Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rbjh20 Download by: [Radcliffe Infirmary] Date: 22 February 2016, At: 10:11 British Journal for the History of Philosophy ISSN: 0960-8788 (Print) 1469-3526 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rbjh20 Mill on virtue as a part of happiness Roger Crisp To cite this article: Roger Crisp (1996) Mill on virtue as a part of happiness, British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 4:2, 367-380, DOI: 10.1080/09608789608570946 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09608789608570946 Published online: 03 Jun 2008. Submit your article to this journal Article views: 176 View related articles
Transcript
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found athttp://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rbjh20
Download by: [Radcliffe Infirmary] Date: 22 February 2016, At: 10:11
To cite this article: Roger Crisp (1996) Mill on virtue as a part of happiness, British Journal forthe History of Philosophy, 4:2, 367-380, DOI: 10.1080/09608789608570946
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09608789608570946
There are three stages to J. S. Mill's 'proof of utilitarianism.1 In thethird paragraph of chapter IV of Utilitarianism, he attempts toshow (i) that happiness is desirable, using the notorious analogybetween Visible' and 'desirable', and (ii) that the general happinessis desirable. In the following five paragraphs he endeavours toprove (iii) that nothing other than happiness is desirable.
In stage (i), Mill suggests that the sole evidence that anything isdesirable is that people do in fact desire it. Since we each desire ourown happiness, we must accept that happiness is desirable. Despitethe fact that more ink has been spilled over this passage than overany other in Mill's writings, the conclusion of stage (i) is soplausible that one wonders why Mill even bothered to argue for it.The answer is probably that he depends on the same premise - thatdesire is the sole evidence for desirability - in stage (iii), theconclusion of which is far less plausible.
In stage (iii), then, Mill has to show that we desire nothing as anend apart from happiness. He notes immediately in IV.4 thatpeople do desire what is 'in common language' clearly dis-tinguished from happiness. With his intuitionist opponents inmind, Mill gives virtue as an example. This poses an immediateproblem for his account. For if we desire virtue as an end, andvirtue is distinct from happiness, then our desire is evidence for thedesirability of something other than happiness.
Mill might have chosen to argue that we do not in fact desirevirtue as an end, but only, perhaps, as a means to the end ofhappiness. In fact, however, in IV.5 he argues that utilitariansbelieve not only that people do desire virtue as an end, but that thisis to be applauded. He continues,
1 J. S. Mill, Utilitarianism, ed. Mary Warnock (London: Fontana, 1962), chap. IV.References to this text are to chapters and paragraphs.
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Rad
clif
fe I
nfir
mar
y] a
t 10:
11 2
2 Fe
brua
ry 2
016
368 Roger Crisp
This opinion is not, in the smallest degree, a departure from theHappiness principle. The ingredients of happiness are very various, andeach of them is desirable in itself, and not merely when considered asswelling an aggregate . . . Virtue, according to the utilitarian doctrine, isnot naturally and originally part of the end, but is capable of becomingso; and in those who love it disinterestedly it has become so, and isdesired and cherished, not as a means to happiness, but as a part of theirhappiness.
This paper is an attempt to understand Mill's claim that virtue is apart of happiness.
I
It might appear that Mill is using the concept of 'happiness' in thesame formal way as Aristotle employs that of 'eudaimonia', torefer to those things, whatever they are, that constitute people'sflourishing.2 Mill would then be taken in this context to beclaiming that virtue is one of the constituents of human happinessor flourishing. An interpretation along these lines has been offeredby Fred R. Berger in a detailed study of Mill's ethics and politics.3
As Berger notes,4 in 'Remarks on Bentham's philosophy', writtenlong before Utilitarianism, Mill claimed that'an action performedfrom 'impulse' can be an end in itself and that 'there is nothingwhatever which may not become an object of desire or of dislike byassociation';5 and in an article of 1838, he objected to Benthamthat he failed to recognise that people can desire a virtuouscharacter for its own sake.6
All that we can conclude on the basis of these passages,however, is that at times other than that at which he wroteUtilitarianism, Mill probably would have allowed that virtue andother things can be parts of happiness.7 They do not give us a greatdeal of guidance on what Mill meant by the idea.
