Models of fishery development

The cooperative approach

Svein Jentoft

Cooperative organization has rarely The need for a collective approach to the problems of the fishing been regarded as a general remedy to management problems and ‘market fai-

industry has not been seriously disputed. What has been debated,

lures’ of the fishing industry. Instead, though, has been what form of solution would be appropriate. to what the cooperative alternative has most extent and under what circumstances. A central issue here has been the often been introduced ad hoc, in times of crises, and as a solution of last

:rdequate role of the state. When and where is government involvement

resort. Drawing on Norwegian and required? Should the state limit its actions to simply influencing the Canadian experiences for illustrative overall economic and institutional framework. or make use of more purposes, this paper discusses the specific fisheries problems to which the cooperative approach has been ap- plied. In four sections the cooperative alternative is discussed: as a vehicle for controlling distributional processes within the fishing industry; as a tool for handling problems of coordination among production and marketing units; as a way to fulfil the need for regulation of competitive actions stemming from the common property resource base; as an instrument for innovation and regional development within fishing communities. It is argued that the coop- erative approach has much broader potential than has been recognized in the past and that it deserves more serious consideration when appropri- ate means for solving management problems in the fisheries are sought.

Keywords: Fishing industry; Cooperatrve organization: Norway and Canada

time of writing this article was a Visiting Professor at the Department of Sociology

Svein Jentoft is an Associate Professor at the University of Tromso, Institute of

and Social Anthropology, Dalhousie Uni-

Fisheries, Tromso, Norwav, and at the

versity, Halifax, NS, Canada B3H lT2.

direct means, for example. through ownership, through detailed regulation of fishing activities or through subsidy programmes to specific firms or communities. and the like.’

Even though there seems to be a common understanding that state involvement is necessary in some way or other, most observers would say that, so far, state involvement has had little success. Many would even say that state intervention has been a complete failure. In spite of the government’s well intended measures, resource depletion has not been effectively :rvoided. idle capacity in both harvesting and processing is ;L fact, and uneven regional development has created unemployment and despair in many fishing communities.

I argue that this is, in fact, a fairly accurate portrait of the Norwegian x well as the Canadian fishery. In both countries government fisheries policy has been criticized for ineffectiveness. unfairness and insensitivity in its efforts to resolve the crisis in which fishing communities are captured. The wny programmes for regulation of the fishery have been introduced serves ;IS a reveirling C;IS(: in point. Instead of accomplishing the primary goal of lowering the catch level :md fishing capacity, the lot of fishermen h;rs been made unnecessarily and unequally more difficult without any significant progress toward the stated goal.’

:rrc many who favour less regulati;~n by government and more by the market. For instnnce. in Norway there has been a debate about whether

the state should actively seek to reduce over-capacity in the processing sector, and yet hurt local communities ;IS little as possible. The former labour government launched such ;I plan, with the intention of

Even if the free market has few spokesmen within the fisheries.’ there

322 0308-597X/85/040322-10$03.00 0 1985 Butterworth & Co (Publishers) Ltd

This paper was originally presented at a seminar at the Institute of Social Research, Memorial University of Newfoundland, St John’s, in February 1985. We are grateful to Richard Apostle, Michael Clout and Victor Pittman for constructive comments on the manuscript.

‘In Canada these questions are raised in a government discussion paper: ‘Policy for Canada’s Atlantic Fisheries in the 1980’s’, Minister of Supply and Services, Ottawa, 1981. In Norway they are discussed by various authors in Bjerrn Hersoug, ed, Kan fiskerinaeringa styres? Novus Forlag, Oslo, 1983. ‘Canadian references are here Richard Apostle, Leonard Kasdan and Arthur Han- son, ‘Political efficacy and political activity amonq fishermen in Southwest Nova Sco- tia,’ J&ma/ of Canadian Studies, Vol 19, No 1. 1984. Peter Sinclair, ‘Fishermen divided: the impact of limited entry licens- ing in Northwest Newfoundland,‘- Human Oraanization. Vol 42. No 4. 1983. Norwe- gi& ones a& Knut H. Mikalsen, ‘Lovgivn- ing og offentlig styring,’ in Bj0rn Hersoug, ed, Kan fiskerinaeringa styres? Novus Forlag, Oslo, 1983. Knut H. Mikalsen, Ends and Means in Public Policy: The Case of Limited Entry in the Fisheries, Mimeo, Institute of Fisheries, University of Tromser, 1984. Aslak Kristiansen, ‘Gar det en nemesis giennom historien? Om reg- uleringer i &ket’. Mimeo, Institute of Fisheries. Universitv of Tromso. 1984. 3The Kirby Commission, in its report ‘Navi- gating Troubled Waters: A New Policy for the Atlantic Fisheries’, Department of Fisheries and Oceans, Ottawa, 1983, states that: ‘Nor could the Task Force accept the school of thought that suggests that the industry should be able to operate in a completely unfettered free market environment - for the result would be economic and social chaos,’ p 9. 4Fiskerideparimentet (Ministry of Fisher- ies), Oslo, ‘Om retningslinjer for fiskeripoli- tikken,’ Storingsmelding, No 93, 1982-83.

