertainsectionstoArabscontemplated,agreementshouldbereachedimmediately.

AccordingDayannew immigrantsnowoccupyingArabproperty throughout IsraelandhomesnolongerexisttowhichArabrefugeescouldreturn.40

TheProvisionalGovernment of Israel hadmade plans for the possiblesettlementof the refugees inArabcountries, towhichDayanexplainedIsraelwouldcontribute.

Eliahu Elath (Epstein), who had become the ProvisionalGovernment’sfirstministertoWashington,agreed,withtheprovisionthatChristianArabsmightconstituteanexceptionbecausetheywereunlikeMuslim Arabs who “would be an intractable element who could notassimilate in Israel.”41 Israel’s view of Lebanon’s Christian Maroniteminority remaineda constant in its policy towardBeirut,whether in thefirstcivilwarof1958,Israel’sinvasionofLebanonin1982,orsubsequentIsraeliinvasions.Maroniteswereheldtobeaspeciesapart,susceptible

tocooperatingwithIsrael.In the same month in which negotiations with Egypt began, the

Palestine question was raised by U.S. officials. Robert McClintockdefined U.S. objectives as designed to obtain a “prompt and lastingcessation of hostilities; the negotiation by means of the PalestineConciliation Commission of which this Government is a Member, of apermanentpoliticalsettlement;andthereliefandeventuallyrehabilitationof the Arab refugees, for which purpose the President will ask theCongressforanappropriationof$16million.”42

Shortlythereafter,Lovett informedU.S.officersinLatinAmericathattheU.S.militarywasconcernedwiththeconditionsforrefugees,“whosefate if not promptly relieved will lead to further deterioration [of] ourstrategicpositioninthisimportantarea.”43

THESTATEDEPARTMENTREVIEWONTHEREFUGEEQUESTION:MARCH15,1949

Before the Lausanne Conference opened, the decision was made totransfer“allmattersrelatedtotherefugeequestiontoWashington.DeanRusk informed Ethridge of the State Department’s plan to put GeorgeMcGhee in charge, under the title ‘Special Assistant to Secretary ofState.’”44McGheewas assigned to implement the refugee resettlementplandevisedby theStateDepartment’sArabRefugeeWorkingPanel.45HewastobesenttoBeiruttobecomeacquaintedwiththedetailsoftherefugeeproblemthroughaseriesofinterviewsandmeetings,afterwhichhewouldreturntoWashington.AsRuskdescribedtoEthridge,“uponhisreturnhewilldealnotonlywith immed[iate]andinterimphasesrefugeeproblem but, more particularly, long-rangemeasures designed for finalsettlement.”46ThiswastoremainconfidentialuntilMcGheereturnedfromBeirut.

The move confirmed Washington’s recognition that refugeerepatriation, as recommended by UNGA Resolution 194, was unlikelygivenIsrael’sposition.Hencethedecisiontoappropriatetheproblembytransformingitfromarefugeeproblemtooneofdevelopment.Theresultwas not only to increaseU.S. responsibility with respect to Palestinianrefugees but to deliberately redefine their status. Palestine all butdisappearedinpoliticaltalkinWashington.Palestinianrefugees,forcibly

exiled from a land that was no longer on the map, were no longerrecognized as Palestinian nationals but exclusively as deracinated anddepoliticizedrefugees.ThisinnowaylessenedWashington’sinsistenceon the urgency of taking action to improve the refugees’ lot. Nor did itdiminishWashington’spressureonIsraeltoatleastrespondtorequestsforrepatriationwithasymbolicgestureofacceptance.

The State Department’s major review of U.S. policy issued in mid-March1949basedonmaterial preparedby theOffice ofNearEasternand African Affairs and the Office of UN Affairs, reinforced the U.S.positioninfavorofrepatriation.47Itprovidedahistoryoftheoriginoftherefugee problem, the positions of various parties, the role of UNGAResolution194inestablishingthePCC,anditsintendedrolewithrespecttorefugeerepatriation.

Although calling for compliance with UNGA Resolution 194, U.S.officials did not disguise their limited expectations of Israel’s response.Theydid,however,hopeforasymbolicgesturetoappeaseArabregimesand to strengthenWashington’s stance in the Middle East. The policypaper offered estimates of the numbers of refugees that ranged in themonth of April alone from 700,000 to 800,000 to close to 950,000.48 Itaddressedthecauseofthisforcedexodusasaproductof“hostilities inPalestine” related to themandateand theestablishmentof Israel, asaresultofwhich“almosttheentireArabpopulationofPalestinefledorwasexpelled from the area under Jewish occupation. These Arabs, nowestimatedat 725,000, took refuge inArab-controlledareasofPalestineandintheneighboringArabstates.”49

FocusingonIsrael,theStateDepartmentcontinued,statingthatifIsraelindicatesagreementinprinciplewiththeDecember11resolution,orexpressesitswillingness to cooperate in resolving the refugee question, we also contemplatemakingrepresentationtotheArabstates,withaviewtotheiradoptionofamorerealisticattitudetowardsthequestionofacceptingashareoftherefugeesonapermanentbasisandwithaviewtostimulatingthemtomakeconstructiveplanstothisend.50

The statement recalled past history, when in accord with UNGAResolution 181 Jews had accepted that the Jewish state would haveincludedsome500,000Arabs.Atpresent,“itisdoubtfulthattheStateofIsraelwouldnowpermitmorethanasmallnumberofrefugeestoreturnto Israel.”51Asa result, itestimated that thatsome600,000Palestinianrefugeeswouldhave tobesettled inArabcountries,whichhadneither

themeansnor the infrastructure to do this.Andas its reviewof Israelipolicyemphasized,

IsraeliauthoritieshavefollowedasystematicprogramofdestroyingArabhouses.Insuchcities asHaifa and in village communities in order to rebuildmodern habitations for theinfluxofJewishimmigrantsfromDPcampsinEurope.Thereare,thus,inmanyinstances,literallynohousesfortherefugeestoreturnto.InothercasesincomingJewishimmigrantshaveoccupiedArab dwellings andwillmost certainly not relinquish them in favor of therefugees.Accordingly, it seems certain that themajority of theseunfortunate peoplewillsoonbeconfrontedwiththefactthattheywillnotbeabletoreturnhome.52

This realization would have immense repercussions, and the paperconcludedthattheprimaryfearwasthatthosewithouthopewouldproveopentotheappealsofcommunismandrevolution.

In addition, State Department officials criticized the extent of publicignorance on the refugee problem due to the inadequacy of mediacoverage.Theproblem“hasnotbeenhammeredawayatbythepressorradio. Aside from theNew York Times and theHerald Tribune, whichhavedonemorefaithfulreportingthananyotherpapers,therehasbeenverylittlecoverageoftheproblem.”53Ifreportswerefiled,theywerenotnecessarilyused.“Editorialcommentisstillmoresparse.FredaKirchweyinNation,afeweditorialsinAmerica(Catholic),aneditorializedarticleintheNewLeaderandoneeditorialeachintheBaltimoreSunandtheDesMoinesRegisternearlyexhausts the list.Mostof thenewsarticlesandeditorialshavehadafriendlyslant,exceptfortheNewYorkPost,whichwasviolentlyopposedtohelpingtheArabs.”54

Inpractice,IsraelengagedincampaignstomoldpublicopinionandtolobbymembersofCongress,aswell as those inU.S. labor circles.Onthecontentious issueof lifting thearmsembargo toArabstates, Israelisources reveal that efforts were made to engage Senators Henry C.LodgeandHerbertLehmanandHouseRepresentativessuchasJosephSavitz, A. J. Sabath, and Anthony Tauriello to pressure Acheson toopposesuchmeasures.55

Severaldaysafter issuanceof theStateDepartmentpolicypaper,areview of the U.S. position labeled “top secret” focused on territorialissues,alongwithEthridge’sresponse.

ThePresidenthasdefinedourattituderegardingtheterritoryofIsraelbystatingthatIsraelisentitledtotheareasallottedtoitundertheGeneralAssembly’sResolutionofNovember

29,1947,and thatnochangesshouldbemade in theseboundarieswithout Israel’s freeconsent.However,ifIsraelseekstoretainterritoryinPalestinewhichhasbeenallottedtotheArabsunder theGeneralAssembly’s resolution,suchasJaffa,WesternGalilee,andthe corridor leading to Jerusalem, Israel should be expected to make territorialcompensation elsewhere, presumably in the Negev. However, the British ForeignSecretaryandourownrepresentativesinJerusalemandTransjordanhaveexpressedthefearthattheIsraeliGovernmentwouldseektotakeevenmoreArabterritory,specificallyinSamaria. Meanwhile, the Israeli authorities evince no intention of relinquishingWesternGalilee,Jaffaor thecorridor toJerusalem.Although theGeneralAssemblyof theUnitedNations, in the resolution of December 11, 1948, declared that Jerusalem should beinternationalizedundereffectiveUNcontrol,theIsraeliPrimeMinisterhaspubliclydeclaredtheintentionofhisgovernmenttoregardNewJerusalemasanintegralpartofIsrael.

Confrontedwith thissituation, theUnitedStatesMemberof thePalestineConciliationCommission,Mr.MarkEthridge,onMarch14,telegraphedtheSecretaryofStatethattheDepartmentisfacedwithamajordecision—whetherornottoseektopersuadetheIsraeliGovernment tomake territorial compensations, presumably in theNegev, if it desires toretainArabareasnowheldinmilitaryoccupation,orelsetorelinquishthoseareas.

AprimaryproblemwithregardtoPalestineisthefateofthe700,000ArabrefugeeswhohavefledfromareasoccupiedbyIsrael.TheIsraeliGovernmenthasshownnointentionofpermitting thereturnof thebulkof thoserefugees,althoughtheGeneralAssembly, in itsresolutionofDecember11,establishedtheirrighttoreturniftheywouldliveatpeacewiththeir neighbors and the right of compensation for the property of those choosing not toreturn.Eventually,resettlementwillhavetobeprovidedforperhapshalfamillionpeopleincontiguousArabcountryorintheArabportionofPalestine.Unlessthisproblemismetwithadequate means and with imagination, there is every prospect that the refugees willbecome the victims of communist agitation and a situation paralleling that in China willthreatenthevitalstrategicandeconomicinterestsoftheUnitedStatesintheNearEast.56

Coinciding with the issuance of the State Department Policy Paper

wasameetingheld in theRamallahRefugeeOffice representingsome500 refugees from Jordan and Palestine, as well as a member of theArab Higher Commission, landowners, and businessmen who wereauthorized “to negotiate on behalf of the refugees in all mattersconcerningthem.”57TheirmeetingswithIsraeliofficialsdidnotyieldanymeaningfulresults.

Israel’spositionontherefugeequestionremainedattherootofU.S.criticismthroughMarchandearlyApril.Ethridgegrewincreasinglybitterand unprepared to remain silent before the “abortion of justice andhumanitytowhichIdonotwanttobemid-wife;completedestructionofallfaithinaninternationalorganizationandcreationofaverydangerousflameagainstU.S.inthispartofworld.”58

TheU.S.delegate to thePCCdeclared thatJewswereprepared toconduct separate negotiations with Arab states but were unwilling tocooperatewith thePCCon the internationalization of Jerusalemor the

questionofrepatriation.Hisconclusionsweresevere.

Jewshave no respect forCommission orArab states and having beenbornwith swordseemconvincedtheycanonlygrowwithsword.Whatevermeritsof individualcasesmaybe, Jews have acquired through armed force (1) westernGalilee, (2) Jaffa, (3)most ofJerusalem,(4)allofterritorybetweenJerusalemandMediterraneanincludingArabtownsand fields of Ramle, Lydda, Beersheba and (5) theNegev.Much of areawas acquiredduring confused conditions of truce and periods between truce.With this background inmind and apparently realizing reluctance of UNGA or UNSC to take action, it seemsunlikely Israelwill cooperatewithCommissionunlessUNandmember statesarewillingjointlyandseparatelytobackUNinstructions.59

Rusk and Acheson, who had become secretary of state in January

1949, met with Sharett several days later to review the question ofJerusalem and the refugees. Sharett indicated that Israel was stillconsideringnegotiationswithTransjordan,but therewasnoconcessionpossibleontherefugeequestion.

Achesondescribed the800,000 refugeesas “thesourceofgreatestimmediate concern to the President.”60 He reminded Sharett of UNGAResolution 194 and its recommendation of refugee repatriation,recognizing“itcanbeunderstoodthatrepatriationofalloftheserefugeesisnotapracticalsolution,neverthelessweanticipatethataconsiderablenumbermustberepatriatedifasolutionistobefound.”61Headdressedarecurring theme in Israel’s rejoinder on this question—namely, thatrepatriationbelinkedtoapeacesettlement—apositiontheUnitedStatesrejectedasitviewedthetwoproblemsasinextricablyrelated.

Acheson suggested that Israel consider accepting “a portion, say afourth, of the refugees eligible for repatriation.”62 Sharett replied byindicating that “Israeli experts” questioned the total numberof refugeescited,suggestingthat itwascloserto500,000and550,000,addingthat“there were many local inhabitants who described themselves asrefugeesinordertoobtainrelief.”63Moreover,SharettmaintainedthattherefugeequestionwasthefaultoftheArabs,asithadarisenasaresultoftheir going towar against Israel.He thenargued “that Israel had beenwillingtoacceptthepresenceofalargeArabminoritywithinitsterritory,but that the situation is now completely changed.” Repatriation “woulddisturb the homogeneity of Israeli areas,” and he proposed that therefugeesberesettledinArabcountries.64

Astoterritory,Sharettrejectedthedistinctionbetweenlandallottedto

Israel in the UN partition resolution of 1947, which the United Statessupported, and the land that Israel determined it required for its safetythatwasoutsideofthe1947partitionborders.

Acheson did not relent, conceding differences with respect tonumbersof refugeesbutexplaining that itwas important tohavesomesenseofthenumberofrefugeesIsraelmightconsiderrepatriatingforthePCCtoprogress,andadditionallytobeabletodealwithCongress.65Thesecretary suggested that “initially repatriation might be to less criticalareas froma security point of view and could beworked out so that itwouldnotjeopardizetheIsraelimilitaryposition.”66

EthridgeandYalcin, theTurkishdelegatewhowasnowchairof thePCC,metwithBen-Gurionandaidestwiceinthecourseofthenextfewdays,disclosingtheir familiarandincompatiblepositions.PrimeMinisterBen-GurionwaswillingtosendrepresentativestomeetaloneortogetherwithArabrepresentativesinaneutralplace,suchasItalyorSwitzerland,buthe“wasunabletomakeanycommitmentregardingrefugeespriortopeacesettlementduringwhichquestionwouldbediscussedandtowardsolution of which Israel would contribute what it could.”67 Ben-GurionrejectedtheinternationalizationofJerusalem,althoughhewaspreparedto consider the “international supervision of holy places,” and heindicatedhisplans“toarguecasebeforeGAinSeptember.”68

Yalcin pointed out to Ben-Gurion that the PCC had been able topersuadeArabsnottomaketalkswithIsraelconditionalonthesolutionoftherefugeeproblem.HenowturnedtotheIsraelileaderrequestinga“conciliatorystatementonrefugeeswithoutresult.”69Inresponse,

Ben-Gurion emphasizedArab statesmadewar on Israel and that PalestineArabswereinvitedbyArabstatestofightIsrael.PeacehasnotyetbeenachievedanditwasnotyetclearArabswishedto liveatpeace. Israelwaswillingtocontribute tosolutionofrefugeeproblem. Such action would be in interest of justice and self-interest of Israel. It woulddepend,howeveronwhetherpeacefulrelationswereestablishedbetweenIsraelandArabstates.70

Inaddition,Ben-GurionrejectedtheinternationalizationofJerusalem

becausetheUNhadfailedtoprotectitinMay1948when“onehundredthousand Jews had been imperiled,” due to destruction in the city.71YalcinremindedBen-Gurionthat“IsraelhasalwayshadworldsympathywhichhasassistedJewsinreachingpromisedland.IfIsraeldeniesArabrights,worldopinionwouldbealienated.IsraelishouldnotlikeHitler,use

methods incompatible with standards western civilization.”72 The primeminister’sresponsewasthat

IsraelhadbeenfaithfultomoralprinciplesandreiteratedIsraelwouldmakeitscontributionbutthatitdependedonArabstatesattimeofpeacesettlement.Ben-Gurionemphaticallydenied Israel expelled any Arabs from Israeli territory and, with considerable emotion,stated“creationofrefugeeproblemwasorganizedplanbyArabstatesorBritishorboth.”Helamentedthecontinuationofwhathedescribedasa“propagandacampaignmagnifyingrefugeeproblemfrom500,000to800,000,wasbeingwagedbythosewhohadinstigatedArabwaragainstIsrael.73

Ben-Gurionemphasized that settlementofPalestinian refugees inArabstateswouldbe“morehumanethaninIsrael.”74WhileBen-Guriondidnotalter his position on repatriation, exceptions were made for GreekCatholic refugeeswhowere tobeallowed to remain in Israel,althoughtheyhadinfiltratedintothecountry.

Israeli records indicate that on June 22, 1949, the Israel foreignminister’sofficeinformedIsraeliofficialEliahuSassoninLausannethat

Israeldesiresasimilararrangementwith theMaronites,and it isproposed to intimate toMubarak that hewould bewelcome to visit Israel, whereupon theMaronite churches inIsrael would be ceremonially handed over to him and an arrangement on the Maroniterefugees would be worked out. Political matters would also be discussed, and the visitwouldservetosilencecriticismofIsraelbytheCatholicChurch.75

As Ethridge was preparing his departure, he sent Acheson a

surprisinglyoptimisticaccount.“Wearebeginningtoseethebeginningofthe end,” hewrote. “After nineweekswe have persuadedArabs to sitdownforpeacetalkswiththeJews.”EthridgerecognizedthatdebateonIsrael’s admission to the UN might delay this process. Listing thearmistice agreements that had either been signed or were in process,Ethridge conceded that the PCC was unable to find a solution for therefugeeproblem.Buthebelieved thathispartners in thePCC—Turkeyand France, and even Britain—would go along with whatever plan theUnitedStatesoffered.SomeanalystsarguedthattheArabpositionwasnot as unyielding as it appeared in official pronouncements. “What theArabstateswantedfromIsraelbeforeengaging innegotiationswastheacceptance of the refugees’ principle right to return or receivecompensation.”76

Ben-Gurion invitedEthridge tomeetwithhimbefore returning to theUnited States to clarify Israel’s rejection of American proposals onrefugees and land. He urged Washington to free itself of the British

influence and to “develop Middle East economically and raise livingstandard throughout the area.”77 According to Ethridge, “Israel had nointentionofrelinquishinganypartofNegev.”78Further,accordingtoBen-Gurion, “if Egypt did notwantGazabecauseof refugees therein Israelwould accept and permit those refugees to return to their homes.”79George McGhee, in reviewing this period during his initiation into therefugeequestion,reportedthatEgyptrejectedtheproposalasit“didnotwant to be accused of trading land for refugees in overcrowdedEgyptproper.”80TothisMcGheeaddedthat“perhapstheyalsofelttheywouldendupwiththerefugeesanyway,andlosethestripinthebargain.”81

Ethridge reported that “Ben-Gurion made no reference to possibleconciliatorystatementbyIsraeliGovernmentrerefugees,”proposingthat“PalestinianandIsraeliArabrefugees”besenttoSyriaorIraq,whichhedescribed as underpopulated.82 Israel, according to this plan, wouldcontribute to compensation for Arab refugees, providing technicalassistanceandallowingfamilyreunification.

McGHEE,THEREFUGEEQUESTION,ANDISRAEL’SRESPONSE

While theU.S.continued to receivenewsof theeffortsofEthridgeandotherPalestineConciliationCommissionmembers,GeorgeMcGheewasmoving into his newposition.McGheepresented the following “PlanofAction”inApril.

Agreement by Israel to repatriate at least 200,000 refugees, pursuant to the GeneralAssemblyResolution,isconsideredanecessaryprecedenttoanyultimateandsatisfactorysolutionoftherefugeeproblem.Thisisnecessarytoreducethetotaltoanumbercapableofassimilationonaself-supportingbasis in theArabcountrieswithina reasonable time,and to provide a favorable atmosphere for assumption by the Arab states of theresponsibilitiesinvolvedintheresettlement.83

Continuing in circumspect language, McGhee referred to Israel’sresponsibility.Inthelightof

large-scale preemption of Arab lands, housing and unemployment possibilities in Israel,primaryattentionshouldbedirectedtosecuringrepatriationofrefugeestothoseformerlypredominantly Arab areas now under Israeli military occupation which are outside theboundariesoftheJewishstateasdefinedintheresolutionofNovember29,1947.84

McGheecalculatedthetotalnumberof“Palestinerefugeesanddestitute

persons”currentlyreceivingreliefas950,000,ofwhom700,000qualifiedas “bonafide displaced persons” who would be either resettled orrepatriated.85

McGheehadnoillusionsastotheirconditionsorimpact,orthestateofArabeconomies,whichwerebynomeans identical.Hebrokedownthe location of such refugees, indicating that “Arab Palestine” had thehighest number with 630,000 refugees, followed by Lebanon with131,000, Transjordan with 99,000, Syria with 85,000, and Iraq with5,000.86 As McGhee pointed out, “if Transjordan acquires all of ArabPalestine, including the Gaza strip, she will have on present figures729,000 refugees, in comparison with an original population of850,000.”87 The result would double the size of the artificial state thatoweditsexistencetotheBritish,asMcGheepointedlyremarked.

Two important developments occurred in this period, one of whichwas not directly related to the armistice talks or the LausanneConference,but it couldhardlyhaveavoided influencing itscourse.OnMay11,theUNGAconsideredIsrael’sadmissiontotheUnitedNations.The United States was cosponsor of the resolution calling for Israel’sadmission,whichpassedbyavoteof37infavorand12opposed,with9abstentions.88

OnMay12,MarkEthridgeinformedSecretaryofStateAchesonthata protocol had been agreed to by Israel and thePCC that opened thedoorstoIsraelitalkswithArabdelegatesthroughtheofficesofthePCC.AsEthridgestated,theprotocolincludeda“mapshowing[19]47partitionlinesbeusedasbaseforterritorialtalks,”whichwasacceptedbyIsraeland Arab delegates.89 The parties, including the Arab states that hadpreviously not recognized the partition resolution,moved to accept themap. However, the protocol did not lead to significant breakthroughsbeyondthis.90

Despite the difficulties in the Israeli–Syrian armistice negotiations,EthridgewaspersuadedthatSyria,aswellasTransjordan,shouldagreeto admit some 400,000 Palestinian refugees, with outside assistance.SomeprogressmightbeintheoffingifIsraelagreedto“take250,000inaddition to thosealready in Israelor final totalof400,000which is lessthannumberunder1947partitionplan.”91

Planningcontinued,aswellas recommendations forpolicies todealwith the refugee crisis, but they yielded little but frustration. A strongly

wordedstatementwassubmitted to the IsraeliprimeministerbyActingSecretary of State James Webb, with the support of Acheson andTruman.TheIsraeliprimeministerandforeignministerconsidereditthe“strongestrepresentationyetsentbyU.S.toIsrael.”92

The Govt of the U.S. is seriously disturbed by the attitude of Israel with respect to aterritorialsettlementinPalestineandtothequestionofPalestinianrefugees,assetforthbytherepresentativesof IsraelatLausanne inpublicandprivatemeetings.AccordingtoDrEytan, the Israeli Govt will do nothing further about Palestinian refugees at the presenttime,although ithasunderconsiderationcertainurgentmeasuresof limitedcharacter. Inconnectionwithterritorialmatters,thepositiontakenbyDrEytanapparentlycontemplatesnotonlytheretentionofallterritorynowheldundermilitaryoccupationbyIsrael,whichisclearly in excess of the partition boundaries ofNov 29, 1947, but possibly an additionalacquisitionoffurtherterritorywithinPalestine.93

According to Webb’s statement, the United States expected Israel to“offer territorial compensation for any territorial acquisition which itexpectstoeffectbeyondthefoundations”establishedintheUNpartitionresolution.94 Webb recalled U.S. support for Israel’s creation “becausetheyhavebeenconvincedof the justiceof thisaspiration.”95TheUnitedStatesnowreliedonIsrael toactontherefugeequestionandtodesistfrommakingexcessiveterritorialclaims.If itdidnot,Webbwarned,“theU.S.GovtwillrespectfullybeforcedtotheconclusionthatarevisionofitsattitudetowardIsraelhasbecomeunavoidable.”96

The statement elicited an equally sharp rejoinder from the Israeliprime minister who challenged the account of Israel’s origins andreminded his critics of the failure of the UN and the United States toprotect thenewstate fromArabassault. “IsraelwasestablishednotonbasisNovember29butonthatofsuccessfulwarofdefense,”theprimeministerasserted.97Ben-Gurionthen

accusedtheDepartmentofStateofignoringtwobasicfactsinitsattitudetoIsrael:(a)thattheStateofIsraelhadcomeintobeingnotasaresultofthePartitionPlan,butowingtoavictoryinthefieldverycostlyincasualtiesandachievedwithnoaideitherfromtheU.S.orfromtheU.N.,and(b)thattheArabrefugeeswereIsrael’spotentialenemiesandthattheirrepatriationwithoutapeaceagreementwouldthreatenIsrael’ssecurity.98

Theweeksthat followedweremarkedbyrepeatedU.S.criticismsof

Israeli positions that, according to Washington, undermined the gainsachieved by the armistice accords. Among Israeli critics was EliasSasson,headoftheMiddleEasternDepartmentoftheForeignMinistry,

whowas “theonlyOriental Jewof senior rank in theForeignMinistry,”which virtually guaranteed him second tier status in the Israeli policyelite.99InSasson’swords,

“the Jews think they can achieve peace without any price—either maximal or minimal.”TheywanttheArabstocedetheterritoryoccupiedbyIsrael;toabsorballtherefugeesintheArabstates; toacceptfrontiermodificationsfavorabletoIsrael tocontrolPalestine, inthesouth,andintheJerusalemarea,towaiverightstotheirpropertyinIsraelinreturnforcompensation tobeassessedby the Israelisand tobepaidoveraperiodofyearsafterpeace agreements have been signed; to institute immediate diplomatic and economicrelationswithIsrael,andsoon,andsoforth.

TheArabs,whileacknowledgingIsraelasanestablishedfact,areinnohurrytoextendofficialrecognitioninviewofthetermssetbytheIsraelis.100

Sasson’sremarkablycandidanalysisoftheEgyptianandArabpositionscontinued, as he reported that the Egyptians were concerned that“recognizing Israelwould strengthennot only the latter but also JordanandIraq,andwoulddisturbthebalanceofpowerintheArabworldtothedetriment of Saudi Arabia, Syria, Egypt and the Lebanon.”101 TheEgyptian view, as related by Abd al-Mun’im, was that under thecircumstancesEgyptianswouldnotmovetorecognizeIsraeluntil ithadbecomesufficientlystrong“militarily,economicallyandtechnologicallytobe able to withstand a separate or collective Israeli, Jordanian or Iraqithreat.”102SassonaddedthatfromanEgyptianperspectivehefelt“itwasdifficulttoquarrelwiththisthesis.”103

Sasson was one of the few officials, including those in the UnitedStates,toadmitthatPalestinianswereneitherconsultednorincludedindeliberationsabout their fate.Ashepointedout,everyone“isexploitingtheir plight towards ends entirely unrelated to the refugees’aspirations.”104 Jordan and Syria were eager to obtain U.S. aid andassistance. Egypt, which was in control of Gaza and its thousands ofPalestinian refugees, remainedunmoved, andSassonattributed this tothe Egyptians’ familiarity with “human suffering, poverty and highmortality in their own country.”105 Sasson, however, did not supportrepatriation. Instead, he favored refugee settlement in Arab countries,whichheclaimedoffered“thebestguarantee fora formalsettlement toevolve into a true and lasting peace,” albeit, one that did not prevent“Israel from using the refugees for positive action which would benefitboththemandIsrael.”106

SassonreportedonaPalestinianproposal,accordingtowhichIsrael

would“annextheArabpartsofPalestine,conditionalonreadmissionofaboutonehundredthousandrefugeesandconfermentofadministrativeautonomyon theseArabareas.”107Therewereotherdimensionsof theproposal.Nonefoundsupport.

In September 1949, Sasson sent a sober memorandum to MosheSharettinwhichheleftfewillusionsastohowArabslookedonIsrael.AsShlomoBen-Amireported,by the fallof1949,Sassonconcludedthat itwas“thecherisheddreamoftheArabstodoawaywiththeStateofIsraelaltogether.”108 Unable to carry that out, the Arab world “opted for arealisticstrategy”thatconsistedofattemptingtoreduceIsrael’ssizeandlimitherregionaleconomicimpact.109

ETHRIDGE’SFINALASSESSMENTS

By mid-June, Mark Ethridge had come to his own dismal conclusionsregardingthefailureofLausanne.

If there is tobeanyassessmentofblame forstalemateatLausanne, Israelmustacceptprimary responsibility. Commission members, particularly U.S. Rep, have consistentlypointedouttoPrimeMinister,ForeignMinister,andIsraelidelegationthatkeytopeaceissome Israeli concession on refugees. USDel prepared memo months ago of minorconcessionswhichcouldbemadewithoutprejudice to Israel’s finalposition,pointingoutthat such concessions would lay the basis for successful talks at Lausanne. Israel hasmademinorconcessionswithreservations,buthassteadfastlyrefusedtomakeimportantones and has refused to indicate either publicly or privately howmany refugees she iswilling to take back and under what conditions. Israel’s refusal to abide by the GAassembly resolution, providing those refugeeswho desire to return to their homes, etc.,hasbeentheprimaryfactorinthestalemate.Israelhasfailedeventostipulateunderwhatconditionsrefugeeswishingtoreturnmightreturn;shehasgivennodefinitionofwhatsheregardsaspeacefulco-existenceofArabsandJewsinIsraelandsheconsistentlyreturnsto the idea that her securitywould be endangered; that she can not bear the economicburdenandthatshehasnoresponsibilityforrefugeesbecauseofArabattacksuponher.Ihave never accepted the latter viewpoint. Aside from her general responsibility forrefugees,shehasparticularresponsibilityforthosewhohavebeendrivenoutbyterrorism,repressionandforcibleejection.110

Ethridgeaddressed Israel’s territorial claimsand the seizureof land

by force.On thecontentiousquestionofwhat todowithGazaand theNegev, Ethridge suggested that the former could become “a basis forsettlementofrefugeeproblemtoextentofIsrael’sresponsibilityandalsoabasisforterritorialsettlement.”111Ethridgethoughtthat,inexchangefor

Gaza,Israelcouldagreetosome“concessionintheNegev.”Gazahadbecomeadestination forPalestinianrefugeesafter Israeli

attacksonLyddaandRamle,buttheIsraeliswerenotinterested,atthetime,inthequidproquoEthridgesuggested.However,theideaofIsraelincorporatingGazawasnotentirelyabandoned.InSeptember1949,theBritish Foreign Office maintained that refugees in Gaza “should bepermitted to return to any part of Israel where they had property orspecial interests and they should be able to earn a livelihood andpresumablyhavefullrightsofcitizenship.”112

Ethridge’s conclusionwas a denunciation of Israel’s policies towardPalestinianrefugees.Theyrevealedthestate’smoralandethicalfailings,andtheyendangeredIsrael’sfutureandthestabilityoftheMiddleEast.

Israelwasstatecreateduponanethicalconceptandshouldrestuponanethicalbase.Herattitudetowardrefugeesismorallyreprehensibleandpoliticallyshort-sighted.Shehasnosecuritythatdoesnotrestinfriendlinesswithherneighbors.ShehasnosecuritythatdoesnotrestuponthebasisofpeaceintheMiddleEast.Herpositionasconquerordemandingmoredoesnotmakeforpeace.Itmakesformoretrouble.113

Israelisandpro-Israeli supporters in theUnitedStatesattributed the

severecriticismsof Israelipolicytothevictoryof thepro-Arabelementsof the State Department overWhite House circles. Such criticism wasblamedforencouragingArabintransigencetowardIsrael.

To contain U.S. pressure on Israel, in June 1949 the IsraeliambassadortotheUnitedNationsmetwithAmericanrepresentativesoftheAmericanJewishCommitteealongwithJacobBlaustein,headoftheU.S. oil company Amoco, and Simon Segal. According to Blaustein’sreport,

It is important that the pro-Arab section of the State Department which again seems tohavewontheupperhand,Mr.DeanRuskbeingthekeypersoninthesituation,shouldbefrustratedand that theJessup formula [to require Israel tocedeorpaycompensation forlandoutsidethatgivenbytheUNpartitionplan],whichonlyencouragestheArabsintheirintransigence,shouldbeabandoned.114

InanothercriticismofU.S.policythatechoedIsrael’sposition,Saadia

Touvalmaintained thatWashington’semphasison the refugeeproblemgaveitprominencethatworkedtotheArabs’advantage.Hearguedthatiteffectivelysubordinatedthequestionofthepoliticalsettlement.115

Washington insiders such asDavidNiles, whowas also concerned

withU.S. pressure on Israel, “informedAmbassador Eban of Truman’sthinking and advised that Israeli President ChaimWeizmann send theU.S. president a letter arguing Israel’s perspective.”116 The plan waseffective.Nileshadbeen in touchwithWeizmann inearlyJune,andbytheendof themonth the Israeli president sent a long letter toTrumandefining the Israeli position and reminding him that Israel had admittedmorethan25,000Palestinianrefugeesandwaspreparedtoimplementafamily reunification plan. Israel was even prepared to work with Arabstatesinthemixedarmisticecommissions,butitwouldnotendangeritsindependenceoracceptwhatitcouldnotaffordtodo.

Weizmanndeclared:

ItwasnotthebirthofIsraelwhichcreatedtheArabrefugeeproblem,asourenemiesnowproclaim,buttheArabattempttopreventthatbirthbyarmedforce.ThesepeoplearenotrefugeesinthesenseinwhichthattermhasbeensanctifiedbythemartyrdomofmillionsinEurope—theyarepartofanaggressorgroupwhichfailedandwhichmakesnosecretofits intention to resumeaggression. They left the country last year at the bidding of theirleadersandmilitarycommandersandaspartoftheArabstrategicplan.117

Weizmann rejected accusations of illegal expansion beyond the 1947boundaries,andheaccusedArabsofhavingrejected the first truce.Tothisheadded that Israeliactionwasa functionof itsself-protection, forwithoutthelandinquestion,Israelwouldbe“defenseless.”GivingupthecorridortoJerusalem,heargued,wouldexposethepopulationtohaving“its water supply cut off and of being starved into submission.”118Weizmanncontinued,pointingtothewesternGalilee:

Inexactly thesameway,WesternGalileeholds thekey to thedefenseofHaifaand theValley of Jezreel, while the Ramley area assures the safety of Tel Aviv from suchmenacing attacks as were launched upon it last year. None of these areas was everallotted to any of the Arab States with which we are now negotiating. All of them areoccupiedbyIsraellegallyunderarmisticeagreements.119

The president of the Nation Associations, Freda Kirchwey, highly

esteemed as a loyal supporter of Israel by Eliahu Epstein and ClarkClifford, wrote to President Truman to express alarm at what shedescribed as “the desire of the Near Eastern Division of the StateDepartment todefeat yourpolicieson thisquestionand tomakeas itsowntheviciouspolicyofForeignMinisterBevinofGreatBritain.”120Sheinformed the president that “there has come into our possessionconclusive evidence that the State Department position has been

inspiredby theoil companies, and that there is active collusionamongtheoilcompanies,theStateDepartment,andGreatBritain.”121KirchweyaccusedU.S.oil companies, includingARAMCOand itsvicepresident,of seeking to undo the partition plan and so informing Arab heads ofstate.

ClarkCliffordattractedother supportersof Israeleager to reach thepresident. Governor Chester Bowles of Connecticut conveyed thecomplaintsofJudgeJosephE.Klau,whodepictedtheStateDepartmentas prone to “anti-Israel and pro-Arab sentiments” that “permeate theentireoperatingstaffoftheDepartment’sMiddleEasterndivisions.”122

In early July, the U.S. consul in Jerusalem submitted his direobservations of the deteriorating situation of the refugees, Israel’s role,andArabreaction.BurdettmadenoattempttomaskhisobservationsofPalestinianconditionsorIsraelipolicies.HereflectedonthehardeningofArab positions and the “reaffirmation of their early conviction that it isimpossibletodobusinesswiththeJews.TheturningpointandoneoftheprincipalcausesofthischangewastheharshtermsexactedbyIsraelinthe‘Triangle.’”123

As Burdett wrote, Palestinian refugees wanted, above all, to returnhome “regardless of the government in control.”124 They viewedthemselvesas“victimsnotonlyoftheUNandIsraelbutofthefailureoftheotherArabStates to liveup to theirboasts.”Burdettdescribed theirsituation, adding thiswarning: “Despondency,misery, lackof hopeandfaith,anddestructionof formerstandardsofvalues,make the refugeesan ideal field for thegrowthof communism.Having losteverything, therosy, although vacuous pictures of a Communist society are a strongtemptation.”125

Israel, as Burdett pointed out, was not prepared to admit any“appreciablenumberofrefugeesexcept,perhaps,inreturnforadditionalterritory.”126 But Burdett went further, adding that “Israel eventuallyintendstoobtainallofPalestine,butbarringunexpectedopportunitiesorinternalcriseswillaccomplishthisobjectivegraduallyandwithouttheuseof force in the immediate future.”127 Israel did not fear U.S. pressurebecause itwas “convinced of its ability to ‘induce’ theUnitedStates toabandon itspresent insistenceonrepatriationof refugeesand territorialchanges.Fromexperienceinthepast,officialsstateconfidently‘youwillchangeyourmind,’andthepresscitesinstancesoftheeffectivenessof

organizedJewishpropagandaintheU.S.”128Burdett predicted that the United States faced two options. U.S.

officialswouldhaveto“employthenecessarypunitivemeasuresagainstIsraeltoforcehertoconsenttoareductioninterritoryandrepatriationofrefugees.” Barring such a policy, the United States would have to“liquidatethePalestineproblem,formedonthepremisethattherefugeeswillnotreturnandthatnoterritorialchangeswilloccur.”129

The drift of policies that the State Department and the presidentrecognizedasunacceptableledfirsttotheselectionofPaulA.Porterasthe U.S. member of the PCC after Ethridge’s resignation. He wasempowered to inform the Israeli government that the administrationwould consider withholding funds allocated to it if its position onrepatriation and territory remained unchanged. The reference was toIsrael’srequestforthe$1millionloanfromtheExport-ImportBank,whichwasmadeshortlyafterindependence.