2 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.4, 1095a17-20 and passim.3 F. Berger, Happiness, Justice, and Freedom (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of
California Press, 1984).4 Berger, 14-15.5 J. S. Mill, 'Remarks on Bentham's philosophy', in Collected Works, ed. J. Robson
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969), vol. X, 12-13.6 'Bentham', Collected Works X, 95-6. It should be noted that Mill says of this desire that
it is 'without hope of good . . . from other source than [the agent's] own inwardconsciousness'.
7 Berger argues as well that Mill's view appeared not to have changed after Utilitarianism,
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Rad
clif
fe I
nfir
mar
y] a
t 10:
11 2
2 Fe
brua
ry 2
016
Mill on Virtue as a Part of Happiness 369
Adopting the formal understanding of'happiness', Berger is ableto take Mill's thesis at face value:
Though virtue would not be sought if, at some stage, it was notassociated with pleasure, it does not follow that pleasure is the object ofthe desire for virtue . . . . When it is said that the person desires it as partof his or her happiness, this means the person desires it for itself, andwould be unhappy without it.8
According to Berger, then, it is not just his formal conception ofhappiness that Mill has in common with Aristotle. Both philoso-phers believe that virtue is itself a constituent of happiness.9 AsBerger realises, this interpretation runs into difficulties with Mill'simportant clarification in II.2 of the view that actions are right asthey tend to promote happiness:
By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; byunhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure.
Berger argues that this passage is usually taken to be astraightforward expression of hedonism only because the sentencefollowing it in the text is ignored:10
quoting a passage from a note to an 1869 edition of his father's Analysis of thePhenomena of the Human Mind (London: Longmans, vol. II, 308). Berger claims that inthis note Mill 'pointed out . . . how various things that are not themselves pleasurescome to be desired "for their own sake, without reference to their consequences" '. Infact, however, Mill is claiming that it is his father who is pointing this out. That Millspeaks of 'pointing out' here might well be taken, of course, to suggest that he agreeswith his father, but his main aim is exegesis of his father's argument, and for that reasonI would advise against attaching importance to this passage in elucidation of Mill'sconsidered views of the relation of desire and happiness.
Berger also adduces a passage from A System of Logic (in Collected Works, vol. VIII,1974, 842) to which Mill himself refers us in Utilitarianism. The passage in the Logicexplicitly states that we continue to desire an action even when we have ceased to findany pleasure in it. I take it that Berger finds Mill's reference to this passage inUtilitarianism IV.11 (he does not tell us; see Berger, 15; and note 15, 302). But the pointMill wishes to endorse in Utilitarianism is that the virtuous person can will virtuousaction independently of any pleasure. Immediately after the reference to the Logic,however, Mill states that '[w]ill, the active phenomenon, is a different thing from desire,the state of passive sensibility'. This distinction is not drawn in the passage in the Logic,so that passage cannot plausibly be used to support the thesis that Mill allowed inUtilitarianism that we can desire objects independently of pleasure.
8 Berger, 35-6.9 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1.7, 1098al6-17. Aristotle, of course, speaks of
virtuous activity. On my reading of Berger, he would allow this at least to be consistentwith Mill's view. See the discussion of hedonism in my text below.
10 Berger, 37.
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Rad
clif
fe I
nfir
mar
y] a
t 10:
11 2
2 Fe
brua
ry 2
016
370 Roger Crisp
To give a clear view of the moral standard set up by the theory, muchmore requires to be said; in particular, what things it includes in the ideasof pain and pleasure; and to what extent this is left an open question.