Models of fishery developmrw~

generating a political process within municipalities whereby they could obtain a local consensus on which specific plants should be given priority

for government subsidies and which should be closed. The conservative government, which took office in 1981, opposed the idea of government ‘death sentences’ and set this plan aside.

This is, of course, not an absence of government action; it merely transfers decision making to the market. and accepts the social and political results of the market’s verdict on the viability of particular plants and communities. While the market will ultimately be able to get rid of overcapacity within the industry, it will be strictly pure luck if the industrial structure which results from a process of plant bankruptcies and shut-downs will be the one the government would have preferred.

Even if a reduction in capacity is needed, this is not necessarily a reasonable solution in every fishing community. What’s more, even though resourdes are scarce, a debate on how fishing communities could be developed is still relevant in both Norway and Canada. In the latter case the government seems to have been more active when it comes to resettlement. Officially. at least the Norwegian government says it will maintain the population in the fishing communities, even if the last government white paper - the equivalent to the Canadian Kirby report - states that this can no longer be a matter of propping up the fishing industry.’

A crucial problem with fishery development is its distributional effects. For instance, development in the offshore fishery will inevitably affect the inshore sector, and vice versa. In Norway there is always a geographical dimension to consider. Development in the north - at least in certain fisheries - will compete with the south. Every development process which has a zero-sum element is, naturally, politically compli- cated. Obviously, this is also the reason why the Norwegian right-wing government preferred the ‘neutral’ market instead of the plan they inherited from the former labour government.

Thus, if one accepts the need for collective solutions to the crisis in the fishing industry but, at the same time, admits the limitations of state involvement, what alternatives are there? Is there a middle course; a strategy which is neither ‘plan nor market’ but something in between? I will argue in this paper that there is. This alternative could be called the organizational or cooyerafive approach. It has been proposed and tried in the past, as well as during the current crisis, but all too seldom been seriously considered as a general solution.

Just as the market mechanism has been regarded as a universal norm and remedy, so also has cooperative organization:

cooperative organization has been seen as a way to secure a more equal and fair distribution of income within the fishing industry; cooperative organization has been considered appropriate for obtaining better coordination between interdependent actors, for example, in harvesting and processing; cooperative organization has been suggested as a tool for handling the current need for regulation stemming from the common property resource base; and it has been argued that cooperative entrepreneurship and innovu-

tion is necessary to generate development in marginal fishing communities.

MARINE POLICY October 1985 323

‘Affecting Income distribution was a cen- tral reason for introducing the Raw Fish Act. Another purpose was - by setting minimum prices on the raw fish - to force processors and exporters to obtain from the market the best prices possible. That means the act was also a device for creating higher profitability In the fishing industry as a whole. Abraham Hallen- stvedt, Med lov og organisasjon: Orga- nisering av interesser og markeder i norsk fiskerinaering, Universitetsforlaget, Trom- so, 1982. “The processors, however, claim that changes must be made in the procedures which take place before the fishermen’s sales organization set the prices. Instead of consultations, they want negotiations. ‘Cf especially Ottar Brox, Newfound/and Fishermen in the Age of Industry: The Sociology of Economic Dualism, ISER, Memorial University, St John’s, 1972. ‘Arthur J. Hanson and Cynthia Lamson, ‘Fisheries Decision Making in Atlantic Canada,’ in C. Lamson and A. Hanson, eds, Atlantic Fisheries and Coastal Com- munities: Fisheries Decision-Making Case Studies, Dalhousie Ocean Studies Prog- ramme, Halifax, 1984. ‘According to Wallace Clement, ‘Canada’s fisheries: formation of unions, coopera- ttves, and associations,’ Journal of Cana- dian Studies, Vol 19, No 1, 1984, in Canada some organizations represent crewmen, boat-owners and fish-plant workers, some only one or two of these groups. In some instances, workers out- side the fishing industry are included. Other organizations represent fishermen who specialize In a certain type of gear. Most of these organizations have mem- hers concentrated in a specific area or province. In Nprway, the fishermen’s asso- ciation is a nationwide organization which includes fishermen and boat-owners (not fish-plant workers), but there are now many suborganizations of fishermen which have membership status in the national association. Thus, almost every Norwe- gian fisherman is a member of the associa- tion. Therefore, the organization is ex- tremely complex, and includes groups of fishermen with, to a large extent, conflict- ing interests. According to many obser- vers, this leads to too many internal com- promises and too much moderation in its external policy. However, because of its broad representation, the national associa- tion has obtained a central role in the industry as a whole, something which the fish-processors’ organization has never accomplished. For instance, it is the fisher- mens’ association which, on behalf of the entire fishing industry, annually negotiates government subsidies. The processors’ organization does not participate here. In Canada, the case seems to be the reverse. According to R.D.S. MacDonald ‘Canadian fisheries policy and the development of Atlantic Coast ground fisheries manage-

continued on page 325

The problem of distribution

To improve their bargaining position, fishermen have few other options than to organize. In :I market system based on individual transactions with fish buyers, fishermen are bound to lose. An easily perishable product cannot be withheld in anticipation of better prices. The fisherman has to make :I living and must sell to the local fish buyer :lt whatever price he can get and can thus find himself caught in ;I vicious circle. To compensnte for income loss when prices deteriorate, he has to increase his fishing efforts which, naturally, brings ;I further downward pressure on prices.

