AIR WAR COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM: RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL STRUGGLE IN THE ISLAMIC WORLD

by

Jose A. Guillo Rodes, LtCol, SPAF

A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty

In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements

Advisor: Dr. David S. Sorenson

Maxwell Air Force Base, Montgomery, Alabama

27 February 2004

ii

DISCLAIMER

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author(s) and do not reflect

the official policy or position of the US government or the Department of Defense. In

accordance with Air Force Instruction 51-303, it is not copyrighted, but is the property of the

United States government.

iii

Contents

Page

1. Introduction 5

2. Origin and accuracy of the use of the word Fundamentalism 7

3. The Western provocation as origin of the Islamism: the need for success 9

3.1 Renovation 12 3.2 Westernization 13

3.3 Islamic Modernism 14

3.4 Islamic Fundamentalism: Islamism 16

4. Inflection point in the development: the colonial occupation 18

4.1 The compulsory Westernization: Nationalism 19

4.2 The reaction from the socio-psychological point of view 20

4.3 The birth of the current Islamism 21

5. The radicalization: from the Seven Days War to the Gulf War 25

5.1 The Iranian revolution 28

5.2 The reaction to the Iranian revolution and Afghanistan 30

5.2 The Gulf War 33

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Page

6. Islamism as mass movement 35

6.1 Ideology 37

6.2 Critic of the modernizing society 37

6.3 The historic-therapeutical dramatization of the conflict between Islamism

and Western Modernism 38

6.4 The ideal order: The Fundamentals of Islam 39

6.5 The Islamic Model of Society 39

6.6 The “Jihad:” The Sixth Pillar? 41

7. Possible implications for the US and other Western Countries 42

8. Conclusions 46

Annex A: Summary of the content of “Sura” related to Jihad 48

Bibliography 49

End Notes 51

5

Chapter 1

Introduction

“Know your enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril”

Sun Tzu

Islam is, in terms of numbers of practitioners, one of the three main religions in the World.

In fact nowadays it continues growing in some parts of the World, especially in Africa. After

having grown very rapidly initially, conquering and converting a big part of the known World, it

came to stabilization and even started to lose some territory and influence, due to its

confrontation with the western cultures.

Culturally the evolution was very similar; after centuries of maintaining a dominant position

over the western World, Islam came to a halt in both science and philosophy development. As a

consequence, the Muslim leaders were surprised in 1798 when, confronted with the Napoleonic

military machine, they realized their shortcomings in relationship with the modernized nations.

Religion (Islam) ruled the life in the Muslim World. Traditionally there was no separation

between religion and politics. Therefore, it is not surprising that the reaction to the confrontation

of western modernity included both components: religion and politics.

This paper will specifically focus on the origin and evolution of political Islam as occurred

from the confrontation with the western modernity to the present situation. With this purpose, I

will first discuss the accuracy of the word Fundamentalism to identify the revival of the

6

political Islam. I will instead propose the use of the name Islamism for the final form of the

movement.

The main objective will be to compare the different schools of Islamic thought and the

evolution of the different movements related to them. This analysis will give a chronological

base to the study highlighting, at the same time, some historical moments in the relationship

between Islam and the western cultures. The study will be subdivided according to the following

scheme: first I will study the different reactions provoked by the first contact with the modernity.

Then I will continue my analysis going through the effects of the colonial occupation and,

finally, discuss the radicalization that occurred after the Seven Days War. Moreover, the study

will include an analysis of Islamist ideology and the model of society that it proposed.

The paper will conclude with an analysis of the possible implications for the U.S. and other

Western Countries; followed by a comparison between the achievements and expectations of the

Islamist movement.

7

Chapter 2

Origin and accuracy of the use of the word Fundamentalism

The word “Fundamentalism” started to be used during the decade of the seventies, in

conjunction with the adjective Islamic, to denote the return to the “Quranic” way of living within

the Muslim world. But, it was with the Islamic Revolution in Iran that the word started to be

used in a defamatory sense against the Islamic Revolutionaries.

The meaning given by the Western (Christian) politician and media to this word is related to

a community of believers that do not share the spirit of the present time and would like to return

to the past, to the Middle Age. But this idea is directly related with the Christian origin of the

word and has nothing to do with the Muslim tradition. The term was used for the first time in

1878 in the USA to denote a Protestant theological movement resulting from a Bible conference

that took place in Niagara Falls (New York). The signatories of the final declaration that was

agreed upon during the conference (mostly leaders of the Baptist, Presbyterian and Disciples of

the Christ churches) named themselves fundamentalist. Among the principles agreed to in the

conference, the most important was to declare the infallibility of the Bible. Later (1925 in

Tennessee) the discussion went on against teaching the “theory of evolution” (Darwin) in state

subsidized schools1. The same word has also been used by the Catholic Church in relationship

with the repulse of the rational critique of the Holy Text. Fundamentalism, in the Catholic

8

context, means the absolute return to the Holy Book as the unique basis of every critique and

renovation2.

The use of the word fundamentalist makes no sense to the Muslim community. The Islamic

religion is based upon the Book (the Qur’an). This is the reason why practicing Muslims (and

most of them are active practitioners) do not feel like fundamentalist, in the western meaning of

the word, (a come back to the past after having been taught the right way to become modern

societies) because they have always acted and lived “according to the Book.”

But the “Qur’an” is not only intended to rule the religious life, but also the social and

political relations. The “Islamist” movements (they call themselves “al-islamiyyun”) want to

organize life (not only the religious one) and society according to the Qur’an. Therefore the term

Islamism seems to be more accurate to design these movements and the internal struggle in the

Muslim societies that advocate a return to a more “pure” form of Islam and for the use of the

Shari’a or Islamic law instead the secular law, which they refuse.

9

Chapter 3

The Western provocation as origin of the Islamism: the need for success

The Islamic religion has had, from its origin, great influence over the different populations

who accepted it as their own religion. As revealed religion, Islam -explained through the

Prophet- contained the expectations from God for mankind (to be fulfilled). This way the

influence of religion in the way of living of the Muslims has been important, not only limited to

the purely religious environment, but rather in the social behavior and also in the political

environment.

The Qur’an is not only a practical guide to organize the individual and communitarian life;

it is the operational science of the Muslim society. History (according to the Qur’an) has only

one sense, only one. The Qur’an is composed by God’s indications to fulfill the History3.

This is the greatest difference between Christendom and Islam. While Christians (following

the words of the Founder of Christianity, “render unto Caesar the things which are Caesar’s; and

unto God the things which are God’s” -Matt. XXII: 21-) separated their religion from politics,

Islam unified in the person of the Prophet (and his followers, the Khalifa, meaning deputy or

successor) the head of the State and the exemplification of the religious life for the Muslims, for

“the only religious leader and the only sovereign in Islam is God”4.

Muslim life is ruled by the religious behavior as contained in the Qur’an and based upon the

“five Pillars of Islam”, which summarize the essential nature and structure of Islamic faith and

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practice. The “Pillars” are mentioned in the Qur’an, but they were clarified later by scholars,

comprising the most basic duties people owe to Allah: the acknowledgement of God (Shahadah),

the ritual prayers (Salat or Salah), the paying of ritual alms (Zakat or Zakah), the fast during

Ramadan (Saum or Siyam) and the pilgrimage to Mecca (Hajj or Haj). Moreover, the Islamic

laws or Shari’a were extracted from the Qur’an and from the practices and the sayings of the

Prophet (Sunna).

This remained this way through the centuries, where except for the Crusades and the Italian,

Sicilian and Spanish “Reconquest” (from 711 to 1492), the eventual contacts with the western

countries were limited to armed conflicts between the Turks (the rulers) and the western

countries. That means only the external layer (the Turkish Army) of the community of believers

(Umma) was affected by those contacts. The Arab population ruled by the Turks, as well as the

rest of the Muslim community was left out of those contacts.

The situation changed dramatically with the French expedition to Egypt in 1798,

commanded by Napoleon. For the first time in centuries, two societies whose cultures and way

of life differed completely confronted each other: The Muslims, declining after centuries of

Ottoman rule, and the Western, represented by the French, modern and post revolutionary, trying

to imbue the spirit of the Enlightenment by means of the first press in Arabic characters in use in

Egypt and using the cannons and the combat techniques of a modern army.

