SenkakuDiaoyu islands

T he Asia-Pacif ic Jo urnal Vo l 12 Issue 30 No 3 July 28 20 14

The Japan-China Confront at ion Over t he SenkakuDiaoyu Islands ndash Bet ween ldquoshelvingrdquo and ldquodisput eescalat ionrdquo

Reinhard Drif t e

INTRODUCTION

The dispute o ver the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands in the Eas t China Sea has remained raw and menacing s ince its lates t eruptio n as aresult o f the purchase o f three is lands by the Japanese central go vernment in 2012 In co ntras t to the aftermath o f the 2010incident the Chinese s ide under the new leader Xi Jinping has widened the dispute by po litical military and pro paganda means andthe Abe go vernment has hardened its s tance by ins is ting that ldquoThere is no territo rial disputerdquo and ldquoThere never was anyunders tanding o f shelving the disputerdquo Rather there was an attempt to po litical and military co unterbalancing which includess trengthening o f the military alliance with the US repo s itio ning Japan`s armed fo rces to the So uth and reinterpreting Article 9 o fthe so -called Peace Co ns titutio n

The o ngo ing military and co as t guard s tand-o ff aro und the is lands risks a serio us clash thro ugh either miscalculatio n unfo reseencircumstances o r risk taking at lo wer co mmand level

The Chinese go vernment is aiming to fo rce Japan to ackno wledgethat there is a territo rial dispute The repeated dispatch o f Chineseco as t guard ships into the territo rial waters aro und the is lands is topro ve that there is indeed a territo rial dispute and that Japan nolo nger has exclus ive co ntro l o ver the is lands The is land dispute alsoinvo lves the US as Japan`s alliance partner with its o wn high s take ina functio ning relatio nship with a ris ing China The US therefo reseeks to avo id a military ldquoentrapmentrdquo despite repeated declaratio nsto the effect that the mutual security treaty includes the is lands China`s mo ves in the Eas t China Sea send wo rrying s ignals to tho seco untries aro und the So uth China Sea which co ntes t actively(Vietnam Philippines ) o r mo re guardedly (Indo nes ia Malays ia andBrunei) China`s claim to almo s t 90 o f the So uth China Sea whileJapan is suppo rting these natio ns po litically and materially (egpro viding ass is tance to beef up the co as t guards o f VietnamIndo nes ia and the Philippines ) Finally China challenges theprinciples o f the invio lability o f internatio nal bo rders and thepeaceful reso lutio n o f internatio nal disputes which is particularlyo mino us agains t the backgro und o f Russ ian mo ves agains t theterrito ry o f the Ukraine

This article lo o ks at the majo r develo pments which led to the currentdangero us s ituatio n and explo res appro aches fo r cris ismanagement o r reso lutio n I co nclude that at leas t initially theso vereignty is sue o ver the disputed is lands has to be put as ide bycreating a new unders tanding that will permit shelving the is sue Thisnew unders tanding will have to take into acco unt the lesso ns whichcan be derived fro m the failed o nes o f 1972 and 1978 in o rder tosucceed Effo rts will then have to be co ncentrated o n Co nfidence and

Security Building Measures (CSBM) and o n ho w to share the eco no mic interes ts in the area o uts ide the 12 nautical mile (nm)territo rial sea aro und the is lands This will require a lo t o f go o d po litical will o n bo th s ides so mething that is currently miss ing

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

- The circumstances o f Japan`s acquis itio n

An analys is o f the his to rical backgro und sho ws that we are faced here with the amo rpho us trans itio n at the end o f the 19 th Centuryfro m a China-do minated Eas t As ian Order to o ne do minated by Wes tern internatio nal law with China bas ing its s tance o n the fo rmerand Japan o n the latter As Shaw explains territo rial o wnership meant different things under these two different co ncepts and

Chinese scho lars use it as a base to refute Japan`s claims to territo rial access io n1

Japan bases its so vereignty claim o n the fact that it inco rpo rated the is lands as terra nullius (vacant territo ry) o n the 14 January

1895 and has been co ntinuo us ly o ccupying the is lands s ince then2 China ho wever argues that it dis co vered the is lands lo ngbefo re and quo tes several his to rical do cuments go ing back to the Ming Dynas ty (1368-1644) which mentio n the is lands as part o f

Taiwan altho ugh Taiwan was inco rpo rated by the Qing Dynas ty o nly in 1683 3 After Japan`s inco rpo ratio n o f the is lands in 1895 aprivate perso n (Ko ga Tatsushiro ) used so me o f the is lands fo r co mmercial purpo ses fo r several decades until Wo rld War II alsopro viding habitatio n fo r wo rkers who were emplo yed in his fish pro cess ing plant The go vernment o f the PRC claimed the is landso nly in December 1971 after a repo rt in 1969 by an UN-related o rganizatio n mentio ning the po ss ibility o f subs tantial o il and gas

reserves aro und the area (ReedmanShimazaki 2006 p 43)4 This late claim was also very much in respo nse to the Guo mindanggo vernment in Taiwan (Republic o f China ROC) which had in February 1971 and again o n the 11 June 1971 publicly o ppo sed the

return o f the Senkaku Is lands (called by the ROC `Diao yutai`) as part o f the revers io n o f Okinawa to Japan in 19725 Applyingco ntempo rary rules o f internatio nal law the Japanese s ide has a s tro ng claim to the so vereignty o ver the is lands because o f theinco rpo ratio n as vacant territo ry and Japan`s effective co ntro l which went unchallenged fo r such a lo ng time

China`s argument abo ut `dis co very` is no t very s tro ng in terms o f mo dern internatio nal law because it never exercised effective

The Asia-Pacific Journal Japan FocusIn-depth critical analysis of the forces shaping the Asia-Pacificand the world

co ntro l and Chinese never inhabited the is lands In a recent publicatio n o f the State Ocean Adminis tratio n ho wever it is argued thatChina no t o nly dis co vered the is lands and used them but also exercised lo ng-term co ntro l o ver them witho ut clarifying what this

means 6 `Disco very` acco rding to the Chinese acco unts s imply means that the is lands were mentio ned in reco rds written by peo plewho passed them and used them as o rientatio n po ints o n their sea vo yage between China and OkinawaJapan and co ns idered them

as part o f China`s co as tal defence7 Mo reo ver the assertio n that Japan acquired the is lands as the result o f the Sino -Japanese Waro f 1894-95 which was ended by the s igning o f the Treaty o f Shimo no seki in April 1895 depends o n whether o ne co ns iders theSenkaku Is lands part o f Taiwan o r part o f Okinawa The Shimo no seki Treaty included the cess io n o f Taiwan and the Pescado res butdid no t mentio n the Senkaku Is lands The latitude and lo ngitude o f the Pescado res were given and a jo int co mmittee fo r

demarcating territo ries was set up8 The map o f Taiwan printed at the time did no t include the Senkaku Is lands China ho wever

s tates that the Treaty included the Senkaku Is lands s ince they belo ng to Taiwan a claim which Japan disputes 9

- Shado w o ver the po litical and mo ral fo undatio n o f Japan`s acquis itio n

Timing decis io n-making pro cess and secrecy o f Japan`s territo rial acquis itio n o f the Senkaku Is lands cas t a shado w o n the po liticaland mo ral fo undatio ns o f Japan`s inco rpo ratio n o f the is lands But even if the do cument o f inco rpo ratio n o f the is lands was madepublic by Japan o nly in 1952 success ive Chinese go vernments mus t have kno wn that Japan was in co ntro l and Japanese citizenspartly living o n and co mmercially us ing the is lands

There is co rrespo ndence in 1885 between the central go vernment in To kyo and lo cal go vernment in Ryukyu (called Okinawa to day)where the fo rmer demanded cautio n in asserting any claim o r putting markers o n the is lands The reaso n given was co ncern o verrais ing the ire and suspicio n o f the Qing go vernment which at that time was militarily s till s tro nger than Japan This is interpreted by

so me as Japan at leas t implicitly admitting the Qing go vernment`s title to the is lands 10 In co ntras t to the o fficial Japanese vers io ndis tributed s ince 1972 that fro m 1885 o n there had been a series o f surveys co nducted by the Japanese go vernment there is no

do cumentary pro o f that such surveys were co nducted11 Mo reo ver in 1880 nego tiatio ns between the Meiji and Qing go vernmentshad taken place o ver the es tablishment o f a so uthern bo rder because the Qing o ppo sed Japan`s incremental takeo ver o f the Ryukyuis land chain which in 1879 had been inco rpo rated into Meiji Japan as a prefecture after having been under dual Chinese andJapanese suzerainty s ince 1609 A draft treaty was prepared in which the Japanese pro po sed to draw the bo rder between Ryukyu andChina by giving China the Ryukyu is lands o f Miyako and Yaeyama and everything to the so uth o f them in exchange fo r co mmercialrights in China There was no specific reference to the Senkaku Is lands but acco rding to Hane this is no t surpris ing s ince they

belo nged in the unders tanding o f the Qing go vernment to the Ryukyu is land chain which as a who le was the o bject o f nego tiatio ns 12

The treaty wo uld have put the Senkaku is lands o n the Chinese s ide Fo r vario us reaso ns China was reluctant to s ign the agreement

at the time and fro m 1885 o nwards Japan no lo nger had any interes t in s igning either13 Hane argues that these two circumstancesndash To kyo `s hes itatio n to inco rpo rate the Senkaku Is lands and its making them the o bject o f a deal ndash raise do ubts abo ut theJapanese go vernment`s claim to day that the is lands are `inherent territo ry` (koyu no ryodo) o f Japan

The timing o f Japan`s inco rpo ratio n o f the is lands is also telling It o ccurred when China had lo s t decis ive battles in the Sino -

Japanese War had put o ut peace feelers to Japan o n 22 No vember 1895 and its ultimate defeat had beco me predictable14 Fro m thedo cuments quo ted fo r example by Hane and Shaw it is clear that the Meiji go vernment felt free in January 1895 to go ahead withinco rpo ratio n o f the is lands in co ntras t to its earlier hes itatio n The Chinese surrender fo llo wed in March 1895 and the Treaty o fShimo no seki ended the war in April 1895 The inco rpo ratio n by the Meiji go vernment is therefo re s trictly speaking no t related to theShimo no seki Treaty altho ugh the timing and his to rical circumstances es tablish a causal link to the Sino -Japanese War The Treatydo es no t co ntain any mentio n o f the Senkaku Is lands o nly that China wo uld cede to Japan `the is land o f Fo rmo sa to gether with allis lands appertaining o r belo nging to said is land o f Fo rmo sa` as Taiwan was then referred to The PRC and ROC unders tands

ho wever that this wo rding applies also to the Senkaku Is lands because they co ns ider the Senkaku Is lands as part o f Taiwan15

Under internatio nal law appro priatio n o f territo ry is legally s trengthened by making it public and by no t being co ntes ted butno tif icatio n is no t an abso lute co nditio n Ho wever even if the is lands were inco rpo rated witho ut this being o fficially made public itmus t have co me to the attentio n o f succeeding Chinese go vernments that the is lands were being eco no mically explo ited andtempo rarily inhabited by Japanese citizens s ince fishermen fro m Taiwan and China pursuing fishing activities in the area so metimes

landed there to escape s to rms 16

The Japanese go vernment tries to pro ve the Chinese reco gnitio n o f Japan`s so vereignty by two do cuments The firs t is a letter o fappreciatio n fro m the co nsul o f the Republic o f China in Nagasaki in 1920 which thanked the peo ple o f Ishigakijima fo r rescuing

Chinese fishermen washed asho re o n o ne o f the Senkaku is lands s tating that the is lands are part o f Okinawa prefecture 17 Anarticle in the People`s Daily in 1996 dismissed this letter as the perceptio n o f certain peo ple given the circumstance o f Japan having

co lo nized Taiwan at the time (1895-1945)18 The seco nd do cument is an article in the People`s Daily o n 8 January 1953 repo rtingOkinawan demo ns tratio ns agains t the US and explicitly including the Senkaku Is lands in the descriptio n o f the Ryukyu

Is lands 19 Ano ther battlefield to day fo r beefing up their respective claims to the is lands are maps Ho wever there are many

inco ns is tencies o n bo th s ides until the 1970s 20

The co nclus io n fro m the abo ve analys is can o nly be that neither the Japanese no r Chinese vers io n o f the his to rical backgro und isdevo id o f weak po ints The Japanese claim is certainly s tro nger in mo dern internatio nal law terms and the Chinese po s itio n isserio us ly weakened by the absence o f any pro tes t fro m 1895 to 1970 and by the circumstances o f the timing o f pro tes ts fro m 1970(ie repo rt o n hydro carbo n reso urces ) But as I will sho w later rather than us ing these weak po ints to reinfo rce mutually exclus iveso vereignty claims the mutual reco gnitio n o f these weak po ints co uld also pro vide an enco uragement fo r finding a co mpro mise

- Wo rld War II agreements and the Senkaku Is lands

After the 2012 natio nalisatio n o f three o f the is lands the Chinese go vernment to o k the line that Japan`s act was a negatio n o f theresults o f Wo rld War II thus co mbining the well-kno wn his to ry dis co urse o f Japan`s aggress io n agains t China until 1945 with theis lands dispute It is therefo re impo rtant to inves tigate briefly what these agreements said abo ut the is lands

Based o n its assertio n abo ut the Sino -Japanese war o f 1894-95 and the Senkaku Is lands being part o f Taiwan the PRC go vernmentargues that the allied agreements co ncerning the po s twar perio d (Cairo Co mmunique and Po tsdam Declaratio n) and the SanFrancis co Peace Treaty o f 1951 (neither the Guo mindang go vernment o n Taiwan no r the PRC go vernment were invited to theco nference leading to the treaty) required Japan to return the Senkaku Is lands The Cairo Dec1aratio n in December 1943 demandedthe return to the Republic o f China o f `all the territo ries Japan has s to len fro m the Chinese such as Manchuria Fo rmo sa and the

Pescado res rsquo21 Article 8 o f the Po tsdam Declaratio n s tates that ` The terms o f the Cairo Declaratio n shall be carried o ut andJapanese so vereignty shall be limited to the is lands o f Ho nshu Ho kkaido Kyushu Shiko ku and such mino r is lands as we

determine`22 Article 2 (b) o f the San Francis co Treaty s tipulates that ` Japan reno unces all right title and claim to Fo rmo sa and the

Pescado res`23

Ryukyu Islands

Vice President Spiro Agnew wit h Prime Minist erEisaku Sat o o n reversio n o f Okinawa Empero rHiro hit o and Empress Nagako lo o k o n May 15 19 72

The Senkaku Is lands are no where mentio ned in these do cuments but because o f its assertio n that the is lands are part o f Taiwan

the Chinese co ns ider them to be included24 At the same time the PRC has never reco gnized the legality o f the San Francis co Peace

Treaty and the Treaty itself do es no t even clarify to which China Taiwan sho uld be returned25 In an uns igned draft planning do cumento f May 1950 fro m the Chinese Minis try o f Fo reign Affairs fo r the PRC`s po ss ible participatio n in the San Francis co Peace Treaty andpublished in the Japanese media o nly in December 2012 as pro o f o f China reco gniz ing Japan`s o wnership the is lands are referredto by their Japanese name and it is pro po sed to examine whether these is lands are part o f Taiwan thus cas ting do ubt o n China`s

claim to day that they have always been part o f Taiwan and no t Okinawa and had been ceded to Japan in 1895 as part o f Taiwan 26

Pro fesso r Liu Jiangyo ng o f Qinghua Univers ity brushed away such do ubts by explaining the use o f the Japanese name by the

circumstance that this name was after the Japanese co lo nizatio n o f Taiwan the mo re po pular name27

It is mo re likely that the Guo mindang go vernment and fro m 1949 o n also the go vernment o f the PRC did no t kno w ando r careabo ut these is lands until 1970 There was no clear unders tanding o f whether the is lands belo nged to Okinawa o r Taiwan and eventhe ROC po s itio n o n Okinawa was unclear During Wo rld War II and in its aftermath there was co ns iderable co nfus io n within the

Guo mindang go vernment abo ut whether it sho uld o r co uld claim the Ryukyu Is lands 28 Ishii mentio ns that the ROC go vernment at

o ne s tage demanded to take part in the Trus teeship o f Okinawa29 Acco rding to an article in the newspaper o f the ChineseCo mmunis t Party Ro o sevelt even o ffered Jiang Jieshi Okinawa (which then wo uld have naturally included the Senkaku Is lands)

during the Cairo co nference in 1943 but Jiang turned it do wn30

As a result o f the San Francis co Peace Treaty o f 1951 Okinawa including the Senkaku Is lands as part o f the Nansei Sho to Is lands(so uth o f 29degno rth latitude refers to all the is lands o f the Ryukyu chain) was placed under US adminis tratio n and became a centralancho r o f the US military deplo yment in As ia

During the San Francis co Peace Treaty nego tiatio ns the US and theUK agreed that Japan wo uld retain `res idual so vereignty` o verOkinawa and that the US wo uld no t require Japan to reno unce its

so vereignty o ver Okinawa31 It is o bvio us that the Japaneseco ns idered the Senkaku Is lands as being included in the `res idualso vereignty o ver Okinawa` s ince fo r To kyo the is lands were part o fOkinawa Mo reo ver when the go vernment o f the Republic o f Chinano rmalized diplo matic relatio ns with Japan in 1952 (Treaty o f Peacebetween Japan and the Republic o f China) the subject o f the is landswas no t raised by either s ide In a separate exchange o f no tes bo ths ides agreed that the Treaty `be applicable to all the territo rieswhich are no w o r which may hereafter be under the co ntro l o f its

Go vernment` referring to the ROC go vernment32 But when the USanno unced in 1953 its intentio n to return to Japan the Amami Is lands(no rth o f Okinawa main is land) as part o f the Nansei Sho to the ROCgo vernment (but no t the PRC) pro tes ted agains t the US legaljus tif icatio n o f do ing so under the co ncept o f Japan`s `res idualso vereignty` o ver these is lands because this co ncept was no t

specified in the San Francis co Peace Treaty33

- The revers io n o f Okinawa in 1972 and the disputed is lands

Co nsequently when the US s tarted to dis cuss with Japan thetrans fer o f the adminis trative rights o ver Okinawa to Japan leading to the co nclus io n o f the `Agreement Between Japan and theUnited States o f America Co ncerning the Ryukyu Is lands and the Daito Is lands` (s igned o n 17 June 1971) the ROC urged the US in

September 1970 no t to include the Senkaku Is lands and to keep the so vereignty is sue o pen34

The ROC ambassado r to the US in a no te o f 15 March 1971explained his go vernment`s s ilence co ncerning the Senkaku Is landsuntil then by saying `fo r regio nal security co ns ideratio ns theGo vernment o f the Republic o f China has hitherto no t challenged theUS military o ccupatio n o f the Senkaku Is lands under Article 3 o f theSan Francis co Peace Treaty Ho wever acco rding to internatio nal lawtempo rary military o ccupatio n o f an area do es no t affect the

ultimate determinatio n o f its so vereignty`35 He then asked fo r theres to ratio n o f the is lands to the ROC `Regio nal securityco ns ideratio ns` certainly meant that under the Co ld War co nditio nsand its co nfro ntatio n with Beijing the ROC go vernment did no t wantto do anything which might have diminished the military po wer o f o rits go o d relatio nship with its American pro tecto r Mo reo ver Japanwas an impo rtant anti-co mmunis t neighbo ur fo r Taiwan andtherefo re the ROC go vernment had in 1951 waived all reparatio nsfro m Japan

Under pressure fro m bo th allies (the US s till had diplo maticrelatio ns with Taiwan in 1971) the US had to cho o se whether to goagains t Japan o r Taiwan and in the end decided to suppo rt Japan`sdemand Mo reo ver the US felt driven into a co rner by Taiwanbecause the latter had the po wer to to rpedo the pending textileagreement which the US was jus t nego tiating with several co untries including Taiwan Henry Kis s inger the Pres ident`s Ass is tant fo rNatio nal Security Affairs sugges ted pro mis ing the ROC that apending US military delegatio n vis iting Taiwan in Augus t wo uld buy

them o ff with pro mises o f military aid 36

Suppo rting Japan rather than Taiwan in the end meant that the USwo uld arbitrarily ldquodetachrdquo the Senkaku Is lands fro m Okinawanterrito ry despite having clearly co ns idered the two as o ne territo rialunit o ver which Japan enjo yed ldquores idual so vereigntyrdquo despite US

o ccupatio n until 197237 This was do ne by differentiating between

Okinawa which was returned as a territo ry and where the US to day has a co nsulate-general and the Senkaku Is lands which wereo nly reco gnised as being under the adminis tratio n o f Japan Any co nflicting so vereignty claims were explicitly left fo r the partiesco ncerned to so rt o ut after the revers io n o f Okinawa which included the Senkaku Is lands Since Art V o f the bilateral security treatyapplied to all Japanese territo ry being under Japanese adminis tratio n the security guarantee therefo re applied also to the is lands In this way the US co ntributed s ignificantly to the current diff icult s ituatio n

This rather self-serving ambiguo us US po s itio n was enunciated when the US Adminis tratio n s tated during Senate hearings o n therevers io n that `The United States has made no claim to the Senkaku Is lands and co ns iders that any co nflicting claims to the is lands

are a matter fo r reso lutio n by the parties co ncerned` the latter including the ROC and the PRC38 Since the revers io n in 1971 the UShas s tuck to no t taking a po s itio n o n the so vereignty o f the Senkaku Is lands and emphas iz ing that the 1971 Agreement trans ferredo nly the `adminis trative rights` to Japan In this way the US allo wed Japan to regain co ntro l o ver the Senkaku Is lands and enabled itto reinfo rce its so vereignty claim thanks to the revers io n When reading the pro po sal by Natio nal Security Staff member Jo hnHo ldridge to return `the Ryukyus (sic) and the Senkakus` but to pass no judgement as to the co nflicting claims to them HenryKiss inger wro te candidly o n the margin o f the memo o f 13 April 1971 `But that is no nsense s ince it gives is lands back to Japan

Ho w can we get a mo re neutral po s itio n`39

While the abo ve sheds so me light o n why the ROC did no t make any public claims to the title o f the Senkakus between 1945 and1970 it do es no t explain its s ilence befo re that perio d o r even fo r the perio d 1945-1949 ie befo re the es tablishment o f the PRCShaw o ffers the theo ry that this was because the ROC go vernment did no t have any his to ry o f ruling Taiwan and had to rely o n

Japanese co lo nial reco rds and maps when it to o k o ver Taiwan in 194540 The US Department o f State do cuments (FRUS) reveal thatfo r the ROC go vernment it was very much the o ppo s itio n by public o pinio n in Taiwan to the is lands` return to Japan as well as by

o verseas Chinese which put pressure o n Taibei in 1970 to o ppo se the trans fer o f the is lands to Japan41 Ano ther reaso n no tmentio ned in these do cuments is the repo rt o f hydro carbo n reserves aro und the is lands The Co mmittee fo r Co o rdinatio n o f Jo intPro specting fo r Mineral Reso urces in As ian Offsho re Areas (CCOP) under the auspices o f the UN Eco no mic Co mmiss io n fo r As iaand the Far Eas t (ECAFE) had co nducted a geo phys ical survey in 1968 The Co mmittee said in a repo rt in May 1969 that the

co ntinental shelf between Taiwan and Japan may be extremely rich in o il reserves 42 So o n after the publicatio n o f this repo rt Japans tarted to explo re with Taiwan and the Republic o f Ko rea po ss ibilities fo r jo int develo pment o f the Sea`s hydro carbo n reso urces InMarch 1969 Japan began pro tracted nego tiatio ns with Taiwan and So uth Ko rea leading to an agreement in principle in September

1970 to set up a jo int develo pment pro ject43

If the ROC had until 1945 no experience o f ruling Taiwan then the PRC go vernment had even less experience with the area o f theSenkaku Is lands Their negligible s ize and remo te lo catio n befo re the likeliho o d o f hydro carbo n reserves was raised certainly didno t draw any attentio n to them The abo ve circumstances also explain the timing o f the PRC`s claim In additio n and pro bably mo reurgent at a time when the go vernment was jus t emerging fro m the po litical ravages o f the Cultural Revo lutio n the PRC co uld no ts tay quiet in the face o f ROC and o verseas Chinese claims if it wanted to be reco gnized as the so le representative o f China Thefirs t newspaper repo rts abo ut China`s claims came o ut in May 1970 after Japan and Taiwan had s tarted talks o n jo intly explo ringthe energy reso urces aro und the Senkaku Is lands and Okinawa`s revers io n was anno unced Only o n 30 December 1971 did the

Chinese Fo reign Minis try publish an o fficial s tatement claiming the is lands 44

The weakes t po int o f the territo rial claim to the Senkaku Is lands by the ROC and s ince 1949 also that by the PRC is therefo re thatuntil the ECAFE survey o f the Eas t China Sea the is lands were no t claimed by either go vernment and Japan`s co ntro l o ver the

is lands had been unco ntes ted Shaw calls this absence o f o bjectio n a `serio us po litical miss tep`45 The co ntras t to the Chineseclaims to almo s t the who le o f the So uth China Sea is revealing the 9 dash line (o riginally 11 dash line) o n which China`s claims tothe So uth China Sea is based was already es tablished in 1947 but had appeared in Chinese maps in o ne fo rm o r ano ther s ince

1936 and was then taken o ver in 1949 by the PRC46

In meetings with PRC academics in February 2013 this autho r was given several reaso ns fo r the lo ng s ilence o f the Beijinggo vernment including so me o f tho se mentio ned abo ve Firs t o f all the go vernment saw no reaso n to specifically claim the is landsbecause acco rding to the PRC interpretatio n o f the Shimo no seki Treaty o f 1895 Therefo re having been taken away fro m China aspart o f Taiwan Japan was o bligated to return them as a result o f the abo ve-mentio ned wartime and po s twar agreements Allco unterarguments abo ut the is lands no t having been mentio ned in these agreements (in co ntras t to eg the Penghu Is lands) wereswept away by the assertio n that the Diao yu Is lands are part o f Taiwan The US adminis tratio n o ver Okinawa which explicitly includesthe Senkaku Is lands and the USUK s tatement co ncerning Japan`s res idual so vereignty o ver Okinawa during the San Francis co PeaceTreaty nego tiatio ns (at that time no difference between Japanese so vereignty o ver Okinawa and adminis trative rights o ver theSenkaku Is lands had yet been made) were s imply co ns idered as having been addressed by two PRC s tatements in 1951 whichdeclared the treaty illegal Interes tingly in these s tatements Beijing claimed the Paracel Is lands the Spratly Is lands and the Pratas

Is lands as part o f China47 Even if the PRC co ns idered the Senkaku Is lands as part o f Taiwan it is s trange that no claim to theSenkaku Is lands was made altho ugh Taiwan was under the co ntro l o f the Guo mindang whereas the Senkaku Is lands in co ntras twere placed under US adminis tratio n (and mo reo ver jo ined to Okinawa) while the Pratas Is lands were placed under UN Trus teeshipAno ther explanatio n given by these PRC academics fo r China`s s ilence is the absence o f diplo matic relatio ns between Beijing andTo kyo until 1972 It is no t clear to this autho r why this sho uld have prevented Beijing fro m pro tes ting agains t Japan`s territo rialclaim to the is lands s ince the go vernment o n many o ccas io ns befo re 1972 pro tes ted Japanese po licies and even co ncluded`private` fishery agreements which managed to circumvent the territo rial dispute Ano ther reaso n mentio ned was China`s do mes ticins tability during the Cultural Revo lutio n 1966-69 which certainly dis tracted the PRC leadership fro m dealing with such a mino r is sueas these far away is lands

WAS THE SENKAKUDIAOYU ISSUE SHELVED IN 1972 AND 1978

What had kept the territo rial dispute between To kyo and Beijing under co ntro l fro m the 1970s until the beginning o f the 1990s wasa tacit unders tanding (`anmo ku no ryo kai` in Japanese) in 1972 and 1978 to shelve the dispute (`tana age` in Japanese `gezhi` inChinese) Ho wever the Japanese go vernment later explicitly denied such an unders tanding Since this shelving agreement helped tokeep the territo rial co nflict under wraps fo r such a lo ng time despite several incidents and played a critical ro le in the 2010 and 2012crises it is impo rtant to inves tigate the circumstances o f what was unders to o d in 1972 and 1978 and why this unders tanding fellapart Mo reo ver this autho r is co nvinced that ano ther ldquounders tandingrdquo will have to be fo und in o rder to escape fro m the currentdangero us co nfro ntatio n but this will o nly be po ss ible if the appro priate lesso ns can be learned fro m the demise o f the 19721978unders tanding

In 1972 the two co untries no rmalized diplo matic relatio ns and in 1978 they co ncluded a Peace and Friendship Treaty On theo ccas io n o f bo th nego tiatio ns it was the Japanese s ide which raised the is sue o f the Senkaku Is lands and agreed to pro ceed to aco nclus io n o f the respective nego tiatio ns despite diametrically o ppo sed claims to the o wnership o f the Senkaku Is lands In o therwo rds bo th go vernments agreed to shelve the is sue albeit no t in writing o r in any public o r legal fo rm In the case o f the September1972 nego tiatio ns between Prime Minis ter Tanaka Kakuei and Prime Minis ter Zho u Enlai the territo rial is sue (as well as the exactwo rding o f Japan`s apo lo gies abo ut its pas t actio ns in China which Tanaka o ffered to Zho u Enlai) was so sens itive fo r the

Japanese go vernment that the reco rd o f the Gaimusho o mits the reactio n o f Tanaka to Zho u Enlai`s refusal to dis cuss theterrito rial is sue This part was deleted by the then head o f the China Divis io n in the Gaimusho Hashimo to Hiro shi who lateradmitted this in an interview in 2000 In the interview he said that Tanaka Kakuei in reactio n to Zho u Enlai`s reaso ning that it wo uld

be better no t to dis cuss the pro blem o f the Senkaku Is lands replied `Let`s dis cuss it ano ther time`48 Yabuki Susumu co rro batesthis reactio n by quo ting the bo o k by Zhang Xiangshan an adviser to the Chinese Minis try o f Fo reign Affairs who was present at o neo f the meetings Acco rding to his reco rd Tanaka replied `All right Then it is no t necessary to talk anymo re abo ut it Let`s do it

ano ther time`49 Befo re this summit meeting Ko meito Chairman Takeiri Yo shikatsu who served as an impo rtant go -between fo r theJapanese go vernment to prepare the vis it by Prime Minis ter Tanaka had a s imilar exchange with Zho u Enlai in July 1972 when it wasalso decided to shelve the Senkaku is sue When Takeiri met Zho u Enlai o n 28 July 1972 the latter is quo ted as saying `There is noneed to to uch o n the Senkaku Is lands is sue Mr Takeiri yo u also had no interes t I also had no interes t But the his to rians raise itas a pro blem due to the o il is sue and Mr Ino ue Kiyo shi is very keen o n it Ho wever there is no need to place impo rtance o n it

(omoku miru)`50 It is an iro ny that Zho u Enlai even referred to a Japanese academic Pro fesso r Ino ue Kiyo shi who se his to ricals tudies favo ur China`s claim o n his to rical gro unds and who se views had been presented in an article in the People`s Daily in May1971 In these dis cuss io ns it was made quite clear by bo th s ides that the no rmalizatio n o f diplo matic relatio ns was the mo s timpo rtant go al and therefo re they agreed to shelve the Senkaku is sue

When bo th s ides nego tiated the Treaty o f Peace and Friendship in 1978 there was a s imilar willingness to put the territo rial pro blemas ide in o rder to achieve the co nclus io n o f the Treaty altho ugh the Gaimusho (Japan`s Minis try o f Fo reign Affairs ) has so far no treleased the do cuments Acco rding to Fravel a chro no lo gy (nianpu in Chinese) o f Dengrsquos activities published by a party researcho ffice summarizes a meeting between Deng Xiao ping and Japan`s Fo reign Minis ter So no da Sunao acco rding to which Deng s tated`Its no t that China and Japan do no t have any pro blems Fo r example [there are] the Diao yu Is land and co ntinental shelf is sues Do nt drag them in no w they can be set as ide to be calmly dis cussed later and we can s lo wly reach a way that bo th s ides can accept

If o ur generatio n canno t find a way the next generatio n o r the o ne after that will f ind a wayrsquo 51 After the ratif icatio n o f the TreatyDeng vis ited Japan and declared at a press co nference o n 25 Octo ber 1978 that the is sue sho uld be left to future generatio ns whomay be wiser In Diet dis cuss io ns it was also made clear by LDP Secretary General Ohira Masayo shi and Fo reign Minis ter So no daSunao that it was in Japan`s natio nal interes t to go alo ng with Deng Xiao ping`s pro po sal to leave things fo r the next 20 o r 30

years 52 Ohira declared at the time o n the ques tio n o f an agreement to shelve the is sue (tana age) that `tana age` was no t co rrect

rather the o ther party (senpo ) wo uld no t bring the is sue up (mo chidasanai)53 Or as So no da wro te later while it is true that Chinais claiming these is lands as their territo ry the is lands are currently in Japans hands and have no t beco me an actual is sue amo ngJapan and China If Japan takes the tro uble to bring up the subject at this o ccas io n and wakes up a s leeping giant ( literally `dis turb

a bush o nly to let a snake o utrsquo ndash yabu wo tsutsuite hebi wo dasu) it will be a to tal lo ss (moto mo ko mo nai) fo r Japan54

One canno t but co nclude fro m these acco unts that bo th s ides agreed to shelve the territo rial is sue while in no way abando ning theirclaims to the is lands o therwise there wo uld no t have been a no rmalizatio n o f diplo matic relatio ns in 1972 o r a Treaty o f Peace andFriendship in 1978 It did no t mean that the Chinese accepted Japan`s territo rial claim s ince China had s tated its o wn claim in thesenego tiatio ns and has s ince 1971 never abando ned the claim It is also o bvio us that bo th s ides knew that there was a territo rialpro blem o therwise `shelving` wo uld no t have made sense The directo r o f the Treaties Divis io n and later Directo r General o f theTreaties Bureau Kuriyama Takakazu who was invo lved in the nego tiatio ns in 1972 and in 1978 s tated in an interview in 2012 thathe unders to o d bo th then and to day that there was a `tacit unders tanding` (anmoku no ryokai) between Japan and China to shelve the

territo rial is sue55 Asai Mo to fumi who was directo r o f the Treaties Divis io n in 1978-80 and directo r o f the China Divis io n in 1983-85 also co nfirmed that it was the unders tanding no t o nly in the Gaimusho but also amo ng the po litical leadership (Nagatacho ) that

there was a territo rial pro blem co ncerning the Senkaku Is lands 56 Miyamo to Yuji also mentio ned in 2012 that in his time as head o fthe China Divis io n in the 1990s there was s till o n the o ne hand a clear po s itio n that the Senkaku Is lands were Japanese territo rybut o n the o ther the fundamental s tance o f maintaining the s tatus quo ( genjo iji) and a tacit unders tanding that no actio n needed to

be taken57 Tajima Atsushi who was the Directo r o f the China Divis io n in 1978 and participated in the dis cuss io n between Fo reignMinis ter So no da and Deng Xiao ping in 1978 emphas ized in an interview published in June 2013 that the Chinese s ide`s perceptio no f an ldquoagreement (go i)rdquo was o ne-s ided and that the Japanese s ide o nly lis tened to Deng`s explanatio n that the is sue o f theSenkaku Is lands (and o f the disputed sea bo rder) sho uld be left to future generatio ns The Japanese s ide was satis fied that Beijing

had no intentio n to change the s tatus quo and therefo re judged that ldquono reactio n was requiredrdquo58 Despite Tajima`s intentio n torefute the exis tence o f an ldquoagreementrdquo it is clear that there was an implicit unders tanding s ince the status quo was in Japan`sfavo ur

Ano ther indirect indicatio n that Japan tacitly accepted the exis tence o f a territo rial pro blem and was willing to suspend the is sue topro tect the o verall relatio nship with China was the go vernment`s res traint fo r so me time after 1972 and 1978 in taking actio nswhich might have been interpreted by China as inflaming the territo rial dispute The go vernment never allo wed pro specting anddrilling fo r o il o r gas reserves aro und the is lands and sho wed res traint in allo wing landing o n o r making eco no mic use o f theis lands As we will see in the next part ho wever this res traint was no t abso lute and s till left ro o m fo r measures which ero ded theshelving agreement

It is o bvio us fro m the his to rical co ntext o f the 1972 and 1978 nego tiatio ns that bo th s ides had much greater interes ts at s takethan the Senkaku Is lands Mo reo ver the shelving agreement was very much in favo ur o f Japan as the co untry in de facto co ntro l o verthe is lands thereby reinfo rcing To kyo `s o wnership claim in internatio nal law Later when China`s po litical eco no mic and militaryweight increased and it became do ubtful whether the US wo uld invo ke the Security Treaty guarantee to pro tect the militarily-indefens ible is lands agains t a Chinese military challenge the shelving agreement was useful fo r Japan agains t any such

co ntingency59

THE EROSION OF THE SHELVING UNDERSTANDING

While o ne can well unders tand the des ire by the Japanese and Chinese leaders to deepen the bilateral relatio nship thro ugh the twotacit unders tandings in 1972 and 1978 and to trus t that all remaining pro blems including the territo rial dispute wo uld then beeas ier to so lve with hinds ight this faith lo o ks mo re like wishful thinking It is indeed rather unusual to co nclude a Peace andFriendship Treaty witho ut clarifying an o pen territo rial is sue the very heart o f a co untry`s security po licy Since the 1970s thisdispute has no t o nly been a sens itive is sue within Japan but also within the much mo re limited circle o f the Chinese leadership withpo litical gro upings in bo th co untries ins trumentaliz ing it fo r their o wn narro w purpo ses

The main co nceptual pro blem with the bilateral unders tanding has been that it was based o n the assumptio n that the co nditio nsallo wing its fo rmulatio n in the 1970s co uld be fro zen fo r as lo ng as it wo uld take to find a so lutio n to the o ppo s ing territo rialclaims Ho wever maintaining the co nditio ns fo r the co ntinued reliance o n the bilateral unders tanding wo uld have demanded muchgreater effo rts by bo th s ides to clarify what the status quo is and what measures wo uld be seen as vio lating the status quo Ins teadas Ishii Akira put it the leaders o n bo th s ides pro cras tinated and allo wed the territo rial is sue to beco me the symbo l o f natio nalism

in bo th co untries 6 0 As a result vario us changes and pressures in the do mes tic and internatio nal enviro nment gradually ero dedthese co nditio ns with Japan`s go vernment in the end publicly even denying that there was a dispute which co uld have been theo bject o f shelving and pro mpting the PRC in the 2010 and 2012 crises to sho wer Japan with po litical and eco no mic sanctio ns which

were unprecedented fo r two co untries suppo sedly bo und by a Peace and Friendship Treaty

