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i 11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111 3 4067 02087 028 2 ISSN 1327-8231 WORKING PAPERS ON ECONOMICS, ECOLOGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT Working Paper No. 21 A Report Prepared for the Queensland Commercial Fishermen's Organisation by Gavin Ramsayt, Clem Tisdellt and Steve Harrisont; David Pullar+ and Samantha Sun+ in conjunction with Ian Tibbetts* January 1998 t Department of Economics, The University of Queensland, Brisbane, Qld 4072, Australia. + Department of Geographical Sciences and Planning, The University of Queensland, Brisbane, Qld 4072, Australia. * The School of Marine Schience, The University of Queensland, Brisbane, Qld 4072, Australia.
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i11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111 3 4067 02087 028 2

ISSN 1327-8231 WORKING PAPERS ON

ECONOMICS, ECOLOGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT

Working Paper No. 21

A Report Prepared for the Queensland Commercial Fishermen's Organisation

by

Gavin Ramsayt, Clem Tisdellt and Steve Harrisont; David Pullar+ and Samantha Sun+ in conjunction with Ian Tibbetts*

January 1998

t Department of Economics, The University of Queensland, Brisbane, Qld 4072, Australia. + Department of Geographical Sciences and Planning, The University of Queensland, Brisbane, Qld

4072, Australia. * The School of Marine Schience, The University of Queensland, Brisbane, Qld 4072, Australia.

WORKING PAPERS IN THE SERIES, Economics} Ecology and the Environment are published by the Department of Economics, University of Queensland, 4072, Australia, as follow up to the Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research Project 40 of which Professor Clem Tisdell was the Project Leader. Views expressed in these working papers are those of their authors and not necessarily of any of the organisations associated with the Proj ect. They should not be reproduced in whole or in part without the written permission of the Project Leader. It is planned to publish contributions to this series over the next few years.

Research for ACIAR project 40, Economic impact and rural adjustments to nature conservation (biodiversity) programmes: A case study ofXishuangbanna Dai Autonomous Prefecture, Yunnan} China was sponsored by the Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research (ACIAR), GPO Box 1571, Canberra, ACT, 2601, Australia.

The research for ACIAR project 40 has led in part, to the research being carried out in this current series.

For more information write to Professor Clem Tisdell, Department of Economics, University of Queensland, Brisbane 4072, Australia.

Documents Included

Outline of report

Summary

Acknowledgments

Tenus ofreference

A review of reports on optimal Australian dugong populations and proposed action/conservation plans: an economic perspective

Compensation for the taking of resource interests: practices in relation to the wet tropics and Fraser Island, general principles and their relevance to the extension of dugong protection areas

Economic impacts of imposition of restrictions on gill nets on the Queensland east coast fishery

Representations of fishing effort and catch in the east coast fishery of Queensland

Representations of fishery closures on the east coast of Queensland

Appendices

Questionnaire

Preliminary report on economic impacts of imposition of restrictions on gill nets on the Queensland east coast fishery (8 August, 1997)

Clem Tisdell

Clem Tisdell

Gavin Ramsay, Steve Harrison and Clem Tisdell

David Pullar and Samantha Sun

David Pullar and Samantha Sun

ii

Background and outline of report

In June 1997, Senator Hill as federal minister for the environment announced proposed dugong protection areas (DPAs) on the east coast of Queensland, where restrictions would be introduced on the use of gill nets for fishing, on the grounds that dugong deaths arose from use of these nets. A number of studies by the government and fishing industry arose, to shed light on dugong biology, changes in dugong populations and possible causes. The Queensland Commercial Fishermen's Organisation (QCFO) contacted the School of Marine Science (SOMS) at The University of Queensland (UQ) concerning advice on the impacts to the fishing industry of the proposed bans. SOMS in tum contacted Professor Clem Tisdell, head of the Department of Economics concerning estimation of economic impacts, principles of compensation for the takings of property rights to natural resources, and other issues relevant to the fishing industry. A series of meetings led to the formulation of research projects in the area of economic analysis and geographical information systems, to be undertaken by independent researchers without undue influence by industry or environmental interest groups.

The project reported here, which was commissioned by the Queensland Commercial Fishermen's Organisation (QCFO), investigates the implications of the closure of the coastal gill net fishery in Queensland, and options available to the participants (i.e. the federal government, state government, fishers and dependent communities). In particular it seeks to clarify the accuracy of assun1ptions used in formulating the proposed strategy, and examine likely income losses in the fishing industry and the extent of consideration for compensation.

The terms of reference for the studies are included in the report to provide background information on the studies being carried out and information on the aims of the studies.

The report consists of four components. The first two components consist of papers written by Professor Clem Tisdell. The first paper examines compen§ation for the taking of resource interests and particularly examines practices in relation to compensation following the World Heritage listings of the Wet Tropics region of North Queensland and of Fraser Island. The application and relevance of compensation principles to extension of dugong protection areas are also examined. The second of Professor Tisdell's papers reviews reports on optimal Australian dugong populations and proposed conservation plans from an economic perspective.

Results from the survey of net fishers carried out in July 1997 are presented in the third component. In this component information on labour working in the fishing industry, fishing vessels, on-shore facilities, total annual catch and profit are presented and examined. In addition, information on the predicted response of fishers to fishing closures and willingness to accept compensation in return for surrender of fishing licenses is presented.

The fourth component is made up maps produced using a. geographical information system to provide information on fishing catch and effort and fishing closures on the east coast of Queensland. .

iii

Acknowledgements

We thank; the Queensland Commercial Fishermen's Organisation for funding the studies, all fishers who attended meetings and patiently completed questionnaires, the staff of QCFO especially Ted Loveday, Daryl McPhee and Martin Breen, and the local QCFO representatives for organising and participating in the district meetings held to complete the questionnaires.

We also thank Nick Emtage, Joe Owen, Robert Harrison and Bryan Morgan who assisted in data collection, entry and analysis, and who worked long hours to ensure the survey was completed quickly.

iv

Summary of major findings

The summary is presented under four headings which cover the components of the studies presented in this report, namely optimal dugong populations, principles of compensation, results of survey of net fishing industry and results from geographical information system studies.

1. Optimal dugong populations

An economic approach to optimality would evaluate the social economic costs and benefits of reducing the incidental catch of dugongs. Policy measures must be formulated by weighing up these two components. From a social economic perspective it is clear that too much reduction in by-catch can be forced on fishermen and excessive costs imposed on them if strategies or policies are proposed without economic assessment. This type of assessment is missing from reports prepared on the management of dugong. Economic issues should be explored further, especially given the regional repercussions likely to result from the imposition of extended dugong protection areas. In addition, more ecological research is needed and in particular research is needed to find cost-effective ways of maintaining dugong populations.

". .i' 2. Principles of compensation

The availability of compensation depends on the existence of private property rights expressed or implied. The stronger the property right and the greater the owner's loss the more likely the taking will be viewed as compensable. Queensland fishers have firm licences and endorsements to use different types of nets. The dugong protection areas restrict these rights and reduces the value of businesses which rely on these rights, hence a case for compensation exists.

In the case of communities governments have no legal requirement to compensate communities which may be adversely affected by the loss of resource interests, political reality often requires that such restitution is made. The loss of exploitation of a resource can depress the local economy; therefore, adverse economic effects are not restricted to those directly affected by the withdrawal of resource rights or interests.

The rationale for the taking of resource interests should be carefully considered before a decision is made. The value to the state acting on behalf of the community should exceed the economic value to users of retaining the rights. In relation to proposed extension of DPA's, these values have not been estimated or discussed to any extent.

It is possible that fishers are not the main cause of decline in the size of dugong populations. Other factors such as spill-overs from land-based agriculture and other economic activities could be major causes of decline. If this is so it provides a further reason why the full cost of further protection for dugongs should not fall solely on fishermen because this would be inequitable.

v

3. Results of survey of net fishing industry

In general the Queensland east coast net fishing industry is made up small scale owner operated businesses with a small number of larger enterprises. Considerable variation is present between fishers in the level of investment in vessels, nets, the annual total value of catch and profit. Investments in on-shore assets averages a little over $100,000. Total costs typically are of the order of $36,000 leading to a net margin of about $14,000 per fisher, equivalent to about 30 cents per dollar of total value of catch. All fishers own more than one vessel. Most vessels are made from aluminium and built in regional centres of Queensland.

Most of the labour force is made up of the licence holder and his spouse. Some businesses employ part-time labour while there is also a small number of larger businesses involved in the net fishing industry which employ full-time labour. However, the larger enterprises are often involved in net fishing for part of the year only, in particular during the cyclone season when it is not possible to carry out other fishing activities.

Fishers have a strong desire to continue fishing rather than take a compensation pa.ckagefor surrender of their liceIlc~~This was reinforced by the high value placed on their licence package by most active net fishers ..While some would be prepared to accept buyout offers for licences of $40,000 to $60,000 or less about 75% would not surrender licences for buyout offers of $100,000.

Most fishers believe they could survive in business with a reduced catch or increased cost of up to 10% to 15%. Information provided on debt levels was inconclusive, but it would appear some fishers would have difficulty meeting repayments if profitability were to fall.

The vast majority of fishing related expenditure is made in the home port and nearby regional centres. Restrictions on fishing while not having a major impact on the state's economy, could have considerable impact on local traders.

Most fishers felt they would become unemployed if they were to lose their licence. The lack of alternative employment prospects is related to their age and lack of training and skills that would enable them to gain alternative en1ployment.

4. Results from GIS studies

As a short term objective maps were produced to show the distribution of fishing activity and fishing effort along the Queensland coast. The data for these maps is based upon Queensland Fish Management Authority Logbooks for 1996. Due to release constraints the information is not shown to a detailed level. The resulting maps provide indicative evidence of fishing activity rather than an exact qualitative description. One important indication is how marginal the catch is for offshore fishing. Any further closure of inshore waters will significantly reduce the resources available for viable fishing industry. A further exercise was to map the extent of closed waters for commercial fishing along the coast. This proved to be difficult due

vi

to the lack of boundary information on regulated fishing closures. However an indicative map has been produced showing the scope of constraints on fishing.

Longer tern1 objectives for the project are to develop a GIS that monitors the distribution and density of sea grass beds. This is important for both ecological reasons and for sustainable commercial fishing. A beginning has been made, new data will be added on a piecemeal basis to build up evidence for existence of sea grass beds.

vii

Terms of Reference

Prepared by the School of Marine Science The University of Queensland For the Queensland Commercial Fishermen's Organisation

This project investigates the implications of the closure of the coastal gill net fishery in Queensland, and options available to the participants (i.e. the federal government, state government, fishers and dependent communities). In particular it seeks to clarify the accuracy of assumptions used in formulating the proposed strategy, examine likely income losses in the fishing industry and the extent of consideration for compensation, and provide some suggestions on the accuracy of the implied cause and effect relationship between dugong population decline and the activities of commercial fishers. The study has three components.

1. The effect of new restrictions on fishing activities

A GIS is to be created to assist in the economic analysis and to answer spatial queries related to dugong protected areas and fishing activities. Specifically the GIS will include: • Coastal Information • Management Areas • Fishing Activity and Catch Impact • Ecological Variables (seagrass habitat, dugong stock, etc.)

The GIS will be used to answer quantitative queries including: i) gross rate of production of fish by region, date, and species, and ii) relation of fishing activity to gazetted fish habitat areas, management areas, and proposed dugong protection areas. The GIS will output maps and tables useful in economic assessment. Also the GIS will provide graphical maps indicating fishing activity with respect to seagrass habitat and dugong habitats. The later will be useful to interpret various scientific findings and validate the boundaries described for protected areas, in particular to assess if dugong stock can be better protected by alternative management strategies.

2. The economic implications of changes in fishing activities

The examination of economic implications of changes in fishing activities will involve four major tasks, namely: • Examination of proposals for dugong management from an economic perspective • Collection of data from fishers by a questionnaire • Determine the individual and regional consequences, and • Examination of compensation The aims and methods for carrying out these tasks are detailed in these terms of reference.

3. Produce anecdotal evidence from fishers on the distribution of seagrass in the affected fishing areas.

viii

TOR Procedure The TOR as described below have been established through the joint agreement of a committee including Dr Daryl McPhee and Mr Ted Loveday (QCFO), Professor Clem Tisdell, Associate Professor Steve Harrison and Gavin Ramsay (UQ, Department of Economics) and Dr Ian Tibbetts (UQ, School of Marine Science), and Dr David Pullar (UQ, Department of Geographical Science and Planning).

Section 1. GIS Summary of Closures

Dr David Pullar, Peter Johnson and Samantha Sun Department of Geographical Science and Planning The University of Queensland

Plan The tasks involved in the GIS are:

Task Sub-Task Create Base Layer Import map data for coastline, etc.

Management Zones Import map data from GBRMPA Digitise DPI Gazetted Fish Habitat Areas Import DOE Marine Parks and Management Zones

Fishing Activity Geocode Fish Log Data from DPI Validate DPI estimates for random regions Interpolation of seagrass maps from UQ survey Generate appropriate tables and maps

Ecological Variables Import DOE Directory of Important Wetlands Import DPI Sea Grass Habitat Geocode AMCS Habitat Database

Review and Critique Comment on Causal Relationships Maps and Final Report

Section 2. Economic Implications of the Closure

Prof. Clem Tisdell, Assoc. Prof. Steve Harrison and Gavin Ramsay Department of Economics The University of Queensland

Examine from an economic perspective the proposals for dugong management. Determine the likely changes in fishing activities as a result of the proposed regulations and the effects of those changes on incomes from fishing. The economic implications of the closure will be examined using data collected during a survey of fishers and secondary data such as data from government agencies, the QCFO and previous studies. The examination will include the direct effects of the decision on the incomes and viability of fishers in the affected areas and the indirect regional effects.

ix

Task 1. Examination of proposals for dugong management from an economic perspective

Aims Determine the economic validity of proposals for dugong management and the system of Dugong Protected Areas.

Method Review dugong management proposals

Task 2. Collection of data from fishers by a questionnaire Aims Determine the effects of the proposed gill net restrictions on • the catch, effort and viability of fishers currently fishing in the affected areas • the actions they will take to ensure income • the likely effects of actions of fishers taken to ensure income • the likely effects on employment in local area • effects of proposed restrictions on associated industries • effects of proposed restrictions on local communities

Method • develop questionnaire • test on individual fishers in southern Queensland • collect data from fishers in affected areas through district meetings • analyse data

Task 3. Determine the individual and regional consequences Aim To determine the effect on the viability of individual fishers, associated industries and local communities of the proposed changes.

Method Using data from the questionnaire and secondary data sources, determine the economic impact of the proposed changes on an individual and community basis. Multipliers based on those found to be applicable to the industry and region will be used in determining the economic impact.

Task 4. Examination of compensation

Aim To determine appropriate levels of compensation for fishers should restrictions be applied.

Method Levels of compensation desired by fishers will be estimated via questionnaire. Methods to determine appropriate levels of compensation will be examined.

x

Section 2. Distribution of seagrass

Aim Determine using the local knowledge of fishers the distribution of seagrass in the fishing areas affected by DPA's.

Method, At meetings of fishers and using maps generated in the GIS component of the study obtain detailed information on the distribution and density of seagrass in the interim and proposed DPA's. Produced maps of this information.

xi

Budget

1. Department of Geographical Sciences and Planning

Most the work involves compilation and collating information already help by various agencies. Most information is already in a digital form and can be imported into a GIS, the one exception was the DPI Gazetted Fish Habitat Areas which are in a map form and would require digital conversion. Other information, such as fish log data, can be geocoded into the GIS based upon recorded geographical data. Most of this work and the production of maps and reports from the GIS will be conduct by a research student under the direct supervision of Dr. David Pullar. The final critique and review will bedone by Dr. Ian Tibbetts and a qualified research assistant, Peter Johnson.