Berger argues that if Mill intended to define happiness merely aspleasure, it is not clear why he should wish to add anything to hisinitial statement. We know what pleasures and pains are, and Millprovides no philosophical analysis of these notions. Rather, Bergersuggests, Mill goes on to analyse the idea of happiness, 'therebyindicating what, in the way of pleasures, was included in thatidea'.11 Berger concludes that the paragraph in question is merely apreliminary outline of Mill's conception of happiness, and that hisview is not that pleasure is the only thing of value, but that it ispleasure, 'in so far as it is a constituent of a person's happinesswhich has valué".n
The view that Mill provides no philosophical analysis ofpleasure can be correct only on a narrow understanding of theanalysandum or what would constitute analysis of it. He doesindeed fail in Utilitarianism to draw a sharp distinction betweenthe notion of pleasure itself and that of activities which may bedescribed as 'pleasures'. Nor does he consider the question of thenature of pleasure, whether it is, say, a sensation. On this latterissue he would probably have agreed with Berger that suchconsideration was not germane to his central topic. Surely,however, Mill does go on to say more about 'what things it[utilitarianism] includes in the idea of pain and pleasure' in theaccount of higher and lower pleasures which follows upon thisintroductory paragraph?
Berger suggests that the sentence following the initial apparentstatement of hedonism has been largely ignored in the literature. Itis ironic, then, that he himself fails specifically to discuss thesentence which follows that which bears the weight of his owninterpretation:
But these supplementary explanations do not affect the theory of life onwhich this theory of morality is grounded - namely, that pleasure, andfreedom from pain, are the only things desirable as ends; and that alldesirable things (which are as numerous in the utilitarian as in any other
11 Berger, 37.12 Berger, 38.
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Rad
clif
fe I
nfir
mar
y] a
t 10:
11 2
2 Fe
brua
ry 2
016
Mill on Virtue as a Part of Happiness 371
scheme) are desirable either for the pleasure inherent in themselves, or asmeans to the promotion of pleasure and the prevention of pain.
This seems, if anything, an even clearer statement of hedonism.Berger, however, offers an account of Mill's discussion of higherand lower pleasures as being primarily an account of happiness,understood in the formal sense. His central claim is that, accordingto Mill,
human happiness is not an open concept in the sense that it consists ofpleasures completely unspecified. Mill's concept of happiness is partlydeterminate in the sense that there are particular elements requisite to it.13
Now Mill does indeed say:
Human beings have faculties more elevated than the animal appetites,and when once made conscious of them, do not regard anything ashappiness which does not include their gratification. (II.4)14
The sentence before this, however, makes it clear that Mill is herespeaking of our conception of happiness. We can therefore allowthat lower pleasures constitute actual happiness, while claimingthat a conception or account of happiness which excluded higherpleasures would be in that respect lacking.15
Berger claims that, as Mill continues the discussion of higherpleasures, he suggests that people are not happy without thefulfilment of these elevated faculties.161 take it that he is referringto the following sentence in II.6: 'A being of higher facultiesrequires more to make him happy . . . than one of an inferiortype'. Again, there need be no implication here that hedonism isfalse. Mill can be read merely as pointing out that, if one considersa being of elevated faculties and one of lower faculties, both ofwhom are happy, the happiness of the former will require moreresources. There is no implication that, were the higher being to'sink into a lower grade of existence', his life would contain nohappiness. Indeed, Mill implies quite the opposite when he arguesa few sentences later that the higher being is happier than thelower.17
13 Berger, 39.14 Quoted in Berger, 38.15 I discuss Aristotle's use of similar 'more-is-better' arguments in 'Aristotle's indusivism',
Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 12 (1994) 111-36.16 Berger, 39; note 15, 306.17 The notion of 'happiness' can, of course, be used in more than one way. On one
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Rad
clif
fe I
nfir
mar
y] a
t 10:
11 2
2 Fe
brua
ry 2
016
372 Roger Crisp
I noted above Berger's suggestion that Mill's apparent definitionof happiness in II.2 was merely a preliminary sketch. Berger claimsthat Mill's final definition comes after the discussion of higherpleasures, and that it shows clearly that 'the ultimate end sought ishappiness, conceived as made up of pleasures, but not indiscrimi-nately compounded':18
According to the Greatest Happiness Principle, as above explained, theultimate end, with reference to and for the sake of which all other thingsare desirable . . . is an existence exempt as far as possible from pain, andas rich as possible in enjoyments, both in point of quantity and quality;the test of quality, and the rule for measuring it against quantity, beingthe preference felt by those who in their opportunities of experience, towhich must be added their habits of self-consciousness and self-observation, are best furnished with the means of comparison. (11.10)
Again, however, this passage does not imply that Mill's concept ofhuman happiness is 'partly determinate'. Indeed, the final sentenceof this paragraph shows that he saw his definition here applyingalso 'so far as the nature of things admits' to all sentient beings.