Some movement on the refugee question began to occur by mid-summer.SignswereconveyedtoIsraelthatitsneighbors“wouldacceptthat the majority of Palestinian refugees were resettled within theirborders.”130 King Abdullah had earlier informed the PCC that he wasprepared to do as much, provided he obtained aid. He informed theIsraelis “that he would absorb all of the refugees on theWest Bank ifIsrael would lend support to the annexation of this area toTransjordan.”131OtherArabstatesalsoindicatedawillingnesstoacceptrefugeesprovidedassistancewasoffered.

OnJuly25,GeneralJohnJ.Hilldring,whowasknowntoIsraelistobea reliable source of information on developments in theWhite House,sent the secretary of state a message informing him that the Israeliconsul general in New York had come to see him to convey Israel’swillingness to accept some 100,000 “Arab refugees,” a figure thatincluded those who were described as already having entered Israelillegally,butexcludinganycurrentlyinGaza.132Thiswasfollowedseveraldays laterbyameetingbetween IsraeliAmbassadorEliahuElath,UrielHeyd, the Israeli first secretary, and Rusk, McGhee, andWilkins. Thismeetingwasdesignedtofurtherclarifythisoffer.133

Israeli records reveal that Sharett, unable to break the StateDepartment’s hold onTruman, contemplated concessions.Heexploredhow the United States would react to a pledge to repatriate 100,000

refugeeswhilemaintainingsufficientdistance from the idea todrop it ifthe U.S. reaction seemed unsatisfactory. Arthur Lourie asked GeneralHildringtosoundoutTrumanonJuly18.Trumanindicatedthathemightsupportanofferof100,000 if itpromised tobreak thedeadlock,butheforbade Hildring from repeating his words. Despite this admonition,Hilldring conveyed Truman’s position to David Niles, who promptlyinformed Lourie, who immediately related the news to Sharett.Encouraged, Sharett formally offered to repatriate 100,000 refugees inexchange forapeace treaty.134Theeffort failed,butnotwithout furtheralienatingtheStateDepartment,whichinformedtheCIA“thatasourceintheWhiteHousehaddivulgedsecretinformationtoIsrael.”135

This was part of a more ambitious attempt to undermine StateDepartment policies with respect to the refugees that had included aneffort to replaceEthridgewithamoresympathetic figure. InAugust thePCC sent a questionnaire to delegates at Lausanne that included thedeclarationthatrefugeesallowedtoreturntoIsraelwouldbecome“ipsofactocitizensofIsraelandthatnodiscriminationwillbepracticedagainstthembothregardingcivilandpoliticalrightsandobligationsimposedonthembylawofland.”136Ofthisandotherdeclarations,includingTruman’sexchangewithIsraeliPresidentWeizmann,nothingcametopass.

OnAugust13,FrazerWilkinshelpedTrumandrafta letter toChaimWeizmannthatconveyedhisdisappointmentwiththeIsraeliresponsetoUNGAResolution194,addingthat“theviewsoftheIsraeliGovernmentmay also be considered as failing to take into account the principlesregarding territorial compensation advanced by the United States asindicated in our Aide-Memoire of June 24.”137 Further, on the basis ofdevelopmentsatLausanne,Trumanwrote,

onemay conclude that the Arab representatives are prepared to enter into negotiationswith the objective of achieving a peace settlement. This conclusionwould appear to bereinforced by the Commission’s communiqué of July 28, which reports that “the Arabdelegations and the delegation of Israel have given express assurances regarding theirintentionstocollaboratewiththeCommissionwithaviewtothedefinitivesettlementofthePalestineproblemandtotheestablishmentofajustandpermanentpeaceinPalestine.”138

At the same time, Truman maintained that the Arab states were

unwillingtoengageIsraeldirectly,asprovidedforintheUNGAresolutionofDecember11,1948.HeexpressedthehopethatnegotiationsheldinLausannemightmakethispossible,ignoringthebilateralencountersthat

hadtakenplacebetweenIsraeliandArabdelegates.Inaddition,Trumanappearedunawarethat,

in1949theArabsdidrecognizeIsrael’srighttoexist,theywerewillingtomeetfacetofaceto negotiate peace, they had their conditions for making peace with Israel, and Israelrejected these conditions because they were incompatible not with her survival as anindependentstatebutwithherdeterminationtokeepalltheterritorysheheldandtoresisttherepatriationoftherefugees.139

FromanIsraeliperspective,relationsbetweentheUnitedStatesand

Israelwereextremely tensebytheendofAugust.AmbassadorElath inhis communications with Foreign Minister Sharett claimed that “theAmericanGovernment isgrowing increasinglybellicoseandAcheson isbeing steadily drawn into the compass of the policy of the militarycircles.”140Elathstated thatU.S.pressureon Israelwas tobeexpectedand, if it deemed necessary, would result in the United States forcingIsrael“toabandonherneutralityandplaceherselfentirelyatthedisposaloftheU.S.”141

But as Elath and Sharett and other Israeli figures understood, theissuewasnotonlyIsrael’sneutralitybutherpositiononrepatriationandterritory.Onbothmatters,Israel’sdelegatetotheLausanneConferencebelieved that Paul Porter, Mark Ethridge’s replacement, was moreamenabletoIsraeliinterests.ThiswasbynomeansthegeneralviewinIsraelicircles,particularlyastheConciliationCommissionwasviewedashostiletoIsraeland,bytheendofSeptember,wasdeterminedtobringthePalestinequestiontotheGeneralAssembly.

Sassonwasinfavorofthecommissionbeingdissolvedbecause“itisevident that theCommission intends to refer thePalestine issue to theAssemblyand to characterize Israel thereasextremistandasguiltyofcontributing to instability in the Middle East.”142 Sasson believed thiswould be followed by recommendations to the General Assembly thatinvolved Israeli withdrawal from territory that would then be given toSyria,Egypt,andJordanwhiletheGeneralAssemblyproceededto“ratifytheannexationoftheArabpartsofPalestinetoJordan.”143

Sasson’s solution was that Israel not participate in the forthcomingNewYork sessionof theConciliationCommission, thusmaking it clearthatIsraelrejecteditsproposalsasrepresentingtheinterestsofthethreepowers whose delegates sat on the commission and not the UnitedNations.SassondenouncedLausanneas

seekingsimultaneoussolutionstotherefugee,territorialandpeaceissues,[that]wouldofnecessity be inimical to Israel’s interests: Israelwould be required tomake concessionsunacceptable to her, theArabswould harden their positions and the path to permanentpeacewouldbecomestilllongerandmoretortuous.144

U.S.Ambassador to Israel JamesMcDonaldwas frankly depressed

by what he sensed was his marginalization in the policymakingestablishment. McDonald was convinced that Washington did not paysufficientattentiontoIsrael’ssituation,andMarkEthridgewasfrustratedbywhat he viewed as Israel’s relentless intransigence.BothMcDonaldand Ethridge were puzzled, frustrated, and even embittered by U.S.policy,leadingthemtoquestionitsnatureandpurpose.

McDonald’s encounter with Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson inthelatesummerof1949shedsomelightonthatpolicy.Asthedefensesecretary observed, Washington regarded Israel as useful from astrategic point of view, but Johnson thought it ought to do somethingmoreonthesubjectofrefugees.Johnsonsaidnomoreonthisoccasion,butonMay16,1949,hisviewsofIsrael’simportancetoU.S.securityintheMiddleEastwereclearlyarticulated.TheywouldnothavecomfortedEthridge,buttheymightwellhaveconsoledMcDonald.

13TheViewfromthePentagonandthe

NationalSecurityCouncil

Indeed, it was not the view of the secretary of defense alone but theviews of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) with respect to Israel thatcontributed to defining U.S. policy in the aftermath of Israel’sindependence,markinganewphaseofU.S. policy in theMiddleEast.Created under FranklinD.Roosevelt (FDR) to advise the president onmatters related to “the strategic direction of the armed forces of theUnitedStates,” the JCS continued to play an important role in postwarU.S.policy.1

In 1947, when the question of partition was being discussed anddisputed in Washington, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were on record asopposed to such a policy. Their position was that it “would prejudiceUnited States strategic interests in the Near and Middle East” to theextentthat“UnitedStatesinfluenceintheareawouldbecurtailedtothatwhichcouldbemaintainedbymilitaryforce.”2Further,theywarnedofitsimpactonthestatesoftheregion,aswellasontheSovietUnion,whoseinfluence they predicted would increase if the United States endorsedpartition. With the deterioration of conditions in Palestine followingpassage of the UNGA partition resolution, the alternative option oftrusteeshipwasunderdiscussion.TheJCSwereagainconsultedas totheforcesthatwouldbenecessarytocarryoutsuchapolicy.

The trusteeship option did not go beyond discussion, as has beendetailedinpreviouschapters.Instead,itwastheeventsofMay14,1948,(Israel’s declaration of independence and the departure of Britain fromPalestine)thataffectedU.S.policy.Morespecifically,theperformanceof

the Israelimilitarycompelledreconsiderationof thePalestiniansituationbytheU.S.militaryaswellasbytheDepartmentofState.

TheJCSconcededthatIsrael’semergencehadalteredthebalanceofpowerintheregion,whichledtoanotherconcern—namely,theinfluenceof theUSSR in the new state.Attentionwas now focused on securingIsrael’s pro-western and pro-American orientation as a prelude tointegrating it into U.S. regional policy. This objective overruled otherdimensionsofU.S.policy,suchastheprioremphasisonobtainingIsraeliagreementtocarryoutUNGAResolution194,withitsrecommendationswith respect to refugees, territory, and Jerusalem.Neither the JCS northe State Department explicitly abandoned the policy, but thereassessmentwasaccompaniedbyapurposeful lesseningof pressureon the Israeli government with respect to compliance with the UNresolution. The result gave rise to accusations of confusion andcontradictions in U.S. policy from those both within and outside of thepolicyframework.Itwasneither.

What,then,wasbehindthesedevelopments?

DEFININGU.S.INTERESTSINISRAEL

Throughout 1948 and 1949, the Defense Department focused on theimportanceofmaintainingthepro-westernorientationoftheoil-producingstates and ensuring U.S. access both to their oil and to U.S. defensearrangements, as in the case of the Dhahran base in Saudi Arabia.Israel’s emergence did not lead to a break in contractual relationsbetween theoilproducing regimesandU.S.oil companies.But Israel’semergence did alter the dynamics of power in the region, and thisaffectedbutdidnotdisruptArabrelationswiththeUnitedStates.3

As officials of the Defense Department reconsidered their earliercritical assessment of partition and statehood in the wake of Israel’sindependence, theyconcludedthat thenewstatemeritedrecognitionofitssovereigntyandmilitarycapacity,which they judgedtobesecondtothat of Turkey in the Middle East, which rendered it useful in U.S.regionalplanning.

Such calculations were offset by concern with Israel’s politicalorientation, and specifically its neutralist stance toward theUSSR. Theorigins of Israel’s position were understood in terms of the Israeli

concernsregardingSovietJewry’semigrationandthecontinuationoftheSovietUnion’sfuelexportstoIsrael.ButU.S.prioritiesrestedonturningIsraelawayfromtheSovietUnionandtowardtheUnitedStatesandtheWest.

In July 1948, the Joint Strategic Plans Committee issued a reportwhose purpose was to determine whether the Joint Chiefs of StaffbelievedtheUnitedStatesanditsallieswerecapableofprotectingU.S.oil interests in theMiddleEast. In theeventofwar, theJCSstatedthat“theAllies do not at present have the capability of securing theMiddleEastoilresourcesinitiallyintheeventofhostilities.AlliedforcescandenytheuseofthisoiltotheenemyandcanlaterregaintheseresourcesasadditionalAlliedforcesbecomeavailablefordeployment.”4

Radicalchangesintheregionalteredthisassessmentwithinamatterofmonths.InamemorandumfromthechiefofstaffoftheU.S.AirForceto the JointChiefsofStaff on “U.S.Strategic Interest in Israel,” theAirForcestatedthatthebalanceofpowerhaddramaticallychangedduetoIsrael’s emergence as a new state in the region. The U.S. militaryrecognizedIsrael’svalueintermsofoilanddefenseandtheexclusionoftheUSSRfromtheMiddleEast.5

TheMarch7,1949,memorandumbythechiefofstaffoftheU.S.AirForcedescribedthesituationintheMiddleEastinthefollowingterms.

(2)ExistingJointChiefsofStaffpolicyonthissubjectappearsnowtohavebeenovertakenbyevents.ThepowerbalanceintheNearandMiddleEasthasbeenradicallyaltered.AtthetimethestateofIsraelwasforming,numerousindicationspointedtoitsextremelyshortlifeinthefaceofArabLeagueopposition.However,IsraelhasnowbeenrecognizedbytheUnitedStatesandtheUnitedKingdom, is likelysoontobecomeamemberof theUnitedNations, and has demonstrated by force of arms its right to be considered the militarypowernextafterTurkeyintheNearandMiddleEast.6

Then,remarkingonBritain’spastroleinthe“strategicallyimportantareaofPalestine,”theAirForcechiefofstaffconcludedthattheUnitedStateswasnowpoisedtobenefitfromitssupportofIsrael.

(3)ThestrategicallyimportantareaofPalestineconstitutedanimportantBritishbaseintherecent past, and presumably remains of strategic importance although lost to Britishcontrol.Thepossibilityexists that,as the resultof itssupport to Israel, theUnitedStatesmight now gain strategic advantages from the new political situation. At a minimum, itappears that theUnitedStatesshouldpursueavigorouspolicyaimedatpreventinganyaccrualofmilitaryadvantagestotheUSSRinIsrael.7

This statement leaves the erroneous impression that the British

acceptedtheir lossofPalestine,whichtheycouldnotaffordtodogiventheirregionalinterestsandPalestine/Israel’scentrallocation.Asidefromrecognizing Israel’s military superiority, the British continued toappreciatetheimportanceofPalestine’slocationinaregionwheretheirmilitary and political power remained significant, such as in Egypt andIraq.BothBritishandAmericanmilitaryplannersconsideredthattheareaofPalestine,nowpartitioned,“wouldbecomeeitherakeybattlegroundorattheveryleast,anareathroughwhichtheirvitalcommunicationswouldhavetopass.”8SofarastheBritishwereconcerned,“inanemergency,Britainwouldneed todeploy its (and laterCommonwealth) troops,withalltheirlogisticsupportsystems,throughandonIsraeliterritory,withoutanyhindrancefromthelocalarmedforcesorpopulation.”9

That option presented major problems in light of Britain’s pastrelationswithJewishforcesinPalestineanditslong-standingoppositionto theestablishmentof theJewishstate.Suchconsiderations interferedwiththepossibility,entertainedbysomeBritishofficials,ofestablishingaBritishbaseinIsrael.10Manyyearslater,KennethCondit’sofficialhistoryof the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff recounted the view of GeneralVandenberg.

Israel,hesaid,hademergedasanindependentstateandasamilitarypowerintheMiddleEastsecondonlytoTurkey.ItwaspossiblethattheUnitedStates,asaresultofitssupportofIsrael,mightgainstrategicadvantagesintheMiddleEastthatwouldoffsettheeffectsofthedeclineofBritishpowerinthatarea.Herequested,therefore,thattheJCSrestudyU.S.strategicobjectiveswithregardtoIsraelandprepareanewstatementofJCSviewstobetransmittedtotheDepartmentofState.11

What rapidly emerged from these evaluations was the Defense

Department’s desire to ensure Israel’s pro-western, pro-Americanorientation. In the days and weeks that followed, other questionsconcerning U.S. policy were raised by prominent U.S. policymakers,including questions related to Israel’s expansion and rejection ofrepatriation.

CONTRARYVOICESONU.S.POLICYANDPURPOSE

Thememorandum by the chief of staff of the U.S. Air Force that wasissued onMarch 7, 1949, called for a policy toward Israel designed toensure that the USSR gained no advantage in that country. In mid-March, the secretary of state was asked by Israel to consider trainingIsraeli forces. TheUnited States turned down, this request although: itreflectedaleveloftrustincompatiblewiththeseverityofU.S.criticismofIsrael’srejectionoftherecommendationsofUNGAResolution194.

OnMarch16,1949,SecretaryofStateAchesontooknoteofIsrael’srequestfor“permissiontosendacertainnumberofofficerstotheUnitedStates for training. Giving such permission could be one way ofencouragingIsraeltowardsaWesternorientation.”12

Several days later, the “top secret” page in the Rusk–McClintockpapersonPalestineofMarch19,1949,openedwith thestatement thatnochangesweretobemadewithrespecttoboundaries“withoutIsrael’sfreeconsent.”ThiswasfollowedbytheobservationthatIsrael’sterritorialclaimswere tobekeptwithin theprescribed limitsof theNovember29,1947,UNGAResolution181.Butthereminderthatnochangesweretobemade without Israel’s approval was an example of U.S. deferral toIsrael. It was similar to the approach recommended by Lovett indiscussing the U.S. position on territorial changes concerning Israel inlate November 1948. As Lovett calculated at the time, the change inregional conditions occasioned by Israel’s emergence necessitated acorrespondingchangeinU.S.policy.

In themidst of these developments, assistant secretary of state forUnited Nations Affairs Dean Rusk sent Dean Acheson explicitsuggestions in anticipation of Acheson’s meeting with Sharett. Ruskreported that, according to Ethridge, “without pressure placed by theUnitedStatesonIsraeltherecanbenogoodresultfromtheworkofhisCommission.”13 The expectation, then, was that the secretary of statewouldapply thenecessarypressure.What likelihoodwasthere that theIsraeligovernmentwouldyieldtosuchpressure?

Rusk identified the three issuesAchesonwas to raisewithSharett:issuesbearingonterritory,refugees,andJerusalem.Achesonwasalsourged to follow along the lines presented by Philip Jessup, then U.S.representative at theUnitedNations.Restating theU.S. position,Ruskurged that “Israel should make appropriate territorial compensation foranyterritoryitseekstoretainbeyondthatallottedtotheJewishstateby

theNovember29 resolution.”14On thequestionof Jerusalem,Achesonwas to remind the Israeli official that “the United States Governmentfirmly supports the principle of the internationalization of the Jerusalemarea, as recommended by the General Assembly resolutions ofNovember29,1947andDecember11,1948.”15Onrefugeerepatriation,Ruskstatedthat

the United States Government is deeply concerned by the problem represented by the800,000Palestine refugees. TheUnitedStates is counting heavily upon Israel to play amajor role in the solution of this problem, not only in offering financial assistance in theresettlement of these refugees who do not desire to return to Israel, but also in therepatriationtoIsraelofasubstantialnumberoftherefugees.16

OnApril 5,Acheson repeatedWashington’spositionon the refugee

question toForeignMinisterSharett, indicating thepresident’s concern.OnApril 9,Acheson receiveda telegram from theU.S.delegate to thePalestineConciliationCommittee(PCC)complainingofIsrael’sposition.OnApril20,itwasEthridgewhosentnewsoftheIsraeliprimeminister’srejectionoftheU.S.andUNpositions.Theseeffortsyieldednotangibleresults.

Throughout this period, other communications betweenWashingtonandTel Aviv had an entirely different cast. Israeli records indicate thatMajor GeneralWilliam J. Donovan, “former head of the U.S. Office ofStrategic Services, visited Israel in April 1949.”17 There were othervisitors, includingJohnHilldringandFranklinRooseveltJr., thenaU.S.congressman,whovisitedintheearlysummer.Itisnottheprivatevisitsbutthoseofthemilitarythataremostofinterest.MajorGeneralDonovanwasclearly interestedintheIsraeli/Palestinianquestion.Inthewinterof1948, when Eliahu Epstein was circulating the Jewish Agency’s notes,Donovan was identified as being among those who had expressed aninterestinseeingthem.

AttheendofApril,anotherresponsetoIsrael’srequestfortechnicalassistance came, this time from the chief of naval operations.OnApril27, 1949, the chief of naval operations sent the JointChiefs of Staff amemorandum on the provision of technical assistance to Israel. It wasprefacedbythestatementthattodatetherehadnotbeenaformalpolicystatementon Israel: “anexpressionby the JointChiefsofStaff of theirviewswith respect to that country is appropriate, and should bemadeavailable to the Secretary of State.”18 The declassified copy of this

memorandumcontainedbothavoidedpageanda“corrected”text,whichrevealeddifferentformulationsofthesamestatementofobjectives.Thevoidedparagraphisworthconsideringforitsgreaterprecision:

Because of United States strategic interests in Israel, it would be desirable for herorientationtowardtheUnitedStatestobefosteredandforhermilitarycapabilitytobesuchastomakeherusefulasanallyintheeventofwarwithourmostprobableenemy.Most[difficulttoread]ofthesepointsjustifyfavorableconsiderationofeventualestablishmentofaUnitedStatesmilitarymissiontoIsrael.19

Thesanitizedversionofthesamepassagewasabridgedasfollows:

BecauseofUnitedStatesstrategicinterests,itwouldbedesirabletofostertheorientationof Israel toward theUnitedStates. Thismay justify favourable consideration of eventualestablishmentofaUnitedStatesmilitarymissioninIsrael.20

Inpractice,theU.S.militaryopposedthepresenceofamilitarymissioninIsrael at this stage, much as it was wary of providing technicalassistance, arguing that it was unnecessary and undesirable lest itembroiltheUnitedStatesintheongoingArab–Israeliconflict.

Fromthemilitarypointofview,however,establishmentofamilitarymissiontoIsraelwouldbe inadvisable until after conditions with respect to Israel and the Arab League havebecome so stabilized that risk of further conflict in that area is remote, otherwise, theUnited States would be exposed to the possibility of overt involvement in Jewish-Arabconflict.

It appears that the Israeli Army is not now in dire need of any foreign technicalassistance in its organization and training. Further, our strategic interests in the MiddleEastwouldunquestionablysuffer if Israelshouldbecomeinvolved inaresumptionof thearmedconflictwithherneighborsafterourestablishmentofamilitarymissionthere.21

Despite their reservations, the U.S. military’s positive view of Israelremained: “theJointChiefsofStaffhave recognized thatUnitedStatespolicy toward Israel isoneof friendlysupport.”22Moreover, thequestionofmilitaryassistancewasofferedstrictlyfromamilitarypointofviewand“withoutspecificknowledgeastowhatthelimitsofpresentgovernmentalpolicymaybe.”23Thoselimitshadbeenamplyclarified,asdiscussioninthefirstpartofthischaptermakesclear.

MAY16,1949,SECRETARYOFDEFENSE:U.S.STRATEGICOBJECTIVESINISRAEL

OnMay16,1949,closetothefirstanniversaryofIsraeli independence,theJointChiefsofStaffissuedamajorreassessmentofitspolicytowardIsrael, leavingnodoubtas to itsappreciationof thenewstate’s role inU.S.MiddleEastpolicy.

TheJointChiefsofStaffprepareda“StudyofUnitedStatesStrategicObjectives in Israel,” which led Defense Secretary Louis Johnson torecommend that the National Security Council (NSC) undertake toreexamine its own policy toward Israel. Johnson had replaced formerDefense Secretary James Forrestal, who—as others in the DefenseDepartmentaswellastheStateDepartment—hadbeenopposedtoU.S.supportforthepartitionofPalestineandadditionallyopposedtoitsroleindomestic politics. The May 16 JCS statement was issued in a verydifferentenvironment.

Johnson’s memorandum to the NSC described the JCS study asrestingoncertain viewsconcerning theEasternMediterraneanand theMiddleEast thathavea “bearingonUnitedStatesstrategic interests inthenewStateofIsrael.”24Firstamongthemwastheaxiomaticassertionof the importanceof theregion toU.S.security,andallied to itwas theassuranceoftheexclusionoftheUSSR.25

Israel’s strategic importance was defined in terms of its location,militarycapacityincludingbases,andpoliticalorientation.Discountedasamajorbasearea,itwasviewedpositivelyinlightofitsairfieldsandairbases, as well as its harbor in Haifa and its experienced military; thelatterwaskeytotherevisedassessmentofIsrael’sroleinU.S.policy.

First,then,wasthequestionoflocation.

The direct land routes (road and rail) between Turkey and the Cairo-Suez area passthrough Israeli territory. In addition, the main land routes from the Caspian area of theUSSRandfromIraq,Iran,andSaudiArabiatoEgyptandtheLevantpassthroughornearIsrael’s territory,asdothepipelinesfromtheMiddleEastoilareasto theMediterranean.Israel controls the land approaches to the Cairo-Suez area from the east, the borderbetween Israel and Egypt being about one hundred and fifty miles east of the SuezCanal.26

Second,wasthequestionofbases.AlthoughtheU.S.militarydidnot

envision Israel as the location of a major base, as the secretary ofdefenseargued,Israeldidpossess

afine,butsmall,artificialharboratHaifa,andanexcellent,althoughlimitedsystemofwell-developedairfieldsandairbases.Inourhands,theseairinstallationswouldbemostuseful

in the interdiction of the lines of communication from the USSR to the Middle East oilresourceswithmediumandshort-rangeaircraft.27

Israel was unprepared to give Washington any guarantees with

respect tomilitarybases,although in thewinterof 1949 IsraeliForeignMinister Moshe Sharett explained to U.S. Supreme Court Judge FelixFrankfurter thatgivenIsrael’s tiestoU.S.Jewrytherewasnocauseforalarm. Sharett claimed that “the very existence of U.S. Jewry affordssuch a guarantee, for Israel would never imperil her ties with the fivemillionAmericanJews.”28

TheU.S.military recognized that “thenewStateof Israel hasclosetieswith theUnited States because of our large and influential Jewishminority and is geographically well separated from Soviet-dominatedcountries.”29 The JCS conceded that “Israel’s foreign policy can atpresentbeconsideredpro-Westernalthoughnotnecessarilyanti-Soviet.However, Israel’s policy is one of neutrality in the ‘cold war.’”30 Whatreassured the JCSwas that “Israel’s leaders have stated privately thattheirsympathiesliewiththeWestbutthatforthepresentitisnecessaryforIsraelpubliclytoassumea‘neutral’position,”theexplanationrestedinIsrael’sdependenceonSovietsupportat theUNand toensureJewishemigrationfromtheSovietbloc.31

It wasSharett who, in June, invitedAndreiGromyko, deputy to theforeignminister in theUSSR and head of the Soviet delegation at theUN,tovisit Israel.Suchavisit,heobserved,“willservetorefuteSovietchargesofIsraelipro-westernorientationarisingfromfrequentreciprocalAmerican-Israelivisits.”32Thesamevisit,ifknowntoU.S.officials,wouldservetoconfirmtheirfearswithrespecttoIsraeli–Sovietrelations.

Third,andperhapsmostimportantintheJCSreevaluationofIsrael’sstrategic importance, was the designation of its military force aspotentiallycritical toU.S.policy intheregion.Thedescriptionof Israel’s“indigenousmilitaryforces,whichhavehadsomebattleexperience,”andwhich could be important in any attempt to establish control over theEasternMediterranean andMiddle East, was key to theU.S.military’sreevaluation.33InthefaceofaSovietattemptto“secureorneutralizetheoil facilities of the Middle East and to operate against the Cairo-Suezbasearea,”Israel’spositionanditsforceswouldbecritical.

Fromtheviewpointoftacticaloperations,Israel’sterritoryanditsindigenousmilitaryforces,

which have had some battle experience, would be of importance to either theWesternDemocraciesortheUSSRinanycontestforcontroloftheEasternMediterranean-MiddleEastarea. It isestimated that insuchacontest theUSSRhas thecapability,andwouldprobablyattempttosecureorneutralizetheoilfacilitiesoftheMiddleEastandtooperateagainst theCairo-Suez base area. The final line of strong defensive possibilities for thedefense of the Cairo-Suez area is at the Jordan rift. Should Israel ally herself with theWesternDemocraciesintheeventofwarwiththeUSSR,fulladvantagecouldbetakenofdefensivepositionsinthatcountryandofIsrael’sforcesforthedefenseoftheCairo-Suezareaand for landoperations to defendor to recapture theMiddleEast oil facilities.ThecooperationofIsraelwouldbeofconsiderableassistancetotheWesternDemocraciesinmeetingmaximumSovietcapabilities inthePalestinearea.Israel,asanallyorafriendlyneutral,wouldenabletheUnitedStatestousetheCairo-AlexandrettarailwayforalimitedtimefortheshipmentofsuppliestoTurkey.Israelasanunfriendlyneutralwoulddenyustheseadvantages.34

FourthwastheemphasisontheimportanceofresolvingAnglo-AmericandifferencesandcoordinatingpolicywiththeBritish.Tothiswasaddedthepossibilityofpromoting the formationofaNATO-likepact,whichwouldincludeTurkey,Greece, Israel,andpossiblyArabstates, irrespectiveofArab opposition. Reasons were plainly cited. Despite anticipated Arabopposition due to Israel’s presence, “the strategic location andmilitarystrengthofthelattermakeitalmostmandatorythatIsraelbeamember,providing theparticipationofSaudiArabiaand Iran isnotprecludedbysuchaction,ifthepactisaimedtoresistSovietaggression.”35

TheMay 16memorandumbySecretary ofDefense Johnson to theNational Security Council’s executive secretary left no doubt about thedefense secretary’s appreciation of Israel’s potential in a U.S. regionalstrategy. Johnson understood that criticism of Israeli policies on therefugeequestiondidnotprecludesupportforotherdimensionsofU.S.–Israeli relations. As Johnson had told JamesMcDonald in their casualencounter when the U.S. ambassador was in Washington, “Israel isimportantstrategicallyandwemustsupporther.Buttheyoughttotrytotakesomemorerefugeesin.”36

At the end of May, however, JamesWebb, the acting secretary ofstate,deliveredamessageofseverecriticismconcerningIsraelipoliciestoTelAviv,whichelicitedasimilarlystrong reply from the Israeliprimeminister.Suchcriticalexchangeswouldcontinueinthecomingweeks.Inmid-June,Achesonaskedthesecretaryofdefenseforhisassessmentoftherefugeeproblemintermsof“USmilitaryandstrategicinterestsintheNearEast.”37

JohnsonconveyedtheviewsoftheJointChiefsofStaff,andthoseofthenationalmilitaryestablishment.Theirconcernwasa functionof “thestrategic importance of the Middle East to the U.S. and its securityinterests.”38 Oil and war were at the heart of U.S. planning, and oilrequiredfriendlyrelationswithAraboilproducingstates. In thiscontext,the refugee problem was seen as a source of instability and politicalinsecurity.

Johnson’spronouncementsweresimilartothoseofhispredecessor,JamesForrestal,whohadinformedthechairoftheHouseCommitteeonForeign Affairs in January 1949 that themilitary was in full support ofState Department policy on aiding Palestinian refugees. At the time,ForrestalhadpointedtopreviousreportsfromBrigadierGeneralWilliamRiley,U.S.M.C.,whowasassignedas thechiefofstaffofUNMediatorRalph Bunche, as additional evidence of the thinking of highly placedmembersof theU.S.militaryon the refugeequestion.Themilitarywasconcerned with the destabilizing potential of the refugee situation andcalledforassistancetoalleviatetheircondition.39

In August 1949, the Defense Department supported the StateDepartment’sapprovalofarmssalestoIsraelandArabstates,whichhadhitherto been prohibited by UN agreement. In consideration of thearmistice agreements signed by Israel and Lebanon, Egypt, andSyria,theSecurityCouncilconcludedthattheexistingtrucearrangementswereto be superseded by arms sales to the states concerned. The StateDepartment followed suit, and export licenses were subsequentlygranted.

Washington was aware of Israel’s reliance on Czech arms, whichsomearguedeterminedtheoutcomeofthefirstphaseofthe1948war.40TheStateDepartment was also aware of Israeli efforts to obtain armsfrom other Eastern European states and from the Soviet Union itself.IsraelhadturnedtotheUSSRformilitaryassistanceinthefallof1948,when Israeli military attaché Yohanan Ratner met with Soviet GeneralSerev to request Soviet military manuals and the possibility of Soviettraining of Israeli officers. This was followed by the Israeli request topurchaseGermanwarmaterielcapturedbySoviettroopsduringthewar.At the time, Ivan Bakulin, head of theDepartment ofMiddle andNearEastern Countries of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, counseledagainstsuchatransfer,remindingtheIsraelisoftheUNembargo.41

One year later, on October 4, 1949, the Israelis again turned toBakulin,thistimewiththerequest“thatI.D.F.officersincertainbranchesbeallowedtostudytheorganizationof theRedArmy.”42 Inresponsetothe“notionthattheI.D.F.wastobeorganizedontheAmericanmodel,”Sharett’s reply was “inconceivable at G.H.Q.,” which he proceeded toexplain.AsidefromtheobviousdifferencesbetweentheU.S.andIsraelimilitary, Sharett emphasized “the combination of agricultural work withmilitary training, andof centrally based striking forceswith a peripheralbeltofdefensivesettlements.”43

Condit’saccountindicates“thatIsraelwantedtohirealimitednumberof U.S. Army reserve or retired regular officers as advisers in militaryorganization to the Israeli Army.”44 The JCS opposed it at the time asinappropriategivenexisting tensionsand the riskofwarbetween IsraelandtheArabstates.

InearlyApril1950,theU.S.MunitionsBoardclaimedthatIsraelhadlately been requesting “not only surplus munitions in commercialchannels,butmanyitemsofthemostadvancedtypesinusebytheU.S.Forces.”45A list followed.46 Inareportat theendof thesamemonthbythe Joint Strategic Plans Committee, the United States defined itsposition on arms shipment to Israel as including only that considered“necessary to help Israel maintain internal order and provide forlegitimatedefense.”47

On May 5, 1950, the JCS opposed the release to Israel of theequipmentlistedbytheMunitionsBoardasbeinginexcessofthestate’slegitimaterequirementsfordefense.48

THENATIONALSECURITYCOUNCIL,OCTOBER1949

SixmonthsaftertheJointChiefsofStaffissuedtheirreportaffirmingtheimportanceofIsraeltoU.S.policy,theNationalSecurityCouncilfollowedsuit. “A Report to the President by the National Security Council onUnitedStatesPolicyTowardIsraelandtheArabStates,”issuedOctober17, 1949,was approved by the president onOctober 20.49 Its purposewas to “define and assess the policy which the United States shouldfollow toward Israel and the Arab States, with particular reference toproblemsarisingoutoftherecenthostilitiesinPalestine.”50

In its comprehensive survey, the NSC reviewed the history of the

conflict and ensuing UN resolutions, affirming U.S. support for Israel’sindependence while criticizing its policies on boundaries and refugeerepatriation.Recognizing the stark imbalance of power in the area, theNSC attributed Arab weakness to the absence of effective politicalleadership,aggravatedbytheperpetuationofthePalestineconflictandapreoccupationwithmilitaryasopposedtoeconomicdevelopment.

Withoutcomment,theNSCstatementcomparedthesizeoftheareaofPalestineassignedtotheJewishzonebyUNGAResolution181withthatforPalestinianArabs.Insodoing, itrecognizedtheextenttowhichIsrael had expanded its territorial control since the initial UN partitionresolution,anditsimpactonthenumberofPalestinianrefugees.

4a. The area of the Jewish State as contemplated under the General Assemblyresolutionwasapproximately5,600squaremiles,theareaoftheArabstate4,400squaremiles.TheproposedpopulationoftheJewishStatewasapproximately550,000Jewsand500,000 Arabs; that of the Arab state, 745,000 Arabs and 10,000 Jews; and that ofJerusalem,100,000Arabsand100,000Jews.

b. At the present time, the total area of Palestine under Israeli control or militaryoccupationisestimatedat7,750squaremiles.ThepresentpopulationofIsraelconsistsofapproximately800,000Jewsand70,000to100,000Arabs.JewishimmigrantshavebeenenteringIsraelattherateof25,000monthlysinceMay15,1948.

c.Asaresultof thehostilities,some700,000PalestinianArabs fledorwereexpelledfromIsraeli-controlledterritory.TheytookrefugeinareasofPalestineunderArabmilitaryoccupation and in the neighboringArab states. ThePalestinianArabs, togetherwith theArab populations of the independent Arab states of the Near East, number about35,000,000.51

TheNSC reviewed the U.S. response to these developments in its

supportof theUNcease fireofMay29,1948; theUNtruceofJuly15,1948; the creation of the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) inNovember 1948; and the PCC. It echoed State Departmentpronouncementsonrepatriationandcompensation,describingtheIsraeligovernment as “intensely nationalistic” and under pressure from its“extremist elements,” which rendered the prospect of compromiseunlikely.

U.S. officials came to suspect that the Israeli government exploitedthethreatofextremistactionsinitsexchangeswithWashington.Israel’sthreatening response to the possibility of aSyrian–Iraqi unionwas onesuchcase.ItaroseinconversationbetweenGeorgeMcGheeandEliahu

Elathasthelatterwarnedthatsuchaneventcouldleadto“graveinternalrepercussions in Israel. The extremist elements might well regard theunionasjustificationforactionbyIsraeltoannexEasternPalestine.TheGovernment,whichwouldbeextremelyhardpressedbytheextremists,would be placed in a most difficult position.”52 According to the U.S.record,theIsraeliforeignministerinformedtheU.S.ambassadortoIsraelthat if any such union occurred “it would be idle [to] pursue peaceobjectiveswhensurroundedbyanearthquake.”53

In a mid-November exchange between U.S. and British officials onthe subject, the British explained that the post–World War I “territorialsettlement”was responsible for “artificial territorial divisionswhichhavebeencontinuouslyresented.”54Theresultwasadesireforunionthatwaslinked to overall reform, which the UK did not want to appear to beblocking.McGhee claimed to agree but let it be known that theUnitedStatesopposedaSyrian–Iraqiunionasinauspiciousanduntimely.WashedeferringtoIsrael’swarnings?

TheOctober1949NSCreportcalledattentiontothestrikingcontrastbetween Israeli and Arab economic conditions and prognoses fordevelopment. It was candid in attributing Israel’s advanced technicalskills to western, especially U.S., assistance and in predicting that theabsence of comparable assistance to Arab states would contribute toexacerbatingthetensionbetweenIsraelanditsneighbors.Inaddition,itpointed to Israel’s long-term dependence on western assistance toenableittocopewithitsimmigrationprogram,whichriskedleadingittoexpandbeyonditscurrentborders.