Cost Heading Funding PERSONNEL

GIS Coordinator - Dr. David PuUar (10 Days @ $400/Day) 4,000 Research Assistant - Samantha Sun (21 Days @ $192/Day) 4,032 Research Assistant - Peter Johnson (8 Days @ 264/Day) 2,112

CONSUMABLES GBRMPA Data Extraction Costs 250 AMCS Data Extraction Costs 500 Overhead - computer usage, map output, etc. (10% of Personnel Costs) 1014

ITotal GIS $11,908 r

2. Department of Economics Personnel

Number Days Rate Amount CAT 10 500 5000 SRH 10 500 5000 GCR 20 400 8000 Interviewers 4 11 150 6600 Statistician, data 15 160 2400 entry

Travel 6 500 3000 Accommodation 6 12 100 7200 and meals Phone 500 Photocopying 200 and paper Typing 300 Incidentals 400 (taxis, parking fees etc) ITotal $ 386001

3. School of Marine Science Personnel

Dr Ian Tibbetts 5 400 2000

IGrand total $52,50SI

xii

A REVIEW OF REPORTS ON OPTIMAL AUSTRALIAN DUGONG POPULATIONS AND PROPOSED ACTION/CONSERVATION PLANS: AN

ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE

1. Introduction

Two important ecological reports, The Dugong Dugong dugon: An Action Planfor its

Conservation (Marsh et al., nod.) and A System of Dugong Sanctuaries for the Recovery and

Conservation ofDugong Populations in the Great Barrier ReefWorld Heritage Area (preen and

Morissette, 1997) have been prepared in recent times on the status of the dugong in Australia.

Each is accompanied by proposals to foster conservation of populations of dugong. The latter

report proposes ten dugong sanctuaries for the southern Great Barrier Reef and Hervey Bay (see

Figure 1). Gill nets are recommended to be banned in these sanctuaries.

Of the two reports, that by Marsh et al. (nod.) is the least categorical. It points out that

while dugong numbers have declined in The Great Barrier Reef (GBR) region south of

eooletown, 'the causes of the decline are unknown, but could include habitat loss, incidental

drowning in commercial gill nets and indigenous hunting', (p. 2). It states that 'apart from

dugongs drowned in shark nets in Queensland, there are no quantitative data on anthropogenic

impacts' (pp. 1-2). A well thought out list of research priorities essential for informed

management of dugong populations are set out (Marsh et at., nod, pp. 5-6).

jt Despite the fact that this research has not been completed, Preen and Morissette (1997)

make major policy recommendations for a system of dugong sanctuaries which are expected to

impact adversely on the livelihood of a large number of fishermen in Queensland, as well as

resulting in displacement of fishermen and possible crowding of fishermen in areas not set aside

as dugong sanctuaries. Flow-on adverse economic consequences for local communities in

1

NLlxality Map~ C. Bedford ...~~.

Coo'C.ownl. A

~" .

Roc:khamplDll •

100 o 100 200 300 400 I

Kilometre.

Figure 1

2

Location of the ten Dugong Sanctuaries proposed for the southern Great Barrier Reef and Hervey Bay.

regional coastal Queensland are anticipated. They make these recommendations with a view to

achieving an optimal population of dugongs. For them this seems to imply the requirement that

dugongs be not critically endangered locally anywhere within their current population range in

Australia. This however, begs the question of how the 'optimal' population of dugongs is to be

determined.

2. The Optimal Population of Dugongs

Figures given by Marsh et at., indicate that Australia's total dugong population is of the

order of 83,245 head. Most of this population is located in the 'top' of Australia from the north

of Cape Bedford in Queensland around to Shark Bay in Western Australia. The population in

southern Great Barrier Reef region is estimated to be relatively low at about 1,642 head and in

this region dugong is listed by Marsh et at. (nod) as a critically endangered species (not IUCN).

The IUCN Red book describes a critically endangered species as a one 'facing extremely high

risk of extinction in the wild in the immediate future'. Because dugongs in the southern GBR

probably do not form an isolated described population, they are unlikely to achieve separate

classification as critically endangered under IUCN criteria. In any case, the dugong is not

endangered throughout the whole of its population range in Australia according to Marsh et at.

(nod.) (see Figure 2). The exact contributors to low numbers of dugong in the southern GBR

region are not clear as yet, although a cyclone in the Hervey Bay area significantly lowered

dugong numbers there by reducing the extent of seagrass meadows. Periodic destruction of

seagrass meadows by cyclones and then their subsequent recovery along with that of the size of

'/ local dugong populations appears to be normal.

Preen and Morissette (1997, p. 8) state 'To allow dugong populations to recover to their

optimum sustainable level all significant dugong habitat, poth past and present, should be 'lj, , : '

3

\ o

TIIll Data Deficient

Low risk - least concern

•• o Low risk - conservation dependent

Nearthreatened

Critically endangered

Figure 2 Map showing the status of the dugong in various parts of Australia according to the IUCN (1995) criteria as interpreted by Marsh et al. (n.d.).

4

protected in sanctuaries. Protection of only a subset of dugong habitats, like those that contain

substantial dugong numbers may prevent dugong extinction in the southern GBR, but will not

allow for recovery'. Elsewhere they also speak of the optimum sustainable population of

dugong, but nowhere does their concept of the optimum population appear to be defined.

From their text, it is clear that Preen and Morissette want not just to maintain the

minimum population of dugong required to ensure the reasonable probability of survival of

dugong in Australian waters as a whole, but at least the minimum populations of dugong

throughout their whole range in Australia considered necessary for their survival in every region

where they now occur. Their aim is to try to prevent any local extinctions. Whether or not their

proposals are sufficient or more than sufficient to prevent local extinctions is a matter for

ecologists. What is the probability that local extinctions will occur without the DPAs proposed

and where? What difference do the restrictions make to these probabilities? Could similar

reductions in probabilities be obtained by alternative means and more cheaply? No specific

information seems to be available in relation to these questions.

Preen and Morissette (1997) seem to waiver between two ideas about optimum

populations ofdugong in the southern GBR region, which is the main focus of their attention and

policy recommendations. These are:

(1) The minimum populations of dugong required to ensure the survival of dugong

throughout their range in the southern GBR region, taking into account the mobility of

these animals.

(2) The (maximum sustainable) population which would emerge In the absence of

anthropogenic disturbance.

(3) A dugong population somewhere in between these.

5

What we are not told is what criterion is used to decide that these populations are optimal. From

what point ofview or points ofview are they optimal? From the point ofview of dugongs? How

is the human interest factored in? Are humans to be considered as part of the ecological system

or not? What human values should be factored into the optimisation problem and how? Without

account being taken on these factors, proposals for optimisation of dugong populations are very

narrowly based and unclear. Economic and social evaluation is not included in the problem by

Preen and Morissette unless they assume that saving of dugongs is of infinite value.

It is true that some appeal is made to Australia's obligations under international

conventions but there is no discussion of how legally binding they are and how these are to be

interpreted. In any case, it is doubtful if the international Convention on Biodiversity

Conservation obligates nations to 'save' species throughout their entire range.

It should furthermore be noted that there is usually no minimum population of a species

that guarantees its future existence (Hohl and Tisdell, 1993). All that one can conclude is that

the probability of survival of a species can be expected to rise as its habitats and its population

are more fully protected. So we have to ask what probability of survival of a species, in this case

dugong, are we aiming for and why? In addition, the above theory implies that application of

the precautionary principle requires an assessment ofthe weighted risk of various management

options. No attempt to do this has been made in the policy recommendation of Preen and

Morissette.

3. Economics and the Optimal Population of Species, in this case, Dugong

Economics, not considered in the reports mentioned above, can be factored into

decisions about optimal population or conservation of species in two different ways. These are:

(1) Cost minimisation in relation to some standard or target for population of a species and,

6

(2) economic optimisation of the population of the species.

Neither of these approaches have been applied in determining the optimal population of dugong

in Australia or in the GBR region.

Cost minimisation involves searching for strategies which will minimise the cost of

achieving the population of dugong aspired to. This for example, would involve search for

conservation strategies which would minimise costs imposed on fishermen. Has for exanlple,

the best configuration of DPAs been proposed to achieve protection of dugong populations and

minimise the cost imposed on fishermen? Should research be undertaken to search for effective

methods to deter dugong from entering the area of gill nets? Are there techniques available or

which could be developed to reduce unwanted incidental catch? Why is such research not being

funded and why is there not a programme for such research? The incidental catch problem is a

widespread problem and more attention needs to be given to it from a scientific research point

of view.

The second approach to this type of problem adopted by some economists is to treat it

as an economic optimisation problem using social cost~benefit analysis (Cf. Campbell et al.,

1997). For this method to be applied, it is ideal if all social costs and benefits can be expressed

in monetary units. If this is not possible, then one goes as far as is practical in quantifying social

costs and benefits in monetary terms and makes a list of the 'intangibles' that cannot be

quantified so these can be taken into account in the final judgement.

This approach is illustrated by diagrams which look at possible costs and benefits of

reducing the incidental catch ofdugong by fishermen. There are several possibilities to consider.

Firstly, it is possible that the economic costs imposed on fishermen in terms of reduced profit,

income and so on exceeds the willingness of conservationists to pay for any reduction in the

7

incidental catch of dugong in an area. This would imply that on purely economic grounds that

no reduction in the incidental catch of dugong would be justified. This case is illustrated in

Figure 3. Line DEF represents the additional costs imposed on fishermen of having to reduce

their incidental catch of dugong and line ABC represents the additional benefits to

$

Additional costs (economic loss) to fisherme F

~

D

A 1------.I:3L--__-J Addtitional benefits to conservationists ~ [

o Reduction in incidental catch of dugong % 100

Figure 3 No reduction in the incidental catch of dugong 1S optimal (economic) in this case.

conservationists (e.g., their marginal willingness to pay) for a reduction in the incidental catch

of dugong. In this case, it is not economic to reduce their incidental catch of dugong. This is

because the cost imposed to fishermen always exceeds the economic benefit to conservationists.

Although in the case shown in Figure 3 no reduction in the incidental take of dugong is

economic, if a new method of reducing the incidental take ofdugong happened to be developed,

this could reduce the cost to fishermen of reducing the incidental catch of dugong.

Consequently, it may become economic to reduce the incidental catch of dugong. Such a new

8

method would move the line DEF downward possibly sufficiently far to intersect line ABC, other

things constant. Its an intersection point would correspond to the optimal economic reduction

in the incidental catch of dugong after the introduction of the technique. A reduction in the

incidental catch of dugong would then be economic. New techniques of this kind result in a

'win-win' situation, that is benefit both conservationists and fishermen. However, little or no

sustained research appears to have been undertaken to find such methods.

Figure 4 illustrates a case in which it is economic from a social point of view to reduce

the incidental catch of dugong. Line OAB represents the additional costs to fishermen of

reducing their incidental catch of dugong and line CAD represents the additional benefit to

conservastionists of doing this. In this case, a reduction in the incidental catch of dugong by Xl

per cent maximises social net economic benefit: for this reduction the marginal benefit to

B$ Marginal benefit to conservationists

c

D

o 100

Percentage reduction in incidental catch of dugong

Figure 4 In this case some reduction in the incidental catch of dugong is economic socially but any greater reduction results in a social deadweight loss.

9

conservationists equals the marginal cost imposed on fishermen I. If the incidental catch of

dugong is reduced further, a social deadweight economic loss occurs. If, for example,

authorities require and achieve a reduction in the incidental catch of X2 per cent, the social

deadweight loss is equal to the equivalent of area of triangle AKL, the hatched area in Figure

4. It is clear from the above discussion that without proper attention to the costs and benefits

ofreducing the incidental catch ofdugongs, a social economic loss can occur. It is even possible

for regulation to be socially less favourable than no regulations from an economic standpoint.

In addition, if the measures, means and techniques for reducing the incidental catch are

prescribed, they may not be the most efficient or cost-effective ones from an economic point of

view. For example, the prescribed methods may, in relation to the case shown in Figure 4, result

in higher extra costs being imposed on fishermen so that their additional (marginal) cost is than

those shown by line OAB. For ease ofi1lustration a similar diagram to Figure 4 is shown as

Figure 5. The prescribed methods may result in extra costs being imposed on fishermen. When

these are accounted for, their marginal costs might be as shown by line OEF. If this is so and

authorities reduce the incidental catch by x2 percent, the deadweight economic loss from

regulation is equal to the equivalent of the dotted area, the area of triangle OLM, plus the

equivalent of the area of the hatched triangle AKL2, Consequently, 'social loss' is raised by

even more than the area of triangle AKL due to cost-effective methods not being prescribed.

There is a high risk of-this occurring as far as the present policy recommendations for attaining

'optimal' population of dugongs is concerned.

Observe that the steeper is the additional cost imposed on fishermen of having to reduce

the incidental catch of dugong, the smaller is the optimal reduction in the by-catch of dugong.

10

F

B

c

100

Percentage reduction in incidental catch of dugong

Figure 5 Public regulation of incidental catch can be excessive from an economics point of view and add unnecessarily to the cost imposed on fishermen.

If an economic approach to optimality is adopted, it is important to evaluate the social

economic costs and benefits of reducing the incidental catch of dugongs. Policy measures must

be formulated by weighing up these two components; costs and benefits. It is clear from a social

economic standpoint that too much reduction in the by-catch can be forced on fishermen and that

excessive costs can be imposed upon them if strategies or policies are proposed without

economic assessment. These type of assessments are missing in the reports prepared by Marsh,

et al., and Preen and Morissette.

4. Concluding Comments

From the above, it seems that not even the precautionary principle requires that hasty

emergency action is needed to save dugongs from imminent extinction in Australian waters.

Even the likelihood oflocal extinctions could be a subject for serious debate. Note also that

proper attention to the precautionary principle requires an ~ssessment of the weighted risks of

11

alternative management options; something which has not been done by policy-makers in this

case.

A decision to create or extend DPAs and tighten controls on fishing effort is bound to

have major economic repercussions regionally. Therefore, there is a need and time to assess

economic factors, take these into account and gather further ecological evidence before coming

to policy conclusions. This appears not to have been done in most cases by those making

recommendations for management of dugong.

While economics cannot be the sole arbiter on social decisions, it is nevertheless

unreasonable to ignore it, especially given that many of the impacts of regulations are likely to

have irreversible economic consequences. The economic issues should be explored further, more

ecological research is needed and in particular research is needed to find cost-effective methods

of maintaining populations of dugong. Hasty decision-making in this area seems both unwise

and unnecessary.

5. Notes

1. The optimality condition can easily be outlined in mathematical terms. If h(x) represents

the costs imposed on fishermen of reducing the incidental catch of dugong and if g(x)

represents the benefit to conservationists, then the net social benefit (NSB) of reducing

the incidental catch of dugong is NSB = g(x) - h(x) =j(x). The necessary condition for

fth° ( . l')' df dg dh• • 0 0 0a maXlImsatlOn 0 IS gIven an mtenor so ution IS - = - - - = 00 dx dx dx

The rate of change of benefits to conservationists should be equal to the rate of

increase in costs imposed on fishermen.

The second order condition for the maximum is that j "< O. Since g'(x) is

downward sloping and h'(x) has a positive slope, this condition will be automatically

12

satisfied if the first order condition is met.

Mathematically the optimisation problem is straightforward. In practice, the main

problem that is likely to occur is to estimate the functions accurately from an empirical

point of view. Furthennore, there is scope for philosophical argument about how best

to specify benefits to conservationists. Should for example willingness to pay form the

basis of such estimates or should willingness to accept compensation be used for

specification (Tisdell, 1991). Observe that deadweight social loss (DSL) shown by the

hatched area in Figure 4 would mathematically be obtained as follows: Xl Xl

DSL = Jh /(x)dx - fg /(x)dx.

o 0

2. Let r(x) represent the extra cost imposed on fishermen by regulation, that is costs in excess of

the efficient ones. Then the total economic loss from regulation equals

Xl

jr(x)dx

o

plus DSL as specified in note 1.

6. References

Campbell, H.F., McIlgorm, A. and Tsmenyi, B.M. (1997) 'Fishing Management, Environmental

Protection and Trade Liberalization', International Journal a/Social Economics, Vol. 24,

pp. 128-138.

Hohl, A. and Tisdell, C.A. (1993) 'How Useful are Environmental Safety Standards in

Economics? The Example of Safe Minimum Standards for Protection of Species',

13

Biodiversity and Conservation, Vol. 2, pp. 168-181.

Marsh, H., Corkeron, P., Breen, B. and Morissette, N. (n.d.) The Dugong Dugan dugan: An

Action Plan for its Conservation in Australia (Draft Report), Department of Tropical

Environment Studies and Geography, James Cook University, Townsville, 4811,

Australia.

Preen T. and Morissette, N. (1997) A System of Dugong Sanctuaries for the Recovery and

Conservation ofDugong Populations in the Great Barrier ReefWorld Heritage Area and

adjacent Southern Waters, Department ofTropical Environment Studies and Geography,

James Cook University, Townsville.

Tisdell, CA. (1991) Economics ofEnvironmental Conservation, Elsevier, Amsterdam.