So far, then, I have argued against Berger for the traditionalview that Mill is an 'indiscriminate' hedonist. At this point I shouldclarify the nature of hedonism. Hedonism can be understood eitheras a view about what makes certain things good for people, viz.pleasantness (explanatory hedonism), or as a view about whatthings are good for people, viz. pleasurable experience orexperiences (substantive hedonism). What one might call purehedonism will combine both views: what is good for people ispleasurable experience alone, and what makes it good is its beingpleasurable.
understanding, happiness is just whatever is desirable in a being's life; on another, ahappy life is a life that contains more than some reasonable amount of what is desirable(thus we may say, 'There were some good things in his life - but it wasn't happy overall').Were Mill using happiness in the second way here, he might claim that higher pleasuresare necessary conditions for happiness, while allowing that happiness in the first sensecan nevertheless be found in the lives of lower beings. There is no sign in the text,however, that Mill is shifting from one sense to the other, and it is more charitable tointerpret him as speaking only of happiness in the first sense throughout. Even if Mill isusing a second sense, this need not be inconsistent with hedonism, as long as what makesa being happy in this sense is nothing other than pleasure (see below in the main text). Iwas helped in the writing of this note by a comment of Thomas Hurka on a previousdraft.
18 Berger, 39.
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Rad
clif
fe I
nfir
mar
y] a
t 10:
11 2
2 Fe
brua
ry 2
016
Mill on Virtue as a Part of Happiness 373
Because Berger argues that Mill believed that things other thanpleasurable experience or experiences constitute the human good,he is committed to viewing Mill as a substantive non-hedonist. It isnot sufficient to defeat Berger's interpretation to point to Mill'sfrequent reference to 'pleasures'. For there is a sense in English of'apleasure' where this does not refer to a pleasurable experience.What we might call an activity pleasure is some activity in which Iengage with enjoyment. Thus, my activity pleasures might includeski-ing or acting virtuously. These activities are not to be identifiedwith the experiences I have and enjoy while engaging in them.19
Mill might, however, be taken to be referring to such pleasurableexperiences {experience pleasures) when he speaks of 'pleasures'.Which of the two interpretations, the activity and the experience,is the more plausible?
Several times, when speaking of pleasures, Mill contrasts themwith 'pains' or sets them alongside the 'absence' of pain (see e.g.II.8; 12; IV.5; 10-11; see also the contrast between the pleasuresof the intellect etc. and the pleasures of sensation in II.4). 'Pain', inEnglish, cannot mean quite the opposite of 'activity pleasure'. If Ienjoy punting, and hate housework, I may say that punting is oneof my pleasures, but not that housework is one of my pains. I mayindeed say that housework ÍS a pain, in the sense of a trouble tome, but I may not speak of 'pains' to mean things I dislike in theway that I can speak of pleasures as things I enjoy. Since Mill oftenspeaks of pains, then, he must be understood to be referring topainful experiences. It is therefore both more charitable and moreparsimonious to assume that, when he speaks of 'pleasures', he isreferring to pleasurable experiences.20 This understanding of 'apain' as 'a painful experience' was of course standard in theutilitarian tradition.21
19 Berger admits that Mill's discussion is unclear. But he claims that the use of 'pleasure*which predominates in Utilitarianism, and which is consistent with his own interpre-tation, is to refer to 'that which is a pleasure, e.g., intellectual activity, money, andvirtue' (Berger, note 12, 305). I understand Berger to be speaking of activity pleasures inthis passage.