The clash between both cultures had initially a military character (the submission of the

Ottomans by the weapons), and the result was a deep commotion as well in the individual life of

the Egyptian Muslims, as in the political and social framework. Western influence was not

limited to the military, but to the cultural aspects of life. This way when the French troops left

Egypt and the Ottomans went back to rule the country, a sector of the Egyptian society opened

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themselves to the influence of the European (western) culture. However, other Muslims,

recognizing the gap between the western scientific advances and their own scientific status,

started to look for the internal reasons for their decadence, in the light of the clear technical,

political and economical dominance of the West5.

As a consequence of these two different approaches to the situation, different movements

developed to renew the Muslim world, which sometimes opposed each other. On the one hand,

the imitational movements, some of them with a secular character (e.g. nationalism and

socialism); on the other hand [mostly as] the reactions to these imitational movements, always

with a religious character.

The reason for the religious character of these reactions must be found in the Qur’an. The

history of Islam shows the continuity of success in the initial campaigns against the “infidels.”

This was explained to the Muslims in the Qur’an in the following way:

003.110

(YUSUFALI): Ye are the best of peoples, evolved for mankind, enjoining what is right,

forbidding what is wrong, and believing in Allah. If only the People of the Book* had faith,

it were best for them: among them are some who have faith, but most of them are perverted

transgressors. (* People of the Book meaning the Bible for both Jews and Christians).

Consequently, the Muslims should have continued having success in their relations with the

“people of the Book” because God was with them…as long as they demonstrated fidelity to

God continuing the right way. If they failed, the only possible explanation was that they have

deviated from the right way (and, therefore God could not be with them any more).

Next we are going to review those movements in chronological order as they originated.

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Renovation

In previous confrontations with the western armies, the Ottomans had learned about the

superior use of arms and tactics by their enemies, first in sea battles and later increasingly in land

battles. When the Ottomans started losing instead of winning the battles on the ground, they

started to ask themselves why. This was the case after signing the Treaty of Carlowitz (1699)

where they assumed losses of territory north and west of the Black Sea and, later on the Azov

Sea. They continued asking themselves why they lost more territory each time. The answer

before the confrontation with the French army was always the same: The failure was the

estrangement from the early Islam, and the solution (based on the religious beliefs as written in

the Qur’an) was the return to the true Islam.6

One of the people, who promoted this solution, specifically concerning the region of the

Arabian Peninsula, was Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1792) who created a movement

that intended the return to the original Islam, rejecting every foreign influence (not only the

westerner, but also the Ottoman and the Hindu). He based his movement on the thoughts of Taqi

al-Din Ahmad Ibn Taymiyya (Islamic intellectual 1263-1328) and especially rejected the

influence of the Sufis (Islamic Mysticism) due to the Hindu influence he saw in the practices of

the Sufi Brotherhood. He also rejected as heresy (idolatry) the adoration of both tombs and

saints. He understood the original Islam as the one practiced in the times of the Prophet. The

movement could be named the “Renovation.7”

This movement was timely placed before the confrontation with the West. In 1744 Abd al-

Wahhab reached a pact (bai’a) with the Emir Muhammad Ibn Sa’ud of Dar’iya. The intention of

the pact was “to reach the empire of God’s word, even with the use of force, ending the external

influences and innovations, as well as the popular superstitions8.”

13

The movement under the name of its founder (Wahhabism) experienced a revival in modern

times. We are going to see the explanation to this assertion later on.

Westernization

The direct result of the confrontation with French troops was to imitate the [Western]

model, trying first (again) to understand what made the difference. But before starting to imitate,

one had to clarify with the religious leaders “if it was licit to learn from the infidels.” The answer

of the official Ulema (the religious authorities) was that “it is permissible to imitate the infidels

in order to more effectively fight against them.”9

About what made the difference and (subsequently) what to learn, the answer initially found

was to learn the organization of the instruments of power and (related to them) the economic

system. The first intention was to create armies similar to those of the western nations. In this

way Muhammad Ali, after becoming ruler of Egypt got rid of the Mamluk leadership, and

organized an army in the western style. That allowed him to challenge his boss, the Sultan of

Istanbul.

But the need to modernize the army soon involved the entire Muslim society. The new army

had to be paid and armed with appropriate weapons (provided initially by the western countries).

That required (at the end) a financial reform (tax reform) that (again) required an administrative

reform to be able to properly administer the new taxes. Finally, in order to acquire the

knowledge needed to perform all these reforms, one started to intensify the contacts with the

West and to send students to learn the new techniques. They also decided to hire experts from

the western nations to help in the organizational reform. The students sent abroad were later in

charge of the educational and military reforms linked to the administrative one.

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The name given to this imitational movement was the New Order, based purely in military

strength and its subsequent cultural and social influence over the Muslim society.

The negative effect of the New Order was the progressive influence that the western nations

started to exert over the Muslim world, due to their control over the technical and scientific

knowledge that the Muslims needed to perform the reforms10.

Islamic Modernism

Partially as reaction to the New Order but mainly to find the answer to the question on the

reasons for the Muslim decline (in relationship with the West), there was an intellectual

movement related with Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani (Iran 1839-1897) and with Mohammed Abduh

(Egypt 1849-1905). Both intellectuals took an attitude of open confrontation against the existing

two basic positions of the Muslim world.

On the one hand, they criticized the traditional representatives of Islam: the orthodoxy of

Ulemas and the spirituality and piety of the Sufi Order (Islamic Mysticism). They found them

responsible for the inferiority and decline of Islam in comparison with the West, due to the Sufi’s

conformity with the situation, based in their inclination to meditation together with their

rejection of wealth, imitating Muhammad’s lifestyle. On this point they coincided with

Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s ideas11.

On the other hand, Afghani and Abduh rejected the blind imitation of the West as a decisive

element to obtain their objective: the internal renovation (Renaissance) of Islam, taking as

example the Islamic civilization in the High Middle Age. Although they criticized sharply the

western influence, both were prepared to accept certain elements of the western culture and

civilization, as long as those elements were able to reinforce the Islam12.

15

Their common departing point was that the key to the problems and (in comparison with the

West) the poverty of the Muslim World lay in the dereliction of the good way of Islam and was

not an effect of merely structural deficiencies. For them, a well understood Islam could create the

miracle to recover the Muslim world from its inferiority and dependence of the West and (at the

same time) “return Islam to its natural position in relationship with the rest of the World: the

superiority” (after Afghani’s words). Therefore, they advocated for a “return to the ancestors

(salafiyya)” as a solution for the inferiority of the Muslim World. The other name given to this

movement, “Salafism,” is related with Afghani and Abduh’s motto.

According to Abduh and Afghani’s ideas, the reform of Islam would take place in all its

aspects: the judicial and law system, the social and political order and the spiritual and moral

aspects. This should not be done by introducing the [western] modernity but allowing “the right

to individual interpretation (ijtihad) of the founding texts (the Qur’an and the Sunna)13.”

Nevertheless, the way to reform Islam “returning to the way of the ancestors” had slightly

different meanings to each of them.

For al-Afghani this return had a practical form; intending to renovate the traditional

solidarity between Muslims, this way making the Muslim community “a world power feared and

respected14.” He expected to confront the Western Imperialism with a renewed (and unified)

Islam.

For Mohammed Abduh this return to the ancestors represented the return to a rationalist

Islam, free from superstition and tyranny15. An internal renovation or “Renaissance” of Islam

based on the example of Islamic Civilization of the High Middle Age, and open to the

reinterpretation of Islam (ijtihad), based upon the teaching of Ibn Taymiyya 16. Nevertheless, the

16

movement, at this stage, remained at the intellectual level without achieving any political

support.

Islamic Fundamentalism: Islamism

This movement could be seen as a continuation of the former and as an amalgamation of

some components of both the Renovation Movement or Wahhabite (or wahhabiyya, after

Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab) and the Islamic Modernism (Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani and

Muhammad Abduh), also known as Salafism. The origin of the movement is linked to one

student of Muhammad Abduh named Rashid Rida (1865-1935).

Rida, as well as Al-Afghani and Abduh, departed from one common point: They were

discontent with the state of Islam in their times and (as seen above) all of them had a deep desire

for reform “returning to the way of the ancestors” (salafiyya). But for Rashid Rida the salafiyya

came to mean the revival of strict Islamic practices and religious fervor, in its most puritanical

way. In “stricto sensu”, Rida was the only salafi, because his return to the ways of the ancestors

was genuine17.