This W;IS the situiltion in Norwegian fishing communities early in this century before ;I nation-wide association of fishermen was set up in 1926 and bcforc the Raw Fish Act W;IS enacted in 1038. This law gives the fishermen’s cooperative salts organizations the authority to fix mini- mum prices. which fish buyers halve to :iccept if they want to stay in business. Processors are not allowed to purchase fish from outside these organizations and the organizations can also decide if a plnnt will bc given permission to :rct as buyer or not.i

In Norway, the principle that, by I:rw, fishermen have the Lmthority to

detcrminc fish prices is generally accepted today. Even the fish processors ’ association has given up fighting it.” This arrangement is unique; to the best of my knowledge it is not found in any other country. Howcvcr, I know that Norwegian sociologists have advocated a similar system for Canada after they did field-work in Newfoundland in the late 1’960s.’ Much has happened in the Canadian fishery since then. and Canadian fishermen are becoming increasingly organized. But still, ;IS Iianson and Lams& observe. ‘Atlantic fishermen (in Canada) have never found ;i “collective voice” nor have they successfully mobilized their potentially powerful political will to serve their collective interests’. Thus. Canadian fishermen seem more divided and the organizational structure more fragmented than in the Norwegian CLISC.

0

The fact that fishermen in Canada :trc frequently on strike. something which never happens in Norway, is an indication of their relative power. I” I find it hard to believe. though. that Norwegian fishermen would have been granted their privileges if the question were to be settled today. The Raw Fish Act was created at a time when fishermen were many and job alternatives were few. This ma& the law an issue of broad national concern. In 193X Norwegian fishermen were also much better organized than their processor counterparts. And. of course, it should not be forgotten that the law was introduced when the labour party was at its most radical and in government.

Organizing l~ori~nnfall~ is not the only way that fishermen can affect

the income distribution and increase their power. The same can be obtained by organizing vertically, ic by establishing producer coopera- tives. However. fishermen’s cooperatives have never played any significant role in fish processing in Norway. An obvious reason is that by organizing horizontally under the protection of the Raw Fish Act, many of the fishermen’s problems were taken care of. Producers’ cooperatives became most widespread in the northernmost county in Norway (Finnmark), and were, to ;I large extent, a way of rebuilding the industry after the Germans had literally burned the country down when they were retreating from the Russians in the closing days of the second

MARINE POLICY October 1985

world war. In many fishing communities there were no alternatives but to establish fish processing cooperatives.

Since then, and especially during the 1960s the producers’ coopera- tives have experienced a series of bankruptcies so that today there are few survivors. This process has been fairly well studied by Norwegian sociologists who have concluded that whatever caused their failures, it was not primarily their organizational form.” They went out of business in periods of export recession which affected both cooperatives and private fish buyers, and private fish buyers went bankrupt in large numbers as well. Even though some of the Norwegian fishing cooperatives which are left are outstanding in their economic and social performance, there are few within the industry today who enthusiasti- cally promote this alternative as a means of solving distributional problems, not even fishermen’s organizations. However, there is an interesting exception which should be mentioned.

By law, Norwegian fishermen are given the exclusive right to own

boats. When fresh-fish trawlers were introduced in the lYSOs, the processors were lobbying the government to change the law so that they could acquire such vessels. They succeeded despite the wishes of the Norwegian Fishermen’s Association which favoured that trawlers should be owned by special fishermen’s cooperatives. However, the big trawlers became processor-owned, directly or indirectly through share- holder companies, and this remains the situation today. But from time

continued from page 324 to time, the fishermen’s organizations have suggested the cooperative merit,’ in C. Lamson and A. Hanson, eds, Atlantic Fisheries and Coastal Communi-

alternative, the last time being in 1983 in the report of a task force

ties: Fisheries Decision-Making Case Stu- committee which had been set up by the government to examine ways of

dies, Dalhousie Ocean Studies Program, levelling out the fish supplies in order to create more stability in the Halifax, 1984, p 30, 'PrOCeSSOrS have processing industry." been better organized, more articulate and

The idea was to loosen the tight bonds between

more aware of how to influence the politic- the trawlers and specific companies and establish instead some form of

al and bureaucratic levels of government with respect to positive fisheries policies

cooperative ownership on a regional basis to give every community a

than their fishermen counterparts who fair share of the trawler catches.

have been divided on national or Atlantic- For obvious reasons the proposal has never been seriously debated

wide scales’. within the industry or within government. It is a real zero-sum question, “‘According to Ottar Brox, op tit, Ref 7, Newfoundland fishermen in the late 1960s

where the concept is to take away an important privilege from the most

obtained the lowest fish prices among the powerful units within the industry and divide the benefits to the many.