20 David O. Brink, in his non-hedonist interpretation of Mill in 'Mill's deliberativeutilitarianism', Philosophy and Public Affairs 21 (1992) 67-103 (see esp. 72-9), neitherdistinguishes activity pleasures from experience pleasures, nor discusses Mill's view ofpain as the opposite of pleasure. I assume, incidentally, that Mill understands happinessto consist in any kind of pleasurable experience, that is, any experience which is enjoyed.Likewise, any distressing experience will count as painful.
21 See e.g. Bentham's claim that the pains (and pleasures) which 'issue from the physical,political or moral sanctions, must all of them be expected to be experienced, if ever, in
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Rad
clif
fe I
nfir
mar
y] a
t 10:
11 2
2 Fe
brua
ry 2
016
374 Roger Crisp
So Mill accepts substantive hedonism.22 One can, however, be asubstantive hedonist, and yet not an explanatory hedonist. Onemight hold, for example, that what makes things good for peopleis the satisfaction of desire. This, combined with the view thatpeople desire only pleasurable experiences, will issue in substantivehedonism and explanatory non-hedonism. But Mill is clearly anexplanatory hedonist. He ends the definitive statement of hisposition in II.2 as follows:
. . . all desirable things . . . are desirable either for the pleasure inherentin themselves, or as means to the promotion of pleasure and theprevention of pain.
Mill is, then, a pure hedonist.Let me consider finally those passages which Berger adduces in
support of a straightforwardly non-hedonistic interpretation. Thefirst is that in which Mill attempts to explain why it is that higherbeings will refuse to sink into a lower grade of existence (II.6). Milloffers the following options: the feeling of pride, or the love ofliberty, power or excitement. He himself thinks it most appro-priate to describe this unwillingness of the higher being as
a sense of dignity . . . which is so essential a part of the happiness in thosein whom it is strong, that nothing which conflicts with it could be,otherwise than momentarily, an object of desire to them.
Berger claims that in this paragraph Mill asserts that the requisitesof happiness include a sense of one's independence and self-determination, of power, and of freedom, a measure of excitementand 'described generally, whatever is necessary to maintain humandignity'.23
We can leave aside the point that Mill speaks of a love ofindependence and so on, not a sense of them. For it is clear notonly that Mill thinks it more appropriate to speak of the sense of
the present life' (Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, repr. in J. S.Mil l , Utilitarianism, ed. M . W a r n o c k , chap . III, paragraph 7 , p p . 6 0 - 6 1 ; 'experienced'italicised by me) .
2 2 In my forthcoming book , Mill's Utilitarianism (London: Rout ledge, 1997) , I claim tha t ,though Mill is clearly commit ted to hedonism by I I .2 , there does remain a gap in hisaccount : if nobili ty, for example , can increase pleasurableness o r enjoyableness, w h y is itno t a good-making proper ty in its own right? W e have to assume that for Mill its value isfiltered through pleasurableness, as is tha t of quanti ty (i .e. the length and intensity of thepleasure). But this is a sign of an excessive commitment to hedonism.
2 3 Berger, p . 4 0 .
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Rad
clif
fe I
nfir
mar
y] a
t 10:
11 2
2 Fe
brua
ry 2
016
Mill on Virtue as a Part of Happiness 375
dignity in this context, but that this is the only component ofhappiness he here mentions. Nor does he claim that happinessmust include whatever is necessary to maintain this component.Indeed that would be for him to mistake means with ends.24 AsBerger points out,25 Mill does claim in his discussion of justice thatsecurity is crucial to happiness. But Mill himself refers to it as a'necessary', akin to food (V.25). Again, Berger is right to say thatMill speaks of disappointed expectation as an evil.26 We mighteven agree that this suggests that a sense of security is a part ofhappiness. But a sense of security can itself, of course, beunderstood to be an experience pleasure, and indeed to be valuableonly because of the pleasure it instantiates.