The shelving agreement o bvio us ly had no legal fo rce but denying its exis tence was po litically unwise and mo rally wro ng OkabeTatsumi argues that fo r po litical co nvenience Japan agreed in 1978 to shelve the is sue but that this was different fro m shelving the

dispute in a legal sense6 1 The fo llo wing o fficial Japanese s tatements can be interpreted in this light in Octo ber 1990 CabinetSecretary Sakamo to Miso ji after res tating Japan`s so vereignty claim s till declared that the is land is sue between Japan China and

Taiwan (sic) sho uld be so lved by a later generatio n thus implying that there was a territo rial dispute which had been put as ide6 2 Butby the time China pro mulgated its law o n territo rial waters in February 1992 (see belo w) the Japanese go vernment wo uldunequivo cally and publicly deny that there had been any agreement to shelve the is sue and even that there was a territo rial is sueWhen Prime Minis ter Miyazawa Kiichi pro tes ted agains t the Chinese law in February 1992 referring to a prio r unders tanding withDeng Xiao ping o ver the Senkaku Is lands the Minis try o f Fo reign Affairs (MOFA) is sued a co rrectio n denying such an

unders tanding6 3 In September 1996 Adminis trative Vice-Minis ter Hayashi Sadayuki said that Japan had no t agreed with Dengrsquos lsquoput

o n the shelfrsquo pro po sal ie arguing that there was no territo rial is sue6 4 In the fo llo wing the autho r analyses the three maincircumstances which acco unt fo r the breakdo wn o f the bilateral unders tanding

THE CORROSIVE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

The requirements o f internatio nal law regimes particularly the UN Co nventio n o n the Law o f the Sea (UNCLOS) which was ratif ied byJapan and the PRC in 1996 pro mpted bo th co untries to take do mes tic ando r internatio nal adminis trative and legal s teps (fo rexample pass ing legis latio n related to the adminis tratio n o f their maritime space demarcating their sea bo rders and claimingbo rders fo r their EEZ) which had a general purpo se but did no t sufficiently take into acco unt the need to pro tect the bilateralunders tanding o f putting the territo rial dispute as ide Mo reo ver internatio nal regimes have `ves ted o therwise wo rthless is lands

with immense eco no mic value`6 5 They enco urage the assertio n o f so vereignty and penalize s tates fo r appearing to acquiesce in arival s tate`s claim to a disputed territo ry Paul O`Shea applied the term `so vereignty game` to this diplo matic-legal tit-fo r-tat

based o n Alexander Wendt`s co nceptio n o f so vereignty as a so cially co ns tructed ins titutio n6 6 Finally the vagueness o f

internatio nal law allo ws s tates to cherry pick tho se no rms which fit bes t their interes ts and claims 6 7 It is pro bably with thiss ituatio n in mind that fo rmer Chinese ambassado r to Japan and the UN Chen Jian explained at the beginning o f a talk o n 30

Octo ber 2012 that internatio nal law is a ro o t cause o f the current territo rial disputes 6 8 This autho r has to o much respect fo rinternatio nal law no tably UNCLOS to agree with this s tro ng s tatement but is aware o f the weaknesses o f many legal s tipulatio ns

With regard to the Senkaku dispute internatio nal law regimes have thus bro ught with it the fo llo wing co mplicatio ns

- Bo th co untries mus t always co ns ider that whatever is decided in relatio n to the disputed Senkaku Is lands might have implicatio nsfo r the co untry`s o ther territo rial disputes (Japan`s territo rial disputes with Ko rea and Russ ia China`s EEZ dispute with Ko rea o rterrito rial disputes with the o ther litto ral claimants in the So uth China Sea )

- Any actio n taken by the Japanese go vernment with regard to the Senkaku Is lands can be interpreted as the o fficial express io n o fthe go vernment in co ntro l o f the is lands and China will therefo re feel o bliged to pro tes t in o rder to defend its claim

- Bo th co untries had to co mply with UNCLOS in o rder to benefit fro m this regime and o fficially draw sea bo rders which s tart withbase lines o n which are dependent the extent o f the Territo rial Waters (12 nm fro m the base line) o f the Co ntiguo us Zo ne (24 nmfro m the base line) o f the EEZ (200 nm fro m the baseline) and o f the Extended Co ntinental Shelf (under certain co nditio ns up to350 nm fro m the base line can be claimed) The is sues aris ing fro m this are whether Japan and China wo uld apply the drawing o f thesea bo rders to the disputed territo ry and if so whether the Senkaku Is lands co uld be class ified as `is lands` which are entitled toan EEZ o r jus t `ro cks` which wo uld entitle them o nly to territo rial waters under UNCLOS Article 123 and ho w to draw the EEZbo rder in the Eas t China Sea`s Senkaku area These is sues were bo und to have an impact o n the bilateral unders tanding in o ne wayo r the o ther and wo uld have required special actio n in o rder to keep the territo rial dispute shelved

When China passed its Territo rial Law in 1992 it explicitly included the Diao yu Is lands which naturally was immediately pro tes ted bythe Japanese go vernment while s till sho wing a co ns iderable amo unt o f unders tanding and specifically saying that the law did no t

vio late Japan`s so vereignty o ver the is lands 6 9 At that time the Japanese go vernment was s till preo ccupied with preventing China`siso latio n after the 1989 Tiananmen crackdo wn China also played do wn the impact o f this law and even referred to Deng Xiao ping`s

1978 s tatement o f leaving the territo rial is sue fo r the future70 When Jiang Zemin vis ited Japan in April 1992 he also reaffirmed the

shelving acco rding to Deng`s pro mise in 1978 while s till res tating China`s claim to the is lands 71 Ho wever the Chinese Minis try o f

Fo reign Affairs (hereafter Waijiaobu o r CMOFA) o riginally had no t wanted to include the Senkaku Is lands 72 When it ratif ied UNCLOS in1996 China referred to the 1992 Law and pro mulgated the precise lo catio n o f many o f its base lines but left o ut so me o f them

including tho se fo r the Senkaku Is lands 73 In 1998 the Natio nal Peo ple`s Co ngress pro mulgated the PRC Exclus ive Eco no mic Zo neand Co ntinental Shelf Act which did no t mentio n any specific geo graphical areas Clearly the Chinese leadership was trying to walka fine line between its territo rial and EEZ claims (including the need to respo nd to do mes tic demands increas ingly do minated bynatio nalis t tendencies ) the requirements o f the internatio nal law regime and the maintenance o f go o d relatio ns with Japan

Japan ratif ied UNCLOS in June 1996 and es tablished in the fo llo wing mo nth the Law o n the Territo rial Sea and the Co ntiguo us Zo neas well as the Law o n the EEZ and Co ntinental Shelf which were supplemented by guidelines fo r implementatio n The latter also

es tablished an EEZ aro und the Senkaku Is lands Japan did no t include the Senkaku Is lands in its s traight baseline claim74 Twoseparate bills creating the Bas ic Law o f the Ocean Sea and the Law o n Es tablishing Safety Areas fo r Maritime Structures were

passed by the Diet in April 2007 and came into effect o n 16 July 200775 The latter two laws were passed mainly having in mind anyfuture explo itatio n o f natural reso urces in the co ntes ted EEZs Naturally China do es no t reco gnize the validity o f these laws fo r theSenkaku Is lands o r fo r the EEZ bo rder between the two co untries The territo rial dispute is also a majo r o bs tacle fo r agreement o nthe EEZ bo rder in the so uthern area o f the Eas t China Sea which is no t made eas ier by the fact that an agreement o n the title to theSenkaku wo uld have a majo r impact o n the s ize o f the EEZ area o f the success ful claimant particularly if the is lands were acco rdedan EEZ

FISHING AND OTHER ECONOMIC INTERESTS

Fishing is a majo r interes t fo r all litto ral s tates o f the Eas t China Sea Altho ugh Japan and China have co ncluded co nsecutive fisheryagreements fo r the Eas t China Sea the 1997 agreement (effective fro m June 2000) excludes fro m the applicatio n o f the fisheriesagreement the territo rial waters adjacent to the Senkaku Is lands Ins tead the extant 1975 Fishery Agreement which deemed the

areas aro und the Senkakus as part o f the high seas was allo wed to prevail76 In 2012 a letter related to the 1997 Agreement abo utfishing in the EEZ was revealed in which Fo reign Minis ter Obuchi Keizo had s tated to the Chinese ambassado r in To kyo Xu Duxinthat Japanrsquos laws and regulatio ns wo uld no t apply to the `waters in ques tio n` (togai no suiiki) It is unders to o d that the `waters in

ques tio n` include the Senkaku Is lands altho ugh their name is no t mentio ned and the Japanese go vernment to day denies it77 SatoMasaru a fo rmer intelligence analys t o f the Japanese Fo reign Minis try explained that this letter referred to the EEZ aro und the

Senkaku Is lands and applied o nly to Chinese fishermen78 Ho wever the Japanese go vernment seems no t to want to allo w fo reignfishermen unco ntro lled access to the territo rial waters aro und the Senkaku Is lands and has been patro lling the area This has ledto the expuls io n o f Chinese fishermen and subsequent pro tes ts by Taiwan and the PRC The Japanese co ntro ls have apparently

increased in the decade s ince 2000 while Chinese fishing activities have also vas tly increased79 Mo re research is needed o n thesedevelo pments to judge whether yet ano ther `uno fficial unders tanding` between To kyo and Beijing has been undermined

Finally in this co ntext o ne has to mentio n the is sue o f private and s tate o wnership o f the Senkaku as well as the ro le o f no n-s tateacto rs In 1896 Ko ga Tatsushiro o btained a free lease o f 30 years fo r the is lands o f Uo tsurijima Kubajima Minami Ko jima and KitaKo jima After his death in 1918 his so n Ko ga Zenji to o k o ver the bus iness In 1926 after the end o f the free lease the Japanese

go vernment co nverted it to a rental bas is 8 0 In 1932 the Japanese go vernment changed the s tatus o f these fo ur is lands fro m s tate-o wned to privately-o wned land by selling them to the Ko ga family After 1945 Kubajima and Taisho jima (the latter was always s tate-o wned) were leased to the US as firing ranges In 1972 Ko ga Zenji so ld Kita Ko jima and Minami Ko jima fo llo wed by Uo tsurshima in1978 and Kubajima in 1988 to Kurihara Kunio ki a real es tate inves to r and his family In 2002 Kitako jima Minami Ko jima and

Uo tsurijima were leased to the s tate which paid Yen 25 millio n per year fo r them in rent8 1 The US military used Kubajima andTaisho jima fro m 1957 as firing ranges and after the revers io n o f Okinawa in 1972 co ntinued to do so until 1979 It paid rent to the

private o wner o f Kubajima but after 1971 the rental payment was effected by the Japanese go vernment8 2 It is also interes ting tono te that even in the Japan-US minutes o f 15 May 1972 abo ut these two firing ranges the is lands are s till referred to by their

Chinese characters which are transcribed in the English vers io n as Ko bisho and Sekibisho rather than Kubajima and Taisho jima8 3

The relevant po int here is that s ince the shelving o f the territo rial is sue in 1972 and 1978 the is lands changed private o wners andthe s tate rented three o f the is lands fro m their private o wner and o wned o ne The leas ing in 2002 and the `natio nalizatio n` (nomo ney was invo lved) o f the Uo tsurijima beaco n in 2005 caused Chinese pro tes ts but the private o wnership changes did no t cause

any Chinese reactio n8 4 This is an illus tratio n o f the deterio ratio n o f the bilateral relatio nship during the fo llo wing years because itwas the sale o f three is lands to the Japanese central s tate which to uched o ff the 2012 cris is

THE IMPACT OF OIL AND GAS INTERESTS

The 1969 ECAFE Repo rt had led to claims by the ROC and the PRC o ver the Senkaku Is lands The mo s t pro mis ing area defined in thisrepo rt fo r hydro carbo n reso urces happened to be aro und the Senkaku Is lands Since Japan abando ned its jo int explo ratio n planswith Taiwan in 1972 with the diplo matic reco gnitio n o f the PRC no Japanese activities have taken place because o f co ncern abo utChina`s reactio n

In o rder to fulfill its gro wing demand fo r o il and gas and to divers ify away fro m its high dependence o n Middle Eas tern supplies

China s tarted in the 1970s to pro spect and extract energy reso urces in the Eas t China Sea8 5 To o verco me the territo rial dispute inthe so uth o f the Eas t China Sea and the divergent po s itio n o n ho w to draw the EEZ bo rder in the res t o f the Eas t China Sea Chinapro po sed `jo int develo pment` o f hydro carbo n reso urces In Octo ber 1980 PRC Deputy Premier Yao Yilin even pro po sed to aJapanese bus iness delegatio n that develo pment o f o ff-sho re o il reso urces aro und the disputed is lands be do ne jo intly by China

Japan and the US8 6 Ano ther bilateral pro po sal was made in 1984 by Deng Xiao ping who urged so lving the territo rial pro blems o fthe Spratly Is lands in the So uth China Sea and the Senkaku Is lands by jo intly develo ping the disputed areas befo re dis cuss ing theques tio n o f so vereignty But in this case as well as later pro po sals until 1996 Japan firs t demanded a settlement o f the maritime

bo rder o r reco gnitio n o f its title to the Senkaku Is lands 8 7

China`s relentless pro gress and expans io n o f o il and gas develo pment increas ingly caused frictio n between Japan and China whichalso impacted o n the territo rial dispute Since 1996 Chinese research vessels have entered the waters o f the Senkaku Is lands

including its territo rial waters 8 8 Japan exerted great res traint and until 2004 did no t allo w Japanese co mpanies to survey the ECSeven in the area which it claimed as its EEZ let alo ne aro und the Senkaku Is lands Mo reo ver To kyo `s permiss io n fo r surveying in2004 by a Japanese explo ratio n co mpany (never fo llo wed up because o f the po litical risks invo lved) in respo nse to Chinese o il andgas develo pment near Japan`s claimed EEZ bo rder was o nly fo r an area further no rth away fro m the disputed is lands

The Senkaku Is lands dispute co ntributed to the failure to fo llo w up o n the jo int unders tanding in June 2008 (ryokai in Japaneseliangjie in Chinese) to engage in jo int develo pment o f an area in the no rth o f the Eas t China Sea and to allo w Japan to jo in the

Chunxiao gas field explo itatio n which had been develo ped by China in a disputed EEZ area8 9 During the nego tiatio n o f the 2008jo int unders tanding the Chinese demanded jo int develo pment o f energy reso urces in the area aro und the Senkaku Is lands inexchange fo r their co mpro mise o n jo int develo pment in o ther areas o f the Eas t China Sea Altho ugh the Chinese go vernment agreedto the unders tanding witho ut getting satis factio n o n its demand the failure to achieve greater recipro city fro m the Japanese in theSenkaku area then made it do mes tically impo ss ible fo r the Chinese go vernment to go any further with nego tiating an

implementatio n o f the unders tanding9 0 In December 2008 two Chinese patro l vessels o f the China Marine Surveillance (CMSHaijiandui in Chinese) which is under the State Ocean Adminis tratio n (SOA) entered fo r the firs t time the territo rial waters aro und

the Senkaku Is lands in an apparent mo ve to s trengthen its claim to the is lands 9 1

INSTRUMENTALIZATION OF THE SENKAKU DISPUTE BY POLITICIANS AND NON-STATE ACTORS

The rais ing o f the territo rial is sue by China (ROC and PRC) and the campaign o f the Bao Diao (Pro tect the Diao yu) mo vementno tably in Taiwan and Ho ng Ko ng s ince the ECAFE repo rt led to a s imilar invo lvement o f the Japanese po litical right and o thernatio nalis tic gro ups which to o k up the is sue as a symbo l o f natio nalism In 1973 several rightwing po liticians within the rulingLiberal Demo cratic Party including Ishihara Shintaro who in 2012 became the trigger fo r the central go vernment`s purchase o f so meo f the Senkaku is lands es tablished the so -called Seirankai It was particularly Ishihara who raised the territo rial is sue and o ppo sed

its shelving by Prime Minis ter Tanaka9 2 Agains t the increase o f tens io ns between Japan and China s ince the middle o f the 1990s the supra-partisan Diet Asso ciatio n fo r the Preservatio n o f Territo rial Integrity was es tablished in 2004 It had 60 members by 2011On 30 March 2004 the Security Co mmittee o f the Lo wer Ho use passed a reso lutio n o n preserving territo rial integrity and demanded

a s tro nger Japanese s tance It was the firs t time the Diet passed a reso lutio n relevant to the Senkaku Is lands in this vein9 3 EdanoYukio chief o f the Co ns titutio n Research Co mmittee o f the Demo cratic Party o f Japan (DPJ) then in o ppo s itio n pro po sed that

Self-Defense Fo rces (SDF) tro o ps sho uld be s tatio ned o n the disputed Senkaku Is lands to prevent incurs io ns by o ther co untries 9 4

Since SDF members are civil servants (komuin) this demand so unds very s imilar to the demands by Abe Shinzo o n 15 September2012 to s tatio n komuin o n the is lands (witho ut clarifying whether he meant so ldiers o r o ther civil servants ) altho ugh he po s tpo ned

a decis io n when taking o ver the go vernment in December 20129 5 This sho ws the o ppo rtunis tic explo itatio n o f the territo rial disputefo r electo ral purpo ses

Natio nalis t po liticians and activis ts have also been demanding to erect facilities o n the is lands such as a weather s tatio n a beaco na helipo rt o r a harbo r in o rder to assert Japan`s so vereignty The Niho n Seinensha (Japanese Yo uth Federatio n) a natio nalis to rganizatio n affiliated with the majo r yakuza gro up Sumiyo shi-kai caused several incidents by landing o n the is lands s tarting witherecting a light to wer o r beaco n firs t o n Uo tsurijima in September 1978 which was enlarged in 1988 and ano ther o ne o n Kitako jima

Is land in 19969 6 Each such landing caused pro tes ts in China and amo ng the Chinese diaspo ra and pro mpted the PRC go vernmentto co mplain o fficially It also led to demands by the Seinensha that the light to wers be o fficially reco gnized by the go vernment andthe maintenance be taken o n by the Maritime Safety Agency (later called Co as t Guard) But even the co mpro mise o f including thelight to wer into o fficial charts was an o fficial act reinfo rcing Japan`s effective co ntro l o ver the is lands The dis cuss io n abo ut theo fficial handling o f the light to wer also raised the natio nalis t fever in Taiwan and its military even prepared (but then cancelled at

the las t mo ment) a co mmando actio n at the end o f 1990 to des tro y the facility9 7 In February 2005 amids t ris ing tens io ns o verChina`s energy develo pments in co ntes ted parts o f the Eas t China Sea and Chinese pro tes ts agains t Prime Minis ter Ko izumi`sYasukuni Shrine vis its the Japanese go vernment finally ceded to the demands o f the gro up to take o ver the Uo tsurijima lightho use

s tructure and its maintenance9 8 Until then the Gaimusho had succeeded in delaying this s tate takeo ver as `to o premature` in

o rder no t to pro vo ke China9 9

As can be seen the Japanese go vernment tried to res is t these natio nalis t claims but it co uld no t fully circumvent them thus keepingChina`s suspicio ns alive Mo reo ver whereas the Japanese go vernment always tries to prevent the landing by fo reigners o n theis lands it has no t until fairly recently prevented the landing by Japanese In o rder to keep fo reigners o ut o f the is lands and theirterrito rial waters the Japanese Co as t Guard (CG) has been patro lling the area which again is an o fficial act It may have been thenatio nalis t pressure fro m within the LDP as well as fro m right wing circles which pro mpted Ohira Masayo shi when he was PrimeMinis ter to send in 1979 a general survey team o f 50 perso ns (including Kurihara Hiro yuki) to the is lands in o rder to inves tigate the

building o f facilities like a helipo rt Such demands had already been made by the LDP o n 24 March 197810 0 Altho ugh the final repo rto f the survey spo ke agains t building facilities and no thing fo llo wed fro m it the Kurihara family co ns idered Ohira ndash altho ughgenerally kno wn to be a pro -China po litician - to be the mo s t suppo rtive prime minis ter o f all fo r the Japanese assertio n o f effectiveco ntro l o ver the is lands Befo re that Ohira had also agreed to Kurihara Hiro yuki`s pro po sal to set up o n Uo tsurijima a mo nument

to ho no ur Ko ga Tatsushiro which was do ne with the go vernment`s material and financial suppo rt10 1

Even within the Chinese leadership the territo rial is sue has been divis ive Jus t when the two s ides were nego tiating the Peace andFriendship Treaty in April 1978 abo ut 100 Chinese fishing vessels so me armed appeared aro und the Senkaku area with bannersdeclaring China`s title to the is lands While this was explained at the time in Japan as a means to pressure the Japanese during thetreaty nego tiatio ns it no w seems no w mo re likely that the Senkaku is sue was used by fo llo wers o f the Chairman o f the MilitaryCo mmiss io n Hua Guo feng as a means o f attacking the re-emerging Deng Xiao ping The PRC central leadership explained at the

time that this was `accidental` and Deng Xiao ping pro mised it wo uld never happen again10 2

These latter incidents are also impo rtant when dis cuss io n turns to the ques tio n who s tarted to undermine the unders tanding abo utshelving the is lands dispute ndash Japan o r China Was it China when it passed the 1992 Territo rial Law as is o ften mentio ned in Japano r did it already vio late the unders tanding in April 1978 as so me o thers claim Ho wever if the latter incident was beyo nd the co ntro lo f the Chinese go vernment it co uld be argued that it was the Japanese go vernment with the erectio n o f a mo nument o r the 1979survey that to uched o ff frictio ns Yet the blame game do es no t help in finding a so lutio n ins tead these incidents sho uld make itclear that bo th s ides bear part o f the respo ns ibility fo r undermining the 197278 unders tanding and sho uld therefo re be willing toco me to a new unders tanding

THE DETERIORATION OF THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP SINCE THE 1990S

In additio n to the abo ve develo pments it was the general deterio ratio n o f the bilateral relatio nship s ince the middle o f the 1990sthat changed the co nditio ns fo r maintaining the shelving o f the territo rial dispute Japan became suspicio us o f China`s no n-transparent military mo dernizatio n particularly o f the navy which has been expanding its o peratio ns including the Eas t China

Sea10 3 Other negative develo pments were the pro gress o f Chinese o il and gas explo ratio n in the Eas t China Sea despitedisagreement o ver the co mmo n EEZ bo rder vis its by Japanese po litical leaders to the Yasukuni War Shrine and o ther is sues relatedto Japan`s pas t aggress io n agains t China

A nadir in the bilateral relatio nship was reached during the rule o f Prime Minis ter Ko izumi Junichiro (2001-2006) because o f hisannual vis its to the Yasukuni Shrine But while the po litical relatio nship go t co lder the eco no mic relatio nship expanded andpro spered (`Co ld Po litics Ho t Eco no mics`) This also had ndashat firs t glance co unter-intuitively ndash a deleterio us effect o n themo tivatio n to wo rk harder to maintain the co nditio ns fo r putting as ide the territo rial co nflict s ince this dicho to my gave the falseimpress io n that po litics and eco no mics co uld be kept separate fo rever while the territo rial is sue was pending The wo rsening o f theterrito rial co nflict fro m 2010 and particularly fro m 2012 with China`s harsh po litical and eco no mic retributio n wo uld bear this o ut

Part o f the ratio nale fo r the Chinese navy`s increased presence in the Eas t China Sea is China`s o il and gas develo pments as wellas the wish to preserve the navy`s access to the Pacific Ocean to prevent JapaneseUS o bservatio n o r to intervene in a cris is Thisco uld no t but affect the territo rial dispute In May 1999 12 Chinese warships co nducted a mano euvre in waters no rth o f the

Senkaku is lands The exercise was the firs t o f its kind to be carried o ut by China in that regio n10 4 Other Chinese naval mo vementsin the Eas t China Sea increased including repo rts abo ut intelligence-gathering ships In the las t few years the po litical influence o f

the PLA and particularly o f the PLA Navy (PLAN) has co ns iderably increased10 5 The Japanese reacted by increas ing their militarydeplo yment and a s trengthening o f Japanese-American military co o peratio n Ho wever the Senkaku area is co ntro lled by the Co as tGuard which is a law enfo rcement agency and the Japanese navy keeps away fro m po licing This incidentally reinfo rces Japan`sclaim as po licing is do ne o nly within natio nal territo ry o r EEZ areas

Until the central go vernment`s purchase o f three o f the is lands in September 2012 it was the activities o f no n-s tate acto rs fro mJapan Taiwan Ho ng Ko ng and the PRC whether natio nalis t activis ts o r fishermen which caused the greates t direct co nfro ntatio nss ince Japan`s co untermeasures were a demo ns tratio n o f the exercise o f so vereignty which the PRC became increas ingly unwilling toto lerate In 1996 a Ho ng Ko ng pro tes ter who tried to co ver the las t meters fro m his bo at to o ne o f the is lands dro wned Ano therincident o ccurred in 2008 when a Japanese Co as t Guard ship rammed a Taiwanese spo rt fishing bo at which had entered Senkaku

territo rial waters The actio n caused the bo at to s ink10 6

In March 2004 fo r the firs t time s ince 1996 seven Chinese activis ts landed o n Uo tsurijima When the Japanese po lice made arres ts the Chinese Fo reign Minis try pro tes ted calling it a serio us vio latio n o f Chinese so vereignty The arres ts were made under the

immigratio n management law which includes a clause o n expuls io n o f illegal fo reign trespassers 10 7 In light o f the 2010 incident inwhich a PRC fishing trawlere twice rammed a Japanese co as t guard ship it is impo rtant to no te that despite guidelines which were togive = law enfo rcement agencies the autho rity to deal with trespassers `acco rding to the law` it was repo rted that the centralgo vernment intervened at the las t minute did no t press fo r an indictment and o rdered the release o f the arres ted Chinese Thego vernment did no t want any further co mplicatio ns that might to rpedo the planned China vis it by Fo reign Minis ter Kawaguchi Yo riko

and was satis fied to have demo ns trated effective co ntro l o ver the Senkaku Is lands by arres ting and expelling the Chinese10 8 AJapanese jo urnal repo rted that there was a Japanese pledge to China fo llo wing this incident that in future an intruder wo uld no t beput in detentio n but o nly arres ted as lo ng as it was no t a serio us case in turn China agreed to prevent the departure o f vessels withpro tes ters fro m its harbo urs Such an unders tanding has no t surpris ingly been denied by the Japanese as well as by the Chinese

go vernment10 9

The China Marine Surveillance (CMS) s tarted irregular patro l activities near the Senkaku Is lands in December 2008 when two CMSvessels s tayed fo r o ver nine ho urs in the territo rial waters o f the Senkaku Is lands as mentio ned abo ve This was interpreted in

Japan as a majo r escalatio n110 Fo rmer ambassado r to China Miyamo to Yuji called this new develo pment a qualitative change in the

Senkaku dispute which went beyo nd previo us cases o f intrus io n by fishermen o r pro tes ters 111 This deplo yment was fo llo wed byo thers the fo llo wing year agains t a backgro und o f China reinfo rcing its maritime co ntro l Japan respo nded by building up its o wndefence effo rts in the so uth including planned s tatio ning o f so me tro o ps o n Yo naguni Is land o ne o f the clo ses t is lands to the

Senkaku Is lands 112

THE 2010 FISHING TRAWLER INCIDENT

It is agains t this co mplex backgro und that the Chinese fishing trawler Minjinyu 5179 with a crew o f 15 entered the territo rial waters o fthe Senkaku Is lands o n 7 September 2010 near Kubajima There were many o ther Chinese fishing trawlers in the same area andseveral ships o f the Japanese Co as t Guard were trying to chase them away Pursued by three Japanese CG vessels the Minjinyu 5179twice co llided with two o f the CG vessels There are different interpretatio ns whether the Chinese captain Zhan Qixio ng intentio nally

rammed the CG vessels and there are so me s trange inco ns is tencies highlighted in the repo rts o f the incident113 So me no n-Japanese autho rs like Sheila Smith and Linus Hags trouml m are no n-co mmittal o n the ques tio n o f the co llis io n but mo s t Japanese

autho rs blame the trawler and this autho r is mo re inclined to believe that the ramming was intentio nal114 The Chinese

unsurpris ingly blame the CG vessels 115 The is sue o f intentio n is impo rtant inso far as it gives so me indicatio n abo ut the risk o frecurrence and o f escalatio n The fo llo wing circumstantial evidence sugges ts intentio nal ramming by the Chinese captain

- There is ample video fo o tage leaked by a CG o fficer which specialis ts have interpreted as intentio nal ramming by the Chinese

captain116

- The captain seemed to have been drunk and is kno wn to be a vo latile perso n 117

- Fishing in the Eas t China Sea is very co mpetitive and Chinese fishermen are particularly anno yed abo ut the patro ls and co ntro ls byJapanese and Ko rean law enfo rcement agencies in the as yet un-demarcated EEZs amo ng all three co untries

Chinese fishermen have a reputatio n o f o ften being vio lent as many incidents in the So uth China Sea and in the Yello w Sea seem topro ve Only three mo nths later in December 2010 ano ther Chinese fishing trawler captain rammed a So uth Ko rean co as t guard

vessel in the Yello w Sea ho wever his bo at sank as a result and the Chinese captain dro wned 118 Chinese crews are o ften armed

with metal pipes and attack law enfo rcement agents which have led to o ther fatal casualties in 2011 and 2012119

The 2010 trawler incident is further relevant in o ur co ntext in view o f the Japanese go vernment`s handling it ( legal aspect denial o fthe shelving unders tanding) China`s co untermeasures and the aftermath o f the go vernment`s purchase o f three is lands inSeptember 2012 After the co llis io ns the Japanese go vernment arres ted the crew and co nfis cated the trawler The fo llo wing day theChinese go vernment demanded the release o f the crew and the trawler which the Japanese go vernment did o n the 13 September butkeeping the captain in cus to dy The Japanese ambassado r to China Niwa Uichiro was summo ned s ix times by the Chinese between8 and 19 September Beijing`s reactio n escalated after the Chinese captain`s term o f detentio n was extended o n 19 September tolas t fro m 20 to 29 September On 20 September Chinese autho rities detained fo ur Japanese citizens fo r entering a res trictedmilitary area in Hebei pro vince Even witho ut the trawler incident the detentio n o f the fo ur Japanese wo uld have harmed the bilateralrelatio nship but happening in this co ntext it was rightly o r wro ngly immediately linked by the Japanese to o ther Chinese sanctio ns

as dis cussed belo w The result ho wever was that the Japanese released the Chinese captain120 Even immediately after the crew`sarres t the Chinese go vernment had already begun to cancel the seco nd ro und o f nego tiatio ns fo r implementatio n o f theunders tanding o n energy co o peratio n in the Eas t China Sea co ncluded o n 18 June 2008 Other reprisals and sanctio ns fo llo wedincluding the suspens io n o f rare earth expo rts to Japan o n which the co untry`s high techno lo gy indus try is very dependentAltho ugh befo re the incident the Chinese go vernment had already mo ved to reduce rare earth expo rts which naturally hit Japan asthe bigges t impo rter Japanese media repo rted that the Chinese cus to ms autho rities to tally suspended expo rts in late

September121 The exact circumstances o f this alleged embargo are s till no t yet clear as dis cussed in detail by Alas tair Jo hns to n122

The cris is ended when the deputy pro secuto r in Ishigaki anno unced o n 24 September the release o f the captain citing the`diplo matic impact` o f the case o n the bilateral relatio nship So me co ns idered this as surrender by the Japanese and the result o fdubio us po litical interference into the legal pro cess The o ppo s itio n had a field day attacking the go vernment`s handling o f the

incident123 The Japanese Fo reign Minis try spo kesman declared that the go vernment had applied do mes tic law and again refuted the

idea o f there being a territo rial pro blem to be reso lved124 Others argue that the incident had several benefits fo r the Japanesego vernment because it o btained a reco nfirmatio n o f the US security guarantee to include the Senkaku Is lands it helped to co nvince

the public abo ut the necess ity o f mo re Japanese defence effo rts and it expo sed China as an assertive if no t aggress ive po wer125

China claimed that the incident sho wed that Japan had changed its appro ach to handling this type o f incident which co uld be

interpreted as a co nfirmatio n that bo th s ides had reached an info rmal unders tanding after the 2004 incident126 Ho wever thisincident was much mo re severe s ince the captain`s two co llis io ns with CG ships were interpreted by the Japanese go vernment asintentio nal ramming The captain was charged with o bs tructio n o f Perfo rmance o f Public Duty as a result o f the ramming On theo ther hand o ne canno t blame China fo r allo wing this bo at to leave its Chinese harbo ur because it was a fishing trawler and no t apro tes ters` campaign vessel What made this incident so serio us fo r the Chinese was Japan`s very public assertio n o f itsso vereignty o ver the is lands in the way it handled the Chinese captain and the explicit denial o f the shelving unders tanding o f the

1970s On 21 September Fo reign Minis ter Maehara s tated that Japan had no t agreed with China to shelve the territo rial dispute127

This declaratio n fo llo wed the seco nd extens io n o f the captain`s detentio n o n 19 September which pro mpted the Chinesego vernment to allo w widespread demo ns tratio ns in China and to place a series o f sanctio ns agains t Japan (cancellatio n o fminis terial meetings `self- res trictio ns` o n vis its to Japan by Chinese to uris ts and po s tpo nement at very sho rt no tice o f the vis ito f 1000 Japanese yo uth planned fro m 21 September to the Shanghai Wo rld Exhibitio n) Japan is es timated to have lo s t yen318

billio n due to a decline in the number o f Chinese to uris ts 128

It is diff icult to judge whether these unprecedented co untermeasures were centrally directed and it is likely that it was aco mbinatio n o f vario us po wer centres co mpeting ando r feeling the need to be seen acting in acco rdance with the increas ingly anti-Japanese mo o d

Japan`s do mes tic circumstances made a speedy so lutio n such as that in 2004 difficult The DPJ had co me to po wer o nly in 2009 andlacked fo reign po licy experience There was no effective co mmunicatio n between the two go vernments at leas t at the beginning o fthe incident in co ntras t to earlier times The Japanese leadership o bvio us ly mis judged ho w the Chinese wo uld interpret Japanesehandling o f the incident which it perceived as a reversal o f Japan`s previo us (albeit gradually diminishing) res traint Altho ugh theDPJ had initially a mo re pro -China leadership when it came to po wer (no tably Prime Minis ter Hato yama Yukio and Secretary General

Ozawa Ichiro ) this had changed by 2010 The minis ter in charge o f the CG (which is under the Minis try o f Land Infras tructureTranspo rt and To urism) o n the day o f the incident was Maehara Seiji a kno wn defence hawk who then became Minis ter o f Fo reignAffairs in a cabinet reshuffle o n 17 September He was therefo re much mo re at liberty to take a hard-line s tance agains t China whilethe DPJ pres idential electio n ndash wo n again by Kan Nao to ndash to o k place o n 14 September fo llo wed by the prime minis ter`s departure toNew Yo rk to attend the UN General Assembly o n 22 September The fo reign minis ter befo re the 17 September was Okada Katsuyawho was also mo re inclined to take a s tro ng s tance Maehara as well as Okada had seen the CG`s video o f the co llis io n which co uld

no t but have left them with a very negative impress io n o f the Chinese captain`s actio ns 129 It certainly did no t help when Maehara inhis new po s t as fo reign minis ter qualif ied China`s reactio n in the Diet o n 18 September as `very hys terical` and then declared o n

21 September that there had never been an unders tanding abo ut shelving the territo rial dispute130 On 23 September Secretary o fState Hillary Clinto n assured vis iting Fo reign Minis ter Maehara that the Senkaku Is lands were co vered by the bilateral Japan-USSecurity Treaty an interventio n that was certainly also no t welco me to the Chinese Ho wever there have been speculatio ns that inexchange fo r this s tro ng US reco nfirmatio n o f the security guarantee in o rder to get o ut o f the s talemate the Japanese had to

pro mise to release o f the Chinese captain which o ccurred the fo llo wing day131

The 2010 incident had several co nsequences which made a recurrence very likely Firs t o f all the incident raised tens io ns to a degreelas t seen during the anti-Japan demo ns tratio ns in 2004 and 2005 which had been mainly co ncerned with Japan`s attempt to gain apermanent UN Security Co uncil seat and the his to ry is sue These tens io ns had made it impo ss ible to have any new nego tiatio nro und to co nclude a treaty abo ut co o peratio n in the explo itatio n o f hydro carbo n reso urces in the Eas t China Sea and thus reduceano ther majo r so urce o f bilateral tens io ns and o ne mo reo ver related to the Senkaku is sue Agains t this backgro und but also inline with its previo us po s itio n Japan rejected a Chinese pro po sal made in Octo ber 2010 fo r jo int reso urce develo pment in the

Senkaku area132 The legal aftermath o f the incident co ntinued fo r so me time with Japan claiming co mpensatio n fro m the Chinesecaptain fo r the damage caused to the two CG vessels which was rejected by China and co untered with demands fo r co mpensatio nand an apo lo gy The Japanese pro secuto r dro pped the case agains t the captain o nly in January 2011 but the CG s till sent a bill to

the captain in February 2011133

While the incident helped the Japanese go vernment to o btain s tro ng US suppo rt o n the applicability o f the bilateral security treaty tothe Senkaku Is lands and generally helped to co nvince the Japanese public abo ut the need fo r greater Japanese defence effo rts(including a s trengthening o f US leverage vis-agrave-vis Japan co ncerning the realignment o f its fo rces o n Okinawa) it reduced Japan`sindependence with respect to the degree o f suppo rt it pro vided fo r US China po licy

Seco ndly the incident further undermined the co nditio ns which were the fo undatio n fo r the uno fficial shelving o f the Senkaku is sueIf it was no t yet clear to everybo dy that there was a territo rial dispute o ver the Senkaku Is lands then this incident with theunprecedented Chinese sanctio ns agains t Japan lifted the las t remnants o f do ubt Maehara Seji who repeated o n 25 o ccas io ns inDiet debates between 10 September and 16 No vember 2010 that there exis ted no territo rial dispute made this o fficial po s itio n

even less co nvincing134 The incident pro mpted Beijing to publicly undermine Japan`s territo rial claim further by anno uncing o n 29Octo ber 2010 permanent deplo yment o f large fisheries patro l vessels in waters near the Senkaku Is lands which was recipro cated by

the CG deplo ying patro l vessels o f o ver 1000 to ns in the same area135 In a further tit-fo r-tat o n 17 December 2010 the city

go vernment o f Ishigaki the adminis trative autho rity o f the Senkaku Is lands passed an o rdinance to des ignate 14 January the day to

co mmemo rate the Senkaku Is lands` inco rpo ratio n in 1895136

The further ero s io n o f the shelving agreement after Octo ber 2010

The next majo r co nfro ntatio n o ver the Senkaku Is lands in September 2012 o ccurred agains t the backgro und o f mo re measurestaken by bo th s ides to suppo rt their respective territo rial claims and do mes tic circumstances in bo th co untries which were evenless co nducive to re-es tablish trus t and go o d relatio ns The gro wing US-China po litical and military rivalry in Eas t As ia asexemplif ied by the As ia pivo t which China perceives as directed agains t its rise certainly did no t help Initially the year 2011 saw areco very o f relatio ns fro m the 2010 incident Bilateral trade reached a new high with a vo lume o f $345 billio n Japanese fo reign

direct inves tment in China so ared nearly 50 per cent in 2011 to $6 3bn137 Mo reo ver the Chinese public was very impressed with thedis ciplined way the Japanese peo ple reacted to wards the triple disas ters which hit the co untry o n 11 March 2011 and there was an

o utpo uring o f sympathy which also included the sending o f a Chinese search-and-rescue miss io n to the affected To ho ku area138