Rida’s ideas (as previously stated) linked with the Wahhabite movement and connected with

the ideas of the Sa’ud family (Arabian peninsula), which used them as a foundation to

reconstitute the Arab empire and supported Rida’s movement politically. In 1925 the Emir Abd

al-Aziz Ibn Sa’ud defeated the Hashemite ruler of the Hiyaz (Mecca and Medina) and in 1932

started to name his country as the Saudi Arab Kingdom.

Politically “salafism” did not condemn the existing Muslim governments, remaining

traditional and pretending the reconstruction of the Muslim Umma (community of the Faithful)

with the restoration of the caliphate.

17

The movement Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan al-muslimun) was created in Egypt 1928 by

Hasan al-Banna, originally as a continuation of the salafiyya, but taking a different direction. We

are going to see this and other movements related to it, considered as the basis of the current

Islamism, with more detail in the following chapters.

In 1927, the year before the creation of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Tablighi Jamaat or

Society for the Propagation of Muslim faith started to develop in India. According to its founder,

Muhammad Ilyas, the movement was outside politics. The Tabligh preaching pretended the

“exact and literal imitation of the Prophet as the personification of Islamic virtue18.” This

imitation included to sleep the same way the Prophet did according to the tradition, and to dress

and move the same way as the Prophet: dress in a white jellaba and move on foot. They rejected,

however, the politicizing of Islam as done by the successors of Hasan al-Banna and the Islamist

movement. According to Muhammad Ilyas, “a man should not sit back and expect the state to

implement Islam within society; he should do it himself, through his efforts to convert others.”

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Chapter 4

Inflection point in the development: the colonial occupation

All the movements summarily described before, with the exception of the last development

of Islamism (Muslim Brotherhood), occurred in a period of time where the influence of the

western countries was limited to their capability to control the technical and scientific knowledge

that the Muslims needed to perform the modernization process. But the situation was going to

change dramatically at the point where the western nations started to act as colonial powers in

the Arab world.

This occupation (one can discuss if it was a colonization but not about the presence of the

troops and their influence) had two main effects: On the one hand, it implied an acceleration of

the modernization (westernization) process, with the assimilation of western ideas as nationalism

and (later on) others like socialism, materialism, and secularism. These ideas were acquired and

followed by the elites of the new nations, but they were never well digested by the rest of the

Muslim community. On the other hand there was a reaction to these “foreign ideas.”

Next we are going to review the evolution of both effects, in order to understand the more

recent developments of these two tendencies.

The compulsory Westernization: Nationalism

The western colonization of the Arab region began already in 1830 (Algeria), and continued

during the rest of the century until the First World War. During the War the Arabs (particularly

19

in the Arabian peninsula and the Levant) fought against the Ottoman Empire (on the side of the

colonial powers) hoping to reach their independence. But in 1916 France and Great Britain

reached an agreement (Sykes-Picot), which was kept secret. According to the agreement, the

region was divided into two administrative zones, keeping Palestine under international

administration.

The Society of Nations legalized the agreement after the War. The proper Society of Nations

creation Pact (June 28,1919) made a distinction between “communities of people not yet ready to

control themselves” and “developed nations (…) due to their resources, experience or

geographical position.” Article 22 of the Pact refers to the “Mandate Nations,” meaning the

nations to whom the international community conferred an educational mission under the form

of a Mandate19. The official reason given for the mandate was “to help manage their

administration until the administrated communities were able to manage by themselves.20”

The voluntary trend to Westernization among parts of the Muslim society was transformed

by the mandate to compulsory for the complete society; among the Arab societies affected by the

mandate. This compulsory Westernization, united with the partition of the Arab umma (for the

first time in 1300 years) and the posterior creation of the state of Israel, represented a

tremendous shock for the Arab world, since they expected to rebuild a Unified Arab Nation.

The elite of the involved states thought it was necessary to adapt their structures to the

administrators of the mandate powers in such a way that they had every possibility to give their

states the status of civilized (developed Nation)21. Therefore, after having adopted the Arab

Nationalism in order to differentiate from the Ottomans, they fought first against the Ottoman

Empire. But after the Sykes–Picot agreement, the elites converted to the western nationalist ideas

20

and started to differentiate from the other Arab countries, fighting individually against the

colonial (or imperial, depending on the source) powers in order to get their own independence.

Nevertheless, the elites tried to maintain as a basic ideal the Arab Unity, based in the Arab

Nationalism (Pan Arabism) which they estimated as: founded in the common language, the

common history and the common customs and feelings22, feelings related with the believes and

(consequently) with Islam. But for the Arab nationalist, Islam represents another sign of identity

for the Arab World rather than the unifying amalgam for the Muslim community.

The reaction from the socio-psychological point of view

We can study from a socio-psychological point of view the reaction to this external

imposition of foreign norms of behavior in relation to the Islamic civilization. Let us study from

this perspective the reaction of the individuals to fast changes (the perception of speediness in

relationship to the changes, compared with the long lasting own civilization is important), and

moreover, changes imposed by a foreign power. The reaction remains at the perceptive level and

takes the form of insecurity: the feeling is that the individual identity is in danger. Again, the

impression is that they are no longer able to define their own environment by themselves (some

foreign power is doing it for them). But to be able to keep their own identity, they have to be

able to define their own environment.

In this situation the indigenous religion (Islam in this case) becomes more important, so that

it wins a central position, not only as ideology, but also as a “promise of a paradise to be

regained23.” This increasing role of religion in the societies could be observed to a certain degree

in recent times in two societies of the former eastern block Poland and Lithuania.

In the case of Islam this situation occurred for the first time as a consequence of the

imposition of westernization by the mandate powers.

21

The next step in the chain of feelings is that once the above-depicted circumstances are

experienced, every change is perceived as a danger coming from outside, in this case from the

West. As a consequence, one tends to hold conservative positions: the idea that everything in the

past was better will get through. The return to old traditions and to the indigenous religion turns

out to be not only an individual need, but also a political program.

The Birth of the current Islamism

As a consequence of this reaction, if one compares the slow tempo of the evolution that

occurred before the colonial occupation, with the speed with which changes occurred after this

occupation, one can see that in a small period of time the evolution went from an Islamic

Modernism which was open to incorporate foreign ideas to the Islam (provided that these would

reinforce Islam), to a movement pretending to re-Islamize the Muslim society, that declares

dangerous every idea coming from the outside (specifically from the West).

As example of this acceleration the following data are offered: In 1924-25 the Saud dynasty

took power in the Arabian Peninsula, using (as previously seen) the wahhabist ideology as its

basis of reunification and Rashid Rida as their ideologist. In Egypt, Hasan al-Banna (1906-1949)

founded in 1928 the Muslim Brotherhood. In 1941 Maulana Abu l-Ala al-Mawdudi (1903-

1979) founded the Djamaat-i Islami in India and in the mid-40’s started the struggle of the

Fedayan-i-Islami in Iran, which was founded by the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (1900-1988).

The last three may be considered the basis of the current Islamism.

Compared with the Islamic Modernism or Salafism (Afghani, Abduh and Rida), Islamism

(or Islamic Fundamentalism) is the product of a new generation of scholars. They do not

represent the pure intellectuals, but the middle class of their societies. Between them (with the

22

exception of Iran) there are more university-educated individuals than mullahs (ritual

practitioners of religion).

The movement was generated as a reaction against the influence of western colonialism

(they named it imperialism) and (contrary to the salafist) directed specifically against the ruling

class of the respective societies and their adaptation to western ideas. Another distinction from

Islamic modernism is that the West, for the Islamist, does not represent a certain “positive

challenge” but an undetermined threat.

To the ideal of the Western modernity as adopted by the Muslim elites, the Muslim Brothers

opposed the idea of “Islamic modernity.” That means, to the Christian ideas of separation

between the politics, religion and culture within the Muslim societies (as previously explained),

the Brothers opposed the ideal of the Islamic society as the extension of the “oneness” (or unity,

tawhid) of God in the community of believers (umma), unifying society, state, culture and

religion in a unique and indivisible mix: the Islamic state. For them every division of the umma

is contrary to Islam and, that is why the Islamist rejected the political parties24. This will be

further explained in chapter 6, under the Islamic model of society.

King Farouk of Egypt used this to his own benefit, against the secularism of the nationalist

movements. Later on, the confrontation with Nasser’s nationalism and the claim that the

Brothers had attempted to kill Nasser (1954) led to the dissolution of the organization.