AsinthecaseoftheDefenseDepartment,theNSCpraisedthenewstate’smilitary:

Israel’smilitaryestablishment,althoughsmall, isarelativelymodernandeffectivefightingmachine which has proved itself adequate to resist the poorly equipped, ill-trained andbadlyledarmiesoftheArabLeaguestatesinthecourseofrecenthostilitiesandtooccupyconsiderableterritorybeyondthatawardedunderthepartitionplan.ItcanbeexpectedthatthefutureeffectivenessoftheIsraeliArmywillincreasewiththeimplementationofcurrentplansfortrainingandreorganization.55

In turning to the Arab states, the NSC pointed to “competing

nationalisms and personal and dynastic rivalries” that rendered themvulnerableto“extremistelementsandtheimpositionofauthoritarianandunrepresentative forms of government.”56 The assessment linked these

conditions to inadequate development, which had been aggravated bythePalestinianproblem.As the report’s authorsunderstood, until therewasasolutionofthePalestineproblem,Arabregimeswouldbeobligedto put their resources and efforts into shoring up theirmilitary sectors,ignoringtheurgenteconomicandsocialneedsofthecountriesinvolved.

The NSC report acknowledged the extensive role of the UnitedKingdom in the past, but it said nothing about British or Frenchresponsibilityforblockingeconomicdevelopment,orforprovidinginferiormilitary equipment, as in the case of the British in Egypt. At the sametime,Washington supported continued French colonial control in NorthAfrica.U.S.officialswerekeenlyawareofthedesireonthepartofArabregimesforcloserrelationswithWashington,whichwascompatiblewiththe U.S. objective of promoting “the resumption of commercialintercoursewithinandthroughthearea,uninterruptedflowofpetroleumproducts, and uninhibited operation of and access to internal andinternationalsurfaceandairtransportfacilities.”57

Before its concluding remarks, the NSC report addressed the U.S.role,pointingout that“U.S.policy towardIsraelandtheArabstateswillbeanimportant factor indeterminingwhethertheycanbestimulatedtoconstructiveactions in theirownbehalf toprovidethebasis forastableandprogressivepoliticalstructureandabalancedandviableeconomy.”58Reiterating previous U.S. positions with respect to Israel and therepatriationofPalestinian refugees, territorialexpansion,compensation,and the internationalization of Jerusalem, the NSC report underscoredtherisksofjeopardizingU.S.regionalinterestsintheabsenceofaccordonthesecriticallyimportantissues.

Against thisbackground, theNSCunderlined thevalueofeconomicdevelopment and the opportunities it offered for the region’s people“abovethelevelatwhichsocialrevolutionisarecurringthreat.”59

U.S.ASSESSMENTOFISRAEL’SPLACEINU.S.STRATEGYBETWEEN1948AND1949

AsearlyasJuly1948,onthebasisofhiscalculationsofIsrael’s“strongmilitary position,” Philip Jessup, then acting U.S. representative at theUnitedNations,concludedthatit“couldbecomeaforceoperatingtoourown advantage and to advantage of Arab countries.”60 But it was the

implications of the new state’s military prowess that clearly interestedJessupandotherswhowereconvincedoftheimportanceoftheregioninthecontextofoverallU.S.oilinterests.

Withinamatterofmonths,thechiefofstaffoftheU.S.AirForcehadconceded that Israel’semergencehadaltered thepowerbalance in theregion.Reflectingonthechangedperceptionofthenewstate’sviability,heobservedthatIsrael“hasdemonstratedbyforceofarmsitsrighttobeconsidered themilitarypowernextafterTurkey in theNearandMiddleEast.”61 Some six weeks later, the chief of naval operations sent amessage to the JCS urging them to make their views with respect toIsraelknowntothesecretaryofstate.TheJCSmemorandumdiscussedearlierreferredtoIsrael’smilitarycapabilityasmaking“herusefulasanallyintheeventofwarwithourmostprobableenemy.”62

On May 16, Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson submitted amemorandumtotheexecutivesecretaryoftheNationalSecurityCouncil,SidneySouers,onU.S.strategic interests in Israel.63 Included in itwasthe JCS study on U.S. strategic objectives in Israel, which explicitlyconnected Israel’s role as an ally to “Western Democracies” with theprotection of oil. This statement identified Israel’s territory and militaryforcesaspotentiallyuseful in theeventofwarwith theSovietUnion, inwhichcase“fulladvantagecouldbetakenofdefensivepositions in thatcountryandofIsrael’sforcesforthedefenseoftheCairo-Suezareaandfor land operations to defend or to recapture the Middle East oilfacilities.”64

By the spring of 1949, the DefenseDepartment concluded that thenew state, which was well situated and endowed with an impressivemilitary-politicalcadre, justified its inclusion in thepostwarU.S. regionalorder, whose purpose was to protect U.S. interests in the easternMediterraneanandtheMiddleEast.

TheJointChiefsofStaff’sreassessmentof Israel in1949cannotbeinterpretedasevidence that theJCSenvisioneda “special relationship”with Israelat thisdate.What itsignifiedwasrecognitionof thepotentialvalue, in terms of U.S. strategy, of a state whose origins had initiallyarousedoppositionduetothefearthatU.S.supportwouldimperilaccessto oil. Its reconsideration was in the context of U.S. calculations withrespect to theoverall assessment of the “U.S.StrategicPosition in theEastern Mediterranean and Middle East,” in which the exclusion of

communist and Soviet penetration into Greece, Turkey, and Iran wasparamount.

In this framework, there was a clear understanding that lack ofresolution of the continuing conflict between Jews and Arabs riskedjeopardizingU.S.interests.65TofurtherqualifythenatureofU.S.supportfor Israel at this stage, it is important to recall that by the end of 1949WashingtonhadprovidedIsraelwitha$100millionloanfromtheExport-ImportBank.

Insofarasarmswereconcerned,Israel’sprincipalsupplierofmilitaryassistanceinthisperiodwasFrance.

Washington’s assistance to Israel grew in thedecadeof the1950s,from$35.1millionin1951toaneconomicgrantof$73.6millionin1953,to $85 million in 1958, and to $126.8 million in 1966—a figure thatincluded$90millioninmilitaryloans.

In 1968, after the Six Day War, U.S. assistance reached $196.5million.66 In that year, the U.S. replaced France as Israel’s militarysupplier. “[T]he Johnson Administration, with strong support fromCongress, approved the sale of Phantomaircraft to Israel, establishingtheprecedentforU.S.supportforIsrael’squalitativemilitaryedgeoveritsneighbors.”67 Seven years later “Israel became the largest recipient ofU.S. foreign assistance,” and in the period from 1971 to 2008, U.S.annualaidtoIsraelwasontheorderof$2.6billion,“two-thirdsofwhichhasbeenmilitaryassistance.”68

14TheIsraeli–U.S.OilConnectionand

ExpandingU.S.OilInterests

DidU.S.policytowardIsraelundermineU.S.oilcompaniesoperatinginSaudi Arabia and the Gulf, as many feared it would? An informedobserverof “TheMilitarizationof theMiddleEast,”MaxHolland, statedthe problem as follows: “As the 1940s drew to a close, these twofundamental—yetseeminglycontradictory—aimsofU.S.policywerethusin place: access to oil, and support for Israel. It would fall to U.S.policymakerstojuggletheseinterestsandkeepthemfromcolliding.”1

Nosuchcollisionoccurred.Contrary towhatmany in theStateandDefensedepartmentsfeared,theriskstoU.S.oil interestsasaresultofU.S.supportforIsraelprovedtobemisplaced.Infact,U.S.oilcompanyactivityexpandedafterMay1948.Thecommunicationandunderstandingdeveloped between Jewish Agency officials and U.S. oil executives,including the director of the Oil and Gas Division of the InteriorDepartment, had long-term repercussions, as is described in part II onthe“oilconnection.”

U.S.oilcompaniessufferedfarlessthandidotherU.S.commercialorcultural operations in the Middle East. The period following Israel’semergenceprovedtobeoneofexpansion,notcontraction, for theU.S.oilindustry.Indeed,U.S.sourcespredicted“thattheoilcompaniesareina position to recover lost ground in the Near East sooner than U.S.Government or other private interests.”2 In 1949, the so-called SevenSistersdominatedtheglobalpetroleumindustry.

Theoutstandingcharacteristicoftheworld’spetroleumindustryisthedominantpositionofseven international companies. The seven companies that conduct most of the

international oil business include five American companies—Standard Oil Co. (NewJersey),StandardOilCo.ofCalifornia,Socony-VacuumOilCo., Inc.,GulfOilCorp.,andThe Texas Co.—and two British-Dutch companies—Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Ltd., and theRoyalDutchShellgroup.ApartfromMexicoandRussiancontrolledcountries,thesesevencompaniescontroldirectlyorindirectlymostoftheworld’spetroleumbusiness.3

In1952theInternationalPetroleumCartelreportedthatthecartelwith

its Seven Sisters “owned 65 percent of theworld’s estimated crude-oilreserves….OutsidetheUnitedStates,Mexico,andRussia,thesesevencompanies, in1949,controlledabout92percentof theestimatedcrudereserve.”4 In addition, the same seven companies “accounted formorethanone-halfoftheworld’scrudeproduction…about99percentofoutputin the Middle East, over 96 percent of the production in the EasternHemisphere, and almost 45 percent in the Western Hemisphere.”5Refiningwascontrolledbythesamecompanies.

At the end of 1949, theU.S.minister to Saudi Arabia informed thesecretaryofstatethatthetensionthathadmarkedU.S.–SaudirelationsasaresultofU.S.supportofIsraelhadeasedconsiderably.AsMauriceJr.Labellepointsout,“oncethefirstArab-Israeliwarconcluded,thetwostates formulatedastrongerpartnership,”onethatwasdeterredneitherby Truman’s support of Israel nor Saudi support for the Arab LeaguestanceindefenseofPalestine.6

Less than a year after Israel’s creation, ARAMCO was pursuingaccess to offshore rights in theGulf andmaking sure the Dhahran airbaseinSaudiArabiawasingoodrepair.U.S.militaryobjectivesweretohave access to “telecommunications and airbase facilities in Aden,Hadhramaut,Oman,TrucialOman,Socotra IslandandAsmara;airandnavalbasefacilitiesatMassaua;airandadvancedshiprepairfacilitiesinAden;advancedbasefacilitiesatBahrein.”7

Negotiating offshore oil rights was a major concern for U.S. oilcompanies,ARAMCOchief among themgiven its privilegedposition inSaudiArabia.Suchconcernwassupportedby theDepartmentofStatewith an understanding that British oil and commercial interests weresimilarly involved. In January 1949, there was talk in the StateDepartment and among oil executives of dividing the Persian Gulfbetween the UK, ARAMCO, and the United States, with theunderstandingthattheSaudiswouldnotstandinthewaywhileawaitingclarificationoftheownershipofoffshoreoil,includingthethirteenislands

offtheSaudicoast.RaymondHare,deputydirectoroftheOfficeofNearEasternandAfricanAffairs,disclosedthatU.S.AmbassadortoIranJohnC.Wileywarneditwasimportant“thatnoproclamationsorpublicitywereputoutonthissubject.”8

ARAMCO’slegalteamwasincharge.Itslegalcounsel,JudgeManleyHudson, offered the Saudis consideration of a “decree concerningPersianGulfsubsoilandseabedbutalsodecreesconcerningislandsinthe Gulf and the territorial waters of Saudi Arabia.”9 Such decreesrecognizedthattheseislandswereunderSaudiownership.

Therewas action on other oil fronts aswell. U.S. officials had longindicated interest in establishing a U.S. Consulate in Kuwait, despiteBritish fears of being displaced. There were also Anglo-Americandiscussionsconcerning thestatusof theHaifarefinery,whichhadbeenclosedsincebeing takenoverby Israel.TheBritishestimated that “thefailuretoreopentherefinerywouldrepresentadrainontheUK’sdollarresourcesamountingto$50millionayear.”10

SeveralmonthsafterIsrael’sindependence,thedirectoroftheOilandGasDivisionof the InteriorDepartment,MaxW.Ball,noted inhisdiarythattwoCIAofficershadcometodiscussthe

bestmeans ofmakingNational IntelligenceSurveys (NIS) showing basic oil facts abouteachcountryintheworld,103ofthem.TentativedecisionthatMPAC(?)shouldbeaskedtodesignatemantoworkoneachofabout20principalcountrieswithmaninOGDpaidforbyCIAtosuperviseandedit.11

At the end of the month, representatives of major U.S. petroleum

agenciesmet to discuss how to obtain oil company assistance for theintelligence project and concluded that the best approachwas to workdirectlywithU.S.andBritishcompaniesoperating in thearea.Whethertheyincludedthestudyofthemobilizationoflaboracrosstheoilindustryin theMiddleEast isunclear,but this informationwouldnothavebeendifficulttoobtain.12

MaxBall returned tohisprivatepracticeasanoilgeologist in1951,following his resignation as head of the Oil and Gas Division of theDepartmentoftheInterior.WorkingwithhissonDouglas,Ballagreedtowrite a report on the possibilities of oil prospecting in Palestine for theIsraeligovernment.

Ballhadremainedintouchwithhisson-in-lawRayKosloff,whohadreturned to Israel in the spring of 1949 when offered a position as

“Petroleum Director and Adviser to the Ministry of Finance.” He laterserved on the Executive Committee of Delek, Israel’s oil company,becoming “Israel’s influential Oil Adviser.”13 In the spring of 1951,MaxBallprovidedhisson-in-law,thenheadofDelek,withthenamesofthosewhomight be helpful in making Venezuelan oil available for the Haifarefinery.14

Kosloff’s appointment coincided with Israel’s search for a reliablesourceoffuel,aconstantsubjectofconcernamongIsraelipolicymakersintheearlyyearsofthestate’sexistence.Increasingly,thegovernmentinTel Aviv sought alternative sources of oil that would lessen itsdependence on U.S. and British oil companies that were unable, orunwilling,topersuadeArabregimestoallowtheflowofoiltoIsraeliports.The result was that Israel turned to the Soviet Union and then to the“Iranianmarketwhichwastobecomeitsprincipalsourceoffuelprovisionformanyyears.”15

In the interim, thefollowingtookplace.BeginningasabanonshipsflyingIsraeliflags,themaritimeArabblockadewasbroadenedin1949toprohibitthird-partyvesselsfromcarryingcontrabandwarmaterials—armsand oil—to Israel. Closure of the Suez Canal to oil bound for Israelreduced operations at the Haifa refinery, and soon it was closed. ThefinancialimplicationsforIsrael’soilimportswereconsiderable.Directandindirect damages to the Israeli economy fromoil boycott actions in theperiod 1948 to 1951were estimated at $23million. In the period from1951to1955,damagesamountedto$44million.16

Despite theArabboycott,UriBialerobserved that “agreementswithAIOC, Shell, Socony Vacuum and Standard Oil of New Jersey” weremade,offeringIsraelopportunities“inthegeneraldirectionsenvisagedbyKosloff and others.”17 Was Max Ball responsible for indicating thesedirections? Earlier he had attempted to introduce Eliahu Elath (thenEpstein)tosomeofthemajoroilcompanyexecutives,amongthemTerryDuce of ARAMCO. When Kosloff returned to Washington, havingdecidedtoleavetheUnitedStatesandsettleinIsrael,Ballarrangedforhimtomeetanumberoffiguresintheoilindustry.AmongthoseKosloffmetwasWalterLevy,knowntobefriendlytoIsrael.

On May 18, 1949, Ball contacted “Phil Kidd of ARAMCO to try toarrangeforKoslofftoseeTerryDuceinNewYorknextweek,”whichwasnotpossibleasthevicepresidentofARAMCOwasonthewestcoast.18

“CharlieHarding,DittoBertHull.Allof themareattendinganARAMCOdirectors’ meeting in California. Duke Curtice of Conorado is inVenezuela.”19

OnMay13,1949,Ball“tookRay[Kosloff]andCharlieRaynortolunchat the Cosmos Club. Charlie is Washington manager of AmericanIndependentOilCo.Wetalkedabout theoilpossibilitiesofPalestine.”20Raynorprovedtobe lessthanenthusiastic,however,ashemadeclearto Ball several days later when he called to report that “AmericanIndependenthasaboutallitcanhandleintheMiddleEastwithitsneutralzone concession and that he doesn’t think therefore they could tackleanythinginIsrael.”21Balldoesnotappeartohavebeendeterred.

In the summerof 1949,Ballmetwith Israeli officials throughEliahuElath,includingtheeconomicadviserintheIsraeliEmbassy,Mr.Witkon.BallreferredtoanunidentifiedmemowrittenbyRayKosloff,butthereisnoindicationofwhatitcontained.Atthesametime,headvisedElathandWitkonabout developments taking place in international oil, noting thatthecartelwasgivingwaytocompetitionamongthemajorplayers.

I told them I thought competitionamong the8principal producersand vendorsof crudeend products in the Middle East had replaced the former cartel arrangements andmarketingagreementsandgavethemmyevidenceforthebelief.Irecommendedpursuingpolicies thatwould create themaximum competition in both exploration and distribution,andmostparticularlyindistribution,withanti-trustlawsagainstpricefixingandrestraintoftrade and with no distributor, public or private, given either a monopoly or a favoredposition. I recommend, in other words, that the government not go into the distributionbusiness.

I agreed to sound out Charlie Harding, Stewart Coleman, and Terry Duce to seewhetherthetimehasyetcome(whichithadnotthelasttimeItalkedtothem)whentheyfeelthattheycanhaveinformaltalkswiththerepresentativesofIsraelwithoutendangeringtheiroperationsinArabcountries.22

Ballcontinued to try toarrangemeetingsbetween theoilmenheknewand Israeli officials such asEliahuElathwhen theywere in theUnitedStates.Theseeffortsdidnotmaturebecausemostof theoilexecutiveswereunpreparedtoenterintosuchengagementsatthisstage.23

WhenBallmetwithTerryDuceofARAMCO,Duceagreed tomeetwithElathbutpointedout that “they [ARAMCO]wouldnotdarebuildalineacross Israel, that in fact theirpermit tobuild the lineacrossSaudiArabianterritorycontainsastipulationthat the linewillnotcrossJewish

territory.”24 But Duce had a suggestion for Israel—namely, that itinvestigatenaturalgas,whichwastobefoundinthearea.Thismayhavebeen among the topics Duce discussed with Elath when the two met,thankstoBall’sarrangements,at“Mr.Elath’sapartmentattheShorehamat4:00pmWednesdayafternoonforadrinkandadiscussion.”25

BallreceivedaninvitationtovisitIsraelthroughtheintercessionofhisson-in-law,RayKosloff,whichheeventuallyacceptedwithhissonandassociate,DouglasBall. In thesummerof1950, the twowent to Israelwith their families.Between July 18 andAugust 31,MaxBall compiledinformation touse inhisassessmentof Israel’soil prospects,whichheprepared at the request of the Israeli government.26 Ball assisted inwriting thepetroleumlawsfor Israeland forTurkey.Thefollowingyear,Kosloff reported that the Israeli Embassy had received “numerousinquiries from oil men indicating a disposition to spend money on oilexplorationinIsrael.”27

Interest emerged from another source as well. In 1951, Joel D.Wolfsohn, who was then assistant secretary of the interior and hadworkedwith the American Jewish Committee as its European director,met with Ball to discuss the possibilities of stockpiling oil in severallocations in Israel.28BallhadmetwithWolfsohn inApril1948,atwhichtimehehadtalkedaboutPalestinewithhimandTexGoldschmidt,whowasinchargeofacommitteedealingwithforeignaid.29WolfsohnaskedBallifheandhissonwouldbewillingtopresenttheirstudyofIsraelioilprospects“beforeameetingoftechnicalemployeesofInteriorsometimeinthefuture.”30ThereferencewastotheDepartmentoftheInterior,Ball’shomebase.Ballacceptedtheinvitation.

AttheendofMay,WolfsohnandBallwereagainindiscussiononthestockpiling issue, inpreparation forapresentation toDavidBen-GurionandIsraeligeologists.BallreportedthatWolfsohnthoughtitlikelythat

theUnitedStateswouldfill,say7millionbarrelsofstorageinIsraelifIsraelwouldsupplythestoragecapacityinreasonablybomb-proofform.Itoldthemthatdespitethetendencyofmanypeople toshrugoff the idea I thoughtstorage inasuitableundergroundcavernfeasible, and that if a suitable cavern could not be found an artificial cavern could becreatedforlittlecost,ifthereisamarketforthelimestone.31

Throughout this period, Ball continued towork on the Israeli report,

which generated considerable interest among Israeli officials, includingBen-Gurion, who inquired as to its status when he met Ball at the

receptionheld inWashington inhonorof Israel’s thirdanniversary.Balland his son continued to consult with Kosloff and high-level Israeliofficials.Inthesummerof1951KosloffturnedtoBall,“askingwhetherI[Ball] could help to get Israel 12,000 to 20,000 barrels of aviationgasoline.”32Ballconcludedthat itwouldbeappropriateforsuchmatterstobehandledbysomeoneelse,butheremainedinvolved.

InMay1951, IsraeliPrimeMinisterBen-GurionorganizedameetinginChicagoonoildevelopmentinIsrael,towhichheinvitedBall,whowaspreparing a draft of thePetroleumAct for Israel. TheChicagomeetingtookprecedence.Itspurpose,asBen-Gurionexplained,was“todiscussthe possibility of getting American oil men interested in Israeli oilexplorationanddevelopment.”33Nothing cameof theChicagomeeting,butitstimulatedinterestandledBalltorecommendthatIsraelclarifyitsconditions for such exploration. The former director of theOil andGasDivisionpersisted intheattemptto interestAmericanoilmeninboththePetroleumActand“indoingsomewildcatting.”34

In the interim, Ball won the approval of Teddy Kollek, who wasworking closely with Ben-Gurion. Ball observed that Kollek “liked thelettersIsenttoabouttenindependentsandmajorsaskingiftheywouldbewillingtoreadandcommentonthedraftPetroleumact.”35Kollekalsoapprovedthe“backgroundinformation”onIsraelthatBallincludedinhisreport.36

InanarticleintheGlobalJewishNewsSourceonMay11,1951,Ballindicatedthatthe

possibilitiesoffindingoilinIsraelaregoodenoughtowarrantexploration.MrBallsurveyedIsraelandreportedeachofthe“geologicprovinceshasoilpossibilities”andthatthemostpromisingare theNegev, the foothill belt of Judas thecoastal plain, and theDeadSea-WadiArabariftvalley.37

Ball’s optimistic prediction appeared to be the partial fulfillment of a

pronouncementbythedirectorsoftheIndustrialInstituteofIsraelwho,in1949,predictedthegrowthanddevelopmentoftheIsraelieconomyinaseries of Industrial Survey reports. The board of directors included arangeofAmericancorporate leaderswhoseviewsevoked thoseof theNathan, Gass, and Creamer study of 1946. That work had describedZionist development as benefiting Jews aswell as Arabs. Three yearslater,RalphFriedman,whoidentifiedhimselfasanindustrialist,surveyedtheeconomicconditionsof thenewstateandofferedrecommendations

foritsdevelopmenttothedirectorsoftheIndustrialInstituteofIsrael.Heconcludedhisremarkswiththeobservationthat,

despitemountainousdifficulties, the leadersof Israelbelieve(andIagreewiththem)thatthisnew littlestatehasachance forgreatness,possessedas it isofastrategic locationandofapopulationgiftedwithtalents,education,imagination,andwithadrivingambitiontobecomeapeacefulexampleofmaterialprogressofmoral force in that largeandverybackwardpartoftheworld.38

OnNovember9,FriedmanwrotetoClarkCliffordwithinformationhe

hadsentthefinanceministerofIsrael.It includedalistofthose“versedin finance, industry and commerce who would be available to study,consult on and in general to encourage the flow of capital from thiscountry to theStateof Israel.”39AsFriedmanobserved, “Israelwithourhelp,mayintheyearstocomerepresentawesternoutpostandanchorinthewholeNearEast.”

Michael J. Cohen reminded readers “that in issuing the BalfourDeclarationinNovember1917,theBritishhadgonetogreatlengths,andtonosmalldegreeofsubterfuge,inordertoinstalltheJewsinPalestine,largelysothattheymightguardtheBritishpositionattheSuezCanal.”40U.S. policy in Palestine was not analogous to that of Great Britain inWorldWarl.Washingtondidnot“installtheJewsinPalestine,”anduntilMay1948mostU.S.officialsengagedinpolicyrelatedtoPalestinewereconvinced that both partition and a Jewish statewere undesirable andvirtuallyimpossibletoimplementwithouttheuseofforce.

Israel’s emergence obliged U.S. officials to reconsider the regionalbalance of power and to revise their views of Israel, whose militarycapacitytheynowdeemedtobesecondtothatofTurkeyintheregion.OnceperceivedasaliabilityinthecontextofU.S.regionalinterests,afterindependence Israel emerged as an asset.Washington thenmoved toensureIsrael’sorientationwastowardtheUnitedStatesandtheWest,aprerequisite to its integration into theU.S. regional strategy.This sameprocessledU.S.officialstoreducetheirpressureonIsraeltocomplywiththe recommendations of UNGA Resolution 194, notably on therepatriation of thePalestinian refugees, the adjudication of boundaries,andtheinternationalizationofJerusalem.ThedecisiontodefertoIsraelon these core issues signified Washington’s subordination of thePalestineQuestion,anditslegitimationofIsrael’suseofforceinitspolicytowardthePalestinianstocalculationsofUSinterest.

ThisrevisedU.S.policytowardIsraelandPalestinerepresented“theend”ofonephaseofU.S.policy—whichhadbeenmarkedbysupportforUNGA Resolution 194—and the “beginning” of another, whoseconsequencesarewithustoday.

PARTVIInPlaceofaConclusion

Notes

INTRODUCTION:OPENSECRETS

1.TheopeningpagesofthisIntroductionoriginallyappearedunderthetitle“Gaza,1948andU.S.Policy,” inIsraeliOccupationArchive(IOA)(www.Israeli-Occupation.org),http://www.israeli-occupation.org/2014–08–25/irene-gendzier-gaza-1948-and-us-policy/.

2. GlennGreenwald, “Cash,Weapons and Surveillance: TheU.S. Is a Key Party to EveryIsraeliAttack,”TheIntercept,no.885,Aug.4,2014.

3.AmongtherevelationsthatappearedintheWallStreetJournalwasthatonJuly20,inthemidst of the fighting in Gaza, the “Israel’s Defense Ministry asked the U.S. for a range ofmunitions,including120mmmortarshellsand40mmilluminatingrounds,whichwerealreadykeptstoredatapre-positionedweaponsstockpileinIsrael.Therequestwasapprovedthroughmilitarychannelsthreedayslaterbutnotmadepublic.UnderthetermsofthedealtheIsraelisusedU.S.financing topay for$3million in tank rounds.”AdamEntous, “GazaCrisis: IsraelOutflanks theWhite House on Strategy,” Wall Street Journal online, Aug. 13, 2014,http://online.wsj.com/articles/u-s-sway-over-israel-on-gaza-at-a-low-1407979365.

4. William R. Polk, “Gaza and the Struggle for Palestine: Historical Background” (Pt 1.a),InformedComment,blogbyJuanCole,Aug.10,2014,www.juancole.com/2014/08/palestine.

5. Beryl Cheal, “Refugees in the Gaza Strip, December 1948–1950,” Journal of PalestineStudies18,no.1(Autumn1988):138–157.

6.AsquotedinEthanBronner,“Israel,BattlefieldAltered,TakesaTougherApproach,”NewYorkTimes,Nov.17,2012,A1.

7.DonnaNevel,“TheProbleminGazaIsnotHamas,”TikkunDaily,Aug.14,2014.8.StevenErlanger, “Israel IsTrapped in aWarThatNeverEndedas InstabilityPersists at

Home,”NewYorkTimes,Aug.16,2014,A10.9.“KerryIsRightaboutNetanyahu’sUnnecessaryJewishStateDemand,”editorial,Ha’aretz,

Mar.16,2014.10. Paul A. Silverstein andUssamaMakdisi,Memory andViolence in theMiddleEast and

NorthAfrica(Bloomington:IndianaUniversityPress,2006),1.11.EugeneL.RoganandAviShlaim,eds.,TheWar forPalestine,Rewriting theHistoryof

1948(Cambridge,UK:CambridgeUniversityPress,2001),1.12. IreneGendzier,“WhattheUSKnewandChosetoForget in1948andWhyItMatters in

2009,”Znet, Jan. 22, 2009; andGendzier, “TheRisk of Knowing,” in “Academic FreedomandIntellectualActivisminthePost-9/11University,”ed.E.CarvalhoandD.Downing,specialissue,WorksandDays51/52,53/54,26–27(2008–09):323–338.

13.SeeIanBlack,“RememberingtheNakba:IsraeliGroupPuts1948PalestineBackontheMap,”Guardian,May2,2014.

14.FrankE.Manuel,TheRealitiesofAmerican-PalestinianRelations(Washington,DC:PublicAffairsPress, 1949); andHowardSachar,AHistory of Israel, from theRise of Zionism toOur

Time(NewYork:Knopf,1976).15.MichaelT.Benson,HarryS.TrumanandtheFoundingofIsrael(Westport,Ct.:Praeger,

1997); Arnold Offner,Another Such Victory: President Truman and the ColdWar, 1945–1953(Stanford:StanfordUniversityPress,2002).

16. UssamaMakdisi, Faith Misplaced, The Broken Promise of U.S.-Arab Relations: 1820–2001 (New York: Public Affairs, 2010); Seth Tillman, The United States in the Middle East(Bloomington:IndianaUniversityPress,1982);seealsoAllisRadoshandRonaldRadosh,ASafeHaven:HarryS.TrumanandtheFoundingofIsrael(NewYork:HarperCollins,2009).

17.Peter L.Hahn,Caught in theMiddleEast,U.S.PolicyToward theArab-IsraeliConflict,1945–1951(ChapelHill:UniversityofNorthCarolinaPress,2004),Part1,chap.3;MelvynLeffler,“InConclusion,SearchingforSynthesis,” inHarryS.Truman,theStateofIsrael,andtheQuestfor Peace in the Middle East, ed. Michael J. Devine (Kirksville, Mo.: Truman State UniversityPress,2009),131;andJohnB.Judis,Genesis,Truman,AmericanJews,andtheOriginsoftheArab-IsraeliConflict(NewYork:Farrar,StraussandGiroux,2014).

18. Michael J. Cohen, “Truman’s Recognition of Israel, the Domestic Factor,” in Harry S.Truman, theStateof Israel,and theQuest forPeace in theMiddleEast,ed.MichaelJ.Devine(Kirksville, Mo.: Truman State University Press, 2009); Cohen, Truman and Israel (Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1990);Cohen,“TheGenesisoftheAnglo-AmericanCommitteeonPalestine,November1945:ACaseStudyintheAssertionofAmericanHegemony,”TheHistoricalJournal 22, no. 1 (1979): 185–207, 204; John Snetsinger, Truman, the Jewish Vote, and theCreationofIsrael(Stanford:HooverInstitutionPress,1974);andRitchieOvendale,TheOriginsofthe Arab-Israeli Wars, 2nd ed. (New York: Longman, 1992); and Douglas Little, AmericanOrientalism:TheUnitedStatesandtheMiddleEastsince1945,3rded.(ChapelHill:UniversityofNorthCarolinaPress,2002).

19.PersonalcommunicationcitedinRashidKhalidi,ResurrectingEmpire:WesternFootprintsandAmerica’sPerilousPathintheMiddleEast(Boston:Beacon,2005),127.

20. Among those that illustrate these trends of a new international and/or transnationalscholarshipareMichael J.Hogan, “The ‘NextBigThing’:TheFutureofDiplomaticHistory inaGlobalAge,”DiplomaticHistory28,no.1(Jan.2004):1–21;AkiraIriye,“TheTransnationalTurn,”Diplomatic History 31, no. 3 (June 2007): 373–376; and Peter L. Hahn, “The View fromJerusalem:RevelationsaboutU.S.DiplomacyfromtheArchivesofIsrael,”DiplomaticHistory22,no. 4 (Fall 1998): 509–532.SeealsoDonaldNeff, “U.S.Policyand thePalestinianRefugees,”Journal of Palestine Studies 18, no. 1 (Autumn 1988): 96; Fred H. Lawson, “The TrumanAdministration and the Palestinians,” Arab Studies Quarterly 12 (Winter/Spring 1990): 43–65;Michael Ottolenghi, “Harry Truman’s Recognition of Israel,” The Historical Journal 47, no. 4(2004):963–988.

21.UssamaMakdisi,“AfterSaid:TheLimitsandPossibilitiesofaCriticalScholarshipofU.S.-ArabRelations,”DiplomaticHistory38,no.3(June2014):657–684.

22.SeeRobertVitalis, “TheNobleAmericanScienceof ImperialRelationsand Its LawsofRaceDevelopment,”ComparativeStudiesinSocietyandHistory52,no.4(2010):909–938;Keesvan der Pijl, The Discipline of Western Supremacy, Modes of Foreign Relations and PoliticalEconomy,vol.3(London:PlutoPress,2014).

23.SeeintroductoryremarksbyAviShlaimtohisanalysisof“TheDebateAbout1948,”inTheIsrael/PalestineQuestion,RewritingHistories,ed.IlanPappé(NewYork:Routledge,1999),171.

24. “‘No Common Ground’: Joseph Massad and Benny Morris Discuss the Middle East,”HistoryWorkshopJournal53(2002):205–216,http://www.jstor.org/stable/4289780.

25.Nur-eldeenMasalha,“OnRecentHebrewandIsraeliSourcesforthePalestinianExodus,1947–1949,”JournalofPalestineStudies18,no.1(Autumn1988):134.

26.JoelBeinin,“ForgetfulnessforMemory:TheLimitsoftheNewIsraeliHistory,”JournalofPalestineStudies34,no.2(Winter2005):10.

1.THEPRIMACYOFOIL

1. David Painter, “Oil and the American Century,” Journal of American History 99, no. 1(2012): 24; seealsoPainter, “Supply,DemandandSecurity: TheColdWar and theTransitionfromCoaltoOil,”InternationalEconomicHistoryConference,Helsinki,Finland,Aug.2006.

2.Taken from the titleofTonyJudt’sbook,Postwar:AHistoryofEuropeSince1945 (NewYork:Penguin,2005).

3.PerryAnderson,“ImperiumandConcilium,”NewLeftReview83(Sept.-Oct.2013):22.4.Themeaningandusageof the term “DisplacedPersons,” referring topostwarEurope, is

discussed by Bob Moore in his review of Gerard Daniel Cohen, In War’s Wake: Europe’sDisplacedPersons in thePostwarOrder,AmericanHistoricalReview 117,no.5 (2012):1656–1657.

5.JohnA.Loftus,“PetroleuminInternationalRelations,”DepartmentofStateBulletin13,no.319(Aug.5,1945):173.

6.Ibid.7.Ibid.,175.8.PhilipH.BurchJr.,ElitesinAmericanHistory(NewYork:HolmesandMeier,1980),109.9.Ibid.10.Anderson,“ImperiumandConcilium,”42.11.Michael J. Cohen, “WilliamA. Eddy, theOil Lobby and the Palestine Problem,”Middle

EasternStudies30,no.1(1994):166–180.12. “TheDepartment:PetroleumDivision,”DepartmentofStateBulletin10,no.249 (Apr.1,

1944):303.13.MaxW.Ball,“FuelingaGlobalWar,anAdventureinStatecraft,”OhioJournalofScience

45,no.1(Jan.1945):38.14.Ibid.15.Ibid.,34.16.RalphK.Davies,UnitedStatesDepartmentoftheInterior,OilandGasDivision,Papersof

RalphK.Davies,HarryS.TrumanLibrary,Dec.12,1946.17.Ibid.18. Harold F.Williamson, Ralph L. Andreano, Arnold R. Daum, and Gilbert C. Klose, The

American Petroleum Industry, 1809–1959, The Age of Energy (Evanston, Ill.: NorthwesternUniversityPress,1963),754; formoreextensivediscussionof the “formidable task” involved inthemobilizationoftheoilindustryinthisperiod,seepages747–762.

19.Ibid.,755.20.Citedin“MultinationalOilCorporationsandU.S.ForeignPolicy—ReporttotheCommittee

onForeignRelations,”UnitedStatesSenate,bytheSubcommitteeonMultinationalCorporations(Washington,D.C.:U.S.GovernmentPrintingOffice,Jan.2,1975),6.Itwasalsoin1944thattheCaliforniaArabianStandardOilCompanybecameknownasARAMCO,theArabianAmericanOilCompany.

21. Herbert Feis,Petroleum and American Foreign Policy (Stanford, Calif.: Food ResearchInstitute,StanfordUniversity,Mar.1944),54.

22.Ibid.,62.23.Ibid.,43.24.RobertEngler,ThePoliticsofOil(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1961),271.25.Ibid.,291.26.Ibid.

27.Feis,PetroleumandAmericanForeignPolicy,29.28.“TheAmbassadorintheSovietUniontotheSecretaryofState,”ForeignRelationsofthe

UnitedStates5(Feb.28,1947):636.29.“ForeignPetroleumPolicyoftheUnitedStates,”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates5

(Apr.11,1944):28.30.Ibid.,29.31.Ibid.32.LloydC.Gardner,ThreeKings,TheRiseofanAmericanEmpireintheMiddleEastafter

WorldWarII(NewYork:NewPress,2009),33.33. “The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant),” Foreign

RelationsoftheUnitedStates5(Oct.17,1944):666.34.“TheSecretaryofWar(Stimson)totheSecretaryofState,”ForeignRelationsoftheUnited

States(Oct.27,1944):748.35.Ibid.,750–751.36. “The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) to the Secretary of State,” Foreign

RelationsoftheUnitedStates(Mar.29,1944):678–679.37.“MemorandumbyColonelJohnW.BowenoftheWarDepartmentGeneralStaff,”Foreign

RelationsoftheUnitedStates(Nov.22,1944):669.38. “Report by the Ad Hoc Committee of the State-War-Navy-Coordinating Committee,”

ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates8(Feb.22,1945):852.39.“TheSecretaryoftheNavy(Forrestal)totheSecretaryofState,”ForeignRelationsofthe

UnitedStates5(Dec.11,1944):755.40. “TheMinister inSaudiArabia(Eddy) to theSecretaryofState,”ForeignRelationsof the

UnitedStates8(Aug.8,1945):944.41.Ibid.42.Annex1,DraftMemorandum toPresidentTruman,preparedbyChief of theDivisionof

NearEasternAffairs (Merriam)andsubmitted to theDirectorof theOfficeofNearEasternandAfrican Affairs (Henderson) early in August 1945, attached to “Memorandum by the UnderSecretaryofState(Acheson)totheSecretaryofState,”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates8(Aug.1945):45.