Yet this impro ved atmo sphere was quickly dispelled when the results o f the textbo o k review were published o n 27 March whichasserted Japan`s territo rial claim to the Senkaku Is lands (as well as to TakeshimaDo kto ) and denied the Chinese figure o f

300 000 victims in the Nanjing massacre139

In the meantime the Japanese go vernment co ntinued to turn the legal s crews which affected the Senkaku Is lands by implementingdo mes tic laws in o rder to be co ngruent with internatio nal law and s trengthening maritime co ntro l In February 2012 the Japanesecabinet passed bills to enhance the Japan Co as t Guards law enfo rcement po wers in territo rial waters which wo uld fo r example

autho rize the CG to o rder fo reign ships to leave Japan`s Territo rial Waters witho ut firs t bo arding them140 Other adminis trativemeasures derived fro m the Bas ic Law o n Ocean Po licy which had been enacted in 2007 and which pro vides the framewo rk fo radminis trating remo te is lands Since 2009 Japan has given names to hitherto unnamed is lands to subs tantiate its claims to anEEZ Fo r this purpo se in Augus t 2011 the go vernment placed 23 uninhabited is lands under s tate co ntro l but fo ur is lets near theSenkaku Is lands were exempt o ut o f co ns ideratio n fo r China In March 2012 ho wever the go vernment abando ned this cautio n and

regis tered Kitako jima as a natio nal asset141 In No vember 2011 the go vernment had let it be kno wn that it wo uld sho rtly release a

new lis t o f names fo r is lands which wo uld include is lets o f the Senkaku gro up142 China pro tes ted and a meeting in Beijing plannedin February 2012 between Pres ident Hu Jintao and representatives o f seven bilateral friendship gro ups fro m Japan was cancelled Ano pinio n piece in the Peoples Daily (RMRB) o n 17 January 2012 said Japans mo ve lsquois a blatant mo ve to damage Chinas co re

interes ts rsquo143 On 2 March 2012 To kyo finally anno unced a lis t o f 39 is lands which included fo ur is lets in the Senkaku Is lands

gro up144 The Chinese pro tes ted immediately o n the same day and in a tit-fo r-tat the State Oceanic Adminis tratio n released o n 3

March s tandard names and descriptio ns o f the Senkaku is lands and its 70 affiliated is lets 145 Ano ther Chinese co untermo ve was theanno uncement o n 16 March by the SOA that they had s tarted patro lling near the Senkaku Is lands This was fo llo wed pro mptly o n thesame day by o ne CMS ship entering the Territo rial Waters o f the Senkaku Is lands and the same vessels with ano ther CMS ship

cruis ing in the Co ntiguo us Waters o f the is lands 146 In No vember 2010 an o fficial o f the Minis try o f Agricultures Bureau o f Fisherieswhich o perates the Fisheries Law Enfo rcement Co mmand (FLEC) had already anno unced that his o rganizatio n wo uld fro m no w o n

deplo y fisheries patro l vessels o f o ver 1000 to ns to maintain co ntinuo us patro ls 147

THE 2012 CONFRONTATION ISHIHARA SHINTARO LIGHTING THE FUSE

It was in this tense enviro nment that To kyo Go verno r Ishihara Shintaro anno unced o n 16 April 2012 that the To kyo Metro po litanGo vernment (TMG) was nego tiating the purchase o f three o f the fo ur privately-held Senkaku is lands by the end o f the year ie

Uo tsurijima Kita Ko jima and Minami Ko jima The lease o f the central go vernment fo r these three is lands was due to expire in March2013 and no incident wo uld have o ccurred if the go vernment had quietly renewed the lease The central go vernment s tated that ithad no t kno wn abo ut Ishihara`s intentio n but that there had been co ntacts o n vario us o ccas io ns between the go vernment and the

private o wner148 This seems co nvincing s ince s tate o wnership wo uld have pro vided better preventio n o f incidents even mo re thanjus t leas ing Taken aback by Ishihara`s surprise mo ve the Chief Cabinet Secretary Fujimura Osamu declared the fo llo wing day thatthe central go vernment might acquire the is lands `if required` and Prime Minis ter No da implied in a Diet speech o n the 18 April that

a purchase by the central go vernment was o ne o f the o ptio ns Bo th s tatements were widely repo rted in China149 Ishihara hadcho sen his anno uncement fo r maximum effect o n the o ccas io n o f a speech at the co nservative Washingto n DC-based HeritageFo undatio n He made it clear that this pro ject was meant as a criticism o f the DPJ-led central go vernment which he co ns ideredfailing in its duty to sufficiently pro tect Japan`s so vereignty by saying that the central go vernment sho uld be buying the is lands butthat the Gaimusho was to o afraid o f o ffending China The lo catio n o f his anno uncement was meant to gain s tro nger suppo rt fro m

the US fo r Japan`s territo rial claim150 As we have seen abo ve fro m Ishihara`s activities in the 1970s this anno uncement was inmany ways the lo gical co nclus io n o f his lo ng las ting o bsess io n with the Senkaku Is lands and his hatred o f co mmunis t China It wasthe 2010 incident in particular which had enco uraged him to renew his o ld plan o f buying the is lands after his earlier failure to do so His go o d co nnectio ns with the o wner Kurihara Kunio ki who shared his natio nalis t pro clivities helped Ishihara to beco me the

favo ured purchaser151

The po ss ibility o f having the three is lands under the co ntro l o f the natio nalis tic go verno r o f To kyo who wanted to build facilities o nthe is lands to s trengthen Japan`s so vereignty was unpalatable to the No da go vernment which feared co mplicatio ns with China In a

meeting o n 18 May No da and his to p advisers decided in principle to purchase the is lands 152 Pressure o n the go vernmentincreased to pre-empt Ishihara because he was as to nishingly success ful in rais ing vo luntary co ntributio ns fro m the public to buythe three is lands thus circumventing any legal diff iculties in us ing To kyo `s taxpayer mo ney and also pro ving the po pularity o f his

mo ve By 1 June he had co llected 70 000 do natio ns to taling aro und yen101 billio n which increased to yen146 billio n by 6 September153

On 27 July the TMG ran an advertisement in the Wall Street Journal asking fo r US unders tanding and suppo rt fo r the purchase plan154

The TMG had to reques t central go vernment permiss io n to co nduct a survey o f the is lands which the go vernment refused to grant

o n 27 Augus t fo rcing the TMG to co nduct a survey fro m a ship o n 2 September155 In the end it was the higher sum and the sho rtes tdelay o f co ncluding the deal which pro mpted Kurihara Kunio ki who was apparently in so me financial diff iculties to accept the centralgo vernment`s o ffer o f yen205 billio n ($26 millio n) and to s ign the co ntract o n 11 September This was an embarrass ing turn fo rIshihara In additio n he did no t succeed in us ing the o ffer o f his co llected mo ney to entice the No da go vernment to pro mise thebuilding o f any facility o n the is lands No da was presented by his adminis tratio n with several o ptio ns including his favo ured o ptio no f repairing the exis ting light ho use o n Uo tsurijima but in the end was co nvinced by Fo reign Minis ter Gemba to leave things as they

were in o rder no t to further inflame the Chinese156

The central go vernment`s purchase o f the three is lands o n 11 September immediately led to a very harsh reactio n by the Chinesewhich was even wo rse than in 2010 But befo re lo o king at Chinese co untermeasures after 11 September in detail it is impo rtant toinves tigate why the Chinese reactio n was so s tro ng and why the Japanese apparently did no t anticipate it particularly in view o fChina`s unprecedented reactio n in September 2010

CHINESE WARNINGS BEFORE THE NATIONALIZATION ON 11 SEPTEMBER

Prime Minis ter No da admitted o n 19 September o nly eight days into the co mprehens ive Chinese sanctio ns and co unter measures

that he had underes timated their extent157

158 In a named co mmentary o f Xinhua o n 18 April attentio n was drawn to Ishihara`s kno wn right wing and anti-Chinese s tatementsbut also po inted o ut that the CMOFA `wo uld no t hes itate to take any necessary measures to safeguard so vereignty o ver the Diao yu

Is lands`159 Vice-Pres ident Xi Jinping to ld vis iting Ko no Yo hei a kno wn pro -China hand that Japan sho uld no t wo rsen the bilateral

relatio nship and that co re is sues sho uld be reso lved by the two co untries in an appro priate manner16 0 At the end o f April the StateOceanic Adminis tratio n anno unced a plan to des ignate is lands and their surro unding waters as s trategically vital and to pro tect their

enviro nments and develo p marine reso urces 16 1 Mo re specifically targeting the Senkaku Is lands was ho wever the entry o n 3 May o f

two FLEC vessels into the Senkaku Is lands` Co ntiguo us Waters fo r the firs t time s ince Ishihara`s anno uncement16 2 Bilateraltens io ns also increased after a Japanese right wing gro up suppo rted the ho lding o f a meeting o f the Wo rld Uyghur Co ngress in

To kyo fro m 14 to 18 May which led to the cancellatio n by Beijing o f several o fficial vis its 16 3 On 13 May Premier Wen Jiabao raisedthe Senkaku is sue and the Uighur meeting during talks in Beijing with Prime Minis ter Yo shihiko No da cautio ning that lsquoit is impo rtant

to respect Chinarsquos co re interes ts and matters o f great co ncernrsquo16 4 Wang Jiarui head o f the Co mmunis t Partys Internatio nalDepartment was quo ted by Eda Satsuki a fo reign po licy adviser o f the DPJ that bo th the Senkaku and the Uighur is sue were

described as `co re is sues` and Wen`s s tatement was s tressed in a Chinese TV bro adcas t16 5 The Xinjiang is sue as well as Taiwanand Tibet have been referred to fo r so me time by the Chinese go vernment as `co re is sues` but the Senkaku is sue had been called

a `co re is sue` apparently fo r the firs t time o nly in an o pinio n piece by the Renmin Ribao in January 201216 6 Only o n 23 March 2013did the Chinese Fo reign Minis try Spo kesperso n clearly s tate that China regards the Diao yu Is lands as its co re interes t altho ugh the

written reco rd subsequently so ftened this s tatement16 7

The abo ve chro no lo gy certainly gives the impress io n that there was a series o f Chinese reactio ns which expressed s tro ng Chineseco ncern with any purchase (whether by the TMG o r the central go vernment) o f the Senkaku Is lands If that had no t been eno ugh theinterview o f the Financial Times with Japan`s ambassado r in China Niwa Uichiro at the beginning o f June sho wed s tro ng co ncernabo ut the implicatio ns o f a purchase He was quo ted as saying that lsquoif Mr Ishihararsquos plans are acted upo n then it will result in anextremely grave cris is in relatio ns between Japan and ChinahellipWe canno t allo w decades o f pas t effo rt to be bro ught to no thingrsquo He

added that such a cris is wo uld affect bus iness 16 8 Niwa mus t have been truly co ncerned abo ut the severity o f the s ituatio n to makesuch an undiplo matic public s tatement fo r which he was reprimanded by Fo reign Minis ter Gemba and criticized by so me media

o utlets and po liticians ultimately leading to his recall later in the year16 9

The Chinese warnings became sharper at the seco nd s tage when Prime Minis ter No da anno unced o n 7 July that his go vernment wo uldseek to buy the is lands because the purchase co uld no lo nger be put do wn to a mere lo cal maverick with s tro ng anti-Chineseinclinatio ns The Global Times edito rial o f 9 July sho wed the frus tratio n by so me Chinese lsquoEach time Japan takes o ne s tep we sho uldtake o ne and half o r even two s teps fo rward making Japan aware o f the grave co nsequences caused by its aggress io n agains t

Chinarsquo170 A Xinhua co mmentary o n 7 July quo tes the CMOFA`s spo kesperso n referring pro bably fo r the firs t time in this ro w to a`co nsensus` agains t which the Japanese go vernment went by wanting to buy the is lands meaning o f co urse the shelving co nsensus

o f 1972 and 1978171 On 9 July a Xinhua co mmentary titled `Japan playing with fire o ver Diao yu Is lands` called the purchase by the

central go vernment a `farcical ambitio n` an express io n repeated thereafter many times 172 On 11 July the Japanese media repo rtedthe entry by three FLEC vessels into the territo rial waters o f Kubajima the firs t time s ince the 16 March 2012 fo llo wed by o ne vessel

cruis ing the fo llo wing day in the is land`s co ntiguo us zo ne173 Public o pinio n became increas ingly inflamed and the Global Timesrepo rted o n 19 July that 90 8 per cent o f Chinese peo ple surveyed appro ve us ing the military to enfo rce Chinas so vereignty o ver

the is lets with 521 per cent saying a military clash lsquois likelyrsquo between China and Japan o ver the is lands 174

Even the US gave Japan `s tro ng advice` no t to pro ceed with the purchase because it co uld `trigger a cris is` as was revealed in April2013 by Kurt Campbell who was at the time Ass is tant Secretary fo r Eas t As ian and Pacific Affairs Even tho ugh we warned JapanJapan decided to go in a different directio n and they tho ught they had gained the suppo rt o f China o r so me did which we were

certain that they had no t Campbell is quo ted in an interview with Kyo do 175

FAILURE OF COMMUNICATION

The abo ve chro no lo gy and escalatio n o f Chinese reactio ns to the planned purchase o f the is lands o ver the summer 2012 give aclear indicatio n that a Japanese purchase o f the three is lands was no t co ns idered jus t ano ther incident witho ut majo rco nsequences So why did the Japanese go vernment s till go ahead with the purchase In the final analys is the failure to avo id thecris is escalating in September 2012 lay in the wide difference between the interes ts o f the two go vernments Do mes ticcircumstances o n bo th s ides and the inherent zero sum nature o f territo rial disputes prevented the trans itio n fro m dialo gue topreventive actio n let alo ne so lutio n Aggravating events o ver the summer 2012 which raised tempers o n bo th s ides were thedemands by the TMG to send a survey team to the Senkaku Is lands (the No da go vernment after so me initial co nflicting repo rts didno t allo w a landing) the landing o f Ho ng Ko ng activis ts o n Uo tsurijima o n 15 Augus t (timed with the anniversary o f Japan`ssurrender) fo llo wed by the landing o f Japanese activis ts ( including lo cal parliamentarians ) o n 19 Augus t and an attack in Beijing o n27 Augus t o n the car carrying Ambassado r Niwa Despite o ngo ing co mmunicatio n and dialo gue thro ugh vario us channels theseadverse circumstances led to a hardening o f po s itio ns o ver the summer 2012 between the two go vernments

The Japanese central go vernment had been caught sho rt by Ishihara`s sudden anno uncement o n 16 April and became to tallyabso rbed with preventing the maverick po litician fro m go ing ahead with the purchase o f the is lands fearing rightly that this wo uldserio us ly co mplicate Japan-China relatio ns Ishihara wanted to embarrass the No da go vernment which was co ns tantly declining inpo pularity and to fo rce it to deal mo re assertively with the is lands As we have seen fo r Ishihara it was no t jus t abo ut purchas ingthe is lands but abo ut building facilities o n them Fo r the No da go vernment buying the is lands by the s tate was therefo re the lesserevil The go vernment tried all alo ng to co nvince the Chinese o f To kyo `s go o d intentio ns fo r example when Fo reign Minis ter Gembamet with his Chinese co unterpart Yang Jiechi o n 11 July that the purchase was o nly a `do mes tic co mmercial transactio n` and no t a

diplo matic matter and was o nly meant to ensure that the is lands wo uld be `adminis tered peacefully and s tably`176 In December2012 when the full extent o f China`s unprecedented reactio ns had beco me kno wn the new Japanese ambassado r Kitera s till s tatedthat lsquoThe change in o wnership sho uld no t have caused a pro blem in relatio ns with Chinarsquo adding that Japan had given China sufficient

explanatio ns ahead o f the purchase177 Fo reign Minis ter Gemba even tried to highlight in No vember that the purchase was actually areturn to the status quo ante lsquoThe measure taken by the go vernment o f Japan was jus t a trans fer o f title under Japanese do mes ticlaw and jus t means that the o wnership o f the is lands mdash held by the go vernment until 1932 mdash was returned fro m a private citizen to

the go vernmentrsquo178 In sho rt fo r the Japanese the purchase o f the is lands was aimed at maintaining the status quo in such a waythat it ho ped China wo uld co ns ider to be in its o wn interes t that is by cho o s ing the lesser o f two evils That express io ns like`peaceful adminis tratio n` o r `trans fer o f title under do mes tic Japanese law` co uld o nly be interpreted by the Chinese as acts o fasserting Japanese so vereignty was apparently s imply igno red Under these circumstances it was impo ss ible to co nvince theChinese that trans fer o f o wnership had no thing to do with so vereignty Ins tead the Chinese even suspected that the No da

go vernment and Ishihara were co nniving at s trengthening Japan`s co ntro l o ver the is lands 179

Any intended co nciliato ry o verto ne in the abo ve explanatio ns by Gemba and many s imilar declaratio ns befo re and later were furthernegated by the ins is tence that there was no territo rial dispute exactly the po s itio n the Chinese mo s t so ught to change Thefrequent references to `co re interes t` by China were igno red by the Japanese go vernment Fo r the Chinese leaders the `o ffer` tocho o se between the To kyo Metro po litan Go vernment o r the Go vernment o f Japan buying the is lands was as Vice Fo reign Minis ter

Zhang Zhijun later put it like being asked to cho o se between two do ses o f po iso n18 0

It was also unfo rtunate that the Japanese go vernment allo wed the express io n kokuyuka (natio nalizatio n) to prevail even amo ng

go vernment members ins tead o f the o riginal term agreed by the Japanese cabinet shutoku (acquis itio n)18 1 Chinese media hastaken o ver the Japanese term o f lsquonatio nalizatio nrsquo which certainly further co nfused Chinese public o pinio n Since it do es no t kno w thehis to rical backgro und and Japan`s effective co ntro l o f the is lands `natio nalizatio n` tended to be unders to o d as a radical change in

the status quo o r even as invas io n18 2 A well kno wn Japanese o bserver in China Kato Yo shikazu even argued therefo re that the 1972

and 1978 unders tanding abo ut shelving had prevented the Chinese peo ple fro m learning abo ut the is sue as perceived in Japan18 3

Bo th s ides made it impo ss ible with their extreme and diametrically o ppo sed po s itio ns to find a co mpro mise The No da go vernmentwas to o weak (and also to o preo ccupied with o ther is sues like the pass ing o f the law to intro duce a hike o f the value added taxco ping with the aftermath o f the triple disas ter o f March 2011 and s imply trying to s tay in po wer) to find an alternative to the no wabando ned `shelving co mpro mise` and to admit that there was a territo rial pro blem At the end o f Augus t No da was fo rced topro mise Lo wer Ho use electio ns `so metime so o n` despite the grim o utlo o k fo r his party`s chances in the electio ns Making aco mpro mise o n the territo rial is sue wo uld no t have helped to gain po pular suppo rt While the Chinese pro bably felt enco uraged toescalate pressure by their success in fo rcing the Japanese go vernment hand o ver the captain in September 2010 it mo s t likely hadthe effect o n the No da go vernment to remain inflexible in o rder to avo id being seen yet again as caving in to Chinese pressure Butthe Chinese were also no t able to co mpro mise o n their demand that the Japanese sho uld admit the exis tence o f a territo rial is sue

The preparatio n fo r the 18 th Natio nal Party Co ngress in No vember 2012 and the ensuing leadership change to be finalized o nly inspring 2013 s imilarly did no t allo w the Chinese leaders whether inco ming o r o utgo ing to appear so ft Eight o ut o f nine Po litbureaumembers publicly expressed o ppo s itio n to the purchase either befo re o r after the anno uncement o f the purchase o n 11

September18 4 There are also credible repo rts that during the CCP`s summer retreat to Beihaide in Augus t Hu Jintao came underpressure fro m the future gro up o f leaders to take a mo re severe po s itio n o n Japan`s intentio n to natio nalise the three is lands Asa result the leading fo reign po licy interlo cuto rs o f the Japanese go vernment Zhang Zhijun and Dai Bingguo hardened their po s itio n

as well18 5 Public o pinio n in China had gro wn increas ingly ho s tile to Japan o ver the summer and was particularly inflamed when thelanding o f the Ho ng Ko ng activis ts was fo llo wed by the landing o f Japanese activis ts which were treated by the Japanese autho ritiesmo re leniently than the fo rmer ie no t arres ted despite having vio lated private land leased to the s tate Rio ts in several Chinese

cities s tarted thereafter18 6

Altho ugh bo th s ides agreed to co ntinue dialo gue and several o fficial meetings at different levels to o k place they co uld o nly end inres tating kno wn po s itio ns China did no t make things eas ier by later cancelling such meetings depriving bo th s ides o f po ss ibleo ppo rtunities to find a breakthro ugh The s tart o f Chinese sanctio ns acro ss the who le gambit o f bilateral relatio ns deprived theJapanese o f even mo re do mes tic wriggle ro o m fo r a co mpro mise

It seems that the abo ve circumstances did no t allo w Japan`s central decis io n-makers co ncerned with the is sue in particular the

Prime Minis ter and his immediate circle to admit to ando r unders tand until the purchase anno uncement o n 11 September 2012ho w s tro ngly the Chinese felt abo ut it Ambassado r Niwa`s rather undiplo matic s tatements in the Financial Times interview seem toindicate that he felt that the central decis io n-makers did no t unders tand the s trength o f the feelings o f the Chinese and ho w far theymight go Niwa warned in his interview that even a po ss ible pre-purchase survey o f the is lands co uld be diplo matically incendiary

s ince such a survey was dis cussed already at the time to enable the TMG to go ahead with the purchase18 7 As late as the 3September the Yomiuri Shimbun repo rted that the Chinese go vernment was reacting calmly as lo ng as three co nditio ns wereo bserved to maintain the status quo The co nditio ns co ntained no o ppo s itio n to a po ss ible purchase and ins tead jus t mentio ned

abs tentio n fro m landing surveying and building facilities o n the is lands 18 8 Acco rding to Pro fesso r Takahara Akio General ZhuChenghu said o n 5 September that a purchase by the central go vernment wo uld be better and Qu Xing directo r o f the China Ins titute

o f Internatio nal Affairs is said to have expressed a s imilar o pinio n18 9 Even o n 12 September when the s to rm bro ke the deputydirecto r o f the Japan Ins titute o f the Chinese Academy o f So cial Science Gao Ho ng s tated in an interview with the o n-line vers io no f the Renmin Ribao that if Japan wo uld respect the three abs tentio ns mentio ned abo ve the s ituatio n co uld ultimately revert to the

status quo ante19 0 But these were no lo nger the decis ive vo ices o f the Chinese leadership after the Beihaide meeting The abo ve-mentio ned Campbell interview seems to sugges t that Japan was lo ng befo re mo re inclined to act upo n Chinese s tatements whichwere clo ser to what it wanted to unders tand

CHINESE REACTION RHETORICAL WARFARE

The final misco mmunicatio n o r clash o f irreco ncilable interes ts o ccurred when Prime Minis ter No da met Pres ident Hu o n thes idelines o f the As ia Pacific Eco no mic Co o peratio n (APEC) summit in Vladivo s to k o n 9 September then anno unced two days laterthe s igning o f the purchase co ntract with the Kurihara family Whether Hu had no t sufficiently co nveyed his s tro ng feelingsco ncerning the purchase which had been kno wn and bilaterally dis cussed at leas t s ince the Japanese o fficial anno uncement o f itspurchase intentio n o n 7 July o r No da had no t unders tanding the Chinese feeling fo r the po ss ible reaso ns dis cussed abo ve Hu

apparently felt he had lo s t face when Japan anno unced the purchase o n 11 September19 1 Mo reo ver the Japanese anno uncementco uld no t have co me at a mo re awkward time because o f the anniversary o f the Mukden Incident o n the 18 September which likeseveral o ther carefully cultivated anniversaries regarding Japan`s pas t misdeeds in China always aro use latent anti-Japanesefeelings As a result the Japanese anno uncement caused an avalanche o f virulent rheto rical o utburs ts relating to the pas t po liticalsanctio ns further measures to assert China`s territo rial claim (fo r example including the is lands in the Chinese TV weatherfo recas t an exhibitio n o f ancient maps to pro ve Chinese co ntro l) eco no mic sanctio ns and an escalatio n o f patro ls by ChineseFLEC and MSA ships and aircraft aro und the Senkaku Is lands

The mildes t part o f China`s rheto rical o ffens ive was calling the go vernment purchase a `farce` a rather undiplo matic express io nalready used by Xinhua in July 2012 but then taken up at the highes t level by Vice Pres ident Xi Jinping when meeting Secretary o f

Defence Leo n Panetta o n 19 September19 2 But the main line fro m no w o n was that Japan`s claim to the Senkaku Is lands was adenial o f the po s t-Wo rld War II results In its s tatements and rebuttals the Chinese sho wed their frus tratio n at no t having been ableto fundamentally change the status quo and they did no t hes itate to use express io ns which were rather undignified fo r diplo mats andpo litical leaders Japan o n the o ther hand argued fo r peaceful reso lutio n alo ng the lines o f internatio nal law and dialo gue whichpro bably infuriated the Chinese even mo re On 10 September the CMFA is sued a s tatement calling Japans po s itio n o n the disputedis lands `an o utright denial o f the o utco mes o f the victo ry o f the Wo rld Anti-Fascis t War and hellip a grave challenge to the po s t-war

internatio nal o rder`19 3 In a heated exchange at the UN General Assembly between Chinas UN ambassado r Li Bao do ng and JapansDeputy UN ambassado r Ko dama Kazuo Li called the mo tive fo r purchas ing the three is lands to lsquolegalize its s tealing and o ccupatio no f Chinese territo ryrsquo and s tated lsquoThis actio n o f Japan co ns titutes a serio us encro achment upo n Chinas so vereignty and intends toco ntinue and legalize the result o f Japans co lo nial po licy It is an o pen denial o f the o utco mes o f victo ry o f the wo rld anti-fascis twar and a grave challenge to the po s t-war internatio nal o rder and the purpo ses and principles o f the Charter o f the United

Natio ns rsquo19 4 In a further rebuttal o f Japan`s assertio n o f its claim Li characterized the is land purchase as lsquono thing different fro m

mo ney launderingrsquo19 5 At the As ia Euro pe Meeting (ASEM) in Lao s Fo reign Minis ter Yang Jiechi repeated the reference to the`o utco me o f the anti-Fascis t war` while Prime Minis ter No da spo ke o f peaceful reso lutio n o f co nflicts acco rding to internatio nal

law19 6 On 11 Octo ber the CMFA spo kesperso n Ho ng Lei refuted Fo reign Minis ter Gembarsquos his to rical acco unt jus tifying Japan`s

claim by calling it `gangs ter lo gic`19 7

On the Chinese s ide therefo re there are no w two clo sely-linked his to ry narratives o ne is abo ut the is lands having been part o fChina s ince the Ming and Qing dynas ties the o ther co nnects the is lands to the already well-rehearsed his to ry narrative ie Japanhaving victimised China s ince the Sino -Japanese war o f 1894-95 These two narratives co ntinue to be cultivated by the Chineseleadership In Octo ber 2012 the Chinese anno uncement o f the publicatio n o f 80 vo lumes o n the Far Eas t War Criminal Co urt was

clearly meant to link the latter narrative to Japan`s acquis itio n o f the Senkaku Is lands 19 8 Fo rmer Fo reign Minis ter Gemba explicitlytried in Octo ber 2012 to delink the territo rial is sue fro m Japan`s aggress io n agains t China o nly to be reminded by the Chineseambassado r to the UK in an article in the Financial Times (as part o f the ensuing wo rldwide press campaign by bo th s ides ) that lsquothe

Diao yu Dao is sue is all abo ut his to ryrsquo19 9 Since then until no w China has co ntinued this ldquohis to ry warfarerdquo by publishing endlessarticles o n Japan`s aggress io n agains t China befo re 1945 The mo s t recent mo ve in July 2014 is the serialised o n-line publicatio n o f

the hand-written co nfess io ns by 45 Japanese co nvicted war criminals by the State Archives Adminis tratio n20 0

POLITICAL SANCTIONS AND PUBLIC OPINION

Chinese po litical co untermeasures ranged fro m the cancellatio n o f o fficial and uno fficial vis its to further legal acts to reinfo rce

China`s claim to the Senkaku Is lands Aro und 40 per cent o f ceremo nial events in Japan to mark 2012 as the 40 th anniversary o f the

no rmalizatio n o f diplo matic relatio ns with China were cancelled o r po s tpo ned and even mo re events in China20 1 Thesecancellatio ns were no t always the result o f direct go vernment interventio n but so metimes mo re indirect o fficial `dis co uragement`helped by the Chinese preference fo r no t being seen to do so mething in co ntradictio n to the (initially fo mented and later self-pro pelling) anti-Japan atmo sphere o r by fear o f participants running into demo ns tratio ns if no t assaults The legal s crews werefurther turned with lo ng-term implicatio ns On 10 September the Chinese go vernment anno unced the base po ints and baselines o f

the territo rial waters o f the disputed is lands and their affiliated is lets as well as the names and co o rdinates o f 17 base po ints 20 2

On 16 September repo rts appeared that China was submitting pro po sals fo r its extended co ntinental shelf to the UN Co ntinental

Shelf Co mmiss io n which included the Senkaku Is lands but in fact the actual submiss io n o ccurred o nly o n 14 December 201220 3 On

20 September a go vernment agency published a thematic map o f the Diao yu Is land and its affiliated is lands 20 4 Chinarsquos

Meteo ro lo gical Adminis tratio n s tarted pro viding weather fo recas ts fo r the Senkaku area o n the s tate-run TV s tatio n20 5 On 16September the fishery bureau anno unced the lifting o f the fishery ban in the Eas t China Sea and s tressed that China planned to

s trengthen its so vereignty claim o ver the Senkakus 20 6

There were rumo urs that 1000 fishing vessels wo uld co me to the Senkaku area and tho ugh this did no t materialize it helped to

further raise tens io ns 20 7

Mo st attentio n in Japan was fo cused o n the widening s treet pro tes ts in o ver 100 Chinese cities the des tructio n o f Japanese sho ps

res taurants cars and pro ductio n facilities and the attacks o n Japanese citizens in China20 8 The webs ites o f at leas t 19 Japanese

banks univers ities and o ther ins titutio ns came under cyber-attack20 9 At a demo ns tratio n in Shanghai abo ut 7000 pro tes ters

chanted s lo gans such as lsquoBeat Japanese imperialismrsquo lsquoBo yco tt Japanese pro ducts rsquo and lsquoDes tro y Japan and retrieve Okinawarsquo210

Altho ugh o nly 63 per cent o f po lled Japanese in late September 2012 expressed suppo rt fo r their go vernment`s natio nalizatio n o fthe is lands do wn fro m 73 per cent in a previo us po ll o n 15 and 16 September 82 per cent o f respo ndents in a Mainichi Shimbun

survey said the Japanese go vernment had no t pro tes ted s tro ngly eno ugh to Beijing o ver anti-Japan pro tes ts 211 The Chinesego vernment denied any o fficial invo lvement and the spo kesperso n o f the Waijiao bu went o nly as far as saying that the pro tes ts anddemo ns tratio ns were `co mpletely caused by the Japanese go vernments illegal purchase o f the Diao yu Is lands and are peo ples

spo ntaneo us acts`212 There were ho wever repo rts that so me o f the demo ns tratio ns were to lerated if no t abetted by go vernment

agencies 213 The demo ns tratio ns so o n died do wn because to lerating them much lo nger wo uld have run the risk that they wo uld turninto anti-go vernment demo ns tratio ns Even the Chinese Academy o f So cial Sciences repo rted that so me demo ns trato rs who were

arres ted did no t even kno w where the Senkaku Is lands were and that anger o ver the widening wealth gap was behind their acts 214 Inco ntras t to these Chinese demo ns tratio ns and acts o f lawlessness there was hardly any public demo ns tratio n in Japan whichsho ws the relative detachment o f the Japanese fro m the dispute On 22 September `Nippo n Gambare` a right wing o rganizatio nchaired by fo rmer Air Self Defence Fo rce chief Tamo gami To shio s taged a march thro ugh parts o f To kyo which this autho rwitnessed A brief fire was s tarted at a Chinese scho o l in Ko be and two smo ke bo mbs were thro wn into the Chinese Co nsulate

General in Fukuo ka215 But such actio ns were relatively rare and small in s cale

ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND THE QUESTION OF WHO IS MORE DEPENDENT ON WHOM

Pro tes t measures o f a lo nger duratio n and as yet unpredictable co nsequences fo r the bilateral relatio nship have been China`seco no mic sanctio ns and a bo yco tt o f Japanese go o ds by the general public altho ugh the autho rities denied again any go vernmentinterventio n A co mmentary o f Xinhua half admitted ho wever go vernment interventio n when it made the unco nvincing dis tinctio nbetween `measures` and `sanctio ns` `Since Japan purchased Chinas Diao yu Is lands in September the Chinese go vernment hastaken a series o f co untermeasures in the eco no mic legal diplo matic and military fields which have helped it to wres t the initiativeto reso lve the is lands dispute despite China no t impo s ing any eco no mic sanctio ns the Japanese eco no my has been badly

hit`216 Renmin Ribao co mpared `eco no mic punishments` with a `gun` and warned that thro ugh its is land purchase Japan hadalready to uched the `trigger` In a rather heavy hint the paper po inted o ut ho w vulnerable Japan`s eco no my was because o f the

2011 earthquake and the dependence o f key eco no mic secto rs o n China217 Even mo re o fficial was Vice Minis ter o f Co mmerce Jiang

Zengwei`s warning that the is land purchase wo uld inevitably have a negative impact o n Sino -Japanese eco no mic and trade ties 218

After 11 September it so o n became very o bvio us that the heavy hand o f the Chinese go vernment was impo s ing sanctio ns andmaking life fo r Japanese bus iness mo re diff icult On 21 September it was repo rted that Chinese cus to ms autho rities were

s trengthening inspectio ns o f impo rts fro m and expo rts to Japan altho ugh the Chinese autho rities denied this 219 In the same week

repo rts appeared abo ut Japanese co mpanies experiencing delays in o btaining wo rking visas fo r their Japanese emplo yees 220 BigJapanese co mpanies with inves tments in China were experiencing ho ld-ups in gaining regulato ry appro vals fo r Merger amp

Acquis itio ns 221 In co ntras t to the interference in rare earth expo rts to Japan after the trawler incident in 2010 ho wever no such

embargo was implemented because this particular eco no mic weapo n had lo s t its effectiveness s ince then (see belo w)222

The greates t medium-term damage to Japanese eco no mic activities apart fro m the abo ve mentio ned des tructio n o f Japaneseco mmercial and indus trial s ites was caused by a partial co nsumer bo yco tt no tably the fall o f car sales in China and Chineseto urism to Japan Overall bilateral trade decreased by 39 per cent in 2012 to $329 billio n the firs t dro p s ince the co llapse o f theLehman inves tment bank in 2009 and in 2013 to $3125 billio n acco rding to Chinese figures Acco rding to Japanese figures trade in

2013 increased but declined in vo lume223

The wo rs t hit secto r was auto mo biles To yo ta so ld 840 500 vehicles in China in 2012 the firs t annual dro p s ince 2002 Nis san

experienced a 24 per cent dro p in December China sales and Ho nda saw a 19 per cent December fall224 Ho wever as o f 2014Japanese car sales in and to China have again been increas ing The to uris t indus try was also hard hit in bo th co untries Chinese

vis ito rs to Japan decreased by 44 per cent fro m September to December 2012 fro m the year befo re225 The number o f Japanese

to uris ts o n gro up to urs to China plunged by mo re than 70 per cent year-o n-year in the las t three mo nths o f 2012226 This fallco ntinued into 2013 when their number fell to 29 millio n Japanese to uris ts do wn 18 2 fro m 2012 and the 3rd s traight annual

decline227 Ho wever in March 2014 vis ito rs fro m mainland China surged 80 1 fro m the previo us March to to tal 184200 a reco rdhigh fo r the mo nth and a s teeper year-o n-year rise than vis ito rs fro m any o ther co untries and regio ns This was also helped by the

falling yen and the resumptio n o f cruise to urs with large ships which were to tally suspended in March 2012228

Ano ther mo re lo ng-term negative eco no mic effect o n the bilateral relatio nship can be gauged fro m falling Japanese FDI to Chinawhich acco rding to Chinese figures declined by 422 in the firs t five mo nths o f 2014 after having fallen by 43 to $71 billio n in

2013 acco rding to Chinese figures o r by 18 to $10 9 billio n acco rding to Japanese figures 229

China`s multiple eco no mic retributio ns cas t do ubt o n the co ntinued viability o f the earlier `Ho t Eco no mics and Co ld Po litics`dicho to my The answer to the ques tio n which co untry is mo re dependent o n the o ther o r mo re vulnerable to sanctio ns is dependento n the eco no mic indicato rs and secto rs being cho sen and is also a po litical ques tio n because the answer can be po liticallymanipulated Japan`s eco no mic diff iculties s ince the 1990s (and its dependence o n eco no mic interactio n with China to co pe withthese diff iculties ) and China pushing Japan to No 3 in wo rld GDP ranking has diminished the Chinese perceptio n o f Japan as aneco no mic po wer ho use It means that fo r China the relatio nship with Japan became less impo rtant while po litical relatio nsdeterio rated at the same time The s tro ng effect o f the Chinese embargo o n rare earth expo rts to Japan in 2010 can be viewed intwo diametrically o ppo sed ways Chinese o bservers may be inclined to put emphas is o n the s tro ng effect it had o n Japanese publico pinio n and indus trial circles co ntributing to a certain extent to the go vernment`s surrender o f the trawler captain Others maypo int o ut that the case demo ns trated the futility o f abus ing a do minant supplier po s itio n because within a sho rt time Japan`sindus try secured alternative reso urces and demand reductio n thro ugh recycling and pro duct re-engineering no t o nly pro videdeno ugh breathing space but in the end reduced China`s market po wer Still Chinese experts are co nvinced that Japan is no w mo redependent o n China than the o ther way ro und Acco rding to so me specialis ts Chinas impo rts acco unted in 2011fo r 237 per cent o fJapan`s expo rt vo lume The bilateral trade vo lume in 2011 to o k up 21 per cent o f Japanese gro ss trade vo lume o f that year while it

merely acco unted fo r 9 4 per cent o f Chinas annual gro ss trade vo lume230 There seem to be o nly few Chinese vo ices which expressco ncern o ver the negative impact o f China`s sanctio ns o n China`s eco no my itself no tably at a time o f wo rldwide eco no mic

co ntractio n231

The Chinese market is certainly to o impo rtant fo r many Japanese co mpanies to leave A survey in No vember 2012 to which mo rethan 10 000 Japanese co mpanies in China replied sho wed that fo r almo s t 30 per cent o f them the territo rial dispute had affected

their bus iness but s till mo re than half want to maintain their o peratio ns and o nly 16 per cent said that they wanted to either cut

back o r pull o ut232 Japanese co mpanies in certain secto rs are likely to beco me mo re reluctant to make inves tments in China all themo re as o ther So utheas t As ian co untries (no tably Myanmar is currently the New Fro ntier fo r Japanese bus iness ) have cheaper

labo ur co s ts 233 Ho wever Chinese co nsumers s till prefer Japanese pro ducts fo r safer fo o d drinks and daily necess ities and tho se