The model to be used for the Muslim community is, for the Islamist, the Original

community of the Prophet and the four “well directed Caliphs”(al-rachidun). This model differs

again from the High Middle Age Islamic civilization (model of the Modernist-Salafist). The

philosophic and scientific Islamic tradition (from the period of High Middle Age) is rejected as

infidel by the Islamist25.

23

But there were different interpretations over how to establish an Islamic state. One

interpretation (moderate) foresees the Islamization of the complete society “from the bottom up”

but peacefully, and trying to exercise pressure over the rulers to change the legislation,

introducing the sharia (al-Banna and Mawdudi had this interpretation). Nevertheless, if the

rulers would not come to terms, then they were prepared to use the popular agitation against

them.

Others, as Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966) and Khomeini, considered impossible to get a

compromise, not only with the rulers but also with the Muslim society as it was at that time,

therefore, advocated for “revolution” and “rupture26.” Qutb equals the existing Muslim states

with the societies before the Prophet: jahiliyya (meaning both barbarism and ignorance) is the

name he uses for these States. As a consequence, and as it occurred at the time of the Prophet,

the real Muslims should fight jihad against the infidel (kafir) rulers of those (nominally Muslim)

states in order to establish a real Islamic state.

Nevertheless none of the above mentioned founders except Khomeini used their theories in

reference to social differences. Among the “sunni27 Arab,” only Qutb presented Islam as a tool of

social justice, but he did not use this concept in order to lead any movement of the “disinherited”

among the Muslim community28. This is coherent with the above-mentioned ideas of the

“oneness” of the umma and with the Islamist rejection of the political parties.

Nonetheless, Qutb’s ideas were considered dangerous by the Nasser regime that accused

him of conspiring to assassinate President Nasser. Consequently he was imprisoned in 1965 and

later summarily judged and hung in1966.

24

Chapter 5

The radicalization: from the Seven Days War to the Gulf War

The creation of the Muslim Brotherhood, as mentioned before, was accelerated by the

imposition of civilization by the western powers, but it has to be seen as a reaction to the local

modernization (adoption of western modernism) of the society. However, for a long time the

movement was kept at the universities, and between the scholars, with no real contact with the

Muslim masses. The Arab Nationalism was the triumphant movement.

This changed dramatically with the disaster of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. After the

humiliation suffered in the “seven days war”, Nationalism began gradually losing the popular

support and Islamist movements started to be revitalized, steadily fulfilling the vacuum left by

the nationalist disaster.

In Egypt the first reaction to the defeat was driven by the leftist students, who started rioting

against Nasser’s Government. The situation was similar in the other Arab states affected by the

defeat. Nasser’s image as “progressive and socially involved” was in danger, so the reaction (not

only in Egypt but in all the affected Arab states) was to confront the leftist as a threat to the state.

In Jordan the riots of the Palestinian Organizations (erected as representatives of the Arab

Nationalism after the defeat) were stopped by the use of force, becoming the “Black September

bloodbath” (1970).

25

During these riots, King Hussein of Jordan found some support from the Muslim Brothers,

something that was going to be useful for the movement in other Arab countries. But in fact the

support was really based in the Brother’s rejection of the socialist and nationalist ideology of the

PLO as forming part of the European (“western”) influence.

Two main reasons could be suggested as motive for the failure of the leftist student

movements that (finally) resulted in their partial suppression from some Muslim countries: first

(as exposed above) their confrontation with the rulers and second (and more important) their

message resulted excessively “foreign” for the Muslim masses. Finally some of the leftist

students started to convert to Islamism, after having seen the problems of the left to get support

from the population.

Moreover, there was a new generation of scholars, who took the relief from the generation

who fought against the “imperial” powers to get the independence. This new generation had not

benefited from independence and had not lived the nationalist euphoria. They were the

descendants of emigrants to the big cities and formed part of a population explosion. They were

educated in the western style and had great expectations of social progress; expectations that did

not become a reality. The resulting frustration was directed against the ruling elites and

expressed as a rejection of their nationalist ideology29.

The final result of the situation described was the gradual elimination of possible ideological

competitors for the Islamism. While the leftists were persecuted, the Islamists have always had

the possibility of using the Mosque as a reunion point and the pulpit to give political sermons.

Moreover, in Egypt Anwar Sadat released the Islamist leaders from prison after he succeeded

Nasser in power.

26

The natural consequence of the above exposed situation was that the Islamist started, slowly

but surely, to rebuild their network departing from the universities and continuing, through the

mosques, to the rest of the society. The Islamists propagated the ideas of Qutb, Mawdudi and

Khomeini, instigating the masses to prepare for a new war against Israel.

The October 1973 war was seen as retaliation for the previous defeat, and the result was (as

seen by the Arab world) positive. But after the oil embargo forced the peace treaty, the Saudis

benefited most from the situation. The increased prices brought money reserves to the Saudis,

reserves that were invested in support of the local Islamist movements around the Muslim

World, mainly to win support and legitimacy for the (Saudi) Wahhabism. The objective was to

replace the different nationalist movements among the sunni Arab world with a unified Islam

after the Wahhabist model, not limited by the traditional frontiers of the Muslim World30.

Meanwhile in Egypt, after a period of good relationship between Sadat’s Regime and the

Islamist intellectuals, there was a radicalization from a sector of the movement under the name

of “Takfiri” (those who excommunicate other Muslims). This movement, based on Qutb’s

doctrine, was lead by Shukri Mustafa and reached more audience after kidnapping and

murdering an “official cleric” (Sheik Dhahabi from the Al Azhar university). The group was

arrested and tried, condemning the leader to death. The military prosecutor of the trial provoked

irritation among the Islamists after incriminating the entire movement for the situation. Later on

in November 1977, the Islamists denounced Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem to make peace with Israel

as “shameful.” This, in change, provoked the dissolution of some student movements and their

return to secrecy31.

27

The Iranian revolution

With the purpose of reaching a better understanding of the present situation and before

continuing with the history of the radicalization of the Islamism and the Iranian revolution, let us

have a look into the two fractions that, in terms of political legitimacy, dispute the “orthodoxy”

among the Muslims: The Sunnis and the Shiite.

Let us start by stating that there is no theological divergence between Shiism and Sunnism.

Both fractions share the same beliefs and base their way of living upon the Qur’an. But, as stated

in the beginning of this study, Islam unified in the person of the Prophet (and his followers, the

Khalifa=Deputy or successor) the head of the State and the exemplification of the religious life

for the Muslims. It is precisely in the line of succession where Shiite and Sunnis differ. The

Prophet died without designating his successor and, moreover, without a son to continue his

bloodline of succession according with the Arab tradition. This created dissension among his

followers from the beginning. A faction (Shia’) believed that Ali, Muhammad’s cousin and

husband of Fatima (his daughter), was the legitimate first Khalif and not the fourth. But the

successor Abu Baqr (Muhammad’s father in law) was officially designated by “consensus”

(ijma) of the community, according with the Muslim custom (Sunnah). Most of the Muslims

supported this mainstream line of Khalifs, and came to be known as Sunnis.

After Ali’s assassination by the first Umayyad Khalif (661), his younger son Husayn

rebelled against the rule of the Sunnis and was killed (680) in a massacre at Karb-Allah, Iraq32.

The Shiite commemorate annually this massacre. The main difference between both groups lies

nowadays in Shiite’s differentiation of spiritual direction (imama) from the political direction

(jilafa) and their rejection of the political power as evil. Nevertheless, for centuries they had no

28

intention of revolting against it. They believe true imams are direct descendants of Ali and

expect the “come back” of the twelfth imam, Muhammad al-Mahdi, who disappeared in 874.

While the Sunnis base their law and ethics in the decisions of the community (consensus or

ijma), the Shiite believe the imam is the only interpreter of law and tradition.

In the early seventies, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini published the book “Islamic

Government,” containing the ideas implemented by the Islamic Republic after coming to power.

His power as Shiite interpreter of the law was used to support the Islamist ideas. He adapted

those ideas to the Shiite version by introducing the idea of “vilayat-i faqih” (government of the

doctor of the law). That enabled the mobilization of disciples and followers in a way impossible

for the Sunni Muslims to reach.

Khomeini’s political strength rested in his ability to foresee and use the expectations of the

young activists for his purposes. This way he used the ideas of Ali Shariati, a young activist that

advocated for the “continuation of the fight against state injustice begun by Ali and Husayn.33”

Ali Shariati (1933-1977) transformed the Marxist theory of class struggle into an Islamic

friendly theory, realizing that the failure of the Marxism to mobilize the Muslim masses was due

to the cultural distance that the Marxist terminology had in relationship with the religious

terminology used by the Muslim masses. So he transformed “oppressors” and “oppressed” into

the Qu’ranic words “mustakbireen” (the arrogant) and “mustadafeen” (the weakened or

disinherited). In 1970 Khomeini’s speeches used those terms, presenting himself as the

representative of the disinherited34.