43.Ibid.,46.44.Ibid.45. Draft Memorandum to President Truman, included in “Report by the Coordinating

CommitteeoftheDepartmentofState,”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates8(May2,1945):45.

46.Ibid.,46.47.StatementisbyWilliamQuandtinhisIntroductiontoEvanM.Wilson,ACalculatedRisk,

theU.S.DecisiontoRecognizeIsrael(Covington,Kt.:ClerisyPress,2008),13.48.All references to theexchangebetweenParkerandMerriamarebasedonan interview

withGordonMerriamofJuly7,1990,byRichardParker,andsenttotheauthorin1992.49.Ibid.50. Robert Vitalis, “Aramco World: Business and Culture on the Arabian Oil Frontier,” in

Counter-Narratives,History,ContemporarySociety,andPoliticsinSaudiArabiaandYemen,ed.Madawial-RasheedandRobertVitalis(NewYork:Palgrave,Macmillan,2004),152.

51.“DraftMemorandumtoPresidentTruman,”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates8(May2,1945):46.

52.Ibid.,45.53.Ibid.,47.54. Robert Vitalis, “Black Gold, White Crude: An Essay on American Exceptionalism,

Hierarchy,andHegemonyintheGulf,”DiplomaticHistory26,no.2(Spring2002):190.

55.“PolicyoftheUnitedStatesTowardtheArabPrincipalitiesofthePersianGulfandtheGulfofOman,”MemorandumPrepared in theDepartment ofState,ForeignRelationsof theUnitedStates7(Mar.15,1946):67.

56.“VisitoftheRegentofIraqtotheUnitedStates,”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates8(May28,1945):586.

57.Ibid.58.“ConcernoftheUnitedStatesforEnsuringAmericanParticipationintheDevelopmentof

PetroleumResourcesintheNearEast,”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates8(May29,1945):49.

59. Irene L Gendzier, Notes from the Minefield, 2nd ed. (New York: Columbia UniversityPress,2006),22.

60.U.S.Senate,MultinationalOilCorporationsandU.S.ForeignPolicy,49.61.“PolicyoftheUnitedStatestowardtheArabPrincipalitiesofthePersianGulfandtheGulf

ofOman,”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates7(Mar.15,1946):68.62.WilliamEngdahl,ACenturyofWar,Anglo-AmericanOilPoliticsandtheNewWorldOrder,

2nded.(London:Pluto,1992),93.63.Foraclearandvaluablediscussionof the issuesatstake in thecontroversyoverAIOC

that ledtothe1953coup,seeErvandAbrahamian,TheCoup,1953,theCIA,andtheRootsofModernU.S.-IranianRelations(NewYork:NewPress,2013).

64.RogerOwen andSevket Pamuk,AHistory ofMiddleEast Economies in the TwentiethCentury(Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress,1999),69.

65. Joel Beinin, Workers and Peasants in the Modern Middle East (Cambridge, UK:CambridgeUniversityPress,2001),117.

66.Ibid.,126.67.Ibid.68.Ibid.,126–127.69.ZacharyLockman,ComradesandEnemies,ArabandJewishWorkersinPalestine,1906–

1948(Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1996),332.70.Beinin,WorkersandPeasants,124.71.Ibid.,125.72.JoelBeinin,WastheRedFlagFlyingThere?MarxistPoliticsandtheArab-IsraeliConflict

inEgyptandIsrael,1948–1965(Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1990),43.73.MalekAbisaab,“‘Unruly’FactoryWomeninLebanon,ContestingFrenchColonialismand

theNationalState,1940–1946,”JournalofWomen’sHistory16,no.3(2004):65.74. Hanna Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq

(Princeton,N.J.:PrincetonUniversityPress,1978),623.75.Ibid.76. Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett, “The Social Classes and the Origins of the

Revolution,” inTheIraqiRevolutionof1958,theOldSocialClassesRevisited,ed.R.A.FerneaandWilliamR.Louis(NewYork:I.B.Tauris,1991),127.

77.OwenandPamuk,AHistoryofMiddleEastEconomies,87.78.RobertVitalis,America’sKingdom,MythmakingontheSaudiOilFrontier(Stanford,Calif.:

Stanford University Press, 2006), 22. A brief account of “labor organizations in the Americanpetroleumindustry”appearsastheAppendixinTheAmericanPetroleumIndustry,ed.Williamsonetal.,827–845.

79.Vitalis,America’sKingdom, 25; TimothyMitchell,CarbonDemocracy,PoliticalPower intheAgeofOil(London:Verso,2011).

80.Vitalis,America’sKingdom,95.81.FigurescitedintheMulliganpapers,namedforWilliamE.Mulligan,alongtimeARAMCO

public relations officer and archivist for the period 1946–1978, in Inside theMirage, America’s

Fragile Partnership with Saudi Arabia, ThomasW. Lippman (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press,2004),79.

82.Ibid.,80–81.83.LaurentRucker,Staline,IsraeletlesJuifs(Paris:PressesUniversitairesdeFrance,2001),

62–63,63nt.1.84. Ibid., 63–64, where Rucker describes this exchange but points to its divergent

interpretations. In Laurent Rucker, “Moscow’s Surprise: The Soviet–Israeli Alliance of 1947–1949,” ColdWar International History Project,Working Paper 46 (Washington, D.C.:WoodrowWilsonInternationalCenterforScholars,n.d.),2,differentfiguresaregiven.There,Weizmannisreportedtohavesaidthat“ifhalfamillionArabscouldbetransferred,twomillionJewscouldbeput in their place.” For an earlier version of this article, see LaurentRucker, “TheUnexpectedAlliance: USSR and Israel during the 1940s,” in Ruskii Vopross, Russia and Jewish World,http://www.ruskiivopros.com/print.phd.php?id=77.

85. Benny Morris, The Birth of the Palestine Refugee Problem Revisited (Cambridge, UK:CambridgeUniversityPress,2004),52–53.

86.SeeRucker, “Moscow’sSurprise,” 14, andRucker,Staline, Israel et les Juifs, 93, for adiscussionoftheSovietpositiononbi-nationalisminthisperiod.

87.ErvandAbrahamian,IranbetweenTwoRevolutions(Princeton,N.J.:PrincetonUniversityPress,1982),210.

88.Painter,“OilandtheAmericanCentury,”113.89.BarinKayaoglu,“ColdWarintheAegean,StrategicImperatives,DemocraticRhetoric:The

UnitedStatesandTurkey,1945–1952,”ColdWarHistory9,no.3(Aug.2009):325.90.MelvynLeffler,APreponderanceofPower,NationalSecurity,theTrumanAdministration,

andtheColdWar(Stanford,Calif.:StanfordUniversityPress,1992),125.91. Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign

Policy,1945–1954(NewYork:HarperandRow,1972),235.92.Ibid.,345–346.

2.THEPALESTINEQUESTION:1945

1.“ReportbytheCoordinatingCommitteeoftheDeptofState,Annex,”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates8(May2,1945):37.

2.EvanM.Wilson,ACalculatedRisk:TheU.S.DecisiontoRecognizeIsrael(Covington,Ky.:ClerisyPress,2008),39.OriginallypublishedunderthetitleDecisiononPalestine:HowtheU.S.CametoRecognizeIsrael(Stanford,Calif.:HooverInstitutionPress,1979).

3.RashidKhalidi,ResurrectingEmpire:WesternFootprintsandAmerica’sPerilousPathintheMiddleEast(Boston:BeaconPress,2004),185n.61.

4.WilliamRogerLouis,TheBritishEmpireintheMiddleEast,1945–1951(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1988),421–422.

5.EvanM.Wilson,“ThePalestinePapers,1943–1947,”JournalofPalestineStudies2,no.4(Summer1973):34–35.

6.JerryN.Hess,“OralHistoryInterviewwithGeorgeM.Elsey,”HarryS.TrumanLibrary,July7,1970,325.

7. Richard D. McKinzie, “Oral History Interview with LoyW. Henderson,” Harry S. TrumanLibrary,June14,1973,30.

8.Ibid.9.MichaelJ.Cohen,TrumanandIsrael(Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1990),chap.

5;Wilson,ACalculated Risk, chap. 3; Peter L. Hahn,Caught in theMiddle East, U.S. Policy

towardtheArab-IsraeliConflict (ChapelHill:TheUniversityofNorthCarolinaPress,2004),26–28.

10.NahumGoldmann,TheAutobiographyofNahumGoldmann:SixtyYearsof JewishLife(NewYork:Holt,RinehartandWinston,1969),232–233.Foradditionalinformation,seePeterL.Hahn,“TheViewfromJerusalem:RevelationsaboutU.S.DiplomacyfromtheArchivesofIsrael,”DiplomaticHistory22,no.4(Fall1998):513.

11.Louis,TheBritishEmpire,424.12.Cohen,TrumanandIsrael,77.13.Hahn,CaughtintheMiddleEast,27.14.MichaelT.Benson,HarrySTrumanandtheFoundingofIsrael(WestportConn.:Praeger,

1997),83.15.DavidS.WymanandRafaelMedoff,ARaceagainstDeath,PeterBergson,America,and

theHolocaust(NewYork:NewPress,2002),152–153.16.AllcitationsattributedtoMerriamaredrawnfromanunpublishedinterviewconductedby

RichardParkerin1990andsenttotheauthorin1992.17.Ibid.18.MemorandumPrepared in theDepartmentofState, “Palestine:FormofGovernment” (A

Summary),ForeignRelationsoftheUnited8(Jan.30,1945):684.19.“Palestine:FormofGovernment,”684.20.“Palestine:Immigration,”685.21.Ibid.,686.22.Ibid.23.“LieutenantColonelHaroldB.HoskinstotheDeputyDirectoroftheOfficeofNearEastern

andAfricanAffairs(Ailing),”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates8(Mar.5,1945):691.24.“PresidentTrumantotheAmirAbdullahofTrans-Jordan,”ForeignRelationsoftheUnited

States8(May17,1945):707.25. “Memorandum of Conversation byMr. EvanM.Wilson of theDivision of Near Eastern

Affairs,”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates8(June27,1945):714.26.Ibid.,715.27.Ibid.28. “Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs

(Henderson)totheSecretaryofState,”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates8(Aug.24,1945):730.

29.Ibid.,728.30.Ibid.,727–728.31.Ibid.,728.32.Ibid.33.Ibid.34.Ibid.35.Ibid.,Annex2,733.36.Ibid.37. “Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Merriam),”Foreign

RelationsoftheUnitedStates8(Aug.31,1945):735.38.HarryS.Truman,Memoirs,YearsofTrialandHope,Vol.2(GardenCity,N.Y.:Doubleday,

1956),136.39.“PresidentTrumanto theBritishPrimeMinister(Attlee),”ForeignRelationsof theUnited

States8(Aug.31,1945):738.40. Melvyn I. Urofsky, American Zionism from Herzl to the Holocaust (New York: Anchor,

1976),369.SeethecomprehensiveanalysisbyJohnB.Judis,Genesis,Truman,AmericanJews,andtheOriginsoftheArab/IsraeliConflict(NewYork:Farrar,StrausandGiroux,2014).

41.Urofsky,AmericanZionism,377.42.DavidBen-Gurion,Israel:APersonalHistory(London:NewEnglishLibrary,1972),54.43.ArnoldA.Offner,AnotherSuchVictory(Stanford,Calif.:StanfordUniversityPress,2002),

277.44.The letterofNov.26,1945, fromJacobBlausteinof theAmericanJewishCommittee to

SecretaryofStateByrnes,isintheJamesMcDonaldPapers,Box7,folder617,intheColumbiaUniversityRareBookandManuscriptLibrary,ButlerLibrary,6thfloor,535West114thSt.,NewYork,N.Y.10027.

45.PeterGrose,IsraelintheMindofAmerica(NewYork:Knopf,1983),197.46.ReportofEarlG.HarrisontoPresidentTruman,“TheTreatmentofDisplacedJewsinthe

United States Zone of Occupation in Germany,” included in Truman’s Letter Regarding theHarrisonReport and the Treatment ofDisplaced Jews,Sept. 29, 1945,WhiteHouseRelease,JewishVirtualLibrary,10,http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Holocaust/truman_.

47.Ibid.,7.48. YosefGrodzinsky, In the Shadow of theHolocaust (Monroe,Maine: CommonCourage

Press,2004),56–57.49.Ibid.,57.50.Ibid.51. Gilbert Achcar, “The Arab-Israeli War of Narratives,” openDemocracy, Apr. 19, 2010,

http://www.opendemocracy.net.52.ArnoJ.Mayer,WhyDidtheSkiesNotDarken?(NewYork:Pantheon,1988),165.53.DavidS.Wyman,PaperWalls,Americaand theRefugeeCrisis,1938–1941 (NewYork:

Pantheon,1968),33.54. David McBride, “American Nativism and Common Misperceptions: How the Displaced

Persons Issue Influenced America’s Palestine Policy, 1945–1948,” Eras Journal 7 (June 27,2010):1.

55. Noam Chomsky, The Fateful Triangle: The United States, Israel and the Palestinians(Cambridge,Mass.:SouthEnd,1999),91–92,170n.10.

56.Grodzinsky,IntheShadowoftheHolocaust,167.57.StephenGreen,TakingSides,America’sSecretRelationswithaMilitantIsrael(NewYork:

William Morrow, 1984), 48–51, 261 n. 2–3. Green cites “Secret” intelligence reports from theOffice of the Director of Intelligence, OMGUS, for the periods Jan. 10 and July 3, 1948, inPublicationsFile,RecordsoftheDocumentLibraryBranch,OfficeoftheAssistantChiefofStaffG-2,RecordGroup319,NationalArchives.

58.“TheSecretaryofStatetotheEmbassyinEgypt,”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates5,part2(June25,1938):1149.

59.Grodzinsky,IntheShadowoftheHolocaust,163.60.Ibid.,225.61. Ibid., 223.Grodzinsky offers figures to illustrate the “Migration patterns of JewishDPS,

1945–1951” in the Allied occupation zones. Out of a total of 333,000, 140,000 or 42 percentmigratedtoPalestine;120,000or36percentwenttotheUnitedStates;20,000or6percentwenttoSouthAmerica;15,000or4.5percentwenttoCanada;10,000or3percentwenttoAustralia;some20,000or6percentremained inGermany;andanother8,000or2.5percentremained inEurope.Fordifficultiesinvolvedinarrivingatreliablecalculations,seepages222–224.

62. “TheConsequencesof thePartitionofPalestine,”Central IntelligenceAgency,Nov. 28,1947,17,http://www.foia.cia.gov/browse_docs_full.asp.

63.GilbertAchcar,TheArabsandtheHolocaust(NewYork:Metropolitan,2009),chap.4;seethe discussion byAchcar of “liberalwesternizers” in theArabworld, his citation of thework ofLebanese intellectuals and nationalists, including Joseph Achcar, 36; the studies of EgyptianintellectualsandSyriannationalistsbyGershoniandAyalon,37–41;andtheviewsofPalestinian

opponentsofNaziismandfascism,41–46.64.MohamedHassaneinHeikal,“ReflectionsonaNationinCrisis,1948,”JournalofPalestine

Studies18,no.1(Autumn1988):113.65.InterviewwithEricRouleau,StJeandeQuentin,June2010.66.Heikal,“ReflectionsonaNationinCrisis,1948,”115.67.Achcar,TheArabsandtheHolocaust,41.68.Ibid.,45.69.Ibid.70.Cohen,TrumanandIsrael,126.71.McKinzie,“OralHistoryInterviewwithLoyW.Henderson,”29.72.Goldmann,TheAutobiographyofNahumGoldmann,232.73.Cohen,TrumanandIsrael,126.74.“OralHistoryInterviewwithLoyW.Henderson,”McKinzie,29.75.DeanAcheson,Present at theCreation:MyYears in theStateDepartment (NewYork:

Norton,1969),172.76.Louis,TheBritishEmpire,398.ThedescriptionsoftheBritishmembersofthecommittee

aretakenfromLouis’sdiscussion.77.“PrefacetoReportoftheAnglo-AmericanCommitteeofEnquiry,”regardingtheproblems

of European Jewry and Palestine, Apr. 20, 1946, Lausanne. London, HisMajesty’s StationeryOffice (henceforth identified as Anglo-American Committee). For informative analyses of theAnglo-AmericanCommittee, seeJ.C.Hurewitz,TheStruggle forPalestine (NewYork:Norton,1950); Louis, The British Empire; Amikam Nachmani,Great Power Discord in Palestine: TheAnglo-AmericanCommitteeof Inquiry into theProblemsofEuropeanJewry inPalestine,1945–1948 (London: Frank Cass, 1986); Susan Lee Hattis, The BiNational Idea in Palestine duringMandatoryTimes(Haifa,Israel:Shikmona,1970).

78. Anglo-American Committee, “Preface to Report of the Anglo-American Committee ofEnquiry,”39.

79.Ibid.,40.80.Ibid.,41.81.Ibid.,34–35.82.Ibid.,35.83.Ibid.,27.84.NoamChomsky,Peace in theMiddleEast?ReflectionsonJusticeandStatehood (New

York:Pantheon,1974),83.85.Ibid.86. Anglo-American Committee, “Preface to Report of the Anglo-American Committee of

Enquiry,”35.87.FromNahlaAbdoandNiraYuval-Davis,“Palestine,IsraelandtheZionistSettlerProject,”

ascitedinUnsettlingSettlerSocieties,ArticulationsofGender,Race,EthnicityandClass,ed.D.StasuilisandN.Yuval-Davis(ThousandOaks,Calif.:Sage,1995),298.

88. Anglo-American Committee, “Preface to Report of the Anglo-American Committee ofEnquiry,”29.

89.Ibid.,31.90.Ibid.91.“EliahuEpsteintoRobertLovett,”inFilesofClarkClifford,HarryS.TrumanLibrary,Aug.

3,1948.92.TestimonyofRobertNathan,inHearingBeforetheAnglo-AmericanCommitteeofInquiry,

Washington,D.C.,StateDepartmentBuilding,Jan.7,1946.WardandPaul,Electreporter, Inc.,OfficialReporters,1760Pennsylvania,Ave.N.W.,Washington,D.C.

93.RobertR.Nathan,OscarGass,andDanielCreamer,Palestine:ProblemandPromise,an

Economic Study (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, American Council on Public Affairs,1946),5.

94.Ibid.,13.95.IamgratefultoJohnJustinHaydenforgivingmeaccesstohisthesis,1946:ARevisionist

ThesisonCanadaandPalestine,AmericanUniversityofBeirut,DepartmentofPoliticalStudiesandPublicAdministration,2011,Canada.

96. Anglo-American Committee, “Preface to Report of the Anglo-American Committee ofEnquiry,”1.

97.Ibid.,7.98.Ibid.,4.99.Wilson,ACalculatedRisk,294.100.Ibid.,187.101. Cited in Allis Radosh and Ronald Radosh, A Safe Haven: Harry S Truman and the

FoundingofIsrael(NewYork:Harper,2009),118.102.Hurewitz,TheStruggleforPalestine,257–258.103.“TheAmbassador intheUnitedKingdom(Harriman)totheSecretaryofState,”Foreign

RelationsoftheUnitedStates7(July24,1946):652.104.Acheson,PresentattheCreation,175.105.Ibid.,176.106. “Memorandumby theAssistantChiefof theDivisionofNearEasternAffairs (Wilson),”

ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates7(Sept.5,1946):693.107.Truman’sstatementwas included inhisOct.3communication toBritishPrimeMinister

Attlee,ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates7(Oct.3,1946):701–703;seealsoCohen,TrumanandIsrael,143–146.

108.Wilson,ACalculatedRisk,197,andCohen,TrumanandIsrael,144.109.Goldmann,TheAutobiography ofNahumGoldmann, 235.On Truman’s recognition of

Israel,seeJohnSnetsinger,Truman,theJewishVote,andtheCreationofIsrael(Stanford,Calif.:Hoover Institution Press, 1974); Michael Ottolenghi, “Harry Truman’s Recognition of Israel,”Historical Journal 47, no. 4 (2004): 963–988; Bruce J. Evensen, “The Limits of PresidentialLeadership: Truman at War with Zionists, the Press, Public Opinion and His Own StateDepartmentoverPalestine,”PresidentialStudiesQuarterly23,no.2(Spring1993):269–287.

110.Wilson,ACalculatedRisk,199–200.111.Ibid.,199.112.Ibid.113. “Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Merriam) to the

DirectoroftheOfficeofNearEasternandAfricanAffairs(Henderson),”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates7(Dec.27,1946):733.

114.Ibid.,733–734.115.Ibid.,734.116.Ibid.117.Wilson,ACalculatedRisk,209.118.Dec.27,1946,Memorandum,732,noteatbottomofpage.119.“AspectsofThinkingintheDepartmentofStateonPoliticalandEconomicPoliciesofthe

UnitedStatesintheNearandMiddleEast,”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates7(1946):1.120.Ibid.,4.121.Ibid.

3.THECRITICALYEAR:1947

1. “TheUnder-SecretaryofState (Acheson) to theDirectorof theOfficeofNearEasternanAfricanAffairs(Henderson),”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates5(Feb.15,1947):1048.

2. “‘The Pentagon Talks of 1947’ Between the United States and the United KingdomConcerning the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean,” Foreign Relations of the UnitedStates5(1947):544–545.ForacriticalviewofAnglo-AmericanrelationsinthePersianGulfinthe1940s,seeSimonDavis,“ThePersianGulfinthe1940sandtheQuestionofanAnglo-AmericanMiddleEast,”History95,no.317(Jan.2010):64–88.

3.LoyHenderson’stalkwascoveredbyBertramF.Linz,“WatchingWashington,”TheOilandGasJournal(Nov.22,1947):5.SeethepapersofMaxW.Ball,HarryS.TrumanLibrary,Box1.

4.Ibid.5.MichaelT.Benson,HarryS.TrumanandtheFoundingofIsrael(Westport,Conn.:Praeger,

1997),78.6.DavidS.Painter, “Oil and theAmericanCentury,”Journal ofAmericanHistory 99, no. 1

(June2012):5.7.Taken from the introductorypaperon theMiddleEast submitted informallyby theUnited

Kingdomrepresentative,includedundertheheadingofthe“SubstanceofResponseoftheActingSecretarytotheBritishAmbassador,attheFirstMeetingonOctober16,1947,”in“‘ThePentagonTalksof1947,’”ForeignRelationsof theUnitedStates5 (1947):569.Note that the title “ActingSecretary”sometimesappearsas“Under-Secretary.”

8. “Memorandum by Mr. Fraser Wilkins of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs,” ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates5(Jan.14,1947):1004.

9.Ibid.,1005.10.“TheSecretaryofStatetotheEmbassyintheUnitedKingdom,”ForeignRelationsofthe

UnitedStates7(Jan.15,1947):1006n.1.11. “Memorandum of Conversation by the Under Secretary of State (Acheson),” Foreign

RelationsoftheUnitedStates7(Jan.31,1947):1010.12.“TheConsulGeneralatBasel(Sholes)totheSecretaryofState,”ForeignRelationsofthe

UnitedStates7(Dec.30,1946):737.Forananalysisof“TheParadoxofAmericanZionism,”seeJohnB.Judis,Genesis(NewYork:Farrar,StrausandGiroux,2014),part2.

13.ShlomoBen-Ami,ScarsofWar,WoundsofPeace:TheIsraeli-ArabTragedy(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,2007),13.

14. “Memorandum of Conversation by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near EasternAffairs(Wilson),”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates7(Sept.5,1946):693.

15.“TheSecretaryofStatetotheEmbassyintheUK,”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates5(Jan.15,1947):1012.

16.Ibid.,1013.17.Ibid.18.J.C.Hurewitz,TheStruggleforPalestine(NewYork:Norton,1950),290.19.Ibid.,265.20.WilliamRogerLouis,TheBritishEmpireintheMiddleEast,1945–1951(NewYork:Oxford

UniversityPress,1988),462.21. Walid Khalidi, ed., From Haven to Conquest (Beirut, Lebanon: Institute for Palestine

Studies,1971),680.22. Ibid., 662. Section 11, “Relief of Jewish Refugees and Displaced Persons,” in

“BinationalismnotPartition.”23.Ibid.,677.24.IlanPappé,TheEthnicCleansingofPalestine(Oxford,England:Oneworld,2006),34.25.Khalidi,FromHaventoConquest,677.26.Ibid.,681.27.GilbertAchcar,TheArabsandtheHolocaust(NewYork:Metropolitan,2009),49.

28.AscitedinEvanWilson,DecisiononPalestine,HowtheU.S.CametoRecognizeIsrael(Stanford,Calif.:HooverInstitutionPress,1979),118.Henderson’sentirememoisincludedinthisworkonpages117–121.

29.Ibid.,121.30.Ibid.,120.31.Ibid.32. Richard D. McKinzie, Oral History Interview with LoyW. Henderson, Harry S. Truman

Library,43.33.Ibid.34.Ibid.35.Ibid.,28.36.Ibid.37.SeeJohnJudis’sreferencetotheideaof“transfer”inthePeelCommissionReport,aswell

asBen-Gurion’sviewsoftransfer inJudis,Genesis,116–117.Fortheideaoftransfer inZionistthinkingbefore1948,seeBennyMorris,TheBirthofthePalestinianRefugeeProblemRevisited(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004), chap. 3 and chap. 5; Nur Masalha,ExpulsionofthePalestinians:TheConceptof“Transfer” inZionistPoliticalThought,1882–1948(Beirut,Lebanon:InstituteforPalestineStudies,1992),andThePoliticsofDenial:IsraelandthePalestinianRefugeeProblem(London,UK:Pluto,2003),chap.1.

38.Morris,BirthofthePalestinianRefugeeProblem,51–52.39.CitedinPappé,EthnicCleansing,48.40.Ibid.,49.41.Morris,BirthofthePalestinianRefugeeProblem,43.42.IsraelShahak,“TheHistoryoftheConceptof ‘Transfer’ inZionism,”JournalofPalestine

Studies18,no.3(Spring1989):26.43.Ibid.,28.44.AriShavit,“Lydda,1948,”TheNewYorker,Oct.21,2013,46;andAriShavit,MyPromised

Land:TheTriumphandTragedyofIsrael(NewYork:Spiegel&Grau,2013).45.Ari Shavit, “Survival of theFittest,”Ha’aretz, Jan. 8, 2004; see alsoBennyMorris, “We

MustDefeatHamasNextTime,”Ha’aretz,July30,2014.46.“MemorandumofConversationbytheDirectorof theOfficeofNearEasternandAfrican

Affairs(Henderson),” includedin“ThePentagonTalksof1947,”ForeignRelationsof theUnitedStates5(Sept.9,1947):498.

47.Ibid.,499.48.EditorialNotebeforeNo.31(Mainvolume,p.44).Referstomaterial thatappears inthe

Companion Volume,Political and Diplomatic Documents, December 1947–May 1948, State ofIsrael,IsraelStateArchives,Jerusalem,1979,45.

49. IlanPappé,TheMakingof theArab-IsraeliConflict,1947–1951 (NewYork: I.B.Tauris,1951),119.

50. See Avi Shlaim, “The Debate about 1948,” in The Israel/Palestine Question, ed. IlanPappé(NewYork:Routledge,1999),183–186.

51.“ThePentagonTalksof1947,”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates5(1947):538.52. Richard D. McKinzie, Oral History Interview with LoyW. Henderson, Harry S. Truman

Library,39.53.Ibid.54.Ibid.,40.55. “Memorandum by Mr. Robert M. McClintock to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett),”

ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates5(Oct.20,1947):1190.56.Ibid.57.Ibid.,1191.

58.Ibid.,1191–1192.59. Central Intelligence Agency, “The Current Situation in theMediterranean and the Near

East,”ORE52(Oct.17,1947):2;http://www.foia.cia.gov/browse_docs_full.asp.60.CentralIntelligenceAgency,“TheCurrentSituationinPalestine,”ORE49(Oct.20,1947):

copyno.45,p.1;http://www.foia.cia.gov/browse_docs.asp.61.Ibid.62.Oct.,10,1947,JCS1684/3,citedinMichaelA.Palmer,GuardiansoftheGulf:AHistoryof

America’sExpandingRoleinthePersianGulf,1833–1992(NewYork:Simon&Schuster,1992),55.

63.RichardD.McKinzie,OralHistoryInterviewwithLoyW.Henderson,36–37.64.WalterMillis,ed.,TheForrestalDiaries(NewYork:Viking,1951),358.65.McKinzie,OralHistoryInterviewwithLoyW.Henderson,37.66.Central IntelligenceAgency, “TheConsequencesof thePartitionofPalestine” (Nov.28,

1947):8;http://www.foia.cia.gov/browse_docs_full.asp.67.Ibid.,8–9.68.Ibid.,4.69.Ibid.70.Ibid.,5.71. Ibid.,7.Foranotherviewofwhatoccurred inBaghdad,seeAchcar,TheArabsand the

Holocaust,99–103.72.CentralIntelligenceAgency,“TheConsequencesofthePartitionofPalestine,”13.73.Ibid.74.Ibid.,14.75.Ibid.,13.76.Ibid.,14.77.Ibid.,10.78.Ibid.79.Ibid.,10.80.Ibid.,12.81.Shlaim,“TheDebateabout1948,”294.82.Khalidi,FromHaventoConquest,Appendix8,“NoteonArabStrengthinPalestine,Jan–

15May1948,”860.83.Ibid.84.Ibid.,AppendixlX-B,“TheArabExpeditionaryForcestoPalestine,15/5/48,”867.85.CentralIntelligenceAgency,“TheConsequencesofthepartitionofPalestine,”9.86.Ibid.,1.87.Ibid.,1,17.88.“InterestoftheUnitedStatesintheSecurityoftheEasternMediterraneanandtheMiddle

East,”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates5(1948):2.89.UNGeneralAssemblyResolution181(II), “FutureGovernmentofPalestine”UNGAOR,

2nd session, 128th plenary (Nov. 29, 1947), 131–132. See also UN Special Committee onPalestine (UNSCOP Palestine Report), General Assmbly Official Records, 2nd session,SupplementNo.11,September3,1947,UNDocA/364,Vol.1,p.35.IamindebtedtoSusanM.Akram,“MythsandRealitiesofthePalestinianRefugeeProblem:ReframingtheRightofReturn,”in Commemorating the Naksa, Evoking the Nakba 8 (Spring 2008): 183–198. MIT ElectronicJournalofMiddleEastStudies,http://web.mit.edu/cis/www,mitejmes.

90.MusaBudeiri,ThePalestineCommunistParty,1919–1948 (Chicago:Haymarket,1979),155–165;JoelBeinin,WastheRedFlagFlyingThere?(Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1990),part2.

91. Cited in Nafez Abdullah Nazzal, “The Zionist Occupation of Western Galilee, 1948,”

JournalofPalestineStudies111,no.3(Spring1974):59.92.Ibid.,59n.2.93. Pablo de Azcarate, Mission in Palestine, 1948–1952 (Washington, D.C.: Middle East

Institute,1966),4.94.CitedinBen-Ami,ScarsofWar,34.95.CitedinPappé,EthnicCleansing,49.96.SimhaFlapan,TheBirthofIsrael,MythsandRealities(NewYork:Pantheon,1987),90.97.Ibid.98.Ibid.99.Ibid.100. “The Consul General at Jerusalem (Macatee) to the Secretary of State,” Foreign

RelationsoftheUnitedStates5(Dec.31,1947):1322.101.Ibid.,1323.102.Ibid.103.Cited inUri Bialer,BetweenEast andWest: Israel’s Foreign PolicyOrientation 1948–

1956(NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,1990),173.104.DavidMcCullough,Truman(NewYork:Simon&Schuster,1992),604.105. “Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr FraserWilkins of the Division of Near Eastern

Affairs,”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates5,part2(Jan.6,1948):537.106. Zachary Lockman, Comrades and Enemies: Arab and Jewish Workers in Palestine,

1906–1948(Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1996),351.107. According to Ben-Gurion’s diaries of Jan. 1948, “the strategic objective [of the Jewish

forces] was to destroy the urban communities, which were the most organized and politicallyconscioussectionsofthePalestinianpeople.Thiswasnotdonebyhouse-to-housefightinginsidethecitiesandtowns,butbytheconquestanddestructionoftheruralareassurroundingmostofthetowns.ThistechniqueledtothecollapseandsurrenderofHaifa,Jaffa,Tiberias,Safed,Acre,Beit-Shan,Lydda,Ramleh,Majdal,andBeersheba.”CitedinFlapan,TheBirthofIsrael,92.

4.THEWINTEROFDISCONTENT:1948

1.EditorialNote,ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates5,part2(1948):543.2.DavidMayers,GeorgeKennanandtheDilemmasofU.S.ForeignPolicy(NewYork:Oxford

UniversityPress,1988),249–261.3. “Report by the Policy Planning Staff on Position of the United States with Respect to

Palestine,”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates5,part2,Annex(Jan.19,1948):548.4.Ibid.,546–547.5. “Memorandum by Mr. Samuel K.C. Kopper of the Office of Near Eastern and African

Affairs,”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates5,part2,Annex3(Jan.27,1948):564.6.Ibid.7.Ibid.,565.8.Ibid.9.SimhaFlapan,TheBirthofIsrael,MythsandRealities(NewYork:Pantheon,1987),95.10.“TheConsulGeneralatJerusalem(Macatee)totheSecretaryofState,”ForeignRelations

oftheUnitedStates5,part2(Feb.9,1948):606.11.Ibid.12.Ibid.,607.13.Ibid.,609.14.Ibid.,611.

15.“TheConsulGeneralatJerusalem,Secret,A-37,”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates5,part2(Feb.9,1948):612.

16. “The Consul General, A-35,” Foreign Relations of the United States 5, part 2 (Feb. 9,1948):608.

17.Flapan,TheBirthofIsrael,95.18. “Memorandumby thePolicyPlanningStaff (PPS /21),”ForeignRelations of theUnited

States5,part2(Feb.11,1948):619,620.19.Ibid.20.Ibid.,625.Seeexplanationinnote5.21. Undated handwritten notes by Robert M. McClintock, Foreign Relations of the United

States 5, part 2 (1948): 627; note indicates that this was prepared for the National SecurityCouncilmeetingplannedforFeb.13,1948.

22.Ibid.,628.23.Ibid.,629.24.“DraftReportpreparedbytheStaffoftheNationalSecurityCouncil,”ForeignRelationsof

theUnitedStates5,part2(Feb.17,1948):632.25.Ibid.26.Ibid.,63327.Ibid.,633.28.DepartmentofStatetoPresidentTruman,“MessagetothePresident,”ForeignRelations

of the United States 5, part 2 (Feb. 1948): 638–639. There is a discrepancy in dating thismessage.Note1onpage637indicatesthatthetextisdatedFeb.23,butitreferstothemessagebeingtransmittedtothepresidenttwodaysearlier.

29.Ibid.,640.30.Ibid.31.Ibid.;see637n.1.32.InthepapersofClarkN.Clifford,“TopSecret”[Draft],“ThePositionoftheUnitedStates

withRespecttoPalestine,”HarryS.TrumanLibrary,Feb.17,1948.33.ForrestC.Pogue,GeorgeC.Marshall:Statesman(NewYork:Viking,1987),359.34. “Reportby thePolicyPlanningStaff,PPS/23,”ForeignRelationsof theUnitedStates5,

part2(Feb.24,1948):656.35.“PossibleDevelopmentsinPalestine,ReportbytheCentralIntelligenceAgency,”Foreign

RelationsoftheUnitedStates5,part2(Feb.28,1948):666n.1.36.Ibid.,666.37.Ibid.,672.38.Ibid.,674.39. Cited inWilliam Roger Louis,The British Empire in theMiddle East, 1945–1951 (New

York:OxfordUniversityPress,1988),462.40.RichardD.McKinzie, “OralHistory Interviewwith LoyW.Henderson,”HarryS.Truman

Library,June14,1973,39.41. Michael J. Cohen, “Truman and the State Department: The Palestine Trusteeship

Proposal,March1948,”JewishSocialStudies43,no.2(Spring1981):167.

5.THEOILCONNECTION1.“J.RobinsontoA.Lourie,”Jan.27,1948(No.147),inPoliticalandDiplomaticDocuments,

December1947–May1948(Jerusalem:IsraelStateArchives,1979),248.2. See the discussion by Uri Bialer, Between East and West: Israel’s Foreign Policy

Orientation1948–1956(NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,2008),part1;andZoharSegev,“StruggleforCooperationandIntegration,”MiddleEasternStudies42,no.5(2006):827–828.

3.“MemorandumofConversation,bytheUnder-SecretaryofState,”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates5,part2(Feb.21,1948):642.

4.Ibid.,646.5.Ibid.6.Ibid.7. Avi Shlaim, The Politics of Partition (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 11.

ShlaimcitesEliahuElath(Epstein)asamongthegroupofJewishArabiststhatincludedReuvenShiloah,AharonCohen,YaacovShimoni,andEliasSasson;onEliahuEpstein,seePhilipKhoury,Syria and the FrenchMandate: The Politics of Arab Nationalism, 1920–1945 (Princeton, N.J.:PrincetonUniversityPress,1987),548–552.

8.EliahuElath,IsraelandElath:ThePoliticalStrugglefortheInclusionofElathintheJewishState(London:WeidenfeldandNicolson,1966),18.

9. Clark Clifford (with RichardHolbrooke), Counsel to the President: AMemoir (NewYork:RandomHouse,1991),18.

10.See theFredaKirchweyPapers at theSchlesinger Library on theHistory ofWomen inAmerica, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University, including the Apr. 19, 1948, Letter to GaelSullivanoftheDemocraticNationalCommittee.

11. See Peter L. Hahn, “The Influence of Organized Labor on U.S. Policy Toward Israel,1945–1967,” inEmpireandRevolution:TheU.S.and theThirdWorldSince1945,ed.PeterL.HahnandMaryAnnHeiss(Columbus:OhioStateUniversityPress,2001),162.

12. “Petroleum Administration forWar,” Ralph K. Davies Papers, Harry S. Truman Library,Apr.5,1946.

13. J. E. Jones, “Oil Exploration in the Western U.S.,” The Mossadegh Project,MohammadMossadegh.com,Aug.9,1951.

14.MaxW.Ball, “Petroleum in theEuropeanRecoveryProgram,”TheMinesMagazine,13,includedinpapersofMaxW.Ball,HarryS.TrumanLibrary,Box2,May1948.

15.MaxW.Ball, “Government for thePeople,” I.P.A.ofA.Monthly,presentationbefore theAmericanPetroleumInstitute,Chicago,Ill.,28inpapersofMaxW.Ball,HarryS.TrumanLibrary,Box2,Nov.11,1948.