My arguments against Berger's view of Mill's conception ofhappiness in Utilitarianism as non-hedonistic and 'determinate',and especially the evidence of II.2, show that any such interpre-tation will fail. So we cannot answer the question of what Millmeans by his claim that virtue is a part of happiness by arguingthat, on a non-hedonistic and pluralistic conception of happiness,such a claim can be taken literally.27
II
In a slightly more recent study of Mill, John Skorupski accepts thatMill is a hedonist.28 According to Skorupski, Mill uses theterminology of 'parts' of happiness to avoid the claim that becausewe desire, say, virtue only inasmuch as it is thought of as pleasant,virtue is therefore a means to happiness.29
24 In his conclusion on Mill's conception of the 'essential elements of human happiness'(Berger, 41-2) , Berger indiscriminately runs together instrumental and non-instrumentalgoods. It cannot be that what are merely 'requirements' or 'requisites' for humanhappiness - such as the following by others of the rules of justice - can themselves beelements of human happiness. It should be noted that in his response to John Skorupski'sreview of his book, Berger speaks of 'whatever is requisite to "a sense of dignity" ' as oneof the 'things in which we take pleasure by our natures' ('Reply to Professor Skorupski',Philosophical Books 26 (1985), 206). But Mill must surely be taken to be speaking of the(pleasurable) sense of dignity as the pleasurable component of happiness, not anypleasure we take in what is necessary for it.
2 5 Berger, 40-126 Berger, 4 1 .2 7 Or almost literally. Even on Berger's view, despite his suggestion that virtue is a pleasure
(Berger, note 12, 305), Mill must have meant that it is in fact being virtuous or exercisingthe virtues that is a constituent of happiness (cf. Berger's reference to 'virtuous activity','Reply to Professor Skorupski', 202). I shall return to this matter in my final section.
2 8 J. Skorupski, J. S. Mill (London: Routledge, 1989), 13 and passim.29 Skorupski, 296; cf. 13-14.
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Rad
clif
fe I
nfir
mar
y] a
t 10:
11 2
2 Fe
brua
ry 2
016
376 Roger Crisp
Virtue, on Skorupski's interpretation, is desired under the ideaof it as pleasant. This enables Mill to distinguish the spontaneouslyor authentically generous person from the conscientious giver:
The generous man desires to give because he takes pleasure in giving. It isjust the unmotivated pleasure in giving others pleasure that constituteshim a generous man. Or consider a father playing with his children. Heplays with them because he wants to; he wants to simply because heenjoys it. The act of giving is pan of the happiness of the generous man.Playing with his children is part of the happiness of the father. They dothese things because they enjoy them - but we cannot say that they dothem in order to get that pleasure or enjoyment. That would be torepresent the motive involved as egotistic, which is just what it is not.30
Skorupski then discusses the passage I have already mentionedfrom 'Remarks on Bentham's philosophy', in which Mill dis-tinguishes between action in pursuit of an 'interest' - a prospectivepleasure or pain - and acting on an 'impulse' - a pleasure or painfelt at the prospect of the act itself.31 Skorupski understands Mill tobe using the distinction between interest and impulse in an attemptto show that the view that all actions are determined by pleasureand pain does not imply the view that human action isself-interested.
As Skorupski points out, since the selfish/unselfish distinctioncuts across the interest/impulse distinction, Mill's argument sounderstood fails. 'The point that ought to be emphasised',Skorupski continues, 'is that even when a person does somethingbecause he thinks it will be pleasant - like the generous man whogives a present - it still does not follow that he is acting selfishly.'And this point which Mill ought to have emphasised is the oneSkorupski interprets him as making in Utilitarianism with thedistinction between parts of happiness and means to happiness.
When considering whether a writer commits himself to aparticular position in a particular work, it is probably best toadduce evidence first from within that text. Does the text ofUtilitarianism itself suggest psychological egoism? That view isusually taken to be that people act only to further what they taketo be their own good. In this sense, Mill is clearly not apsychological egoist. He allows for genuine self-sacrifice, in which
3 0 Skorupski, 296.31 J. S. Mill, 'Remarks on Bentham', 12-15; discussed in Skorupski, 296-7.