Khomeini was also able to use to his benefit the frustration of the young immigrants in

Teheran who lived in bad conditions in the suburbs, and the reaction of the traditional middle

class (the bazaar owners) who were economically damaged by the Shah’s economic policy.

29

He was able to use his religious rhetoric to mobilize the students together with other urban

groups to demonstrate against the regime, using the “martyrs” caused by police repression as an

example to be followed by the “disinherited” in their fight against the evil monarch.

At the end of this spiral of radicalization, he was supported by most of the minor mullahs

and the complete mosques network (with the the madrassas or Islamic “schools”) and was able

to get support from the leaders of the Liberal National Front and the Tudeh Communist party as

well. As proof of his power, he used the days of Husayn’s martyrdom commemoration (on

December 10 and 11) 1978 to defy the Shah by ordering to shout “Allah Akhbar” from every

terrace and rooftop in Tehran. This was enough for the Shah who left Iran one month and five

days later35.

The reactions to the Iranian revolution and Afghanistan

The lesson of the Shah’s regime fate was well learned among other Muslim regime leaders,

which tried to present themselves as the best Muslims and asked the official ulemas for help and

legitimacy. In change the ulemas required more control over morals and culture, taking some

advantage over the secularist sector of the society. One consequence of this situation was the

strengthening of the external signals of religious behavior.

But the aspirations of the Iranian revolutionaries did not stop in Iran. They wanted to export

the Islamic Revolution to the rest of the Muslim World, hoping to capitalize the revolt of the

population against their leaders. So they tried to reach to the young Islamist in other Muslim

countries.

There they competed with the Saudis for leadership (political as well as religious) of the

Islamism in the Muslim world. To prevent the spread of revolution among the Sunni countries,

the Saudis presented the Iranian revolution first as a product of the Shiite imams (they consider

30

them heretical), and secondly as a demonstration of the propensity to expansionism of the

Persian nationalism. Saddam Hussein used the last argument to justify the war against Iran36.

But the Saudi influence over the sunni World was well-based. As mentioned before, the oil

embargo in 1973 brought more revenues to the Saudis converted increasingly to charities in

support of the Islamist movement in other Muslim countries. With those charities they were able

to found (around) 1500 new mosques all over the world. In the Muslim countries a madrassa or

religious school, where kids are educated using the Qur’an as a unique text, accompanied those

mosques. Moreover, realizing that controlling the sermons and readings heard and distributed in

these Mosques was worth the effort, in order to gain control of the population who were

susceptible of being recruited by the revolutionaries (the young population and the disinherited).

The Wahhabites started printing and distributing millions of Qur’ans along with other texts

belonging to the Wahhabite ideology and millions of cassettes containing fevent sermons, using

this way of preaching to promote the “daawa” (the call to Islam)37.

One unexpected effect of the reading of Ibn Taymiyya (one of the authors distributed by the

Wahhabites) by young Islamists in Egypt was the justification of the assassination of Sadat in

1981. One of these young Islamists, Abdessalam Faraj founder of the radical group “Jihad” that

maintained the line of Qtub’s theories, called Sadat (after his visit to Jerusalem and the signing

of the peace treaty with Israel) “apostate of Islam fed at the tables of imperialism and

Zionism38;” and this was the sign for his assassination. This could also be seen as a signal toward

later developments, a signal that the conservative Saudis were not able to see.

In December 1979 the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan to support Kabul’s communist

regime, starting a period of ten years occupation. Due to the division of the Muslim countries,

some of them allied with the Soviets, it was not possible for the Saudis to built a common front

31

against them. The only possibility left was to gather some well known ulemas to issue some

“fatwas” (legal opinion based on the holy text in answer to a question) declaring the Soviet

intervention as invasion of dar al-Islam (the house of submission to God) by the impious (kafir)

and, as a consequence, declare jihad against them. According with the defensive character of this

jihad, every Muslim was obligated to participate, but in the beginning the only support came as

financial help. Nevertheless, in 1985 the foreign jihadists (most of them Arabs) started to arrive

to Peshawar (Pakistan) to be trained and then move to Afghanistan39.

To get better control over both investments and weapons (shipped from both the US and the

Muslim Community) they accumulated in Pakistan, the Saudis were forced to recruit

“trustworthy agents” (Arabs) who were willing to go to Afghanistan. One of them was Abdallah

Azzam a Muslim Brother who in 1984 established in Pakistan a “Bureau of Services to the

Mujehedeen,” to receive, supervise and organize the Arab volunteers. He was a Palestinian

university professor, who tried to make clear to all the Muslims the obligation to fight jihad in

Afghanistan. But for him the obligation to fight against those who usurped Islamic land was not

only limited to Afghanistan but to other Muslim (or former Muslim) lands, starting with

Palestine40.

Some of the international jihadists were experienced radical activists in their original

countries, so that their national authorities were glad to lose them in the mountains of

Afghanistan. For others it was a new experience, as well as an initialization to radicalism. When

the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan (February 1989), the US help was reduced;

consequently, the fight against the communist rulers remained unsolved for years. On November

24, 1989, Abdallah Azzam was killed by anonymous assassins.

32

The Gulf War

The invasion of Kuwait occurred in the middle of a meeting of the Organization of the

Islamic Conference assembled in Cairo that voted to express its solidarity with the emirate and

condemning the Iraqi invasion. But five of his members (plus Iraq) did not approve the

resolution, three of them voting against it and the others abstaining. Other than the beginning of

an international crisis which ended in the Gulf War, this was the beginning of a long lasting

division in the Muslim world. Five days later, King Fahd asked the United States for military

assistance.

To understand the implications and the argumentation used by both parties to support their

own posture, one must know the situation: the (so named) “Custodian of the Two Holy Places of

Islam” (Mecca and Medina) asked for (and accepted) “infidel soldiers” to stay in this holy land

to defend his own interests against another Muslim country. This was used by Saddam Hussein

to obtain support for his position. Saddam had learned in fighting with Iran to counter religious

argumentation that accused him of apostasy. So the first signal after invading Kuwait was to

struck his flags with the words “Allah Akbar” and to pray in public (and for the TV cameras) in

Kuwait City. Then he used the same arguments as Iran against Saudi Arabia: “the kingdom was

an American protectorate unworthy of governing the Holy Places.41”

According to Saddam, the Kuwaiti oil was going to help Iraq to be a strong Arab Power able

to oppose the new “American world order” and defend the poor nations against it. The idea was

to use the anti-Western feeling to reinforce a “single populist cause.42” To support his thesis,

Saddam called for a Popular Islamic Conference scheduled in Baghdad on January 15 (end date

of the UN ultimatum to Iraq) that called for jihad against the West due to the sacrilege

committed by the western soldiers against Mecca and Medina.

33

The Saudis, on the other side, convened in Mecca for the same day another meeting of the

Popular Islamic Conference, attended by the most respected figures among Islamic conservatives

that denounced Saddam Hussein and his rebel ulemas. This confrontation continued after the war

ended, demonstrating that Saddam had been successful in dividing sunni Islam in his favor.

Moreover, he succeeded in dividing the Saudis, provoking an internal crisis confronting the

liberal and the conservative wings of the Saudi society. After the war, the Islamists continued

attacking the Saudi monarchy with the purpose of ruining the long-term effort developed by the

Saudis to obtain the moral leadership of the Islamic World43.

But this was not going to be the last blow against the Saudi’s leadership. After the United

States reduced its help in 1989 (financial and weapons), following the Soviet withdrawal, the

Afghan mujahedins (combatant for God) and the Arab jihadists had a prolonged fight against the

(Afghan) communist rulers. Unable to unify themselves fighting their common enemy, it took

the mujahedins much longer than estimated (until 1992) to beat the communist regime.

Moreover, the jihadists saw the fund reduction as an abandonment from the U.S. and,

consequently the anti-western sentiment revived. This was contrary to what Riyadh initially

expected, when it tried to divert the jihadists (Islamist) anti-western feeling towards the Soviets.