16.Ibid.17.Ball,“PetroleumintheEuropeanRecoveryProgram,”13.18.Ibid.19.Hon.DeweyShort, cited in “Reportof InvestigationofPetroleum inRelation toNational

Defense,”conductedbytheSpecialSubcommitteeonPetroleumCommitteeonArmedServices,HouseofRepresentatives (Washington,D.C.:U.S.GovernmentPrintingOffice,Jan.20,1948),15.

20.SeeNathanJ.Citino,“TheRiseofConsumerSociety:PostwarAmericanOilPoliciesandtheModernization of theMiddle East,” 14th International Economic History Congress, Helsinki2006,Session118,14.

21.Ibid.,Session24,69,77.22.Bialer,BetweenEastandWest,85.23.Ibid.,128.24.“MaxWBalltoMrPaulGlowa,”inpapersofMaxW.Ball,HarryS.TrumanLibrary,Box2,

Mar.13,1948.25.“PersonalDiary,”inpapersofMaxW.Ball,HarryS.TrumanLibrary,Box2.26.Ibid.,Oct.14,1948.27.“ReportonInvestigationofSpecialSubcommitteeonPetroleum,”inReportofInvestigation

of Petroleum in Relation to National Defense, conducted by the Special Subcommittee on

Petroleum Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives (Washington, D.C.: U.S.GovernmentPrintingOffice,1948),no.263.

28. Testimony by James Terry Duce, Petroleum for National Defense, House ofRepresentatives, Committee on Armed Services, Special Subcommittee on Petroleum, Feb. 2,1948,204.

29.Ibid.,203.30.Ibid.31.Ibid.,207.32.CitedinEdwardW.Chester,UnitedStatesOilPolicyandDiplomacy:ATwentiethCentury

Overview(Westport,Conn:GreenwoodPress,1983),240.33.Ibid.34.Ibid.,207–208.35.Ibid.,211.36.Ibid.37.Ibid.,216.38.Ibid.39.RobertR.Nathan,OscarGass,andDanielCreamer,Palestine:ProblemandPromise,An

Economic Study (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, American Council on Public Affairs,1946),5;andseediscussioninchap.1,“ProblemsandEconomicPotentialities.”

40.See “ConsultationofJewishAgencystaffandadvisers (Washington,3February1948),”Feb. 4, 1948 (No. 173), in Political and Diplomatic Documents, December 1947–May 1948(Jerusalem: IsraelStateArchives,AhvaPress,1979),294–297.SeealsoPeterGrose, Israel intheMindofAmerica(NewYork:AlfredA.Knopf,1983),265–266.

41.Grose,IsraelintheMindofAmerica,265.42.Ibid.,267.43.CompanionVolumeNo.162,Political andDiplomaticDocuments,December1947–May

1948(Jerusalem:StateofIsraelArchives,AhvaPress,1979),75.44. Memorandum by Jewish Agency Office, “Note on Palestine Policy. Problem of

Implementation” (No. 162), inPolitical and Diplomatic Documents, December 1947–May 1948(Jerusalem:StateofIsraelArchives,1979),273.

45.Ibid.,272.46.“MemorandumbytheArabSectionoftheJewishAgency’sPoliticalDepartment,”Mar.1,

1948 (No.239), inPoliticalandDiplomaticDocuments,December1947–May1948 (Jerusalem:StateofIsraelArchives,1979),402.

47.Grose,IsraelintheMindofAmerica,267.48.“PersonalDiary,”inpapersofMaxW.Ball,Box2,Feb.13,1948.49.Ibid.,Feb.14,1948.50. “Memorandum for M. Shertok (New York),” Feb. 18, 1948 (No. 210), in Political and

DiplomaticDocuments,December1947–May1948 (Jerusalem:Stateof IsraelArchives,1979),354. Gideon Ruffer (aka Gideon Rafael) is identified as an adviser to the Jewish AgencydelegationattheUnitedNationsintheIndexoftheCompanionVolumeofPoliticalandDiplomaticDocuments, December 1947–May 1948, 211. “Kosloff” is the transliteration of Israel Koslov’snameasitappearsinU.S.sources.

51.“PersonalDiary,”inpapersofMaxW.Ball,Box2.52.Ibid.53.“MemorandumforM.Shertok(NewYork),”18February1948,354.54.Ibid.,354–355.55.Bialer,BetweenEastandWest,24.56.“MemorandumforM.Shertok(NewYork),”355.57.RobertVitalis,America’sKingdom:MythmakingontheSaudiOilFrontier(Stanford,Calif.:

StanfordUniversityPress,2006),82–84.58.“MemorandumforM.Shertok(NewYork),”355.59.CitedinIrvineAnderson,Aramco,TheU.S.andSaudiArabia(Princeton,N.J.:Princeton

UniversityPress,1961),185.60.CitedinVitalis,America’sKingdom,119;seealso104,118,andchap.4,“TheWizardsof

Dhahran,” for further discussion and evidence of a dimension of ARAMCO’s activities notpreviouslyavailable.

61.“MemorandumforM.Shertok(NewYork),”355.62.Ibid.63.Ibid.64.Ibid.,356.65.Ibid.66.Ibid.,357.67.“PersonalDiary,”inpapersofMaxW.Ball,Box2,Apr.27,1949.68.“MemorandumforM.Shertok(NewYork),”357.69.Ibid.70.Bialer,BetweenEastandWest,32.71.“PersonalDiary,”inpapersofMaxW.Ball,Box2,Feb.20,1948.72.“PersonalDiary,”inpapersofMaxW.Ball,Box1,Jan.14,1948.73. Robert Vitalis, “Black Gold, White Crude: An Essay on American Exceptionalism,

Hierarchy,andHegemonyintheGulf,”DiplomaticHistory26,no.2(Spring2002):205.74. Ibid., 205–206. See Kirchwey to Clark Clifford, June 18, 1948, and enclosures, RG 59

890E6363/6–2248.75.“PersonalDiary,”inpapersofMaxW.Ball,Box1,Mar.10,1948.76. “E. Epstein tomembers of the Jewish Agency Executive,” Mar. 17, 1948 (No. 281), in

Political and Diplomatic Documents, December 1947–May 1948 (Jerusalem: State of IsraelArchives,1979),469.

77.Ibid.,470.78.Ibid.,471.79.Ibid.80.Ibid.81.Ibid.82.Citino,“TheRiseofConsumerSociety,”13.83.Ibid.84.“TheMinisterinSaudiArabia(Childs)totheSecretaryofState,”ForeignRelationsofthe

UnitedStates5,part2(Mar.13,1948):719.85.Central IntelligenceAgency, “TheConsequences of thePartition of Palestine,”ORE 55

(Nov.28,1947):9.

PARTIII:BEWARE“ANOMALOUSSITUATION,”1948

ThequotedphraseinthetitleofpartIII istakenfromthe“DraftMemorandumbytheDirectorofthe Office of United Nations Affairs (Rusk) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett),” ForeignRelationsof theUnitedStates 5,part2 (May4,1948):894.ThememorandumwasdraftedbyRobertMcClintock,butaccordingtoU.S.sourcesitwasnotsent.

6.THETRANSFORMATIONOFPALESTINE

1. Pablo de Azcarate, Mission in Palestine 1948–1952 (Washington, D.C.: Middle EastInstitute,1966),32.

2. “DraftMemorandumby theDirector of theOffice ofUnitedNationsAffairs (Rusk) to theUnderSecretaryofState(Lovett),”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates5,part2(May4,1948):894.

3.Ibid.,894–895.4.Ibid.,895.5. Ilan Pappé,TheMaking of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1947–1951 (NewYork: I. B. Tauris,

1994),85.SeePappé’scomprehensivereviewofPlanDaletinIlanPappé,TheEthnicCleansingofPalestine(London:Oneworld,2006),chap.5,“TheBlueprintforEthnicCleansing:PlanDalet.”

6.AviShlaim,TheIronWall,IsraelandtheArabWorld(NewYork:Norton,2000),31.7.SimhaFlapan,TheBirthofIsrael,MythsandRealities(NewYork:Pantheon,1987),93.8. Benny Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited (New York:

Cambridge University Press, 2004), 164. See Joel Beinin’s rejoinder and review in “No MoreTears:BennyMorris and theRoadBack fromLiberal Zionism,”MiddleEastReport 34 (Spring2004):8.

9.Morris,BirthofthePalestinianRefugeeProblemRevisited,164.10.SeeacriticalexaminationofBennyMorris’sargumentsinNormanFinkelstein,Imageand

RealityoftheIsrael-PalestineConflict,2nded.(NewYork:Verso,2003),chap.3,“BorneofWar,NotbyDesign,”80–87.

11.WalidKhalidi,“PlanDalet:MasterPlanfortheConquestofPalestine,”JournalofPalestineStudies18,no.1(October1988):30.ThiswasthefirstcomprehensiveanalysisandtranslationofPlanDalettoappearinEnglish.

12.WalidKhalidi, “TheArabPerspective,” inTheEndof thePalestineMandate,ed.WilliamRogerLouisandRobertStookey(Austin:UniversityofTexasPress,1986),127.

13.Ibid.14.Finkelstein,ImageandReality,xiv.15. Israel Shahak, “AHistory of theConcept of ‘Transfer’ in Zionism,” Journal of Palestine

Studies18,no.3(Spring1989):23.16. Benny Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947–1949 (New York:

CambridgeUniversityPress,1987),25.17.NurMasalha,ThePoliticsofDenial,IsraelandthePalestinianRefugeeProblem(London:

Pluto, 2003), 24; and by the same author, Expulsion of the Palestinians: The Concept of“Transfer” in Zionist Political Thought, 1882–1948 (Washington, D.C.: Institute for PalestineStudies,1992).

18.Masalha,ThePoliticsofDenial,25.19.AriShavit,“SurvivaloftheFittest?AnInterviewwithBennyMorris,”Ha’aretz,Jan.8,2004.20.Ibid.21.AsreportedinMorris,BirthofthePalestinianRefugeeProblemRevisited,53.22.BennyMorris,“TheHarvestof1948andtheCreationofthePalestinianRefugeeProblem,”

MiddleEastJournal40,no.4(Autumn1986):677.23.Ibid.,678.24.Ibid.,679.Italicsadded.SeediscussionoftheTransferCommitteeinMorris,TheBirthof

thePalestinianRefugeeProblem,1947–1949,135–138.25.SimhaFlapan, “ThePalestinianExodusof1948,”JournalofPalestineStudies16,no.4

(Summer1987):10.26. Hillel Cohen, Army of Shadows, trans. by Haim Watzman (Berkeley: University of

CaliforniaPress,2008),232–233,and309n.7,citingHaganahArchivesaswellasthoseoftheIsrael Defense Forces. Cohenwrites: “An unconfirmed Arab source reported a day before theattack on Deir Yasin that the people of the village and of ’Ayn Karem were asked to host

mujahidin(Arabfighters).Thelatteragreed,buttheformerrefusedandarguedthattheyareinapeacefulrelationshipwiththeirJewishneighborsandthepresenceofforeignerswoulddisturbit.”

27. “TheConsulatJerusalem(Wasson) to theSecretaryofState,”ForeignRelationsof theUnitedStates5,part2(Apr.13,1948):817.

28.JacquesdeReynier,“DeirYassin,”inFromHaventoConquest:ReadingsinZionismandthe Palestine Problem Until 1948, 2nd ed., ed. Walid Khalidi (Washington, D.C.: Institute forPalestineStudies,1987),764.

29.Masalha,ThePoliticsofDenial, 32–33. Ina letter published in theNewYorkTimes onDec.4, 1948,agroupof radicalAmericanJewsdenounced theeventsofDeirYassinand theparty responsible for it. They similarly denounced the then current visit to theUnitedStates ofMenachemBegin,leaderofthe“FreedomParty,”“apoliticalpartycloselyakininitsorganization,methods,politicalphilosophyandsocialappealtotheNaziandFascistparties.ItwasformedoutofthemembershipandfollowingoftheformerIrgunZvaiLeumi,aterrorist,right-wing,chauvinistorganizationinPalestine.”

30.BennyMorris,1948:TheFirstArab-IsraeliWar(NewHaven,Conn.:YaleUniversityPress,2008),128.

31.Ibid.32.Ibid.33. JamesG.McDonald,MyMission in Israel 1948–1951 (NewYork:SimonandSchuster,

1951),174–175.34.Ibid.,175.35.Flapan,TheBirthofIsrael,94.36.TomSegev,1949:TheFirstIsraelis(NewYork:FreePress,1986),89.37. “Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs

(Henderson)totheActingSecretaryofState(Lovett),”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates5,part2(Apr.9,1948):804.

38.“TheActingSecretaryofStatetotheConsulateGeneralatJerusalem,”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates5,part2(Apr.10,1948):811.

39.Ibid.40.Ibid.,n.2.41. “C.Weizmann to President Truman (Washington),” Israeli Documents December 1947-

May1948(Apr.9,1948):590.42.“TheActingSecretaryofStatetotheEmbassyinEgypt,”ForeignRelationsoftheUnited

States5,part2(Apr.10,1948):812.43.MenachemBegin,TheRevolt(NewYork:Dell,1977),225.(Originallypublishedin1951.)

44.Flapan,TheBirthofIsrael,94.45. “TheConsulatJerusalem(Wasson) to theSecretaryofState,”ForeignRelationsof the

UnitedStates5,part2(Apr.22,1948):842–843.46.WalidKhalidi,“TheFallofHaifaRevisited,”JournalofPalestineStudies37,no.3(Spring

2008):46.47.Khalidi,“TheArabPerspective,”129.48.DonaldNeff,“U.S.PolicyandthePalestinianRefugees,”JournalofPalestineStudies18,

no.1(Autumn1988):96.49.Ibid.50.Beinin,“NoMoreTears,”2.51.Flapan,“ThePalestinianExodusof1948,”4;seealsoMajorR.D.Wilson,“TheBattlefor

Haifa,April21–22,1948,”inFromHaventoConquest,771–774;WalidKhalidi,“SpecialFeature:TheFallofHaifaRevisited,”JournalofPalestineStudies37,no.3(Spring2008):30–58.

52.Khalidi,“SpecialFeature:TheFallofHaifaRevisited,”41–42.53.Flapan,“ThePalestinianExodusof1948,”5.

54.Flapan,TheBirthofIsrael,89.55.“EditorialNote,”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates5,part2(1948):838–839.56. “Lippincott, Haifa to Secretary of State,” Palestine Reference Files of Dean Rusk and

Robert McClintock, 1947–1949, Record Group 59, National Archives and Records Service(Washington,D.C.:GeneralServicesAdministration,1981),Apr.24,1948,reel10,no.8955.

57.MustafaAbbasi,“TheFallofAcreinthe1948PalestineWar,”JournalofPalestineStudies39,no.4(Summer2010):24.

58.Wilson,“TheBattleforHaifa,”774.59.“TheConsulatHaifa(Lippincott)totheSecretaryofState,”ForeignRelationsoftheUnited

States5,part2(June23,1948):1138.60.Ibid.61.CitedinMorris,BirthofthePalestinianRefugeeProblemRevisited,310.62.Ibid.,310–311.63.ZacharyLockman,ComradesandEnemies:ArabandJewishWorkersinPalestine,1906–

1948(Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1996),351.64. “The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State,”Foreign

RelationsoftheUnitedStates5,part2(June18,1948):1123.65.“TheSecretaryofStatetotheEmbassyintheUnitedKingdom,”ForeignRelationsofthe

UnitedStates5,part2(June22,1948):1132.66.Ibid.,1133.67.Ibid.68. “Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Petroleum Division (Moline),” Foreign

RelationsoftheUnitedStates5,part1(Sept.10,1948):42.69.Ibid.70.UriBialer,OilandtheArab-IsraeliConflict,1948–1963(NewYork:St.Martin’s,1999),35.71.See“EditorialNote,”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates5,part1(1948):67.72.AmiramCohen,“USCheckingPossibilityofPumpingOil fromNorthernIraqtoHaifa,via

Jordan,”Ha’aretz,Aug.25,2003.73.EdVuillamy,“IsraelSeeksPipelineforIraqiOil,”TheGuardian(London),Apr.19,2003.74. “The Ambassador in Egypt (Tuck) to the Secretary of State,” Foreign Relations of the

UnitedStates5,part2(Apr.26,1948):863.75.SeeRashidKhalidi, “ThePalestinians and 1948: TheUnderlyingCauses of Failure,” in

TheWar for Palestine:Rewriting theHistory of 1948, 2nd ed., EugeneRogan andAvi Shlaim(NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,2007),30;andseealsoRashidKhalidi,TheIronCage:TheStoryofthePalestinianStruggleforStatehood(Boston:Beacon,2006),chap.4.

76.Michael Palumbo,The Palestinian Catastrophe: The 1948 Expulsion of a People FromTheirHomeland(Boston:FaberandFaber,1987),89.

77.Ibid.,87.78.Ibid.,88.79. From theAmerican Legation,Beirut, cover letter by Lowell Pinkerton toAcheson dated

Apr.11,1949, included in IreneGendzier, “TheMemorandumSubmitted to theGovernmentoftheUnitedStatesofAmerica,”bytheJaffaandDistrictInhabitantsCouncil,”JournalofPalestineStudies18,no.3(Spring1989):97.

80.Ibid,103.81.Ibid.,102.82.Ibid.,104.83.Ibid.,105.84.Ibid.,107.85.Ibid.,99;andseeMorris,BirthofthePalestinianRefugeeProblemRevisited,321.86.Palumbo,ThePalestinianCatastrophe,92.

87.Morris,BirthofthePalestinianRefugeeProblemRevisited,219.88.TheagreementisincludedinGendzier,“TheMemorandumSubmittedtotheGovernment

oftheUnitedStatesofAmerica,”99.89.“InstructionstotheArabPopulationbytheCommanderoftheHaganah,Tel-AvivDistrict,”

May13, 1948, is included in theagreement ofMay13, 1948, inGendzier, “TheMemorandumSubmittedtotheGovernmentoftheUnitedStatesofAmerica,”100.

90.Ibid.91.Ibid.92.Ibid.,104;seeunderthecategoryof“Submissions.”93.Ibid.94.CitedinSegev,1949,75.95.Morris,BirthofthePalestinianRefugeeProblemRevisited,220;JonKimche,SevenFallen

Pillars(London:SeckerandWarburg,1953),234.96.Morris,BirthofthePalestinianRefugeeProblemRevisited,221.97.CitedinPappé,TheEthnicCleansinginPalestine,204.98. Ibid., 206. In an interview of Gen. (Reserves) Mordechai Gur by Alex Fishman that

appeared inAl-Hamishmar onMay 10, 1978, the general addressed the question of looting ofPalestinianpropertybytheIDFinhisremarkstoaskepticalreporter.HereferredtothecaseofHaifa.“Whenyoutellpeople,whowereraisedontheethicsof‘Thoushaltnotkill!’‘Gotowarandkilltheenemy’—theneverythingelseispermitted.Theminuteyouoverturnthemoralcode,whatcanamando.” In response to the interviewer’squestionsaboutwho identified theenemy,andwhat of a civilian population,Gur replied, “in Jaffa there oncewasa civilian populationorwastherenot? InHaifawas thereahostilecivilianpopulationorwas therenot?Did they leaveoneapartmentuntouchedorunlooted?”IamgratefultothelateIsraelShahakforthisinterview.

99.Ibid.,205.100.Ibid.,103.

7.TRUCEANDTRUSTEESHIP1.“TheSecretaryofStatetotheUnitedStatesRepresentativeattheUnitedNations(Austin),”

ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates5,part2(Mar.5,1948):681.2.Ibid.,697.3. John Snetsinger,Truman, The Jewish Vote, and the Creation of Israel (Stanford, Calif.:

Hoover Institution Press, 1974), 86; see also the views of Defense Secretary Forrestal, asreported in Walter Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries (New York: Viking, 1951), 387. For acontrasting interpretation, seeMelvynP.Leffler, “NationalSecurityandU.S.ForeignPolicy,” inOrigins of the Cold War, 2nd ed., ed. Melvyn P. Leffler and David S. Painter (New York:Routledge,2005),23;andMelvynP.Leffler,APreponderanceofPower,NationalSecurity, theTrumanAdministrationandtheColdWar(Stanford,Calif.:StanfordUniversityPress,1992),chap.5andchap.6.

4.“MemorandumbythePresident’sSpecialCounsel(Clifford)toPresidentTruman,”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates5,part2(Mar.8,1948):695.

5.Ibid.,691.6. “Memorandum byMr. Samuel K.C. Kopper to theUnitedStatesRepresentatives at the

UnitedNations(Austin),”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates5,part2(Mar.14,1948):724.7.Ibid.8.Ibid.,725.9.AviShlaim,“BritainandtheArab-IsraeliWarof1948,”JournalofPalestineStudies16,no.4

(Summer1987):55.For themostcomprehensiveaccountof this relationshipand itsevolution,seetheworkofAviShlaim,CollusionAcrosstheJordan(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1988).

10.“MemorandumbytheLegalAdviser(Gross)totheDirectoroftheOfficeofUnitedNationsAffairs(Rusk),”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates5,part2(Mar.19,1948):748.

11.“EditorialNote,”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates5,part2(1948):748–749,includesreferencetothecriticalpositionofDanKurzman,authorofGenesis1948(Cleveland,Ohio:NewAmerican Library/World Publishing Company, 1970), who claimed that “President Trumantelephoned toSecretaryMarshall atSanFranciscoonMarch20and instructedhim to issueastatementmakingitclearthattrusteeshiphadnotbeenproposedasasubstituteforpartitionbuthadsimplybeensuggestedasatemporarymeasuretofillthepoliticalvacuuminPalestineuntilpartition couldbeaffected” (748).Truman’s statement, however, indicatedonly that trusteeshipwasregardedasatemporarymeasure.

12.OralHistory InterviewwithLoyW.HendersonbyRichardD.McKinzie,HarryS.TrumanLibrary,41.

13.“MemorandumbytheDirectoroftheExecutiveSecretariat(Humelsine)totheSecretaryofState,”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates5,part2(Mar.22,1948):749.

14.Ibid.,750.15. “Memorandum Prepared in the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs,” Foreign

RelationsoftheUnitedStates5,part2(n.d.):756.FootnoteindicatesthatthismemorandumwastransmittedbyHendersontoMarshall“withhismemorandumofMarch24.”

16.DepartmentofState,“DraftTrusteeshipAgreementforPalestineWiththeUnitedNationsas theAdministeringAuthority,”ForeignRelationsof theUnitedStates5,part2 (Apr.2,1948):778–796.

17. For analysis of what came to be known as the minority report, see Walid Khalidi,“BinationalismnotPartition,”inFromHaventoConquest:ReadingsinZionismandthePalestineProblemUntil1948,2nded.,ed.WalidKhalidi(Washington,D.C.:InstituteforPalestineStudies,1987), 645–699, and more specifically, the pages relevant to the “Principles underlying theconstitutionofaunitaryStateinPalestine,”687–690.TheoriginaltextofSubcommittee2canbefoundinA/AC.14/32andAdd.1.

18.DepartmentofState,“DraftTrusteeshipAgreementforPalestine,”779.19.Ibid.,780.Foracomparisonwith“Principlesunderlyingtheconstitution,”seeKhalidi,From

Haven to Conquest, 688. See Shira Robinson’s study,Citizen Strangers: Palestinians and theBirthofIsrael’sLiberalSettlerState(Stanford,Calif.:StanfordUniversityPress,2013),especiallychap.3.

20.DepartmentofState,“DraftTrusteeshipAgreementforPalestine,”781.TheUNcommitteeprinciplesrecommendedconstitutionalrecognitionoftheuseofHebrewasa“secondlanguageinareasinwhichthey[theJews]areinamajority.”seeKhalidi,FromHaventoConquest,688.

21.DepartmentofState,“DraftTrusteeshipAgreementforPalestine,”789.22. “The Acting Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices,” Foreign

RelationsoftheUnitedStates5,part2(Apr.18,1948):832n.2.23.“EditorialNote,”776.24.“MemorandumbytheJointChiefsofStafftoPresidentTruman,”ForeignRelationsofthe

UnitedStates5,part2(Apr.4,1948):799.25.“TheSecretaryofDefense(Forrestal)totheSecretaryofState,”ForeignRelationsofthe

UnitedStates5,part2(Apr.19,1948):832.26.Ibid.27.AbbaEban,AnAutobiography(NewYork:RandomHouse,1977),103;andWilliamRoger

Louis,The British Empire in theMiddle East, 1945–1951 (NewYork:OxfordUniversity Press,1984)514–515andn.4.

28. April 15, 1948, Secretary of State from Chaim Weizmann, included in The PalestineReferenceFilesofDeanRuskandRobertMcClintock, 1947–1949.RecordGroup59,NationalArchivesandRecordsService,GeneralServicesAdministration,Washington1981.Reel10,no.449.Alsoin“TheUnitedStatesRepresentativesoftheUnitedStates(Austin)totheSecretaryofState,”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates5,part2(Apr.15,1948):823.

29. “The United States Representatives of the United States (Austin) to the Secretary ofState,”823.

30.Ibid.,824.31. “The Ambassador in Egypt (Tuck) to the Secretary of State,” Foreign Relations of the

UnitedStates5,part2(Apr.18,1948):830–831.32. “The Acting Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices,” Foreign

RelationsoftheUnitedStates5,part2(Apr.18,1948):832n.2.33. “Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs

(Henderson)totheUnderSecretaryofState(Lovett),”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates5,part2(Apr.22,1948):840.

34. “Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs(Henderson)totheUnderSecretaryofState(Lovett),”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates5,part2(Apr.23,1948):854.

35.Nosuchmapisincludedinthedeclassifieddocumentsoftheperiod.36. “The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of

State,”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates5,part2(Apr.27,1948):864no.2.37.SeeWalterLaqueur,AHistoryofZionism (NewYork:Schocken,1972),467,552; fora

discussionof theviewof theAmericanJewishCommitteeonPalestineandZionism,seeCyrusAdlerandAaronM.Margalith,WithFirmnessintheRight:AmericanDiplomaticActionAffectingJews,1840–1945(NewYork:AmericanJewishCommittee,1946),450–452.

38. “The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary ofState,”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates5,part2(Apr.25,1948):858.

39. “The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary ofState,”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates5,part2(Apr.22,1948):849.

40.“MemorandumofConversation,bytheDirectoroftheOfficeofNearEasternandAfricanAffairs(Henderson),”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates5,part2(Apr.26,1948):859.

41.Ibid.42. “Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs

(Henderson)totheUnderSecretaryofState(Lovett),”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates5,part2(Apr.22,1948):840.

43.Ibid.44.Ibid.,841.45.Ibid.46. “The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of

State,”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates5,part2(Apr.27,1948):867n.3.47.“Mr.MosheShertoktoSecretaryofState,”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates5,part2

(Apr.29,1948):876n.2.48. “The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of

State,”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates5,part2(Apr.29,1948):873n.1.49. “Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of United Nations Affairs

(Rusk),”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates5,part2(Apr.30,1948):878.50. “Moshe Shertok to Hon. George S. Marshall,” in papers of Clark M. Clifford, Harry S.

TrumanLibrary,Apr.29,1948.51. “Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of United Nations Affairs

(Rusk),”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates5,part2(Apr.30,1948):878.

52.SeeLouis,TheBritishEmpire,514–515.53.Ibid.,515.54. “The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of

State,”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates5,part2(Apr.30,1948):880.55.Ibid.56.“TheSecretaryofStatetotheEmbassyintheUnitedKingdom,”ForeignRelationsofthe

UnitedStates5,part2(Apr.27,1948):865.57. Pablo de Azcarate, Mission in Palestine 1948–1952 (Washington, D.C.: Middle East

Institute,1966),22.58.“TheConsulGeneralatJerusalem(Wasson)totheSecretaryofState,”ForeignRelations

oftheUnitedStates5,part2(May3,1948):889.59.“TheSecretaryofStatetotheConsulateGeneralatJerusalem,”ForeignRelationsofthe

UnitedStates5,part2(May1,1948):882n.2.60. “The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of

State,”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates5,part2(Apr.30,1948):880.61.“TheConsulGeneralatJerusalem(Wasson)totheSecretaryofState”(May3,1948):889.62.Ibid.,890.63.Ibid.64.Ibid.,891.65.NurMasalha,ThePoliticsofDenial:IsraelandthePalestinianRefugeeProblem(London:

Pluto,2003),32.66. “TheSecretary ofState to theEmbassy in theUnitedStates,”ForeignRelations of the

UnitedStates5,part2(May3,1948):891.67. “Mr. Moshe Shertok to the Director of the Office of United Nations Affairs (Rusk), at

Washington,”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates5,part2(1948):893.68. “Draftmemorandumby theDirectorof theOfficeofUnitedNationsAffairs (Rusk) to the

UnderSecretaryofState(Lovett),”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates5,part2(May4,1948):894.

69.Ibid.70.Ibid.,894–895.71.Ibid.,895.72.Ibid.73.Ibid.74.Ibid.,895n.3(continuedon896).75.SeediscussionofMagnes’svisittoWashingtoninLouis,TheBritishEmpireintheMiddle

East,519.76.May4,1948,“MemorandumofConversation,bytheSecretaryofState,”ForeignRelations

oftheUnitedStates5,part2(May4,1948):902.77.Ibid.78.Ibid.,903.79.Ibid.80.Ibid.,904.81.Ibid.82. “The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of

State,”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates5,part2(May4,1948):905.83.Ibid.;see905n.1forthequalificationsproposedbyMcClintock.84. “TranscriptofRemarksMadebyMr.DeanRusk inConversationbyTelephoneWithMr.

JessupandMr.Ross,”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates5,part2(May11,1948):965.85.Ibid.,967.86.Ibid.

87.Ibid.88.Ibid.89.Ibid.,968.90.“EditorialNote,”906.91. “MemorandumbyMr. JohnE.Horner,”ForeignRelationsof theUnitedStates 5,part2

(May4,1948):899.92.Ibid.93.Ibid.,900.94.Ibid.,900–901.95.Ibid.,901.96.CitedinStatement(withhandwrittendate,May9,1948,included)thatappearsunderthe

file titled “Palestine: Recognition of the Jewish State,May 7, 1948,” in the papers of ClarkM.Clifford,HarryS.TrumanLibrary.

97.Ibid.,3.

8.RECOGNITIONANDRESPONSE1. “Memorandum of Conversation by Secretary of State (drafted by McClintock),” Foreign

Relationsof theUnitedStates5,part2(May12,1948):972–976.SeealsoRichardHolbrooke,“PresidentTruman’sDecisiontoRecognizeIsrael,”JerusalemViewpoints,no.563(May1,2008).

2.“A.LourietoM.Shertok,”PoliticalandDiplomaticDocuments,Dec1947–May1948,IsraelStateArchives(May11,1948):776.Theprecisewordingis:“Crum[BartleyCrum]sawPresidentyesterday, returned fairly optimistic. Clifford advised we go firmly forward with plannedannouncement of State, has definite impression President considering recognition. MeanwhileunderstandLovett,Rusk,doingutmostagainstus.”

3.DavidBen-Gurion,Israel:APersonalHistory(NewYork:NewEnglishLibrary,1971),273.4.Ibid.,274.5.“Palestine,”inpapersofClarkM.Clifford,HarryS.TrumanLibrary,May11,1948.6.Ibid.,no.1,1.7.Ibid.,2.8.Ibid.9. “For Mr Clifford: Supplemental Memo on (1) The Arab States; (2) British Investment in

JewishPalestine,”internaldateApril8,1948;seealsoletterfromPalestineEconomicCorporationaddressedtoMaxLowenthal.bothareinpapersofClarkM.Clifford,HarryS.TrumanLibrary.Inaddition, see Clark Clifford,Counsel to the President: A Memoir (New York: Random House,1991),3–25.

10.Ibid.11. “Memorandum of Conversation by Secretary of State (drafted byMcClintock),”Foreign

RelationsoftheUnitedStates5,part2(May12,1948):973.12.Ibid.13.Ibid.,974.14. Ibid. See alsoWilliamRoger Louis,The British Empire in theMiddle East, 1945–1951

(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1984),527.15. “The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices,”Foreign Relations of the United

States5,part2(May13,1948):984.16. “TheConsulatJerusalem(Wasson) to theSecretaryofState,”ForeignRelationsof the

UnitedStates5,part2(May13,1948):985.17.Ibid.

18.Ibid.19.JonathanDaniels,TheManofIndependence(Philadelphia:Lippincott,1950),320.20. “Memorandum of Conversations by the Under Secretary of State (Lovett),” Foreign

RelationsoftheUnitedStates5,part2(May17,1948):1007.21.CliffordandHolbrooke,“PresidentTruman’sDecisiontoRecognizeIsrael,”8;Cliffordwith

Richard Holbrooke,Counsel to the President, 18–25. See also “The Agent of the ProvisionalGovernmentof Israel (Epstein) toPresidentTruman,”ForeignRelationsof theUnitedStates5,part2(May14,1948):989n.2,whichreferstoaGeorgeElseynotethat“CMC[Clifford]spenttheafternoongettingarrangementsmade,includingarrangementthatEpsteinwouldsendintherequesttoU.S.Gov’tforrecognition.”

22. “The Agent of the Provisional Government of Israel (Epstein) to President Truman,”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates5,part2(May14,1948):989.

23.Ibid.24.SimhaFlapan,TheBirthofIsrael,MythsandRealities(NewYork:Pantheon,1987),35.25.Ibid.26.BaruchKimmerling,Politicide:TheRealLegacyofArielSharon(London:Verso,2003),25.27. “TheSecretary of State toMr EliahuEpstein, atWashington,”ForeignRelations of the

UnitedStates5,part2(May14,1948):992.28. “Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs

(Henderson)totheUnderSecretaryofState(Lovett),”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates5,part2(May16,1948):1002.

29.CitedinTomSegev,1949:TheFirstIsraelis(NewYork:TheFreePress,1986),xviii.30.Ibid.31. Shlomo Ben-Ami, Scars of War, Wounds of Peace (London: Oxford University Press,

2007),37.32. “EditorialNote,” includes theJune13,1974, letterbyDeanRusk to theHistoricalOffice

recallingtheeventsattheUNonMay14,ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates5,part2(1948):993.

33.Ibid.34.Ibid.35.Ibid.36. “The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of

State,”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates5,part2(May19,1948):1013.37.Ibid.38. “The United States Representative to the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of

State,”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates5,part2(May15,1948):997.39.DouglasLittle,“Gideon’sBand:AmericaandtheMiddleEast,”DiplomaticHistory18,no.4

(Fall1994):520.40.DouglasLittle,AmericanOrientalism(London:I.B.Tauris,2002),87.41.ConsidersomeofthefollowinganalysesofpostwarU.S.policytowardIsraelthatinclude

discussions of Truman’s decision to recognize Israel. This is not a complete list of worksaddressing thissubject.JustusD.Doenecke, “PrincipleandExpediency:TheStateDepartmentand Palestine, 1948,” Journal of Libertarian Studies 2, no. 4 (1978): 343–356, offers a criticalassessment of Foreign Relations of the United States 5, part 2, and Truman’s decision torecognize Israel.PeterL.Hahn,Caught in theMiddleEast:U.S.PolicyToward theArab-IsraeliConflict,1945–1961(ChapelHill:TheUniversityofNorthCarolinaPress,2004),26–31,providesa broad review of the varied explanations offered by historians for Truman’s decisions. Thefollowingcontributetoourunderstandingoftherangeofexplanationsofferedforthepresident’sdecision: Clark Clifford and Richard Holbrooke, “President Truman’s Decision to RecognizeIsrael”; The Jerusalem Viewpoints series included in Clifford and Holbrooke, Counsel to the

President;MichaelJ.Cohen,TrumanandIsrael(Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1990),chap.12;W.Brands,InsidetheColdWar:LoyHendersonandtheRiseoftheAmericanEmpire,1918–1961 (NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1991), chap.12;NoamChomsky,TheFatefulTriangle (Cambridge, Mass.: South End Press, 1999), 94–98; Michael Ottolenghi, “HarryTruman’s Recognition of Israel,” Historical Journal 47, no. 4 (2004): 963–988; LawrenceDavidson, “Truman thePoliticianand theEstablishment of Israel,”Journal ofPalestineStudies39,no.1 (Summer2010);DavidMcCullough,Truman,613–620;JohnSnetsinger,Truman, theJewishVote,andtheCreationofIsrael(Stanford,Calif.:HooverInstitutionPress,1974);MelvynLeffler,“SearchingforSynthesis,”inHarryS.Truman,theStateofIsrael,andtheQuestforPeaceintheMiddleEast,ed.MichaelJ.Devine(Kirksville,Mo.:TrumanStateUniversityPress,2009);“OralHistory InterviewwithGeorgeM.Elsey,” inHarryS. TrumanLibrary, Feb. 1974, vol. 11,212–477;J.C.Hurewitz,TheStruggle forPalestine (NewYork:Norton,2008),322–323;Little,“Gideon’sBand,”513–541;Louis,TheBritishEmpire,528;ArnoldA.Offner,AnotherSuchVictory(Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2002), 275, 298; Evan M. Wilson, Decision onPalestine: How the U.S. Came to Recognize Israel (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press,1979), 149; ZviGanin,Truman, American Jewry and Israel, 1945–1948 (NewYork:Holmes&Meier,1979);PeterGrose,IsraelintheMindofAmerica(NewYork:Schocken,1984);MichaelT.Benson, Harry S. Truman and the Foundation of Israel (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1997);KennethR.Bain,MarchtoZion:UnitedStatesPolicyandtheFoundingofIsrael(CollegeStation:TexasA&MUniversityPress,2000);MichelleMart,Eyeon Israel:HowAmericaCame toViewIsraelasanAlly(Albany:StateUniversityofNewYorkPress,2006);YaacovBar-Siman-Tov,“A‘SpecialRelationship,’”DiplomaticHistory22,no.2(Spring1993):231–262.