Japanese co mpanies were hardly affected by the bo yco tt234

A wide gap between bo th s ides` perceptio n abo ut their eco no mic dependence and vulnerability to sanctio ns is dangero us fo r themanagement o f their bilateral relatio nship particularly when o ne s ide tries to leverage its suppo sedly s tro nger po s itio n to achievevicto ry in a sens itive area like territo rial integrity While Chinese co mmentato rs and experts may be inclined to o verrate Japan`svulnerability their Japanese co unterparts have a tendency to lo o k at the is sues to o much in purely eco no mic terms neglecting theimpact o f Chinese emo tio ns and go vernment pro paganda as well as the wider public`s insufficient kno wledge abo ut the o verall

impact o f bad eco no mic relatio ns with Japan o n China`s o wn eco no my235 The Japanese perceptio n remains that China in the endneeds Japan mo re than the o ther way ro und which in view o f China`s huge pro blems and its dependence o n Japanese hightechno lo gy co mpo nents fo r its manufacturing indus try is arguably the case This Japanese perceptio n has fo s tered the co nvictio nas demo ns trated fo r example by the belief in the sus tainability o f `Ho t Eco no mics and Co ld Po litics` that despite recurring

po litical crises in the relatio nship China wo uld in the end co mpro mise as it had do ne several times in the pas t236 Yet the pro blemwith the perceptio n o f `needing Japan` is that it can be po litically manipulated particularly in an autho ritarian sys tem This gapbetween Japanese and Chinese o bservers and experts o n the is sue o f dependence can serio us ly influence the willingness o f bo th

s ides to co mpro mise237 It also challenges the liberal view that clo se eco no mic relatio ns can prevent o r at leas t so ften deeppo litical differences like territo rial co nflicts which mo reo ver are linked to eco no mic interes ts like hydro carbo n reso urces In thisco ntext it is interes ting to no te that China has recently been exchanging with Japan a number o f high-po wered bus iness delegatio ns(apart fro m exchanges with po litical parties and lo cal go vernment o fficials ) The willingness o f Japanese bus iness to take part maybe interpreted by China as an express io n o f Japan`s eco no mic dependence o n China while giving it also the o ppo rtunity to putpressure o n the Abe go vernment to make co ncess io ns and to keep links with Japan fo r the po s t-Abe era

In view o f the impo rtance o f the eco no mic relatio nship and the damage suffered by Japanese bus iness after September 2012 o newo uld have expected mo re pressure fro m the bus iness co mmunity to co me to a territo rial co mpro mise so lutio n and so impro verelatio ns Ho wever this has no t been the case and may have to do with the perceptio n gap dis cussed abo ve but also the relativelack o f influence o n the go vernment (the majo rity o f the China-relevant Japanese bus iness co mmunity co ns is ts o f small- andmedium-s ized co mpanies ) the fear that a mo re vo cal ro le wo uld get co mpanies into tro uble with the autho rities in Japan ando rChina o r the ho pe o f being able to weather the po litical s to rms either because o f alternative market o ppo rtunities o r theco mpany`s s ize

FROM POLICING TO MILITARY INVOLVEMENT

The mo s t serio us co nsequences fo r the bilateral relatio nship ndash let alo ne fo r the so lutio n o f the territo rial dispute and regio nalpeace ndash arise fro m the co ns tant intrus io ns o f Chinese o fficial vessels into the Co ntiguo us Zo ne (CZ) o r even Territo rial Waters(TW) o f the Senkaku Is lands s ince September 2012 and the gro wing invo lvement o f the armed fo rces o f bo th s ides The aim o f theChinese is o bvio us to demo ns trate that the Japanese can no lo nger claim exclus ive co ntro l o f the is lands and to fo rce To kyo toadmit the exis tence o f a territo rial dispute Apparently a task fo rce at the highes t level headed by Xi Jinping was set up in

September 2012 to achieve this go al thro ugh escalating pressure238 So far law enfo rcement actio ns by Japan in the Senkaku areahave been limited to the deplo yment o f the Japanese Co as t Guard and po lice which is no w ho wever co ns tantly challenged byChinese with patro ls by CMS and FLEC (s ince 22 July 2013 unified under the State Ocean Adminis tratio n and renamed China Co as tGuard CG) vessels asserting the same rights in the is lands` CZ and TW The Chinese s ide escalated its pressure o n Japan by firs tdeplo ying FLEC vessels in the CZ and TW o f the disputed is lands then ratcheting up their pressure with CMS vessels do ing the samefo llo wed later in December 2012 with air patro ls by CMS aircraft which led to the deplo yment o f the air fo rce o f bo th s ides inJanuary 2013

As we have seen after the September 2010 incident in No vember 2010 FLEC s tarted to regularly send its vessels to the Senkakuarea which entered fro m time to time the is lands` CZ and also in Augus t 2011 twice the TW Apparently the mo re serio usintrus io ns which are tho se into the TW were so metimes timed with specific spikes o f tens io ns such as the TW incurs io n o n 16March 2012 (the Japanese naming o f so me is lands) July 2012 (No da`s anno uncement o f purchase intentio n o n 7 July) and finallyo n 19 September when s ix vessels entered the TW s tarting a series o f mo re frequent and regular incurs io ns In December 2012

FLEC deplo yed its newes t and bigges t ship the 5800-to n FLEC vessel Yuzheng 206 a fo rmer ship o f the Chinese navy239

The entries o f the vessels o f the CMS into the is lands` CZ and TW seem meant to send an even higher degree o f warning and denialo f Japan`s co ntro l o ver the is lands On 17 September the number o f FLEC and CMS vessels in the CZ and TW had reached the reco rd

o f 17240 Thereafter the frequency o f incurs io ns into the CZ and TW increased but it decreased after March 2013 On 30 Octo berXinhua even repo rted that the CMS had `expelled a number o f Japanese vessels illegally sailing in waters aro und the Diao yu

Is lands` altho ugh it is no t clear what exactly this meant s ince the CG did no t co nfirm such an incident241 Acco rding to Xinhua NewsAgency in 2013 China sent 50 ldquopatro l miss io ns rdquo into the TW o f the disputed is lands and as o f 12 July 2014 by the autho r`s co unt

there had been 17 such Chinese ldquopatro l miss io ns rdquo in 2014 which are ldquoincurs io ns rdquo fo r the Japanese s ide242 Other needle pricks todemo ns trate China`s claims are the o ccas io nal incurs io ns o f Chinese survey ships into the Senkaku Is lands` EEZ o r the bo ardingo f Chinese fishing vessels in the EEZ Defence Minis ter Itsuno ri Ono dera in late Octo ber 2013 called these repeated incurs io ns a

threat to peace which fell in a ldquogray zo ne (between) peacetime and an emergency s ituatio nrdquo243

A new level o f depriving Japan o f the ability to claim so le effective co ntro l o ver the is lands was reached o n 13 December 2012 when

a small turbo pro p aircraft o f the CMS (Harbin Y12 type) flew o ver Uo tsurijima244 Since then regular CMS air patro ls have beenco nducted but the aircraft no rmally s tay abo ut 120 km fro m the is lands With this mo ve Chinese measures to undermine Japan`sco ntro l o ver the is lands were expanded to the air space which fo r o rganizatio nal reaso ns had immediately military implicatio nsbecause the Air Self Defense Fo rce (ASDF) is respo ns ible fo r intercepting aircraft which intrude illegally into Japan`s air space The

incident did no t happen o ut o f the blue because already in January 2012 the SOA had anno unced a plan to deplo y the Y12 in 2012245

On 24 September the SOA had also anno unced plans to deplo y dro nes by 2015 fo llo wing the success ful tes t the previo us day 246

The Chinese acts are apparently carefully planned and co o rdinated s ince the o fficials in the abo ve Kyo do repo rt also said that theairspace vio latio ns o n 13 December 2012 by an airplane o f the CMS was planned by the s taff sectio n o f the natio nal Land and SeaBo rder Defense Co mmittee which acts as a liaiso n o ffice fo r the Chinese military the State Oceanic Adminis tratio n and the fishing

bureau o f the Agriculture Minis try with the aim o f rais ing tens io ns 247

The lo w altitude flight o f the Y12 o n 13 December was particularly upsetting fo r the Japanese go vernment because it was no t pickedup by the ASDF radar (the clo ses t o ne being o n Miyako jima abo ut 200 km fro m the is lands) but ins tead by CG ships in the area Inthis case eight ASDF fighters s crambled but co uld no t detect the Y12 Interceptio n o f aircraft is by nature much mo re diff icult andcarries a certain risk o f accident as happened in 2001 when a US intelligence aircraft co llided with a Chinese intercepto r jet Witho ut

explaining the s tandard Japanese pro ceedures fo r aerial defence which so lely relies o n the ASDF the Chinese media interpreted theuse o f military aircraft by Japan as `aggress ive` and the Global Times cautio ned agains t any interceptio n warning that China might

respo nd by sending its air fo rce248 On the Japanese s ide even the centre-left Asahi Shimbun called the Y12 flight ` a highly

pro vo cative act that co uld lead to an armed co nflict between the two co untries`249 At the beginning o f January 2013 there wereapparently erro neo us repo rts that the ASDF might co ns ider firing warning sho ts (tracer bullets ) at intruding Chinese aircraft which

pro mpted further bellico se co mments in the Chinese press 250 As a co nsequence the Chinese air fo rce also became invo lved o n10 January when the Chinese Minis try o f Defence anno unced that the Peo ple`s Liberatio n Army Air Fo rce (PLAA) had sent two fighterjets agains t two ASDF F-15 intercepto rs because they were fo llo wing a Chinese military Y8 transpo rt aircraft patro lling the airspace

o f Chinese o il platfo rms in the Eas t China Sea251 The Japanese repo rted that mo re than ten Chinese aircraft including military

aircraft had appro ached the Japanese air defence identificatio n zo ne252 In a further escalatio n the Japanese s ide repo rted that o n11 June 2014 two Chinese military jets flew abno rmally clo se to two planes o f Japans Self Defence Fo rce abo ve the Eas t China Sea

an accusatio n which the Chinese s ide refuted speaking ins tead o f two incidents pro vo ked by Japanese fighters 253 Related to thisdevelo pment and further enhancing the po ss ibility o f an incident is the enhanced patro lling o f the PLAA o ver the Eas t China Seawhich caused the ASDF to increase scrambling agains t PLAA aircraft to 415 times between 1 April 2013 and 31 March 2014 (Fis cal

Year 2013) 109 times mo re than in the previo us Fis cal Year 2012254

Co ntinuing to increase the pressure o n Japan the Chinese go vernment decreed o n 23 No vember 2013 an Air Defence Identificatio nZo ne (ADIZ) which includes the airspace o ver the Senkaku Is lands and was certainly meant to reinfo rce China`s territo rial claimdespite the fact that an ADIZ has no territo rial implicatio ns in internatio nal law The threat o f military co untermeasures in the text o fthe decree (lsquoChinas armed fo rces will ado pt defens ive emergency measures to respo nd to aircraft that do no t co o perate in the

identificatio n o r refuse to fo llo w the ins tructio ns rsquo) has further heightened the po ss ibility o f a military clash255 Ho wever theJapanese s ide refuses to accept the ADIZ The Chinese mo ves have wider implicatio ns fo r peace and s tability in the regio n in o rderto pro tect the freedo m o f its military aircraft in Eas t As ian airspace and its ability to o bserve China`s military fo rces Washingto nrefused to reco gnise the zo ne co ntinued to igno re the requirements o f the ADIZ by pursuing its regular patro l f lights and criticisedits implementatio n Simultaneo us ly ho wever the Department o f State advised civilian airlines to fo llo w China`s ins tructio ns andVice Pres ident Biden advised bo th co untries o n his trip to No rtheas t As ia in December 2013 to es tablish a cris is managements tructure Since the US do es no t take a s tance o n the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands` so vereignty Washingto n seemed to igno re Japan`smain grievance abo ut the ADIZ which is China`s intentio n to further reinfo rce its so vereignty claim by extending the ADIZ o ver theis lands The mo s t far-reaching US s tatements were a reco nfirmatio n o f the applicatio n o f the security treaty to the is lands evenmentio ning the is lands by their Japanese and Chinese names and co mplaining that the Chinese actio n was an attempt to unilaterally

change the status quo in the Eas t China Sea which raised regio nal tens io n and increased the risk o f accident and miscalculatio n256

Ho wever in this way the Obama Adminis tratio n risked creating amo ng so me Japanese o bservers do ubts abo ut the Adminis tratio n`sreliability and so gave succo ur to China`s attempt to drive a wedge between the two allies Ano ther co mplicatio n is that the ChineseADIZ o verlaps that o f Ko rea and mo reo ver co vers the submerged ro ck called Ieo do in Ko rean and Suyan in Chinese which has animpact o n the no t yet demarcated EEZ bo rder between bo th co untries Interes tingly the Japanese ADIZ also co vers Ieo do but thishas never been underpinned by any Japanese EEZ claims But China kno ws ho w to play o n So uth Ko rea`s criticism o f Japan`sattitude to wards the his to ry is sue and the territo rial dispute with Japan o ver Do kto Takeshima is land Mo reo ver the As ian co untriesco ntes ting China`s claims to parts o f the So uth China Sea are co ncerned that China wo uld further co mplicate the territo rialdisputes in the area by es tablishing an ADIZ Yet the ASEAN member s tates have been very cautio us in directly criticis ing ChinaChina`s es tablishment o f the ADIZ directly affects many co untries because so many o f them have airlines flying thro ugh the zo neHo wever with the exceptio n o f Japan all o thers agred to co nfo rm with China`s reques t fo r no tif icatio n which undermines theJapanese go vernment`s po s itio n o f explicitly advis ing Japanese airlines no t to co nfo rm

With these escalating develo pments the Chinese s ide achieved its go al o f sho wing that the Japanese autho rities are no lo nger infull co ntro l o f the disputed is lands In the case o f Chinese Co as tguard vessel intrus io ns the reactio n o f the Japanese CG is limitedto shado wing the Chinese vessels to info rm them that they are vio lating Japan`s CZ o r TW and to ask them to leave whichho wever they do at their o wn dis cretio n (the time span ho vering in the CZ o r TW having beco me a further means o f Chinesepressure) fo llo wed by diplo matic pro tes ts Otherwise the CG has avo ided any phys ical co nfro ntatio n o r co ntact When co nfro ntedby the CG the Chinese vessels s imply declare (by radio o r even electro nic displays ) that they are patro lling Chinese waters and thatthe CG ships were o perating illegally in these waters This ritual has so far prevented vio lence This is in co ntras t to an exchange o fwater canno n salvo s between the CG and the Taiwanese co as t guard in the territo rial o f the Senkaku Is lands o n 25 September 2012

and again o n 24 January 2013257

The increase o f patro ls by Japan and China is caus ing o peratio nal s train fo r bo th s ides (also rais ing the risk o f miscalculatio ns o ro verreactio ns ) but this has no t reduced the willingness o f either go vernment to s cale do wn the almo s t daily demo ns tratio ns o f

`effective co ntro l` In Octo ber it was repo rted that the CG no w always maintains ten vessels agains t eight fro m China258 The 11th

regio nal headquarters respo ns ible fo r the Senkaku area is in Naha and has nine patro l ships (but o nly seven vessels o f at leas t

1000 to ns ) but no w needs additio nal ships which are dispatched fro m o ther regio nal headquarters 259 In April 2012 the CG had ato tal o f 357 patro l vessels but o nly 51 o ver 1000 to ns which are tho se mo s t needed fo r a far flung area like the Senkaku

Is lands 26 0 On 14 September 2012 Senio r Vice Minis ter o f Fisheries Iwamo to Tsukasa mentio ned plans to increase the number o f

fishery patro l vessels to ensure fishermens safety amid intens ifying territo rial disputes with China and So uth Ko rea26 1 On 26Octo ber the Minis try o f Land Infras tructure Transpo rt and To urism which heads the CG anno unced plans to increase budgetary

reques ts fo r mo re ships 26 2 The Abe go vernment plans to build mo re vessels o r advance the calendar retro fit vessels which were to

be retired and is co ns idering extending the retirement age o f the o fficers 26 3

The Chinese have fewer vessels which can be deplo yed as far as the Senkaku Is lands In additio n leave o f the sailo rs has been

res tricted and their deplo yment length at sea has increased26 4 In March 2013 the Chinese s ide anno unced clo ser co o peratio nbetween the military and vario us maritime law enfo rcement agencies as well as the merger o f fo ur maritime law enfo rcementagencies under the State Ocean Adminis tratio n (adminis tered by the Minis try o f Land and Reso urces ) ie the China MarineSurveillance the co as t guard fo rces o f the Public Security Minis try the fisheries law enfo rcement co mmand o f the Agriculture

Minis try and the maritime anti-smuggling po lice o f the General Adminis tratio n o f Cus to ms 26 5

Ano ther wo rrying develo pment is the gradual invo lvement o f the PLA navy (PLAN) and the Maritime Self Defence Fo rce (MSDF) TheJapanese MOD anno unced o n 16 Octo ber 2012 that fo r the firs t time PLAN ships were o bserved navigating in the 22-km-wide CZbetween Yo naguni and Irio mo te is lands altho ugh the minis try left o pen the po ss ibility that they did so in o rder to avo id a typho o n

Nevertheless the Gaimusho so ught explanatio ns fro m the Chinese abo ut these ship mo vements 26 6 In December 2012 fo ur PLANships sailed thro ugh the CW o f the Irio mo te-Yo naguni is lands o n the way back fro m drills in the Pacific after having go ne into the

Pacific thro ugh the mo re no rmal ro ute o f the s trait between the Okinawan main is land and Miyako jima26 7 Again there was no thingillegal abo ut it but it raised attentio n at a time o f tens io ns Ho wever there are s igns o f greater co o peratio n o f the PLAN withChinese Co as t Guard vessels as was sho wn in the s tando ff between China and the Philippines aro und the disputed Scarbo ro ugh

Sho al in the So uth China Sea and jo int exercises to o k place between the three in the Eas t China Sea in Octo ber 201226 8 The

patro lling activities o f the MSDF in the Senkaku area became kno wn when the Japanese repo rted at the end o f January 2013 that o n19 January a Chinese frigatersquos target radar had lo cked o nto an MSDF helico pter and o n 30 January ano ther frigate sailing clo se to

an MSDF des tro yer did likewise The Chinese vehemently denied it26 9 Ho wever in March this year the Kyo do news agency repo rtedthat senio r Chinese military o fficials had admitted the incident o f 29 January Even mo re wo rriso me is that the Chinese vessels

acted apparently witho ut prio r appro val fro m the fleet co mmand o r navy headquarters All this was denied by the Chinese s ide270 Itdid no t help that under Prime Minis ter No da the MSDF had been o rdered after the eruptio n o f the 2012 cris is to keep a greaterdis tance fro m PLAN ships than the hitherto 3 km in o rder avo id incidents but this po licy was reversed by the mo re hawkish Abe

adminis tratio n to the previo us 3 km dis tance271 The fire radar lo cking incident had happened at a dis tance o f 3 km

Agains t the backgro und o f greater invo lvement o f military fo rces it is particularly regrettable that a plan to build a maritime liaiso n

mechanism between their defense autho rities o n which they had agreed in June 2012 to make later that year was shelved272

Unfo rtunately it is s till Chinese practice to co ns ider Co nfidence Building Measures (CBM) no t as the firs t s tep to build co nfidencebut as a to o l to extract fro m the o ther s ide prio r co ncess io ns under the pretext o f `creating a better atmo sphere` fo r dis cuss ingCBM The o utbreak o f the September 2012 cris is was therefo re a co nvenient pretext fo r the Chinese to cancel the pro ject Thelates t co nfirmatio n was in March 2013 when General Yin Zhuo explained that there co uld be no military trus t if the po litical and

diplo matic relatio nship is bad273 Since the target radar lo ck-o n incidents the Japanese go vernment is publicly calling fo rresumptio n o f nego tiatio ns fo r the maritime liaiso n mechanism but the Chinese will certainly want to extract so me co ncess io nsbefo re even co ns idering a po s itive respo nse

Ho wever the co ns tant co nfro ntatio n between the po licing and military fo rces o f bo th s ides co uld eas ily lead to a military clasheither as a result o f an unfo reseen civilian o r military incident miscalculatio n o r malicio us intentio n at a lo wer level o f co mmandTwo recent examples o f unfo reseen civilian incidents co uld have escalated One is the attempted landing o n o ne o f the disputedis lands by a Chinese pro tes ter with a ballo o n in January 2014 This incident was peacefully reso lved because Japan did no t arres t theballo o nis t In this case the firs t repo rt o n the crash-landing in the territo rial waters o f Uo tsurijima came fro m the Taiwanese co as tguard which info rmed the Japanese co as t guard fo llo wed by the hand-o ver o f the ballo o nis t to the PRC autho rities o uts ide o f

Japan`s territo rial waters 274 The o ther incident was the s inking o f a Chinese fishing bo at ldquoto the no rth o f the Diao yu Is landsrdquo and

the mo ve o f two Chinese naval () vessels to rescue the crew275 This autho r co uld no t find o ut ho w clo se the fishing bo at came tothe is lands and apparently there has no t been any further repo rting abo ut the incident

The previo us ly mentio ned radar-targeting incidents and these two civilian incidents have no t led to an escalatio n but there is noguarantee fo r the future Shi Yinho ng a pro fesso r at Renmin Univers ity predicts that the territo rial co nflicts in the ECS So uth ChinaSea and alo ng the Sino -Indian bo rder will intens ify because o f po pular natio nalism dynamics within the armed fo rces and o f co urse

also o ur to p leaders perso nal beliefs and s trategic perso nalities 276 Hugh White argues that a war (which co uld lead to a nuclearexchange between China and the US) co uld also begin because the Chinese leadership may co ns ider that s tarting ho s tilities no wrather than later wo uld be mo re beneficial to either tes t US reso lve to defend Japan (which the Chinese leadership do ubts ) anddetermine the is sue o f Chinese supremacy in the As ian regio n which he co ns iders to be the real is sue rather than the is lands

themselves 277

IS THERE A WAY FORWARD

The current co nfro ntatio n is no t o nly co ntinuing but even escalating and do mes tic develo pments in bo th co untries are no t creatingan atmo sphere mo re co nducive to better management o f the cris is let alo ne finding a so lutio n Inactio n runs the risk o f a furtherescalatio n o r even a military clash while po s itive o ptio ns are beco ming fewer Meanwhile bo th co untries suffer fro m the eco no micfall-o ut and heightened tens io ns while the integratio n o f a ris ing China into a new s trategic enviro nment in As ia will beco me evenmo re fraught cas ting a shado w o n Japan`s clo se relatio nship with the US

The 2010 incident ended quickly with Japan`s release o f the captain One reaso n fo r this is certainly the fact that China`s demand in2010 was relatively clear and achievable (release o f the captain) if painful fo r Japan at a time o f a weak and inexperiencedgo vernment This time in September 2012 the cris is firs t hit a go vernment which reacted intrans igently because o f its previo usdefeat and o ther unfavo urable do mes tic circumstances and was then replaced by the mo re hawkish Abe go vernment The Abecabinet`s attitude to wards the pas t as exemplif ied by vario us s tatements by cabinet members and peo ple clo se to it the attempt torevise the Ko no s tatement reco gniz ing the fo rced war pro s titutio n (the military co mfo rt wo men) and Abe`s Yasukuni Shrine vis itall served China`s anti-Japan pro paganda wo rsened Japan-Ko rea relatio ns which China is cleverly explo iting and even angered theUS adminis tratio n Abe is seen as utiliz ing the tens io ns with China to win do mes tic and internatio nal suppo rt fo r Japan to have aldquono rmalrdquo natio nal defence po s ture The latter is welco me by the US adminis tratio n because it wo uld help with the US As ianrealignment and suppo rt its China po licy At the same time China`s actio ns cas t an o mino us shado w o n its intentio ns in the So uthChina Sea and Abe and mo re impo rtantly the US is suppo rting the claimants there agains t China

Under these bilateral multilateral and regio nal circumstances wo uld China be satis fied with go ing back to the `unders tanding abo utsetting as ide the dispute` in co njunctio n with Japan`s reco gnitio n o f the exis tence o f a territo rial dispute o r wo uld it demand areversal o f the purchase o f the three is lands Wo uld it demand the end o f Japanese CG patro ls aro und the is lands China`ss tandard demand no w that Japan `co rrect its mis takes` is rather ambiguo us because it co uld be interpreted as go ing back to theshelving unders tanding and the reco gnitio n o f the exis tence o f a dispute o r demanding a reversal o f the go vernment`s purchase o f

the is lands 278 The latter wo uld s imply be impo ss ible in legal and practical terms and o ne can o nly ho pe that the ambiguity is o nlyaimed at rais ing China`s nego tiatio n po s itio n ando r leaving eno ugh wiggle ro o m fo r nego tiatio ns which wo uld satis fy all Chineses takeho lders` interes ts

It seems that it is already to o late fo r go ing back to the shelving agreement o f 19721978 which wo uld imply that the two s ides canso meho w go back to the status quo o f the 1970s This as we have seen has been superseded by deeds and wo rds o n bo th s ides The Chinese have no w no t o nly publicly declared that the shelving agreement was lsquobro kenrsquo by Japan but after the firs t Y12 patro l o n13 December 2012 co mmented that ldquoThe s ituatio n has changed It has beco me no rmal fo r Chinas marine surveillance vessels to

enter the 12-nautical-mile zo ne Japans actual co ntro l o ver the is lands has go nerdquo279

The bilateral relatio nship has deterio rated to the extent that at leas t shelving the co nflicting so vereignty claims without o fficiallyadmitting that there is a territo rial dispute is no lo nger an o ptio n acceptable to China because it feels Japan has abused theshelving co nsensus thro ugh a series o f adminis trative measures with the final s traw having been the central go vernmentrsquos purchaseo f three is lands When s tudying the vario us Chinese o fficial s tatements and news repo rts after the 2012 cris is had fully erupted inSeptember it beco mes clear that until Octo ber 2012 the Chinese s till raised the demand that Japan sho uld go back to the previo uslsquounders tandingrsquo o r lsquoco nsensus rsquo but this demand was no t made o ften thereafter It reappeared in remarks by Wang Jiarui the head o fthe Co mmunis t partys Internatio nal Department when meeting Yamaguchi Natsuo the leader o f the junio r co alitio n partner

Ko meito in January 201328 0 Previo us ly a co mment o n the Xinhua internet s ite o n 29 Octo ber said that ldquoThe lsquopurchasersquo sho wed thatthe Japanese go vernment has who lly abando ned the attitude o f laying as ide disputes and has fundamentally changed the

s ituatio nrdquo28 1 On 30 Octo ber the CMOFA spo kesperso n declared that lsquoJapans illegal purchase o f the Diao yu Is lands bro ke the

impo rtant co nsensus The Japanese s ide sho uld no t have any mo re illus io n o f o ccupying the Diao yu Is lands What the Japaneses ide sho uld do is to face up to the reality admit the so vereignty dispute co rrect mis takes and co me back to the track o f a

nego tiated settlement`28 2 The lates t o fficial pro po sal to shelve the is lands is sue was made by the fo rmer fo reign minis ter Tang

Jiaxuan o n 16 July 201428 3

The reco gnitio n o f a territo rial pro blem wo uld be relatively easy fo r Japanese public o pinio n (and even mo re so fo r Japanrsquos friendsand allies ) to accept because they wo uld no t see the need fo r any kind o f diplo matic o r legal so phis try fo r what is o bvio us ly aterrito rial co nflict whatever the legitimacy o f the Chinese claim might be given also the fact that the current Japanese po s itio nco mes do wn to refus ing to even dis cuss whatever settlement might be po ss ible Acco rding to a survey co nducted by Genro nto gether with Zho ngguo Ribao she in June 2012 627 per cent o f Japanese agreed that there exis ts a territo rial pro blem dispute

(176 disagreed) co mpared with 822 o f the Chinese (139 disagreed)28 4 Ho wever co nsecutive Japanese cabinets haverefused to reco gnise the exis tence o f a territo rial dispute which is o ften the default po s itio n o f a go vernment in actual co ntro l o f adisputed territo ry (fo r example the Ko rean go vernmentrsquos po s itio n o n Do kto Takeshima) This po s itio n has been reinfo rced by theexplicit Japanese denial s ince the 1990s o f a shelving agreement which wo uld have been an implicit admiss io n that there is adispute To circumvent the risk o f being perceived as admitting the exis tence o f a territo rial pro blem the deputy prime minis ter o fthe previo us No da go vernment Okada Katsuya was repo rted to have mentio ned in a speech in Octo ber 2012 that there was no

territo rial dispute but as a matter o f fact a debate exis ted28 5 Ho wever this co mpro mise so lutio n was never co nfirmed by the No dago vernment and did no t beco me po licy It is even less likely to be acceptable to the new Abe go vernment Even amo ng influentialo pinio n makers there is hardly any suppo rt fo r admitting the exis tence o f a territo rial co nflict o r o f a shelving agreement Even mo reco nciliato ry s tatements o n this subject are rather vague Maehara Seiji o f the Demo cratic Party declared in a co nference at QinghuaUnivers ity in Beijing in September 2013 that the Japanese go vernment sho uld add (to its o wn po s itio n) that China has a differentview (Senkakusho to wo meguru Niho n seifu no tachiba ni tsuite lsquoChugo ku ga chigau kangaekata wo mo tte iru to iuko to wo ichigen

tsukekuwaerubeki darsquo) At the same time he emphas ised ho wever that there was no territo rial dispute28 6 Japan Bus inessFederatio n Chairman Yo nekura Hiro masa mentio ned in September 2012 in an NHK interview that the go vernment sho uld be mo re

flexible s ince o therwise its s tance co uld be taken to mean that Japan has no intentio n o f so lving the dispute28 7 Miyamo to Yuji thefo rmer Japanese ambassado r to China is quo ted as saying that lsquoThe go vernment do es no t need to alter its bas ic po s itio n but in

reality a co nflict do es exis t o ver the Senkaku is les rsquo 28 8 This is also the s tance which the previo us Japanese ambassado r Niwa

Uichiro takes in an article after his return to Japan28 9

Co ncerning co nflict reso lutio n it is interes ting to no te that when asked abo ut the mo dern s ignificance o f the 1978 Japan-ChinaPeace and Friendship Treaty 68 4 o f the po lled Japanese agreed with Art 12 (lsquoThe two parties shall settle all disputes by peacefulmeans and shall refrain fro m the use o r threat o f fo rcersquo) but o nly 525 o f the Chinese agreed Mo reo ver 58 1 o f the Chinese

favo ur China s trengthening its co ntro l o ver the area29 0

If therefo re a new ldquoimplicit unders tandingrdquo abo ut shelving the dispute is achievable it wo uld have to be based o n learning fro m thefailures o f the 19721978 shelving ie it wo uld be necessary to achieve a mutual unders tanding o f what the s tatus quo is whatwo uld undermine the s tatus quo and what has to be do ne to mo ve fro m co nflict management to so lutio n Quite clearly such a newunders tanding wo uld be less favo urable to Japan`s current s tance o n the dispute

FROM CONFLICT MANAGEMENT TO ADDRESSING THE SOVEREIGNTY ISSUE

Any mo ve fo rward will certainly require decis ive leadership o n bo th s ides be it to take the initiative o r to respo nd po s itively to theinitiative o f s tarting the pro cess to wards reso lutio n In view o f the co mplex backgro und o f the external and internal dynamics it iso bvio us that address ing the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands dispute requires a s tep-by-s tep appro ach The ultimate is sue to address is theso vereignty is sue and territo rial disputes are generally viewed as zero sum in nature given their clo se link to co re securityinteres ts Even tho se who reco gnize the impo rtance o f transcending such lo gic in favo ur o f co ndo minium o r shared so vereigntygenerally ho ld that the is sue can o nly be addressed at the las t s tage o f any nego tiated pro cess if at all

Two impo rtant is sues have to be co ns idered at the beginning to what extent have the vario us s tages o f the nego tiating pro cess tobe agreed befo rehand (lsquoro ad maprsquo) o r even the final o utco me whether a viable co ndo minium o r o nly shelving the is sues and co uldthe ro le o f a third party mediato r be helpfulacceptable In view o f the po litical diff iculties o n bo th s ides the s tart o f thenego tiatio n pro cess wo uld be endangered if there is no t sufficient ro o m fo r ambiguity and interpretatio n abo ut the vario us s tages altho ugh the general aim o f tens io n reductio n and suspens io n o f the so vereignty is sue mus t be clearly agreed

A third party mediato r is pro bably no t acceptable to the Chinese s ide The third party mo s t o ften mentio ned is the Internatio nalCo urt o f Jus tice (ICJ) o r any kind o f internatio nal arbitratio n Ho wever this seems unlikely in view o f China`s preference fo rbilateral nego tiatio ns and its refusal to accept judicial settlement by the ICJ o r any internatio nal arbitratio n except in no n-po litical

areas such as trade29 1 The Japanese go vernment wo uld be willing to accept the jurisdictio n o f the ICJ but o nly if China brings the

case to the Co urt les t it be perceived as ackno wledging the exis tence o f a territo rial dispute29 2 But there are also po litical andpro cedural arguments agains t the reco urse to the ICJ China`s legal argumentatio n is co mparatively weak and s ince a negativejudgement co uld have implicatio ns fo r China`s legal claim to mo s t o f the So uth China Sea there is even less o f a chance o f Chinamaking an exceptio n fo r the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands dispute In view o f the entrenched po s itio ns o f bo th s ides and the risk o f a`winner takes all` o utco me o f internatio nal litigatio n bo th go vernments wo uld face co ns iderable do mes tic res is tance in case o f anegative o utco me In view o f the urgency o f the dispute and the lo ng time it takes fo r a judgement there wo uld also be the risk o fdo mes tic fo rces trying to pre-empt a negative result

In view o f the security is sues invo lved (let alo ne the American his to rical `debt` as a result o f Washingto n`s ambiguity related toWashingto n`s ending o f the adminis tratio n o f Okinawa in 1972) an American mediatio n co uld be seen as natural and even inAmerican interes ts Such an American ro le ho wever is extremely unlikely as it wo uld be seen by China as unduly advantageo us toJapan Ho wever at so me po int during the Japan-China nego tiatio n pro cess the US might ass is t (o r even be reques ted) by agreeingto certain Co nfidence and Security Building Measures (CSBM) in the area aro und the is lands

The firs t s tage wo uld have to co ns is t o f measures which reduce the risk o f a military clash but in a way which prevents theperceptio n that o ne s ide is giving in to co ercio n This s tage wo uld be a gradual phas ing o ut o f intrus io ns by Chinese o fficial vesselsand aircraft into the territo rial waters co ntiguo us zo ne and airspace o f the is lands which is recipro cated by Japanrsquos reducing in thesame way its co as tguard patro ls in the two zo nes as well as its s crambling activities in the is lands` airspace There were repo rts in

June 2013 that China called o n Japan to agree to a 12-nautical-mile no -entry zo ne aro und the is lands 29 3 Japan rejected this co urse

Ano ther measure wo uld be to increase the dis tance at which vessels o f bo th maritime fo rces o bserve each o ther Such s teps sho uldultimately be o fficialised by a gradually expanding series o f CSBMs and a bilateral liaiso n mechanism This co uld also include ademilitarisatio n agreement as an incentive fo r the Chinese s ide It wo uld be vital that the s teps at this s tage be incremental that nos tep is explo ited in a o ne-s ided way and that they are co ns idered irrevers ible At the same time bo th s ides have to prevent peo plefro m appro aching the is lands s ince this wo uld be seen as a pro vo catio n by the o ther s ide This latter task is technically no t easy

because o f the co ntro vers ial character o f any co mpro mise with certain no n-s tate acto rs in Japan China Ho ng Ko ng and Taiwan The(failed) landing o f a Chinese ho t ballo o n o n o ne o f the is lands in January 2014 demo ns trated at the same time the technical

diff iculty o f a no -entry po licy as well as the po ss ibility o f a success ful co o peratio n o f the co as tguards o f all three co untries 29 4

At this firs t s tage o r leading to the next there will have to be a Japanese go vernment s tatement to the effect that there is alsquopro blemrsquo related to the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands This can be wo rded in such a way that the sens itive express io n `territo rialpro blem` (which is s trenuo us ly denied by the go vernment) is avo ided and it can be supplemented by a sentence that such as tatement in no way prejudices the legal po s itio n o f the go vernment Such a qualifying s tatement is fo r example included in the

Japan-China agreement fo r prio r no tif icatio n o f research vessels fro m bo th co untries in the Eas t China Sea in 200029 5 A s imilarqualif icatio n is part o f the 1997 Japan-China Fisheries Agreement In the jo int co mmuniqueacute o f 1972 which no rmalised diplo maticrelatio ns between Japan and China diplo matic wo rding also managed to bridge the huge gap between their s tances o n Taiwan whichthe PRC co ns iders an lsquoinalienable partrsquo o f its territo ry Japan co ns iders the so vereignty is sue s till unreso lved because the 1951 SanFrancis co Peace Treaty Art 2 (b) o nly s tipulated that lsquoJapan reno unces all right title and claim to Fo rmo sa and the Pescado res rsquowitho ut clarifying the recipient o f the territo ry The co mpro mise in 1972 was reached with the sentence that Japan lsquofully unders tandsand respects this s tand o f the Go vernment o f the Peo ples Republic o f China and it f irmly maintains its s tand under Article 8 o f thePo tsdam Pro clamatio nrsquo