Finally the ties between Riyadh and the jihadists had broken when Abdullah Azzam (their

intermediary) was killed. The result was the loss of control over the radical activists. During the

Gulf War, when the local Islamist (following the Pakistani Islamists) started to turn against the

Saudi monarchy, the Arab jihadists subscribed to this sentiment, feeling free from Saudi tutelage

and (finally) revolting against it44. When Najibullah’s regime fell, there were many radical

veteran jihadists, well trained to fight and disposed to continue fighting and training others

staying uncontrolled between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

34

Chapter 6

Islamism as mass movement

Once we have gotten to this point, we could ask how is the movement organized, what

makes it attractive and who is likely to be attracted by the Islamism?

Basically (as stated in chapter 5) the initial militants of Islamism were young intellectuals,

educated in the western style and coming from recently urbanized families. That is, mainly

people stemming from the middle class, marginalized politically and culturally by one

westernizing and modernizing elite class. But the western educated militants themselves were,

sociologically speaking, modern. So in conclusion, one can say that “rather than a reaction

against the modernization of Muslim societies, Islamism is a product of it.45”

The process towards Islamism could be summarized as follows: After the independence of

the different countries, the expectation of progress and prosperity originated massive movements

of the rural population to the cities. The youth population was educated in the western style and

expected better possibilities and economic wealth. But the structures of both the cities and the

new states were not well prepared to absorb both the increasing population and the need for new

jobs. Once the first generation after the independence of the new countries had experienced the

deception of those failures, the youth population started to search for the causes of the failures.

Their families, still structured in the traditional way but reduced to the small family cell, did not

offer them any answer, due to their superior level of education, so they sought for help in the

35

student associations. Some explanations, speaking about social classes, oppressors and

oppressed, sounded too foreign for them and too confusing. But then they heard another kind of

explanation using more familiar terms (like mustadafeen, the disinherited) related with Islam that

denounced the depravation of morals and customs of modern society and that related this

depravation with the perversion of the ruling elite and their acquisition of the western model to

rule the Muslim society. That was one form of the daawa (preaching or call to Islam)46.

Islamism is presented as the reaction against the anarchical modernization of the society,

destroying the ancient communal structures without creating any other new structure to

substitute them, forcing the rural emigration without preparing the cities to receive the

emigrants47. In this way the Islamic associations took advantage of the difficulties of

socialization of the rural emigrants and their separation from the traditional village, clan and (or)

family loyalties.

Summing up, the Islamist target is the individual Muslim using models extracted from the

daily life and targeting specially the urban conglomerations. The recruitment can be seen as a

reaction against the external influences (education, moral social…) and is mainly supported by

the individual devotion to the traditional model of patriarchal organization of society and family.

In some cases the mobilization may happen as a reaction to the loss of authority within the

family (from the father in relationship with the children and from the man in relationship with

the wife).

Depending on the level of personal conversion (personal re-Islamization) and purification,

there are four stages of affiliation: sympathizer, members, “pillars”, and shura-ye markazi (the

Central Council), which elect the emir, assisted by an Executive Committee.48

36

Ideology

Following the Prophet’s message that indicated “to live on God is sufficient to live in a

fraternal community”, a society without classes and without discrimination49, Islamism does not

pose a dilemma of class war, therefore its “revolution” is not the classical social revolution, but

instead it limits itself to recover the basic life ideals (as well familiar as social) based on the

Islamic religiosity. This way it goes further away from the social classes making no distinctions

between them50.

One can distinguish three dimensions in the ideology of the Islamism: first of all the

criticism of the modernizing society, secondly the historic-therapeutical dramatization of the

conflict between Islamism and western modernization and, finally, the draft of principles for the

ideal order. Next we are going to take a look at each of them separately.

Criticism of the Modernizing society

In the original Islamist ideology, the critique of the society was not based on political or

economical problems. In fact, the critique was based mainly on the failures committed on

cultural issues by governments (and monarchies) applying the westernization process to their

societies. The main critique of the Islamism was centered on the decline of social morals,

specifically the sexual moral, relations between sexes and the effects on the structure of the

family. Other examples of depravation used by the Islamist were (and are) the use of alcohol and

gambling. The examples used were (and are) clearly related to the day-to-day life of the (local)

Muslim society, something everybody is able to understand.

37

Later on they started to refuse the “developmental theories” exported from the West and

accepted and disseminated by the nationalistic elites, because they only produced the enrichment

of the elites (the minority) and the impoverishment and underdevelopment of the rest of the

societies. Their refusal of the western type of democracy is not based on the “ideal of

democracy” but in their experience of failures committed by the elites on their own societies

implementing what they called democracy. They keep remembering that in Arab cultural

traditions there is a strong tradition of consulting (shura) that may be assimilated to the western

parliamentarism51.

The message changed along the way. Nowadays it is mainly based on the failures of

modernization and its effects: the massive emigrations (to the cities and, later, to other countries)

and the negative consequences of these emigrations. The emigration from an Islamist point of

view is twofold: humiliating52 (remember the Prophet’s Hijra to Medina, forced by the paganism

of the Mecca society and their refusal to accept Islam) and moreover, when they are forced to

migrate not to Muslim countries, separates the emigrated people from the Muslim community,

where they are in the yahiliyya (the ignorance period which preceded the Prophecy), because

they are forced to live constantly surrounded by impurity and infidels.

The historic-therapeutical dramatization of the conflict between Islamism and Western Modernism

The critique of the society and the proposed ideal order (we are going to take a look at it

next) are used in a dramatized form by the Islamists to represent (with a kind of historical

background) the eschatological fight between good and evil, between “the powers of the light

and the powers of the darkness, between the agents of God and those of Satan, between the true

Muslims and the pagan53.”

38

This dramatization is a fundamental part of the Islamist ideology and, whenever possible,

will be used to obtain conversions in mass or (in its negative form) to separate someone (or

specific groups) from the rest of the Muslim society (excommunication or takfir).

The Ideal Order: The Fundamentals of Islam

In relationship with the Ideal Order of the Islamist society, Islamists desire a community

without conflict of classes, built on the base of the society in the time of the Prophet: "The Islam

is interpreted as a total System to regulate the Society and the way of living.54" Following the

Islamist ideas one should be able to solve all social problems by going back to the Qur’an and

the Sunna, and the result would be a successful Islamic community. The model of society is

going to be treated in the next chapter.

As explained in chapter 3, the Muslim religious life is based upon the “five Pillars of

Islam”, which summarize the essential nature and structure of Islamic faith and practice.

Islamists have used one of the pillars, the paying of ritual alms (Zakat or Zakah), to expand their

influence creating new Mosques together with new Islamic Schools or madrassas. In fact from

the great religions, Islam is the only one that continues expanding (in Africa for instance) thanks

to the generosity of the Muslims.

The Islamic Model of Society

In comparison with the model of industrial society organized pluralistic and bureaucratically

according to laws, which are intended to regulate conflicts of interest, the Islamist ideal

represents a religiously integrated society, organized according to a patriarchal model.

The historical genesis of the western constitutional rights and public liberties should be seen

as a logical consequence of the different revolutions and social confrontations in the West,

39

resulting in the victory of the middle-class, and the doctrine of Enlightenment with the human

(and citizen) rights declaration in the form of general and impersonal laws. This genesis has no

comparable emulation in the Muslim community where (as stated in the beginning of chapter 3)

for centuries there was no separation between the religious and the political leader. Moreover,

the Qur’an, according to the Prophet’s revelation, introduces the idea of the need to maintain the

“oneness” (tawhid) of the Muslim (up to this time still Arab) community (umma) in different

verses, and prevents the Muslims from everything that threatens to divide them, avoiding the

constitution of groups and parties55. According to this tradition, the Islamist movements have

postulated for the unity of the Muslim community in an Islamic state ruled according to the law

of the sacred text: the Shari’a 56.

This is the reason for the idea “the Qur’an Is our Constitution” repeated by every Islamist

movement. Based on this idea, the valid institutions that have to be developed (following the

tradition) are only two: the amir (emir) or leader of the community and the shura or advisory

council. Again following the Muslim tradition, the amir should be both the political and the

religious leader, and (due to this dual role) therefore, he should be a model of behavior57.

For Muslims, sovereignty belongs only to God, therefore the Islamists dislike of the

“popular sovereignty” from the western model. Just in case the amir could not be easily

differentiated from others, his election could be made by a shura (advisory assembly) or even by

universal suffrage. In this case the decision does not represent popular sovereignty, but

community consensus (ijma).58 The shura can take the form of a parliament but without the

legislative function (for only God legislates) acting only as counseling council to help the amir

to make decisions and reminding him of Islamic principles.