North Atlantic, which he explained by their poor organization. Peter Sinclair states that: ‘While it is valid to claim that condi- The problem of coordination tions have improved, it is important to recognize that the best organized fisher- Whatever the organizational form, the fishing industry will still be a men; those of Newfoundland, have failed

i

to raise the price of fish to a level close to system of integral parts and interdependent activities which need some

the European prices and that their incomes form of coordination. Even if it can be argued that much would be

are, on the average, still abysmally low: gained if fishermen were more independent in relation to the fish Peter Sinclair, Off Course: ‘Navigating processors, Troubled Waters’ in the Newfoundland

it is easy to see that a market-like system based on

Context. Deoartment of Socioloav Memo- transactions between totally autonomous decision-making units would

rial Universiiv, St John’s, 1984, F25. have negative effects. For instance. it would introduce an element of “Cf Per Otnes, Fiskarsamvirk& i Finn- mark, lnstituttt for sosiologi, Universitetet i

uncertainty into their relations. The fact that each unit’s profitability is

Oslo, 1980, which has an English sum- dependent on what other actors in the fishery system do, will give

mary. ‘*Cf NOU (Norwegian Public Reports),

reason for second thoughts, especially in investment situations.

Rastoffutjevning i fiskeindustrien, Chair- Organization theory tells us that under such circumstances, investors

man: Arild Nylund, 1982, p 5. will try to bring their environment under control, by integrating %f James D. Thompson, Organizations vertically. ” in Action, McGraw Hill, New York, 1967.

The empirical evidence is easily at hand in the fishing

Olliver E. Williamson, Markets and Hierar- industry, both in Canada and in Norway. It is not the profits from

chies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications, harvesting alone which have induced processors to invest in fishing

The Free Press, New York, 1975. vessels, but profits from harvesting and processing combined in a joint

MARINE POLICY October 1985

enterprise. A lack of control over harvesting operations brings uncertainty and instability which is not compatible with efficient and well planned industrial production. It is not only ii question of securing enough fish, but also of getting it wgularl~ and in a certain L~IIuII’I~. As stated by the Kirby commission:

Large daily zwing\ in production, which typically occur at the peak of the

inshore se;~son or when trawler arrivals are not synchronized. impede

productivity by interrupting the rhythm of work :md by making production

scheduling much more difficult. If workers arc c:dled in anticipation of ;I large

volume th:tt doesn’t materialize. paid hour\ will inevitably be wasted.”

Thus, there is more at stake than equalizing supply and demnnd, it is also ;I question of matching interrelated activities and work tasks.

Nevertheless, vertical integration in the trawler fishery has been ;I

disappointment from many points of view. Directing fishing activities from :ishore has its obvious limitations, as Raoul Anderscn has documcntcd in the Newfoundland c;~se.‘~ In Norway, labour recruit- ment and high turnover have been a problem. Norwegian trawlers have never been able to cover their own costs. To keep afloat they have needed support from other facets of processors’ operations ;ls well ;IS government subsidies. Finirlly. fish resources were not as abundant as

had been expected when the trawlers were introduced. In rcccnt times trawler quotas have been much more restricted than those for other vessels. which has resulted in a substantial reduction in their numbers. I”

140p tit, Ref 3. ‘%f Raoul Andersen, ‘Hunt and deceive:

As nn organizational principle. vcrtic;ll integration is not necessarily

information management in Newfoundland outdatecf within the fisheries. cvcn if its record is not the very best. Not

deep-sea trawler fishing,’ in R. Andersen :lII of the Norwegian trllwlers’ difficulties are caused by their close and C. Wadel, eds, North Atlantic Fisher- men, ISER, Memorial University, St

connection to fish processors. What can be claimed. however, is that the

John’s, 1972. The following statement is degree of formalization and hierarchical control has sometimes been

often referred to: ‘Decisions in fishing are pushed too far. Furthermore, vertical integration in the trawler fishery rarely taken on the basis of detailed, predetermined, or programmed, informa-

has always been ‘backward’ - from processing to harvesting and not vice

tion. Moreover, because fishing requires versa. This has meant ;I prolctarization which fishermen have resisted.”

highly specific information which is con- As mentioned. producers’ cooperatives have never played ;I signifi- stantly changing and only obtainable at the actual fishing grounds, and because of the

cant role in the Norwe@rn processing industry. Only in one case, to the

necessity to take quick decisions on the best of my knowlcdgc. h:ts ;I cooperative shared ownership of fresh-fish

basis of this information, fishing cannot be trawlers. Nevertheless, producers’ cooper:Itives represent an alternative directed from ashore: Raoul Andersen and Cato Wadel, eds, North Atlantic Fisher-

solution to coordination problems within the fishery system. While

men, ISER, Memorial University, St horizontal organization of fishermen under the Raw Fish Act was an