POSSIBLE APPROACHES TO THE SOVEREIGNTY ISSUE

The mo s t diff icult pro blem is the so vereignty is sue which go es to the co re o f any co untry`s security interes ts It is no t imaginablethat either s ide will reno unce its claim to the is lands Sides tepping o r shelving the is sue is o nly useful if the lesso ns fro m the 1972and 1978 attempts as o utlined abo ve can be learned and applied but there is s till the fundamental pro blem with the implicitassumptio n that the quality o f the bilateral relatio nship will always be as go o d as when the s ides tepping agreement was achievedand can be maintained in perpetuity o r until the so vereignty is sue can be addressed But in o rder to so lve the so vereignty is sue aneven better relatio nship has to be created This better relatio nship co uld be bro ught abo ut by the s teps explained abo ve and furtherbelo w

An impo rtant co nditio n fo r any las ting territo rial co mpro mise wo uld be reducing the value o f the is lands fo r bo th co untries whichcan be achieved by o ne o f the measures pro po sed fo r s tage 1 ie reso lutely preventing anyo ne fro m appro aching the territo ries(including to tal demilitarizatio n) which in themselves are eco no mically wo rthless and are uninhabited The main po int is to preventany go vernmental act which co uld be interpreted as being part o f the `so vereignty game` The mo s t diff icult part here is to preventany act by no n-go vernmental acto rs This wo uld have to include the territo rial waters and the explo itatio n there in o f any kind o freso urces including fishing Scientif ic interes ts in the is lands co uld be served by bilateral surveys witho ut any po litical co nno tatio ns

There have been pro po sals to declare the is lands an Internatio nal Nature and Wildlife Preserve29 6 Such a preserve wo uld have to beadminis tered either bilaterally o r by a relevant internatio nal o rganisatio n and as such co uld serve as a co nfidence-building measure

The abo ve s teps wo uld then allo w the two s ides to deal with the co ns iderable eco no mic interes ts in fishing and the explo itatio n o fhydro carbo n reso urces and o ther seabed reso urces aro und the is lands ie in the Exclus ive Eco no mic Zo ne ando r the ExtendedCo ntinental Shelf Once the is lands` land area and the territo rial waters have been put as ide it wo uld be eas ier to co me to ano verall agreement o n the delimitatio n o f the EEZ bo rder (with the exceptio n o f the no rthern part which wo uld require a trilateralagreement between China Japan and Ko rea) which wo uld include the delimitatio n o f these surro unding waters It wo uld facilitate aco mpro mise if bo th s ides agree that the is lands do no t merit their o wn EEZ This might be diff icult fo r Japan which claims an EEZ fo rOkino to rishima refuted by China s ince it co ns iders the reef no t to be an is land acco rding to Art 121 o f UNCLOS

A co mpro mise o n the so vereignty is sue co uld o nly be the o utco me ndash if at all ndash o f a success ful pro cess o f the abo ve o r co mparables teps In o rder to avo id a `winner take all` s ituatio n the co mpro mise wo uld have to invo lve a sharing arrangement His to ry o ffers

quite a number o f internatio nal precedents o f shared so vereignty referred to as co ndo minium in internatio nal law29 7 One case withso me s imilarities to the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands is a small is land (3000 sq m) in the river separating France and Spain kno wn asPheasant Is land o r Co nference Is land which even to day s till changes every s ix mo nths between France and Spain as o wner Like theSenkakuDiao yu Is lands the is land has no eco no mic value anymo re and the is land is o ff limits It was the lo catio n o f the s igning o f

the Treaty o f the Pyrenees in 1659 which ended a lo ng war 29 8 Mo s t o ther examples o f jo int so vereignty co ncern territo ries with apo pulatio n which makes co o peratio n much mo re diff icult Other his to rical precedents o f sharing so vereignty are the es tablishmento f ldquoneutral zo nesrdquo Acco rdingly the is lands and po ss ibly a sea area aro und the is lands co uld be declared a neutral zo ne like the o nebetween Saudi Arabia and Kuwait (1922-1965) On July 7 1965 the two go vernments s igned an agreement (which to o k effect o nJuly 25 1966) to partitio n the Neutral Zo ne adjo ining their respective territo ries A demarcatio n agreement dividing the NeutralZo ne was s igned o n December 17 1967

Particularly relevant here is that Saudi Arabia as well as Kuwait explo ited the o il reso urces under a jo int o perating agreement29 9

Co nclus io ns

The actio n-reactio n pattern o f the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands dispute is accelerating and the initiative seems to be mo re o ften thanno t with the Chinese s ide while the Japanese s ide is in a defens ive po s itio n The danger o f a military co nfro ntatio n is lo o mingincreas ingly larger in what co uld be called a lsquochicken gamersquo At the same time the internal and external dynamics are undermining theenviro nment which is required fo r a peaceful so lutio n as well as fo r maintaining the number o f po s itive o ptio ns While the Japanesego vernment refuses to ackno wledge the very exis tence o f a territo rial dispute the Chinese go vernment is no w (July 2014) evenrefus ing to have a dialo gue with Japan`s current prime minis ter It is po ss ible that the Chinese s ide again wants to wait with anymo ve fo rward until the Japanese prime minis ter has changed as Beijing did with Prime Minis ter Sato Eisaku o r with Prime Minis terKo izumi Junichiro But waiting fo r an impro vement o f the bilateral atmo sphere as the Chinese s ide likes to s tress is a very riskyo ptio n and such an impro vement may anyway be a very sho rt windo w o f o ppo rtunity if lo o king at the ups and do wns o f the po s t-1949 his to ry o f the bilateral relatio nship

To s tart a s tep-by-s tep pro cess o f address ing the territo rial is sue s tro ng leadership is required which unders tands the widerinteres ts o f a functio ning Japanese-Chinese relatio nship Japan s imply asking China fo r a summit meeting is no t very sens ible ifthere is no willingness to engage in subs tantive dis cuss io ns and wo uld be very risky fo r China`s to p leader if the Japanese primeminis ter then vis its the Yasukuni Shrine The his to ry is sue sho uld no lo nger be a Chinese lever fo r pressuris ing Japan but the latterhas to abs tain fro m actio ns which are seen as pro vo cative no t o nly by China but also by Ko rea the US and many o thers There hasto be a co mmitted leadership o n bo th s ides which s tarts with a ro ugh ro ad map and tens io n-reducing s teps such as CSBMs en ro uteto agreeing o n a fo rmula which allo ws the parties to o btain eco no mic as well as security gains while reducing tens io ns

Reinhard Drifte is Emeritus Professor of Japanese Politics University of Newcastle UK and Visiting Professor at various Japanese Universities andPau University (France) He is the author of Japanrsquos Foreign Policy for the Twenty First Century His home page is here

Reco mmended citatio n Reinhard Drifte The Japan-China Confrontation Over the SenkakuDiaoyu Islands--Between shelving and dispute

co ntro l and Chinese never inhabited the is lands In a recent publicatio n o f the State Ocean Adminis tratio n ho wever it is argued thatChina no t o nly dis co vered the is lands and used them but also exercised lo ng-term co ntro l o ver them witho ut clarifying what this

means 6 `Disco very` acco rding to the Chinese acco unts s imply means that the is lands were mentio ned in reco rds written by peo plewho passed them and used them as o rientatio n po ints o n their sea vo yage between China and OkinawaJapan and co ns idered them

as part o f China`s co as tal defence7 Mo reo ver the assertio n that Japan acquired the is lands as the result o f the Sino -Japanese Waro f 1894-95 which was ended by the s igning o f the Treaty o f Shimo no seki in April 1895 depends o n whether o ne co ns iders theSenkaku Is lands part o f Taiwan o r part o f Okinawa The Shimo no seki Treaty included the cess io n o f Taiwan and the Pescado res butdid no t mentio n the Senkaku Is lands The latitude and lo ngitude o f the Pescado res were given and a jo int co mmittee fo r

demarcating territo ries was set up8 The map o f Taiwan printed at the time did no t include the Senkaku Is lands China ho wever

s tates that the Treaty included the Senkaku Is lands s ince they belo ng to Taiwan a claim which Japan disputes 9

- Shado w o ver the po litical and mo ral fo undatio n o f Japan`s acquis itio n

Timing decis io n-making pro cess and secrecy o f Japan`s territo rial acquis itio n o f the Senkaku Is lands cas t a shado w o n the po liticaland mo ral fo undatio ns o f Japan`s inco rpo ratio n o f the is lands But even if the do cument o f inco rpo ratio n o f the is lands was madepublic by Japan o nly in 1952 success ive Chinese go vernments mus t have kno wn that Japan was in co ntro l and Japanese citizenspartly living o n and co mmercially us ing the is lands

There is co rrespo ndence in 1885 between the central go vernment in To kyo and lo cal go vernment in Ryukyu (called Okinawa to day)where the fo rmer demanded cautio n in asserting any claim o r putting markers o n the is lands The reaso n given was co ncern o verrais ing the ire and suspicio n o f the Qing go vernment which at that time was militarily s till s tro nger than Japan This is interpreted by

so me as Japan at leas t implicitly admitting the Qing go vernment`s title to the is lands 10 In co ntras t to the o fficial Japanese vers io ndis tributed s ince 1972 that fro m 1885 o n there had been a series o f surveys co nducted by the Japanese go vernment there is no

do cumentary pro o f that such surveys were co nducted11 Mo reo ver in 1880 nego tiatio ns between the Meiji and Qing go vernmentshad taken place o ver the es tablishment o f a so uthern bo rder because the Qing o ppo sed Japan`s incremental takeo ver o f the Ryukyuis land chain which in 1879 had been inco rpo rated into Meiji Japan as a prefecture after having been under dual Chinese andJapanese suzerainty s ince 1609 A draft treaty was prepared in which the Japanese pro po sed to draw the bo rder between Ryukyu andChina by giving China the Ryukyu is lands o f Miyako and Yaeyama and everything to the so uth o f them in exchange fo r co mmercialrights in China There was no specific reference to the Senkaku Is lands but acco rding to Hane this is no t surpris ing s ince they

belo nged in the unders tanding o f the Qing go vernment to the Ryukyu is land chain which as a who le was the o bject o f nego tiatio ns 12

The treaty wo uld have put the Senkaku is lands o n the Chinese s ide Fo r vario us reaso ns China was reluctant to s ign the agreement

at the time and fro m 1885 o nwards Japan no lo nger had any interes t in s igning either13 Hane argues that these two circumstancesndash To kyo `s hes itatio n to inco rpo rate the Senkaku Is lands and its making them the o bject o f a deal ndash raise do ubts abo ut theJapanese go vernment`s claim to day that the is lands are `inherent territo ry` (koyu no ryodo) o f Japan

The timing o f Japan`s inco rpo ratio n o f the is lands is also telling It o ccurred when China had lo s t decis ive battles in the Sino -

Japanese War had put o ut peace feelers to Japan o n 22 No vember 1895 and its ultimate defeat had beco me predictable14 Fro m thedo cuments quo ted fo r example by Hane and Shaw it is clear that the Meiji go vernment felt free in January 1895 to go ahead withinco rpo ratio n o f the is lands in co ntras t to its earlier hes itatio n The Chinese surrender fo llo wed in March 1895 and the Treaty o fShimo no seki ended the war in April 1895 The inco rpo ratio n by the Meiji go vernment is therefo re s trictly speaking no t related to theShimo no seki Treaty altho ugh the timing and his to rical circumstances es tablish a causal link to the Sino -Japanese War The Treatydo es no t co ntain any mentio n o f the Senkaku Is lands o nly that China wo uld cede to Japan `the is land o f Fo rmo sa to gether with allis lands appertaining o r belo nging to said is land o f Fo rmo sa` as Taiwan was then referred to The PRC and ROC unders tands

ho wever that this wo rding applies also to the Senkaku Is lands because they co ns ider the Senkaku Is lands as part o f Taiwan15

Under internatio nal law appro priatio n o f territo ry is legally s trengthened by making it public and by no t being co ntes ted butno tif icatio n is no t an abso lute co nditio n Ho wever even if the is lands were inco rpo rated witho ut this being o fficially made public itmus t have co me to the attentio n o f succeeding Chinese go vernments that the is lands were being eco no mically explo ited andtempo rarily inhabited by Japanese citizens s ince fishermen fro m Taiwan and China pursuing fishing activities in the area so metimes

landed there to escape s to rms 16

The Japanese go vernment tries to pro ve the Chinese reco gnitio n o f Japan`s so vereignty by two do cuments The firs t is a letter o fappreciatio n fro m the co nsul o f the Republic o f China in Nagasaki in 1920 which thanked the peo ple o f Ishigakijima fo r rescuing

Chinese fishermen washed asho re o n o ne o f the Senkaku is lands s tating that the is lands are part o f Okinawa prefecture 17 Anarticle in the People`s Daily in 1996 dismissed this letter as the perceptio n o f certain peo ple given the circumstance o f Japan having

co lo nized Taiwan at the time (1895-1945)18 The seco nd do cument is an article in the People`s Daily o n 8 January 1953 repo rtingOkinawan demo ns tratio ns agains t the US and explicitly including the Senkaku Is lands in the descriptio n o f the Ryukyu

Is lands 19 Ano ther battlefield to day fo r beefing up their respective claims to the is lands are maps Ho wever there are many

inco ns is tencies o n bo th s ides until the 1970s 20

The co nclus io n fro m the abo ve analys is can o nly be that neither the Japanese no r Chinese vers io n o f the his to rical backgro und isdevo id o f weak po ints The Japanese claim is certainly s tro nger in mo dern internatio nal law terms and the Chinese po s itio n isserio us ly weakened by the absence o f any pro tes t fro m 1895 to 1970 and by the circumstances o f the timing o f pro tes ts fro m 1970(ie repo rt o n hydro carbo n reso urces ) But as I will sho w later rather than us ing these weak po ints to reinfo rce mutually exclus iveso vereignty claims the mutual reco gnitio n o f these weak po ints co uld also pro vide an enco uragement fo r finding a co mpro mise

- Wo rld War II agreements and the Senkaku Is lands

After the 2012 natio nalisatio n o f three o f the is lands the Chinese go vernment to o k the line that Japan`s act was a negatio n o f theresults o f Wo rld War II thus co mbining the well-kno wn his to ry dis co urse o f Japan`s aggress io n agains t China until 1945 with theis lands dispute It is therefo re impo rtant to inves tigate briefly what these agreements said abo ut the is lands

Based o n its assertio n abo ut the Sino -Japanese war o f 1894-95 and the Senkaku Is lands being part o f Taiwan the PRC go vernmentargues that the allied agreements co ncerning the po s twar perio d (Cairo Co mmunique and Po tsdam Declaratio n) and the SanFrancis co Peace Treaty o f 1951 (neither the Guo mindang go vernment o n Taiwan no r the PRC go vernment were invited to theco nference leading to the treaty) required Japan to return the Senkaku Is lands The Cairo Dec1aratio n in December 1943 demandedthe return to the Republic o f China o f `all the territo ries Japan has s to len fro m the Chinese such as Manchuria Fo rmo sa and the

Pescado res rsquo21 Article 8 o f the Po tsdam Declaratio n s tates that ` The terms o f the Cairo Declaratio n shall be carried o ut andJapanese so vereignty shall be limited to the is lands o f Ho nshu Ho kkaido Kyushu Shiko ku and such mino r is lands as we

determine`22 Article 2 (b) o f the San Francis co Treaty s tipulates that ` Japan reno unces all right title and claim to Fo rmo sa and the

Pescado res`23

Ryukyu Islands

Vice President Spiro Agnew wit h Prime Minist erEisaku Sat o o n reversio n o f Okinawa Empero rHiro hit o and Empress Nagako lo o k o n May 15 19 72

The Senkaku Is lands are no where mentio ned in these do cuments but because o f its assertio n that the is lands are part o f Taiwan

the Chinese co ns ider them to be included24 At the same time the PRC has never reco gnized the legality o f the San Francis co Peace

Treaty and the Treaty itself do es no t even clarify to which China Taiwan sho uld be returned25 In an uns igned draft planning do cumento f May 1950 fro m the Chinese Minis try o f Fo reign Affairs fo r the PRC`s po ss ible participatio n in the San Francis co Peace Treaty andpublished in the Japanese media o nly in December 2012 as pro o f o f China reco gniz ing Japan`s o wnership the is lands are referredto by their Japanese name and it is pro po sed to examine whether these is lands are part o f Taiwan thus cas ting do ubt o n China`s

claim to day that they have always been part o f Taiwan and no t Okinawa and had been ceded to Japan in 1895 as part o f Taiwan 26

Pro fesso r Liu Jiangyo ng o f Qinghua Univers ity brushed away such do ubts by explaining the use o f the Japanese name by the

circumstance that this name was after the Japanese co lo nizatio n o f Taiwan the mo re po pular name27

It is mo re likely that the Guo mindang go vernment and fro m 1949 o n also the go vernment o f the PRC did no t kno w ando r careabo ut these is lands until 1970 There was no clear unders tanding o f whether the is lands belo nged to Okinawa o r Taiwan and eventhe ROC po s itio n o n Okinawa was unclear During Wo rld War II and in its aftermath there was co ns iderable co nfus io n within the

Guo mindang go vernment abo ut whether it sho uld o r co uld claim the Ryukyu Is lands 28 Ishii mentio ns that the ROC go vernment at

o ne s tage demanded to take part in the Trus teeship o f Okinawa29 Acco rding to an article in the newspaper o f the ChineseCo mmunis t Party Ro o sevelt even o ffered Jiang Jieshi Okinawa (which then wo uld have naturally included the Senkaku Is lands)

during the Cairo co nference in 1943 but Jiang turned it do wn30

As a result o f the San Francis co Peace Treaty o f 1951 Okinawa including the Senkaku Is lands as part o f the Nansei Sho to Is lands(so uth o f 29degno rth latitude refers to all the is lands o f the Ryukyu chain) was placed under US adminis tratio n and became a centralancho r o f the US military deplo yment in As ia

During the San Francis co Peace Treaty nego tiatio ns the US and theUK agreed that Japan wo uld retain `res idual so vereignty` o verOkinawa and that the US wo uld no t require Japan to reno unce its

so vereignty o ver Okinawa31 It is o bvio us that the Japaneseco ns idered the Senkaku Is lands as being included in the `res idualso vereignty o ver Okinawa` s ince fo r To kyo the is lands were part o fOkinawa Mo reo ver when the go vernment o f the Republic o f Chinano rmalized diplo matic relatio ns with Japan in 1952 (Treaty o f Peacebetween Japan and the Republic o f China) the subject o f the is landswas no t raised by either s ide In a separate exchange o f no tes bo ths ides agreed that the Treaty `be applicable to all the territo rieswhich are no w o r which may hereafter be under the co ntro l o f its

Go vernment` referring to the ROC go vernment32 But when the USanno unced in 1953 its intentio n to return to Japan the Amami Is lands(no rth o f Okinawa main is land) as part o f the Nansei Sho to the ROCgo vernment (but no t the PRC) pro tes ted agains t the US legaljus tif icatio n o f do ing so under the co ncept o f Japan`s `res idualso vereignty` o ver these is lands because this co ncept was no t

specified in the San Francis co Peace Treaty33

- The revers io n o f Okinawa in 1972 and the disputed is lands

Co nsequently when the US s tarted to dis cuss with Japan thetrans fer o f the adminis trative rights o ver Okinawa to Japan leading to the co nclus io n o f the `Agreement Between Japan and theUnited States o f America Co ncerning the Ryukyu Is lands and the Daito Is lands` (s igned o n 17 June 1971) the ROC urged the US in

September 1970 no t to include the Senkaku Is lands and to keep the so vereignty is sue o pen34

The ROC ambassado r to the US in a no te o f 15 March 1971explained his go vernment`s s ilence co ncerning the Senkaku Is landsuntil then by saying `fo r regio nal security co ns ideratio ns theGo vernment o f the Republic o f China has hitherto no t challenged theUS military o ccupatio n o f the Senkaku Is lands under Article 3 o f theSan Francis co Peace Treaty Ho wever acco rding to internatio nal lawtempo rary military o ccupatio n o f an area do es no t affect the

ultimate determinatio n o f its so vereignty`35 He then asked fo r theres to ratio n o f the is lands to the ROC `Regio nal securityco ns ideratio ns` certainly meant that under the Co ld War co nditio nsand its co nfro ntatio n with Beijing the ROC go vernment did no t wantto do anything which might have diminished the military po wer o f o rits go o d relatio nship with its American pro tecto r Mo reo ver Japanwas an impo rtant anti-co mmunis t neighbo ur fo r Taiwan andtherefo re the ROC go vernment had in 1951 waived all reparatio nsfro m Japan

Under pressure fro m bo th allies (the US s till had diplo maticrelatio ns with Taiwan in 1971) the US had to cho o se whether to goagains t Japan o r Taiwan and in the end decided to suppo rt Japan`sdemand Mo reo ver the US felt driven into a co rner by Taiwanbecause the latter had the po wer to to rpedo the pending textileagreement which the US was jus t nego tiating with several co untries including Taiwan Henry Kis s inger the Pres ident`s Ass is tant fo rNatio nal Security Affairs sugges ted pro mis ing the ROC that apending US military delegatio n vis iting Taiwan in Augus t wo uld buy

them o ff with pro mises o f military aid 36

Suppo rting Japan rather than Taiwan in the end meant that the USwo uld arbitrarily ldquodetachrdquo the Senkaku Is lands fro m Okinawanterrito ry despite having clearly co ns idered the two as o ne territo rialunit o ver which Japan enjo yed ldquores idual so vereigntyrdquo despite US

o ccupatio n until 197237 This was do ne by differentiating between

Okinawa which was returned as a territo ry and where the US to day has a co nsulate-general and the Senkaku Is lands which wereo nly reco gnised as being under the adminis tratio n o f Japan Any co nflicting so vereignty claims were explicitly left fo r the partiesco ncerned to so rt o ut after the revers io n o f Okinawa which included the Senkaku Is lands Since Art V o f the bilateral security treatyapplied to all Japanese territo ry being under Japanese adminis tratio n the security guarantee therefo re applied also to the is lands In this way the US co ntributed s ignificantly to the current diff icult s ituatio n

This rather self-serving ambiguo us US po s itio n was enunciated when the US Adminis tratio n s tated during Senate hearings o n therevers io n that `The United States has made no claim to the Senkaku Is lands and co ns iders that any co nflicting claims to the is lands

are a matter fo r reso lutio n by the parties co ncerned` the latter including the ROC and the PRC38 Since the revers io n in 1971 the UShas s tuck to no t taking a po s itio n o n the so vereignty o f the Senkaku Is lands and emphas iz ing that the 1971 Agreement trans ferredo nly the `adminis trative rights` to Japan In this way the US allo wed Japan to regain co ntro l o ver the Senkaku Is lands and enabled itto reinfo rce its so vereignty claim thanks to the revers io n When reading the pro po sal by Natio nal Security Staff member Jo hnHo ldridge to return `the Ryukyus (sic) and the Senkakus` but to pass no judgement as to the co nflicting claims to them HenryKiss inger wro te candidly o n the margin o f the memo o f 13 April 1971 `But that is no nsense s ince it gives is lands back to Japan

Ho w can we get a mo re neutral po s itio n`39

While the abo ve sheds so me light o n why the ROC did no t make any public claims to the title o f the Senkakus between 1945 and1970 it do es no t explain its s ilence befo re that perio d o r even fo r the perio d 1945-1949 ie befo re the es tablishment o f the PRCShaw o ffers the theo ry that this was because the ROC go vernment did no t have any his to ry o f ruling Taiwan and had to rely o n

Japanese co lo nial reco rds and maps when it to o k o ver Taiwan in 194540 The US Department o f State do cuments (FRUS) reveal thatfo r the ROC go vernment it was very much the o ppo s itio n by public o pinio n in Taiwan to the is lands` return to Japan as well as by

o verseas Chinese which put pressure o n Taibei in 1970 to o ppo se the trans fer o f the is lands to Japan41 Ano ther reaso n no tmentio ned in these do cuments is the repo rt o f hydro carbo n reserves aro und the is lands The Co mmittee fo r Co o rdinatio n o f Jo intPro specting fo r Mineral Reso urces in As ian Offsho re Areas (CCOP) under the auspices o f the UN Eco no mic Co mmiss io n fo r As iaand the Far Eas t (ECAFE) had co nducted a geo phys ical survey in 1968 The Co mmittee said in a repo rt in May 1969 that the

co ntinental shelf between Taiwan and Japan may be extremely rich in o il reserves 42 So o n after the publicatio n o f this repo rt Japans tarted to explo re with Taiwan and the Republic o f Ko rea po ss ibilities fo r jo int develo pment o f the Sea`s hydro carbo n reso urces InMarch 1969 Japan began pro tracted nego tiatio ns with Taiwan and So uth Ko rea leading to an agreement in principle in September

1970 to set up a jo int develo pment pro ject43

If the ROC had until 1945 no experience o f ruling Taiwan then the PRC go vernment had even less experience with the area o f theSenkaku Is lands Their negligible s ize and remo te lo catio n befo re the likeliho o d o f hydro carbo n reserves was raised certainly didno t draw any attentio n to them The abo ve circumstances also explain the timing o f the PRC`s claim In additio n and pro bably mo reurgent at a time when the go vernment was jus t emerging fro m the po litical ravages o f the Cultural Revo lutio n the PRC co uld no ts tay quiet in the face o f ROC and o verseas Chinese claims if it wanted to be reco gnized as the so le representative o f China Thefirs t newspaper repo rts abo ut China`s claims came o ut in May 1970 after Japan and Taiwan had s tarted talks o n jo intly explo ringthe energy reso urces aro und the Senkaku Is lands and Okinawa`s revers io n was anno unced Only o n 30 December 1971 did the

Chinese Fo reign Minis try publish an o fficial s tatement claiming the is lands 44

The weakes t po int o f the territo rial claim to the Senkaku Is lands by the ROC and s ince 1949 also that by the PRC is therefo re thatuntil the ECAFE survey o f the Eas t China Sea the is lands were no t claimed by either go vernment and Japan`s co ntro l o ver the

is lands had been unco ntes ted Shaw calls this absence o f o bjectio n a `serio us po litical miss tep`45 The co ntras t to the Chineseclaims to almo s t the who le o f the So uth China Sea is revealing the 9 dash line (o riginally 11 dash line) o n which China`s claims tothe So uth China Sea is based was already es tablished in 1947 but had appeared in Chinese maps in o ne fo rm o r ano ther s ince

1936 and was then taken o ver in 1949 by the PRC46

In meetings with PRC academics in February 2013 this autho r was given several reaso ns fo r the lo ng s ilence o f the Beijinggo vernment including so me o f tho se mentio ned abo ve Firs t o f all the go vernment saw no reaso n to specifically claim the is landsbecause acco rding to the PRC interpretatio n o f the Shimo no seki Treaty o f 1895 Therefo re having been taken away fro m China aspart o f Taiwan Japan was o bligated to return them as a result o f the abo ve-mentio ned wartime and po s twar agreements Allco unterarguments abo ut the is lands no t having been mentio ned in these agreements (in co ntras t to eg the Penghu Is lands) wereswept away by the assertio n that the Diao yu Is lands are part o f Taiwan The US adminis tratio n o ver Okinawa which explicitly includesthe Senkaku Is lands and the USUK s tatement co ncerning Japan`s res idual so vereignty o ver Okinawa during the San Francis co PeaceTreaty nego tiatio ns (at that time no difference between Japanese so vereignty o ver Okinawa and adminis trative rights o ver theSenkaku Is lands had yet been made) were s imply co ns idered as having been addressed by two PRC s tatements in 1951 whichdeclared the treaty illegal Interes tingly in these s tatements Beijing claimed the Paracel Is lands the Spratly Is lands and the Pratas

Is lands as part o f China47 Even if the PRC co ns idered the Senkaku Is lands as part o f Taiwan it is s trange that no claim to theSenkaku Is lands was made altho ugh Taiwan was under the co ntro l o f the Guo mindang whereas the Senkaku Is lands in co ntras twere placed under US adminis tratio n (and mo reo ver jo ined to Okinawa) while the Pratas Is lands were placed under UN Trus teeshipAno ther explanatio n given by these PRC academics fo r China`s s ilence is the absence o f diplo matic relatio ns between Beijing andTo kyo until 1972 It is no t clear to this autho r why this sho uld have prevented Beijing fro m pro tes ting agains t Japan`s territo rialclaim to the is lands s ince the go vernment o n many o ccas io ns befo re 1972 pro tes ted Japanese po licies and even co ncluded`private` fishery agreements which managed to circumvent the territo rial dispute Ano ther reaso n mentio ned was China`s do mes ticins tability during the Cultural Revo lutio n 1966-69 which certainly dis tracted the PRC leadership fro m dealing with such a mino r is sueas these far away is lands

WAS THE SENKAKUDIAOYU ISSUE SHELVED IN 1972 AND 1978

What had kept the territo rial dispute between To kyo and Beijing under co ntro l fro m the 1970s until the beginning o f the 1990s wasa tacit unders tanding (`anmo ku no ryo kai` in Japanese) in 1972 and 1978 to shelve the dispute (`tana age` in Japanese `gezhi` inChinese) Ho wever the Japanese go vernment later explicitly denied such an unders tanding Since this shelving agreement helped tokeep the territo rial co nflict under wraps fo r such a lo ng time despite several incidents and played a critical ro le in the 2010 and 2012crises it is impo rtant to inves tigate the circumstances o f what was unders to o d in 1972 and 1978 and why this unders tanding fellapart Mo reo ver this autho r is co nvinced that ano ther ldquounders tandingrdquo will have to be fo und in o rder to escape fro m the currentdangero us co nfro ntatio n but this will o nly be po ss ible if the appro priate lesso ns can be learned fro m the demise o f the 19721978unders tanding

In 1972 the two co untries no rmalized diplo matic relatio ns and in 1978 they co ncluded a Peace and Friendship Treaty On theo ccas io n o f bo th nego tiatio ns it was the Japanese s ide which raised the is sue o f the Senkaku Is lands and agreed to pro ceed to aco nclus io n o f the respective nego tiatio ns despite diametrically o ppo sed claims to the o wnership o f the Senkaku Is lands In o therwo rds bo th go vernments agreed to shelve the is sue albeit no t in writing o r in any public o r legal fo rm In the case o f the September1972 nego tiatio ns between Prime Minis ter Tanaka Kakuei and Prime Minis ter Zho u Enlai the territo rial is sue (as well as the exactwo rding o f Japan`s apo lo gies abo ut its pas t actio ns in China which Tanaka o ffered to Zho u Enlai) was so sens itive fo r the

Japanese go vernment that the reco rd o f the Gaimusho o mits the reactio n o f Tanaka to Zho u Enlai`s refusal to dis cuss theterrito rial is sue This part was deleted by the then head o f the China Divis io n in the Gaimusho Hashimo to Hiro shi who lateradmitted this in an interview in 2000 In the interview he said that Tanaka Kakuei in reactio n to Zho u Enlai`s reaso ning that it wo uld

be better no t to dis cuss the pro blem o f the Senkaku Is lands replied `Let`s dis cuss it ano ther time`48 Yabuki Susumu co rro batesthis reactio n by quo ting the bo o k by Zhang Xiangshan an adviser to the Chinese Minis try o f Fo reign Affairs who was present at o neo f the meetings Acco rding to his reco rd Tanaka replied `All right Then it is no t necessary to talk anymo re abo ut it Let`s do it

ano ther time`49 Befo re this summit meeting Ko meito Chairman Takeiri Yo shikatsu who served as an impo rtant go -between fo r theJapanese go vernment to prepare the vis it by Prime Minis ter Tanaka had a s imilar exchange with Zho u Enlai in July 1972 when it wasalso decided to shelve the Senkaku is sue When Takeiri met Zho u Enlai o n 28 July 1972 the latter is quo ted as saying `There is noneed to to uch o n the Senkaku Is lands is sue Mr Takeiri yo u also had no interes t I also had no interes t But the his to rians raise itas a pro blem due to the o il is sue and Mr Ino ue Kiyo shi is very keen o n it Ho wever there is no need to place impo rtance o n it

(omoku miru)`50 It is an iro ny that Zho u Enlai even referred to a Japanese academic Pro fesso r Ino ue Kiyo shi who se his to ricals tudies favo ur China`s claim o n his to rical gro unds and who se views had been presented in an article in the People`s Daily in May1971 In these dis cuss io ns it was made quite clear by bo th s ides that the no rmalizatio n o f diplo matic relatio ns was the mo s timpo rtant go al and therefo re they agreed to shelve the Senkaku is sue

When bo th s ides nego tiated the Treaty o f Peace and Friendship in 1978 there was a s imilar willingness to put the territo rial pro blemas ide in o rder to achieve the co nclus io n o f the Treaty altho ugh the Gaimusho (Japan`s Minis try o f Fo reign Affairs ) has so far no treleased the do cuments Acco rding to Fravel a chro no lo gy (nianpu in Chinese) o f Dengrsquos activities published by a party researcho ffice summarizes a meeting between Deng Xiao ping and Japan`s Fo reign Minis ter So no da Sunao acco rding to which Deng s tated`Its no t that China and Japan do no t have any pro blems Fo r example [there are] the Diao yu Is land and co ntinental shelf is sues Do nt drag them in no w they can be set as ide to be calmly dis cussed later and we can s lo wly reach a way that bo th s ides can accept

If o ur generatio n canno t find a way the next generatio n o r the o ne after that will f ind a wayrsquo 51 After the ratif icatio n o f the TreatyDeng vis ited Japan and declared at a press co nference o n 25 Octo ber 1978 that the is sue sho uld be left to future generatio ns whomay be wiser In Diet dis cuss io ns it was also made clear by LDP Secretary General Ohira Masayo shi and Fo reign Minis ter So no daSunao that it was in Japan`s natio nal interes t to go alo ng with Deng Xiao ping`s pro po sal to leave things fo r the next 20 o r 30

years 52 Ohira declared at the time o n the ques tio n o f an agreement to shelve the is sue (tana age) that `tana age` was no t co rrect

rather the o ther party (senpo ) wo uld no t bring the is sue up (mo chidasanai)53 Or as So no da wro te later while it is true that Chinais claiming these is lands as their territo ry the is lands are currently in Japans hands and have no t beco me an actual is sue amo ngJapan and China If Japan takes the tro uble to bring up the subject at this o ccas io n and wakes up a s leeping giant ( literally `dis turb

a bush o nly to let a snake o utrsquo ndash yabu wo tsutsuite hebi wo dasu) it will be a to tal lo ss (moto mo ko mo nai) fo r Japan54

One canno t but co nclude fro m these acco unts that bo th s ides agreed to shelve the territo rial is sue while in no way abando ning theirclaims to the is lands o therwise there wo uld no t have been a no rmalizatio n o f diplo matic relatio ns in 1972 o r a Treaty o f Peace andFriendship in 1978 It did no t mean that the Chinese accepted Japan`s territo rial claim s ince China had s tated its o wn claim in thesenego tiatio ns and has s ince 1971 never abando ned the claim It is also o bvio us that bo th s ides knew that there was a territo rialpro blem o therwise `shelving` wo uld no t have made sense The directo r o f the Treaties Divis io n and later Directo r General o f theTreaties Bureau Kuriyama Takakazu who was invo lved in the nego tiatio ns in 1972 and in 1978 s tated in an interview in 2012 thathe unders to o d bo th then and to day that there was a `tacit unders tanding` (anmoku no ryokai) between Japan and China to shelve the

territo rial is sue55 Asai Mo to fumi who was directo r o f the Treaties Divis io n in 1978-80 and directo r o f the China Divis io n in 1983-85 also co nfirmed that it was the unders tanding no t o nly in the Gaimusho but also amo ng the po litical leadership (Nagatacho ) that

there was a territo rial pro blem co ncerning the Senkaku Is lands 56 Miyamo to Yuji also mentio ned in 2012 that in his time as head o fthe China Divis io n in the 1990s there was s till o n the o ne hand a clear po s itio n that the Senkaku Is lands were Japanese territo rybut o n the o ther the fundamental s tance o f maintaining the s tatus quo ( genjo iji) and a tacit unders tanding that no actio n needed to

be taken57 Tajima Atsushi who was the Directo r o f the China Divis io n in 1978 and participated in the dis cuss io n between Fo reignMinis ter So no da and Deng Xiao ping in 1978 emphas ized in an interview published in June 2013 that the Chinese s ide`s perceptio no f an ldquoagreement (go i)rdquo was o ne-s ided and that the Japanese s ide o nly lis tened to Deng`s explanatio n that the is sue o f theSenkaku Is lands (and o f the disputed sea bo rder) sho uld be left to future generatio ns The Japanese s ide was satis fied that Beijing

had no intentio n to change the s tatus quo and therefo re judged that ldquono reactio n was requiredrdquo58 Despite Tajima`s intentio n torefute the exis tence o f an ldquoagreementrdquo it is clear that there was an implicit unders tanding s ince the status quo was in Japan`sfavo ur

Ano ther indirect indicatio n that Japan tacitly accepted the exis tence o f a territo rial pro blem and was willing to suspend the is sue topro tect the o verall relatio nship with China was the go vernment`s res traint fo r so me time after 1972 and 1978 in taking actio nswhich might have been interpreted by China as inflaming the territo rial dispute The go vernment never allo wed pro specting anddrilling fo r o il o r gas reserves aro und the is lands and sho wed res traint in allo wing landing o n o r making eco no mic use o f theis lands As we will see in the next part ho wever this res traint was no t abso lute and s till left ro o m fo r measures which ero ded theshelving agreement

It is o bvio us fro m the his to rical co ntext o f the 1972 and 1978 nego tiatio ns that bo th s ides had much greater interes ts at s takethan the Senkaku Is lands Mo reo ver the shelving agreement was very much in favo ur o f Japan as the co untry in de facto co ntro l o verthe is lands thereby reinfo rcing To kyo `s o wnership claim in internatio nal law Later when China`s po litical eco no mic and militaryweight increased and it became do ubtful whether the US wo uld invo ke the Security Treaty guarantee to pro tect the militarily-indefens ible is lands agains t a Chinese military challenge the shelving agreement was useful fo r Japan agains t any such

co ntingency59

THE EROSION OF THE SHELVING UNDERSTANDING

While o ne can well unders tand the des ire by the Japanese and Chinese leaders to deepen the bilateral relatio nship thro ugh the twotacit unders tandings in 1972 and 1978 and to trus t that all remaining pro blems including the territo rial dispute wo uld then beeas ier to so lve with hinds ight this faith lo o ks mo re like wishful thinking It is indeed rather unusual to co nclude a Peace andFriendship Treaty witho ut clarifying an o pen territo rial is sue the very heart o f a co untry`s security po licy Since the 1970s thisdispute has no t o nly been a sens itive is sue within Japan but also within the much mo re limited circle o f the Chinese leadership withpo litical gro upings in bo th co untries ins trumentaliz ing it fo r their o wn narro w purpo ses