40

The Sunni Islamists strongly reject formulating the relations and the specific form of the

different branches of government in the form of a Constitution. They apply the slogan “the

Qur’an Is our Constitution,” specifying that “Whatever form the executive may take, a leader is

always subject to both the shari’a and to the ijma (consensus) formulated under it.59”

“Jihad:” The Sixth Pillar?

In the Arab language the word jihad has three different meanings: Internal or personal

struggle, fight for the expansion of Islam (struggle against the infidels) and the struggle against

the bad Muslims. “It always means the struggle in the way to God.60”

According to the Islamic tradition, the historical mission of the Umma is to convert the

whole humanity to the true religion. For Islam there are two worlds: the dar al-Islam or house of

submission to God and the infidel world denominated dar al-harb or house of the war destined

to disappear.61

Formally Jihad is not one of the five Pillars of Islam, but the Qur’an has several references

(see Anex A) about the need to fight against the infidels and Ibn Taymiyya, one of the

intellectuals most referred by the Islamists, gives the propagation of Islam by the arms a

preponderant position in relationship with the five pillars.

41

Chapter 7

Possible implications for the U.S. and other Western countries

If we compare the original thought that gave life to the renovation movement to the situation

now, we can appreciate a significant change in the reasononing of the Muslim inferiority in

relationship with the West: The original question “what can we make better?” changed towards

“what have they done to us?” This occurred particularly after the 1967 War, the humiliating

defeat that marked the decline of the Arab Nationalism and the rise of the Islamist movements.

The change from the original question occurred before, when the Nationalist elites perceived

the partition of the Arab Nation and the (posterior) creation of the State of Israel as an act of

treason from the mandate powers. The second question (“what have they done to us?”) served

for a long time, as justification for the failures they committed when they tried both to destroy

Israel and to alleviate the poverty that drove their nations. It served to direct the population’s

irritation against an (supposed) “exterior conspiracy,” rather than against themselves62.

Nevertheless, (as seen in chapter 5) the Islamists had no hesitation in charging the nationalist

elites with the blame for the failures.

Meanwhile the U.S. had inherited from the mandate powers the blame for both, the support

to Israel and the exterior reason for the failures in different Arab countries. But nowadays there

are not only the elites trying to blame someone else, but also the Islamists who blame the U.S.

for their support to the ruling elites, against whom they are trying to fight.

42

After the Iranian revolution and Khomeini’s declaration of the U.S. as the “great Satan,”

other Islamist movements started to demonize the U.S. in their sermons. But it was only upon the

first Gulf War that those ideas generalized among the Islamists. From one extreme of the Islamic

community to the other, the reactions to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait were initially contrary to

Saddam, but after the Western forces build-up started, they began, in the majority, to

demonstrate against the war. Nevertheless, the Muslim Brothers did not react uniformly, but

according to their particular national interests. In this way the Kuwaitis supported the

intervention while the Jordanians opposed it.

Particularly two cases serve as examples: the Pakistani Islamist movement requested

Saddam to withdraw his troops in order “not to give the West a pretext for military intervention,”

later on they thought the war was an American-Israeli plot to dominate the Middle East and they

turned against the Saudis63. In Morocco the Islamist opposition accused the rulers of being

Western accomplices for sending 5000 men to Saudi Arabia. The consequences were strikes and

mutinies in Fez and Tangier in January 1991, where some demonstrators were killed and others

wounded and where (for the first time in Morocco) the demonstrators questioned the Monarchy

under the motto: “Thirty years is enough,” and even units of the Royal Moroccan Armed Forces,

detached in Sahara, deserted to join the Iraqis.

The Islamists do not accept the presence of “infidel” troops in the Arab Holy Land. This was

one of the reasons used by Osama Bin Laden to declare Jihad against the US. Moreover, this

presence reminded the Muslim community of the past; of the time of colonial empires that the

Islamists deeply believe originated the division of the Arab Nation and the origin of the State of

Israel. Those are populist arguments still used in profusion by the radical Islamists trying to keep

the revolutionary flame alive.

43

If we take into account the deep faith of the majority of the Muslim practitioners together

with their perception of the unsuccessful relation with the West, we can understand their need

for success as a need for a signal that God is again with them to fulfill His promise (according

to Qur’an 3, 110). But this “need for success” can take the form of genuine paranoia.

Different populist demagogues have used this idea to win the support of the simple-minded

sectors of the Muslim population. This was the case with Saddam Hussein’s promise of the

“Mother of all Battles” against the Western Coalition during the first Gulf War, presented as a

Holy War against the West. He convinced many not so well informed Muslims of his

possibilities of victory (against all odds), gaining their support in this way.

Nowadays Western coalitions occupy Afghanistan and Iraq trying to build new regimes in

both countries. The resistance against coalition forces appears to be formed by members of the

old army, supporting the fallen regimes. They may be organized and paid by members of the old

regimes (for Afghanistan that means Osama Bin Laden) to prepare terrorist attacks against the

coalitions and its Iraqi collaborators. The “international jihadists” appear to be acting in the same

scenarios organizing terror attacks and suicide bombings.

In Iraq both the Shiis (Islamist or not) and the Kurds benefited most from Saddam’s fall.

That means that as long as the presence of foreign troops does not last a prolonged period of

time, they are safe to organize the preparations for possible elections. The situation is completely

different for the sunni minority. They have lost their power and, unless the principle of

proportionality is assured in the future constitution for the different ethnic and religious groups,

they may be swept from the parliament and from government. That implies that they may be

inclined, if not convinced otherwise, to support the organization and realization of terror attacks

against the coalition and other Iraqi collaborators. Nevertheless, to write the constitution

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(according with chapter 6) is going to be a great challenge for all the involved groups, taking

into account their different expectations.

So far for the internal Iraqi situation, specifically regarding the intervention of the

“international jihadists,” we can affirm that they try to terrorize, not only the coalition forces, but

also the Iraqi population, in order to avoid the collaboration of the population with the (so called)

“occupation forces.” Their final intention could be to bring the nation to such a chaotic situation

(fitna meaning disorder) that allows them to start an Islamic revolution.

Regarding the situation in Iran, after the generational relief (with the “come to age” of a new

generation that did not participate in the revolution, nor knew the Shah) we are witnessing the

internal struggle towards a real democracy. Nevertheless, as we were also able to see, the

conservative elite can rapidly stop these evolutional changes, if they feel their power is going to

be in danger. If these nearly-dictatorship types of regimes are challenged from the exterior, they

have all the possibilities (e.g. IO, Psycho Ops etc.) of convincing their populations to support

them, transforming what is actually a challenge to the regime into a threat to the nation. In this

way they are able to block any possibility towards a democratic evolution.

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Chapter 8

Conclusions

Basically Islamism is a movement directed against the anarchical modernization of the

Muslim society and against the ruling modernizing elites. They postulated for the unity of the

Muslim community (the umma) in an [unique] Islamic State ruled according to the law of the

sacred text: the Shari’a.

Comparing on the one side the programs and expectations of the movements we have

studied and, on the other side, the realities we can find in the present situation, we can deduce

the following:

They have not reached the “unity” of the umma or Muslim community, as requested by the

tawhid or “oneness” of God and his community of believers. In fact what we can see now are

diverse movements based in diverse national particularities. Moreover, the different Islamist

movements entered into competition with the official Islamism organized at national level by the

official ulemas, at the request of the national rulers. The only existing international Islamist

movement is the radical Al Qaida (international jihadist).

At the moment, with the exception of Iran, none of the Islamist movements have come to

power. As seen in chapter 5 the revolution in Iran was successful due to the conjunction of

personal religious power, leadership qualities and revolutionary methods, similar to those of the

Soviet Revolution.

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It is important to note that the revolution in Iran involved all the sectors of the Iranian

population, something that no other Islamic movement has been able to repeat until now.

The high level of expectations present in the Islamic model of society (as seen in chapter 6),

makes it nearly impossible for the model to become a reality, at the personnel level (the amir

should be a model of morality and religiosity), and at the community level it must be really

functional. That makes the model nearly a utopia, as we have seen in the Iranian case.

Independently of the possibilities of the model to become reality, Islamism is going to

continue existing in the Muslim countries in the next future, for as long as the social and moral

conditions that gave form to the current Islamism still exist, will the movement continue to be

attractive for a sector of the Muslim population. This, in change, will continue influencing the

internal political relations among Muslim states.