John’s, 1972, p 154. 16The quota per fresh fish trawler in 1978

~rlternative to vertical integration as far as distributional problems ;tre

was 1 750 tons, in 1982, 631 tons. A few conccrncd, it has not proved to bc an :rlternative adequate to handle

years ago there were around 85 such problems of coordination. In spite of the Raw Fish Act. there arc still

trawlers, today the number is close to 50 transactional costs to bc saved by vertical integration. In the Norwegian (cf Bjorn Brochmann and 0ystein Josef- sen, Fiskerinaeringen, Tiden Norsk Forlag,

case, this would hc the argument for more cooperative organization

1984. within the fishing industry, but not so much ;IS for income distribution

17Cf Bonnie J. McCay, ‘Appropriate Tech- which to a large extent is already taken care of by the Raw Fish Act. no/ogy’ and Coastal Fishermen of New- found/and, PhD Thesis, Columbia Uni-

What should not bc underestimated, however, is that vertic;d

versity, 1976, p 94; Brox, op tit, Ref 7. integration in the fisheries means sOme ciilemmas. which will not

Vertical integration is more advanced in disappear whether the linkages are backward or forward. Directing Canada than Norway. The Kirby Commis- sion reports that there were around 40000

fishing activities from ashore has. 21s mentioned, its own limitations. But

active fishermen in the Atlantic provinces the same can also be said about directing processing from afloat.

in Canada in 1981. According to MacDo- Fishing. fish processing and marketing :lrc activities of a qualitatively nald, op tit, Ref 9, 2250 of them were crewmen on company-owned trawlers. In

dissimilar nature. which require different kinds of occupational exper-

Norway 700 out of 30000 fishermen are tise and training. This is particularly true in a modern industry with

crewmen on company-owned vessels. sophisticated technology and org:mizational units exploiting economies

326 MARINE POLICY October 1985

Models of fishery developmenr

of scale. It is not only a Norwegian experience that fishing cooperatives often have severe management problems which, in some instances, have caused their failure. For instance, fishermen tend to forget their status as processors and neglect their responsibility as employers.

Fish plant workers who are members of producers cooperatives are rare in Norway as well as Canada. So, also, are worker processing cooperatives. However, it is hard to envisage how cooperative solutions to coordination problems could be successful in the future without taking into account the interests of fish plant workers more directly than

has been the case in the past.

‘%f Garret Hardin, ‘The tragedy of the commons,’ Science, Vol 162, 1968. 19Cf Raoul Andersen, ‘Public and private access management in Newfoundland fishing,’ in R. Andersen, ed, North Atlantic Maritime Communities: Anthropological Essays on Changing Adaptions, The-Ha- aue. Mouton Publishers, 1979: Raoul Andersen, and Geoffrey Stiles, ‘Resource management and spatial competition in Newfoundland fishing. An exploratory essay,’ in Peter H. Fricke, ed, Seafarer and Community, Croom-Helm, 1973; McCay, op tit, Ref 16; Anthony Davis, ‘You’re Your own Boss’: An Economic Anthropology of Small Boat Fishing in Port Lameron Harbour, Southwest Nova Sco- tia. PhD thesis, Department of Anthropolo- gy, University of Toronto, 1984. Unfortu- nately, this phenomenon has not yet been examined very well by Norwegian resear- chers. Cf though, Kristiansen, op cit. Ref 20. *OMarchak pessimistically thinks that com- munities therefore have ‘lost their collec- tive capacity to regulate the fisheries for their own common good by locally-based fishermen’: Patricia Marchak, ‘Introduc- tion,’ Journal of Canadian Studies, Vol 19, No 1, 1984.

The problems of regulation

The need to avoid the consequences of what is generally described as the ‘tragedy of the commons ’ lx is at present considered to be more serious and urgent by political authorities than those we have discussed above. The argument is that since the fish stocks are common property. free access is resulting in overfishing and eventual resource depletion. Therefore, there must be barriers against newcomers and strict rules on how fishing operations are carried out. This is normally regarded as a government responsibility.

Today few issues are more debated and disputed among fishermen on both sides of the Atlantic than government regulations. In Norway and Canada fishermen have been vociferous and adamant in their opposi- tion. Their actions have been drastic and have sometimes resulted in legal prosecution by the state. Because of the advisory status of the Norwegian fishermen’s association in the decision-making process, fishermen’s frustrations have frequently been directed against their own organization.

As indicated in the introduction, there has also been a political and academic debate over the role of the state in fishery regulations and the most appropriate methods of capacity reduction and monitoring the fisheries. At present, the market mechanism has many supporters who argue in favour of transferable quotas and licences combined with strict government regulations on newcomer access. In Canada the Kirby commission is a firm proponent of this principle. Those Norwegians who advocate such regulations frequently refer to Canadian discussions, but they have not yet been able to convince the government.