14

1. Summary of Major Findings

Net fishing in the Queensland east coast fishery is predominantly an industry of small scale, owner operated businesses. Most enterprises rely on family labour, although employed part­time or casual labour with a few employing full time labour.

Fishers and their families rely principally on fishing for their livelihood, and most work full­time in the industry.

Investments in offshore and on-shore assets averages a little over $100,000. Total costs typically are of the order of $???, leading to a net margin of about $14,000 per fisher, equivalent to about 3°cents per dollar of total value of catch.

Fishers have a strong desire to remain in the industry. While some would be prepared to accept buyout offers for licenses of $40,000 to $60,000 or less, these appear to be small scale operators. About 75% would not surrender licenses for buyout offers of $100,000.

Most fishing inputs appear to be purchased locally. Restrictions on fishing, while not having a major impact on the state's economy, could have considerable impact on local traders.

Most fishers believe they could survive in business for a reduced catch or increased cost of up to 10% to 15%. Information provided on debt levels was inconclusive, but it would appear some fishers would have difficulty meeting repayments if profitability were to fall.

2. Background to Study

In June 1997, Senator Hill as federal minister for the environment announced that new proposed dugong protection areas (DPAs) along the east coast of Queensland, where restriction would be introduced on the use of gill nets for fishing, on the grounds that dugong deaths arose from use of these nets. A number of studies by government agencies and the fishing industry were initiated, to shed light on dugong biology, changes in dugong populations and possible causes. The Queensland Commercial Fishermen's Organisation (QCFO) contacted the School ofMarine Science (SOMS) at The University of Queensland (UQ) with regard to advice on the impacts on the fishing industry of the proposed bans. SOMS in tum contacted Professor Clem Tisdell, head of the Department ofEconomics, concerning estimation of economic impacts, principles of compensation for the takings of property rights to natural resources, and other issues relevant to the fishing industry. A series of meetings led to the formulation of research projects in the area of economic analysis and geographical information systems, to be undertaken by independent researchers without undue influence by industry or environmental interest groups.

This project reported here, which was commissioned by the Queensland Commercial Fishermen's Organisation (QCFO), investigates the implications of bans on the use of various forms of fishing nets though to pose a risk to dugong, and options available to the participants (i.e. the federal government, state government, fishers and dependent communities). In particular it seeks to clarify the accuracy of assumptions used inJormulating the proposed strategy, and examine likely income losses in the fishing industiyand the case for and appropriate extent of financial compensation. The study has three components.

1. The effect ofnew restrictions on fishing activities

28 August, 1997

COMPENSATION FOR THE TAKING OF RESOURCE INTERESTS: PRACTICES IN RELATION TO THE WET TROPICS

AND FRASER ISLAND, GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND THEIR RELEVANCE

TO THE EXTENSION OF DUGONG PROTECTED AREAS1

Clem Tisde1l2 3

Department of Economics The University of Queensland

Brisbane Qld 4072

A background paper prepared for the Queensland Commercial Fishennen's Organisation on behalf of the School of Marine Science, The University of Queensland.

2 I wish to thank Dr Steve Harrison, Tatjana Kehren, Daryl McPhee, Gavin Ramsay and Dr Ian Tibbets for providing copies of some relevant background documents, or for comments.

3 Professor of Economics and Deputy Director, School of Marine Science, The University of Queensland.

Compensation for Taking of Resource Interests

1. Introduction

./}l!'

The question of whether compensation should be paid for the taking or abrogation of

natural resource rights or interests and how much should be paid and on what basis is complex.

The Report ofthe Commission ofInquiry into Compensationjor the Taking ojResource Interests

(British Columbia, 1992) indicates that the availability of compensation depends upon the

existence of private property rights expressed or implied. It points out (p. 17), 'Property is a

bundle of legally defined mutable right. The owner is free to exercise tho~e rights and is free

from interference by others in their exercise. These rights range from strong to weak, and even

the strongest are subject to restrictions. When rights are modified there is commonly an effect

on the value of the property'. These rights are often modified by government.

The report goes on elsewhere (p. 19) to state that 'not all [government] interferences with ;"

property can possibly be compensable...'The definition of (whether defined by statute, judicial "--.­

interpretation, or custom) of a compensable taking is influenced strongly by pragmatism. There'

are no hard and fast rules, but some generalisations are possible. The stronger the property right,

and the greater the owner's loss, the more likely the taking will be viewed as compensabl~J

Queensland fishers have firm licences and endorsements to use different types of nets.

The proposed dugong protection areas limit these rights. Therefore, the value of businesses

which rely on these rights will be reduced, in many cases substantially. Hence, a primafacie case

for compensation exists.

In the Australian case, a number of precedents exist in relation to the taking ofnatural

resource interests by the state. Consider for example, the loss of private rights (expressed and

implied) in relation to the World Heritage listing of the Wet Tropics region ofNorth Queensland

and similarly in relation to Fraser Island.

1

2. The Wet Tropics Structural Adjustment Packages

The Wet Tropics Structural Adjustment Package consisted of three basic components:

(1) Business compensation;

(2) Labour adjustment assistance; and

(3) Alternative employment creation strategies.

All three components can be regarded as attempts to compensate community members for the

taking of resource rights from which'they previously enjoyed benefits.

Labour adjustment assistance included:

(1) Dislocation allowances;

(2) Early retirement benefits;

(3) Retraining subsidies, and

(4) Relocation allowances.

In order to create alternative sources of employment for displaced timber workers, the

Commonwealth Government, in addition to the above initiatives, began public sector and local

community programmes, and provided subsidies to the private sector to foster employment in

the local regions affected. Apart from providing compensation to displaced timber workers,

these initiatives also incidentally provided some compensation to local communities for the loss

of economic injections (and multiplier effects) due to cessation of logging operations.

Let us consider each of the three components of the Wet Tropics Structural Adjustment

Package (SAp) in more detail and consider its relevance to the proposed extension of Dugong

Protected Areas (DPAs).

BUSINESS COMPENSATION: This scheme allowed for payment of up to $24.4 million to

companies and businesses adversely affected by cessation of logging. Compensation was 'only

2

paid to those businesses who could clearly demonstrate that the Commonwealth Government

decision to cease logging in the World Heritage Listed forests resulted either:

• The closure of their operation;

• The forced rationalisation of their businesses; or

• A substantial reduction in their business viability' (Lynch-Blosse et al., 1991, p. 46).

It would be a reasonable expectation given this case that those with similar adverse effects on

their business due to extension of DPAs should be compensated by the Commonwealth

Government.

About three-quarters of businesses which sought compensation under the Wet Tropics

SAP were successful in that they were ruled to be eligible for compensation, Lynch-Blosse et al.,

(1991, p. 47) observe: 'The types of businesses which were successful in their claim for

compensation include larger timber mills, factories and manufacturing establishments which

were end-users of rainforest tirrlber, contract timber cutters, sleeper cutters, and organisations

which were involved in the maintenance and repairs of the timber-related equipment (e.g., Saw

Doctor)'. This meant that busine~ses.eithe! haviIlg a rel~tiy~lY dire9tJoI"Y\T~~OE1:>~c~ward

economic linkage with logging in the Wet Topics World Heritage listed areas were eligible for

compensation. By analogy, processors and others dependent on the supply offish from extended

DPAs would have a case for compensation as would those involved in the maintenance and

repair of equipment used in areas to be converted to DPAs, as well as of course fishers

themselves.

A two-staged process was involved in determination of business compensation claims.

Firstly, a government body (the Rainforest Unit of DASETT) determined whether in terms of

the criteria an applicant was eligible for compensation. Then an accounting finn (Price

Waterhouse), hired by the Government, was asked to assess the level of compensation

considered to be fair and reasonable on the basis of:

'. A detailed analysis of the earnings in recent years of the business being assessed and an

3

estimate of likely future earnings in the absence of World Heritage Listing;

An assessment of the value of assets used by that business in deriving income from • rainforest logging and milling activities; and,

An assessment of other compensation claims made by that business' . •

If a parallel procedure were adopted to the extension ofDPAs similar information would

need to be collected in relation to fishing in DPAs. Account would need to be taken of loss of

supply of fish from DPAs, business closures, lost contracts and business.

i

i Unfortunately, the method of deternlination of compensation is not precisely specified

above.'rt is more specific for the loss qftimher rights on Fraser Island. In that case (as discussed

below) the basis of business compensation was basically the anticipated reduction in the

capitalised value of the business as a result of the loss of timber right~~-7 . ---'J

LABOUR ADJUSTMENT ASSISTANCE: For employees adversely affected by the cessation

of crown rainforest operations in the nominated World Heritage Area this consisted of:

• Dislocation Allowance;

• Early Retirement Allowance;

• Retraining Subsidy; and

• Removal and Relocation Assistance.

To be eligible applicants had to have been employed in the timber industry or a closely related

business for at least 12 of the 18 months before retrenchment and have been retrenched as a A

result of the cessation of logging in the area included on the World Heritage List. Given this

precedent, a similar labour adjustment package should be available to employees adversely

affected by extension of the DPAs.

ALTERNATIVE EMPLOYMENT CREATION STRATEGIES: Means used to obtain

alternative employment for displaced timber workers included:

4

• Public Sector Projects such as new or additional local council projects;

• Tree planting proj ects funded by the Commonwealth Government;

• Financial assistance 'to individuals, private sector enterprises and other organizations

who could propose feasible and economically viable initiatives which would employ

eligible displaced timber workers' $3.7 million was allocated for this; and,

• Wage subsidy payable to employers (outside the timber industry) of eligible displaced

timber workers. (The subsidy was payable for six months).

The Wet Tropics Structural Adjustment Package was comprehensive. It provided

compensation to all those directly or closely affected by cessation of logging in the World

Heritage Area, and indirectly reduced the economic impact of this cessation on local

communities. It is abenchmark Australian case for the taking of resource interests by the state,

in this case the Commonwealth Government. On the basis of this precedent one would expect

similar types of compensation to be available should DPAs be extended in Queensland as is

proposed. Decisions on compensation following the Fraser Island Report to stop logging there

and to proceed with application for World Heritage Listing of Fraser Island provide additional

guidelines for compensation in Australia in relation to the taking of resource interests.

3. Compensation for the Loss of Timber Rights on Fraser Island

Following the Fraser Island Report, it was decided that logging on Fraser Island would

cease by the end of 1991, and a con1pensation package described as 'A Special Growth and

Development Package for the Great Sandy Region', was devised. In consequence, total financial

assistance of $37 million was proposed for the region. Of this $21.2 million was to be

contributed by the Queensland Government and the remaining $16.5 million by the

Commonwealth Government.

As in the case of the Wet Tropics, the package involved three basic elements:

• Workers' Adjustment Package;

• Schemes to create alternative employment opportunities; and,

5

Compensation for businesses directly and substantially affected by phasing out of logging• on Fraser Island.

However, there were some_cg:f:f~r~iicesin 'Fraser Island' packages compared to the Wet Tropics

settlement. For example, workers were not offered a retirement allowance in the Fraser Island

case. Emphasis was on obtaining alternative employment for displaced workers. Furthennore,

in the Fraser Island case, special mortgage assistance could be made available to displaced

workers. The Special Workers' Adjustment offered the following:

• Dislocation assistance of up to $35,000 based on years of service;

• Priority for alternative employment in government funded schemes;

• Relocation assistance of up to $5,000;

• Income supplementfor 12 months [to displaced workers sufficient to bring their income

to its previous level]; and

• Special mortgage assistance for up to three years to ensure that repayments do not exceed

30 per cent of gross household incomes' (The Queensland Government, 1991, p. 3).

Government-funded employment initiatives were designed to provide alternative

employment to displaced workers if they wished to take advantage of these. However,

employment in projects resulting from these initiatives was not confined to displaced workers

even though they were given priority in employment. The schemes were intended to compensate

or more than compensate, for any decline in regional incomes as a result of the cessation of

logging on Fraser Island.

It is worthwhile considering the basis of compensation for businesses directly or

substantially affected by the phasing out oflogging on Fraser Island. The State Government

claimed that, 'there is no legal obligation to pay compensation to affected businesses',

(Queensland Government, 1991, p. 11). Whether or not that is so is however probably unclear

given the practices adopted in the case of the Wet Tropics. Nevertheless, the State government

Was prepared to consider ex gratia payments to businesses directly or substantially affected by

the decision to phase out logging on Fraser Island.

6

The criteria for eligibility ofbusinesses to be considered for compensation were narrower

than in the case of the Wet Tropics. To be eligible for consideration, a business had to depend

heavily on the timber industry for its income. In the Dugong Protection case, if the same rule

applied, a business would have to be heavily reliant for its income on fishing for it to be

considered for compensation. The exact position in relation to Fraser Island was as follows:

'To be eligible for compensation, about 50 per cent of a business's income would need

to be reliant on the timber industry. The Treasurer would consider particular cases

involving less than 50 per cent if it could be shown the viability of the business had been

substantially affected.' (Queensland Govennnent, 1991, p. 11).

The basis of compensation was intended to be the loss of value of business due to the

cessation of logging on Fraser Island.

, 1m the case of a business forced to close as a result of the decision to phase out logging,

Price Waterhouse would:

[1] Value the existing business as a going concern based on capitalisation of future

maintainable earnings;

[2] Deduct from this value the net book value of the physical assets retained by the

business; and,

[3] Then adjust for any extraordinary expenses incurred by the business relating to

closure, (Queensland Government, 1991, p. 11).

In this case [1] - [2] - [3] would be the basis of compensation.

However, the Government did not necessarily pay the loss in value of business as

determined by Price Waterhouse. It decided on a case by case basis taking account of Price

Waterhouse's assessment and other factors such as:

• Avenues available for mitigation of losses and other business opportunities;

7

• The commercial risks associated with operating the business in an

environmentally sensitive area. ­ e.g., if expensive assets were acquired recently,

it may not be appropriate to compensate the party for full loss of value; and,

• The Government's overall objectives for industry rationalisation in the region.

Compensation payments would be staged to avoid the situation where a lump sum is paid

up front but actual losses do not materialise in line with the original projection.'

(Queensland Government, 1991, p. 11).

Consequently the compensation available to businesses for the taking of resource rights was

relatively uncertain.

Regarding the treatment of physical assets in the case given above, one could question

whether these should be deducted at net book value. Market values would provide a better

indicator of their worth and could well be smaller than net book value.

4. Comparisons Between Compensation in the Wet Tropics and Fraser Island

Cases

The basis of eligibility for business compensation in the Wet Tropics was more generous

than in the Fraser Island case and actual payment of the compensation less restricted and

qualified.

Whereas early retirement allowances was available to displaced labour in the Wet Tropics

area, this was not so for the Great Sandy Region. In the latter case emphasis was on finding

displaced workers alternative employment. To find such alternative employment in the Great

Sandy Region may have been easier than in some regions affected by the Wet Tropics World

Heritage listing.

The creation of alternative employment opportunities in the Hervey Bay Region were

only partly intended to absorb workers displaced as a result of cessation of logging on Fraser

8

Island. New projects also directly created employment for other workers as well. In the case of

the Wet Tropics, more weight was placed on the absorption of displaced timber workers by the

alternative employment schemes devised. Therefore, the Fraser Island Package seems to have

been designed to provide greater community-wide compensation and benefits with these not all

tied specifically to displaced workers. The process of compensation is to a considerable extent

a political process. It is influenced by the political power of the parties involved; both those

directly affected and the communities in which they live.

5. General Observations on Compensation for the Taking of Resource Interests

and Relevance to DPAs

It was observed in the introduction that a good deal of pragmatism is involved in the

payment of compensation for the taking of resource interest by the state. The greater however

the economic loss sustained by a party affected by loss of resource interest and the more

established or definite are these rights, the more likely that compensation will be paid.

Furthermore, 'government is likely to respond to the demands of well-defined, compact

interest groups whose members clearly recognise either the benefits or costs which will fall on

them as a result of a particular policy, while ignoring or discounting the benefits or costs

occurring to ill defined, diffused interest groups who do not clearly recognize the impac~ of the

policy upon them' (Buchanan, et al., 1980; British Columbia, 1992). Therefore, compensation

is more likely to be paid to those damaged by a resource expropriation if they form well-defined

interest groups that 'are capable of clearly and forcefully making their interests known to policy

makers'. This indicates that it is essential that all who will be adversely affected by extension

of DPAs form or belong to such groups. Otherwise, they are more likely to suffer

uncompensated economic loss. Furthermore, the case for compensation must be put clearly and

forcefully to policy makers.