42.Cohen,TrumanandIsrael,277.43.Ibid.44.Louis,TheBritishEmpire,528.45.Hahn,CaughtintheMiddleEast,40–41.46.AviShlaim,TheIronWall:IsraelandtheArabWorld(NewYork:Norton,2000),34.47.ZeevMaoz,DefendingtheHolyLand:ACriticalAnalysisofIsrael’sSecurityandForeign

Policy(AnnArbor:TheUniversityofMichiganPress,2006),4.48.Shlaim,TheIronWall,35.49.Flapan,TheBirthofIsrael,198.50.Ibid.51.Ibid.,198–199.52. IlanPappé,TheMakingof theArab-IsraeliConflict,1947–1951 (NewYork: I.B.Tauris,

1994),137.53. “TheMinister inLebanon(Pinkerton) to theSecretaryofState,”ForeignRelationsof the

UnitedStates5,part2(May16,1948):1003.54.MohamedHassaneinHeikal,“ReflectionsonaNationinCrisis,1948,”JournalofPalestine

Studies18,no.1(Autumn1988):117.55.“Nasser’sMemoirsoftheFirstPalestineWar,”translatedandannotatedbyWalidKhalidi,

JournalofPalestineStudies2,no.2(Winter1973):8.56.Ibid.,10.57.Ibid.58. “Summary of Testimony by Amnon Neumann, Zochrot” (June 17, 2010), 1.

http://zochrot.org/index.php?id=844.59.Ibid.,2.60.Ibid.61. Rashid Khalidi, “The Palestinians and 1948,” in TheWar for Palestine, ed. Eugene L.

RoganandAviShlaim(NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,2001),14.62.AscitedinIlanPappé,TheEthnicCleansingofPalestine(London:Oneworld,2006),132.

63.Khalidi,“ThePalestiniansand1948,”14.64.WalidKhalidi,ed.,AllThatRemains:ThePalestinianVillagesOccupiedandDepopulated

by Israel in 1948 (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1992), xx, 585. For acomprehensivereviewofhowthisfigurewasarrivedat,consultthePreface.

65. Benny Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947–1949 (New York:CambridgeUniversityPress,1987),221.

66.Ibid.,121.67.Ibid.,122.68.MustafaAbbasi,“TheFallofAcreinthe1948PalestineWar,”JournalofPalestineStudies

39,no.4(Summer2010):7.69.Ibid.,14.70.Ibid.,21.71. “StatementMadebyAmbassadorAustinBefore theSecurityCouncilonMay17,1948,”

ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates5,part2(May17,1948):1009.72.Ibid.,1010.73.“TextpresentedbyCountBernadotteatRhodes,”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates5,

part2(June28,1948):1153.74.Ibid.,1153–1154.75.Pappé,TheMakingoftheArab-IsraeliConflict,149.76.AviShlaim,CollusionAcross the Jordan:KingAbdullah, theZionistMovement, and the

PartitionofPalestine(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1988),261.77.Pappé,TheMakingoftheArab-IsraeliConflict,140.78. “TheConsulatJerusalem(Wasson) to theSecretaryofState,”ForeignRelationsof the

UnitedStates5,part2(May22,1948):1030.79.Ibid.80.TheU.S.RepresentativetotheUNinformedthepresidentof theUNSecurityCouncilof

the attack on Wasson on May 22, 1948. S/771, Telegram dated 22 May 1948 from theRepresentativeoftheUnitedStatesAddressedtothePresidentoftheSecurityCouncil.

81. New York Post, June 8, 1948, posted the following account: “Home of the Brave:America’s Sorry Record in Failing to Protect Flag or Citizen Abroad Since Nov.,”http://www.varchive.org/obs/480608.htm.TheNewYorkTimes,whichinitiallyrepeatedthestory,retractedit,suggestingthatitwasunlikelythatWassonknewwhohadattackedhim.SeeStephenGreen,TakingSides(NewYork:WilliamMorrow,1984),33.

82. Pablo de Azcarate, Mission in Palestine 1948–1952 (Washington, D.C.: Middle EastInstitute,1966),90–91.

83.Ibid.,91.84.RichardD.McKinzie,“OralHistorywithStuartW.Rockwell,”HarryS.TrumanLibrary,July

8, 1976, 4. A later interview with Stuart Rockwell as well as Robert B. Houghton, who wasreported to have been in the hospital at the same time asWasson, appears inGreen,TakingSides,33,260n.19.

85.Ibid.,5.86. EvanM.Wilson,ACalculatedRisk: TheU.S.Decision toRecognize Israel (Covington,

Ky.:ClerisyPress,2008),275.87. “TheViceConsulatJerusalem(Burdett) to theSecretaryofState,”ForeignRelationsof

theUnitedStates5,part2(May29,1948):1075.88. “Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs

(Henderson)totheSecretaryofState,”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates5,part1(May26,1948):15.

89.“TheMinisterinSaudiArabia(Childs)totheSecretaryofState,”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates5,part2(June25,1948):1147.

90.Ibid.91.MauriceJr.Labelle,“‘TheOnlyThorn’:EarlySaudi-AmericanRelationsandtheQuestion

ofPalestine,1945–1949,”DiplomaticHistory35,no.2(April2011):281.92. “The Charge in Egypt (Patterson) to the Secretary of State,” Foreign Relations of the

UnitedStates5,part2(June30,1948):1159.93.Ibid.94. “TheViceConsulatJerusalem(Burdett) to theSecretaryofState,”ForeignRelationsof

theUnitedStates5,part2(June25,1948):1145.95.Ibid.

9.RECONSIDERINGU.S.POLICYINPALESTINE

1. “Memorandum byMr. Gordon PMerriam, Member of the Policy Planning Staff, to StaffMembers,”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates5,part2(July15,1948):1222.

2. “The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Jessup),” ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates5,part2(July1,1948):1182.

3. Richard D. McKinzie, “Oral History Interview with LoyW. Henderson,” Harry S. TrumanLibrary,June14,1973,42.Henderson’saccountisconfirmedinDavidMcCullough,Truman(NewYork:Simon&Schuster,1992),620.

4.McKinzie,“OralHistoryInterviewwithLoyW.Henderson,”42.5.Ibid.6. “MemorandumofConversationby theDirector of theOfficeofNearEasternandAfrican

Affairs(Henderson),”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates5,part2(June6,1948):1100.7.Ibid.8. “The Ambassador to the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State,” Foreign

RelationsoftheUnitedStates5,part2(June19,1948):1125.9. “TheSecretaryofState to theEmbassy in theUnitedKingdom,”ForeignRelationsof the

UnitedStates5,part2(June22,1948):1134.10. “TheViceConsulatJerusalem(Burdett) to theSecretaryofState,”ForeignRelationsof

theUnitedStates5,part2(June8,1948):1105.11.“TheSecretaryofStatetotheEmbassyintheUnitedKingdom,”ForeignRelationsofthe

UnitedStates5,part2(June22,1948):1133–1134.12.Ibid.,1134.13.“MemorandumbyMr.RobertMcClintock,”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates5,part2

(June23,1948):1135.SeeasteriskatbottomofpagereferringtotheRepublicanPartyPlatformfor 1948,whichMcClintock noted, repeating its claim, that it had been the “first to call for theestablishment of a free and independent Jewish Commonwealth,” to which he added that theDemocratic Party Platform would “undoubtedly include equivalent references to the State ofIsrael.”

14. “MemorandumbyMr.RobertMcClintock to theDirector of theOffice ofUnitedNationsAffairs(Rusk),”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates5,part2(July1,1948):1177.

15.Ibid.16.“MemorandumbyMr.RobertMcClintock,”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates5,part2

(June23,1948):1135.17.Ibid.,1136.18.Ibid.19.Ibid.20.Ibid.,1137.

21.Ibid.,1136.22.Ibid.,1137.23.Ibid.24.Ibid.,1136.25.Ibid.,1137.26.“TheActingUnitedStatesRepresentativeattheUnitedNations(Jessup)totheSecretary

ofState,”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates5,part2(June30,1948):1161.27.“TheActingUnitedStatesRepresentativeattheUnitedNations(Jessup)totheSecretary

ofState,”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates5,part2(July1,1948):1183.28.Ibid.29.“TheActingUnitedStatesRepresentativeoftheUnitedNations(Jessup)totheSecretary

ofState,”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates5,part2(June30,1948):1165–1166.30.Ibid.,1163.31.AviShlaim,CollusionAcross the Jordan:KingAbdullah, theZionistMovement, and the

PartitionofPalestine(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1988),326.32. Nafez Nazzal, “The Zionist Occupation ofWestern Galilee, 1948,” Journal of Palestine

Studies3,no.3(Spring1974):58–76.33.RashidKhalidi,PalestinianIdentity:TheConstructionofModernNationalConsciousness

(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1997),190–191.34.“TheActingUnitedStatesRepresentativeattheUnitedNations(Jessup)totheSecretary

ofState,”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates5,part2(July1,1948):1185.35.“TheActingUnitedStatesRepresentativeattheUnitedNations,”ForeignRelationsofthe

UnitedStates5,part2(June30,1948):1165.36.Ibid.,1170.37.Ibid.,1169.38.“TheActingUnitedStatesRepresentativeattheUnitedNations(Jessup)totheSecretary

ofState,”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates5,part2(July1,1948):1182.39.Ibid.,1183.40.Ibid.41.Ibid.,1184.42.Ibid.,1184.43.Ibid.,1183.44.Ibid.,1181.45.Ibid.,1184.46.Ibid.,1183.47.Ibid.,1184.48.Ibid.49. Robert R. Nathan, Oscar Gass, and Daniel Creamer,Palestine: Problem and Promise

(NewYork:PublicAffairs,1948),39.50.CitedinShlaim,CollusionAcrosstheJordan,343.51.“TheActingUnitedStatesRepresentativeattheUnitedNations(Jessup)totheSecretary

ofState,”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates5,part2(July1,1948):1184.52.“MemorandumbyMr.RobertM.McClintocktotheDirectoroftheOfficeofUnitedNations

Affairs(Rusk),”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates5,part2(July1,1948):1172.53.Ibid.54.DavidMayers,GeorgeKennanandtheDilemmasofUSForeignPolicy(NewYork:Oxford

UniversityPress,1988),253.55.Ibid.56.“MemorandumbytheDirectorofCentralIntelligence(Hillenkoetter)toPresidentTruman,”

ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates5,part2(July8,1948):1200.

57.“ReportbytheCentralIntelligenceAgency,”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates5,part2(July27,1948):1242.

58.Ibid.,1245.59.Ibid.60.Ibid.,1244.61.Ibid.,1245.62.ThereferencewastotheMapoftheMilitarySituationof18July1948,accompanyingthe

“ReportbytheCentralIntelligenceAgency,”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates5,part2(July27,1948):1241.

63.Ibid.,1244.64.Ibid.65.Ibid.66.AviShlaim,ThePoliticsofPartition:KingAbdullah,theZionists,andPalestine1921–1951

(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1990),205.67.BennyMorris, “In ’48, IsraelDidWhat ItHad toDo,”Commentary,LosAngelesTimes,

Jan.26,2004.ReportingontheHa’aretz interviewBennyMorrishadgiventoAriShavit,Morrisclaimed that “after looking afresh at the events of 1948 and at the context of thewholeArab-Zionistconflictfromitsinceptionin1881untilthepresentday—IfindmyselfasconvincedaseverthattheIsraelisplayedamajorroleinriddingthecountryoftensofthousandsofArabsduringthe1948war,but I alsobelieve their actionswere inevitableandmadesense.Had thebelligerentArabpopulationinhabitingtheareasdestinedforJewishstatehoodnotbeenuprooted,noJewishstatewouldhavearisen,oritwouldhaveemergedsodemographicallyandpoliticallyhobbledthatitcouldnothavesurvived.Itwasanuglybusiness.Suchishistory.”

68.BennyMorris,TheBirthofthePalestinianRefugeeProblem,1947–1949(Cambridge,UK:CambridgeUniversityPress,1987),208–209.

69.Ibid.,209.70.“ReportbytheCentralIntelligenceAgency,”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates5,part

2(July27,1948):1245.71.Ibid.,1242.72.Ibid.,1247.

10.THEPALESTINEREFUGEEPROBLEM1.ForacomprehensiveaccountofPalestinian refugeearchives,seeSalimTamariandElia

Zureik,eds.,ReinterpretingtheHistoricalRecord:TheUsesofPalestinianRefugeeArchivesforSocialScienceResearchandPolicyAnalysis(Beirut:InstituteforPalestineStudies,2001).

2. “The Consul General at Jerusalem (MacDonald) to the Secretary of State,” ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates5,part2(June27,1948):1151.

3. Benny Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947–1949 (New York:CambridgeUniversityPress,1987),204.

4.Ibid.5.CitedinBennyMorris,TheBirthofthePalestinianRefugeeProblemRevisited(NewYork:

CambridgeUniversityPress,2004),322.6. Many Israelis changed their name after the declaration of Israel’s independence; thus

Moshe Shertok took the name Sharett and Eliahu Epstein became Eliahu Elath. U.S. officialsusedtheoldaswellasthenewnamesinterchangeablyduringthistime.

7. Avi Shlaim,Collusion Across the Jordan: King Abdullah, the Zionist Movement, and thePartitionofPalestine(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1988),491.

8.NurMasalha,ThePoliticsofDenial:IsraelandthePalestinianRefugeeProblem(Sterling,Va.:Pluto,2003),30.

9.SpiroMunayyer,“TheFallofLydda,”JournalofPalestineStudies27,no.4(1997/1998):96;seealsoMasalha,ThePoliticsofDenial,29.

10.SeeMunayyer,“TheFallofLydda,”foranapologeticaccountoftheatrocitiescommitted;seealsoHa’aretzjournalistAriShavit,“AMassacreinPalestine,”TheNewYorker,Oct.21,2013,46,inwhichShavitjustifiedtheeventsas“acrucialphaseoftheZionistrevolution,andtheylaidthe foundation for the Jewish state.” Shavit develops this thesis in My Promised Land: TheTriumphandTragedyofIsrael(NewYork:Spiegel&Grau,2013).

11.“TheActingUnitedStatesRepresentativeattheUnitedNations(Jessup)totheSecretaryofState,”ForeignRelationsof theUnitedStates 5,part2 (July27,1948):1248.Seealso IlanPappé, ed., The Israel/Palestine Question (New York: Routledge, 1999), part lV, “The NewHistoryofthe1948War,”andthearticlesbyAviShlaim,BennyMorris,andNurMasalha.

12.AmnonKapeliuk,“NewLightontheIsraeli-ArabConflictandtheRefugeeProblemandItsOrigins,”JournalofPalestineStudies16,no.3(1987):21.

13. JamesG.McDonald,MyMission in Israel 1948–1951 (NewYork:SimonandSchuster,1951),175.

14.Ibid.15.Ibid.16.Ibid.,176.17.Ibid.18.Ibid.19.“PossibleDevelopmentsFromthePalestineTruce,”CentralIntelligenceAgency(Aug.31,

1948):3;http://www.foia.cia.gov/browse_docs_full.asp.20.Ibid.21. “The Charge in Egypt (Patterson) to the Secretary of State,” Foreign Relations of the

UnitedStates5,part2(Aug.7,1948):1295.22.Ibid.23.Ibid.24.Ibid.,1296.25.Ibid.26.Ibid.27.Ibid.28.“TheSecretaryofStatetotheEmbassyintheUnitedKingdom,”ForeignRelationsofthe

UnitedStates5,part2(Aug.13,1948):1309.29. “The Secretary of State to the Legation in Lebanon,” Foreign Relations of the United

States5,part2(Aug.20,1948):1333;inadditiontotheagenciescitedin“TheSecretaryofStatetotheEmbassyintheUnitedKingdom,”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates5,part2(Aug.14,1948):1311.

30.Morris,TheOriginofthePalestinianRefugeeProblem,1947–1949,150.31.“TheSecretaryofStatetotheEmbassyintheUnitedKingdom,”ForeignRelationsofthe

UnitedStates5,part2(Aug.13,1948):1309.32.“TheSecretaryofStatetotheEmbassyintheUnitedKingdom,”ForeignRelationsofthe

UnitedStates5,part2(Aug.14,1948):1311.33.SusanM.Akram,“MythsandRealitiesofthePalestinianRefugeeProblem:Reframingthe

RightofReturn,” in“Commemorating theNaksa,Evoking theNakba,”MITElectronicJournalofMiddle East Studies (Spring 2008): 186. Elia Zureik, “The Palestinian Refugee Problem:ConflictingInterpretations,”GlobalDialogue4,no.3(Summer2002):93.

34. “Memorandumby theSecretaryofState toPresidentTruman,”ForeignRelationsof theUnitedStates5,part2(Aug.16,1948):1313.

35.Ibid.,1313–1314.36.Ibid.,1314.37.Ibid.38.“MemorandumbytheDirectoroftheOfficeofUnitedNationsAffairs(Rusk)totheUnder

Secretary of State (Lovett),”Foreign Relations of the United States 5, part 2 (Aug. 20, 1948):1331.

39.Ibid.,1331–1332.40.Ibid.,1332.41.Ibid.42.TomSegev,1949,TheFirstIsraelis(NewYork:FreePress,1986),86.43.JamesMcDonald,MyMissioninIsrael,189.44. “The Secretary of State to the Special Representative of the United States in Israel

(McDonald),”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates5,part2(Aug.31,1948):1364.45. “The Secretary of State to the Special Representative of the United States in Israel

(McDonald),”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates5,part2(Sept.1,1948):1367.46.Ibid.47.Ibid.48.Ibid.,1367–1368.49.Ibid.,1368.50.“TheSecretaryofStatetotheEmbassyintheUnitedKingdom,”ForeignRelationsofthe

UnitedStates5,part2(Sept.1,1948):1369.51.“MemorandumofConversationPreparedintheOfficeoftheSpecialRepresentativeofthe

UnitedStatesinIsrael,”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates5,part2(Sept.7,1948):1377.52. “The Consul General at Jerusalem (MacDonald) to the Secretary of State,” Foreign

RelationsoftheUnitedStates5,part2(Sept.8,1948):1383.53.Ibid.54.Ibid.55. “The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State,”Foreign

RelationsoftheUnitedStates5,part2(Sept.9,1948):1384.56.“TheSpecialRepresentativeoftheUnitedStatesinIsrael(McDonald)totheSecretaryof

State,”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates5,part2(Sept.9,1948):1385.57.Ibid.58. Seth P. Tillman, The United States in the Middle East: Interests and Obstacles

(Bloomington:IndianaUniversityPress,1982),58–59.59.Ibid.,175.60. “The Consul General at Jerusalem (MacDonald) to the Secretary of State,” Foreign

RelationsoftheUnitedStates5,part2(Sept.17,1948):1412.61.Ibid.,1413n.1.62. “The Acting Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices,” Foreign

RelationsoftheUnitedStates5,part2(Sept.21,1948):1415.63. “Mr.RobertM.McClintock toMr.DeanRusk,atParis,”ForeignRelationsof theUnited

States5,part2(Sept.30,1948):1439.64. “TheAmbassador to Egypt (Griffis) to theSecretary of State,”ForeignRelations of the

UnitedStates5,part2(Sept.15,1948):1398.65.Ibid.66.Ibid.67. “ProgressReport of theUnitedNationsMediator inPalestine,”ForeignRelations of the

UnitedStates5,part2(1948):1403.68.Ibid.69.Ibid.

70.Ibid.,1403–1404.71.Ibid.72.Ibid.,1405–1406.73.Ibid.,1406.74.DanaAdamsSchmidt, “BlanketsNeededbyArabRefugees,”NewYorkTimes,Oct.19,

1948,5.75. Progress Report of the United Nations Mediator in Palestine, Foreign Relations of the

UnitedStates5,part2(1948),1403.76.Ibid.77.WalidKhalidi,ed.,AllThatRemains:ThePalestinianVillagesOccupiedandDepopulated

byIsraelin1948(Washington,D.C.:InstituteforPalestineStudies,2006),xxxi.78.Ibid.,xxxii.79.Ibid.80.Ibid.81.Ibid.82. See the project organized by the Israeli NGO Zochrot, Towards a Common Archive:

Reframing theRoots of Palestine and Israel, at http://zochrot.org/en/press/54591; see also theTruth Commission on the Responsibility of Israeli Society for the Events of 1948–1960 in theSouthathttp://zochrot.org/en/keyword/45528.

11.THESTATEDEPARTMENTONTHERECORD1. Victor Kattan, From Coexistence to Conquest: International Law and the Origins of the

Arab-IsraeliConflict,1891–1949(London:Pluto,2009),218.2. “TheSecretaryofState to theActingSecretaryofState,”ForeignRelationsof theUnited

States5,part2(Oct.15,1948):1481.3. “TheSecretaryofState to theActingSecretaryofState,”ForeignRelationsof theUnited

States5,part2(Oct.16,1948):1481.4.Ibid.,1482.5.Ibid.6. Stian Johansen Tiller andHildeHenriksenWaage, “Powerful State, PowerlessMediator:

TheUnitedStatesand thePeaceEffortsof thePalestineConciliationCommission,1949–1951,InternationalHistoryReview33,no.3(Sept.2011):501–524.

7. “TheSecretaryofState to theActingSecretaryofState,”ForeignRelationsof theUnitedStates5,part2(Oct.16,1948):1482–1483.

8.Ibid.,1483.9. “The Special Representative of the United States to Israel (McDonald) to President

Truman,”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates5,part2(Oct.17,1948):1486.10.Ibid.11.Ibid.12. “The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Acting Secretary of State,”

ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates5,part2(Nov.12,1948):1571.13. “The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Acting-Secretary of State,”

ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates5,part2(Oct.29,1948):1531.14.Ibid.,1532.15.Ibid.16.Ibid.17.Ibid.

18.“TheActingSecretaryofStatetotheSecretaryofState,atLondon,”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates5,part2(Oct.30,1948):1533.

19.Ibid.,1534.20.Ibid.21.“E.ElathtoM.Sharett(Paris),”DocumentsontheForeignPolicyofIsrael,October1948–

April1949,vol.21984(Oct.30,1948):74.22.“TheActingSecretaryofStatetotheSecretaryofState,atLondon,”ForeignRelationsof

theUnitedStates5,part2(Oct.31,1948):1535.23. Benny Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited (New York:

CambridgeUniversityPress,2004),468.24. Michael Palumbo, The Palestinian Catastrophe: The 1948 Expulsion of a People from

TheirHomeland(London:Faber&Faber,1987),xiii–xiv.25.Ibid.,xiv.26.Morris,TheBirthofthePalestineRefugeeProblemRevisited,469,and495n.45where

Morrisclaimsthat“thisreport,andotherslikeit,weremostprobablybasedonrumoursthanfirst-handaccountsorinvestigation.”

27.Palumbo,ThePalestinianCatastrophe, xiv.Seealso theworkofSaraRoy,GazaStrip:The Political Economy of De-Development (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies,1995),65,andFailingPeace:GazaandthePalestinianIsraeliConflict(London:Pluto,2006).

28. Beryl Cheal, “Refugees in theGaza Strip, December 1948–1950,” Journal of PalestineStudies18,no.1(Autumn1988):138.

29.Roy,GazaStrip,67.30. IlanPappé,TheMakingof theArab-IsraeliConflict,1947–1951 (NewYork: I.B.Tauris,

1994),174.31.Morris,OriginsofthePalestineRefugeeProblemRevisited,481.32.Ibid.,492.33.AirForceCaptainE.J.Zeuty’spresenceiscitedinPalumbo,ThePalestinianCatastrophe,

163.34.“MemorandumofConversation,bytheActingSecretaryofState,”ForeignRelationsofthe

UnitedStates5,part2(Nov.10,1948):1563.35.Ibid.36.Ibid.37.Ibid.38.Ibid.39. “NotebyComay,Paris#142,NoteOnUnitedStatesVisit 6th to13thNovember1948,”

DocumentsintheForeignPolicyofIsrael2(Nov.15,1948):181.40.“Mr.WellsStablertotheActingSecretaryofState,”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates

5,part2(Nov.9,1948):1557.41.“TheActingSecretaryofStatetotheSecretaryofState,atParis,”ForeignRelationsofthe

UnitedStates5,part2(Nov.10,1948):1565.42.Ibid.43.Ibid.44.Ibid.45.“TheActingSecretaryofStatetotheLegationinLebanon,”ForeignRelationsoftheUnited

States5,part2(Nov.11,1948):1569.46.Ibid.47.Ibid.,1570n.2.48.“MemorandumofConversation,bytheActingSecretaryofState,”ForeignRelationsofthe

UnitedStates5,part2(Dec.21,1948):1677n.4.49.“TheMinisterinLebanon(Pinkerton)totheActingSecretaryofState,”ForeignRelationsof

theUnitedStates5,part2(Dec.16,1948):1670.50.Ibid.51.“TheSecretaryofStatetotheActingSecretaryofState,”ForeignRelationsoftheUnited

States5,part2(Nov.15[16],1948):1595.52.“TheSecretaryofStatetotheActingSecretaryofState,”ForeignRelationsoftheUnited

States5,part2(Nov.16,1948):1594.53. “Memorandum by Mr. Robert M. McClintock to the Acting Secretary of State,” Foreign

RelationsoftheUnitedStates5,part2(Nov.17,1948):1598.54.Ibid.55.Ibid.,1600.56.Ibid.,1601.57.“TheActingSecretaryofStatetotheUnitedStatesDelegationatParis,”ForeignRelations

oftheUnitedStates5,part2(Nov.22,1948):1622.58.Ibid.59. “TheActingChairman ofUnitedStatesDelegation at Paris (Dulles) to theSecretary of

State,”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates5,part2(Nov.29,1948):1636.60.“PresidentTrumantothePresidentoftheProvisionalGovernmentofIsrael(Weizmann),”

ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates5,part2(Nov.29,1948):1633.61.Ibid.,1633–1634.62.“TheActingSecretaryofStatetotheEmbassyintheUnitedKingdom,”ForeignRelations

oftheUnitedStates5,part2(Dec.1,1948):1639.63.Ibid.64.“MrWellsStablertotheActingSecretaryofState,”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates

5,part2(Dec.6,1948):1647n.1.65. “The First Secretary of Embassy in the United Kingdom (Jones) to the Director of the

OfficeofNearEasternandAfricanAffairs(Satterthwaite),”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates5,part2(Dec.8,1948):1650.

66.Ibid.,1651.67.UnitedNationsGeneralAssembly,A/RES/212(111),Nov.19,1948.68.Ibid.69.“TheActingSecretaryofStatetotheUnitedStatesDelegationatParis,”ForeignRelations

oftheUnitedStates5,part2(Dec.7,1948):1648.70.UnitedNationsGeneralAssemblyA/RES/194(111),Dec.11,1948.71. Salim Tamari and Elia Zureik, eds.,Reinterpreting the Historical Record: The Uses of

PalestinianRefugeeArchives forSocialScienceResearchandPolicyAnalysis (Beirut: InstituteforPalestineStudies,2001),3.

72.Ibid,5.73. “The Acting Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices,” Foreign

RelationsoftheUnitedStates5,part2(Dec.29,1948):1697.74.NurMasalha,ThePoliticsofDenial:IsraelandthePalestinianRefugeeProblem(Sterling,

Va.:Pluto,2003),75.75. “The Acting Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices,” Foreign

RelationsoftheUnitedStates5,part2(Dec.29,1948):1696n.1.76.“EditorialNote,”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates6(1949):688.77.Ibid.78.Ibid.79.Ibid.80.Ibid.,688–689.81.Ibid.,688.82. See John Judis,Genesis: Truman, American Jews, and theOrigins of the Arab–Israeli

Conflict(NewYork:Farrar,Strauss&Giroux,2014),part11,part111.

12.THEPCC,ARMISTICE,LAUSANNE,ANDPALESTINIANREFUGEES

1.WalterMills,ed.,TheForrestalDiaries(NewYork:Viking,1951),124.2.“Mr.JohnC.RosstotheSecretaryofState,”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates6(Jan.

4,1949):610.3.“MemorandumbyMr.SamuelK.C.KoppertoMr.MarkF.Ethridge,”ForeignRelationsof

theUnitedStates6(Jan.27,1949):703.4.Ibid.,704.5.“ProposedRepresentationstoGovernmentofIsraelonArmisticeNegotiationswithEgypt,”

DeanRuskReferenceBook,January16–April1949,ThePalestineReferenceFilesofDeanRuskandRobertMcClintock,1947–1949,reel7,NationalArchives,RG59,FilmS1040(Feb.4,1949).

6.TomSegev,1949:TheFirstIsraelis(NewYork:FreePress,1986),8.7. Ilan Pappé,TheMaking of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1947–1951 (NewYork: I. B. Tauris,

1994),179.8.CitedinSegev,1949,8.9.Ibid.,659.10.“TelAviv(McDonald)toSecretaryofState,”ThePalestineReferenceFilesofDeanRusk

andRobertMcClintock,1947–1949,no.88(Feb.3,1949).11.Ibid.12. “TheConsul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to theSecretary ofState,”ForeignRelations of the

UnitedStates6(Mar.10,1949):814.13. “TheConsul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to theSecretary ofState,”ForeignRelations of the

UnitedStates6(Feb.8,1949):736.14.Ibid.,737.15.Ibid.,738n.3.16.“Jerusalem(Burdett)toSecretaryofState,”ThePalestineReferenceFilesofDeanRusk

andRobertMcClintock,1947–1949,no.216(Mar.11,1949).17.“MrWellsStablertotheSecretaryofState,”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates6(Mar.

12,1949):824.18.Pappé,TheMakingoftheArab-IsraeliConflict,1947–1951,190.19. Ibid.,189.The“LittleTriangle”wasdescribed inPappé’sworkas including“WadiAr’ara

(Aranowdays),itsimmediatesurroundingsandtheroadwhichrunsthroughitconnectingthetwoIsraelitownsofAfulainthevalleyandHaderaonthecoast.”

20. “TheConsul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to theSecretary ofState,”ForeignRelations of theUnitedStates6(Apr.8,1949):900.

21.Shlaim,CollusionAcrosstheJordan,427.22.“NewYork(Austin)toSecretaryofState,”DeanRuskReferenceBook,January16–April

1949,ThePalestineReferenceFilesofDeanRuskandRobertMcClintock,1947–1949, reel7,no.356(Mar.17,1949).

23.AviShlaim,CollusionAcross the Jordan:KingAbdullah, theZionistMovement, and thePartitionofPalestine(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1988),391.

24. “E.SassonandZ.Liff (Lausanne) toSharett,31May1949 (15:00),”Documentson theForeignPolicyofIsrael,CompanionVolume,4,no.46(May–Dec.1949):31–32.

25.“MemorandumofConversationbytheSecretaryofState,”ForeignRelationsoftheUnited

States6(Mar.4,1949):790.26.Ibid.27. “TheConsulatJerusalem (Burdett),”ForeignRelationsof theUnitedStates6 (Mar.14,

1949):825.Theopeningof this “TopSecret” “Urgent”communique indicated that itwaswritten“forAcheston’seyesonlyfromEthridge.”

28.SeeJoshuaLandis,“EarlyU.S.PolicyTowardPalestinianRefugees:TheSyriaOption,”inThe Palestinian Refugees: Old Problems—New Solutions, ed. Joseph Ginat and Edward J.Perkins(Norman:UniversityofOklahomaPress,2001),77–87.

29.BennyMorris,“ASecondLookatthe‘MissedPeace,’orSmoothingOutHistory:AReviewEssay,”JournalofPalestineStudies 24,no.1 (Autumn1994):81;and ItamarRabinovich,TheRoadNotTaken(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1991),chap.3.

30.“TheMinisterinSyria(Keeley)totheSecretaryofState,”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates6(July19,1949):1235.

31.“M.Sharett:GuidelinesforIsraeliMissionsAbroad,”DocumentsontheForeignPolicyofIsrael,CompanionVolume,4(July25,1949):79.

32.Ibid.33.Ibid.34.Ibid.35.AviShlaim,TheIronWall:IsraelandtheArabWorld(NewYork:Norton,2001),51.36.Shlaim,CollusionAcrosstheJordan,428.37.J.C.Hurewitz,TheStruggleforPalestine(NewYork:Norton,1950),319.38.Shlaim,CollusionAcrosstheJordan,492.39. Benny Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947–1949 (New York:

CambridgeUniversityPress,1987),261–262.40.“Jerusalem(Burdett)toSecretaryofState,”ThePalestineReferenceFilesofDeanRusk

andRobertMcClintock,1947–1949,reel7,no.82,RG59FilmS1040(Jan.29,1949).41.“PolicyPaperPreparedintheDepartmentofState,”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates

6(Mar.15,1949):837.42. “Memorandum byMr. RobertM.McClintock,”Foreign Relations of the United States 6

(Jan.11,1949):640.43.“TheActingSecretaryofStateinCertainDiplomaticMissionsintheAmericanRepublics,”

ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates6(Jan.18,1949):677.44. “The Secretary of State to Consulate General of Jerusalem,” Foreign Relations of the

UnitedStates6(Mar.11,1949):818.45.ForavaluableoverviewofMcGhee’sroleandtheplanhewastooversee,inprinciple,see

PeterHahn,CaughtintheMiddleEast:U.S.PolicyTowardtheArab–IsraeliConflict,1945–1961(ChapelHill:NorthCarolinaUniversityPress,2004),102–108.

46.Ibid.47. “Policy Paper Prepared in the Department of State, Palestine Refugees,” Foreign

RelationsoftheUnitedStates6(Mar.15,1949):828,andseen.5.48.The800,000figureiscitedin“MemorandumofConversation,bytheSecretaryofState,”

Foreign Relations of the United States 6 (Apr. 5, 1949): 891; see also “Memorandum by theCoordinatoronPalestineRefugeeMatters(McGhee)totheSecretaryofState,”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates6(Apr.22,1949):935.

49. “Policy Paper Prepared in the Department of State, Palestine Refugees,” ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates6(Mar.15,1949):828.

50.Ibid.,830–831.51.Ibid.52.Ibid.,837.53.Ibid.,838.

54.Fora recentexposéof thesevere limitsofcoverageof the Israeli–Palestinianconflict intheNewYorkTimes,seeHowardFrielandRichardFalk,Israel–PalestineonRecord(NewYork:Verso,2007).

55. Peter Hahn, “The View from Jerusalem: Revelations About U.S. Diplomacy from theArchivesofIsrael,”DiplomaticHistory22,no.4(Fall1998):516.

56. “Top Secret, Palestine,” The Palestine Reference Files of Dean Rusk and RobertMcClintock,1947–1949,reel7,RG59FilmS1040(Mar.19,1949).

57.Shlaim,CollusionAcrosstheJordan,489.58. “Control 11599, from Beirut, Ethridge (signed Pinkerton) to Secretary of State,” The

PalestineReferenceFilesofDeanRuskandRobertMcClintock,1947–1949(Mar.29,1949).59.“Control12738,Beirut(signedPinkerton)toSecretaryofState,”ThePalestineReference

FilesofDeanRuskandRobertMcClintock,1947–1949(Mar.31,1949).60.“MemorandumofConversation,bytheSecretaryofState,”ForeignRelationsoftheUnited

States6(Apr.5,1949):891.61.Ibid.62.Ibid.63.Ibid.,892.64.Ibid.,893.65.Ibid.66.Ibid.67.“Control3618,IncomingTelegramToSecretaryofState,”NARG59FilmS1040,#M1175,

DeanRuskReferenceBook,January16–April1949,ThePalestineReferenceFilesofDeanRuskandRobertMcClintock,1947–1949,reel7(Apr.9,1949).

68.Ibid.69.Ibid.70.Ibid.71.Ibid.72.Ibid.73.Ibid.74.Ibid.75.“BureauoftheMinisterofForeignAffairs(TelAviv)toE.Sasson(Lausanne),”Documents

ontheForeignPolicyofIsrael,CompanionVolume,4(June22,1949):53.76. Stian J. Tiller and Hidle H. Waage, “Powerful States, Powerless Mediator: The United

Statesand thePeaceEffortsof thePalestineConciliationCommission,1949–51,” InternationalHistoryReview33,no.3(Sept.2011):507.

77. “TheConsul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to theSecretary ofState,”ForeignRelations of theUnitedStates6(Apr.20,1949):925.

78.Ibid.,926.79.Ibid.,926–927.80.SeediscussionofthisandrelatedissuesinGeorgeMcGhee,EnvoytotheMiddleWorld:

AdventuresinDiplomacy(NewYork:Harper&Row,1983),36.81.Ibid.82. “The Consul at Jerusalem to the Secretary of State,” Foreign Relations of the United

States6(Apr.20,1949):926.83. “Memorandum by the Coordinator on Palestine Refugee Matters (McGhee) to the

SecretaryofState,”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates6(Apr.22,1949):935–936.84.Ibid.,836.85.Ibid.,935.86.Ibid.;seeinformationunderdistributionofrefugeesanddestitutepersonsasestimatedby

PalestineConciliationCommission,atbottomofpage.

87. “Memorandum by the Coordinator on Palestine Refugee Matters (McGhee) to theSecretaryofState,”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates6(Apr.22,1949):938.

88.“EditorialNote,”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates6(1949):995–996.89.“Mr.MarkF.EthridgetotheSecretaryofState,”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates6

(May12,1949):998.90.SeediscussionoftheseeventsinHahn,CaughtintheMiddleEast,87.91.“TheMinisterinSwitzerland(Vincent)totheSecretaryofState,”ForeignRelationsofthe

UnitedStates6(May16,1949):1014.92.“TheAmbassadorinIsrael(McDonald)totheSecretaryofState,”ForeignRelationsofthe

UnitedStates6(May29,1949):1075.93.“TheActingSecretaryofStatetotheEmbassyinIsrael,”ForeignRelationsoftheUnited

States6(May28,1949):1072.94.Ibid.,1073.95.Ibid.96.Ibid.,1074.97.“TheAmbassadorinIsrael(McDonald)totheSecretaryofState,”ForeignRelationsofthe

UnitedStates6(May29,1949):1075.98.YeminaRosenthal,“EditorialNote,”DocumentsontheForeignPolicyofIsrael,Companion

Volume,4(May–Dec.1949):30.99.Shlaim,CollusionAcrosstheJordan,473.SeealsoShlaim’sdiscussionofSasson’sviews

oftheoverallIsraelipositionatthisperiod,474–476.100. “E. Sasson (Lausanne) to S. Divon,” Documents on the Foreign Policy of Israel,

CompanionVolume,4(June16,1949):48.NotethatthequotationmarksinthetextareastheyappearintheIsraelidocuments.TheremainderofthecitationisasummaryofSasson’sposition.

101.Ibid.102.Ibid.103.Ibid.104.Ibid.,49.105.Ibid.106.Ibid.107.Ibid.108.ShlomoBen-Ami,ScarsofWar,WoundsofPeace:TheIsraeli–ArabTragedy(NewYork:

OxfordUniversityPress,2006),53.109.Ibid.110.“TheAmbassadorinFrance(Bruce)totheSecretaryofState,”ForeignRelationsofthe

UnitedStates6(June12,1949):1124.Theopeninglineofthiscommuniquemarked“TopSecret”is“FromEthridge.”