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Rad
clif
fe I
nfir
mar
y] a
t 10:
11 2
2 Fe
brua
ry 2
016
Mill on Virtue as a Part of Happiness 377
a person knowingly gives up his or her own happiness for the sakeof others (II.15-16).32 But Mill does accept a narrower, desire-centred account of psychological egoism (we might call it desireegoism), according to which human beings desire only their ownpleasure.33 In IV.9, Mill sums up his proof: if human beings desireonly happiness and the means to it, it will have been proven thathappiness is the only thing desirable. He goes on, in the followingparagraph:
And now to decide whether this is really so; whether mankind do desirenothing for itself but that which is a pleasure to them, or of which theabsence is a pain. [Italics mine.]
It might be objected that this passage does not in itself commit Millto desire egoism. I might, say, desire a pleasure of yours. This willbe desiring something that is a pleasure to mankind, since you areone of mankind.
The passage in IV.10, however, harks back to stage (i) of theproof. And there Mill leaves us in little doubt:
No reason can be given why the general happiness is desirable, exceptthat each person, so far as he believes it to be attainable, desires his ownhappiness. This, however, being a fact, we have not only all the proofwhich the case admits of, but all which it is possible to require, thathappiness is a good. (II.3) [Italics mine.]
Why is it not possible to require a proof grounded on the claimthat human beings desire the happiness of others? The reason mustbe that Mill thinks it impossible. Each of us desires only his or herown happiness. Desire egoism may cause problems for Mill instage (ii) of the proof, and indeed in his general project. But it is hisstated position.
Skorupski's example of the generous man, quoted above,strongly suggests that he allows Mill to claim that a person candesire to give pleasure to others, as an end in itself. This, then, isthe first problem with Skorupski's interpretation, its inconsistencywith Mill's desire egoism.
3 2 The use of 'genuine' is to mark the distinction between Mill's view and that of, say,Aristotle, in which apparent self-sacrifice always turns out in fact to be in the agent's bestinterests; see Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, IX.8, 1168b23-31.
33 Self-sacrificial action is best understood, then, to be motivated not by desire, but by will;see IV.11 .
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Rad
clif
fe I
nfir
mar
y] a
t 10:
11 2
2 Fe
brua
ry 2
016
378 Roger Crisp
It also runs into trouble with the logic of the first stage of theproof. Recall that, according to the central premise of that firststage, the sole evidence of an object's being desirable as an end initself is the fact that people desire it as such. On Skorupski'sinterpretation, people do indeed desire virtue as an end in itself.This would commit Mill to the view that virtue itself is desirable, aview which we have already seen, in the discussion of Berger, isinconsistent with pure hedonism. Like Berger, Skorupski under-stand's Mill's talk of pleasures to refer to activity pleasures (i.e.certain activities conceived of independently from the experiencesof them). Since the evidence of pure hedonism is so strong, wemust conclude that Skorupski's interpretation of Mill's claim thatvirtue is a part of happiness also fails.
Ill
Any interpretation of Mill's view about the parts of happiness mustbe shaped in the light of his pure hedonisn and his desire egoism.According to the substantive component of his pure hedonism,happiness is constituted by experience pleasures alone. So whenMill speaks of virtue as desirable in itself, he must be understoodto be speaking of the pleasure of virtue. He cannot mean by thisthe pleasure that follows from being virtuous, the enjoyment of theperson surveying his past virtuous actions. For virtue would thenclearly be a means, and Skorupski is certainly right to say that hisview is one that Mill is keen to avoid.
In the central discussion of virtue as a part of happiness inchapter IV, Mill offers as examples of objects that can becomeparts of happiness 'music' and 'health'. He explicitly refers to theseas 'pleasures' (IV.5). What are the pleasures of music and thepleasures of health? Surely these can be understood only as thepleasures of listening to or playing music, and of being healthy.'Virtue', then, as a pleasure, can be understood only as thepleasure of being virtuous (which we may take to include actingvirtuously).34 This, then, is what Mill's claim that virtue is a part of
34 See H. R. West, 'Mill's "proof of the principle of utility', in The Limits ofUtilitarianism, ed. H. B. Miller and W. H. Williams (Minneapolis: University ofMinnesota Press, 1982), 28. West says that the ultimate ends of desires can be seen as'experiences . . . with a pleasure component'. Unfortunately, he goes on to allow thatvirtue can be said to be desired as an end, apparently because he sees this as the soleinterpretative alternative to the view that what is desired ultimately is only the 'pleasure
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Rad
clif
fe I
nfir
mar
y] a
t 10:
11 2
2 Fe
brua
ry 2
016
Mill on Virtue as a Part of Happiness 379
happiness amounts to: that happiness can be constituted partly bythe enjoyable experience of one's being virtuous.