The main co nceptual pro blem with the bilateral unders tanding has been that it was based o n the assumptio n that the co nditio nsallo wing its fo rmulatio n in the 1970s co uld be fro zen fo r as lo ng as it wo uld take to find a so lutio n to the o ppo s ing territo rialclaims Ho wever maintaining the co nditio ns fo r the co ntinued reliance o n the bilateral unders tanding wo uld have demanded muchgreater effo rts by bo th s ides to clarify what the status quo is and what measures wo uld be seen as vio lating the status quo Ins teadas Ishii Akira put it the leaders o n bo th s ides pro cras tinated and allo wed the territo rial is sue to beco me the symbo l o f natio nalism

in bo th co untries 6 0 As a result vario us changes and pressures in the do mes tic and internatio nal enviro nment gradually ero dedthese co nditio ns with Japan`s go vernment in the end publicly even denying that there was a dispute which co uld have been theo bject o f shelving and pro mpting the PRC in the 2010 and 2012 crises to sho wer Japan with po litical and eco no mic sanctio ns which

were unprecedented fo r two co untries suppo sedly bo und by a Peace and Friendship Treaty

The shelving agreement o bvio us ly had no legal fo rce but denying its exis tence was po litically unwise and mo rally wro ng OkabeTatsumi argues that fo r po litical co nvenience Japan agreed in 1978 to shelve the is sue but that this was different fro m shelving the

dispute in a legal sense6 1 The fo llo wing o fficial Japanese s tatements can be interpreted in this light in Octo ber 1990 CabinetSecretary Sakamo to Miso ji after res tating Japan`s so vereignty claim s till declared that the is land is sue between Japan China and

Taiwan (sic) sho uld be so lved by a later generatio n thus implying that there was a territo rial dispute which had been put as ide6 2 Butby the time China pro mulgated its law o n territo rial waters in February 1992 (see belo w) the Japanese go vernment wo uldunequivo cally and publicly deny that there had been any agreement to shelve the is sue and even that there was a territo rial is sueWhen Prime Minis ter Miyazawa Kiichi pro tes ted agains t the Chinese law in February 1992 referring to a prio r unders tanding withDeng Xiao ping o ver the Senkaku Is lands the Minis try o f Fo reign Affairs (MOFA) is sued a co rrectio n denying such an

unders tanding6 3 In September 1996 Adminis trative Vice-Minis ter Hayashi Sadayuki said that Japan had no t agreed with Dengrsquos lsquoput

o n the shelfrsquo pro po sal ie arguing that there was no territo rial is sue6 4 In the fo llo wing the autho r analyses the three maincircumstances which acco unt fo r the breakdo wn o f the bilateral unders tanding

THE CORROSIVE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

The requirements o f internatio nal law regimes particularly the UN Co nventio n o n the Law o f the Sea (UNCLOS) which was ratif ied byJapan and the PRC in 1996 pro mpted bo th co untries to take do mes tic ando r internatio nal adminis trative and legal s teps (fo rexample pass ing legis latio n related to the adminis tratio n o f their maritime space demarcating their sea bo rders and claimingbo rders fo r their EEZ) which had a general purpo se but did no t sufficiently take into acco unt the need to pro tect the bilateralunders tanding o f putting the territo rial dispute as ide Mo reo ver internatio nal regimes have `ves ted o therwise wo rthless is lands

with immense eco no mic value`6 5 They enco urage the assertio n o f so vereignty and penalize s tates fo r appearing to acquiesce in arival s tate`s claim to a disputed territo ry Paul O`Shea applied the term `so vereignty game` to this diplo matic-legal tit-fo r-tat

based o n Alexander Wendt`s co nceptio n o f so vereignty as a so cially co ns tructed ins titutio n6 6 Finally the vagueness o f

internatio nal law allo ws s tates to cherry pick tho se no rms which fit bes t their interes ts and claims 6 7 It is pro bably with thiss ituatio n in mind that fo rmer Chinese ambassado r to Japan and the UN Chen Jian explained at the beginning o f a talk o n 30

Octo ber 2012 that internatio nal law is a ro o t cause o f the current territo rial disputes 6 8 This autho r has to o much respect fo rinternatio nal law no tably UNCLOS to agree with this s tro ng s tatement but is aware o f the weaknesses o f many legal s tipulatio ns

With regard to the Senkaku dispute internatio nal law regimes have thus bro ught with it the fo llo wing co mplicatio ns

- Bo th co untries mus t always co ns ider that whatever is decided in relatio n to the disputed Senkaku Is lands might have implicatio nsfo r the co untry`s o ther territo rial disputes (Japan`s territo rial disputes with Ko rea and Russ ia China`s EEZ dispute with Ko rea o rterrito rial disputes with the o ther litto ral claimants in the So uth China Sea )

- Any actio n taken by the Japanese go vernment with regard to the Senkaku Is lands can be interpreted as the o fficial express io n o fthe go vernment in co ntro l o f the is lands and China will therefo re feel o bliged to pro tes t in o rder to defend its claim

- Bo th co untries had to co mply with UNCLOS in o rder to benefit fro m this regime and o fficially draw sea bo rders which s tart withbase lines o n which are dependent the extent o f the Territo rial Waters (12 nm fro m the base line) o f the Co ntiguo us Zo ne (24 nmfro m the base line) o f the EEZ (200 nm fro m the baseline) and o f the Extended Co ntinental Shelf (under certain co nditio ns up to350 nm fro m the base line can be claimed) The is sues aris ing fro m this are whether Japan and China wo uld apply the drawing o f thesea bo rders to the disputed territo ry and if so whether the Senkaku Is lands co uld be class ified as `is lands` which are entitled toan EEZ o r jus t `ro cks` which wo uld entitle them o nly to territo rial waters under UNCLOS Article 123 and ho w to draw the EEZbo rder in the Eas t China Sea`s Senkaku area These is sues were bo und to have an impact o n the bilateral unders tanding in o ne wayo r the o ther and wo uld have required special actio n in o rder to keep the territo rial dispute shelved

When China passed its Territo rial Law in 1992 it explicitly included the Diao yu Is lands which naturally was immediately pro tes ted bythe Japanese go vernment while s till sho wing a co ns iderable amo unt o f unders tanding and specifically saying that the law did no t

vio late Japan`s so vereignty o ver the is lands 6 9 At that time the Japanese go vernment was s till preo ccupied with preventing China`siso latio n after the 1989 Tiananmen crackdo wn China also played do wn the impact o f this law and even referred to Deng Xiao ping`s

1978 s tatement o f leaving the territo rial is sue fo r the future70 When Jiang Zemin vis ited Japan in April 1992 he also reaffirmed the

shelving acco rding to Deng`s pro mise in 1978 while s till res tating China`s claim to the is lands 71 Ho wever the Chinese Minis try o f

Fo reign Affairs (hereafter Waijiaobu o r CMOFA) o riginally had no t wanted to include the Senkaku Is lands 72 When it ratif ied UNCLOS in1996 China referred to the 1992 Law and pro mulgated the precise lo catio n o f many o f its base lines but left o ut so me o f them

including tho se fo r the Senkaku Is lands 73 In 1998 the Natio nal Peo ple`s Co ngress pro mulgated the PRC Exclus ive Eco no mic Zo neand Co ntinental Shelf Act which did no t mentio n any specific geo graphical areas Clearly the Chinese leadership was trying to walka fine line between its territo rial and EEZ claims (including the need to respo nd to do mes tic demands increas ingly do minated bynatio nalis t tendencies ) the requirements o f the internatio nal law regime and the maintenance o f go o d relatio ns with Japan

Japan ratif ied UNCLOS in June 1996 and es tablished in the fo llo wing mo nth the Law o n the Territo rial Sea and the Co ntiguo us Zo neas well as the Law o n the EEZ and Co ntinental Shelf which were supplemented by guidelines fo r implementatio n The latter also

es tablished an EEZ aro und the Senkaku Is lands Japan did no t include the Senkaku Is lands in its s traight baseline claim74 Twoseparate bills creating the Bas ic Law o f the Ocean Sea and the Law o n Es tablishing Safety Areas fo r Maritime Structures were

passed by the Diet in April 2007 and came into effect o n 16 July 200775 The latter two laws were passed mainly having in mind anyfuture explo itatio n o f natural reso urces in the co ntes ted EEZs Naturally China do es no t reco gnize the validity o f these laws fo r theSenkaku Is lands o r fo r the EEZ bo rder between the two co untries The territo rial dispute is also a majo r o bs tacle fo r agreement o nthe EEZ bo rder in the so uthern area o f the Eas t China Sea which is no t made eas ier by the fact that an agreement o n the title to theSenkaku wo uld have a majo r impact o n the s ize o f the EEZ area o f the success ful claimant particularly if the is lands were acco rdedan EEZ

FISHING AND OTHER ECONOMIC INTERESTS

Fishing is a majo r interes t fo r all litto ral s tates o f the Eas t China Sea Altho ugh Japan and China have co ncluded co nsecutive fisheryagreements fo r the Eas t China Sea the 1997 agreement (effective fro m June 2000) excludes fro m the applicatio n o f the fisheriesagreement the territo rial waters adjacent to the Senkaku Is lands Ins tead the extant 1975 Fishery Agreement which deemed the

areas aro und the Senkakus as part o f the high seas was allo wed to prevail76 In 2012 a letter related to the 1997 Agreement abo utfishing in the EEZ was revealed in which Fo reign Minis ter Obuchi Keizo had s tated to the Chinese ambassado r in To kyo Xu Duxinthat Japanrsquos laws and regulatio ns wo uld no t apply to the `waters in ques tio n` (togai no suiiki) It is unders to o d that the `waters in

ques tio n` include the Senkaku Is lands altho ugh their name is no t mentio ned and the Japanese go vernment to day denies it77 SatoMasaru a fo rmer intelligence analys t o f the Japanese Fo reign Minis try explained that this letter referred to the EEZ aro und the

Senkaku Is lands and applied o nly to Chinese fishermen78 Ho wever the Japanese go vernment seems no t to want to allo w fo reignfishermen unco ntro lled access to the territo rial waters aro und the Senkaku Is lands and has been patro lling the area This has ledto the expuls io n o f Chinese fishermen and subsequent pro tes ts by Taiwan and the PRC The Japanese co ntro ls have apparently

increased in the decade s ince 2000 while Chinese fishing activities have also vas tly increased79 Mo re research is needed o n thesedevelo pments to judge whether yet ano ther `uno fficial unders tanding` between To kyo and Beijing has been undermined

Finally in this co ntext o ne has to mentio n the is sue o f private and s tate o wnership o f the Senkaku as well as the ro le o f no n-s tateacto rs In 1896 Ko ga Tatsushiro o btained a free lease o f 30 years fo r the is lands o f Uo tsurijima Kubajima Minami Ko jima and KitaKo jima After his death in 1918 his so n Ko ga Zenji to o k o ver the bus iness In 1926 after the end o f the free lease the Japanese

go vernment co nverted it to a rental bas is 8 0 In 1932 the Japanese go vernment changed the s tatus o f these fo ur is lands fro m s tate-o wned to privately-o wned land by selling them to the Ko ga family After 1945 Kubajima and Taisho jima (the latter was always s tate-o wned) were leased to the US as firing ranges In 1972 Ko ga Zenji so ld Kita Ko jima and Minami Ko jima fo llo wed by Uo tsurshima in1978 and Kubajima in 1988 to Kurihara Kunio ki a real es tate inves to r and his family In 2002 Kitako jima Minami Ko jima and

Uo tsurijima were leased to the s tate which paid Yen 25 millio n per year fo r them in rent8 1 The US military used Kubajima andTaisho jima fro m 1957 as firing ranges and after the revers io n o f Okinawa in 1972 co ntinued to do so until 1979 It paid rent to the

private o wner o f Kubajima but after 1971 the rental payment was effected by the Japanese go vernment8 2 It is also interes ting tono te that even in the Japan-US minutes o f 15 May 1972 abo ut these two firing ranges the is lands are s till referred to by their

Chinese characters which are transcribed in the English vers io n as Ko bisho and Sekibisho rather than Kubajima and Taisho jima8 3

The relevant po int here is that s ince the shelving o f the territo rial is sue in 1972 and 1978 the is lands changed private o wners andthe s tate rented three o f the is lands fro m their private o wner and o wned o ne The leas ing in 2002 and the `natio nalizatio n` (nomo ney was invo lved) o f the Uo tsurijima beaco n in 2005 caused Chinese pro tes ts but the private o wnership changes did no t cause

any Chinese reactio n8 4 This is an illus tratio n o f the deterio ratio n o f the bilateral relatio nship during the fo llo wing years because itwas the sale o f three is lands to the Japanese central s tate which to uched o ff the 2012 cris is

THE IMPACT OF OIL AND GAS INTERESTS

The 1969 ECAFE Repo rt had led to claims by the ROC and the PRC o ver the Senkaku Is lands The mo s t pro mis ing area defined in thisrepo rt fo r hydro carbo n reso urces happened to be aro und the Senkaku Is lands Since Japan abando ned its jo int explo ratio n planswith Taiwan in 1972 with the diplo matic reco gnitio n o f the PRC no Japanese activities have taken place because o f co ncern abo utChina`s reactio n

In o rder to fulfill its gro wing demand fo r o il and gas and to divers ify away fro m its high dependence o n Middle Eas tern supplies

China s tarted in the 1970s to pro spect and extract energy reso urces in the Eas t China Sea8 5 To o verco me the territo rial dispute inthe so uth o f the Eas t China Sea and the divergent po s itio n o n ho w to draw the EEZ bo rder in the res t o f the Eas t China Sea Chinapro po sed `jo int develo pment` o f hydro carbo n reso urces In Octo ber 1980 PRC Deputy Premier Yao Yilin even pro po sed to aJapanese bus iness delegatio n that develo pment o f o ff-sho re o il reso urces aro und the disputed is lands be do ne jo intly by China

Japan and the US8 6 Ano ther bilateral pro po sal was made in 1984 by Deng Xiao ping who urged so lving the territo rial pro blems o fthe Spratly Is lands in the So uth China Sea and the Senkaku Is lands by jo intly develo ping the disputed areas befo re dis cuss ing theques tio n o f so vereignty But in this case as well as later pro po sals until 1996 Japan firs t demanded a settlement o f the maritime

bo rder o r reco gnitio n o f its title to the Senkaku Is lands 8 7

China`s relentless pro gress and expans io n o f o il and gas develo pment increas ingly caused frictio n between Japan and China whichalso impacted o n the territo rial dispute Since 1996 Chinese research vessels have entered the waters o f the Senkaku Is lands

including its territo rial waters 8 8 Japan exerted great res traint and until 2004 did no t allo w Japanese co mpanies to survey the ECSeven in the area which it claimed as its EEZ let alo ne aro und the Senkaku Is lands Mo reo ver To kyo `s permiss io n fo r surveying in2004 by a Japanese explo ratio n co mpany (never fo llo wed up because o f the po litical risks invo lved) in respo nse to Chinese o il andgas develo pment near Japan`s claimed EEZ bo rder was o nly fo r an area further no rth away fro m the disputed is lands

The Senkaku Is lands dispute co ntributed to the failure to fo llo w up o n the jo int unders tanding in June 2008 (ryokai in Japaneseliangjie in Chinese) to engage in jo int develo pment o f an area in the no rth o f the Eas t China Sea and to allo w Japan to jo in the

Chunxiao gas field explo itatio n which had been develo ped by China in a disputed EEZ area8 9 During the nego tiatio n o f the 2008jo int unders tanding the Chinese demanded jo int develo pment o f energy reso urces in the area aro und the Senkaku Is lands inexchange fo r their co mpro mise o n jo int develo pment in o ther areas o f the Eas t China Sea Altho ugh the Chinese go vernment agreedto the unders tanding witho ut getting satis factio n o n its demand the failure to achieve greater recipro city fro m the Japanese in theSenkaku area then made it do mes tically impo ss ible fo r the Chinese go vernment to go any further with nego tiating an

implementatio n o f the unders tanding9 0 In December 2008 two Chinese patro l vessels o f the China Marine Surveillance (CMSHaijiandui in Chinese) which is under the State Ocean Adminis tratio n (SOA) entered fo r the firs t time the territo rial waters aro und

the Senkaku Is lands in an apparent mo ve to s trengthen its claim to the is lands 9 1

INSTRUMENTALIZATION OF THE SENKAKU DISPUTE BY POLITICIANS AND NON-STATE ACTORS

The rais ing o f the territo rial is sue by China (ROC and PRC) and the campaign o f the Bao Diao (Pro tect the Diao yu) mo vementno tably in Taiwan and Ho ng Ko ng s ince the ECAFE repo rt led to a s imilar invo lvement o f the Japanese po litical right and o thernatio nalis tic gro ups which to o k up the is sue as a symbo l o f natio nalism In 1973 several rightwing po liticians within the rulingLiberal Demo cratic Party including Ishihara Shintaro who in 2012 became the trigger fo r the central go vernment`s purchase o f so meo f the Senkaku is lands es tablished the so -called Seirankai It was particularly Ishihara who raised the territo rial is sue and o ppo sed

its shelving by Prime Minis ter Tanaka9 2 Agains t the increase o f tens io ns between Japan and China s ince the middle o f the 1990s the supra-partisan Diet Asso ciatio n fo r the Preservatio n o f Territo rial Integrity was es tablished in 2004 It had 60 members by 2011On 30 March 2004 the Security Co mmittee o f the Lo wer Ho use passed a reso lutio n o n preserving territo rial integrity and demanded

a s tro nger Japanese s tance It was the firs t time the Diet passed a reso lutio n relevant to the Senkaku Is lands in this vein9 3 EdanoYukio chief o f the Co ns titutio n Research Co mmittee o f the Demo cratic Party o f Japan (DPJ) then in o ppo s itio n pro po sed that

Self-Defense Fo rces (SDF) tro o ps sho uld be s tatio ned o n the disputed Senkaku Is lands to prevent incurs io ns by o ther co untries 9 4

Since SDF members are civil servants (komuin) this demand so unds very s imilar to the demands by Abe Shinzo o n 15 September2012 to s tatio n komuin o n the is lands (witho ut clarifying whether he meant so ldiers o r o ther civil servants ) altho ugh he po s tpo ned

a decis io n when taking o ver the go vernment in December 20129 5 This sho ws the o ppo rtunis tic explo itatio n o f the territo rial disputefo r electo ral purpo ses

Natio nalis t po liticians and activis ts have also been demanding to erect facilities o n the is lands such as a weather s tatio n a beaco na helipo rt o r a harbo r in o rder to assert Japan`s so vereignty The Niho n Seinensha (Japanese Yo uth Federatio n) a natio nalis to rganizatio n affiliated with the majo r yakuza gro up Sumiyo shi-kai caused several incidents by landing o n the is lands s tarting witherecting a light to wer o r beaco n firs t o n Uo tsurijima in September 1978 which was enlarged in 1988 and ano ther o ne o n Kitako jima

Is land in 19969 6 Each such landing caused pro tes ts in China and amo ng the Chinese diaspo ra and pro mpted the PRC go vernmentto co mplain o fficially It also led to demands by the Seinensha that the light to wers be o fficially reco gnized by the go vernment andthe maintenance be taken o n by the Maritime Safety Agency (later called Co as t Guard) But even the co mpro mise o f including thelight to wer into o fficial charts was an o fficial act reinfo rcing Japan`s effective co ntro l o ver the is lands The dis cuss io n abo ut theo fficial handling o f the light to wer also raised the natio nalis t fever in Taiwan and its military even prepared (but then cancelled at

the las t mo ment) a co mmando actio n at the end o f 1990 to des tro y the facility9 7 In February 2005 amids t ris ing tens io ns o verChina`s energy develo pments in co ntes ted parts o f the Eas t China Sea and Chinese pro tes ts agains t Prime Minis ter Ko izumi`sYasukuni Shrine vis its the Japanese go vernment finally ceded to the demands o f the gro up to take o ver the Uo tsurijima lightho use

s tructure and its maintenance9 8 Until then the Gaimusho had succeeded in delaying this s tate takeo ver as `to o premature` in

o rder no t to pro vo ke China9 9

As can be seen the Japanese go vernment tried to res is t these natio nalis t claims but it co uld no t fully circumvent them thus keepingChina`s suspicio ns alive Mo reo ver whereas the Japanese go vernment always tries to prevent the landing by fo reigners o n theis lands it has no t until fairly recently prevented the landing by Japanese In o rder to keep fo reigners o ut o f the is lands and theirterrito rial waters the Japanese Co as t Guard (CG) has been patro lling the area which again is an o fficial act It may have been thenatio nalis t pressure fro m within the LDP as well as fro m right wing circles which pro mpted Ohira Masayo shi when he was PrimeMinis ter to send in 1979 a general survey team o f 50 perso ns (including Kurihara Hiro yuki) to the is lands in o rder to inves tigate the

building o f facilities like a helipo rt Such demands had already been made by the LDP o n 24 March 197810 0 Altho ugh the final repo rto f the survey spo ke agains t building facilities and no thing fo llo wed fro m it the Kurihara family co ns idered Ohira ndash altho ughgenerally kno wn to be a pro -China po litician - to be the mo s t suppo rtive prime minis ter o f all fo r the Japanese assertio n o f effectiveco ntro l o ver the is lands Befo re that Ohira had also agreed to Kurihara Hiro yuki`s pro po sal to set up o n Uo tsurijima a mo nument

to ho no ur Ko ga Tatsushiro which was do ne with the go vernment`s material and financial suppo rt10 1

Even within the Chinese leadership the territo rial is sue has been divis ive Jus t when the two s ides were nego tiating the Peace andFriendship Treaty in April 1978 abo ut 100 Chinese fishing vessels so me armed appeared aro und the Senkaku area with bannersdeclaring China`s title to the is lands While this was explained at the time in Japan as a means to pressure the Japanese during thetreaty nego tiatio ns it no w seems no w mo re likely that the Senkaku is sue was used by fo llo wers o f the Chairman o f the MilitaryCo mmiss io n Hua Guo feng as a means o f attacking the re-emerging Deng Xiao ping The PRC central leadership explained at the

time that this was `accidental` and Deng Xiao ping pro mised it wo uld never happen again10 2

These latter incidents are also impo rtant when dis cuss io n turns to the ques tio n who s tarted to undermine the unders tanding abo utshelving the is lands dispute ndash Japan o r China Was it China when it passed the 1992 Territo rial Law as is o ften mentio ned in Japano r did it already vio late the unders tanding in April 1978 as so me o thers claim Ho wever if the latter incident was beyo nd the co ntro lo f the Chinese go vernment it co uld be argued that it was the Japanese go vernment with the erectio n o f a mo nument o r the 1979survey that to uched o ff frictio ns Yet the blame game do es no t help in finding a so lutio n ins tead these incidents sho uld make itclear that bo th s ides bear part o f the respo ns ibility fo r undermining the 197278 unders tanding and sho uld therefo re be willing toco me to a new unders tanding

THE DETERIORATION OF THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP SINCE THE 1990S

In additio n to the abo ve develo pments it was the general deterio ratio n o f the bilateral relatio nship s ince the middle o f the 1990sthat changed the co nditio ns fo r maintaining the shelving o f the territo rial dispute Japan became suspicio us o f China`s no n-transparent military mo dernizatio n particularly o f the navy which has been expanding its o peratio ns including the Eas t China

Sea10 3 Other negative develo pments were the pro gress o f Chinese o il and gas explo ratio n in the Eas t China Sea despitedisagreement o ver the co mmo n EEZ bo rder vis its by Japanese po litical leaders to the Yasukuni War Shrine and o ther is sues relatedto Japan`s pas t aggress io n agains t China

A nadir in the bilateral relatio nship was reached during the rule o f Prime Minis ter Ko izumi Junichiro (2001-2006) because o f hisannual vis its to the Yasukuni Shrine But while the po litical relatio nship go t co lder the eco no mic relatio nship expanded andpro spered (`Co ld Po litics Ho t Eco no mics`) This also had ndashat firs t glance co unter-intuitively ndash a deleterio us effect o n themo tivatio n to wo rk harder to maintain the co nditio ns fo r putting as ide the territo rial co nflict s ince this dicho to my gave the falseimpress io n that po litics and eco no mics co uld be kept separate fo rever while the territo rial is sue was pending The wo rsening o f theterrito rial co nflict fro m 2010 and particularly fro m 2012 with China`s harsh po litical and eco no mic retributio n wo uld bear this o ut

Part o f the ratio nale fo r the Chinese navy`s increased presence in the Eas t China Sea is China`s o il and gas develo pments as wellas the wish to preserve the navy`s access to the Pacific Ocean to prevent JapaneseUS o bservatio n o r to intervene in a cris is Thisco uld no t but affect the territo rial dispute In May 1999 12 Chinese warships co nducted a mano euvre in waters no rth o f the

Senkaku is lands The exercise was the firs t o f its kind to be carried o ut by China in that regio n10 4 Other Chinese naval mo vementsin the Eas t China Sea increased including repo rts abo ut intelligence-gathering ships In the las t few years the po litical influence o f

the PLA and particularly o f the PLA Navy (PLAN) has co ns iderably increased10 5 The Japanese reacted by increas ing their militarydeplo yment and a s trengthening o f Japanese-American military co o peratio n Ho wever the Senkaku area is co ntro lled by the Co as tGuard which is a law enfo rcement agency and the Japanese navy keeps away fro m po licing This incidentally reinfo rces Japan`sclaim as po licing is do ne o nly within natio nal territo ry o r EEZ areas

Until the central go vernment`s purchase o f three o f the is lands in September 2012 it was the activities o f no n-s tate acto rs fro mJapan Taiwan Ho ng Ko ng and the PRC whether natio nalis t activis ts o r fishermen which caused the greates t direct co nfro ntatio nss ince Japan`s co untermeasures were a demo ns tratio n o f the exercise o f so vereignty which the PRC became increas ingly unwilling toto lerate In 1996 a Ho ng Ko ng pro tes ter who tried to co ver the las t meters fro m his bo at to o ne o f the is lands dro wned Ano therincident o ccurred in 2008 when a Japanese Co as t Guard ship rammed a Taiwanese spo rt fishing bo at which had entered Senkaku

territo rial waters The actio n caused the bo at to s ink10 6

In March 2004 fo r the firs t time s ince 1996 seven Chinese activis ts landed o n Uo tsurijima When the Japanese po lice made arres ts the Chinese Fo reign Minis try pro tes ted calling it a serio us vio latio n o f Chinese so vereignty The arres ts were made under the

immigratio n management law which includes a clause o n expuls io n o f illegal fo reign trespassers 10 7 In light o f the 2010 incident inwhich a PRC fishing trawlere twice rammed a Japanese co as t guard ship it is impo rtant to no te that despite guidelines which were togive = law enfo rcement agencies the autho rity to deal with trespassers `acco rding to the law` it was repo rted that the centralgo vernment intervened at the las t minute did no t press fo r an indictment and o rdered the release o f the arres ted Chinese Thego vernment did no t want any further co mplicatio ns that might to rpedo the planned China vis it by Fo reign Minis ter Kawaguchi Yo riko

and was satis fied to have demo ns trated effective co ntro l o ver the Senkaku Is lands by arres ting and expelling the Chinese10 8 AJapanese jo urnal repo rted that there was a Japanese pledge to China fo llo wing this incident that in future an intruder wo uld no t beput in detentio n but o nly arres ted as lo ng as it was no t a serio us case in turn China agreed to prevent the departure o f vessels withpro tes ters fro m its harbo urs Such an unders tanding has no t surpris ingly been denied by the Japanese as well as by the Chinese

go vernment10 9

The China Marine Surveillance (CMS) s tarted irregular patro l activities near the Senkaku Is lands in December 2008 when two CMSvessels s tayed fo r o ver nine ho urs in the territo rial waters o f the Senkaku Is lands as mentio ned abo ve This was interpreted in

Japan as a majo r escalatio n110 Fo rmer ambassado r to China Miyamo to Yuji called this new develo pment a qualitative change in the

Senkaku dispute which went beyo nd previo us cases o f intrus io n by fishermen o r pro tes ters 111 This deplo yment was fo llo wed byo thers the fo llo wing year agains t a backgro und o f China reinfo rcing its maritime co ntro l Japan respo nded by building up its o wndefence effo rts in the so uth including planned s tatio ning o f so me tro o ps o n Yo naguni Is land o ne o f the clo ses t is lands to the

Senkaku Is lands 112

THE 2010 FISHING TRAWLER INCIDENT

It is agains t this co mplex backgro und that the Chinese fishing trawler Minjinyu 5179 with a crew o f 15 entered the territo rial waters o fthe Senkaku Is lands o n 7 September 2010 near Kubajima There were many o ther Chinese fishing trawlers in the same area andseveral ships o f the Japanese Co as t Guard were trying to chase them away Pursued by three Japanese CG vessels the Minjinyu 5179twice co llided with two o f the CG vessels There are different interpretatio ns whether the Chinese captain Zhan Qixio ng intentio nally

rammed the CG vessels and there are so me s trange inco ns is tencies highlighted in the repo rts o f the incident113 So me no n-Japanese autho rs like Sheila Smith and Linus Hags trouml m are no n-co mmittal o n the ques tio n o f the co llis io n but mo s t Japanese

autho rs blame the trawler and this autho r is mo re inclined to believe that the ramming was intentio nal114 The Chinese

unsurpris ingly blame the CG vessels 115 The is sue o f intentio n is impo rtant inso far as it gives so me indicatio n abo ut the risk o frecurrence and o f escalatio n The fo llo wing circumstantial evidence sugges ts intentio nal ramming by the Chinese captain

- There is ample video fo o tage leaked by a CG o fficer which specialis ts have interpreted as intentio nal ramming by the Chinese

captain116

- The captain seemed to have been drunk and is kno wn to be a vo latile perso n 117

- Fishing in the Eas t China Sea is very co mpetitive and Chinese fishermen are particularly anno yed abo ut the patro ls and co ntro ls byJapanese and Ko rean law enfo rcement agencies in the as yet un-demarcated EEZs amo ng all three co untries

Chinese fishermen have a reputatio n o f o ften being vio lent as many incidents in the So uth China Sea and in the Yello w Sea seem topro ve Only three mo nths later in December 2010 ano ther Chinese fishing trawler captain rammed a So uth Ko rean co as t guard

vessel in the Yello w Sea ho wever his bo at sank as a result and the Chinese captain dro wned 118 Chinese crews are o ften armed

with metal pipes and attack law enfo rcement agents which have led to o ther fatal casualties in 2011 and 2012119

The 2010 trawler incident is further relevant in o ur co ntext in view o f the Japanese go vernment`s handling it ( legal aspect denial o fthe shelving unders tanding) China`s co untermeasures and the aftermath o f the go vernment`s purchase o f three is lands inSeptember 2012 After the co llis io ns the Japanese go vernment arres ted the crew and co nfis cated the trawler The fo llo wing day theChinese go vernment demanded the release o f the crew and the trawler which the Japanese go vernment did o n the 13 September butkeeping the captain in cus to dy The Japanese ambassado r to China Niwa Uichiro was summo ned s ix times by the Chinese between8 and 19 September Beijing`s reactio n escalated after the Chinese captain`s term o f detentio n was extended o n 19 September tolas t fro m 20 to 29 September On 20 September Chinese autho rities detained fo ur Japanese citizens fo r entering a res trictedmilitary area in Hebei pro vince Even witho ut the trawler incident the detentio n o f the fo ur Japanese wo uld have harmed the bilateralrelatio nship but happening in this co ntext it was rightly o r wro ngly immediately linked by the Japanese to o ther Chinese sanctio ns

as dis cussed belo w The result ho wever was that the Japanese released the Chinese captain120 Even immediately after the crew`sarres t the Chinese go vernment had already begun to cancel the seco nd ro und o f nego tiatio ns fo r implementatio n o f theunders tanding o n energy co o peratio n in the Eas t China Sea co ncluded o n 18 June 2008 Other reprisals and sanctio ns fo llo wedincluding the suspens io n o f rare earth expo rts to Japan o n which the co untry`s high techno lo gy indus try is very dependentAltho ugh befo re the incident the Chinese go vernment had already mo ved to reduce rare earth expo rts which naturally hit Japan asthe bigges t impo rter Japanese media repo rted that the Chinese cus to ms autho rities to tally suspended expo rts in late

September121 The exact circumstances o f this alleged embargo are s till no t yet clear as dis cussed in detail by Alas tair Jo hns to n122

The cris is ended when the deputy pro secuto r in Ishigaki anno unced o n 24 September the release o f the captain citing the`diplo matic impact` o f the case o n the bilateral relatio nship So me co ns idered this as surrender by the Japanese and the result o fdubio us po litical interference into the legal pro cess The o ppo s itio n had a field day attacking the go vernment`s handling o f the

incident123 The Japanese Fo reign Minis try spo kesman declared that the go vernment had applied do mes tic law and again refuted the

idea o f there being a territo rial pro blem to be reso lved124 Others argue that the incident had several benefits fo r the Japanesego vernment because it o btained a reco nfirmatio n o f the US security guarantee to include the Senkaku Is lands it helped to co nvince

the public abo ut the necess ity o f mo re Japanese defence effo rts and it expo sed China as an assertive if no t aggress ive po wer125

China claimed that the incident sho wed that Japan had changed its appro ach to handling this type o f incident which co uld be

interpreted as a co nfirmatio n that bo th s ides had reached an info rmal unders tanding after the 2004 incident126 Ho wever thisincident was much mo re severe s ince the captain`s two co llis io ns with CG ships were interpreted by the Japanese go vernment asintentio nal ramming The captain was charged with o bs tructio n o f Perfo rmance o f Public Duty as a result o f the ramming On theo ther hand o ne canno t blame China fo r allo wing this bo at to leave its Chinese harbo ur because it was a fishing trawler and no t apro tes ters` campaign vessel What made this incident so serio us fo r the Chinese was Japan`s very public assertio n o f itsso vereignty o ver the is lands in the way it handled the Chinese captain and the explicit denial o f the shelving unders tanding o f the

1970s On 21 September Fo reign Minis ter Maehara s tated that Japan had no t agreed with China to shelve the territo rial dispute127

This declaratio n fo llo wed the seco nd extens io n o f the captain`s detentio n o n 19 September which pro mpted the Chinesego vernment to allo w widespread demo ns tratio ns in China and to place a series o f sanctio ns agains t Japan (cancellatio n o fminis terial meetings `self- res trictio ns` o n vis its to Japan by Chinese to uris ts and po s tpo nement at very sho rt no tice o f the vis ito f 1000 Japanese yo uth planned fro m 21 September to the Shanghai Wo rld Exhibitio n) Japan is es timated to have lo s t yen318

billio n due to a decline in the number o f Chinese to uris ts 128

It is diff icult to judge whether these unprecedented co untermeasures were centrally directed and it is likely that it was aco mbinatio n o f vario us po wer centres co mpeting ando r feeling the need to be seen acting in acco rdance with the increas ingly anti-Japanese mo o d

Japan`s do mes tic circumstances made a speedy so lutio n such as that in 2004 difficult The DPJ had co me to po wer o nly in 2009 andlacked fo reign po licy experience There was no effective co mmunicatio n between the two go vernments at leas t at the beginning o fthe incident in co ntras t to earlier times The Japanese leadership o bvio us ly mis judged ho w the Chinese wo uld interpret Japanesehandling o f the incident which it perceived as a reversal o f Japan`s previo us (albeit gradually diminishing) res traint Altho ugh theDPJ had initially a mo re pro -China leadership when it came to po wer (no tably Prime Minis ter Hato yama Yukio and Secretary General

Ozawa Ichiro ) this had changed by 2010 The minis ter in charge o f the CG (which is under the Minis try o f Land Infras tructureTranspo rt and To urism) o n the day o f the incident was Maehara Seiji a kno wn defence hawk who then became Minis ter o f Fo reignAffairs in a cabinet reshuffle o n 17 September He was therefo re much mo re at liberty to take a hard-line s tance agains t China whilethe DPJ pres idential electio n ndash wo n again by Kan Nao to ndash to o k place o n 14 September fo llo wed by the prime minis ter`s departure toNew Yo rk to attend the UN General Assembly o n 22 September The fo reign minis ter befo re the 17 September was Okada Katsuyawho was also mo re inclined to take a s tro ng s tance Maehara as well as Okada had seen the CG`s video o f the co llis io n which co uld

no t but have left them with a very negative impress io n o f the Chinese captain`s actio ns 129 It certainly did no t help when Maehara inhis new po s t as fo reign minis ter qualif ied China`s reactio n in the Diet o n 18 September as `very hys terical` and then declared o n

21 September that there had never been an unders tanding abo ut shelving the territo rial dispute130 On 23 September Secretary o fState Hillary Clinto n assured vis iting Fo reign Minis ter Maehara that the Senkaku Is lands were co vered by the bilateral Japan-USSecurity Treaty an interventio n that was certainly also no t welco me to the Chinese Ho wever there have been speculatio ns that inexchange fo r this s tro ng US reco nfirmatio n o f the security guarantee in o rder to get o ut o f the s talemate the Japanese had to

pro mise to release o f the Chinese captain which o ccurred the fo llo wing day131

The 2010 incident had several co nsequences which made a recurrence very likely Firs t o f all the incident raised tens io ns to a degreelas t seen during the anti-Japan demo ns tratio ns in 2004 and 2005 which had been mainly co ncerned with Japan`s attempt to gain apermanent UN Security Co uncil seat and the his to ry is sue These tens io ns had made it impo ss ible to have any new nego tiatio nro und to co nclude a treaty abo ut co o peratio n in the explo itatio n o f hydro carbo n reso urces in the Eas t China Sea and thus reduceano ther majo r so urce o f bilateral tens io ns and o ne mo reo ver related to the Senkaku is sue Agains t this backgro und but also inline with its previo us po s itio n Japan rejected a Chinese pro po sal made in Octo ber 2010 fo r jo int reso urce develo pment in the

Senkaku area132 The legal aftermath o f the incident co ntinued fo r so me time with Japan claiming co mpensatio n fro m the Chinesecaptain fo r the damage caused to the two CG vessels which was rejected by China and co untered with demands fo r co mpensatio nand an apo lo gy The Japanese pro secuto r dro pped the case agains t the captain o nly in January 2011 but the CG s till sent a bill to

the captain in February 2011133

While the incident helped the Japanese go vernment to o btain s tro ng US suppo rt o n the applicability o f the bilateral security treaty tothe Senkaku Is lands and generally helped to co nvince the Japanese public abo ut the need fo r greater Japanese defence effo rts(including a s trengthening o f US leverage vis-agrave-vis Japan co ncerning the realignment o f its fo rces o n Okinawa) it reduced Japan`sindependence with respect to the degree o f suppo rt it pro vided fo r US China po licy