111.Ibid.112.“TheBritishEmbassytotheDepartmentofState,”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates

6(Sept.1,1949):1345.113.“TheAmbassadorinFrance(Bruce)totheSecretaryofState,”ForeignRelationsofthe

United States 6 (June 12, 1949): 1125. See note 110 above for an indication of Ethridge’sauthorshipofstatement.

114. Cited from the papers of Jacob Blaustein in Abba A. Solomon, The Speech, and ItsContext(Baltimore,Md.:AmericanJewishCommittee,2011),143.

115. Saadia Touval,The Peace Brokers: Mediators in the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1948–1979(Princeton,N.J.:PrincetonUniversityPress,1982),92.

116.Hahn,“TheViewfromJerusalem,”513.117. “Weizmann toTruman, inPresident’sSecretary’sFile,” inPapers ofHarryS. Truman,

HarryS.TrumanLibrary,June24,1949.

118.Ibid.119.Ibid.120.“FredaKerchweytotheHon.HarryS.Truman,”inPapersofClarkM.Clifford,HarryS.

TrumanLibrary,June19,1948.121.Ibid.122. “JudgeJosephE.Klau,Hartford,Conn.,sentbyGovernorChesterBowles toClarkM.

Clifford,”inPapersofClarkM.Clifford,HarryS.TrumanLibrary,June27,1949.123. “TheConsulatJerusalem(Burdett) to theSecretaryofState,”ForeignRelationsof the

UnitedStates6(July6,1949):1203.124.Ibid.,1204.125.Ibid.126.Ibid.127.Ibid.,1205.128.Ibid.129.Ibid.130.TillerandWaage,“PowerfulState,PowerlessMediator,”513.131.Ibid.132. “Major General John H. Hilldring to the Secretary of State,” Foreign Relations of the

UnitedStates6(July25,1949):1250.133.“MemorandumofConversation,bytheDeputyUnder-SecretaryofState(Rusk),”Foreign

RelationsoftheUnitedStates6(July28,1949):1264.134.Hahn,“TheViewfromJerusalem,”515.135.Ibid.136.“MrStuartW.RockwelltotheSecretaryofState,”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates

6(Aug.15,1949):1313.137.“PresidentTrumantoPresidentWeizmann,atRehevoth,Israel,”ForeignRelationsofthe

UnitedStates6(Aug.13,1949):1307.138.Ibid.,1306–1307.139.Shlaim,CollusionAcrosstheJordan,488.140.“E.Elath(Washington)toM.Sharett,”DocumentsontheForeignPolicyofIsrael,May–

December1949,CompanionVolume,4(Aug.30,1949):158.141.Ibid.142.“E.Sasson(Jerusalem)toM.Sharett,”DocumentsontheForeignPolicyofIsrael,May–

December1949,CompanionVolume,4(Sept.28,1949):199.143.Ibid.144.Ibid.,200.

13.THEVIEWFROMTHEPENTAGONANDTHENATIONALSECURITYCOUNCIL

1.AsdescribedintheForewordtoKennethW.Condit,TheHistoryoftheJointChiefsofStaff:TheJointChiefsofStaffandNationalPolicy,1947–1949,Vol.2(Washington,D.C.:OfficeofJointHistory,OfficeoftheChairmanoftheJointChiefsofStaff,1996),v.DavidA.Armstrong,directorforJointHistory,haspointedoutthat“inasmuchasthetexthasnotbeenconsideredbytheJointChiefs of Staff, it must be construed as descriptive only and does not constitute the officialpositionoftheJointChiefsofStaffonanysubject”(vi).

2.Ibid.,43.3.See thevaluablediscussionofU.S.–Saudi relations throughout thisperiod inMauriceJr.

Labelle,“‘TheOnlyThorn’:EarlySaudi-AmericanRelationsandtheQuestionofPalestine,1945–1949,”DiplomaticHistory35,no.2(Apr.2011):257–281.

4. “Report of the Joint Strategic Plans Committee to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on MilitaryViewpoint Regarding the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East Area,”Records of the JointChiefsofStaff,1887/1(July19,1948):5–6.

5. Peter L. Hahn,Caught in theMiddle East: U.S. Policy Toward the Arab–Israeli Conflict,1945–1961(ChapelHill:UniversityofNorthCarolinaPress,2004),70;MichaelJ.Cohen,FightingWorldWar Three from theMiddle East: Allied Contingency Plans, 1945–1954 (London: FrankCass,1997),195–199.

6. “Memorandum by the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on U.S.StrategicInterest inIsrael,”enclosureinRecordsof theJointChiefsofStaff,part2,1948–1953[sectB],theMiddleEast,filmA368(B),reel2(Mar.7,1949):181.

7.Ibid.8.Cohen,FightingWorldWarThree,196.9.Ibid.10.Ibid.,207–208.11.Condit,TheHistoryoftheJointChiefsofStaff,55.12.“TheSecretaryofStatetotheEmbassyinIraq,”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates6

(Mar.16,1949):844.13.“MemorandumbytheAssistantSecretaryofStateforUnitedNationsAffairs(Rusk)tothe

SecretaryofState,”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates6(Mar.29,1949):880.14.Ibid.,881.15.Ibid.SeealsodiscussionofU.S.–IsraeliexchangesandpolicytowardJerusaleminHahn,

CaughtintheMiddleEast,chap.8.16.Ibid.17.“M.Sharett(TelAviv)toM.Namir(Moscow),”DocumentsontheForeignPolicyofIsrael,

CompanionVolume,4(June27,1949):59.18. “Memorandum by the Chief of Naval Operations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on United

StatesStrategic Interest in Israel,”Recordsof theJointChiefsofStaff, 1684/30,part 2, 1948–1953[sectB],theMiddleEast,filmA368(B),reel2(Apr.27,1949).

19.Ibid.,98.20.Ibid.;notethatbothvoidedandsanitizedpagesarenumberedidentically.21.Ibid.22.Ibid.,99.23.Ibid.24. “Memorandumby theSecretaryofDefense (Johnson) to theExecutiveSecretaryof the

National Security Council (Souers),”Foreign Relations of the United States 6 (May 16, 1949):1012.

25.Ibid.,1012.26.Ibid.,1010.27.Ibid.28.“Meeting:M.Sharett–F.Frankfurter(Washington,15December1949),”Documentsonthe

ForeignPolicyofIsrael,CompanionVolume,4(Dec.15,1949):300.29. “Memorandumby theSecretaryofDefense (Johnson) to theExecutiveSecretaryof the

National Security Council (Souers),”Foreign Relations of the United States 6 (May 16, 1949):1011.

30.Ibid.31.Ibid.32.“M.Sharett(TelAviv)toM.Namir(Moscow),”DocumentsontheForeignPolicyofIsrael,

CompanionVolume,4(June27,1949):158–159.

33. “Memorandumby theSecretaryofDefense (Johnson) to theExecutiveSecretaryof theNational Security Council (Souers),”Foreign Relations of the United States 6 (May 16, 1949):1011.

34.Ibid.35.Ibid.36.JamesG.McDonald,MyMission in Israel,1948–1951 (NewYork:SimonandSchuster,

1951),189.37.“TheSecretaryofDefense(Johnson)totheSecretaryofState,”ForeignRelationsofthe

UnitedStates6(June14,1949):1134.38.Ibid.39.“TheSecretaryofDefense(Forrestal)totheChairmanoftheHouseCommitteeonForeign

Affairs(Bloom),”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates6(Jan.25,1949):697–698.40.LaurentRucker,Staline,IsraeletlesJuifs(Paris:PUF,2001),172.41.Ibid.,139–140.42.“M.Sharett(TelAviv)toM.Namir(Moscow),”DocumentsontheForeignPolicyofIsrael,

CompanionVolume,4(Oct.4,1949):209.43.Ibid.44.Condit,TheHistoryoftheJointChiefsofStaff,57.45.“MunitionsBoard,MemorandumfortheJointChiefsofStaff,”enclosureinRecordsofthe

JointChiefsofStaff,1684(Apr.5,1950):34.46. Ibid., Appendix. JCS 1684/39 contains the following list: “List of Arms Required by the

GovernmentofIsraelforDefensivePurposes”:50machineguns250groundandaircraft;40mmantiaircraftguns30;90mmantiaircraftgunswithradarcontrolandPFammunition36;76.2mmor90mmantitankguns48; 76.2mmor 90mmantitank self-propelledgunsM1020; 105mmHowitzers36;155mmHowitzers18;105mmHowitzersself-propelledM712;M4tankswith76.2mmguns(Sherman)45;M24tanks18;M38orM8armoredcars90;75mmrecoillessrifles100;5inchaircraftrockets10,000;4.5 inchgroundtogroundrockets25,000;24barreledlaunchers;fieldartillery25;jetfighters18;radarandcommunicationequipment,detailsofwhichwillfollow.

47. “Report by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on UnitedStatesPolicy TowardArmsShipments to theNearEast.”Records of the JointChiefs of Staff,1684/42,filmA,368B,reel2(Apr.28,1950).

48.Condit,TheHistoryoftheJointChiefsofStaff,58.49.“Reportby theNationalSecurityCouncil,”ForeignRelationsof theUnitedStates6(Oct.

17,1949):1440.AlsoavailableasNSC47/2,NSCRegistry(PermanentFiles),Oct.17,1949,“AReport to thePresidentby theNationalSecurityCouncilonUnitedStatesPolicyToward IsraelandtheArabStates.”AllreferencesinthecitationsthatfollowaretotheForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStateseditioncitedhere.

50.Ibid.,1430.51.Ibid.52. “Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern,

SouthAsian,andAfricanAffairs (McGhee),”ForeignRelationsof theUnitedStates 6 (Oct.18,1949):1441.

53.Ibid.,1441n.3.54. “Statement by the United States and the United KingdomGroups, Discussion on Arab

Unity,”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates6(Nov.15,1949):69.55.“Reportby theNationalSecurityCouncil,”ForeignRelationsof theUnitedStates6(Oct.

17,1949):1434.56.Ibid.57.Ibid.,1438.58.Ibid.,1436.

59.Ibid.60.“TheActingUnitedStatesRepresentativeattheUnitedNations(Jessup)totheSecretary

ofState,”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates6(July1,1948):1184.61. “Memorandumby theChief ofStaff,U.S.Air Force to the JointChiefs ofStaff onU.S.

StrategicInterest inIsrael,”enclosureinRecordsof theJointChiefsofStaff,part2,1948–1953[sectB],theMiddleEast,filmA368(B),reel2(Mar.7,1949):181.

62. “Memorandum by the Chief of Naval Operations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on UnitedStatesStrategic Interest in Israel,”Recordsof theJointChiefsofStaff, 1684/30,part 2, 1948–1953[secB],theMiddleEast,filmA368(B),reel2(Apr.27,1949):98.

63. “Memorandumby theSecretaryofDefense (Johnson) to theExecutiveSecretaryof theNational Security Council (Souers),”Foreign Relations of the United States 6 (May 16, 1949):1009.

64.Ibid.,1010.65.“MemorandumbythePolitico-MilitaryAdviserintheBureauofNearEastern,SouthAsian,

andAfricanAffairs(Robbertson),”ForeignRelationsof theUnitedStates6(Nov.14,1949):56.SeealsoGabrielKolko,ThePoliticsofWar:TheWorldandUnitedStatesForeignPolicy,1943–1945(NewYork:PantheonBooks,1958),chap.8;andJoyceKolkoandGabrielKolko,TheLimitsofPower:TheWorldandUnitedStatesForeignPolicy,1945–1954 (NewYork:Harper&Row,1972),chap.8.

66. These figures come from JeremyM.Sharp, “U.S. ForeignAid to Israel,”CongressionalResearchService(CRS)ReportforCongress(Jan.2,2008):CRS-19.

67.Ibid.,CRS-15.68.Ibid.

14.THEISRAELI–U.S.OILCONNECTIONANDEXPANDINGU.S.OILINTERESTS

1.MaxHolland,TheMilitarizationoftheMiddleEast(Philadelphia:PeaceEducationDivision,AmericanFriendsServiceCommittee,1983),2.

2. “Memorandum by the Acting Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs(Hare)totheUnderSecretaryofState(Lovett),”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates5,part1(Aug.25,1948):40.

3. InternationalPetroleumCartel, “StaffReport to theFederalTradeCommission,” releasedthroughSubcommitteeonMonopolyofSelectCommitteeonSmallBusiness(Washington,D.C.:U.S.Senate83rdCongress,2ndsession,1952),2.Pagenumbersarefromonlineversion,chap.11, “Concentration of Control of the World Petroleum Industry”;http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/Petroleum/ftc22.htm.

4.Ibid.,2–3.5.Ibid.,4.6.MauriceJr.Labelle,“‘TheOnlyThorn’:EarlySaudi-AmericanRelationsandtheQuestionof

Palestine,1945–1949,”DiplomaticHistory35,no.2(Apr.2011):279.7.“MemorandumbytheJointChiefsofStaff,”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates5,part1

(Aug.10,1948):245.8. “MemorandumofConversation byMrRichardHSanger of theDivision ofNearEastern

Affairs,”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates6(Jan.5,1949):91.9. “MemorandumofConversation, byMrRichardHSangerof theDivisionofNearEastern

Affairs,”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates6(Jan.25,1949):98.10.Ibid.

11.PapersofMaxW.Ball,HarryS.TrumanLibrary,July7,1948,Box2.12. Consider the following sources: Hanna Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the

RevolutionaryMovementsofIraq(London:Saqi,2004);PetterNoreandTerisaTurner,eds.,Oiland Class Struggle (London: Zed, 1980); Ervand Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1982); Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett,“Labor andNational Liberation: TheTradeUnionMovement in Iraq, 1920–1958,”ArabStudiesQuarterly5,no.2 (Spring1983);ZacharyLockman,ComradesandEnemies:ArabandJewishWorkers in Palestine, 1906–1948 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996); FawazTraboulsi, A History of Modern Lebanon (London: Pluto, 2007); Joel Beinin, Workers andPeasantsintheModernMiddleEast(Cambridge,Mass.:CambridgeUniversityPress,2001);JoelBeinin and Zachary Lockman,Workers on the Nile: Nationalism, Communism, Islam, and theEgyptian Working Class, 1882–1954 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988); andMalek Abisaab, “‘Unruly’ Factory Women in Lebanon: Contesting French Colonialism and theNationalState,1940–1946,”JournalofWomen’sHistory16,n.3(2004).AlsoseeMalekAbisaab,“Militant Women of a Fragile Nation” (unpublished manuscript), which provides an extensiveanalysis of the role of Lebanese women in the history of the Lebanese labor movement withspecialattentiontowomenworkersintobaccofactories.

13.UriBialer,OilandtheArab-IsraeliConflict,1948–1963(NewYork:St.Martin’s,1999),128,85.

14.“Diary,”PapersofMaxW.Ball,NewYork,HarryS.TrumanLibrary,Box2,Mar.12,1951.15.Bialer,OilandtheArab-IsraeliConflict,96.16.Ibid.,92.17.Ibid.,93.18. “Diary,” Papers ofMaxW. Ball,Washington, Harry S. Truman Library, Box 2,May 12,

1949,175.19.Ibid.20.Ibid.,May13,1949,176.21.Ibid.,May16,1949,178.22.Ibid.,Aug.1,1949,176.23.Ibid.,Aug.3,1949,175.24.Ibid.,Aug.4,1949.25.Ibid.,Aug.8,1949.26.Ibid.,July18–Aug.31,1950.27.Ibid.,Mar.11,1951,190.28.Ibid.,Feb.28,1951,Mar.8,1951,May1,1951.29. “Diary,” Papers ofMaxW. Ball,Washington, Harry S. Truman Library, Box 2, Apr. 16,

1948.30.“Diary,”PapersofMaxW.Ball,Washington,HarryS.TrumanLibrary,Box2,May1,1951.31. “Diary,” Papers ofMaxW. Ball,Washington, Harry S. Truman Library, Box 2,May 21,

1951.32. “Diary,” Papers ofMaxW.Ball,Washington,HarryS. Truman Library, Box 2, Aug. 30,

1951.33. “Diary,” Papers ofMaxW. Ball,Washington, Harry S. Truman Library, Box 2,May 27,

1951.34. “Diary,”Papers ofMaxW.Ball,Washington,HarryS. TrumanLibrary,Box 2, June26,

1951.35. “Diary,” Papers ofMaxW. Ball,Washington, Harry S. Truman Library, Box 2, July 12,

1951.36. “Diary,” Papers ofMaxW.Ball,Washington,HarryS. Truman Library, Box 2,Dec. 22,

1951.

37. “OilPossibilities in IsraelReported byAmericanExpert:ExplorationsConsidered,”JTA,May11,1951.Morerecently,thesubjectofIsraeldrillingforoilwasonceagainintheheadlines:“Israel to Drill for Oil in the West Bank,” Al Jazeera, Nov. 4, 2013;http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/11/Israel-drill-oil-west-bank-201311114571416794.html.

38.“RalphFriedmantoDirectorsoftheIndustrialInstituteofIsrael,”FilesofClarkM.Clifford,HarryS.TrumanLibrary,Sept.20,1949.

39.“RalphFriedmantoClarkClifford,”FilesofClarkM.Clifford,HarryS.TrumanLibrary,Nov.9,1949.

40.Michael J. Cohen,FightingWorldWar Three from theMiddle East: Allied ContingencyPlans,1945–1954(NewYork:Routledge,1997),96.

REFLECTIONSONDISCOVERY,DENIAL,ANDDEFERRAL

1.“ReportbytheCoordinatingCommitteeoftheDept.ofState,Annex,”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates8(May2,1945):37.

2.Ibid.3.Ibid.,35n.2.4.“Reportof theAnglo-AmericanCommitteeofEnquiryregardingtheproblemsofEuropean

JewryandPalestine,Lausanne”(London:HisMajesty’sStationeryOffice,Apr.20,1946),4.5.Ibid.6. Evan M. Wilson, A Calculated Risk: The U.S. Decision to Recognize Israel (Cincinnati,

Ohio:ClerisyPress,2008),294.7. Central Intelligence Agency, “The Consequences of the Partition of Palestine” (Nov. 28,

1947):8;http://www.foia.cia.gov/browse_docs_full.asp.8.“DraftMemorandumbytheDirectoroftheOfficeofUnitedNationsAffairs(Rusk),”Foreign

RelationsoftheUnitedStates5,part2(May4,1948):894.9.“TheActingUnitedStatesRepresentativeattheUnitedNations(Jessup)totheSecretaryof

State,”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates5(July27,1949):1248.10.“TheSecretaryofStatetotheEmbassyintheUnitedKingdom,”ForeignRelationsofthe

UnitedStates5,part2(Aug.13,1948):1309.11.“TheSecretaryofStatetotheEmbassyintheUnitedKingdom,”ForeignRelationsofthe

UnitedStates5,part2(Aug.14,1948):1311.12. “Memorandumby theSecretaryofState toPresidentTruman,”ForeignRelationsof the

UnitedStates5,part2(Aug.16,1948):1313.13.Ibid.,1313–1314.14.“MemorandumbytheDirectoroftheOfficeofUnitedNationsAffairs(Rusk)totheUnder

Secretary of State (Lovett),”Foreign Relations of the United States 5, part 2 (Aug. 20, 1948):1331.

15.CentralIntelligenceAgency,“PossibleDevelopmentsfromthePalestineTruce”(Aug.31,1948):3;http://www.foia.cia.gov/browse_docs_full.asp.

16. “The Secretary of State to the Special Representative of the United States in Israel(McDonald),”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates5,part2(Sept.1,1948):1367.

17. “The Ambassador in theUnited Kingdom (Douglas) to the Acting Secretary of State atLondon,”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates5,part2(Oct.30,1948):1532.

18.“TheActingSecretaryofStatetotheEmbassyinIsrael,”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates6(May28,1949):1072.

19. “TheAmbassador inFrance (Bruce) to theSecretaryofState,”ForeignRelationsof the

UnitedStates6(June12,1949):1124;openingindicatesMarkEthridgeasauthor.20.Ibid.,1125.21. Shlomo Ben-Ami, Scars of War, Wounds of Peace: The Israeli-Arab Tragedy (Oxford:

OxfordUniversityPress,2007),50.22. Seth P. Tillman, The United States in the Middle East: Interests and Obstacles

(Bloomington:IndianaUniversityPress,1982),58–59.23.“TheActingSecretaryofStatetotheEmbassyinIsrael,”ForeignRelationsoftheUnited

States6(May28,1949):1073.24.“TheActingUnitedStatesRepresentativeattheUnitedNations(Jessup)totheSecretary

ofState,”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates5,part2(July1,1948):1181.25.Ibid.,1183.26.Ibid.,1184.27.Ibid.28. “The Secretary of State to the Special Representative of the United States in Israel

(McDonald),”ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates5,part2(Sept.1,1948):1367.29.Ibid.,1367–1368.30.“TheActingSecretaryofStatetotheSecretaryofState,atParis,”ForeignRelationsofthe

UnitedStates5,part2(Nov.10,1948):1566.31.Ibid.,1565.32. “Memorandum by the Chief of Staff, US Air Force to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on US

Strategic Interest in Israel” [enclosure].Recordsof the JointChiefsofStaff, part 2, 1948–1953[sectB],theMiddleEast,filmA368(B),reel2(Mar.7,1949):181.

33. “Memorandum by the Chief of Naval Operations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on UnitedStatesStrategicInterestinIsrael,”RecordsoftheJointChiefsofStaff,part2,1948–1953[sectB],theMiddleEast,filmA368(B),reel2(Apr.27,1949).

34.Ibid.,98.35.Ibid.;notethatbothvoidedandsanitizedpagesarenumberedidentically.36. “Memorandumby theSecretaryofDefense (Johnson) to theExecutiveSecretaryof the

National Security Council (Souers),”Foreign Relations of the United States 6 (May 16, 1949):1009–1010.

37.Ibid.,1010.38.“Reportby theNationalSecurityCouncil,”ForeignRelationsof theUnitedStates6(Oct.

17,1949):1434.39.Ibid.,1431.40.Ibid.,1433.41.Ibid.,1435.

Index

Pagenumbersrefertotheprinteditionbutarehyperlinkedtotheappropriatelocationinthee-book.

AAC.SeeAnglo-AmericanCommitteeAbbasi,Mustafa,174Abdal-Hadi,Awni,46Abdal-Mun’im,265Abdullah(EmirofTransjordan),27–28,65–66,74,110,125;May12debateand,161,163;

Palestinianrefugeesand,214,222,226,229,234,236,237,263,271;powerand,319;truceand,246,248;trusteeshipand,152–53;U.S.policyonPalestineand,185,188–89,191,193

AbdulRahim,AhmadEffendi,134Abrahamian,Ervand,331n63Abual-Huda,139AbuLaban,AhmadEffendi,134Achcar,Gilbert,335n63Achcar,Joseph,335n63Acheson,Dean,xxii,4,23–24,41,63,376n27;IsraelandU.S.military,279;Jaffaand,132–33;

Merriamand,53;Morrison-Gradyplanand,49,50;Palestinianrefugeesand,258–59,263;partitionand,58,59,60;truceand,244,246–47,249–50

Afghanistan,8,62Africa,24.SeealsoNorthAfricaAHC.SeeArabHigherCommitteeAilling,PaulH.,24AIOC.SeeAnglo-IranianOilCompanyAirForce,U.S.:MiddleEastassessment,277–78,321;inSaudiArabia,9–10Alireza(Sheikh),149Allon,Yigal,173AllThatRemains(Khalidi,W.),173Amoco,268Andraus,AminEffendi,134Anglo-AmericanCommittee(AAC):onArabs,44;onJews,43;Morrison-Gradyplanand,49,50;

recommendations,46–47;report(1946),31,40–48,309;response,48;Wilsonand,47–48,310;Zionismrejectedby,46–47

Anglo-IranianOilCompany(AIOC),14,15,21,98,250,331n63anti-Semitism,33,54,63antitrust,oiland,6,15ArabHigherCommittee(AHC),82,120–22,151,258;AACreport(1946),40;flightprevention,

125–26;partitionand,74;Sharett’smisrepresentationof,93,140;trusteeshipand,153;UNSCOPand,61

ArabianAmericanOilCompany(ARAMCO),10;expansion,14–15,18,97,328n20;influence,12–13,104,108,110–11;withlaborstrikes,18–19;merger(1947),14–15;offshoreoilrightsand,294–95;oilconnectionand,297,298;ownershipof,13;racismand,104;U.S.StateDepartmentasmodelfor,13

ArabianPeninsula,8Arab-Israeliconflict:TowardsaCommonArchiveand,xvi,219,371n82;Ethridge’sfinal

assessment,266–74;Gaza,xiii–xv,226,244–45,266–67,325n3;GreatBritainand,26;justificationsfor,59,367n67,368n10,372n26;Merriamon,50–54;Morris,Benny,on,199,367n67,372n26;SovietUnionand,19–22,193,223;trusteeshipand,xxi,20,26,29–30,47,52–53,84,113–14,137–58;U.S.oilpolicywith,xvi–xxii,6,7,11,57–58,80,85,193–94,285–86,319.SeealsoMiddleEast

ArabLeague,39,73;CIAon,110;Israel’sindependenceand,167;partitionand,61;trusteeshipand,146,148–49

ArabLiberationArmy,73,80Arabs:AACreport(1946),44;attitudes,265;blindspot,195;ChristianArabs,198,253;genocide,

199,226;guerrillawarfare,72,81–82;JewishArabists,93,345n7;Jewishimmigrationand,38–40;militarygroups,72–73,80,81,88,197–98;PalestineArabConference,234;partitionand,59,61–62,66,68–71,74,83,89;populationimbalanceand,59,62,64–65,74,89,173;populationinHaifa,127–28;racismagainst,121;viewson,188–95,196–97;withweaponsembargo,256

ArabWorkers’Congress,17ArabYouthOrganization,72ARAMCO.SeeArabianAmericanOilCompanyarmistice.SeetruceArmstrong,DavidA.,380n1army.SeeArabLiberationArmy;IsraelDefenseForces;military,U.S.ArmyofShadows(Cohen,H.),350n26assassinations,176–79,215–16AtlanticCharter,51,310attitudes:Arabs,265;Jews,258,265,267Attlee,Clement,32,230Austin,Warren,67,69,82,86,88,232;Israel’sindependenceand,166–67,174;truceand,159,

248;trusteeshipand,137,139,140,143,144–45,150,155Australia,64,335n61Aydelotte,Frank,41Azcarate,Pablode,75,115,149,176,244AzzamPasha,110,122,123,139,206

Backer,George,228Bahrein,8,15,294BahreinPetroleumCompany,Ltd.,12,13Bain,Kenneth,xviiBakulin,Ivan,286BalfourDeclaration(1917),32,52,61,75,301Ball,Douglas(son),296,298–99Ball,Jean(daughter),95,101.SeealsoKosloff,JeanBall,Max,xx–xxi,5,6;Duceand,106–7,298;Elath(Epstein,Eliahu)and,101–12,168–69,297,

306;influence,241;oilconnectionand,93–99,101–12,295–300;withPalestinepolicyandoilconnection,99

Baluchistan,8Bancroft,Harding,186banks,161,210,212,249,271,292Baruch,Bernard,99Bedouins,28,76,142Beeley,Harold,221Begin,Menachem:DeirYassinand,123;politicalroots,350n29Beinin,Joel,xx,125Beirut,227–31Ben-Ami,Shlomo,266,317Ben-Gurion,David:AACand,45;Arab-Israeliconflictand,28–29,59,162,343n107;Israel’s

independenceand,160,164–65,166,170;Jewishimmigrationand,39;oiland,299;Palestinianrefugeesand,205,208,214–15,233,259–62,264–65,315–16;partitionand,59,75–76,87,92;transferpolicyand,64–65,118–19,121,340n37;truceand,245,251;trusteeshipand,53;U.S.policyonPalestineand,189,195;violenceadvocatedby,75–76,77,126

Bernadotte,Folke(Count),129,197;assassinationof,215–16;Israel’sindependenceand,174–76,185,188;Jewishimmigrationand,38;Palestinianrefugeesand,202,206–19,221;“sevenbasicpremises,”215–19

Bevin,Ernest,40,53;oilconnectionand,109;Palestinianrefugeesand,208,213;partitionand,60–61,65–66,89,139

Bialer,Uri,77,106,130,296BiltmoreConference(1942),33TheBirthofthePalestinianRefugeeProblem(Morris,B.),xx,340n37Blaustein,Jacob,34,268,334n44blindspot,Arabsand,195Bohlen,Charles,58Boisanger,Claudede,243,252bombings,80,82,199boundaries:Jerusalem,refugees,and,220–24;withnumberandlocationofrefugees,236–38;

truceand,244–45,288;violationsof,227–31,233–34,257–59Brennan,Charles,228Buber,Martin,122Bunche,Ralph,221,243–44,286Burch,Philip,4Burdett,WilliamC.,177–79,220,226–27;“LittleTriangle”and,248;Palestinianrefugeesand,

253,270–71;truceand,246–47Butler,George,83–84Butlermemorandum:Elsey-Cliffordmysteryand,85–87;implications,83–85;U.S.andUN,87–

90;violenceand,87Buxton,FrankW.,41Byrnes,JamesF.,24,34,334n44Cairo-Suezbasearea,283,284–85,322ACalculatedRisk,theU.S.DecisiontoRecognizeIsrael(Wilson),330n47Caltexgroup,15,102Canada,61,64,335n61Carmel,Moshe,174Carter,Jimmy,3

CentralIntelligenceAgency(CIA),331n63;onArabLeague,110;McClintockandPalestine,67–78;oiland,295;Palestineassessedby,68–73,88–89;Palestinianrefugeesand,202–3,205–6,312;onpartition,310–11;inSaudiArabia,13;secretinformationleaksand,272;U.S.policyonPalestineand,197–200

Chamoun,Camille,138children,72;Jewishrefugees,36;Palestinianrefugees,127–28,177,210–11,222;violenceand,

77,120–21,123,222Childs,J.Rives,12–13,110,178–79China,142,257Chizik,Yitzak,136Christians,17,26–27,48–49,237;Arabs,198,253;GreekCatholics,261;Maronites,249,253,

261;relieforganizations,208CIA.SeeCentralIntelligenceAgencyCitino,Nathan,109citrusindustry,49,133Cizling,Aharon,226Clayton,WilliamL.,4Clifford,Clark,21,25,211,300,359n2,360n21;Butlermemorandumand,85–87;influence,50,

94,111,270,361n41;Israel’sindependenceand,166,169;May12debateand,159,160–62,163,185;partitionand,138,155,156–58,162

Cohen,Aharon,345n7Cohen,GerardDaniel,328n4Cohen,Hillel,350n26Cohen,MichaelJ.,50,90,168,301Comay,Michael,227–28CommunistParty:Iraq,18;Palestine,17Condit,KennethW.,278,380n1Connelly,Matthew,159ConsolidatedRefineries,16control.Seepowercorporations,69,268;PalestineEconomicCorporation,161;powersharedbetweenU.S.and,7–

8,10,12–15,101;U.S.oilpolicyinfluencedby,3–9costs,oilandsecurity,13.Seealsofinancescoup,inSyria,250TheCoup,1953,theCIA,andtheRootsofModernU.S.-IranianRelations(Abrahamian),331n63Creamer,Daniel,45,195,300Crick,Wilfred,41Crossman,Richard,41,45Crum,BartleyC.,41,359n2Curtice,Duke,297Czechoslovakia,61,170,210,223–24,286,313

Daniel,Jonathan,163Danin,Ezra,66,119Davies,RalphK.,5–6,99Dawaymamassacre,226Dayan,Moshe,253debate,ofMay12,159–64deferral.SeeMiddleEast,U.S.policyon

DeirYassinmassacre:context,115,129,137,153,204,350n26;denounced,252,350n29;Wassonon,120–25,151

Dekanozov,V.,20democracy,dictatorshipsand,13DemocraticParty,365n13denial.SeeMiddleEast,U.S.policyondeReynier,Jacques,121development.SeeMiddleEast,U.S.policyonDewey,Thomas,99,229Dhahran,9–10,110,276,294dictatorships,democracyand,13discovery.SeeMiddleEast,U.S.policyonDisplacedPersons.Seerefugees,JewishDoenecke,JustusD.,361n41Donovan,WilliamJ.(MajorGeneral),99,100,280Douglas,Lewis,185,223,224,231Douglas,Paul,99Dubinsky,David,228Duce,JamesTerry:Ball,Max,and,106–7,298;oilconnectionand,93,95,96,97–99,106,109,

110,297Dulles,JohnFoster,99,188,233

EarlG.HarrisonReport.SeeHarrisonReportEban,Abba,78,143,190–91,268AnEconomicStudyofPalestine(Nathan,Gass,andCreamer),45,195,300economy:citrusindustry,49,133;finances,13,74,161,208,210,212,235,237–38,249,253,

271,292,295,325n3;oilembargo,296;WorldWarIIandpostwar,3Eddy,William,10–11Egypt,39,142,149,187,197,226;inGaza,244–45,266;Israel’sindependenceand,172–73;

laborstrikesin,16–17;Palestinianrefugeesand,236–37,262,266;partitionand,74,75;truceand,244–45,286

Eisenhower,DwightD.:Jewishimmigrationand,34–35,37;plutocracyand,3Elath,Eliahu(Epstein,Eliahu),xx–xxi,6,280,288,345n7,360n21;withBall,Max,101–12,168–

69,297,306;boundariesand,227–28;Israel’sindependenceand,164–66;Lebanonand,230;namechangeand,368n6;oilconnectionand,93,94,96,99,101–12,297–98;Palestinianrefugeesand,208,211,212,253,271,273;partitionand,59,78,87,92,138;transferand,236;trusteeshipand,147;U.S.StateDepartmentand,225;YomKippurstatementand,50

Elliston,Herbert,228Elsey,George,24,25,85–87,360n21embargo:oil,296;weapons,256employment:oilindustry,18–19,129,331n78;unemployment,16,262.SeealsolaborEngland.SeeGreatBritainEpstein,Eliahu.SeeElath,EliahuErlanger,Steven,xivEthridge,Mark,xxi,238,279,376n27;withexpulsionandflight,132–33;withLausanne

Conference(1949),252,316–17;Palestinianrefugeesand,257–59,261–63,266–74,280;PCCand,243;truceand,243–44,247

Europe,328n2,328n4

EvianConference(1938),36,39Ewing,Oliver,228expansion:IDFand,226;land,xv,208,269,315–16;oil,8–9,14–15,18,97,328n20Export-ImportBank,210,212,271,292expulsion:Palestinianrefugeeswithflightand,65,75–76,115,121–22,124–26,132–33,172–73,

198–99,203–4,213,226–27,229,247,255,311–16,322–23;PlanDaletwithpartitionto,115–36

Exxon,15Eytan,Walter,252,264,315–16

Fascism,39,41,350n29FawziBey,Mahmoud,139,142,144–45,215Feis,Herbert,6–7,8Feisal(PrinceofSaudiArabia),145,147,149finances:banks,161,210,212,249,271,292;Haifarefinery,295;marketpercentages,7;oiland

securitycosts,13;Palestinianrefugeesand,208,235,237–38,253;partition,74;U.S.andIsrael,212,292;forweaponssales,325n3.Seealsoeconomy

FirestoneRubberCompany,69Fishman,Alex,353n98Flapan,Simha,xix,116,117,125,165,170flight,truthabout,125–26.SeealsoHaifa;refugees,Palestinian“AForeignOilPolicyfortheUnitedStates,”6–7“ForeignPetroleumPolicyoftheUnitedStates,”8ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates(FRUS),xx,84“FormofGovernment.”SeetrusteeshipForrestal,James,4,10,58,96,141,225;onEthridge,243;withstrategicobjectivesinIsrael,286France,11–12,17,142,210,261Frankfurter,Felix,69,283Friedman,Ralph,300–301FRUS.SeeForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStatesFutuwwa,72

Galili,Israel,166Gass,Oscar,45,99,195,300Gaza,xiii–xv,267;Egyptin,244–45,266;Palestinianrefugeesin,226;weaponsand,325n3Genesis(Judis),340n37Genesis1948(Kurzman),354n11genocide,199,205,226geography,primeoil-productionareas,8,13–14Germany,35–38,161,335n61.SeealsoNazisGlubb,JohnBagot(Sir),139Goldmann,Nahum,19,25,27,28,41;AACand,50;trusteeshipand,147,153Goldschmidt,Tex,298Grady,Henry,79GreatBritain:Arab-Israeliconflictand,26;BahreinPetroleumCompany,Ltd.,12,13;Haifaand,

125;Morrison-Gradyplanand,31,48–50;oilexpansionand,8–9,14;Palestineand,23,26,29,30–33,35,44,53–54,58,61,89,118,169,185,190,208–9,276,277–78;partitionand,81;PeelCommissionReport(1937),64,118,187,190,340n37;truceand,245–46;trusteeshipand,26,52–53,84;U.S.StateDepartmentandwarningsfrom,224–26;White

Paper(1939),32–33,35,190Greece,22,30,157,192,261Grew,Joseph,27,28Griffis,Stanton,223Grodzinsky,Yosef,335n61Gromyko,Andrei,284Grose,Peter,34,101Gross,ErnestA.,79,85,139Gruenther,Alfred(MajorGeneral),84–85Guatemala,61guerrillawarfare,Arabswith,72,81–82GulfExplorationCompany,14GulfOilCorp.,294Gur,Mordechai(General),353n98Gurney,Henry(Sir),131–32

Haber,William,38Haganah,78;characterizationof,42,71–72,81–82,88,150–51;numbers,72;Palestinian

refugeesand,204;PlanDaletand,115–36;recruitment,37–38Hahn,PeterL.,xvii,25,94,168,327n20,361n41Haifa:flightfrom,121,124–25,213;Lippincottand,125–31;populationofArabsin,127–28;

refinery,78,103,129–31,295–96;violencein,126–28HambrosBank,161Harding,Charlie,106,107,297Harriman,W.Averell,4,49,99Harrison,EarlG.,34–35,168;AACand,41;Palestinianrefugeesand,309HarrisonReport:JewishimmigrationandHolocaust,31–40;Palestineand,35–36Hart,Parker,12HashomerHatzair,39,43Hayden,JohnJustin,337n95Heikal,MohamedHassanein,39,171Henderson,Loy,xxi,12,20,22,41;DeirYassinand,122–23;Israel’sindependenceand,166;on

Jewishimmigration,64;Merriamand,50,51,53;Palestineand,24–25,28–30,54;partitionand,57–60,62–64,69,78–79,82,85,88–90;transferand,184;trusteeshipand,144,145–46;UNSCOPand,67;U.S.policyonPalestineand,184–86