Assessing the economic loss occasioned by the taking of resource interests is a complex

task not least because of the considerable economic and other uncertainties involved. While a

complete coverage of the subject is not possible there some specific matters that are worth raising

9

because oftheir possible relevance to government decisions to extend the DPAs. Let us consider

in turn business compensation; compensation for displaced workers and community-wide

impacts and restitution.

BUSINESS COMPENSATION: The most important thing to consider in assessing the

economic loss incurred by a business as a result of the taking of its resource interests is the

reduction in its capitalised value as a consequence of this loss. This reduction (R) is equal to the

difference of net present value of its anticipated future net earnings should its resource interests

be maintained (VJ and this if its resource interests are lost. In other words R =VR - VE •

It is however difficult to estimate the reduction (R) in the capitalised value ofthe firm due

to loss of its resource interests because future income is uncertain. Furthermore, the size of R

depends on the rate of interest used to discount future earnings.

The reduction of capitalised value, R, does not take account of the value of assets

physical or otherwise retained by the firm. To the extent their assets can be sold they reduce the

loss suffered by the business. Ideally such assets should be valued at realizable or market value

once the business loses its resource interests. There does not seem to be any logic in valuing

them at net book value as in the Fraser Island case. If the business' assets are rather specific to

exploitation of its natural resource interests, then after loss of these resource interests these

asssets may have little use elsewhere. Hence, their market or realizable value may be much less

than their book value after expropriation of the natural resource under consideration. Hence, it

is appropriate to deduct, only the realizable value of the business' assets from its reduction in

capitalised value in determining the business' economic loss (EL). In addition, to estimate a

business' economic loss, it may be appropriate as mentioned in the Fraser Island case, to add any

special expenses (Cs) a business has to incur either because it must close down or restructure

substantially due to its resource loss.

Taking these matters into account, the economic loss of a business due to loss of resource

interests would be estimated as:

10

EL = R - A + C . M S

In relation to the extension of DPAs, it has been suggested that reduction in the value of

licences and endorsements might be used as a basis for compensation or the Commonwealth

might buy back entitlements from fishermen at their market value prior to moves to extend the

DPAs. This, however, would be inadequate to compensate fishers for their loss.

First the market for fishing entitlements is thin and therefore a far from a perfect market.

Secondly and more importantly no allowance is made for asset specificity - that is for the losses

of fishers on their physical capital, geared specifically to the netting operations in new areas to

be included in DPAs. At the most, the sale price of entitlements represents capitalised resource

rents and does not capitalise the normal return on capital used to exploit the resources in

question. The nonnal return from the capital will be lost on the taking ofthe resources and even

the undepreciated value of this capital may not be realisable in the market. Furthennore, no

allowance is made for the special cost factor, Cs, mentioned above.

The specificity of capital needs to be gIven particular attention in claims for

compensation for loss of resource interests. This is not only true ofphysical capital but of other

forms of capital too. Not enough attention has for example been given to human capital in the

past. Owner/managers as well as employees embody much human capital which may be specific

to their business operations reliant on natural resources. Their next best employment may not

be able to use this capital. So this capital becomes a sunk cost to individuals just as physical

capital may have a sunk cost. The longer individuals have been operators in an industry, the

larger is their human capital (as a rule) specific to those operations and the greater their loss is

likely to be when those operations are no longer possible. This needs to be taken into account

for example in the case of owner/operators.

COMPENSATION FOR DISPLACED WORKERS: \Vhile Fompensation for the taking

of resource interests from businesses may have a quasi-legal basis, the case for compensating

11

workers seems to be more a question of equity. Compensation packages have included measures

to find alternative employment for displaced workers, payments to compensate for lost income

in alternative employment (Fraser Island case) and allowances to cover expenses included in

finding alternative employment. Similar types of compensation could be expected for fishennen

displaced by extension of DPAs.

COMMUNITY-WIDE IMPACTS AND RESTITUTION: While governments have no

legal requirement to compensate communities which may be adversely affected by the loss of

resource-interests, politic,al reality often requires that such restitution be made. This is especially

so when a regional economy depends heavily on use of the resource as a source of economic

injections. The loss of exploitation ofthis resource though various multiplier effects can depress

the local economy. Therefore, adverse economic effects are not confined to those directly

affected by the withdrawal of resource rights or interests.

Because of asset specifity or capital specifity, including that of human capital, one

problem that can arise when natural resource rights are restricted is that displaced business and

workers increase their exploitation of closely related resources. If for example, fishers are

restricted in one fishery, they may crowd into other fisheries, thereby causing over exploitation

in these fisheries and depressing incomes in these to below nonnal levels. In a sense, this

exacerbates the social and biological damage caused.

6. Concluding Comments

Commissioner Richard Schwindt (British Columbia, 1992) indicates that the rationale

(including the economic rationale) for the taking of resource interests ought to be carefully

considered before a decision is made. Clearly the value to the state (government), acting on

behalf of the community, in taking resource interests should exceed the economic value to users

of these resources of retaining the rights. In relation to the proposed extension of DPAs these

values have not been estimated or even discussed to any extent.

Second note that community values are changing in relation to the economic exploitation

12

of natural resources. There is now less emphasis on the direct economic benefits to be obtained

from the use of these resources and more emphasis on indirect non-use values. While this may

be reasonable, it may be unreasonable to expect those given specific resource-interests not be

compensated for a change in community or government attitudes affecting their previously

settled interest.

Third, it could well be that fishers are not the main cause of the decline in the size of

dugong populations. For example, habitat change brought about by spillovers from land-based

agriculture and other economic activities could be a major cause of such a d~cline. If this is so,

this would be a further reason why the full cost of further protection for dugongs should not fall

solely on fishermen. To impose the full cost of dugong protection on fishennen would be

inequitable.

Sources

British Columbia Commission of Inquiry into Compensation for the Taking ofResource Interest (1992) Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Compensation for the Taking of Resource Interests, Resource Compensation Commission, Vancouver.

Buchanan, J.M., Tollison R. and Tullock, G. (ed) (1984) Towards a Theory ofthe Rent-Seeking Society, Texas, A. & M. University Press, College Station, Texas.

Lynch-Blosse, M; Turrell, G. and Western, J.. (1992) Impact Assessment: World Heritage Listing SCRU Report No. 22.8, Resource Assessment Commission, Canberra.

McGufflog, I and Western J.S. (1993) Social Impact Assessment ofthe Cessation ofLogging on Fraser Island: An Evaluation of the Workers Special Adjustment Package, Social Research Consultancy Unit, Department ofAnthropology and Sociology, The University of Queensland.

The Queensland Government (1991) The Great Sandy Region: The Queensland Governmen(s Growth and Development Package.

13

ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF IMPOSTION OF RESTRICTIONS ON GILL NETS ON THE QUEENSLAND EAST COAST

FISHERY

A REPORT PREPARED FOR THE QUEENSLAND COMMERCIAL FISHERMENS' ORGANISATION

Gavin Ramsay, Steve Harrison and Clem Tisdell

Department of Economics in conjunction with the School of Marine Science

The University of Queensland September, 1997

Table of Contents

Page 1 Summary of Major Findings 1

2 Background to study 1

3 Data Collection 2

4 Data Analysis 3

5 Fishing Operations and Effort 3

5.1 Importance of the fishing enterprise 3 5.2 Profile of vessels used in fishing operations 4 5.3 Value of nets 9 5.4 Value of on-shore facilities 10 5.5 Overall value of assets 11

6 Labour Inputs in Net Fishing 11

6.1 Fishers' labour inputs 11 6.2 Other family members working in the fishing enterprise 13 6.3 Employed labour 14

7 Calculation of Annual Gross and Net Margins 16

7.1 Expenses in fishing 17 7.2 Annual value of catch 18 7.3 Annual net margin 19

8 Response of Fishers to Bans on Net Fishing in Dugong Protection Areas 21

8.1 Impacts of net bans 21 8.2 Buyout of endorsements and licenses 22 8.3 Effect of changes on viability of fishing enterprises 24 8.4 Debt levels of fishers 25

9 Flow-on effects of fishing restrictions 25

10 Summary and Conclusions 27

11 References 29

1. Summary of Major Findings

In general the Queensland east coast net fishing industry is made up small scale owner operated businesses with a small number of larger enterprises. Fishers and their families rely principally on fishing for their livelihood, and most work full-time in the industry. Considerable variation is present between fishers in the level of investment in vessels, nets, the annual total value of catch and profit. Most of the labour force is made up of the licence holder and his spouse. Some businesses employ part-time labour while there is also a small number of larger businesses involved in the net fishing industry which employ full-time labour. However, the larger enterprises are often involved in net fishing for part of the year only, in particular during the cyclone season when it is not possible to carry out other fishing activities. All fishers own more than one vessel. Most vessels are made from aluminium and built in regional centres of Queensland. The vast majority of fishing related expenditure is made in the home port and nearby regional centres.

Investments in offshore and on-shore assets averages a little over $100,000. The total value of catch averages about $60,000, and total costs are of the order of $40,000, leading to a net margin of about $20,000 per fisher, equivalent to about 30 cents per dollar of total value of catch.

Most fishers believe they could survive in business for a reduced catch or increased cost of up to 10% to 15%. Information provided on debt levels was inconclusive, but it would appear some fishers would have difficulty meeting repayments if profitability were to fall.

Fishers have a strong desire to continue fishing rather than take a compensation package for surrender of their licence. This was reinforced by the high value placed on their licence package by most active net fishers. Most fishers believe they would become unemployed if they were to lose their licence. The lack of alternative employment prospects is related to their age and lack of training and skills that would enable them to gain· alternative employment.

2. Background to Study

In June 1997, Senator Hill as federal minister for the environment announced that new proposed dugong protection areas (DPAs) along the east coast of Queensland, where restriction would be introduced on the use of gill nets for fishing, on the grounds that dugong deaths arose from use of these nets. A number of studies by government agencies and the fishing industry were initiated, to shed light on dugong biology, changes in dugong populations and possible causes. The Queensland Commercial Fishermen's Organisation (QCFO) contacted the School of Marine Science (SOMS) at The University of Queensland (UQ) with regard to advice on the impacts on the fishing industry of the proposed bans. SOMS in turn contacted Professor Clem Tisdell, head of the Department of Economics, concerning estimation of economic impacts, principles of compensation for the takings of property rights to natural resources, and other issues relevant to the fishing industry. A series of meetings led to the formulation of research projects in the area of economic analysis and geographical information systems, to be undertaken by independent researchers without undue influence by industry or environmental interest groups.

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This project reported here, which was comn1issioned by the Queensland Commercial Fishermen's Organisation CQCFO), investigates the implications of bans on the use of various forms of fishing nets though to pose a risk to dugong, and options available to the participants (i.e. the federal government, state government, fishers and dependent communities). In particular it seeks to clarify the accuracy of assumptions used in formulating the proposed strategy, and examine likely income losses in the fishing industry and the case for and appropriate extent of financial compensation. The study has three components.

1. The effect ofnew restrictions on fishing activities

A geographical information system (GIS) is being created to answer spatial queries related to dugong protected areas and fishing activities. Specifically, the GIS will include: • Coastal Information • Management Areas • Fishing Activity and Catch Impact • Ecological Variables (seagrass habitat, dugong stock, etc.)

The GIS will be used to answer quantitative queries including: i) gross rate of production of fish by region, date, and species, and ii) relation of fishing activity to gazetted fish habitat areas, management areas, and dugong protection areas. The GIS will be used to produce maps and tables useful in economic assessment. Also, it will provide maps indicating fishing activity with respect to seagrass beds and dugong habitats.

2. The economic implications of changes in fishing activities

The examination of economic implications of changes in fishing activities involves four major tasks, namely: • Examination of proposals for dugong management from an economic perspective • Collection of data from fishers by means of a questionnaire • Determination of consequences for individuals and regions of the introduction of dugong

protection areas, and • Drawing implications with respect to compensation for fishers affected by the dugong

protection areas.

3. The distribution of seagrass along the Queensland East Coast fishery

Anecdotal evidence has been collected from fishers as part of the economic survey on the distribution of seagrass and of changes in that distribution for the affected fishing areas.

3. Data Collection

Data on the fishing enterprises were collected using a questionnaire, a copy of which is attached as Appendix A. The questionnaire was prepared after examining previous surveys of the east coast fishing industry. A limited time was available for,the survey and preliminary report (about six weeks) hence it was not possible to visit each fishers indiVidually to collect data. Rather, meetings organised by the QCFO were held in Hervey Bay, Gladstone, Mackay and Townsville. At these meetings, studies being funded by QCFO were outlined to fishers by

3

a representative of QCFO, and the questionnaire was introduced and explained by Gavin Ramsay. Questionnaires were handed out at the meetings. Any problems with interpretation of questions were dealt with by Mr Ramsay and research assistants at the meetings.

Fishers filling out the questionnaire were asked to provide their name, address, telephone number, commercial fisher's licence number, and vessel licence number. This ensured that all completed questionnaires came from licenced fishers. Respondents in the survey were those fishers who operated in the proposed or interim DPA's using gill nets. Fishers were assured that all information provided is confidential and individual infonnation will not be divulged. Some questionnaires were collected at the meetings, but most were posted to The University of Queensland subsequently.

Approximately 120 questionnaires were received. Most fishers answered the majority of questions, although some questions proved to be more difficult and provided fewer useable observations. While the number of fishers who would be affected by the net bans is difficult to determine, it would probably be of the order of 180, and it is believed that the majority of those who would be most affected filled out questionnaires.

4. Data Analysis

Data were entered into a series of MicroSoft Excel spreadsheets developed for this study. Spreadsheet functions were used to derive statistical characteristics including means, medians, histograms and cumulative relative frequencies.

5. Fishing Operations and Effort

This section summarises survey findings about the fishing enterprises including the importance of fishing in providing income to fishers, and the number and value of boats, nets and onshore facilities.

5.1 Importance of fishing as a source of income

Fishing is the only business activity carried out by most respondents, with 84% relying solely on fishing for their income. Table 1 outlines the proportion of fishers for whom fishing is the only enterprise, for the four districts and in aggregate. For those with other sources of income, fishing is still the most important source of income, generally providing in excess of 95% of income.

Table 1: Enterprise importance

District Fishing is only enterprise

Hervey Bay 95.0% Gladstone 78.6% Mackay 86.5% Townsville 65.5% All districts 84.0%

4

Most fishers (84%) own the licence under which they fish; however, there are some who lease licences. In Table 2 information on the percentage of fishers who own the licence under which they operate is presented for each fishing district and in aggregate.

Table 2: Licence ownership

District Owner of licence Hervey Bay 78% Gladstone 100% Mackay 86% Townsville 87% All districts 84%

5.2 Profile of vessels used in fishing operations

The number of boats per fisher and average age of boats are presented in Table 3. All fishers own more than one vessel, with an average of 2.9 vessels per respondent. The average age of boats is 9.7 years.

Table 3: Number and age of boats

District Number of boats per Average age of respondent (average) boats (years)

Hervey Bay 3.23 10.7 Gladstone 2.71 7.7 Mackay 2.62 9.6 Townsville 2.89 9.2 All districts 2.90 9.7

Figure 1 presents the frequency distribution of the age of primary fishing vessels while Figure 2 presents the frequency distribution of the age of all tender vessels. These figures reveal that primary fishing vessels are generally older than tender vessels. Primary vessels have an average age of 13 years, while for all tender vessels the average age is 8 years.

5

Figure 1: Age of primary fishing vessel, all districts

25

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5

o+--+-+---!--+--I---+-+--+-+---+-+---I---+--+---+------1 1.00 3.00 5.00 10.00 15.00 30.00 70.00 110.00

age (years)

Figure 2: Age of tender vessels, all districts

35 I

1.00 3.00 5.00 10.00 15.00 30.00 70.00 110.00

age (years)

Table 4 presents information on the type of construction materials for all vessels owned by respondents. Aluminium was the predominant material used in vessel construction, with 57.1 % of vessels made from aluminium. Fibreglass and timber are the next most common construction materials with 19.2% of vessels made from fibreglass and 17.5% from timber.

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Table 4: Type of construction, all fishing vessels

Type of construction Number of boats Proportion of boats Aluminium 205 Steel 7 Timber 63 Fibreglass 69 Fibreglass/ply 15 Total 359 100%

Fishers were asked to estimate the market and replacement values of their boats. Table 5 provides information on the average and median values, for length, age, market value and replacement value for primary and tender vessels. On average, primary vesselS are 7.6 metres long in comparison to tender vessels that average 4.8 metres.