There are many ethnographic studies, particularly in Atlantic Canada, which show how fishermen, through informal arrangements, are locally regulating their fishery. They control access to fishing grounds and monitor each other’s behaviour at sea.“’ Thus, the fishery does not always resemble a game like Hobbesian anarchy as presumed when Common Property Theory is applied.

The increasing capitalization of the fishery has tended to undermine such informal norms and restrictions, and intensified competition between boats and groups of fishermen.*” The logic is, then, that when fishermen try to increase their share of the common resource base, overfishing becomes a growing problem.

Instead of formally institutionalizing informal, fishermen-initiated regulations, the state has chosen direct day-to-day regulatory action. Collective action has been regarded as synonymous with government action. The option of mutually committed and cooperatively organized

MARINE POLICY October 1985 327

“The Kirby Commission states that: ‘The idea of “co-management” has not been developed in detail by those who advocate it and appears for the moment to be more of a catch-phrase than a well thought out proposal of substance. The idea is never- theless intriguing if it means that fisher- men’s organizations might take more re- sponsibility for the development of and follow through on policies in the harvesting sector’: op tit, Ref 3, p 34. 22John F. Kearney, ‘The transformation of the Bay of Fundy herring fisheries 197& 1978: an experiment in fishermen- government co-management,’ in C. Lam- son and A. Hanson, eds, Aflanfic fisheries and Coastal Communities: Fisheries Decision-Making Case Studies, Dalhousie Ocean Studies Programme, Halifax, 1984. 23Fiskeridepartementet (Ministry of Fisher- ies), Oslo, ‘Lagtidsplan for fiskerinaering- en,’ Stortingsmelding, No 18, 1977-78. 241n Norway boats in the herring fishery, even the biggest and most modern purse- seiner, are fishermen-owned. 25As the Kirby Commission observes, negative aggregate effects due to insuffi- cient communication and coordination can also arise in the final markets: ‘with inde- pendent firms making product-mix deci- sions and with the absence of a co- ordinated planning process, it is impossi- ble for Canadian firms to anticipate and plan for the optimum product mix. The time lag between the production decisions and

fishermen handling their own regulations has not hccn generally recognized as a management strategy.

In Norway this appears extraordinary in my opinion. The most important cod fishery. the Lofoten fishery (which takes place from early January until late April and which always has been small-scale fishermen’s main income source), has been regulated by the fishermen themselves for decades. ever since the Lofotcn Act was introduced in the IWOs. Before every season, the fishermen elect their representatives to the committees responsible for updating the regulations and for policing their enforcement. This has been so successful that there has not been even a suggestion that the state should take over this role.

I find it noteworthy that cooperative forms of regulations have apparently been more discussed in Canada than in Norway. even if the Kirby Commission was unwilling to give them much consideration.” John Kearney” demonstrates how fishermen’s co-manngement has been practised in the herring fishery on the Bay of Fundy west of Nova

Scotia. The fact that the arrangement collapsed after ;I few years seems not to have made him doubt its appropriateness as a tool for fisheries management. However. Kearncy stresses the need for government involvement, which probably is an important point. It is certainly true that without the support of the Lofoten Act, fishermen’s systems of

regulation could not have worked in the Norwegian cast. The tendency inherent in the fishing industry to create excess capacity

is not only evident in the harvesting sector, but in tho processing sector as well. A government task force on Norwegian fisheries in the mid- 1970s reported that. on average. not more than half of the processing capacity was utilized, a fact which brought many plants to the edge of bankruptcy.‘” Small-scale fishermen are not to blame for this. In Norwegian waters, as elsewhere, resource depletion is mainly ;I result of overintensive company-trawler fishing. At least, this is true in the cod fishcry.‘4 Investment in trawlers has been part of a combined strategy of expansion of fishery enterprises including growth in processing capacity.

There are many factors promoting such developments. Norwegian tax rules arc one, but some of the results can be traced back to ;I communication problem between individual cntrcpreneurs. Each cn- treprencur tends to think of himself as the only one with investment plans. And if he does not, he suspects his neighbouring competitor of

having similar plans and hc, therefore, cannot afford to wait. Thus. basically the relation between fish processors is the same as that

anticipated among fishermen in *the tragedy of the commons’

sccnario.‘5 Therefore. less secrecy and more cooperation between processors in

the planning process could be ;I preemptive move against cxccss capacity. This must be :I better solution than periodically being forced to ‘build down’ the capacity which has developed, or the other alternative of having government decide in every specific case who should be allowed to invest. how much, where. and when. Such :I step. though, would require some organizational measures to bring the processors together. So far, little has been accomplished in the Norwegian case.

the resulting product arriving on the market - which can vary from six weeks to six

The problem of innovation months - can result in over or under- supplying of particular product forms: Kirby

Fishing cooperatives in Norway. as well as in Canada, have first and

Commission, op tit, Ref 3, p 147. foremost been organized for the purpose of processing or marketing,

MARINE POLICY October 1985

Models oJ Jishery developmem

rather than for harvesting. The sea-going operations have been conducted individually by privately-owned boats. Producers’ coopera-

tives have been joint processing and marketing ventures by fishermen. Cooperation through pooling of resources, however, is a common strategy for getting into fishing. Fishermen, often related to each other, are able to buy their own boat by sharing the investment costs and by hiring other crewmen who bring their own fishing gear.