Heyd,Uriel,271Hilldring,JohnJ.(General),271–72TheHistoryoftheJointChiefsofStaff(Condit),380n1Hitler,Adolf,90Hogan,MichaelJ.,327n20Holbrooke,Richard,361n41Holland,Max,293Holocaust.Seerefugees,JewishHolton,GeorgeV.,15Horner,John,155,157Hoskins,HaroldB.(Lt.Colonel),24Houghton,RobertB.,363n84Hourani,Albert,45,46HouseofRepresentatives,U.S.,96–101

Hudson,Manley,295Hull,Bert,297Hull,Cordell,9Hurewitz,J.C.,xviii,60,251–52al-Husayni,Jamal,45Husseini,AbdulKader,81,120–21al-Husseini,Amin(Haj),66,81,93,121,139,157al-Husseini,Fawzi,43Hutcheson,JosephC.,41

IbnMuammar,Abdal-Aziz,18IbnSaud(KingofSaudiArabia):Israel’sindependenceand,178;trusteeshipand,139,152;U.S.

corporationsand,12–13,101;U.S.militaryand,9–11Ickes,Harold,4,5,6,25,26,95,96IDF.SeeIsraelDefenseForcesIkhwanalMuslimin(MuslimBrotherhood),71,72,171illegalimmigration,46–47,128imbalance.Seepopulationsimmigration:childrenwith,36;HolocaustandJewish,27,31–40,46,54,64,68,335n61;illegal,

46–47,128;legislation,36,37;Morrison-Gradyplanand,49–50;PalestineandJewish,27,30–33,35,37–40,64,190;trusteeshipand,141,147–48;WhitePaper(1939),32–33,35,190

imperialism,11–15independence,Israel’s,188;assassinationofWasson,176–79;Bernadotte’sproposalsand,174–

76;Marshalland,165,167,169,320;May12debate,159–64,185;namechangeswith,202,368n6;PGIand,129–31,192,194,206,209,253,307;Trumanwith,164–69;violenceand,169–74

India,61,99,184InternationalBank,249internationalization,ofJerusalem,61,246,258,260,280,290,301InternationalPetroleumCartel,294InWar’sWake:Europe’sDisplacedPersonsinthePostwarOrder(Cohen,G.D.),328n4IPC.SeeIraqPetroleumCompanyIran,8,14,97,192;partitionand,61;U.S.and,331n63Iraq,8,14,65,74,197;CommunistParty,18;laborstrikes,18–19;Palestinianrefugeesand,236,

263IraqPetroleumCompany(IPC),18,78,103,129–30Ireland,PhilipW.,24,26IrgunZvaiLeumi,25,26;bombings,80,82;capabilities,68,81–82,88;characterizationof,42–

43,350n29;DeirYassinmassacreand,120–21;Jaffaand,131–36;recruitment,37–38Iriye,Akira,327n20Israel,368n10;Arab-Israelirelationsand,xiii–xxii,6,7,11,162,198–99,343n107,367n67;

TowardsaCommonArchiveand,xvi,219,371n82;Gazaand,xiii–xv,226,244–45,266–67,325n3;independence,129–31,159–79,185,188,192,194,202,206,209,253,307,320,368n6;Jessupon,188–95,290–91,318–20;Lebanonand,248–49,286;withMcGheeandPalestinianrefugees,262–66,271;MiddleEastandpowerof,291,319;oilconnectionand,xx–xxi,91–96,293–302;PGI,129–31,192,194,206,209,253,307;SovietUnionand,284;transferpolicy,xiv,20,27,43,45,61–62,64–66,118–21,184,211,236,274,332n84,340n37,367n67;UNadmission,225,230,231–32,233,243;U.S.and,xiii–xv,xviii,25,30,113,159,164–69,192,194,205,209–12,225,229,231–34,254–62,268–69,272–73,276–

79,280–87,290–92,320–22,325n3,330n47;U.S.militaryand,279,281–82,286–87,292;inU.S.strategy(1948–1949),290–92,321–22.SeealsoArab-Israeliconflict

IsraelDefenseForces(IDF),322,350n26;expansionand,226;Haganahand,37–38,42,71–72,78,81–82,88,115–36,150–51,204;Israel’sindependenceand,169–70;lootingby,353n98;NSCon,289;Sharettand,286–87;strategicobjectives,343n107;warofattrition,73;weapons,xv,287,325n3,383n46

Italy,41,142,161,210,259,313

Jaffa,Pinkertonand,131–36JCS.SeeJointChiefsofStaffJerusalem:internationalizationof,61,246,258,260,280,290,301;refugees,boundaries,and,

220–24;U.S.Consulin,226–27Jessup,Philip,xxi,80,143,167,203,280;onIsrael,188–95,290–91,318–20;Palestinian

refugeesand,311–12;transferand,184;truceand,244;U.S.policyonPalestineand,184,188–95,318–20

JewishAgency,xxi,6,19,347n50;McClintockon,311;Morrison-Gradyplanand,49;oilconnectionand,91–96,306;Palestineand,27,28;partitionand,66,77,81,87,91–93;trusteeshipand,142,149–50,152

JewishArabists,93,345n7JewishNationalHome,51–52,60,93,309Jews:AACreport(1946),43;attitudes,258,265,267;Holocaustandimmigration,27,31–40,46,

54,64,68,335n61;independenceandnamechanges,202,368n6;withNazi-likebehavior,121,226,350n29;populationimbalanceand,59,62,64–65,74,89,173.SeealsoIsrael;refugees,Jewish

Johnson,Herschel,69Johnson,Louis,212,274,282,291;onIDF,322;U.S.oilpolicyand,285–86Johnson,LyndonB.,292JointChiefsofStaff(JCS),xxii,380n1;withIsrael’splaceinU.S.strategy(1948–1949),291,321–

22;Palestinianrefugeesand,239;onpartition,275;strategicobjectivesinIsrael,282–84,287;U.S.interestsinIsraeland,276–78

Jones,Charlie,102Jones,Lewis,Jr.,234–35Jordan,266,274Jowitt,William,53Judis,John,xvii,340n37Judt,Tony,328n2JusticeDepartment,U.S.,6

Kalvarisky,Chaim,43Kapeliuk,Amnon,204Kaplan,Eliezer,28Kawukji,Fawzi,81Kennan,George,20–21,58;partitionand,79–80,88;U.S.policyonPalestineand,196–97Kerry,John,xvKhairy,Khulusy,46Khalidi,H.F.,125Khalidi,Hussein,121Khalidi,Rashid,xixKhalidi,Walid,xix,72–73,117–18;onHaifa,125;Israel’sindependenceand,171–72,173;

Palestinianrefugeesand,218Khayyat,Victor,128el-Khouri,FarisBey,138Khoury,Bechara,230–31Khoury,Rami,xivKidd,Phil,297Kirchwey,Freda,94,107,228,256,269–70Klau,JosephE.,270Kohler,Foy,26Kollek,Teddy,299–300Kopper,SamuelK.C.,80Kosloff,Jean(wife)(Ball,Jean),95,101Kosloff,Ray,xxi;Haifarefineryand,296;oilconnectionand,93,95–96,101,102,297–99Koslov,Israel,102,347n50Krug,JuliusA.,5,7–8Kurzman,Dan,354n11Kuwait,8,13,97KuwaitOilCompany,14,250Kuwatly,Shukry,125

Labelle,MauriceJr.,294labor:employment,16,18–19,129,262,331n78;strikes,16–19,104;unions,78land,368n10;boundaries,220–24,227–31,233–34,236–38,244–45,257–59,288;citrus

industryand,49,133;expansion,xv,208,269,315–16;Gaza,xiii–xv,226,244–45,266–67,325n3;“LittleTriangle,”248,270,375n19;PlanDaletand,120,133,165;population-landratio,74,134,211,288;“sevenbasicpremises,”215–19;transferpolicyand,27,43,45,211,274;trusteeshipand,141–42

LausanneConference(1949),xvii,241,243,250,253–54;Ethridgeon,252,316–17;Shlaimon,252

laws.SeelegislationLeagueforVictory(VLeague),20Leahy,William,142leaks,secretinformation,272Lebanon,11,39,128,197,206;boundariesand,230–31;Israeland,248–49,286;laborstrikes

in,17–18;Maronites,249,253,261;Palestinianrefugeesand,236,263;partitionand,74Leffler,Melvin,xviiLeggett,Frederick(Sir),41legislation:immigration,36,37;oil,299–300Lehman,Herbert,256LevantineCoast,8Levy,Walter,297Liberia,69Libya,27Lie,Trygvie,167Liff,Zalman,249Lippincott,Aubrey,Haifaand,125–31Little,Douglas,168“LittleTriangle,”248,270,375n19Litvinov,Maxim,20

Lodge,HenryC.,256Loftus,John,3–4Long,Breckinridge,33looting,353n98Louis,WilliamRoger,23–24,168Lourie,Arthur,272Lovett,RobertA.,xxi,4,63,279,320,359n2;boundariesand,220–24,227–30,234;Butler

memorandum,83–85,87;DeirYassinand,122;GreatBritain’swarningand,224–25;May12debateand,159–62,163–64;Palestinianrefugeesand,207–15,232–33,235,236–37,253,254,314;partitionand,58,69,82,88,92–93;truceand,244,245–46;trusteeshipand,138,140,144,146,147,151,155,156;U.S.policyonPalestineand,186,196

Lowenthal,Max,25,138,160–61,169

Macatee,RobertB.,xxi;partitionand,76–77;onviolence,80–82Magnes,Judah(Rabbi),43,60,145,188;AACand,45;DeirYassinand,122–23;trusteeship

and,153–55Maisky,Ivan,19–20,119Malik,Charles,138,249–50ManninghamBuller,Reginald,41MardamBey,Jamil,178Margalit,Abraham,135–36marketpercentages,7Maronites,249,253,261Marshall,GeorgeC.,xxi,22,24,120,354n11;boundariesand,220–24;Butlermemorandumand,

83,85;GreatBritain’swarningand,224;onHaifarefinery,129–30;Israel’sindependenceand,165,167,169,320;onJewishimmigration,38;May12debateand,159,160–62;Palestinianrefugeesand,201,207–16,231–33,238,312–15;partitionand,58,76;transferand,184;trusteeshipand,137,140,144–51,153–54;U.S.policyonPalestineand,185,196

Masalha,Nur-eldeen,xixmassacres.SeeDawaymamassacre;DeirYassinmassacreMassad,Joseph,xix–xxMay12debate.Seeindependence,Israel’sMcBride,David,37McClintock,RobertM.,xxi,344n21,365n13;Butlermemorandumand,83–84;CIAandPalestine,

67–78;onJewishAgency,311;May12debateand,159;Palestinianrefugeesand,216,232,238,253;partitionand,79,88;onPlanDalet,115–16;transferand,184;trusteeshipand,138,140,146–52,155;UNSCOPand,67–68;U.S.policyonPalestineand,186–88,196–97

McCloy,John,4McDonald,JamesG.,41,121,285;influence,274;Israel’sadmissiontoUNand,233;Palestinian

refugeesand,201,204–5,208,211–14,220,222–23,314–15;relieforganizationsand,223;truceand,246

McGhee,George,12,323;Egyptand,262;October1949NSCreportand,288–89;withPalestinianrefugeesandIsrael’sresponse,262–66,271;resettlementplanand,254

McKinzie,RichardD.,63,176–77,184media:DeirYassinin,350n29;Palestinianrefugeesignoredby,256;inSovietUnion,8;weapons

salesin,325n3mediators.SeeUnitedNationsMeir,Golda(Myerson,Golda),45,66,77,128–29merger,ARAMCO,14–15

Merriam,GordonP.,xxi,238,330n48,333n16;onArab-Israeliconflict,50–54;Jewishrefugeesand,32;oilpolicyand,11–15;Palestineand,24,25–28,30–31,50–54,309–10;partitionand,78,79;U.S.policyonPalestineand,183,184

Mexico,294MiddleEast:Arab-Israelirelationsand,xiii–xxii,6,7,11;Israel’spowerin,291,319;Merriamon,

11–15;postwarviewsof,16–19;primeoil-productionareasin,8,13–14;studies,xviii–xx;U.S.AirForceassessmenton,277–78,321;U.S.StateDepartmenton,308–9

MiddleEast,U.S.policyon:deferralanddevelopment,308,322–23;denial,307,311–22;discovery,307,308–11;explanationof,305–8

migration.Seerefugees,Jewishmilitary,Israeli.SeeIrgunZvaiLeumi;IsraelDefenseForces;SternGangmilitary,U.S.:AirForce,9–10,277–78,321;Army,11;Butlermemorandumand,84–86;Israel

and,279,281–82,286–87,292;JCSand,xxii,239,275–78,282–84,287,291,321–22,380n1;Navy,10,97;NSCand,xxii,25,83–84,86,239,275–92,321–22,344n21,380n1;oilinterests,xv,7–11,16,21;Palestinianrefugeesand,254;inSaudiArabia,9–15,294;SWNCC,10;trusteeshipand,142;weaponssales,325n3,383n46

militarygroups,Arabs,72–73,80,81,88,197–98Mobil,15Moore,Bob,328n4Morgenthau,Henry,34Morris,Benny,xix,xx,134,340n37;onArab-Israeliconflict,199,367n67,372n26;Dawayma

massacreand,226;Palestinianrefugeesand,202;onPlanDalet,117;transferand,65,118–20

Morris,ErnestL.,37Morrison,Robert(Lord),41Morrison-Gradyplan,31,48–50Mossadegh,Mohammed,14,15,21Mulligan,WilliamE.,331n81Munayyer,Spiro,203Murphy,Frank,69Murray,WallaceS.,24,132Muscat,14MuslimBrotherhood(IkhwanalMuslimin),71,72,171Myerson,Golda.SeeMeir,GoldaMyPromisedLand:TheTriumphandTragedyofIsrael(Shavit),368n10Najjada,72Najjar,OraybAref,39–40Nakhleh,Isa,82namechanges,withindependence,202,368n6Nashashibi,Azmi,214Nasser,GamalAbdel,172Nathan,Robert,45,99,195,300NationalLiberationLeague,17NationalPetroleumCouncil,5,7NationalPetroleumWarServiceCommittee,7NationalSecurityAgency(NSA),xiiiNationalSecurityCouncil(NSC),25,83–84,86,275,344n21;onIDF,289;Israel’splaceinU.S.

strategy(1948–1949),290–92,321–22;JCSand,xxii,239,275–78,282–84,287,291,321–

22,380n1;October1949report,287–90;policyandpurpose,prosandcons,279–82;U.SinterestsinIsrael,276–79;U.S.strategicobjectivesinIsrael,282–87

Navy,U.S.,10,97ElNazer,SalahEffendi,134Nazis,127;Holocaustand,35,36,39–40,41,46;JewswithNazi-likebehavior,121,226,

350n29;supportfor,40NearEastDivision.SeeStateDepartment,U.S.Neff,Donald,125Netherlands,61Nevel,Donna,xivNiles,David,25,40–41,50,69,94;boundariesand,228;May12debateand,159;Palestinian

refugeesand,268,272Nitze,PaulH.,4Nixon,Richard,3NokrashiPasha,139Norstad,Lauris(MajorGeneral),142NorthAfrica,9,16,62,103,150,161,290NSA.SeeNationalSecurityAgencyNSC.SeeNationalSecurityCouncilNuriPasha,14

OfficeofNearEasternandAfricanAffairs.SeeStateDepartment,U.S.OfficeofPetroleumCoordinator,4,5,6OfficeofStrategicServices(OSS),13,23offshoreoilrights,294–95OGD.SeeOilandGasDivisionoil:AIOC,14,15,21,98,250,331n63;antitrustand,6,15;ARAMCO,10,12–15,18–19,97,104,

108,110–11,294–95,297,298,328n20;Ben-Gurionand,299;CIAand,295;embargo,296;employment,18,129,331n78;expansion,8–9,14–15,18,97,328n20;GulfOilCorp.,294;Haifarefinery,78,103,129–31,295–96;KuwaitOilCompany,14,250;legislation,299–300;offshoreoilrights,294–95;OPEC,18;PAW,4–6;petroleum,4–8,12–14,18,78,103,129–30,294;primeoil-productionareas,8,13–14;privateownershipof,7,293–94;securitycosts,13;SevenSisters,293–94;Socony-VacuumOilCompany,12,98,106–7,250,294,296;SovietUnionand,19–22,73,101;StandardOilCompany,95,98,106,250,294,296;StandardOilCompanyofCalifornia,6,13,98,294,328n20;TAPLINE,97,105,250;U.S.militarywithinterestsin,xv,7–11,16,21;U.S.withworldwidecontrolof,4–5,7,10–15,98,293–94

OilandGasDivision(OGD),5–6,94oilconnection:ARAMCOand,297,298;Ball,Max,and,93–99,101–12,295–300;Bevinand,

109;Duceand,93,95,96,97–99,106,109,110,297;Elathand,93,94,96,99,101–12,297–98;Househearingsonoilandnationaldefense,96–101;Israeland,xx–xxi,91–96,293–302;JewishAgencyand,91–96,306;Kosloff,Ray,and,93,95–96,101,102,297–99;U.S.and,xx–xxi,92–96,293–302;U.S.policyonPalestineand,99–101

oilpolicy,U.S.:Arab-Israeliconflictand,xvi–xxii,6,7,11,57–58,80,85,193–94,285–86,319;corporationsinfluencing,3–9;Loftuswith,3–4;Merriamand,11–15;MiddleEast,postwar,16–19;SaudiArabiaand,3,8,9–15;SovietUnioninMiddleEast,19–22;U.S.JusticeDepartmentinfluencedby,6

Oman,8,14,98,294OPEC,18

organizations,relief.SeerelieforganizationsOSS.SeeOfficeofStrategicServicesOumanski,Konstantin,19Owen,Roger,16Oxnam,Bromley,154

Painter,David,58Palestine,xvii,3,4,300,340n37;AACreport(1946),31,40–48,309;as“anomaloussituation,”

151–55;ArabLiberationArmy,73,80;“canceroussituation”in,143–46;CIAand,67–78,88–89,197–200,202–3,205–6,312;TowardsaCommonArchiveand,xvi,219,371n82;CommunistParty,17;Gaza,xiii–xv,226,244–45,266–67,325n3;GreatBritainand,23,26,29,30–33,35,44,53–54,58,61,89,118,169,185,190,208–9,276,277–78;HarrisonReportand,35–36;Hendersonand,24–25,28–30,54;Israel’stransferpolicyand,xiv,20,64–65,118–19,121,236,332n84,367n67;JewishAgencyand,27,28;Jewishimmigrationand,27,30–33,35,37–40,64,190;laborstrikesin,16–17;May12debate,159–64;withMcClintockandCIA,67–78;Merriamand,24,25–28,30–31,50–54,309–10;MiddleEaststudiesand,xviii–xx;Morrison-Gradyplan,31,48–50;Trumanand,26,27–29,31–32,40–41,48,60,354n11;UNSCOP,31–32,58,61–62,67;U.S.StateDepartmentand,25–31;WhitePaper(1939),32–33,35,190.SeealsoArab-Israeliconflict;refugees,Palestinian

Palestine,U.S.policyon:CIAand,197–200;criticism,54;defined,181,183–88;Jessupand,184,188–95,318–20;McClintockand,186–88,196–97;oilconnectionand,99–101;Ruskand,196

PalestineArabConference,234PalestineEconomicCorporation,161PalestineRailways,16PalestinianConciliationCommittee(PCC),231,234,236,241;failureof,252,273;onJews,258;

members,243,253Palmon,Josh,76Palumbo,Michael,134Pamuk,Sevket,16Pappé,Ilan,xix,66,116,245;onIsrael’sindependenceandviolence,170–71;“LittleTriangle”

and,375n19Parker,Richard,12,330n48,333n16partition,xxi,30,50,345n7;Arabsand,59,61–62,66,68–71,74,83,89;Butlermemorandum

and,83–90;CIAon,310–11;Egyptand,74,75;toexpulsion,115–36;failureandreconsidering,79–82,93;financesand,74;GreatBritainand,81;Hendersonand,57–60,62–64,69,78–79,82,85,88–90;JCSon,275;JewishAgencyand,66,77,81,87,91–93;Lebanonand,74;Lovettand,58,69,82,88,92–93;transferpolicyand,61–62,64–66;UNGAResolution181,15,55,69–70,74–80,82,84–85,88–89,93,113,162,169,174–75,183,207,213,233,245,255,279,288,306–7,310,320,323;U.S.and,57–64,74,84–86,90,93–94,137–40,155–58,162;U.S.policyonPalestineandoilconnection,99–101;violenceand,71–78,80–82,88;Zionismand,59,70,91–96.SeealsoUnitedNationsGeneralAssemblyPartitionPlan

PAW.SeePetroleumAdministrationforWarPCC.SeePalestinianConciliationCommitteepeace.SeetrucePED.SeePetroleumDivisionPeelCommissionReport(1937),64,118,187,190,340n37PersianGulf,295

Peru,61petroleum.SeeoilPetroleumAdministrationforWar(PAW),4–6PetroleumDevelopmentLtd.,13–14PetroleumDivision(PED),4PetroleumIndustryWarCouncil(PIWC),5PGI.SeeProvisionalGovernmentofIsraelPhilips,William,41Pinkerton,Lowell:Israel’sindependenceand,171;Jaffaand,131–36;Lebanonand,230–31PIWC.SeePetroleumIndustryWarCouncilPlanDalet:Haganahand,115–36;landand,120,133,165;LippincottandHaifa,125–31;

PinkertonandJaffa,131–36;repatriationrejectedand,119,133,201–2,204,209,211,215,222,252–56,259,280;transferpolicyand,118–21;WassononDeirYassin,120–25,151

plutocracy,U.S.as,3–10,12–15,270Pogue,ForestC.,87policy,279–82.SeealsoMiddleEast,U.S.policyon;oilpolicy,U.S.;Palestine,U.S.policyon;

transferpolicy,Israelpolitics,17,18,365n13ThePoliticsofPartition(Shlaim),345n7Polk,WilliamR.,xiiipopulations:Arabmilitarygroups,73,88;ArabsinHaifa,127–28;Haganah,72;imbalance,59,

62,64–65,74,89,173;Palestinianrefugees,198,203–4,206,210,218,226,236–38,255,257,258–59,263,271,314,377n48;PlanDaletand,118;population-landratio,74,134,211,288;SternGang,72.Seealsoimmigration;transferpolicy,Israel

Porter,PaulA.,271,273Postwar:AHistoryofEuropeSince1945(Judt),328n2Potofsky,JacobS.,228power:Abdullahand,319;MiddleEastandIsrael’s,291,319;withoilworldwideunderU.S.

control,4–5,7,10–15,98,293–94;U.S.andcorporationswithshared,7–8,10,12–15,101privateownership,ofoil,7,293–94Proskauer,JosephM.,50,144–45ProvisionalGovernmentofIsrael(PGI):Haifarefineryand,129–31;Palestinianrefugeesand,

206,209,253,307;U.S.policyonPalestineand,192,194

Qatar,8,13,14,97Quandt,William,12,330n47Quwwatli,Shukri,250

Rabin,Yitzhak,199racism:anti-Semitism,33,54,63;againstArabs,121;ARAMCOand,104;withimmigrationand

Holocaust,33,54Rayner,Charles,12Raynor,Charlie,297recruitment.SeeHaganah;IrgunZvaiLeumirefinery.SeeHaifarefugees,Jewish,19,23;children,36;asDisplacedPersons,31,33,37,46,328n4,335n61;

Haganahand,37–38;withHolocaustandimmigration,27,31–40,46,54,64,68,335n61;IrgunZvaiLeumiand,37–38,42–43;migrationpatterns,335n61

refugees,Palestinian,xiii–xv,xx,xxii,12,250,340n37;Bernadotteand,202,206–19,221;

boundaries,Jerusalem,and,220–24;children,127–28,177,210–11,222;CIAand,202–3,205–6,312;Ethridgeand,257–59,261–63,266–74,280;expulsionandflight,65,75–76,115,121–22,124–26,132–33,172–73,198–99,203–4,213,226–27,229,247,255,311–16,322–23;finances,208,235,237–38,253;Haifa,125–31;Israel’sindependenceand,171,307;Jaffa,131–36;Lovettand,207–15,232–33,235,236–37,253,254,314;Marshallwith,201,207–16,231–33,238,312–15;McGheeandIsrael’sresponse,262–66,271;media’signoringof,256;origins,125,201–7;partitionand,xxi,15,30,50,55,57–66,68–96,99–101,113,115–40,155–58,162,169,174–75,183,207,213,233,255,275,279,288,306–7,310–11,320,323,345n7;populations,198,203–4,206,210,218,226,236–38,255,257,258–59,263,271,314,377n48;repatriationfor,xiv,119,133,175,201–2,204,205,209,211,215,218,221,222,236,243,245–46,252–56,259,272,276,279,280,301,307,317;resettlementplan,254;Ruskand,206–16,232,233,254,258,268,271,280,314;“sevenbasicpremises”and,215–19;transferpolicyand,64–65;UNResolution212and,235;U.S.StateDepartmentand,231–39,254–62,309;withvillagesdestroyed,xvi,65,76,81–82,117,119,120–21,125,129,131,151,173–74,218,256

RegiedeTabacs,17relieforganizations,208,223,226–27,235–36.SeealsoUnitedNationsrepatriation:rejectionof,119,133,201–2,204,209,211,215,222,252–56,259,280;UNGA

Resolution194,xiv,175,205,218,221,236,243,245–46,254–55,259,272,276,279,301,307,317

RepublicanParty,365n13resettlementplan,254Resolution181.Seepartition;UnitedNationsGeneralAssemblyPartitionPlanResolution186.SeeUnitedNationsResolution194.Seerepatriation;UnitedNationsGeneralAssemblyPartitionPlanResolution212.SeeUnitedNationsRevercomb,Chapman,37Riley,William(BrigadierGeneral),286Robinson,Jacob,91Rockwell,StuartW.,176–77,363n84Rogan,Eugene,xvRomanCatholics,261Roosevelt,Eleanor,99Roosevelt,FranklinD.,4,14;immigrationandHolocaust,32–33;JCSand,275Rosen,Pinhas,166Rosenman,SamuelI.,25,148Ross,JohnC.,155,244Rouleau,Eric,39Roumania,8RoyalDutchShellgroup,294,296Rucker,Laurent,332n84Ruffer,Gideon,101–2,347n50Rusk,Dean,63,67,279–80,359n2;Israel’sadmissiontoUNand,233;Israel’sindependence

and,166–67;May12debateand,160;Palestinianrefugeesand,206–16,232,233,254,258,268,271,280,314;partitionand,78,79,85;truceand,244;trusteeshipand,144,146–52,155–56;U.S.policyonPalestineand,196

Russia,8,35,294.SeealsoSovietUnionSabath,A.J.,256

Safwat,Ismail(General),125sales,weapons,223–24,286,325n3,383n46Sasson,Elias,189,246,345n7;Palestinianrefugeesand,265–66,273–74;PlanDaletand,119Sasson,Elihau,66,261Satterthwaite,JosephC.,234–35,244SaudiArabia,197;CIAin,13;employmentin,18–19;Palestinianrefugeesand,238;partition

and,74,75;trusteeshipand,145,147,149;U.S.militaryin,9–15,294;U.S.oilpolicyand,3,8,9–15

Savitz,Joseph,256Schmidt,DanaAdams,218secretinformation,leaks,272security,13.SeealsoNationalSecurityAgency;NationalSecurityCouncilSegal,Simon,268self-determination,51,63,215“sevenbasicpremises,”UNand,215–19SevenSisters,293–94Shaarawi,Huda,39Shahak,Israel,118,353n98Sharett,Moshe(Shertok,Moshe),45,59,102,106,189,279,283;AHCmisrepresentedby,93,

140;boundariesand,227;IDFand,286–87;Israel’sindependenceand,159–62;namechangeand,202,368n6;Palestinepolicyandoilconnection,99,100;Palestinianrefugeesand,201–3,205,207,209,214,232,247,258–59,266,272,273,280;partitionand,92–93;SovietUnionand,284;transferpolicyand,64,65,118;truceand,247,251;trusteeshipand,140–42,147–48,151–52;U.S.StateDepartmentand,225

Shavit,Ari,118,367n67,368n10Shertok,Moshe.SeeSharett,MosheShiloah,Reuven,345n7Shimoni,Yaacov,345n7Shlaim,Avi,xv,xix,72–73,198,345n7;withIsrael’sindependenceandviolence,169–70;

LausanneConference(1949),252;PlanDaletand,116–17;truceand,248;U.S.policyonPalestineand,189

Short,Dewey,95,98Shuqayri,Ahmed,46Silver,AbbaHillel(Rabbi),32,59Simon,Julius,161Singleton,John(Sir),41SixDayWar,292Snyder,JohnW.,4Socony-VacuumOilCompany,12,98,106–7,250,294,296Sophoulis,Themistoklis,22Souers,SidneyW.(Admiral),142,291SovietUnion,8,14;Arab-Israeliconflictand,19–22,193,223;Israeland,284;oiland,19–22,73,

101;partitionand,68–69;transferpolicyand,119;Turkish-SovietFriendshipTreaty(1925),21;UNGAPartitionPlanand,74

Sprinzak,Yosef,203Stabler,Wells,228–29,234,247–48StandardOilCompany,95,98,106,250,294,296StandardOilCompanyofCalifornia,6,13,98,294,328n20StateDepartment,U.S.:ARAMCOrunasreplicaof,13;changesin,24–25;GreatBritain’s

warningand,224–26;Jewishrefugees,32;onMiddleEast,308–9;NearEastDivision,23,

25–26,29,30,59,82,92;OfficeofNearEasternandAfricanAffairs,24;Palestine,25–31;Palestinianrefugeesand,231–39,254–62,309;refugees,boundaries,andJerusalem,220–24;U.S.ConsulinJerusalemand,226–27;Washington,Beirut,andTelAviv,227–31

State-War-NavyCoordinatingCommittee(SWNCC),10SternGang,43,179;capabilities,68,88,122,216;characterization,72,81–82,192;DeirYassin

massacreand,120–21Stettinius,Edward,4,26Stevenson,Adlai,99Stimson,Henry,9,99strategies:IDFobjectives,343n107;Israel’splaceinU.S.strategy(1948–1949),290–92,321–22;

U.S.objectivesinIsrael,282–87Stratton,William,37strikes,labor,16–19,104SuezCanal,80,283,284–85,301,322Sullivan,Gael,94Sweden,61SWNCC.SeeState-War-NavyCoordinatingCommitteeSwope,HerbertBagard,228Symington,W.Stuart,142Syria,11,39,65,74,105,128,236;coupin,250;Palestinianrefugeesand,250,262,263–64,

266;truceand,286

Taft,Charles,154Taft,Robert,99Tamari,Salim,236TAPLINE,97,105,250Tariki,Abdallah,18Tauriello,Anthony,256TelAviv,227–31,285Templer,Gerald(Lt.General),223–24terrorists:growthof,60;violenceandpartition,71.SeealsoIrgunZvaiLeumiTexasCo.,13,98,294Thackrey,TheodoreO.,228Thornburg,Max,12Tillman,Seth,215,317tobaccostrikes,17–18Touval,Saadia,268TowardsaCommonArchive,xvi,219,371n82transferpolicy,Israel:Ben-Gurionand,64–65,118–19,121,340n37;land,27,43,45,211,274;

Palestinewith,xiv,20,64–65,118–19,121,236,332n84,367n67;partitionand,61–62,64–66;PlanDaletand,118–21;Sharettand,64,65,118;SovietUnionand,119;supportfor,184

Transjordan,74,93,157,187,263.SeealsoAbdullahtruce:armisticewithoutpeace,243–52;boundariesand,244–45,288;Syriaand,286;trusteeship

and,137–42,146–51,159Trucialcoast,14TrucialOman,8,294Truman,HarryS.,xvii,1,11,14,317,344n28;administration,24–26,74;Israeland,113,159,

164–69,205,209–12,225,229,233,320;Jewishimmigrationand,31–32,33,37;Morrison-Gradyplanand,49–50;Palestineand,26,27–29,31–32,40–41,48,60,354n11;Palestinian

refugeesand,220,272,309;partitionand,60,84–86,90,93–94,137,140;plutocracyand,3,4,270;trusteeshipand,140,148,150,354n11;UNSCOPand,67;Weizmannand,233–34,268–69,272–73;YomKippurstatement,49–50

trusteeship:as“anomaloussituation,”151–55;Arab-Israeliconflictand,xxi,20,26,29–30,47,52–53,84,113–14,137–58;ArabLeagueand,146,148–49;with“cancerousPalestiniansituation,”143–46;divisions,155–58;“FormofGovernment,”26;GreatBritainand,26,52–53,84;immigrationand,141,147–48;JewishAgencyand,142,149–50,152;landand,141–42;truceand,137–42,146–51,159;Trumanand,140,148,150,354n11

Tsaldaris,Konstantinos(General),22Turkey,8,21–22,157,192,261Turkish-SovietFriendshipTreaty(1925),21Turner-Catledge,William,228

UN.SeeUnitedNationsunemployment,16,262UNGAPartitionPlan.SeeUnitedNationsGeneralAssemblyPartitionPlanunions,labor,78UnitedNations(UN):Butlermemorandum,87–90;Israel’sadmissionto,225,230,231–32,233,

243;mediators,174–76,206–19,221,235,243–44,286;Resolution186,221;Resolution212,235;“sevenbasicpremises”and,215–19

UnitedNationsGeneralAssembly(UNGA)PartitionPlan,38,52;Butlermemorandumand,83–90;creationof,58;partitionreconsidered,79–82,93;passageof,69–70,74–78;Resolution181onpartition,15,55,69–70,74–80,82,84–85,88–89,93,113,162,169,174–75,183,207,213,233,245,255,279,288,306–7,310,320,323;Resolution194onrepatriation,xiv,175,205,218,221,236,243,245–46,254–55,259,272,276,279,301,307,317;violations,66,85,225–26,235,255,257

UnitedNationsReliefandWorksAgency(UNRWA),226–27,236,288UnitedNationsSpecialCommitteeonPalestine(UNSCOP),31–32,58,61–62,67;U.S.and,67UnitedStates(U.S.):Butlermemorandum,87–90;FRUS,xx,84;HouseofRepresentatives,96–

101;immigrationandHolocaust,32–33,36;Iranand,331n63;Israeland,xiii–xv,xviii,25,30,113,159,164–69,192,194,205,209–12,225,229,231–34,254–62,268–69,272–73,276–79,280–87,290–92,320–22,325n3,330n47;Israel’splaceinU.S.strategy(1948–1949),290–92,321–22;JCSand,xxii,239,275–78,282–84,287,291,321–22,380n1;JusticeDepartment,6;MiddleEastpolicy,305–23;Morrison-Gradyplan,31,48–50;oilconnectionand,xx–xxi,92–96,293–302;partitionand,57–64,74,84–86,90,93–94,137–40,155–58,162;asplutocracy,3–10,12–15,270;policyandpurpose,279–82;powersharedbetweencorporationsand,7–8,10,12–15,101;strategicobjectivesinIsrael,282–87;UNGAPartitionPlanand,74,84;UNSCOPand,67;Washington,DC,227–31;withworldwidecontrolofoil,4–5,7,10–15,98,293–94.Seealsomilitary,U.S.;oilpolicy,U.S.;Palestine,U.S.policyon;StateDepartment,U.S.

UNRWA.SeeUnitedNationsReliefandWorksAgencyUNSCOP.SeeUnitedNationsSpecialCommitteeonPalestineUruguay,61U.S.Consul,inJerusalem,226–27U.S.ImmigrationAct(1924),36

Vandenberg,ArthurH.,99,224Vandenberg,HoytS.(General),278Venezuela,296,297

villages,destructionof.Seerefugees,PalestinianVinogradov,Sergei,20violations:ofboundaries,227–31,233–34,257–59;UNGAPartitionPlan,66,85,225–26,235,

255,257violence:assassinations,176–79,215–16;Ben-Gurionand,75–76,77,126;bombings,80,82,

199;Butlermemorandumand,87;childrenand,77,120–21,123,222;genocide,199,205,226;inHaifa,126–28;Israel’sindependenceand,169–74;massacres,115,120–25,129,137,151,153,204,226,252,350n26,350n29;partitionand,71–78,80–82,88

Vitalis,Robert,13VLeague.SeeLeagueforVictoryVyshinskii,Andrei,20

Wadsworth,George,68,118wages,16–19Washington,DC,227–31Wasson,ThomasC.,xxi,228,363n84;assassinationof,176–79;onDeirYassinmassacre,120–

25,151;Israel’sindependenceand,162–63,175–76;trusteeshipand,143,150–51,158Watzman,Haim,350n26weapons:embargo,256;Gazaand,325n3;IDF,xv,287,325n3,383n46;sales,223–24,286,

325n3,383n46Webb,James,264,285,315–16Wehba,Hafiz(Sheikh),149Weisgal,MeyerW.,34Weitz,Josef,65Weitz,Yosef,119Weizmann,Chaim,19–20,34,143,205,332n84;AACand,45;Palestinianrefugeesand,269,

272;partitionand,59,93–94,137,140;transferpolicyand,64,119;Trumanand,233–34,268–69,272–73;trusteeshipand,148

Welles,Sumner,99,228WestBank,248,271WhitePaper(1939),32–33,35,190Wiley,JohnC.,295Wilkins,Fraser,59,78,82,92,139;May12debateand,159;Palestinianrefugeesand,271,272Wilson,EvanM.,330n47;AACand,47–48,310;Merriamand,50–51;Palestineand,24,26,27,

28,53Wise,StephenS.(Rabbi),19,25,26,32,37Witkon,Moshe,297Wolfsohn,JoelD.,298–99women,withlaborstrikes,17–18WorldJewishCongress,25WorldWarII:economyafter,3;withJewishimmigrationandHolocaust,27,31–40,46,54,64,68,

335n61;SaudiArabiawithoilafter,3,8,9–15;U.S.asplutocracyafter,3–10,12–15,270WorldZionistOrganization,25

Yadin,Y.(General),120Yalcin,HusaynJahed,243,252,259–60Yale,William,24,26,30–31Yemen,74,161,246YomKippurstatement,49–50

Yugoslavia,61,138

Zaim,Husni,250Zeuty,E.J.,227Zionism:AAC’srejectionof,46–47;influence,249;partitionand,59,70,91–96;transferpolicy

and,65;WorldZionistOrganization,25Zochrot,xvi,219,371n82Zureik,Elia,236