Table 5: Characteristics of primary and tender fishing vessels, all districts

Length (metres) Age (years) Market value ($) Replacement value ($)

Average Median Average Median Average Median Average Median Primary fishing vessel

7.6 6.8 13.0 10.0 44,530 18,000 55,700 30,000 All tender vessels

4.0 4.6 8.2 5.0 5,813 4,000 9,715 7,000

Table 6 summarises market values of primary and tender vessels for each of the four fishing districts covered in the survey. Mean values varied from $37,600 in the Townsville district to $52,700 in the Mackay district. Median values were considerably lower, ranging from $16,000 (Hervey Bay) to $30,000 (Gladstone). It is apparent that a few high value vessels inflate the mean values.

Table 6: Mean and median market value of primary and tender vessels, by district

District Value of primary vessels Value of tender vessels Average Median Average Median

Hervey Bay $39,385 $16,000 $4,329 $2,000 Gladstone $50,536 $30,000 $9,004 $5,750 Mackay $52,757 $18,000 $7,246 $5,000 Townsville $37,574 $18,000 $5,208 $4,000

Figure 3 presents the frequency distribution of respondents estimates of the market value of primary fishing vessels. These values are highly variable, ranging from $1,000 to $325,000 with greatest concentration around the value of $15,000. The market values of 15% of

7

primary fishing vessels is less than $10,000, that for 35% of primary fishing vessels is between $10,000 and $20,000, while 15% of primary vessels are valued between $40,000 and $100,000.

Figure 3: Market value of primary fishing vessels, all districts

25

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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 U1 U1. U1 U1 U1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

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market value

The frequency distribution for replacement values of primary vessels is presented in Figure 4. The estimates are highly variable with a range from $1,500 to $800,000. However there is a concentration around $20,000; estimated replacement value of 20% of vessels is less than $15,000, that for 50% of primary vessels is between $15,000 and $50,000, and that 14% is between $50,000 and $100,000.

The frequency distribution for the market value of all vessels per fisher is presented in Figure 5. Respondents estimates of market value varied considerably ranging from $3,500 to $341,000, with an average of $56,172 and median of $30,000. Fifty percent of fishers owned boats valued at less than $30,000, 70% at less than $50,000 and 90% at less than $120,000.

8

Figure 4: Replacement value of primary vessel, all districts

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0 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 0 u5 a;i 0" 0".... C\J

Replacement value ($)

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Figure 5: Market value of all vessels per fisher, all districts

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Market value ($)

The frequency distribution for the replacement value of all vessels per fisher is presented in Figure 6. Again, there is a wide range, of from $4,200 to $800,000;-!he average replacement value of all vessels per fisher is $90,000, but the median value is only $50,700 indicating strong positive skewness (i.e. a few very high estimates inflate the mean). There is a concentration of estimated replacement values of around $50,000. Fifty per cent of

9

respondents estimate the total replacement value of their boats as less than $50,000, 70% as less than $80,000, and 90% as less than $180,000.

Figure 6: Replacement value of all vessels per fisher, all districts

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Replacement value ($)

5.3 Value of nets

Information on the value of nets held by fishers was collected in Gladstone, Mackay and Townsville but not collected in Hervey Bay. Most fishers (73%) own nets with an estimated market value of less than $14,000 in total while 44% own nets with an estimated value less than $6,000. A small percentage (3%) own nets valued at more than $40,000. The distribution of market value of nets per fisher is presented in Figure 7, and demonstrates variable nature of these estimates with a range from to $200 to $60,000.

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Figure 7: Market value of all nets per fisher, all districts

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a a a a a a a a 0 o a a a a a

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5.4 Value of on-shore facilities

o a a a a a C\J "!" T'"" T'""

Value of nets ($)

a a a a a a a a o a a 8 a

IX)<0 a §T'"" T'"" C\J ~

On-shore facilities are defined in the survey under four categories, namely:

• sheds and other fixed structures • refrigeration units equipment tools • four wheel drive vehicles • other vehicles, and

• other.

Fishers where asked where possible to provide an estimation of the market value and replacement value for each of the categories. Table 7 presents estimate values for five categories of on-shore asset, for the four fishing districts and in aggregate. Averages stated here are for those respondents reporting on-shore assets only; that is, non-responses have been deleted rather than treated as zero values.

Table 7: Reported values of on-shore assets, all districts and in aggregate

Asset

Sheds - market - replt.

Fridges - market . replt.

4wd - market - replt.

Other veh. - market - replt.

Other asset - market . replt

All assets - market All assets· mkt (median) All assets - rep!. All assets - rep!. (median)

District Overall T'ville Mackay Hervey Bay Gladstone average 10124 23692 17403 46222 20592 17655 36250 25878 59250 31041 6124 7234 13734 5833 9062 9313 12559 23276 9417 14912

12167 15000 12500 18950 13971 27083 35471 30429 38500 32135 7528 6527 12054 10583 8892

17778 15460 23125 15600 18338 2613 9609 17309 53750 16598 4110 4110 25833 6600 12453

;"!,

29736 40027 45249 75821 43689 28000 29000 34000 29500 29350 57573 75044 70603 85821 70819 52500 53000 57000 48500 54000

11

Average market values of on-shore assets ranged from about $30,000 in Mackay to $76,000 for Gladstone, with a mean over all districts of about $44,000. Replacement values were approximately 60% higher than market values, in aggregate. Median market values for on­shore assets were about $30,000, and median replacement values about $50,000, across all districts.

5.5 Overall value of assets

As indicated in Table 8, the mean overall investment in the fishing industry ranged from about $85,000 for Townsville district to about $150,000 for Gladstone. Medians were rather lower than means, at between $65,000 and $90,000, suggesting the latter were affected by a few fishers with very large investments.

Table 8: Total value of all assets per respondent ($)

District Number Average Median Hervey Bay 40 94,429 68,000 Gladstone 14 148,416 88,450 Mackay 37 120,164 79,000 Townsville 27 84,929 65,800 All 118 106,730 73,700

6. Labour Inputs in Net Fishing

In the survey, information was collected for for three categories of labour, namely the fisher (and licence holder), other family labour and employed labour. For each category of labour, . information was collected on the age of persons, the number of years they have been fishing for a living, the number of weeks worked per year and whether they have alternative skills that might assist them to gain employment should they no longer be able to fish for a living.

6.1 Fishers' labour inputs

Information on the age and number of years respondents have been fishing fora living is presented in Table 9 and Figures 8 and 9. The age of licence holders ranges from 20 to 68 years. Most licence holders (80%) are less than 55 years old with 50% less than 45 years. Relatively few (10%) are less than 30 years old. The age distribution of licence holders is presented in Figure 8.

As indicated in Table 9, on average respondents have been fishing for 20. However, there is considerable variation in the time they have been fishing for a living ranging from one to 52 years, as illustrated in Figure 9.

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Table 9: Profile of licence holders

District Average age Years fishing Weeks fishing Possess other (years) (average) per year work skills (%)

Hervey Bay 46.4 21.4 48.5 12.5 Gladstone 43.8 22.9 48.6 14.3 Mackay 46.6 20.2 41.7 40.5 Townsville 43.4 16.2 47.7 20.0 All districts 45.4 20.0 46.2 27.5

Figure 8: Age distribution of licence holders, all districts

20

18

16

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15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70

Age (years)

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Figure 9: Number of years fishing for licence holders, all districts

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5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 Years fishing· self

6.2 Other family members working in the fishing enterprise

A profile of family members working in the fishing enterprise is provided in Table 10. Their average age is 12 years less than that of respondents. The age distribution of family labour is illustrated in Figure 10.

Family members had been fishing for a living for half the time of licence holders with many. having fished for less than five years, as illustrated in Figure 11. A third of family labour have alternative work skills.

Table 10: Profile of family labour

District Average Years fishing Weeks fishing Possess other age (years) (average) per year work skills (%)

Hervey Bay 34.1 8.0 40.5 47.8 Gladstone 42.9 10.0 50.3 14.3 Mackay 31.5 11.4 26.7 35.3 Townsville 33.1 9.8 37.7 21.9 All districts 34.0 9.5 37.0 31.7

14

Figure 10: Age of family labour, all districts

15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70

Age (years)

Figure 11: Number of years fishing, family labour, all districts

35

30

25

~o c Ol :l c­Olu:r5

10

5

IIo 40 45 50

6.3 Employed labour

Only 27% of respondents employed any labour. A profile of employed labour is provided in Table 11. The average age of employed labour is 34 years with itho~e working having less fishing experience than either the licence holder or family workers. Most employed labour have less than five years experience in the fishing industry, and slightly less than one third

16

14

12

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4

2

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5 10 15 20 25 30 35 Years fishing· family labour

15

had alternative employment skills. The age distribution of employed workers is illustrated in Figure 12 and the distribution of time spent fishing for a living is presented in Figure 13.

Table 11: Profile of employed labour, all districts

District Average age Years fishing Weeks fishing Other work (years) (average) per year skills (%)

(average) Hervey Bay 34.4 8.2 16.9 40 Gladstone 31.5 4.5 27.5 a Mackay 34.0 7.4 32.1 25 Townsville 35.3 2.0 32.3 33 All districts 34.4 6.7 25.7 32

Figure 12: Age distribution, employed labour, all districts

9

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7

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Age (years)

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Figure 13 : Years fishing experience, employed labour

I I

5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 Years fishing -employed labour

Annual wages paid vary considerably between fishers. Most employ part-time staff. While in some cases wages bills as high as $200,000 have been reported, 50% of employers have wages bills less than $9,000, 80% less than 20,000 and 90% less than $50,000. Table 12 presents average and median wages paid by those employing labour. The high average wages paid by Townsville respondents is due to a small number of respondents in that district having wages bills in the vicinity of $200,000.

Table 12: Average and median wages paid by those employing staff

25

20

>1 5 ()c:: 41 ::s tT 41 It

10

5

o

District Average wages Median wages paid ($) paid ($)

Hervey Bay 14,884 8,000 Gladstone 8,910 3,522 Mackay 12,167 7,641 Townsville 56,070 12,400 All districts 22,409 10,000

7. Calculation of Annual Gross and Net Margins

An important task of the study has been to estimate the proportion of fishing income retained by respondents relative to that which is incurred as cost of procluGtion. Estimates were made of the "gross margin" and "net margin". The former is defined here' as the amount per dollar of income remaining after all variable costs are deducted. Net margin is expressed as the amount retained by fishers per dollar of income when all expenses identified in the survey are

17

deducted. As such, net margin provides ap indication of the loss of income to fishers when total value of catch is reduced. However, it is to be noted that closure of more productive fishing grounds close to the coast may lead to greater time fishing for a given size of catch and hence lower net margins. That is, the loss of income from closure of dugong protected areas could be exacerbated by reduced catch per unit effort.

7.1 Expenses in fishing

In the survey, expenses related to fishing have been collected under the following categories:

• operating costs (such as fuel, oil, gas, bait, ice, boat repairs, and gear replacement and repairs)

• repairs and maintenance to onshore facilities (such as sheds, refrigeration units and vehicle costs)

• marketing costs (such as packing, freight, commissions and selling costs) • administration costs, and • other costs.

Fishers were asked where possible to provide full details for each of the categories, but where this was not possible to provide a total figure. All figures were required to be for the latest available financial year.

Fishers were also asked to indicate the main town where expenses were incurred and the percentage of expenses incurred in that town. In almost all cases most of the expenses were incurred in the local port town or nearby centres.

Table 13 presents frequency information on total fishing expenses. Both absolute and relative frequencies are included. As indicated in this table, 80% of respondents have annual expenses of less than $50,000 and more than half have annual expenses of less than $25,000.

Table 13: Frequency and cumulative frequency for total fishing expenses, all districts

Total fishing Frequency Relative Cumulative expenses frequency (%) relative

(upper boundary) frequency (%) $ 5,000 2 1.8 1.8 $10,000 16 14.7 16.5 $15,000 13 11.9 28.4 $20,000 9 8.3 36.7 $25,000 19 17.4 54.1 $30,000 11 10.1 64.2 $40,000 12 11.0 75.2 $60,000 11 10.1 85.3 $ 80,000 7 6.4 91.7 $100,000 1 1.0 92.7 $200,000 6 5.5 98.2 $220,000 2 1.8 100.0

Total 109 100

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Table 14 provides a breakdown of fishers 'expenses, exclusive of labour costs, according to fishing district and expenditure category. Both mean and median expenditure levels are presented. Expenditure per fisher is highest in the Gladstone and Mackay districts, and lowest for Townsville. Expenditure levels are strongly positively skewed, with the overall mean ($36,000) being 50% greater than the overall median ($24,000).

Table 14: Fishing expenses excluding labour

Expense category Townsville Mackay HeNey Bay Gladstone All areas Operating expenses: Average $12,177 $28,608 $15,694 $29,315 $19,840

Median $9,950 $20,000 $12,717 $22,174 $13,628 Onshore expenses: Average $2,647 $4,904 $3,046 $5,320 $3,657

Median $1,500 $3,080 $2,350 $4,451 $2,554 Marketing expenses: Average $1,628 $7,088 $395 $2,380 $2,311

Median $603 $2,000 $0 $1,806 $256 Administration costs: Average $4,755 $6,949 $5,125 $10,349 $5,949

Median $3,487 $5,042 $2,816 $5,700 $4,002 Other costs: Average a $10,268 $6,122 $68,717 $11,162

Median a $4,733 $5,100 $68,717 $5,200 Overall expenses Average $21,120 $51,194 $29,341 $51,626 $36,041

Median $15,328 $35,500 $24,505 $36,708 $24,509

a: No information was provided on "Other costs" by Townsville respondents.

Figure 14 presents a histogram of total fishing expenses excluding labour. As indicated here, the majority of respondents have expenses of less than $25,000.

Figure 14: Frequency distribution of fishing expenses excluding labour, all districts

20 18

16 14

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O-l--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+-+--+--I~"-f--+--+-+-+-~-+--I o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o8 o o o § o § o o o tn' tn' tn' o''!j g a g a a ,- C\J t') OJ qo OJ C\J, ­,- ... C\J

Fishing expenses

"~ :7.2. Total value of catch

Means and medians for total value of catch (TVC) from all fishing operations for each district and in aggregate are presented in the first two rows of Table 15. The overall mean is about

2

19

$67,000 and the overall median about $47,000, the former being affected by a few large enterprises. The reported TVC for most fishers is less than $60,000, as illustrated in Figure 15.

Table 15: Total value of catch and net margin, by region ($)a

Location Mackay Gladstone Townsville Hervey Bay Overall MeanTVC 93040 57190 49369 52784 66710 Median TVC 60000 54000 32524 42000 47500 MeanNM 25694 12242 12052 21735 20218 MedianNM 25539 14735 8502 16582 14735 Mean NMlMean TVC 0.276 0.197 0.244 0.412 0.303 Median NMlMedian TVC 0.426 0.273 0.261 0.395 0.310 MeanNMlTVC 0.264 0.12 -0.193 0.353 0.183 Median NMlTVC 0.319 0.15 0.271 0.415 0.319 Number 27 5 18 29 79

a: Values in some late questionnaires have not been included in this table.

7.3 Annual net margin

The aggregate "net margin" (NM) for fishing operations is defined here as the total value of catch less all expenses (as categorised above) including paid labour. Mean and median net nlargins per fisher are summarised in Table 15 above. Net margins are highest for Mackay and lowest for Townsville, with an overall average of about $20,000.

Net margins of individual fishers have a large range, as illustrated in Figure 16. The aggregate net margin is less than $15,000 for 42% of fishers, less than $30,000 for 750/0 and less than $50,000 for 90% of respondents.

Figure 15: Distribution of total value of catch (TVC) per fisher, all districts

5000 20000 35000 60000 90000 140000 200000 260000 350000

TVC ($)

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Figure 16: Frequency distribution of aggregate net margins per fisher, all districts

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O+-+--+--I--+-+-+--+--l..-Jf--~+-+--+--+--l--+-+--+-t--l---jf--'r----1 0 0 0 0 0a 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0o 0 8 0 0 0 0 00 0 0o 0 o 0 0 0 .n .n .n .n .n.n .n .n .n .n .n ,....N I'- N NC'"l '<I' I' ­~ (,IT C\J C'"l(,IT (,IT (,IT~ ~ ~ ~ (,IT (,IT

Net margin

The net margin may also be expressed as a proportion of the total value of the catch, i.e. cents retained per dollar of gross takings. As indicated in Figure 15, mean and median net margins vary considerably between fishing districts. The overall median NM is about 30 cents in the dollar of TVC. Figure 17 provides a histogram of net margins of individual fishers, and demonstrates the highly variable nature of this measure. Respondents enjoying very high net margins are mostly those undertaking small-scale fishing activity with low operating costs.