Even if, in some cases, the standard cooperative model is found unsuitable for organizing development projects in fishing communities, pooling of resources is often essential.

Individual local people may have insufficient resources to realize mutual benefit projects but collectively they could, if some basic cooperative organization were in place. Therefore, the first phase of a development process often has to be an organizational one.

Cooperative entrepreneurship is sometimes required for reasons other than scarcity of resources; in some cases the reason is to be found in the projects themselves. The argument goes as follows.

Some innovations have taken very little time to become general and widespread within the fishing industry. Fishermen, for instance, have never waited long before they have adopted new fishing equipment, electronic devices and the like. The same is true of processors, who quickly start to make use of new processing machinery if they see that they can afford it. Typical of these innovations is that it is clear at the outset who is responsible for the investment and who will be the primary benefactor.

For some innovations, however, it is not always clear. For instance, in the case of a new product of better quality, several actors must become involved at the same time. Such an innovation will not only require new processing methods, but also new methods of fishing. (For example, fishermen may have to switch from nets to long-lines.) This cannot be realized without a coordinated effort by both fishermen and fish processors. Certain investments might also be needed. Bait sheds may have to be built and freezing facilities may also have to be provided. The crucial question is who is responsible for this; the fishermen or the fish processor? In many Norwegian fishing communities people could not agree and no development process took place in spite of the availability of generous subsidies from the government.

This problem is due to confusion not only about responsibility or cost sharing, but also about the benefits. New baiting facilities would be of mutual benefit, whoever contributes to their establishment. ‘So why, then, should I take on the economic burden?’ In other words, some innovations which could trigger a development process in the commun- ity have the character of a collective good which, once it is provided, will be profitable for many. Game theory argues that when no one has the responsibility but everyone will benefit, there will be no initiative and

“This is the so-called ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ no innovation unless: it can be arranged cooperatively; free riders are

which is treated in every introduction to discouraged; and an outsider takes the lead.‘” Economists would

aame theorv (cf. for examole. Morton D. describe this as a ‘market failure’ examole. Davis, Game ‘Theory: A Nk&chnica/ In- troducfion, Basic Books, New York, 1973.

I do not think it is coincidental that in Norway it was a fishing

A similar argument based on this model is cooperative which first established so-called baiting centres. These

found in Mancur Olson, The Logic of baiting centres are new and more industrialized forms of baiting where Collective Action, Harvard University

Y

Press, 1965. The ‘tragedy of the com- the processing plant takes over some of the responsibilities which have

mons’ is basically also a prisoner’s dilem- traditionally been fishermen’s, for instance, the recruitment of baiters.

ma. The cooperative’s purpose was to encourage member fishermen to start

MARINE POLICY October 1985 329

long-lining. The same cooperative also started the pond storing of pollock, which later became a widespread device to avoid seasonal slack in the processing industry. In this community, because of the coopera- tive. there was never any doubt who was responsible for these projects, and who would benefit from them. Another factor was that the leader of the cooperative was a natural initiator and administrator.

Lack of cooperative organization means that no leadership role is institutionalized in the local fishery when collective entrepreneurship is needed. No one has the authority or responsibility to act on behalf of all members of the local industry when innovations and development projects require it. In Norwegian communities with no producers’ cooperative, fishermen and fish processors had to go through an organization process before they could qualify for government subsidies which were introduced to promote the baiting centres. In many communities this process could not have taken place without assistance from the local fisheries adviser and municipal authorities.

The fisheries advisory service which the Norwegian government established at the beginning of the 1970s has contributed substantially to filling the leadership vacuum in the organizational structure of local fishing communities. One of the fishery adviser’s major tasks is to act as development project initiator and mediator among fishermen and fish processors. As a member of the municipal bureacracy he has also become a link between the municipal government and the fishing industry which, before lY70, was almost totally absent in most communities. This has resulted in some of the most interesting changes which have taken place in the Norwegian fishing industry in recent years.

Even if the establishment of new fishing cooperatives in the traditional sense has become a rarity in Norwegian fisheries during the lY7Os and lY8Os, many new forms of organizations based on cooperative principles have been created, especially at the local level and in connection with development projects. What is new is the involvement of the municipalities in the formative process. acting both as a sponsor and as a responsible participant. There are many examples of municipal authorities joining together with local fishermen and fish processors, often through a local development organization, to initiate boat- building programmes, fish-collecting stations, fish-farming plants, pro- duct development, marketing programmes, baiting centrcs, and the like. Sometimes the municipality has the majority vote but in other instances no one interest group has the power to make decisions alone. Frequently, the fishery adviser is the central figure in the organization process and is often Chairman of the Board of Representatives in the development organization.