The main disadvantage - if it can be described as such - of thisinterpretation is that this is not exactly what Mill says. After all, hesays that it is virtue that is desirable in itself. But no reasonableinterpretation can take Mill's claim at face value. For that wouldbe to turn that claim into the 'contemptible nonsense' G. E. Mooreattributed to him in his dyspeptic discussion of Mill in chapter IIIof Principia Ethica.35 Another of Mill's examples of objects thatcan come to be desired as ends in themselves is money (IV.6). Ofthis, Moore says:
Does Mill mean to say that 'money', these actual coins, which he admitsto be desired in and for themselves, are a part either of pleasure or of theabsence of pain? Will he maintain that those coins themselves are in mymind, and actually a part of my pleasant feelings? If this is to be said, allwords are useless: nothing can possibly be distinguished from anythingelse; if these two things are not distinct, what on earth is? We shall hearnext that this table is really and truly the same thing as this room; that acab-horse is in fact indistinguishable from St Paul's cathedral.36
Mill believed that it was only in 'common language' that virtue isdistinguished from happiness. In more precise language, virtuecan be seen to be a part of happiness in the sense that the pleasureof being virtuous or acting virtuously can be desirable, quapleasure, as an end in itself. Mill's own language, unfortunately,is not very precise.37 One consequence of this, whether intendedor not by Mill we cannot know, has been that the vast gapbetween the view of the intuitionist opponents Mill is attemptingto pacify and his own has been papered over by confusion.38 The
componen t ' of the state of consciousness of being vir tuous. There is, of course, a thirdop t ion , tha t it is the pleasurable experience of being vir tuous that is desired. (II.2 mightbe taken to suggest tha t West 's rejected alternative is anyway correct . But Mill is t oounclear abou t the distinction between pleasure and a pleasurable experience for thisinterpretat ion t o be accepted.)
3 5 G . E . M o o r e , Principia Ethica (Cambridge; Cambr idge University Press, 1903) , 7 2 . Iwas pleased to find that M o o r e was similarly blunt abou t his own earlier views, in hislater preface recently published in a Revised Edit ion of Principia Ethica, ed. T . Baldwin(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1993) , 2 - 2 7 .
3 6 M o o r e , Principia Ethica, 1st edn . , 7 1 .3 7 Cf. H . Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics (London: Macmil lan , 7 th edn , 1907) , no te 1 ,
Sidgwick's interpretat ion in this note is I think close t o mine .3 8 I myself suspect tha t it was unintended, and not just because Mill was above such tactics.
H e thought that it was 'obvious ' tha t desire cannot be 'directed to anything ultimately
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Rad
clif
fe I
nfir
mar
y] a
t 10:
11 2
2 Fe
brua
ry 2
016
380 Roger Crisp
'opponents of the utilitarian standard' (IV.4) believed that beingvirtuous is an end desirable in itself independently of its being apleasure, and that it could be desired by people independently oftheir own happiness. 'Whether it is or not must now be left to theconsideration of the thoughtful reader' (IV.12.)39
St Anne's College Oxford
except pleasure and the exemption from pain' (IV.11) and 'that to desire anything,except in proportion as the idea of it as pleasant, is a physical and metaphysicalimpossibility' (V.10). Perhaps, then, he never properly understood his opponents' viewsin the first place. It should be noted that I am placing little interpretative weight on thatlatter claim that desiring x and finding x pleasant are the same. After all, this analysis ofdesiring would allow the possibility of finding pleasant something which was not in facta pleasurable experience. My imputation of hedonism to Mill depends primarily on II.2,and of desire egoism on the substantive claims he makes here about what we desire.
39 I am grateful to Professors Hurka and Skompski for helpful comments on an earlier draftof this paper, and to the latter also for enlightening discussion.