Figure 17: Net margin per dollar of catch for individual fishers, all districts

18

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0 ~#. #. 0

0 0 0....<;J

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 C\J C'"l '<I' LO <C I' ­

Net marglnrrotal value of catch ('Yo)

~ ~ 0 #.0 0 0 0 co en 0 ,....

21

8. Response of Fishers to Bans on Net Fishing in Dugong Protection Areas

Several questions were included in the questionnaire to detennine fishers' responses to imposition of bans on net fishing in the Dugong Protection Areas. It was clear from responses to these questions and from comments at the four meetings that fishers have a strong desire to continue to fish rather than to leave the industry.

8.1 Impacts of net bans

Table 16 provides a summary of the responses of fishers to bans on set nets. About half indicated they would wish to remain in the industry permanently, while about one quarter would leave the industry immediately. The high proportion who would remain in the industry permanently or at least in the intermediate term should a ban on gill nets be introduced, has implications in terms of potential crowding and reduced profitability.

Table 16: Response if gill net bans were introduced

Response Hervey Bay Gladstone Mackay Townsville All areas

Number of respondents 40 14 37 29 119 Leave immediately 5 1 10 10 26 Remain in industry 18 6 12 17 53

Of those fishers who would remain in the industry, most indicated that they would continue to operate from the same port (Table 17). However, the majority stated they would increase fishing effort in areas not affected by bans and that they would increase effort in other fisheries and in particular in other inshore fisheries such as crabbing.

Table 17: Anticipated response of fishers to bans on set nets

Response Hervey Bay Gladstone Mackay Townsville All areas Continue from same port 25 10 23 20 78 Change to another port 3 1 1 4 9 Scale down operations 7 4 13 9 33 Increase netting other areas 17 4 17 18 56 Increase in other activities 18 6 22 19 65

Should fishers be forced to leave the industry, a small proportion expected they would retire (Table 18). Most felt that if net bans forced them to stop fishing they would become unemployed. Responses to this question depended on respondents' ages, the time they had spent fishing and their lack of skills that would have enabled them to gain alternative employment.

22

Table 18: Anticipated reactions of fishers to bans on set nets

Predicted reaction to bans Hervey Gladstone Mackay Townsville All areas Bay

Retire 3 2 ° 1 6 Seek employment in fishing 5 1 5 2 13 Seek employment out of fishing 2 4 5 4 15 Start another business 5 1 4 4 14 Become unemployed 27 5 24 18 74

8.2 Buyout of endorsements and licences

Fishers were asked what size of payment would induce them to sell their gill net endorsement. Overall mean and median valuations by respondents are presented in Table 19. These figures, which are considerably above the going price for endorsements, are a reflection of the desire of fishers to remain in the industry.

Table 19: Average and median buyout valuations for gill nets and the total licence package

Measure Endorsement category Gill net Total licence

Average $199,420 $343,267 Median $ 90,000 $203,000

Estimated "willingness to accept" valuations varied widely between fishers, as illustrated in Table 20 and Figure 18. About 45% would accept offers of $60,000 or less.

Table 20: Frequency distribution of stated buyout valuations for gill net endorsement, all districts

Upper class limit Frequency Cumulative ($) relative frequency

(%) 20000 6 8.7 40000 10 23.2 60000 15 44.9 80000 3 49.3 100000 3 53.6 150000 10 68.1 200000 4 73.9 300000 4 79.7 500000 7 89.9

2000000 7 100.0 i

Total 69

23

Figure 18: Cumulative relative frequency distribution of "willingness to accept" buyout offers for gill net endorsements

90.0 ! 80.0

>­g70.0III :::I g'60.0...-~50.0-i "al40.0... III .~30.0 'lli ~20.0 :::I (,) 10.0

0.0 4----+------"""11-----1-----+------1

o 100000 200000 300000 400000 500000

Buyback am aunt ($)

Table 21 and Figure 19 present the distribution of willingness-to-accept buyout offers for total licence packages. These values are somewhat higher than those for gill net endorsements.

Most fishers calculated their buyout value as the value of the licence plus the loss in income that would result from the loss of that licence. Often the loss in income was calculated as being until normal retirement age. Fishers did not discount the income stream and therefore did not allow for the time preference for money.

Table 21: Frequency distribution of stated buyout valuations for total licence packages, all districts

Upper class limit ($) Frequency Cumulative relative frequency (%)

20000 o 0.0 40000 4 4.5 60000 6 11.4 80000 5 17.0 100000 8 26.1 150000 11 38.6 200000 10 50.0 500000 29 83.0 1000000 11 95.5 2000000 4 100.0

Total 88

Figure 19 indicates cumulative proportions of fishers who would be willing to sell their total licence package for various amounts. About 5% indicated they would be prepared to sell for

24

$40,000 or less and about 11 % indicated they would be willing to sell for $60,000 or less. Based on Figure 19, to obtain a 20% reduction in number of fishers, it would be necessary to pay up to about $90,000 to acquire licences. It is notable that the reduction in effort could be less than the reduction in number of fishers, since it is probable that those who would be willing to sell are less active in fishing. Further, it is possible that fishers who did not take part in the survey are less active in the industry and hence would be prepared to accept lower offers than those who provided information. A further complication is that some fishers who would sell licences in a buyback program would subsequently purchase licences from less active fishers. In summary, a buyback program could have a lower impact on fishing effort than would be predicted by Figure 19.

Figure 19: Cumulative relative frequency distribution of "willingness to accept" buyout offers for licence package

90.0 T 80.0

>­~FO.O § g60.0 ~-~50.0

:;::

,*40.0 ~

iQ)

30 0 . 'Se20.0 ;:s

°10.0

0.0 -j4:---j-----t--------'!-------'f------/

o 100000 200000 300000 400000 500000

Buyout value ($)

8.3 Effect of changes on viability of fishing enterprises

Bans on the use of various forms of fishing net in dugong protection areas could be expected to lead to increased fishing costs and reduced catch, with adverse effects on the viability of fishing enterprises. A question was included in the survey to elicit views on what combinations of catch reduction and cost increase could be accommodated without eliminating profitability entirely in the east coast fishery. Responses are summarised in Table 22. If there were no reduction in catch, fishers could absorb a cost increase of the order of 10% to 20%. A 10% reduction in catch would reduce this tolerance for increased costs to about 5%. If the catch were reduced by more than 10%, fishers considered that they would not be able to absorb cost increases and still operate profitably.

Table 22: Cost increases for which fishing enterprises could remain viable

.,','

Measure Cost increase manageable if catch falls by: Nil 10% 20% 30%

Average 17.29% 5.86% 2.64% 1.38% Median 10.00% 5.00% 0.00% 0.00%

25

8.4 Debt levels of fishers

The responses to the question on debt are difficult to interpret, in part because of the mixing of personal and business debt by many fishers. In addition, few fishers responded to the . question and it is difficult to know whether the lack of response is due to a lack of debt. Of those that responded, all stated that any increase in costs or a decrease in catch would make it difficult for them to meet loan repayments.

10. Flow-on effects of fishing restrictions

A reduction in expenditure in the fishing industry in any region would lead to a subsequent reduction of output, income and employment in that region. This arises because of reduced economic activity in upstream industries supplying inputs to the fishing industry. The extent of impact would depend on the extent of reduced effort in the fishing industry and the magnitude of the multipliers1

• While there would also be downstream effects for industries processing the outputs of the fishing industry, these are not usually taken into account in the multiplier analysis, on the grounds they would also occur if fish supplies were imported.

Multipliers reported to the Fraser Island Commission of Inquiry in 1990, were validated in a consultancy undertaken by the Queensland Government Statistician's Office and assisted by Associate Professor John Mangan of The University of Queensland (GSa, 1991; Mangan, 1991). Multlipliers estimated in that consultancy for the fishing industry of Hervey Bay and Fraser Island, based on input-output tables for the Wide Bay - Burnett Statistical Division, are provided in Table 23. Various types of multipliers may be derived, the most widely used of which are Type 2A multipliers, as presented here.

Table 23: Type 2A multipliers for Fishing and Hunting, Wide Bay - Burnett Statistical Division

Multiplier Value Total output multiplier 1.46 Total income multiplier 2.70 Total employment multiplier 1.61 Employment per $lm of output 23.8

These multipliers indicate that a $1 reduction in fishing industry output would cause a $1.46 reduction in regional output (the initial effect plus a further 46 cents) and a $2.70 reduction in

A multiplier measures response to economic stimulus, usually expressed in terms of change in sales to final demand of an industry. The effects may be grouped as initial, first round, industrial support and consumption-induced effects (GSa, 1991, p. 200). The initial effect is simply the change in expenditure, while the first round effect measure the purchases made by the industry experiencing the initial stimulus. The industrial support effects are the second round and subsequent flow-on effects resulting from the initial impact. Consumption-induced effects arise from increased income and consequent increased consumer spending.

regional income. Further, one job lost in the fishing industry would lead to 1.61 jobs lost in the region (the initial job plus 0.61 further jobs). For each $lm loss in industry output, there would be a loss of 23.8 jobs. Using a modified method, Mangan (1991) estimated a slightly higher employment multiplier, of 1.8, indicating that one job lost in the fishing industry would cause another 0.8 of a job loss in the region.

It is difficult to estimate the reduction in fishing effort likely to take place following new regulations on use of gill nets. The total operating cost over the four districts included in the survey is $3.93m. This amount applies to a full year (usually financial year 1995-96), and is comprised of off-shore and on-shore operating expenses, marketing and administration costs, and other costs (see Table 14).

If there were a 20% reduction in effort in the fishery, the aggregate expenditure would be reduced by approximately $0.8m. Applying the above multipliers, this would have the impacts on regions involved in the Queensland east coast fishery as set out in Table 24.

Table 24: Estimated regional impacts of a 20% reduction in fishing effort

Reduction in output $0.37m Reduction in income $IAm Reduction in nUlnber of jobs 20

It is probable that this is an underestimate of impacts. One reason is that annual expenditure is based on an incomplete sample, of only about 120 fishers. It is notable that the number of jobs here refers to full-time jobs. In that employees in the fishing industry typically work only a relatively small number of hours per week, many more people than indicated here would suffer a decline in livelihood.

The impact would be felt over a large area, since the sample of fishers operate between Hervey Bay and Townsville. However, the impact would be concentrated particularly on the port cities from which fishers operate, since most inputs are purchased in these cities.

It could be that most of the fishing activity will continue. This would depend on the extent of mobility of the fish species caught. To the extent that fish stay within newly protected areas, there will be a reduction in catch, and a consequent adjustment of effort. If effort is not reduced, there will be overcrowding in the industry and reduced incomes and profitability.

Any buyback of licences would lead to fewer operators in the industry. However, it is probable that fishers who are less active in the industry or are currently not operating at all (sleeper licences or latent effort) would sell licences first, so there could be some slippage in reduction in effective fishing effort from buyback of licences. On the other hand, net bans will be concentrated on waters close to the coast, for which catch per unit effort is typically highest, and fishers remaining in the industry may incur increased. effort travelling to more distant fishing grounds and fishing a wider ocean area.

27

10. Summary and conclusions

Respondents rely heavily on fishing, and have quite low income from other sources. Most own their own licence. The scale of operation is generally small, although there are a few enterprises much larger than the majority. In general, fishers place a high value on the lifestyle and have a strong desire to remain in the industry.

Fishers have an average of about three boats, mostly aluminium or fibreglass, typically about 10 years old. The average replacement value of boats per fisher is about $65,000 and the median replacement value is about $37,000. Investment in nets is typically less than $14,000, but ranges up to $60,000. Most fishers have on-shore assets to support their operations, and these have a mean market value of $44,000 and mean replacement value of $70,000. Overall investment in the industry per fisher averages $107,000, with a median of $74,000.

The age of licence holders ranges from 20 to 68 years, with a mean of 45 years. Most have been fishing for a living for more than five years, the average being 20 years. They spend an unexpectedly high average of 46 weeks a year on fishing activities. Only about one quarter have other skills which would help them obtain alternative employment should they have to leave the fishing industry.

Family members (other than the licence holder) working in the industry average about 34 years in age, with 10 years fishing experience. They work in the industry for an average 37 weeks a year. Less than one third possess skills which would help them obtain alternative employment.

About a quarter of the fishers employ non-family labour, mostly on a part-time basis. The average age is 34 years, most have less than five years experience in the industry, and less than one third have alternative employment skills. The wages bill averages about $10,000 per fisher per year.

The total value of catch averages about $60,000 a year, and operating expenses about $40,000, leaving an annual net margin of around $20,000 a year. This margin does not include an allowance for the fisher's own labour. The net margin per dollar of total value of catch is highly variable, but on average represents about 30 cents.

In response to bans on gill nets, only about one quarter of fishers considered they would leave the industry in the short term, and half said they would remain in the industry regardless. Of those who would remain in the industry, most said they would continue to operate from the same port, and would increase fishing effort in areas not affected by the bans, and in particular other inshore fisheries such as crabbing. This suggests there may be added resource pressure and reduced incomes as a result of bans. Most believed that if they were forced to leave the industry they would become unemployed.

About one quarter would be prepared to surrender gill net endorsements for $60,000 or less, While about 15% would be prepared to surrender their total licence package for $60,000 or less. On the other hand, about 50% and 75% respectively would not respond to a buyout offer of $100,000, and 10% would not respond to an offer of $500,000 for either the gill net endorsement or the total licence package.

28

Most respondents believe they could absorb small catch declines or cost increases, or the order of 10% to 15%, and remain viable. However, if the catch were to fall by 20%, the majority believe they could not continue to operate profitably. Insufficient information has been obtained on debt levels to judge the importance of debt servicing, although a number of fishers indicated that any decrease in catch or increase in costs would make it difficult for them to meet loan repayments.

Some clear differences are apparent between the four fishing district. Boats appear to be of lower age in Gladstone, and the investment in boats and on-shore assets is higher in Gladstone and Mackay than the other districts. Fishers and employed labour in Townsville have the shortest periods of experience in the industry. Fishers in Hervey Bay and Gladstone appear to have less alternative employment skills than those further north. Less is paid per fisher in wages in Gladstone than in other areas. The total value of catch and operating expenses are higher in Mackay and Gladstone than in Hervey Bay and Townsville.

A contraction in the Queensland east coast fishing industry would not have a major impact on the state economy, but the losses in incomes and jobs would be concentrated on the post towns from which fishers operate.

Concerning the accuracy of findings, while information was collected from only about 120 operators out of approximately 700 commercial fishers in the Queensland east coast fishery, we believe the estimates to be reasonably indicative of those most affected by new fishing restrictions. The approach of presenting and explaining questionnaires at four district meetings for return by post was highly cost effective, although it led to a less then perfect response rate. To the extent that fishers affected by net bans have been missed in the survey, the aggregate costs to the industry and region will be greater than estimated in this study.

29

References

GSO (Government Statistician's Office), 1991, "Input-Output Tables: Wide Bay - Burnett Statistical Division", consultancy report, Commission of Inquiry into the Conservation, Management and Use of Fraser Island and the Great Sandy Region, Appendixes, Volume 3, Goprint, Brisbane, pp. 194-210.

Mangan, J. (1991), "Input-Output Tables: Wide Bay - Burnett Statistical Division", consultancy report, Commission of Inquiry into the Conservation, Management and Use of Fraser Island and the Great Sandy Region, Appendixes, Volume 3, Goprint, Brisbane, pp. 211-246.

IMPACTS OF IMPOSTION OF RESTRICTION ON GILL NETS ON THE QUEENSLAND EAST COAST

FISHERY

ESTABLISHMENT OF A GEOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION SYSTEM (GIS) FOR SHOWING EFFECT OF NEW

RESTRICTIONS IN FISHING ACTIVITIES

David Pullar and Samantha Sun

Department of Geographical Sciences and Planning

The University of Queensland

,"

.'"I.,

~ I

1. Background Spatial infonnation was collected and compiled into a Geographic Information System (GIS) for the purpose of understanding: • the distribution of fishing catch and fishing activity • the extent of closures and constraints on fishing resources • the relationship between ecological variables and Dugong protection areas.

Results for the first two objectives are presented in this report. The last objective is seen as an issue of general interest and is being researched on a continual basis.