To a large extent, the involvement of the municipalities has been a local, spontaneous reaction to a crisis within the fishing industry: it has not been a part of an overall government plan. Reading government white papers from the 1970s and 1YXOs gives no indication that this development was intended. Here. the municipality as an actor in the fisheries is not discussed or even noticed.

No doubt. the fishery advisory service, largely financed by the state,” has been an important contributory factor. The fishery advisers,

“71n the first years, the financial responsi- bility was shared by the state, the county

however, were. at the outset, introduced primarily in order to assist

and the municipality on a 5&25-25 basis. individual fishermen and fish processors, not municipal authorities. The

Today the state has the sole responsibility. advisers’ efforts to make municipal authorities more committed to the

330 MARINE POLICY October 1985

problems of the fishing industry are often based on their own role definitions and initiatives. Nevertheless, an organizational process has been generated whereby municipalities are becoming increasingly involved in the fishing industry. This is a new development on the Norwegian scene and there is no reason to believe that municipalities will not expand their role even further.

Conclusion

This paper has focused on the cooperative approach to collective problems of the fishing industry. These problems are related to distributional conflicts, coordination of interrelated functions, regula- tion of competitive actions, and processes of entrepreneurship and innovation. They are collective in nature not only because they affect many actors simultaneously, but also because they influence patterns of social interaction themselves. Here I have emphasized that the cooperative solution is a model in its own right, distinctly different from direct state control or market mechanisms.

What should be pointed out in this final section is the universal application of the cooperative model. As demonstrated in this paper, cooperative organizations can be established for many purposes. But quite as important is the fact that such organizations can be applied to the handling of many tasks at the xwne time. Cooperatives can be multipurpose as well as unipurpose organizations. For example,

28Cooperatives regulating fishing activities organizations created for the purpose of negotiating fish prices and the

and access to the fisheries are described like can also be suitable instruments for implementing regulation and/or

by Bonnie J. McCay, ‘A fishermen’s coop- for initiating development projects. There are also many reasons why erative limited: indigenous resource man- agement in a complex society,’ Anthropo-

cooperative organizations should be multipurpose. It can be argued that

logical Quarterly, Vol 53, No 1, 1980; Eyolf problems of regulation have to be settled before questions of local

Jul-Larsen, The Lake is our Shamba: development are discussed and that these issues are more effectively Report to Norad About &fain SOCiO- treated within one institution than bv several. Economic Aspects Regarding the Lake Turkana-Project, Working Paper, AZ44, In the fishing industry, multipurpose cooperatives are more often the

Chr. Michelsens Institutt, Beroen, 1981. rule than the exception. They may be established by fishermen in order 29Peter Sinclair criticizes the-Kirby Corn--Ï mission for not considering the cooperative

to free themselves from an exploitative relationship with a private fish

alternative: ’ it is disconcerting that the buyer but, once established, the cooperative will play the role of

major investigation of the Atlantic industry, coordinator between harvesting and processing activities. In situations which was implicity accepted as the basis of future state policy, so completely neg-

similar to the Norwegian, where the cooperative already represents the

lected this more radical strategy, even as a individuals who would otherwise have to be organized prior to an

long term goal’: Sinclair, op tit, Ref 10, p innovation process, the cooperative can be an effective promoter of 28. ?n Norway fishermen’s cooperatives

development projects. There are also examples where cooperatives are

have been closely related lo the growing taking action to protect the fish resources from being depleted, in

labour movement, especially from the addition to carrying out processing and marketing functions.‘x 1930s on (cf Otnes, op &t, Ref.1 0). In Nova Scotia, fishing cooperatives were estab-

In spite of its-usefulness and broad potential, the cooperative model

lished as part of the Antigonish movement has not been made part of any ‘grand scheme’ for restructuring the

in the 1930s (cf Daniel W. Mclnnes. The Antigonish &vement and identity,’ PhD

fishing industrv. v A

*‘) Cooneratives in the fisheries have eenerallv been L 2

thesis, McMaster University, 1978). created on an ad hoc basis. At best, they have been reluctantly

According to McCay, op tit, Ref 16, in supported by the government. In most cases, cooperatives have been

Newfoundland, as in North America in established as a result of a local initiative and frequently been part of the general, ‘producers’ co-operatives have largely been the outcome of “grass roots”

fishermen’s ‘grass roots’ movement.“’ They havk oft& been-used as a

movements by producers themselves, and final resort, when other alternatives have failed. Being organized in

with the assistance of change agents’. In times of crisis and on the ruins of private enterprise is, of course, not the the Antigonish case, these change agents were clerical people. In Norway, in the

best starting point. No wonder they often fail. But if it is true that

1950s a certain government cooperative cooperative ideas have been most successfully promoted in times of

consultant was an enthusiastic agent. crisis, then this should be the time to advocate them once again.

MARINE POLICY October 1985 331