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Annex A

Summary of the content of “Sura” related to Jihad

Number of Sura and Verse Summary of content

Sura VIII Verse 39

Sura II Verse 217

Sura III Verse 157

Sura III Verse 158

Sura III Verse 169

Sura VIII Verse 17

One has ordered you to combat

Sura VIII Verse 39 Combat against them until they give up trying to induce

you to apostatize and everyone worship God

Sura IX Verse 29

Combat against those, who having received the (Holy)

Scripture do not believe neither in God nor in the last Day,

nor do they forbid what God and His Envoy forbid, nor do

they practice the true religion. Until the moment when,

humiliated, they pay the tribute directly.

Sura IX Verse 41

Sura IX Verse 111

Sura IX Verse 123

Sura XLVII Verse 35

Sura LIX Verse 8

Believers! Combat against the infidels that you have near

to you!

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14. Lewis, Bernard, The Crisis of Islam. Holy War and Unholy Terror, Modern Library, New York 2003 15. Lewis, Bernard, What went wrong?, Oxford University Press, New York, 2002 16. Lopez Garcia, Bernabe, El Mundo Arabo-Islamico Contemporaneo, Una Historia Politica, Sintesis, Madrid 1997 17. Marty, Martin E., Fundamentalismus heute, Die Politische Meinung, Heft 271, 1992. 18. Moaddel, Mansoor, The Study of Islamic Culture and Politics: An overview and assessment. Online Internet. Available from: http://www.annualreviews.org/catalog/2002/so28.asp 19. Reissner, Johannes, Islamischer Fundamentalismus: Zur Tauchlichkeit eines Begriffs bei der Erklärung der heutigen islamischen Welt, Der politische Islam: Intentionen und Wirkungen. 1993 20. Riesebrodt, Martin, Islamischer Fundamentalismus aus soziologischer Sicht, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, Heft B33/93 1993 21. Roy, Olivier, The Failure of Political Islam, Harvard University Press, 1996 (1st French edition 1992) 22. Roy, Olivier, Neofundamentalismo. Online Internet. Available from http://www.cholonautas.edu.pe/pdf/neufund.pdf 23. Steinbach, Udo, Der Islam im Nahem Osten. Informationen zur politischen Bildung, Heft 238, 1993 24. Steppart, Fritz, Mobilisiert der politische Islam soziale oder ethnische Umsturzkräfte?, Die “Verwerfungszone” internationaler Politik zwischen Magreb und Golf, AIK Waldbröl, 1993 25. Tibi, Bassam, Der islamische Fundamentalismus zwischen “halber Moderne” und politischen Aktionismus, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, Heft B33/93 1993 26. Tibi, Bassam, Die fundamentalistische Herausforderung, der Islam und die Weltpolitik, Beck’sche Reihe, München, 1993 27. Tibi, Bassam, Islam between Culture and Politics, Palgrave, New York, 2001 28. Tibi, Bassam, Vom Gottesreich zum Nationalstaat: Islam und Panarabischer Nationalismus, Franfurt a.M. 1992

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End Notes

1 Ba-Yunus, Ph. D. Ilyas, The Myth of Islamic Fundamentalism, available from

http://www.geocities.com/CollegePark/6453/myth.html 2 Etienne, Bruno, El Islamismo radical, Hachette, Paris 1987 / Siglo XXI 1996, pp. 161, 162 3 Etienne, Bruno, As above, p. 35 4 Lewis, Bernard, The Crisis of Islam, Modern Library New York 2003, pp. 6, 7 5 Tibi, Bassam, Vom Gottesreich zum Nationalstaat, Frankfurt am Main 1991 p. 67 6 Lewis, Bernard, What went wrong?, Oxford University Press, New York 2002, pp. 19-23 7 Steinbach, Udo, Der Islam im Nahen Osten, Information zur politischen Bildung, Heft Nr

238, Bonn 1993, pp. 12-14 8 Lopez Garcia, Bernabe, El Mundo Arabo-Islamico Contemporaneo, Una Historia Politica,

Sintesis, Madrid 1997, p. 36 9 Lewis, Bernard, What went wrong?, Oxford University Press, New York 2002, p. 43 10 Hottinger, Arnold, Verwestlichung als politisches and soziales Problem. Die

“Verwerfunszone” internationaler Politik zwischen Maghreb und Golf, AIK Wardbrol 1993, p 25

11 Esposito, John L. and Voll, John O., Makers of Contemporary Islam, Oxford University Press, New York 2002, p. 59

12 Riesebrodt, Martin, Islamischer Fudamentalismus aus soziologischer Sicht, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte Nr B 33/93, p. 11

13 Roy, Olivier, The failure of political Islam, Harvard University Press 1996, p. 33 14 Haim, Sylvia G., Arab Nationalism, an anthology, University of California Press,

paperback edition, 1976, pp. 20-21 15 Haim, Sylvia G., Arab Nationalism, an anthology, as above 16 Esposito, John L. and Voll, John O., Makers of Contemporary Islam, p.10 17 Haim, Sylvia G., Arab Nationalism, an anthology, as above 18 Kepel, Gilles, Jihad the trail of Political Islam, Harvard University Press, Cambridge,

Masashusets, 2002, p. 44 19 Lopez Garcia, Bernabe, as above, p.110 20 Lopez Garcia, Bernabe, as above. The complete Text of Article 22 reads as follows: “Certain communities, which belonged in the past to the Ottoman Empire, have reached

such a development degree that their existence as independent Nations may be provisionally recognized, with the condition that the advices and help of one Mandate Nation direct their administration until they are able to manage themselves. For the election of Mandate Nations, the aspirations of those communities must be previously taken into account.”

21 Hottinger, Arnold, Verwestlichung als politisches und soziales Problem, (as above), p. 27 22 Haim, Sylvia G., as above, pp. 40-41 23 Tibi, Bassam, die fundamentalistische Herausforderung, Becksche Reihe 1992, p. 52 and

Islam between Culture and Politics, Palgrave, New York, 2001, pp. 124-125

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24 Kepel, Gilles, Jihad the trail of Political Islam, p. 28. And Roy, Olivier, The failure of

political Islam, p. 71 25 Riesebrodt, Martin, as above, p. 12 26 Roy, Olivier, The failure of political Islam, as above, p. 41 27 The differences between Sunni and Shii Islam are going to be studied under the Iranian

Revolution 28 Kepel, Gilles, Jihad the trail of Political Islam, p. 36 29 Kepel, Gilles, as above, pp. 62-66 30 Kepel, Gilles, as above, p. 70 31 Kepel, Gilles, as above, pp. 83-86 32 Caner, Ergun M. and Caner, Emir F., Unveiling Islam, Kregel Publication, 2002, p. 161 33 Kepel, Gilles, as above, p. 38 34 Kepel, Gilles, as above, pp. 37-41 35 Kepel, Gilles, as above, pp. 108-112 36 Kepel, Gilles, as above, pp. 118-120 37 Kepel, Gilles, as above, pp. 71-73 38 Kepel, Gilles, as above, p. 86 39 Kepel, Gilles, as above, pp. 137-140 40 Kepel, Gilles, as above, pp. 144-149 41 Kepel, Gilles, as above, p. 206 42 Kepel, Gilles, as above, p. 209 43 Kepel, Gilles, as above, pp. 205-215 44 Kepel, Gilles, as above, p. 219 45 Roy, Olivier, The failure of political Islam, as above, p. 50 46 Etienne, Bruno, El Islamismo radical, Hachette, Paris 1987 / Siglo XXI 1996, p. 163 47 Etienne, Bruno, as above, p. 128 48 Roy, Olivier, The failure of political Islam, as above, p. 69 49 Etienne, Bruno, as above, p. 53 50 Riesebrodt, Martin, as above, p. 13 51 Etienne, Bruno, as above, p. 116 52 According to Etienne, Bruno, as above, p.52 53 Riesebrodt, Martin, as above, p. 14 54 Riesebrodt, Martin, as above 55 Etienne, Bruno, as above, p. 64 56 Kepel, Gilles, as above, p. 28 57 Roy, Olivier, as above, pp. 42-43 58 Roy, Olivier, as above, p. 44 59 Roy, Olivier, as above, p. 45 60 Etienne, Bruno, as above, p. 171 61 Etienne, Bruno, as above, p. 173 62 Lewis, Bernard, What went wrong?, Oxford University Press, pp.152-159 63 Kepel, Gilles, as above, p. 218