The GIS was created for short and long terms needs of the QCFO. It has developed with this intent in mind and could be used for future studies. For instance, maps showing summaries of fish catch and fish effort can be generated in future tears on a more routine basis.

2. Fishing Activity Information Information from fishing effort and catch was compiled for the year 1996. The Queensland Fish Management Authority (QFMA) require commercial fishennan to report on their fishing activity. Data is entered into Net and Crab Fishery Logbooks daily on catch size, type and location. Data from fisherman logbooks for 1996 were compiled and maps produced. The spatial units used to show the information was by grid and site. A grid is measured as a half degree square that is di vided evenly into 2S sites.

~(---- 30' --------"7)

5'

5' ....... ~ .; ; - ; .

....... :- ;. : ; . Grid · . . .· . . .· . . . , , .30' • • 0' , .

....... '..... . .

1 ....... \ .

Due to disclosure issues the data was released by QFMA on the basis that a minimum of five vessels needed to operate in a location for data to be released. This gives reasonably reliable information on a grid basis, but at a site level the infonnation becomes very patchy, Therefore the maps display data mostly on a grid basis with site data superimposed to show spatial variability. Because of this limitation the resulting maps provide indicative evidence offishing activity rather than an exact qualitative description.

Maps showing the coastline between Harvey Bay and Cooktown based upon fishing logbook data for 1996 were produced. These provide contextual information on fishing effort and catch sizes. A map is included on the Appendix showing fish effort and catch. They also show the marginal return on fishing catch sizes further away from the coast. In general fisherman operating out from the coastline fished for long periods to get smaller catches. Therefore further restriction of fishing areas will significantly reduce the resources available for commercially viable fishing.

3. Fishing Constraints The motivation for this investigation was to assess the impact of imposing;restrictions on fishing in areas along the Queensland coast deemed as important for Dugong habitat protection. However this measure needs to be taken in perspective with the existing restrictions on net fishing. To provide this context an attempt was made to map all closures for commercial fishing along the coast. Closures

included: i) declared fish habitat areas I , and ii) regulated closed waters for commercial tishing~. It was possible to obtain reasonably current map information for declared fish habitat areas, but there does not exist any map information on regulated dosed waters. Furthermore, it was very problematic to obtain this information as the regulations described areas in descriptive terms using measurements from physical landmarks and official signs erected at the site. In most cases no coordinates are available for these points so it is impossible to define boundaries for closed waters. To obtain an indication of the extent of fishing closures their geographical point locations were mapped based upon the names giYen in the regulations for closed water areas. Again this is only indicative but does show the scope of restrictions already in place along the coast. A map showing locations of closures and fish habitat areas is included in the Appendix.

Significant discussion was carried out with the QDPI-Fisheries concerning the mapping of closed waters. A proposal was discussed where QDPI Fish Patrol Officers at each station would be provided with basic materials to interpret and mark fishing closures on a map. This would then be digitised and entered into the GIS. We believe this action is worth pursuing if only to pressure QDPI to correctly map these closures.

4. Ecological Evidence Preservation of sea grass beds is an important ecological concern for habitat conservation and for a sustainable fishing industry. Yet there is no comprehensive survey to show the distribution and density of this very important resource along the coast. In an effort to obtain first hand knowledge on this matter, the fisherman interviewed during the QCFO survey \vere asked to mark on maps their knowledge of the location and extent of sea grass beds. This data has been digitised and entered into the GIS. We are awaiting further data from the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority (GBRI\lPA) to cross tabulate results with. But significant differences are expected due to temporal changes in their location and the sparsity of reliable dara. As a means to addressing this problem we have decided to

develop a long term GIS for recording evidence of sea grass beds. Data will be entered based upon belief factors to build up a reliable picture of sea grass distribution. This work is seen as an ongoing effort. The University will submit a formal proposal to QDPI fisheries for the advancement of this project.

No maps have been included in this report on sea grass distribution. We are awaiting data from an independent source, namely the GBRMPA, to correlate results with. But we are more than happy to provide information and maps on demand if requested.

Appendix Map 1: Data from QFJ\;IA Logbooks 1996 Map 2: Fishing Constraints

1 Declared Fish Habitat Areas in Queensland, Fisheries Group, Queensland Department of Primary Industries, February 1997. 2 Fisheries Regulations 1995, Government Printer. Schedule 2 and partly Schedule 13.

Appendix 1

Survey Questionnaire use to determine the economic impacts of imposition of restrictions on gill nets on the Queensland east coast

fishery

CONFIDENTIAL

The University of Queensland

Questionnaire for QCFO Netting Study

Name:

Address:

Phone number:

Fishing district:

Commmercial fishers license number:

Commercial fishing vessel licence number:

Date:

In this questionnaire a DPA is a dugong protection area.

Please return to:

Gill Net Study Department of Economics University of Queensland Queensland 4072 Facsimile: 07 3365 7299

FISHING OPERATIONS

1. Is fishing your only business enterprise? 2. If no, what percentage of your work time is devoted to fishing? 3. What percentage of your income is derived from fishing?

Yes / No % %

4. What endorsements are attached to your primary fishing licence?

5. Do you own or lease your primary fishing licence? own / lease

FISHING EFFORT (EXCLUDING LABOUR)

6. What boats and tender vessels do you use in your fishing operation? Boat 1 Boat 2 Boat 3 Boat 4 Others

Length of boat (LOA)

Type of construction

Town ofpurchase

Age of boat (in years)

Estimated market value ($)

Estimated replacement value ($)

~ ; \.

NETS

6a. What nets do you use in your fishing operation? Net type Age Estimated market Estimated

(years) value ($) replacement value ($)

2

LABOUR INPUTS

Please indicate in the two tables below, for each family member or employee, the number of weeks per year spent at sea and on fishing related land-based activities and whether these 'people have other work skills that would help them to get work in another area. Please provide information for family labour in the first table and for non family labour in the second table.

7. Family labour

Person Age (years)

Number of years fishing for a living

Number of weeks/yr.

Other work skills YeslNo

List skills

Self

8. Non-family labour

Person Age (years)

Number of years fishing for a living

Number of weeks/yr.

Other work skills YeslNo

List skills

1 2 3

9. What was your total wage bill in the last financial year (year )? $ _

9a. How much did you payout in shares in the last financial year?

Self $ _

Partner $--- ­Other labour $ _

3

LAND-BASED OPERATIONS

10. What is the estimated value of your onshore facilities directly related to fishing (not processing)?

Asset Estimated market value ($) .

Estimated replacement value ($)

Sheds and other fixed structures

Refrigeration units, equipment, tools etc

4wheel drive vehicles

Other vehicles

Other

4

FISHING RELATED EXPENDITURES

11. What were your fishing related expenses for the last available financial year? Please complete the following table, where possible please complete by individual categories. If not provide total amounts. Financial year _

Item Expenses incurred ($) Main town where Percentage of expenses expenses incurred incurred in that town

Operating costs such as

::~~~~:~~:~0~i:~~p.p.f.~~:~:::::::::::::::::::: ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: ..~~~~.'..?~~.~~..~.~ : . Bait and ice

··Bo·a:t'repaIrs·an(l"maiiitenan~e'·· ..··· , . ::~~:~:~~p.~~~~~~~~::~:~:i~p.~!i.~:::::::: ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: Other

Total

Repairs and maintenance to onshore facilities such as .............................................................................................................- . Sheds

::~~~~i.~~~~~~~:~~!~~::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: Vehicle repairs and running . costs"Travefexpenses'rentais"an',f'hfre'" ..

..~.~~~~~ . Other

...... 0 ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• ~ ••••••••••••••• 0 ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 0 •••••••••• 00 ••••••••••

Total

Marketing costs such as Packing freight Agents commisions Selling costs Other

Total

Administration costs such as Harbour dues and licence fees Insurance payments Interest payments on loans Postal and bank charges Rates and land taxes Accountancy fees

Total

Other

[Overall Total II

5

12. Do you fish in any of the interim or proposed DPA's? Yes INa

12a. Ifyes in which DPA's and which fishing activities?

Name afDPA Fishing activities

6

FISHING ACTIVITY 12b. Please identify the fishing activities you carry out and percentage of total fishing time spent operating in each activity over the last financial year. It is important to fill in a separate line for each type of fishing activity and where nets are used a separate line for each net type used.

Fishing activity Net type Percentage of time spent fishing in interim DPAs

Months spent fishing in interim DPAs

Percentage of time spent fishing in proposed DPAs

Months spent fishing in proposed DPAs

Percentage of time spent fishing in other areas

Months spent fishing in

-other areas

Percentage of total fishing time spent in that activity

Fishing activities include: Net (by net type), line, crab, otter trawl, beam trawl and any other fishing activities.

7

ANNUAL CATCH IN DPA'S USING NETS 13. Please indicate in the table the percentage of the total fish caught for each net type in each of the interim and proposed DPA's.. In the last row indicate the total quantity of fish (in kilograms) caught in each type ofnet.

Offshore Offshore Foreshore River set Ring net Tunnel net Haul/seine ~ Other set net (kg) drift net set net (kg) net (kg) (kg) (kg) net (kg)

(kg) I

Total (kg) each net type all areas

I Area I Offshore Offshore Foreshore River set Ring net Tunnel net Haul/seine Other

set net (%) drift net set net (%) net (%) (%) (%) net(%) (%)

------------------_._---~~-~- -------------­

l _ ..! 1 , 1 1 1 .1

.__ __ l. 1 1 , 1 1 .1. 1 _ .

8

TOTAL CATCH FOR ALL AREAS

14. What was the total value of your catch for each of your fishing activities in the most recently available financial year for all areas and all fishing activities you carry out? Financial year _

Activity Value of catch ($)

••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• _ •••••••••• 1•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• •• ••• •••••••••••• •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••

! :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::r:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: ...............................................................................................................j ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••

j .........................................................~ , :. .

:

..........................." i ~ '" . !

15. What was the average total value of your catch for each of your fishing activities over the last three years for all areas and all fishing activities you carry out?

Activity Value of catch ($)

................................................................................................................i·····························..··· .. ··················· .

.........................................................··· .. ···············································..·1

.........................................................··········································.. ···..·····i· !..........................................................················..· ············· .. ····..·········r·..··· ,

........................................n ! , .............................................................................................................··1··············..···..···········..·············.. ······

~

..

.

.

.

.

RESPONSE IF NET BANS INTRODUCED In this section please provide for each question your response for the situation where • a total net ban is introduced to the proposed DPAs, and • a gill net ban only is introduced.

16. If net bans are introduced would you? Total net Set gill net

ban ban only r"''Yes'''r''No'''''i i · ~ ·····..······i Lx~~::::T:~~:::::::l : ! :Leave the industry immediately : : ; 1 ~ ~ ;·· ..·····..····· .. ·1·················1

Leave the industry after a few months I..········.. ···..i ·· ·i r:::::::::::::::::r:::::::::::::::J : : :Leave the industry after a year : : :

; .; ,f ; y o\ : : :Remain in the industry i ! i 1 ! ! 1 .1 ~ •••_•••••••••••••• "" ••••••••••••••••• I

9

Total net ban

17. Ifyou remain in the industry would you a. r::Y:~~::::F::~:?:::::j Continue to fish from the same port?

!·················i············..···i Change to another port? ~ ! i

1 .1

..................- .·· ..· .· ·· ...· .· .b. If so to which port would you change? ! 1

~ ~ : ••••••••••••••••• _ H :

18. If you remain in the same port would you . ! Yes 1 No i\ , ,

a. Scale down your operations? L L. ] .....................- .. ··· ...· .· · · ...

b. If yes in what way? ~ ! ! ! ~ _ - .:

f..·..y·~s !"..·..No..·· ..·j ~ i _ 4

c. Increase netting effort in other fishing areas? i L ..! _ : . · ~ .· .· ..· · .

d. If yes in which fishing areas? :1

: :

j:

t J

r·· ..y~s....··r·..·..No......·! ...................... , •••••••••••••••••••• 1

e. Increase effort in other fishing activities? i ~ i :. : :

........................................... : I

f. If yes in which other fishing activities? 1:! :

: ~

! 1 ................................. -. ••••••• .1

[..··Ves· T ·No· ·l ~ ~ {

g. Continue as at present but not fish with nets ~ l ! ~in the proposed DPAs l ~

l J i

Set gill net ban only

!!:":~I~~i i L J

[..y~.~ J ~.9. J L L J

.. ..

i· ,i : :I :

! "' J

10

19. Ifyou move to another port what impacts would this have and how much would it cost?

Impact Yes No Estimated cost Disruption to family

Increased costs for equipment (onshore and boat and fishing)

Loss of income

Other

20. Would bans on net fishing cause you to Total net ban Set gill net ban

. onlyr······················:···.._·············..·~

: Yes ~ No ~r:·······>=~·~·······:·····l::::::::~:?::::::::l a. reduce staff numbers? t.·.·.·.·.~·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·:.·.·.·.t:.·.·.·.·.· ..-1

l. ••••• ~ ••••••••••••••••• .:. •••••••••••••••••••••• _.r

........................._ ..· .· .· .

b. If yes by how many? t .J r···..·....··..···......·......··......··......·l

c. How old are those that would lose ~ ~ their jobs? !

: ~ :

I I !

Ii

i..••••.•.••••••••.••••••._••••••••••••••••••••..••i

ORI r·· 'Yes·..·..·r..···..N·o···.. ····~! j

d.reduce staff hours worked per week? r · ·..·..--r..··..· i :. ••••••••••••••••••••••• ..:. ••••••••••••••••••••••••1I

i ........................._ ..· r..·......·..···..·..···....···......·....·..·l·e. Ifyes by how much would you ·····

....... reduce the hours worked? : !

1.. ..1 L i

21. Do the people that would lose their jobs have skills that would enable them to get other jobs in the district?

r::::::x~~:::::::F:::::~~::::::::j L:::::x~~::::::r:::::f.i~::::::::l iii : I :

.I. •• n •••••••••••••••••••• ..:. .. ~ t ••••••••••••••••••••••• :

22. Comments on the effects on employment

11

23. If you leave the industry would you !····y~s··..T····No·····] ~ _ ~ !

retire? f · ·\ ·.. ·1 seek other employment in the fishing industry? : : : r ,-.. _.~ ·····'1 seek other employment outside the fishing industry? : : :

r··················;··················istart another business? 1 : :

~ ••••••• u •••• ••• ••i _· i : ! :become unemployed?

·

i ! : ....................". 1

Other (please specify)

24. Comments Please make any additional comments on your likely response to the impositio~ of these restrictions.

COSTS OF PROPOSED NETTING BANS

Once you have made changes to enable you to continue your operation after the set gill net restrictions are imposed what would you expect the effects will be on your costs and the value of your catch?

25. What would be the effect of proposed restrictions onset gill nets on the value of your catch?

Increase by $ _

Decrease by $ _

12

-----

EFFECT OF PROPOSED RESTRICTIONS ON SET GILL NETS ON YOUR FISHING COSTS

26. What effects would you expect the set gill net bans in the proposed DPA's would have on your operating and maintenance costs?

Percentage change

Operating costs IIncrease/decrease

................................................... u ••••.•••••••• n ••••••••••• ~ ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• ................................................j•••....•.•..•...•.•..••.. u .

Repairs and maintenance to 1 Increase!decrease i onshore facilities' 1 1

: 1

BUYOUT OF ENDORSEMENTS

27. If gill net bans were introduced, and the federal government were to offer to buyout your fixed gill net endorsement or total licence package on a voluntary basis, what amount would induce you to sell?

a. Gill net endorsement $

b. Total licence package $ _

28. Why do you think these are fairamounts? a. Gill net endorsement

b. Total licence package

13

EFFECT OF REGULATORY CHANGES ON YOUR ABILITY TO REMAIN VIABLE IN THE INDUSTRY .

29. The proposed changes could lead to changes in both your costs and your catch. We want to get an indication of the effects of these changes on your ability to continue to operate in the fishing industry. Please indicate a break-even or survival level for each of the following questions. Please answer all questions.

a. If the value of your total annual catch does not change at what level of increase in annual costs would you no longer be able to continue to operate at a profit? 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% more than 25%

b. If the value of your total annual catch decreases by 10% at what level of increase in annual costs would you no longer be able to continue to operate at a profit? 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% more than 25%

c. If the value of your total annual catch decreases by 20% at what level of increase in annual costs would you no longer be able to continue to operate at a profit? 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% more than 25%

d. If the value of your total annual catch decreases by 30% at what level of increase in annual costs would you no longer be able to continue to operate at a profit? 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% more than 25%

14

DEBT

How much does your fishing business owe in loans? $ _

30. For both a total net ban and a set gill net ban would you be able to continue to meet your loan repayments

Total net

,, ban! . ["··Ves····r··..No···..la.

i ~ ·i

without selling other assets? i:

1:

~ :

with selling other fishing assets? C::::::::::::::r::::::::::::::::1 with selling other personal assets? L u •••• n.l ..!