Seco ndly the incident further undermined the co nditio ns which were the fo undatio n fo r the uno fficial shelving o f the Senkaku is sueIf it was no t yet clear to everybo dy that there was a territo rial dispute o ver the Senkaku Is lands then this incident with theunprecedented Chinese sanctio ns agains t Japan lifted the las t remnants o f do ubt Maehara Seji who repeated o n 25 o ccas io ns inDiet debates between 10 September and 16 No vember 2010 that there exis ted no territo rial dispute made this o fficial po s itio n

even less co nvincing134 The incident pro mpted Beijing to publicly undermine Japan`s territo rial claim further by anno uncing o n 29Octo ber 2010 permanent deplo yment o f large fisheries patro l vessels in waters near the Senkaku Is lands which was recipro cated by

the CG deplo ying patro l vessels o f o ver 1000 to ns in the same area135 In a further tit-fo r-tat o n 17 December 2010 the city

go vernment o f Ishigaki the adminis trative autho rity o f the Senkaku Is lands passed an o rdinance to des ignate 14 January the day to

co mmemo rate the Senkaku Is lands` inco rpo ratio n in 1895136

The further ero s io n o f the shelving agreement after Octo ber 2010

The next majo r co nfro ntatio n o ver the Senkaku Is lands in September 2012 o ccurred agains t the backgro und o f mo re measurestaken by bo th s ides to suppo rt their respective territo rial claims and do mes tic circumstances in bo th co untries which were evenless co nducive to re-es tablish trus t and go o d relatio ns The gro wing US-China po litical and military rivalry in Eas t As ia asexemplif ied by the As ia pivo t which China perceives as directed agains t its rise certainly did no t help Initially the year 2011 saw areco very o f relatio ns fro m the 2010 incident Bilateral trade reached a new high with a vo lume o f $345 billio n Japanese fo reign

direct inves tment in China so ared nearly 50 per cent in 2011 to $6 3bn137 Mo reo ver the Chinese public was very impressed with thedis ciplined way the Japanese peo ple reacted to wards the triple disas ters which hit the co untry o n 11 March 2011 and there was an

o utpo uring o f sympathy which also included the sending o f a Chinese search-and-rescue miss io n to the affected To ho ku area138

Yet this impro ved atmo sphere was quickly dispelled when the results o f the textbo o k review were published o n 27 March whichasserted Japan`s territo rial claim to the Senkaku Is lands (as well as to TakeshimaDo kto ) and denied the Chinese figure o f

300 000 victims in the Nanjing massacre139

In the meantime the Japanese go vernment co ntinued to turn the legal s crews which affected the Senkaku Is lands by implementingdo mes tic laws in o rder to be co ngruent with internatio nal law and s trengthening maritime co ntro l In February 2012 the Japanesecabinet passed bills to enhance the Japan Co as t Guards law enfo rcement po wers in territo rial waters which wo uld fo r example

autho rize the CG to o rder fo reign ships to leave Japan`s Territo rial Waters witho ut firs t bo arding them140 Other adminis trativemeasures derived fro m the Bas ic Law o n Ocean Po licy which had been enacted in 2007 and which pro vides the framewo rk fo radminis trating remo te is lands Since 2009 Japan has given names to hitherto unnamed is lands to subs tantiate its claims to anEEZ Fo r this purpo se in Augus t 2011 the go vernment placed 23 uninhabited is lands under s tate co ntro l but fo ur is lets near theSenkaku Is lands were exempt o ut o f co ns ideratio n fo r China In March 2012 ho wever the go vernment abando ned this cautio n and

regis tered Kitako jima as a natio nal asset141 In No vember 2011 the go vernment had let it be kno wn that it wo uld sho rtly release a

new lis t o f names fo r is lands which wo uld include is lets o f the Senkaku gro up142 China pro tes ted and a meeting in Beijing plannedin February 2012 between Pres ident Hu Jintao and representatives o f seven bilateral friendship gro ups fro m Japan was cancelled Ano pinio n piece in the Peoples Daily (RMRB) o n 17 January 2012 said Japans mo ve lsquois a blatant mo ve to damage Chinas co re

interes ts rsquo143 On 2 March 2012 To kyo finally anno unced a lis t o f 39 is lands which included fo ur is lets in the Senkaku Is lands

gro up144 The Chinese pro tes ted immediately o n the same day and in a tit-fo r-tat the State Oceanic Adminis tratio n released o n 3

March s tandard names and descriptio ns o f the Senkaku is lands and its 70 affiliated is lets 145 Ano ther Chinese co untermo ve was theanno uncement o n 16 March by the SOA that they had s tarted patro lling near the Senkaku Is lands This was fo llo wed pro mptly o n thesame day by o ne CMS ship entering the Territo rial Waters o f the Senkaku Is lands and the same vessels with ano ther CMS ship

cruis ing in the Co ntiguo us Waters o f the is lands 146 In No vember 2010 an o fficial o f the Minis try o f Agricultures Bureau o f Fisherieswhich o perates the Fisheries Law Enfo rcement Co mmand (FLEC) had already anno unced that his o rganizatio n wo uld fro m no w o n

deplo y fisheries patro l vessels o f o ver 1000 to ns to maintain co ntinuo us patro ls 147

THE 2012 CONFRONTATION ISHIHARA SHINTARO LIGHTING THE FUSE

It was in this tense enviro nment that To kyo Go verno r Ishihara Shintaro anno unced o n 16 April 2012 that the To kyo Metro po litanGo vernment (TMG) was nego tiating the purchase o f three o f the fo ur privately-held Senkaku is lands by the end o f the year ie

Uo tsurijima Kita Ko jima and Minami Ko jima The lease o f the central go vernment fo r these three is lands was due to expire in March2013 and no incident wo uld have o ccurred if the go vernment had quietly renewed the lease The central go vernment s tated that ithad no t kno wn abo ut Ishihara`s intentio n but that there had been co ntacts o n vario us o ccas io ns between the go vernment and the

private o wner148 This seems co nvincing s ince s tate o wnership wo uld have pro vided better preventio n o f incidents even mo re thanjus t leas ing Taken aback by Ishihara`s surprise mo ve the Chief Cabinet Secretary Fujimura Osamu declared the fo llo wing day thatthe central go vernment might acquire the is lands `if required` and Prime Minis ter No da implied in a Diet speech o n the 18 April that

a purchase by the central go vernment was o ne o f the o ptio ns Bo th s tatements were widely repo rted in China149 Ishihara hadcho sen his anno uncement fo r maximum effect o n the o ccas io n o f a speech at the co nservative Washingto n DC-based HeritageFo undatio n He made it clear that this pro ject was meant as a criticism o f the DPJ-led central go vernment which he co ns ideredfailing in its duty to sufficiently pro tect Japan`s so vereignty by saying that the central go vernment sho uld be buying the is lands butthat the Gaimusho was to o afraid o f o ffending China The lo catio n o f his anno uncement was meant to gain s tro nger suppo rt fro m

the US fo r Japan`s territo rial claim150 As we have seen abo ve fro m Ishihara`s activities in the 1970s this anno uncement was inmany ways the lo gical co nclus io n o f his lo ng las ting o bsess io n with the Senkaku Is lands and his hatred o f co mmunis t China It wasthe 2010 incident in particular which had enco uraged him to renew his o ld plan o f buying the is lands after his earlier failure to do so His go o d co nnectio ns with the o wner Kurihara Kunio ki who shared his natio nalis t pro clivities helped Ishihara to beco me the

favo ured purchaser151

The po ss ibility o f having the three is lands under the co ntro l o f the natio nalis tic go verno r o f To kyo who wanted to build facilities o nthe is lands to s trengthen Japan`s so vereignty was unpalatable to the No da go vernment which feared co mplicatio ns with China In a

meeting o n 18 May No da and his to p advisers decided in principle to purchase the is lands 152 Pressure o n the go vernmentincreased to pre-empt Ishihara because he was as to nishingly success ful in rais ing vo luntary co ntributio ns fro m the public to buythe three is lands thus circumventing any legal diff iculties in us ing To kyo `s taxpayer mo ney and also pro ving the po pularity o f his

mo ve By 1 June he had co llected 70 000 do natio ns to taling aro und yen101 billio n which increased to yen146 billio n by 6 September153

On 27 July the TMG ran an advertisement in the Wall Street Journal asking fo r US unders tanding and suppo rt fo r the purchase plan154

The TMG had to reques t central go vernment permiss io n to co nduct a survey o f the is lands which the go vernment refused to grant

o n 27 Augus t fo rcing the TMG to co nduct a survey fro m a ship o n 2 September155 In the end it was the higher sum and the sho rtes tdelay o f co ncluding the deal which pro mpted Kurihara Kunio ki who was apparently in so me financial diff iculties to accept the centralgo vernment`s o ffer o f yen205 billio n ($26 millio n) and to s ign the co ntract o n 11 September This was an embarrass ing turn fo rIshihara In additio n he did no t succeed in us ing the o ffer o f his co llected mo ney to entice the No da go vernment to pro mise thebuilding o f any facility o n the is lands No da was presented by his adminis tratio n with several o ptio ns including his favo ured o ptio no f repairing the exis ting light ho use o n Uo tsurijima but in the end was co nvinced by Fo reign Minis ter Gemba to leave things as they

were in o rder no t to further inflame the Chinese156

The central go vernment`s purchase o f the three is lands o n 11 September immediately led to a very harsh reactio n by the Chinesewhich was even wo rse than in 2010 But befo re lo o king at Chinese co untermeasures after 11 September in detail it is impo rtant toinves tigate why the Chinese reactio n was so s tro ng and why the Japanese apparently did no t anticipate it particularly in view o fChina`s unprecedented reactio n in September 2010

CHINESE WARNINGS BEFORE THE NATIONALIZATION ON 11 SEPTEMBER

Prime Minis ter No da admitted o n 19 September o nly eight days into the co mprehens ive Chinese sanctio ns and co unter measures

that he had underes timated their extent157

158 In a named co mmentary o f Xinhua o n 18 April attentio n was drawn to Ishihara`s kno wn right wing and anti-Chinese s tatementsbut also po inted o ut that the CMOFA `wo uld no t hes itate to take any necessary measures to safeguard so vereignty o ver the Diao yu

Is lands`159 Vice-Pres ident Xi Jinping to ld vis iting Ko no Yo hei a kno wn pro -China hand that Japan sho uld no t wo rsen the bilateral

relatio nship and that co re is sues sho uld be reso lved by the two co untries in an appro priate manner16 0 At the end o f April the StateOceanic Adminis tratio n anno unced a plan to des ignate is lands and their surro unding waters as s trategically vital and to pro tect their

enviro nments and develo p marine reso urces 16 1 Mo re specifically targeting the Senkaku Is lands was ho wever the entry o n 3 May o f

two FLEC vessels into the Senkaku Is lands` Co ntiguo us Waters fo r the firs t time s ince Ishihara`s anno uncement16 2 Bilateraltens io ns also increased after a Japanese right wing gro up suppo rted the ho lding o f a meeting o f the Wo rld Uyghur Co ngress in

To kyo fro m 14 to 18 May which led to the cancellatio n by Beijing o f several o fficial vis its 16 3 On 13 May Premier Wen Jiabao raisedthe Senkaku is sue and the Uighur meeting during talks in Beijing with Prime Minis ter Yo shihiko No da cautio ning that lsquoit is impo rtant

to respect Chinarsquos co re interes ts and matters o f great co ncernrsquo16 4 Wang Jiarui head o f the Co mmunis t Partys Internatio nalDepartment was quo ted by Eda Satsuki a fo reign po licy adviser o f the DPJ that bo th the Senkaku and the Uighur is sue were

described as `co re is sues` and Wen`s s tatement was s tressed in a Chinese TV bro adcas t16 5 The Xinjiang is sue as well as Taiwanand Tibet have been referred to fo r so me time by the Chinese go vernment as `co re is sues` but the Senkaku is sue had been called

a `co re is sue` apparently fo r the firs t time o nly in an o pinio n piece by the Renmin Ribao in January 201216 6 Only o n 23 March 2013did the Chinese Fo reign Minis try Spo kesperso n clearly s tate that China regards the Diao yu Is lands as its co re interes t altho ugh the

written reco rd subsequently so ftened this s tatement16 7

The abo ve chro no lo gy certainly gives the impress io n that there was a series o f Chinese reactio ns which expressed s tro ng Chineseco ncern with any purchase (whether by the TMG o r the central go vernment) o f the Senkaku Is lands If that had no t been eno ugh theinterview o f the Financial Times with Japan`s ambassado r in China Niwa Uichiro at the beginning o f June sho wed s tro ng co ncernabo ut the implicatio ns o f a purchase He was quo ted as saying that lsquoif Mr Ishihararsquos plans are acted upo n then it will result in anextremely grave cris is in relatio ns between Japan and ChinahellipWe canno t allo w decades o f pas t effo rt to be bro ught to no thingrsquo He

added that such a cris is wo uld affect bus iness 16 8 Niwa mus t have been truly co ncerned abo ut the severity o f the s ituatio n to makesuch an undiplo matic public s tatement fo r which he was reprimanded by Fo reign Minis ter Gemba and criticized by so me media

o utlets and po liticians ultimately leading to his recall later in the year16 9

The Chinese warnings became sharper at the seco nd s tage when Prime Minis ter No da anno unced o n 7 July that his go vernment wo uldseek to buy the is lands because the purchase co uld no lo nger be put do wn to a mere lo cal maverick with s tro ng anti-Chineseinclinatio ns The Global Times edito rial o f 9 July sho wed the frus tratio n by so me Chinese lsquoEach time Japan takes o ne s tep we sho uldtake o ne and half o r even two s teps fo rward making Japan aware o f the grave co nsequences caused by its aggress io n agains t

Chinarsquo170 A Xinhua co mmentary o n 7 July quo tes the CMOFA`s spo kesperso n referring pro bably fo r the firs t time in this ro w to a`co nsensus` agains t which the Japanese go vernment went by wanting to buy the is lands meaning o f co urse the shelving co nsensus

o f 1972 and 1978171 On 9 July a Xinhua co mmentary titled `Japan playing with fire o ver Diao yu Is lands` called the purchase by the

central go vernment a `farcical ambitio n` an express io n repeated thereafter many times 172 On 11 July the Japanese media repo rtedthe entry by three FLEC vessels into the territo rial waters o f Kubajima the firs t time s ince the 16 March 2012 fo llo wed by o ne vessel

cruis ing the fo llo wing day in the is land`s co ntiguo us zo ne173 Public o pinio n became increas ingly inflamed and the Global Timesrepo rted o n 19 July that 90 8 per cent o f Chinese peo ple surveyed appro ve us ing the military to enfo rce Chinas so vereignty o ver

the is lets with 521 per cent saying a military clash lsquois likelyrsquo between China and Japan o ver the is lands 174

Even the US gave Japan `s tro ng advice` no t to pro ceed with the purchase because it co uld `trigger a cris is` as was revealed in April2013 by Kurt Campbell who was at the time Ass is tant Secretary fo r Eas t As ian and Pacific Affairs Even tho ugh we warned JapanJapan decided to go in a different directio n and they tho ught they had gained the suppo rt o f China o r so me did which we were

certain that they had no t Campbell is quo ted in an interview with Kyo do 175

FAILURE OF COMMUNICATION

The abo ve chro no lo gy and escalatio n o f Chinese reactio ns to the planned purchase o f the is lands o ver the summer 2012 give aclear indicatio n that a Japanese purchase o f the three is lands was no t co ns idered jus t ano ther incident witho ut majo rco nsequences So why did the Japanese go vernment s till go ahead with the purchase In the final analys is the failure to avo id thecris is escalating in September 2012 lay in the wide difference between the interes ts o f the two go vernments Do mes ticcircumstances o n bo th s ides and the inherent zero sum nature o f territo rial disputes prevented the trans itio n fro m dialo gue topreventive actio n let alo ne so lutio n Aggravating events o ver the summer 2012 which raised tempers o n bo th s ides were thedemands by the TMG to send a survey team to the Senkaku Is lands (the No da go vernment after so me initial co nflicting repo rts didno t allo w a landing) the landing o f Ho ng Ko ng activis ts o n Uo tsurijima o n 15 Augus t (timed with the anniversary o f Japan`ssurrender) fo llo wed by the landing o f Japanese activis ts ( including lo cal parliamentarians ) o n 19 Augus t and an attack in Beijing o n27 Augus t o n the car carrying Ambassado r Niwa Despite o ngo ing co mmunicatio n and dialo gue thro ugh vario us channels theseadverse circumstances led to a hardening o f po s itio ns o ver the summer 2012 between the two go vernments

The Japanese central go vernment had been caught sho rt by Ishihara`s sudden anno uncement o n 16 April and became to tallyabso rbed with preventing the maverick po litician fro m go ing ahead with the purchase o f the is lands fearing rightly that this wo uldserio us ly co mplicate Japan-China relatio ns Ishihara wanted to embarrass the No da go vernment which was co ns tantly declining inpo pularity and to fo rce it to deal mo re assertively with the is lands As we have seen fo r Ishihara it was no t jus t abo ut purchas ingthe is lands but abo ut building facilities o n them Fo r the No da go vernment buying the is lands by the s tate was therefo re the lesserevil The go vernment tried all alo ng to co nvince the Chinese o f To kyo `s go o d intentio ns fo r example when Fo reign Minis ter Gembamet with his Chinese co unterpart Yang Jiechi o n 11 July that the purchase was o nly a `do mes tic co mmercial transactio n` and no t a

diplo matic matter and was o nly meant to ensure that the is lands wo uld be `adminis tered peacefully and s tably`176 In December2012 when the full extent o f China`s unprecedented reactio ns had beco me kno wn the new Japanese ambassado r Kitera s till s tatedthat lsquoThe change in o wnership sho uld no t have caused a pro blem in relatio ns with Chinarsquo adding that Japan had given China sufficient

explanatio ns ahead o f the purchase177 Fo reign Minis ter Gemba even tried to highlight in No vember that the purchase was actually areturn to the status quo ante lsquoThe measure taken by the go vernment o f Japan was jus t a trans fer o f title under Japanese do mes ticlaw and jus t means that the o wnership o f the is lands mdash held by the go vernment until 1932 mdash was returned fro m a private citizen to

the go vernmentrsquo178 In sho rt fo r the Japanese the purchase o f the is lands was aimed at maintaining the status quo in such a waythat it ho ped China wo uld co ns ider to be in its o wn interes t that is by cho o s ing the lesser o f two evils That express io ns like`peaceful adminis tratio n` o r `trans fer o f title under do mes tic Japanese law` co uld o nly be interpreted by the Chinese as acts o fasserting Japanese so vereignty was apparently s imply igno red Under these circumstances it was impo ss ible to co nvince theChinese that trans fer o f o wnership had no thing to do with so vereignty Ins tead the Chinese even suspected that the No da

go vernment and Ishihara were co nniving at s trengthening Japan`s co ntro l o ver the is lands 179

Any intended co nciliato ry o verto ne in the abo ve explanatio ns by Gemba and many s imilar declaratio ns befo re and later were furthernegated by the ins is tence that there was no territo rial dispute exactly the po s itio n the Chinese mo s t so ught to change Thefrequent references to `co re interes t` by China were igno red by the Japanese go vernment Fo r the Chinese leaders the `o ffer` tocho o se between the To kyo Metro po litan Go vernment o r the Go vernment o f Japan buying the is lands was as Vice Fo reign Minis ter

Zhang Zhijun later put it like being asked to cho o se between two do ses o f po iso n18 0

It was also unfo rtunate that the Japanese go vernment allo wed the express io n kokuyuka (natio nalizatio n) to prevail even amo ng

go vernment members ins tead o f the o riginal term agreed by the Japanese cabinet shutoku (acquis itio n)18 1 Chinese media hastaken o ver the Japanese term o f lsquonatio nalizatio nrsquo which certainly further co nfused Chinese public o pinio n Since it do es no t kno w thehis to rical backgro und and Japan`s effective co ntro l o f the is lands `natio nalizatio n` tended to be unders to o d as a radical change in

the status quo o r even as invas io n18 2 A well kno wn Japanese o bserver in China Kato Yo shikazu even argued therefo re that the 1972

and 1978 unders tanding abo ut shelving had prevented the Chinese peo ple fro m learning abo ut the is sue as perceived in Japan18 3

Bo th s ides made it impo ss ible with their extreme and diametrically o ppo sed po s itio ns to find a co mpro mise The No da go vernmentwas to o weak (and also to o preo ccupied with o ther is sues like the pass ing o f the law to intro duce a hike o f the value added taxco ping with the aftermath o f the triple disas ter o f March 2011 and s imply trying to s tay in po wer) to find an alternative to the no wabando ned `shelving co mpro mise` and to admit that there was a territo rial pro blem At the end o f Augus t No da was fo rced topro mise Lo wer Ho use electio ns `so metime so o n` despite the grim o utlo o k fo r his party`s chances in the electio ns Making aco mpro mise o n the territo rial is sue wo uld no t have helped to gain po pular suppo rt While the Chinese pro bably felt enco uraged toescalate pressure by their success in fo rcing the Japanese go vernment hand o ver the captain in September 2010 it mo s t likely hadthe effect o n the No da go vernment to remain inflexible in o rder to avo id being seen yet again as caving in to Chinese pressure Butthe Chinese were also no t able to co mpro mise o n their demand that the Japanese sho uld admit the exis tence o f a territo rial is sue

The preparatio n fo r the 18 th Natio nal Party Co ngress in No vember 2012 and the ensuing leadership change to be finalized o nly inspring 2013 s imilarly did no t allo w the Chinese leaders whether inco ming o r o utgo ing to appear so ft Eight o ut o f nine Po litbureaumembers publicly expressed o ppo s itio n to the purchase either befo re o r after the anno uncement o f the purchase o n 11

September18 4 There are also credible repo rts that during the CCP`s summer retreat to Beihaide in Augus t Hu Jintao came underpressure fro m the future gro up o f leaders to take a mo re severe po s itio n o n Japan`s intentio n to natio nalise the three is lands Asa result the leading fo reign po licy interlo cuto rs o f the Japanese go vernment Zhang Zhijun and Dai Bingguo hardened their po s itio n

as well18 5 Public o pinio n in China had gro wn increas ingly ho s tile to Japan o ver the summer and was particularly inflamed when thelanding o f the Ho ng Ko ng activis ts was fo llo wed by the landing o f Japanese activis ts which were treated by the Japanese autho ritiesmo re leniently than the fo rmer ie no t arres ted despite having vio lated private land leased to the s tate Rio ts in several Chinese

cities s tarted thereafter18 6

Altho ugh bo th s ides agreed to co ntinue dialo gue and several o fficial meetings at different levels to o k place they co uld o nly end inres tating kno wn po s itio ns China did no t make things eas ier by later cancelling such meetings depriving bo th s ides o f po ss ibleo ppo rtunities to find a breakthro ugh The s tart o f Chinese sanctio ns acro ss the who le gambit o f bilateral relatio ns deprived theJapanese o f even mo re do mes tic wriggle ro o m fo r a co mpro mise

It seems that the abo ve circumstances did no t allo w Japan`s central decis io n-makers co ncerned with the is sue in particular the

Prime Minis ter and his immediate circle to admit to ando r unders tand until the purchase anno uncement o n 11 September 2012ho w s tro ngly the Chinese felt abo ut it Ambassado r Niwa`s rather undiplo matic s tatements in the Financial Times interview seem toindicate that he felt that the central decis io n-makers did no t unders tand the s trength o f the feelings o f the Chinese and ho w far theymight go Niwa warned in his interview that even a po ss ible pre-purchase survey o f the is lands co uld be diplo matically incendiary

s ince such a survey was dis cussed already at the time to enable the TMG to go ahead with the purchase18 7 As late as the 3September the Yomiuri Shimbun repo rted that the Chinese go vernment was reacting calmly as lo ng as three co nditio ns wereo bserved to maintain the status quo The co nditio ns co ntained no o ppo s itio n to a po ss ible purchase and ins tead jus t mentio ned

abs tentio n fro m landing surveying and building facilities o n the is lands 18 8 Acco rding to Pro fesso r Takahara Akio General ZhuChenghu said o n 5 September that a purchase by the central go vernment wo uld be better and Qu Xing directo r o f the China Ins titute

o f Internatio nal Affairs is said to have expressed a s imilar o pinio n18 9 Even o n 12 September when the s to rm bro ke the deputydirecto r o f the Japan Ins titute o f the Chinese Academy o f So cial Science Gao Ho ng s tated in an interview with the o n-line vers io no f the Renmin Ribao that if Japan wo uld respect the three abs tentio ns mentio ned abo ve the s ituatio n co uld ultimately revert to the

status quo ante19 0 But these were no lo nger the decis ive vo ices o f the Chinese leadership after the Beihaide meeting The abo ve-mentio ned Campbell interview seems to sugges t that Japan was lo ng befo re mo re inclined to act upo n Chinese s tatements whichwere clo ser to what it wanted to unders tand

CHINESE REACTION RHETORICAL WARFARE

The final misco mmunicatio n o r clash o f irreco ncilable interes ts o ccurred when Prime Minis ter No da met Pres ident Hu o n thes idelines o f the As ia Pacific Eco no mic Co o peratio n (APEC) summit in Vladivo s to k o n 9 September then anno unced two days laterthe s igning o f the purchase co ntract with the Kurihara family Whether Hu had no t sufficiently co nveyed his s tro ng feelingsco ncerning the purchase which had been kno wn and bilaterally dis cussed at leas t s ince the Japanese o fficial anno uncement o f itspurchase intentio n o n 7 July o r No da had no t unders tanding the Chinese feeling fo r the po ss ible reaso ns dis cussed abo ve Hu

apparently felt he had lo s t face when Japan anno unced the purchase o n 11 September19 1 Mo reo ver the Japanese anno uncementco uld no t have co me at a mo re awkward time because o f the anniversary o f the Mukden Incident o n the 18 September which likeseveral o ther carefully cultivated anniversaries regarding Japan`s pas t misdeeds in China always aro use latent anti-Japanesefeelings As a result the Japanese anno uncement caused an avalanche o f virulent rheto rical o utburs ts relating to the pas t po liticalsanctio ns further measures to assert China`s territo rial claim (fo r example including the is lands in the Chinese TV weatherfo recas t an exhibitio n o f ancient maps to pro ve Chinese co ntro l) eco no mic sanctio ns and an escalatio n o f patro ls by ChineseFLEC and MSA ships and aircraft aro und the Senkaku Is lands

The mildes t part o f China`s rheto rical o ffens ive was calling the go vernment purchase a `farce` a rather undiplo matic express io nalready used by Xinhua in July 2012 but then taken up at the highes t level by Vice Pres ident Xi Jinping when meeting Secretary o f

Defence Leo n Panetta o n 19 September19 2 But the main line fro m no w o n was that Japan`s claim to the Senkaku Is lands was adenial o f the po s t-Wo rld War II results In its s tatements and rebuttals the Chinese sho wed their frus tratio n at no t having been ableto fundamentally change the status quo and they did no t hes itate to use express io ns which were rather undignified fo r diplo mats andpo litical leaders Japan o n the o ther hand argued fo r peaceful reso lutio n alo ng the lines o f internatio nal law and dialo gue whichpro bably infuriated the Chinese even mo re On 10 September the CMFA is sued a s tatement calling Japans po s itio n o n the disputedis lands `an o utright denial o f the o utco mes o f the victo ry o f the Wo rld Anti-Fascis t War and hellip a grave challenge to the po s t-war

internatio nal o rder`19 3 In a heated exchange at the UN General Assembly between Chinas UN ambassado r Li Bao do ng and JapansDeputy UN ambassado r Ko dama Kazuo Li called the mo tive fo r purchas ing the three is lands to lsquolegalize its s tealing and o ccupatio no f Chinese territo ryrsquo and s tated lsquoThis actio n o f Japan co ns titutes a serio us encro achment upo n Chinas so vereignty and intends toco ntinue and legalize the result o f Japans co lo nial po licy It is an o pen denial o f the o utco mes o f victo ry o f the wo rld anti-fascis twar and a grave challenge to the po s t-war internatio nal o rder and the purpo ses and principles o f the Charter o f the United

Natio ns rsquo19 4 In a further rebuttal o f Japan`s assertio n o f its claim Li characterized the is land purchase as lsquono thing different fro m

mo ney launderingrsquo19 5 At the As ia Euro pe Meeting (ASEM) in Lao s Fo reign Minis ter Yang Jiechi repeated the reference to the`o utco me o f the anti-Fascis t war` while Prime Minis ter No da spo ke o f peaceful reso lutio n o f co nflicts acco rding to internatio nal

law19 6 On 11 Octo ber the CMFA spo kesperso n Ho ng Lei refuted Fo reign Minis ter Gembarsquos his to rical acco unt jus tifying Japan`s

claim by calling it `gangs ter lo gic`19 7

On the Chinese s ide therefo re there are no w two clo sely-linked his to ry narratives o ne is abo ut the is lands having been part o fChina s ince the Ming and Qing dynas ties the o ther co nnects the is lands to the already well-rehearsed his to ry narrative ie Japanhaving victimised China s ince the Sino -Japanese war o f 1894-95 These two narratives co ntinue to be cultivated by the Chineseleadership In Octo ber 2012 the Chinese anno uncement o f the publicatio n o f 80 vo lumes o n the Far Eas t War Criminal Co urt was

clearly meant to link the latter narrative to Japan`s acquis itio n o f the Senkaku Is lands 19 8 Fo rmer Fo reign Minis ter Gemba explicitlytried in Octo ber 2012 to delink the territo rial is sue fro m Japan`s aggress io n agains t China o nly to be reminded by the Chineseambassado r to the UK in an article in the Financial Times (as part o f the ensuing wo rldwide press campaign by bo th s ides ) that lsquothe

Diao yu Dao is sue is all abo ut his to ryrsquo19 9 Since then until no w China has co ntinued this ldquohis to ry warfarerdquo by publishing endlessarticles o n Japan`s aggress io n agains t China befo re 1945 The mo s t recent mo ve in July 2014 is the serialised o n-line publicatio n o f

the hand-written co nfess io ns by 45 Japanese co nvicted war criminals by the State Archives Adminis tratio n20 0

POLITICAL SANCTIONS AND PUBLIC OPINION

Chinese po litical co untermeasures ranged fro m the cancellatio n o f o fficial and uno fficial vis its to further legal acts to reinfo rce

China`s claim to the Senkaku Is lands Aro und 40 per cent o f ceremo nial events in Japan to mark 2012 as the 40 th anniversary o f the

no rmalizatio n o f diplo matic relatio ns with China were cancelled o r po s tpo ned and even mo re events in China20 1 Thesecancellatio ns were no t always the result o f direct go vernment interventio n but so metimes mo re indirect o fficial `dis co uragement`helped by the Chinese preference fo r no t being seen to do so mething in co ntradictio n to the (initially fo mented and later self-pro pelling) anti-Japan atmo sphere o r by fear o f participants running into demo ns tratio ns if no t assaults The legal s crews werefurther turned with lo ng-term implicatio ns On 10 September the Chinese go vernment anno unced the base po ints and baselines o f

the territo rial waters o f the disputed is lands and their affiliated is lets as well as the names and co o rdinates o f 17 base po ints 20 2

On 16 September repo rts appeared that China was submitting pro po sals fo r its extended co ntinental shelf to the UN Co ntinental

Shelf Co mmiss io n which included the Senkaku Is lands but in fact the actual submiss io n o ccurred o nly o n 14 December 201220 3 On

20 September a go vernment agency published a thematic map o f the Diao yu Is land and its affiliated is lands 20 4 Chinarsquos

Meteo ro lo gical Adminis tratio n s tarted pro viding weather fo recas ts fo r the Senkaku area o n the s tate-run TV s tatio n20 5 On 16September the fishery bureau anno unced the lifting o f the fishery ban in the Eas t China Sea and s tressed that China planned to

s trengthen its so vereignty claim o ver the Senkakus 20 6

There were rumo urs that 1000 fishing vessels wo uld co me to the Senkaku area and tho ugh this did no t materialize it helped to

further raise tens io ns 20 7

Mo st attentio n in Japan was fo cused o n the widening s treet pro tes ts in o ver 100 Chinese cities the des tructio n o f Japanese sho ps

res taurants cars and pro ductio n facilities and the attacks o n Japanese citizens in China20 8 The webs ites o f at leas t 19 Japanese

banks univers ities and o ther ins titutio ns came under cyber-attack20 9 At a demo ns tratio n in Shanghai abo ut 7000 pro tes ters

chanted s lo gans such as lsquoBeat Japanese imperialismrsquo lsquoBo yco tt Japanese pro ducts rsquo and lsquoDes tro y Japan and retrieve Okinawarsquo210

Altho ugh o nly 63 per cent o f po lled Japanese in late September 2012 expressed suppo rt fo r their go vernment`s natio nalizatio n o fthe is lands do wn fro m 73 per cent in a previo us po ll o n 15 and 16 September 82 per cent o f respo ndents in a Mainichi Shimbun

survey said the Japanese go vernment had no t pro tes ted s tro ngly eno ugh to Beijing o ver anti-Japan pro tes ts 211 The Chinesego vernment denied any o fficial invo lvement and the spo kesperso n o f the Waijiao bu went o nly as far as saying that the pro tes ts anddemo ns tratio ns were `co mpletely caused by the Japanese go vernments illegal purchase o f the Diao yu Is lands and are peo ples

spo ntaneo us acts`212 There were ho wever repo rts that so me o f the demo ns tratio ns were to lerated if no t abetted by go vernment

agencies 213 The demo ns tratio ns so o n died do wn because to lerating them much lo nger wo uld have run the risk that they wo uld turninto anti-go vernment demo ns tratio ns Even the Chinese Academy o f So cial Sciences repo rted that so me demo ns trato rs who were

arres ted did no t even kno w where the Senkaku Is lands were and that anger o ver the widening wealth gap was behind their acts 214 Inco ntras t to these Chinese demo ns tratio ns and acts o f lawlessness there was hardly any public demo ns tratio n in Japan whichsho ws the relative detachment o f the Japanese fro m the dispute On 22 September `Nippo n Gambare` a right wing o rganizatio nchaired by fo rmer Air Self Defence Fo rce chief Tamo gami To shio s taged a march thro ugh parts o f To kyo which this autho rwitnessed A brief fire was s tarted at a Chinese scho o l in Ko be and two smo ke bo mbs were thro wn into the Chinese Co nsulate

General in Fukuo ka215 But such actio ns were relatively rare and small in s cale

ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND THE QUESTION OF WHO IS MORE DEPENDENT ON WHOM

Pro tes t measures o f a lo nger duratio n and as yet unpredictable co nsequences fo r the bilateral relatio nship have been China`seco no mic sanctio ns and a bo yco tt o f Japanese go o ds by the general public altho ugh the autho rities denied again any go vernmentinterventio n A co mmentary o f Xinhua half admitted ho wever go vernment interventio n when it made the unco nvincing dis tinctio nbetween `measures` and `sanctio ns` `Since Japan purchased Chinas Diao yu Is lands in September the Chinese go vernment hastaken a series o f co untermeasures in the eco no mic legal diplo matic and military fields which have helped it to wres t the initiativeto reso lve the is lands dispute despite China no t impo s ing any eco no mic sanctio ns the Japanese eco no my has been badly

hit`216 Renmin Ribao co mpared `eco no mic punishments` with a `gun` and warned that thro ugh its is land purchase Japan hadalready to uched the `trigger` In a rather heavy hint the paper po inted o ut ho w vulnerable Japan`s eco no my was because o f the

2011 earthquake and the dependence o f key eco no mic secto rs o n China217 Even mo re o fficial was Vice Minis ter o f Co mmerce Jiang

Zengwei`s warning that the is land purchase wo uld inevitably have a negative impact o n Sino -Japanese eco no mic and trade ties 218

After 11 September it so o n became very o bvio us that the heavy hand o f the Chinese go vernment was impo s ing sanctio ns andmaking life fo r Japanese bus iness mo re diff icult On 21 September it was repo rted that Chinese cus to ms autho rities were

s trengthening inspectio ns o f impo rts fro m and expo rts to Japan altho ugh the Chinese autho rities denied this 219 In the same week

repo rts appeared abo ut Japanese co mpanies experiencing delays in o btaining wo rking visas fo r their Japanese emplo yees 220 BigJapanese co mpanies with inves tments in China were experiencing ho ld-ups in gaining regulato ry appro vals fo r Merger amp

Acquis itio ns 221 In co ntras t to the interference in rare earth expo rts to Japan after the trawler incident in 2010 ho wever no such

embargo was implemented because this particular eco no mic weapo n had lo s t its effectiveness s ince then (see belo w)222

The greates t medium-term damage to Japanese eco no mic activities apart fro m the abo ve mentio ned des tructio n o f Japaneseco mmercial and indus trial s ites was caused by a partial co nsumer bo yco tt no tably the fall o f car sales in China and Chineseto urism to Japan Overall bilateral trade decreased by 39 per cent in 2012 to $329 billio n the firs t dro p s ince the co llapse o f theLehman inves tment bank in 2009 and in 2013 to $3125 billio n acco rding to Chinese figures Acco rding to Japanese figures trade in

2013 increased but declined in vo lume223

The wo rs t hit secto r was auto mo biles To yo ta so ld 840 500 vehicles in China in 2012 the firs t annual dro p s ince 2002 Nis san

experienced a 24 per cent dro p in December China sales and Ho nda saw a 19 per cent December fall224 Ho wever as o f 2014Japanese car sales in and to China have again been increas ing The to uris t indus try was also hard hit in bo th co untries Chinese

vis ito rs to Japan decreased by 44 per cent fro m September to December 2012 fro m the year befo re225 The number o f Japanese

to uris ts o n gro up to urs to China plunged by mo re than 70 per cent year-o n-year in the las t three mo nths o f 2012226 This fallco ntinued into 2013 when their number fell to 29 millio n Japanese to uris ts do wn 18 2 fro m 2012 and the 3rd s traight annual

decline227 Ho wever in March 2014 vis ito rs fro m mainland China surged 80 1 fro m the previo us March to to tal 184200 a reco rdhigh fo r the mo nth and a s teeper year-o n-year rise than vis ito rs fro m any o ther co untries and regio ns This was also helped by the

falling yen and the resumptio n o f cruise to urs with large ships which were to tally suspended in March 2012228

Ano ther mo re lo ng-term negative eco no mic effect o n the bilateral relatio nship can be gauged fro m falling Japanese FDI to Chinawhich acco rding to Chinese figures declined by 422 in the firs t five mo nths o f 2014 after having fallen by 43 to $71 billio n in

2013 acco rding to Chinese figures o r by 18 to $10 9 billio n acco rding to Japanese figures 229