........................................ b. Or would you be unable to meet loan repayments at all? 1 1.. .1

Thank you for completing the questionnaire.

...................". \

1 ..1. J

15

Appendix 2

Preliminary report on economic impacts of imposition of restrictions on gill nets on the Queensland east coast fishery

QCFO Netting Study Preliminary Report 8 August 1997

This document provides a summary of preliminary results of a survey carried out by the Department of Economics, University of Queensland on the impacts of netting restrictions in dugong protection areas.

Summary of findings

Data are summarised under the four centres at which meetings were held, namely: Hervey Bay, Gladstone, Mackay and Townsville. The data used in this summary are from questionnaires received on or before Thursday 31 July 1997. More completed questionnaires have been received and will be included in subsequent analysis. Data are summarised in Table 1.

Fishing was the only business enterprise of almost all of the respondents. Most fishers responding to the questionnaire owned rather than leased the fishing licence under which they operated.

Labour

Most of the businesses were small consisting of an owner operator who occasionally had family assistance and in some cases employed casual labour. The average age of the owner operators varied between the different centres but in all cases was greater than 40 years and was 44.5 years overall.

Response if bans introduced

The vast majority of respondents wished to continue fishing for a living and to continue to fish from the same port. However, if net restrictions were introduced most would increase netting effort in other areas and effort in other fishing activities. Those that employed staff would reduce staff numbers. Concern was expressed by respondents on the effects on industry sustainability of a greater concentration of fishing effort. Many felt that fishing would no longer be viable for all fishers if effort was concentrated over smaller fishing grounds.

If forced to leave the industry most respondents felt they would become unemployed. The main reasons given for this feeling were the age of respondents and lack of skills that would enable them to gain alternative employment.

Relatively few fishing enterprises responding to the survey stated that they had business debt. However, those that did felt it would be difficult to meet loan commitments without selling business and personal assets. It is important to note that information on personal debt of fishermen was not collected In ~his survey.

Almost all of the expenditures of fishing businesses surveyed were made locally in either the home port or nearby centres.

Table 1: Summary of preliminary results

No. of respondents Hervey Bay

33 Gladstone

8 Mackay

34 Townsville

25 Total 100

Fishing only enterprise

Own licence Lease licence

Yes No

31(94%) 1(6%)

24(73%) 9(27%)

8(100%) 0

7(87.5%) 1 (12.5%)

29(83%) 5(17%)

28(87.5%) 4(12.5%)

19(76%) 6(24%)

21(84%) 4 (16%)

87 12 80 18

Labour Average age (years) Time fishing (years) Other work skills

45.5 23.8

5(15%)

48 10

1(12.5%)

42.3 18.7

11(32%)

46 19.7

9 (36%)

44.5 19.9 26

Catch and expenses (aver~ge $) Total value of catch Operating costs Onshore costs Marketing costs Administration costs Other costs Total above expenses

·52,784 13920 2360 354 3649 5168

26,001

57,191 23994 5390 2708 5019

0 33,591

93,040 31059 5341 8524 7336 10268 55,447

47,812 13036 2868 1966 4936

0 22,257

66710

Labour costs (average per employer) Number of employers

. 10919

13 (39%)

7720

2 (25%)

41520

15 (44%)

6243

8 (32%)

21845

38

Response to bans (set net) leave industry immediately remain in industry

5 14

1 5

10 12

8 16

24 47

Continue to fish from same port Change to another port

22 1

6 1

22 1

17 4

67 7

Scale down operations 5 3 13 8 29

. Increase netting in other areas 15 3 18 17 53

Increase in other activities 16 3 22 17 58

Reduce staffnumbers 7 2 15 9 33

,

Uyou leave the industry retire seek employment in fishing seek employment out of fishing start another business become unemployed

3 3 1 3

24

2 1 1 1 4

0 5 4 4

23

1 2 4 3 16

6 11 10

"11 67

Table 2 Tve and NM for each region

Location Mean TVC Median TVC MeanNM MedianNM Mean NMlMean TVC Median NMlMedian TVC MeanNM/TVC Median NM/TVC Number

Mackay 93040 60000 25694 25539 0.276 0.426 0.264 0.319

27

Gladstone 57190 54000 12242 14735 0.197 0.273 0.12 0.15

5

Overall 66710 47500 20218 14735 0.303 0.310 0.183 0.319

79

Where rve is total value of catch, and NM is net margin.

Gavin Ramsay Department of Economics University of Queensland

Hervey Bay Gladstone Mackay Townsville All areas

27. If bans were introduced, and 27. If bans were introduced, and offer 27. If bans were introduced, and offer 27. If bans were introduced, and offer offer to buyout made, what amount to buyout made, what amount would

would induce you to sell? induce you to sell?

a. Gill net b. Tolallicence a. Gill net b. Tolallicence endorsement package endorsement package

1 30000 100000 2 350000 10000 would not sell 3 500000 4 900000 900000 20000 200000 5 50000 300000 6 200000 200000 7 405000 8 500000 500000 68165 9 60000 133000 700000

10 100000 11 250000 25000 200000 12 20000 45000 110000 500000 13 55000 55000 14 500000 500000 15 135000 16 500000 500000 17 18 40000 19 250000 250000

.20 60906 21 700000 700000 22 1850000 23 250000 24 85000 25 25000 30000 26 50000 500000 27 650000 1300000 28 300000 29 200000 200000 30 31 750000 1000000 32 33 100000o 1000000 34

Sum 6300000 12065906 378000 2068165 Number 15 28 7 7 Mean 420000 430925 54000 295452

to buyout made, what amount would induce you to seO?

a. Gill net b. Tolallicence endorsement package

145000 1500000

15000 75000 30000 40000

180000 60000 150000

565000 40000 85000

500000 1000000

50000 650000

500000 550000

20000 250000

49000 200000 50000 150000

50000 100000 500000 180000 200000

50000 100000 125000 550000 130000 550000 25000 55000

1000000 not for sale 150000 250000 300000 400000

140000 240000 345700

106000 206000

4185000 8421700 22 25

190227 336868

to buyout made, what amount would induce you to sell?

a. Gill net b. Tolallicence Gill net, all Total lie., endorsement package areas all areas

45000 500000 70000 220500

135000 150000 130000 200000 100000 150000

200000

50000 50000 200000

48000 110000 250000 360000

30000 400000 90000 150000 40000 100000

120000 150000 35000 650000 48000 500000 20000 40000 80000 80000

85000

1891000 3695500 12754000 26251271 18 17 62 77

105056 217382 205710 340926

, "~~',',

Values of onshore facilities

Asset category Hervey Bay (n=33) Gladstone (n=12) Mackay (n=34) Townsville (n=25)

Sheds and other fixed structures Refridgeration units, eqUipment, tools 4WD vehicles Other vehicles

No. reporting

26 31 20 21

Current value

($1000) 13397 12997 7318 6327

Replt. value

($1000) 18294 20567 16030 11894

No. reporting

8 10 8 5

Current value

($1000) 22167 4833

11708 5083

RepJt. value

($1000) 32708 7417

25583 6292

No. reporting

21 27 26 23

Current value

($1000) 15032 5942

11618 4794

Replt. value

($1000) 20294 10760 27300 10015

No. reporting

17 24 22 16

Current value

($1000) 7379 6206

11200 5120

Replt. value

($1000) 12524 9006

24040 11800

Other All onshore facilities

9 3800 43840

6803 73588

4 26208 70000

26750 98750

11 3109 40495

4047 72416

11 1150 31055

1808 59178

Asset class Current Replt. value value

($1000) ($1000) Sheds and other fixed structures 13333 19110 Refridgeration units, eqUipment, tools 8348 13309 4WD vehicles 10009 22257 Other vehicles 5456 10674 Other . 5779 7317 All onshore facilities 42925 72668

•••• Showslocations~where some form of.­Cairns

90 •

Tin Can.Bay

Maryborough

Gladstone

BowelLl • Airlie Bea&!

J..

Bundaberg

Rockhampton ,

. '1" '1 fi h'

90 180 Kilometerso

cOl1str,llnt '1mlts COmrn~rlca Ilet. IS . Ing

---"---'-"'----- -------...._---~--)

Townsville

-

-~-

I

I \

"-- \, \

\

. ,

\:-­

Data from Queensland Fisheries Management Authority (QFMA) Logbooks 1996 2011 o 200 Data is for fish species affected by Dugong Protection (Barramnndi, Salmon, Mackerrel, Mullet, Whiting, Flathead) Data provided by QDPI Fisheries

PREVIOUS WORKING PAPERS IN THE BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION: STUDIES IN ITS ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT, MAINLY IN YUNNAN, CHINA SERIES. RESEARCH PAPERS IN THIS CURRENT SERIES FOLLOWING ON FROM THIS

ABOVE MENTIONED SERIES

PREVIOUS WORKING PAPERS IN THIS SERIES

1. "Biodiversity Conservation: Economics, Gains and Costs in China Illustrated by Xishuangbanna Nature Reserve, Yunnan", Clem Tisdell and Xiang Zhu, February 1994.

2. "Does the Economic Use of Wildlife Favour Conservation and Sustainability?", Clem Tisdell, February 1994.

3. "The Environment and Asian-Pacific, Particularly East Asian, Economic Development", Clem Tisdell, March 1994.

4. "Presenting Requests for Financial Support for Protected Areas: The Role for Environmental Economics and Commonsense", Clem Tisdell, March 1994.

5. "Ranking Inter-country and Inter-regional Requests for Financial Support for Protected Areas: Environmental Economic Guidelines" , Clem Tisdell, March 1994.

6. "Conservation, Protected Areas and the Global Economic System: How Debt, Trade, Exchange Rates, Inflation and Macroeconomic Policy Affect Biological Diversity", Clem Tisdell, March 1994.

7. "Environmental and Resource Economics: Its Role In Planning Sustainable Development", Clem Tisdell, April 1994.

8. "Conservation of Biodiversity is the Most Important Aspect of Ecologically Sustainable Development: An Economic Perspective", Clem Tisdell, April 1994.

9. "Ecotourism, Economics and the Environment", Clem Tisdell, October 1994.

10. "Socio-Economic Issues and Strategies for Biodiversity Conservation in China with Observations from Xishuangbanna", Clem Tisdell, November, 1994.

11. "Ecotourism - Its Boundaries and its Economics with Examples from China", He Wen and Clem Tisdell, February, 1995.

12. "Reconciling Economic Development, Nature Conservation and Local Communities: Strategies for Biodiversity Conservation in Xishuangbanna, China", Clem Tisdell and Zhu Xiang February, 1995.

13. "Tourism Development in India and Bangladesh: General Issues, and Ecotourism in the Sunderbans", Clem Tisdell, March 1995.

14. "Trends in Tourism Development in China: Issues and Opportunities", Clem Tisdell, March 1995.

15. "Tourism Development and Conservation of Nature and Cultures in Xishuangbanna, Yunnan", Clem Tisdell and Zhu Xiang, May 1995.

16. "Protected Areas, Agricultural Pests and Economic Damage: A Study of Elephants and other Pests from Xishuangbanna State Nature Reserve", Clem Tisdell and Zhu Xiang, May 1995.

17. "Financing Nature Reserves in China - The Case of the State Nature Reserve of Xishuangbanna, Yunnan: Financial Issues, Political Economy and Conservation", Clem Tisdell and Zhu Xiang, May 1995.

18. "Investment in Ecotourism: Assessing its Economics", Clem Tisdell, May 1995.

19. "Rapid Rural Appraisal (RRA), Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) and their Application in the Global Environmental Facility (GEF-B) Program in China", Zhu Xiang, August 1995.

20. "The Environment, Biodiversity and Asian Development", Clem Tisdell, September 1995.

21. "Biodiversity, Conservation and Sustainable Development: Challenges for North- . East India in Context", Clem Tisdell, September 1995.

22. "Economic and Environmental Perspectives on Sustainable Agricultural Developments", Clem Tisdell, September 1995.

23. "India's Economic Development and Its Environment: General Patterns, Issues and Implications", Kartik Roy and Clem Tisdell, September 1995.

24. "Sustainability of Land Use in North-East India: Issues Involving Economics, the Environment and Biodiversity", Clem Tisdell and Kartik Roy, December 1995.

25. "Criteria for Sustainable Tourism: Why a Cautious Attitude is Needed", Clem Tisdell, January 1996.

26. "Protected Areas, Agricultural Pests and Economic Damage: Conflicts with Elephants and Pests in Yunnan", Clem Tisdell and Zhu Xiang, January 1996.

27. "Alternative Economic Instruments for Regulating Environmental Spillovers from Aquaculture: An Assessment", Clem Tisdell, January 1996.

28. "Economics as a Basis for Conserving Nature", Clem Tisdell, February 1996.

29. "Final Report on ACIAR Small Project: 'Economic Impact and Rural Adjustment to Nature Conservation (Biodiversity) Programmes: A Case Study of Xishuangbanna

Dai Autonomous Prefecture, Yunnan, China', Clement A. Tisdell, March 1996.

30. "Tourism in Yunnan Province and the Xishunangbanna Prefecture of China: Achievements and Prospects", He Wen, March 1996.

31. 'Developing Community-Based Forestry in the Uplands of Yunnan: Dictates of the Environment and Socio-Economics', Zhuge Ren and Clem Tisdell, April, 1996.

32. 'China's Environmental Problems: Selected Issued and Solutions in Context', Clem Tisdell, May 1996.

PREVIOUS WORKING PAPERS IN THIS SERIES:

1. Governance, Property Rights and Sustainable Resource Use: Analysis with Indian Ocean Rim Examples by Clem Tisdell and Kartik Roy, November 1996.

2. Protection of the Environment in Transitional Economies: Strategies and Practices by Clem Tisdell, November 1996.

3. Good Governance in Sustainable Development: The Impact of Institutions by K. C. Roy and C.A. Tisdell, November 1996.

4. Sustainability Issues and Socio-Economic Change in the Jingpo Communities of China: Governance, Culture and Land Rights by Ren Zhuge and Clem Tisdell, November 1996.

5. Sustainable Development and Environmental Conservation: Major Regional Issues with Asian Illustrations by Clem Tisdell, November, 1996.

6. Integrated Regional Environmental Studies: The Role of Environmental Economics by Clem Tisdell, December 1996.

7. Poverty and Its Alleviation in Yunnan Province China: Sources, Policies and Solutions by Ren Zhuge and Clem Tisdell, December 1996.

8. Deforestation and Capital Accumulation: Lessons from the Upper kerinci Region, Indonesia by Dradjad H. Wibowo, Clement A. Tisdell and R. Neil Byron, January 1997.

9. Sectoral Change, urbanisation and South Asia's Environment in Global Context by Clem Tisdell, April 1997.

10. China's Environmental Problems with Particular Attention to its Energy Supply and Air Quality by Clem Tisdell April 1997.

11. Weak and Strong Conditions for Sustainable Development: Clarification of Concepts and their Policy Application by Clem Tisdell, April 1997.

12. Economic Policy Instruments and Environmental Sustainability: A Second Look at Marketable or Tradeable Pollution or Environmental-Use Permits by Clem Tisdell, April 1997.

13. Agricultural Sustainability in Marginal Areas: Principles, Policies and Examples from Asia by Clem Tisdell, April 1997.

14. Impact on the Poor of Changing Rural Enviornments and Technologies: Evidence fromIndia and Bangladesh by Clem Tisdell, May 1997.

15. Tourism Economics and its Application to Regional Development by Clem Tisdell,

May 1997.

16. Brunei's Quest for Sustainable Development: Diversification and Other Strategies by Clem Tisdell, August 1997.

17. A Review of Reports on Optimal Australian Dugong Populations and Proposed Action/Conservation Plans: An Economic Perspective, by Clem Tisdell, October, 1997.

18. Compensation for the taking of Resource Interests: Practices in relation to the Wet Tropics and Fraser Island, General Principles and their Relevance to the Extension of Dugong Protected Areas, by Clem Tisdell, October 1997.

19. Deforestation Mechanisms: A Survey, by D.H. Wibowo and R. N. Byron, November, 1997.

20. Ecotourism: Aspects of its Sustainability and Compatibility, by Clem Tisdell, November 1997.


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