China`s multiple eco no mic retributio ns cas t do ubt o n the co ntinued viability o f the earlier `Ho t Eco no mics and Co ld Po litics`dicho to my The answer to the ques tio n which co untry is mo re dependent o n the o ther o r mo re vulnerable to sanctio ns is dependento n the eco no mic indicato rs and secto rs being cho sen and is also a po litical ques tio n because the answer can be po liticallymanipulated Japan`s eco no mic diff iculties s ince the 1990s (and its dependence o n eco no mic interactio n with China to co pe withthese diff iculties ) and China pushing Japan to No 3 in wo rld GDP ranking has diminished the Chinese perceptio n o f Japan as aneco no mic po wer ho use It means that fo r China the relatio nship with Japan became less impo rtant while po litical relatio nsdeterio rated at the same time The s tro ng effect o f the Chinese embargo o n rare earth expo rts to Japan in 2010 can be viewed intwo diametrically o ppo sed ways Chinese o bservers may be inclined to put emphas is o n the s tro ng effect it had o n Japanese publico pinio n and indus trial circles co ntributing to a certain extent to the go vernment`s surrender o f the trawler captain Others maypo int o ut that the case demo ns trated the futility o f abus ing a do minant supplier po s itio n because within a sho rt time Japan`sindus try secured alternative reso urces and demand reductio n thro ugh recycling and pro duct re-engineering no t o nly pro videdeno ugh breathing space but in the end reduced China`s market po wer Still Chinese experts are co nvinced that Japan is no w mo redependent o n China than the o ther way ro und Acco rding to so me specialis ts Chinas impo rts acco unted in 2011fo r 237 per cent o fJapan`s expo rt vo lume The bilateral trade vo lume in 2011 to o k up 21 per cent o f Japanese gro ss trade vo lume o f that year while it

merely acco unted fo r 9 4 per cent o f Chinas annual gro ss trade vo lume230 There seem to be o nly few Chinese vo ices which expressco ncern o ver the negative impact o f China`s sanctio ns o n China`s eco no my itself no tably at a time o f wo rldwide eco no mic

co ntractio n231

The Chinese market is certainly to o impo rtant fo r many Japanese co mpanies to leave A survey in No vember 2012 to which mo rethan 10 000 Japanese co mpanies in China replied sho wed that fo r almo s t 30 per cent o f them the territo rial dispute had affected

their bus iness but s till mo re than half want to maintain their o peratio ns and o nly 16 per cent said that they wanted to either cut

back o r pull o ut232 Japanese co mpanies in certain secto rs are likely to beco me mo re reluctant to make inves tments in China all themo re as o ther So utheas t As ian co untries (no tably Myanmar is currently the New Fro ntier fo r Japanese bus iness ) have cheaper

labo ur co s ts 233 Ho wever Chinese co nsumers s till prefer Japanese pro ducts fo r safer fo o d drinks and daily necess ities and tho se

Japanese co mpanies were hardly affected by the bo yco tt234

A wide gap between bo th s ides` perceptio n abo ut their eco no mic dependence and vulnerability to sanctio ns is dangero us fo r themanagement o f their bilateral relatio nship particularly when o ne s ide tries to leverage its suppo sedly s tro nger po s itio n to achievevicto ry in a sens itive area like territo rial integrity While Chinese co mmentato rs and experts may be inclined to o verrate Japan`svulnerability their Japanese co unterparts have a tendency to lo o k at the is sues to o much in purely eco no mic terms neglecting theimpact o f Chinese emo tio ns and go vernment pro paganda as well as the wider public`s insufficient kno wledge abo ut the o verall

impact o f bad eco no mic relatio ns with Japan o n China`s o wn eco no my235 The Japanese perceptio n remains that China in the endneeds Japan mo re than the o ther way ro und which in view o f China`s huge pro blems and its dependence o n Japanese hightechno lo gy co mpo nents fo r its manufacturing indus try is arguably the case This Japanese perceptio n has fo s tered the co nvictio nas demo ns trated fo r example by the belief in the sus tainability o f `Ho t Eco no mics and Co ld Po litics` that despite recurring

po litical crises in the relatio nship China wo uld in the end co mpro mise as it had do ne several times in the pas t236 Yet the pro blemwith the perceptio n o f `needing Japan` is that it can be po litically manipulated particularly in an autho ritarian sys tem This gapbetween Japanese and Chinese o bservers and experts o n the is sue o f dependence can serio us ly influence the willingness o f bo th

s ides to co mpro mise237 It also challenges the liberal view that clo se eco no mic relatio ns can prevent o r at leas t so ften deeppo litical differences like territo rial co nflicts which mo reo ver are linked to eco no mic interes ts like hydro carbo n reso urces In thisco ntext it is interes ting to no te that China has recently been exchanging with Japan a number o f high-po wered bus iness delegatio ns(apart fro m exchanges with po litical parties and lo cal go vernment o fficials ) The willingness o f Japanese bus iness to take part maybe interpreted by China as an express io n o f Japan`s eco no mic dependence o n China while giving it also the o ppo rtunity to putpressure o n the Abe go vernment to make co ncess io ns and to keep links with Japan fo r the po s t-Abe era

In view o f the impo rtance o f the eco no mic relatio nship and the damage suffered by Japanese bus iness after September 2012 o newo uld have expected mo re pressure fro m the bus iness co mmunity to co me to a territo rial co mpro mise so lutio n and so impro verelatio ns Ho wever this has no t been the case and may have to do with the perceptio n gap dis cussed abo ve but also the relativelack o f influence o n the go vernment (the majo rity o f the China-relevant Japanese bus iness co mmunity co ns is ts o f small- andmedium-s ized co mpanies ) the fear that a mo re vo cal ro le wo uld get co mpanies into tro uble with the autho rities in Japan ando rChina o r the ho pe o f being able to weather the po litical s to rms either because o f alternative market o ppo rtunities o r theco mpany`s s ize

FROM POLICING TO MILITARY INVOLVEMENT

The mo s t serio us co nsequences fo r the bilateral relatio nship ndash let alo ne fo r the so lutio n o f the territo rial dispute and regio nalpeace ndash arise fro m the co ns tant intrus io ns o f Chinese o fficial vessels into the Co ntiguo us Zo ne (CZ) o r even Territo rial Waters(TW) o f the Senkaku Is lands s ince September 2012 and the gro wing invo lvement o f the armed fo rces o f bo th s ides The aim o f theChinese is o bvio us to demo ns trate that the Japanese can no lo nger claim exclus ive co ntro l o f the is lands and to fo rce To kyo toadmit the exis tence o f a territo rial dispute Apparently a task fo rce at the highes t level headed by Xi Jinping was set up in

September 2012 to achieve this go al thro ugh escalating pressure238 So far law enfo rcement actio ns by Japan in the Senkaku areahave been limited to the deplo yment o f the Japanese Co as t Guard and po lice which is no w ho wever co ns tantly challenged byChinese with patro ls by CMS and FLEC (s ince 22 July 2013 unified under the State Ocean Adminis tratio n and renamed China Co as tGuard CG) vessels asserting the same rights in the is lands` CZ and TW The Chinese s ide escalated its pressure o n Japan by firs tdeplo ying FLEC vessels in the CZ and TW o f the disputed is lands then ratcheting up their pressure with CMS vessels do ing the samefo llo wed later in December 2012 with air patro ls by CMS aircraft which led to the deplo yment o f the air fo rce o f bo th s ides inJanuary 2013

As we have seen after the September 2010 incident in No vember 2010 FLEC s tarted to regularly send its vessels to the Senkakuarea which entered fro m time to time the is lands` CZ and also in Augus t 2011 twice the TW Apparently the mo re serio usintrus io ns which are tho se into the TW were so metimes timed with specific spikes o f tens io ns such as the TW incurs io n o n 16March 2012 (the Japanese naming o f so me is lands) July 2012 (No da`s anno uncement o f purchase intentio n o n 7 July) and finallyo n 19 September when s ix vessels entered the TW s tarting a series o f mo re frequent and regular incurs io ns In December 2012

FLEC deplo yed its newes t and bigges t ship the 5800-to n FLEC vessel Yuzheng 206 a fo rmer ship o f the Chinese navy239

The entries o f the vessels o f the CMS into the is lands` CZ and TW seem meant to send an even higher degree o f warning and denialo f Japan`s co ntro l o ver the is lands On 17 September the number o f FLEC and CMS vessels in the CZ and TW had reached the reco rd

o f 17240 Thereafter the frequency o f incurs io ns into the CZ and TW increased but it decreased after March 2013 On 30 Octo berXinhua even repo rted that the CMS had `expelled a number o f Japanese vessels illegally sailing in waters aro und the Diao yu

Is lands` altho ugh it is no t clear what exactly this meant s ince the CG did no t co nfirm such an incident241 Acco rding to Xinhua NewsAgency in 2013 China sent 50 ldquopatro l miss io ns rdquo into the TW o f the disputed is lands and as o f 12 July 2014 by the autho r`s co unt

there had been 17 such Chinese ldquopatro l miss io ns rdquo in 2014 which are ldquoincurs io ns rdquo fo r the Japanese s ide242 Other needle pricks todemo ns trate China`s claims are the o ccas io nal incurs io ns o f Chinese survey ships into the Senkaku Is lands` EEZ o r the bo ardingo f Chinese fishing vessels in the EEZ Defence Minis ter Itsuno ri Ono dera in late Octo ber 2013 called these repeated incurs io ns a

threat to peace which fell in a ldquogray zo ne (between) peacetime and an emergency s ituatio nrdquo243

A new level o f depriving Japan o f the ability to claim so le effective co ntro l o ver the is lands was reached o n 13 December 2012 when

a small turbo pro p aircraft o f the CMS (Harbin Y12 type) flew o ver Uo tsurijima244 Since then regular CMS air patro ls have beenco nducted but the aircraft no rmally s tay abo ut 120 km fro m the is lands With this mo ve Chinese measures to undermine Japan`sco ntro l o ver the is lands were expanded to the air space which fo r o rganizatio nal reaso ns had immediately military implicatio nsbecause the Air Self Defense Fo rce (ASDF) is respo ns ible fo r intercepting aircraft which intrude illegally into Japan`s air space The

incident did no t happen o ut o f the blue because already in January 2012 the SOA had anno unced a plan to deplo y the Y12 in 2012245

On 24 September the SOA had also anno unced plans to deplo y dro nes by 2015 fo llo wing the success ful tes t the previo us day 246

The Chinese acts are apparently carefully planned and co o rdinated s ince the o fficials in the abo ve Kyo do repo rt also said that theairspace vio latio ns o n 13 December 2012 by an airplane o f the CMS was planned by the s taff sectio n o f the natio nal Land and SeaBo rder Defense Co mmittee which acts as a liaiso n o ffice fo r the Chinese military the State Oceanic Adminis tratio n and the fishing

bureau o f the Agriculture Minis try with the aim o f rais ing tens io ns 247

The lo w altitude flight o f the Y12 o n 13 December was particularly upsetting fo r the Japanese go vernment because it was no t pickedup by the ASDF radar (the clo ses t o ne being o n Miyako jima abo ut 200 km fro m the is lands) but ins tead by CG ships in the area Inthis case eight ASDF fighters s crambled but co uld no t detect the Y12 Interceptio n o f aircraft is by nature much mo re diff icult andcarries a certain risk o f accident as happened in 2001 when a US intelligence aircraft co llided with a Chinese intercepto r jet Witho ut

explaining the s tandard Japanese pro ceedures fo r aerial defence which so lely relies o n the ASDF the Chinese media interpreted theuse o f military aircraft by Japan as `aggress ive` and the Global Times cautio ned agains t any interceptio n warning that China might

respo nd by sending its air fo rce248 On the Japanese s ide even the centre-left Asahi Shimbun called the Y12 flight ` a highly

pro vo cative act that co uld lead to an armed co nflict between the two co untries`249 At the beginning o f January 2013 there wereapparently erro neo us repo rts that the ASDF might co ns ider firing warning sho ts (tracer bullets ) at intruding Chinese aircraft which

pro mpted further bellico se co mments in the Chinese press 250 As a co nsequence the Chinese air fo rce also became invo lved o n10 January when the Chinese Minis try o f Defence anno unced that the Peo ple`s Liberatio n Army Air Fo rce (PLAA) had sent two fighterjets agains t two ASDF F-15 intercepto rs because they were fo llo wing a Chinese military Y8 transpo rt aircraft patro lling the airspace

o f Chinese o il platfo rms in the Eas t China Sea251 The Japanese repo rted that mo re than ten Chinese aircraft including military

aircraft had appro ached the Japanese air defence identificatio n zo ne252 In a further escalatio n the Japanese s ide repo rted that o n11 June 2014 two Chinese military jets flew abno rmally clo se to two planes o f Japans Self Defence Fo rce abo ve the Eas t China Sea

an accusatio n which the Chinese s ide refuted speaking ins tead o f two incidents pro vo ked by Japanese fighters 253 Related to thisdevelo pment and further enhancing the po ss ibility o f an incident is the enhanced patro lling o f the PLAA o ver the Eas t China Seawhich caused the ASDF to increase scrambling agains t PLAA aircraft to 415 times between 1 April 2013 and 31 March 2014 (Fis cal

Year 2013) 109 times mo re than in the previo us Fis cal Year 2012254

Co ntinuing to increase the pressure o n Japan the Chinese go vernment decreed o n 23 No vember 2013 an Air Defence Identificatio nZo ne (ADIZ) which includes the airspace o ver the Senkaku Is lands and was certainly meant to reinfo rce China`s territo rial claimdespite the fact that an ADIZ has no territo rial implicatio ns in internatio nal law The threat o f military co untermeasures in the text o fthe decree (lsquoChinas armed fo rces will ado pt defens ive emergency measures to respo nd to aircraft that do no t co o perate in the

identificatio n o r refuse to fo llo w the ins tructio ns rsquo) has further heightened the po ss ibility o f a military clash255 Ho wever theJapanese s ide refuses to accept the ADIZ The Chinese mo ves have wider implicatio ns fo r peace and s tability in the regio n in o rderto pro tect the freedo m o f its military aircraft in Eas t As ian airspace and its ability to o bserve China`s military fo rces Washingto nrefused to reco gnise the zo ne co ntinued to igno re the requirements o f the ADIZ by pursuing its regular patro l f lights and criticisedits implementatio n Simultaneo us ly ho wever the Department o f State advised civilian airlines to fo llo w China`s ins tructio ns andVice Pres ident Biden advised bo th co untries o n his trip to No rtheas t As ia in December 2013 to es tablish a cris is managements tructure Since the US do es no t take a s tance o n the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands` so vereignty Washingto n seemed to igno re Japan`smain grievance abo ut the ADIZ which is China`s intentio n to further reinfo rce its so vereignty claim by extending the ADIZ o ver theis lands The mo s t far-reaching US s tatements were a reco nfirmatio n o f the applicatio n o f the security treaty to the is lands evenmentio ning the is lands by their Japanese and Chinese names and co mplaining that the Chinese actio n was an attempt to unilaterally

change the status quo in the Eas t China Sea which raised regio nal tens io n and increased the risk o f accident and miscalculatio n256

Ho wever in this way the Obama Adminis tratio n risked creating amo ng so me Japanese o bservers do ubts abo ut the Adminis tratio n`sreliability and so gave succo ur to China`s attempt to drive a wedge between the two allies Ano ther co mplicatio n is that the ChineseADIZ o verlaps that o f Ko rea and mo reo ver co vers the submerged ro ck called Ieo do in Ko rean and Suyan in Chinese which has animpact o n the no t yet demarcated EEZ bo rder between bo th co untries Interes tingly the Japanese ADIZ also co vers Ieo do but thishas never been underpinned by any Japanese EEZ claims But China kno ws ho w to play o n So uth Ko rea`s criticism o f Japan`sattitude to wards the his to ry is sue and the territo rial dispute with Japan o ver Do kto Takeshima is land Mo reo ver the As ian co untriesco ntes ting China`s claims to parts o f the So uth China Sea are co ncerned that China wo uld further co mplicate the territo rialdisputes in the area by es tablishing an ADIZ Yet the ASEAN member s tates have been very cautio us in directly criticis ing ChinaChina`s es tablishment o f the ADIZ directly affects many co untries because so many o f them have airlines flying thro ugh the zo neHo wever with the exceptio n o f Japan all o thers agred to co nfo rm with China`s reques t fo r no tif icatio n which undermines theJapanese go vernment`s po s itio n o f explicitly advis ing Japanese airlines no t to co nfo rm

With these escalating develo pments the Chinese s ide achieved its go al o f sho wing that the Japanese autho rities are no lo nger infull co ntro l o f the disputed is lands In the case o f Chinese Co as tguard vessel intrus io ns the reactio n o f the Japanese CG is limitedto shado wing the Chinese vessels to info rm them that they are vio lating Japan`s CZ o r TW and to ask them to leave whichho wever they do at their o wn dis cretio n (the time span ho vering in the CZ o r TW having beco me a further means o f Chinesepressure) fo llo wed by diplo matic pro tes ts Otherwise the CG has avo ided any phys ical co nfro ntatio n o r co ntact When co nfro ntedby the CG the Chinese vessels s imply declare (by radio o r even electro nic displays ) that they are patro lling Chinese waters and thatthe CG ships were o perating illegally in these waters This ritual has so far prevented vio lence This is in co ntras t to an exchange o fwater canno n salvo s between the CG and the Taiwanese co as t guard in the territo rial o f the Senkaku Is lands o n 25 September 2012

and again o n 24 January 2013257

The increase o f patro ls by Japan and China is caus ing o peratio nal s train fo r bo th s ides (also rais ing the risk o f miscalculatio ns o ro verreactio ns ) but this has no t reduced the willingness o f either go vernment to s cale do wn the almo s t daily demo ns tratio ns o f

`effective co ntro l` In Octo ber it was repo rted that the CG no w always maintains ten vessels agains t eight fro m China258 The 11th

regio nal headquarters respo ns ible fo r the Senkaku area is in Naha and has nine patro l ships (but o nly seven vessels o f at leas t

1000 to ns ) but no w needs additio nal ships which are dispatched fro m o ther regio nal headquarters 259 In April 2012 the CG had ato tal o f 357 patro l vessels but o nly 51 o ver 1000 to ns which are tho se mo s t needed fo r a far flung area like the Senkaku

Is lands 26 0 On 14 September 2012 Senio r Vice Minis ter o f Fisheries Iwamo to Tsukasa mentio ned plans to increase the number o f

fishery patro l vessels to ensure fishermens safety amid intens ifying territo rial disputes with China and So uth Ko rea26 1 On 26Octo ber the Minis try o f Land Infras tructure Transpo rt and To urism which heads the CG anno unced plans to increase budgetary

reques ts fo r mo re ships 26 2 The Abe go vernment plans to build mo re vessels o r advance the calendar retro fit vessels which were to

be retired and is co ns idering extending the retirement age o f the o fficers 26 3

The Chinese have fewer vessels which can be deplo yed as far as the Senkaku Is lands In additio n leave o f the sailo rs has been

res tricted and their deplo yment length at sea has increased26 4 In March 2013 the Chinese s ide anno unced clo ser co o peratio nbetween the military and vario us maritime law enfo rcement agencies as well as the merger o f fo ur maritime law enfo rcementagencies under the State Ocean Adminis tratio n (adminis tered by the Minis try o f Land and Reso urces ) ie the China MarineSurveillance the co as t guard fo rces o f the Public Security Minis try the fisheries law enfo rcement co mmand o f the Agriculture

Minis try and the maritime anti-smuggling po lice o f the General Adminis tratio n o f Cus to ms 26 5

Ano ther wo rrying develo pment is the gradual invo lvement o f the PLA navy (PLAN) and the Maritime Self Defence Fo rce (MSDF) TheJapanese MOD anno unced o n 16 Octo ber 2012 that fo r the firs t time PLAN ships were o bserved navigating in the 22-km-wide CZbetween Yo naguni and Irio mo te is lands altho ugh the minis try left o pen the po ss ibility that they did so in o rder to avo id a typho o n

Nevertheless the Gaimusho so ught explanatio ns fro m the Chinese abo ut these ship mo vements 26 6 In December 2012 fo ur PLANships sailed thro ugh the CW o f the Irio mo te-Yo naguni is lands o n the way back fro m drills in the Pacific after having go ne into the

Pacific thro ugh the mo re no rmal ro ute o f the s trait between the Okinawan main is land and Miyako jima26 7 Again there was no thingillegal abo ut it but it raised attentio n at a time o f tens io ns Ho wever there are s igns o f greater co o peratio n o f the PLAN withChinese Co as t Guard vessels as was sho wn in the s tando ff between China and the Philippines aro und the disputed Scarbo ro ugh

Sho al in the So uth China Sea and jo int exercises to o k place between the three in the Eas t China Sea in Octo ber 201226 8 The

patro lling activities o f the MSDF in the Senkaku area became kno wn when the Japanese repo rted at the end o f January 2013 that o n19 January a Chinese frigatersquos target radar had lo cked o nto an MSDF helico pter and o n 30 January ano ther frigate sailing clo se to

an MSDF des tro yer did likewise The Chinese vehemently denied it26 9 Ho wever in March this year the Kyo do news agency repo rtedthat senio r Chinese military o fficials had admitted the incident o f 29 January Even mo re wo rriso me is that the Chinese vessels

acted apparently witho ut prio r appro val fro m the fleet co mmand o r navy headquarters All this was denied by the Chinese s ide270 Itdid no t help that under Prime Minis ter No da the MSDF had been o rdered after the eruptio n o f the 2012 cris is to keep a greaterdis tance fro m PLAN ships than the hitherto 3 km in o rder avo id incidents but this po licy was reversed by the mo re hawkish Abe

adminis tratio n to the previo us 3 km dis tance271 The fire radar lo cking incident had happened at a dis tance o f 3 km

Agains t the backgro und o f greater invo lvement o f military fo rces it is particularly regrettable that a plan to build a maritime liaiso n

mechanism between their defense autho rities o n which they had agreed in June 2012 to make later that year was shelved272

Unfo rtunately it is s till Chinese practice to co ns ider Co nfidence Building Measures (CBM) no t as the firs t s tep to build co nfidencebut as a to o l to extract fro m the o ther s ide prio r co ncess io ns under the pretext o f `creating a better atmo sphere` fo r dis cuss ingCBM The o utbreak o f the September 2012 cris is was therefo re a co nvenient pretext fo r the Chinese to cancel the pro ject Thelates t co nfirmatio n was in March 2013 when General Yin Zhuo explained that there co uld be no military trus t if the po litical and

diplo matic relatio nship is bad273 Since the target radar lo ck-o n incidents the Japanese go vernment is publicly calling fo rresumptio n o f nego tiatio ns fo r the maritime liaiso n mechanism but the Chinese will certainly want to extract so me co ncess io nsbefo re even co ns idering a po s itive respo nse

Ho wever the co ns tant co nfro ntatio n between the po licing and military fo rces o f bo th s ides co uld eas ily lead to a military clasheither as a result o f an unfo reseen civilian o r military incident miscalculatio n o r malicio us intentio n at a lo wer level o f co mmandTwo recent examples o f unfo reseen civilian incidents co uld have escalated One is the attempted landing o n o ne o f the disputedis lands by a Chinese pro tes ter with a ballo o n in January 2014 This incident was peacefully reso lved because Japan did no t arres t theballo o nis t In this case the firs t repo rt o n the crash-landing in the territo rial waters o f Uo tsurijima came fro m the Taiwanese co as tguard which info rmed the Japanese co as t guard fo llo wed by the hand-o ver o f the ballo o nis t to the PRC autho rities o uts ide o f

Japan`s territo rial waters 274 The o ther incident was the s inking o f a Chinese fishing bo at ldquoto the no rth o f the Diao yu Is landsrdquo and

the mo ve o f two Chinese naval () vessels to rescue the crew275 This autho r co uld no t find o ut ho w clo se the fishing bo at came tothe is lands and apparently there has no t been any further repo rting abo ut the incident

The previo us ly mentio ned radar-targeting incidents and these two civilian incidents have no t led to an escalatio n but there is noguarantee fo r the future Shi Yinho ng a pro fesso r at Renmin Univers ity predicts that the territo rial co nflicts in the ECS So uth ChinaSea and alo ng the Sino -Indian bo rder will intens ify because o f po pular natio nalism dynamics within the armed fo rces and o f co urse

also o ur to p leaders perso nal beliefs and s trategic perso nalities 276 Hugh White argues that a war (which co uld lead to a nuclearexchange between China and the US) co uld also begin because the Chinese leadership may co ns ider that s tarting ho s tilities no wrather than later wo uld be mo re beneficial to either tes t US reso lve to defend Japan (which the Chinese leadership do ubts ) anddetermine the is sue o f Chinese supremacy in the As ian regio n which he co ns iders to be the real is sue rather than the is lands

themselves 277

IS THERE A WAY FORWARD

The current co nfro ntatio n is no t o nly co ntinuing but even escalating and do mes tic develo pments in bo th co untries are no t creatingan atmo sphere mo re co nducive to better management o f the cris is let alo ne finding a so lutio n Inactio n runs the risk o f a furtherescalatio n o r even a military clash while po s itive o ptio ns are beco ming fewer Meanwhile bo th co untries suffer fro m the eco no micfall-o ut and heightened tens io ns while the integratio n o f a ris ing China into a new s trategic enviro nment in As ia will beco me evenmo re fraught cas ting a shado w o n Japan`s clo se relatio nship with the US

The 2010 incident ended quickly with Japan`s release o f the captain One reaso n fo r this is certainly the fact that China`s demand in2010 was relatively clear and achievable (release o f the captain) if painful fo r Japan at a time o f a weak and inexperiencedgo vernment This time in September 2012 the cris is firs t hit a go vernment which reacted intrans igently because o f its previo usdefeat and o ther unfavo urable do mes tic circumstances and was then replaced by the mo re hawkish Abe go vernment The Abecabinet`s attitude to wards the pas t as exemplif ied by vario us s tatements by cabinet members and peo ple clo se to it the attempt torevise the Ko no s tatement reco gniz ing the fo rced war pro s titutio n (the military co mfo rt wo men) and Abe`s Yasukuni Shrine vis itall served China`s anti-Japan pro paganda wo rsened Japan-Ko rea relatio ns which China is cleverly explo iting and even angered theUS adminis tratio n Abe is seen as utiliz ing the tens io ns with China to win do mes tic and internatio nal suppo rt fo r Japan to have aldquono rmalrdquo natio nal defence po s ture The latter is welco me by the US adminis tratio n because it wo uld help with the US As ianrealignment and suppo rt its China po licy At the same time China`s actio ns cas t an o mino us shado w o n its intentio ns in the So uthChina Sea and Abe and mo re impo rtantly the US is suppo rting the claimants there agains t China

Under these bilateral multilateral and regio nal circumstances wo uld China be satis fied with go ing back to the `unders tanding abo utsetting as ide the dispute` in co njunctio n with Japan`s reco gnitio n o f the exis tence o f a territo rial dispute o r wo uld it demand areversal o f the purchase o f the three is lands Wo uld it demand the end o f Japanese CG patro ls aro und the is lands China`ss tandard demand no w that Japan `co rrect its mis takes` is rather ambiguo us because it co uld be interpreted as go ing back to theshelving unders tanding and the reco gnitio n o f the exis tence o f a dispute o r demanding a reversal o f the go vernment`s purchase o f

the is lands 278 The latter wo uld s imply be impo ss ible in legal and practical terms and o ne can o nly ho pe that the ambiguity is o nlyaimed at rais ing China`s nego tiatio n po s itio n ando r leaving eno ugh wiggle ro o m fo r nego tiatio ns which wo uld satis fy all Chineses takeho lders` interes ts

It seems that it is already to o late fo r go ing back to the shelving agreement o f 19721978 which wo uld imply that the two s ides canso meho w go back to the status quo o f the 1970s This as we have seen has been superseded by deeds and wo rds o n bo th s ides The Chinese have no w no t o nly publicly declared that the shelving agreement was lsquobro kenrsquo by Japan but after the firs t Y12 patro l o n13 December 2012 co mmented that ldquoThe s ituatio n has changed It has beco me no rmal fo r Chinas marine surveillance vessels to

enter the 12-nautical-mile zo ne Japans actual co ntro l o ver the is lands has go nerdquo279

The bilateral relatio nship has deterio rated to the extent that at leas t shelving the co nflicting so vereignty claims without o fficiallyadmitting that there is a territo rial dispute is no lo nger an o ptio n acceptable to China because it feels Japan has abused theshelving co nsensus thro ugh a series o f adminis trative measures with the final s traw having been the central go vernmentrsquos purchaseo f three is lands When s tudying the vario us Chinese o fficial s tatements and news repo rts after the 2012 cris is had fully erupted inSeptember it beco mes clear that until Octo ber 2012 the Chinese s till raised the demand that Japan sho uld go back to the previo uslsquounders tandingrsquo o r lsquoco nsensus rsquo but this demand was no t made o ften thereafter It reappeared in remarks by Wang Jiarui the head o fthe Co mmunis t partys Internatio nal Department when meeting Yamaguchi Natsuo the leader o f the junio r co alitio n partner

Ko meito in January 201328 0 Previo us ly a co mment o n the Xinhua internet s ite o n 29 Octo ber said that ldquoThe lsquopurchasersquo sho wed thatthe Japanese go vernment has who lly abando ned the attitude o f laying as ide disputes and has fundamentally changed the

s ituatio nrdquo28 1 On 30 Octo ber the CMOFA spo kesperso n declared that lsquoJapans illegal purchase o f the Diao yu Is lands bro ke the

impo rtant co nsensus The Japanese s ide sho uld no t have any mo re illus io n o f o ccupying the Diao yu Is lands What the Japaneses ide sho uld do is to face up to the reality admit the so vereignty dispute co rrect mis takes and co me back to the track o f a

nego tiated settlement`28 2 The lates t o fficial pro po sal to shelve the is lands is sue was made by the fo rmer fo reign minis ter Tang

Jiaxuan o n 16 July 201428 3

The reco gnitio n o f a territo rial pro blem wo uld be relatively easy fo r Japanese public o pinio n (and even mo re so fo r Japanrsquos friendsand allies ) to accept because they wo uld no t see the need fo r any kind o f diplo matic o r legal so phis try fo r what is o bvio us ly aterrito rial co nflict whatever the legitimacy o f the Chinese claim might be given also the fact that the current Japanese po s itio nco mes do wn to refus ing to even dis cuss whatever settlement might be po ss ible Acco rding to a survey co nducted by Genro nto gether with Zho ngguo Ribao she in June 2012 627 per cent o f Japanese agreed that there exis ts a territo rial pro blem dispute

(176 disagreed) co mpared with 822 o f the Chinese (139 disagreed)28 4 Ho wever co nsecutive Japanese cabinets haverefused to reco gnise the exis tence o f a territo rial dispute which is o ften the default po s itio n o f a go vernment in actual co ntro l o f adisputed territo ry (fo r example the Ko rean go vernmentrsquos po s itio n o n Do kto Takeshima) This po s itio n has been reinfo rced by theexplicit Japanese denial s ince the 1990s o f a shelving agreement which wo uld have been an implicit admiss io n that there is adispute To circumvent the risk o f being perceived as admitting the exis tence o f a territo rial pro blem the deputy prime minis ter o fthe previo us No da go vernment Okada Katsuya was repo rted to have mentio ned in a speech in Octo ber 2012 that there was no

territo rial dispute but as a matter o f fact a debate exis ted28 5 Ho wever this co mpro mise so lutio n was never co nfirmed by the No dago vernment and did no t beco me po licy It is even less likely to be acceptable to the new Abe go vernment Even amo ng influentialo pinio n makers there is hardly any suppo rt fo r admitting the exis tence o f a territo rial co nflict o r o f a shelving agreement Even mo reco nciliato ry s tatements o n this subject are rather vague Maehara Seiji o f the Demo cratic Party declared in a co nference at QinghuaUnivers ity in Beijing in September 2013 that the Japanese go vernment sho uld add (to its o wn po s itio n) that China has a differentview (Senkakusho to wo meguru Niho n seifu no tachiba ni tsuite lsquoChugo ku ga chigau kangaekata wo mo tte iru to iuko to wo ichigen

tsukekuwaerubeki darsquo) At the same time he emphas ised ho wever that there was no territo rial dispute28 6 Japan Bus inessFederatio n Chairman Yo nekura Hiro masa mentio ned in September 2012 in an NHK interview that the go vernment sho uld be mo re

flexible s ince o therwise its s tance co uld be taken to mean that Japan has no intentio n o f so lving the dispute28 7 Miyamo to Yuji thefo rmer Japanese ambassado r to China is quo ted as saying that lsquoThe go vernment do es no t need to alter its bas ic po s itio n but in

reality a co nflict do es exis t o ver the Senkaku is les rsquo 28 8 This is also the s tance which the previo us Japanese ambassado r Niwa

Uichiro takes in an article after his return to Japan28 9

Co ncerning co nflict reso lutio n it is interes ting to no te that when asked abo ut the mo dern s ignificance o f the 1978 Japan-ChinaPeace and Friendship Treaty 68 4 o f the po lled Japanese agreed with Art 12 (lsquoThe two parties shall settle all disputes by peacefulmeans and shall refrain fro m the use o r threat o f fo rcersquo) but o nly 525 o f the Chinese agreed Mo reo ver 58 1 o f the Chinese

favo ur China s trengthening its co ntro l o ver the area29 0

If therefo re a new ldquoimplicit unders tandingrdquo abo ut shelving the dispute is achievable it wo uld have to be based o n learning fro m thefailures o f the 19721978 shelving ie it wo uld be necessary to achieve a mutual unders tanding o f what the s tatus quo is whatwo uld undermine the s tatus quo and what has to be do ne to mo ve fro m co nflict management to so lutio n Quite clearly such a newunders tanding wo uld be less favo urable to Japan`s current s tance o n the dispute

FROM CONFLICT MANAGEMENT TO ADDRESSING THE SOVEREIGNTY ISSUE

Any mo ve fo rward will certainly require decis ive leadership o n bo th s ides be it to take the initiative o r to respo nd po s itively to theinitiative o f s tarting the pro cess to wards reso lutio n In view o f the co mplex backgro und o f the external and internal dynamics it iso bvio us that address ing the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands dispute requires a s tep-by-s tep appro ach The ultimate is sue to address is theso vereignty is sue and territo rial disputes are generally viewed as zero sum in nature given their clo se link to co re securityinteres ts Even tho se who reco gnize the impo rtance o f transcending such lo gic in favo ur o f co ndo minium o r shared so vereigntygenerally ho ld that the is sue can o nly be addressed at the las t s tage o f any nego tiated pro cess if at all

Two impo rtant is sues have to be co ns idered at the beginning to what extent have the vario us s tages o f the nego tiating pro cess tobe agreed befo rehand (lsquoro ad maprsquo) o r even the final o utco me whether a viable co ndo minium o r o nly shelving the is sues and co uldthe ro le o f a third party mediato r be helpfulacceptable In view o f the po litical diff iculties o n bo th s ides the s tart o f thenego tiatio n pro cess wo uld be endangered if there is no t sufficient ro o m fo r ambiguity and interpretatio n abo ut the vario us s tages altho ugh the general aim o f tens io n reductio n and suspens io n o f the so vereignty is sue mus t be clearly agreed

A third party mediato r is pro bably no t acceptable to the Chinese s ide The third party mo s t o ften mentio ned is the Internatio nalCo urt o f Jus tice (ICJ) o r any kind o f internatio nal arbitratio n Ho wever this seems unlikely in view o f China`s preference fo rbilateral nego tiatio ns and its refusal to accept judicial settlement by the ICJ o r any internatio nal arbitratio n except in no n-po litical

areas such as trade29 1 The Japanese go vernment wo uld be willing to accept the jurisdictio n o f the ICJ but o nly if China brings the

case to the Co urt les t it be perceived as ackno wledging the exis tence o f a territo rial dispute29 2 But there are also po litical andpro cedural arguments agains t the reco urse to the ICJ China`s legal argumentatio n is co mparatively weak and s ince a negativejudgement co uld have implicatio ns fo r China`s legal claim to mo s t o f the So uth China Sea there is even less o f a chance o f Chinamaking an exceptio n fo r the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands dispute In view o f the entrenched po s itio ns o f bo th s ides and the risk o f a`winner takes all` o utco me o f internatio nal litigatio n bo th go vernments wo uld face co ns iderable do mes tic res is tance in case o f anegative o utco me In view o f the urgency o f the dispute and the lo ng time it takes fo r a judgement there wo uld also be the risk o fdo mes tic fo rces trying to pre-empt a negative result

In view o f the security is sues invo lved (let alo ne the American his to rical `debt` as a result o f Washingto n`s ambiguity related toWashingto n`s ending o f the adminis tratio n o f Okinawa in 1972) an American mediatio n co uld be seen as natural and even inAmerican interes ts Such an American ro le ho wever is extremely unlikely as it wo uld be seen by China as unduly advantageo us toJapan Ho wever at so me po int during the Japan-China nego tiatio n pro cess the US might ass is t (o r even be reques ted) by agreeingto certain Co nfidence and Security Building Measures (CSBM) in the area aro und the is lands

The firs t s tage wo uld have to co ns is t o f measures which reduce the risk o f a military clash but in a way which prevents theperceptio n that o ne s ide is giving in to co ercio n This s tage wo uld be a gradual phas ing o ut o f intrus io ns by Chinese o fficial vesselsand aircraft into the territo rial waters co ntiguo us zo ne and airspace o f the is lands which is recipro cated by Japanrsquos reducing in thesame way its co as tguard patro ls in the two zo nes as well as its s crambling activities in the is lands` airspace There were repo rts in

June 2013 that China called o n Japan to agree to a 12-nautical-mile no -entry zo ne aro und the is lands 29 3 Japan rejected this co urse

Ano ther measure wo uld be to increase the dis tance at which vessels o f bo th maritime fo rces o bserve each o ther Such s teps sho uldultimately be o fficialised by a gradually expanding series o f CSBMs and a bilateral liaiso n mechanism This co uld also include ademilitarisatio n agreement as an incentive fo r the Chinese s ide It wo uld be vital that the s teps at this s tage be incremental that nos tep is explo ited in a o ne-s ided way and that they are co ns idered irrevers ible At the same time bo th s ides have to prevent peo plefro m appro aching the is lands s ince this wo uld be seen as a pro vo catio n by the o ther s ide This latter task is technically no t easy

because o f the co ntro vers ial character o f any co mpro mise with certain no n-s tate acto rs in Japan China Ho ng Ko ng and Taiwan The(failed) landing o f a Chinese ho t ballo o n o n o ne o f the is lands in January 2014 demo ns trated at the same time the technical

diff iculty o f a no -entry po licy as well as the po ss ibility o f a success ful co o peratio n o f the co as tguards o f all three co untries 29 4

At this firs t s tage o r leading to the next there will have to be a Japanese go vernment s tatement to the effect that there is alsquopro blemrsquo related to the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands This can be wo rded in such a way that the sens itive express io n `territo rialpro blem` (which is s trenuo us ly denied by the go vernment) is avo ided and it can be supplemented by a sentence that such as tatement in no way prejudices the legal po s itio n o f the go vernment Such a qualifying s tatement is fo r example included in the

Japan-China agreement fo r prio r no tif icatio n o f research vessels fro m bo th co untries in the Eas t China Sea in 200029 5 A s imilarqualif icatio n is part o f the 1997 Japan-China Fisheries Agreement In the jo int co mmuniqueacute o f 1972 which no rmalised diplo maticrelatio ns between Japan and China diplo matic wo rding also managed to bridge the huge gap between their s tances o n Taiwan whichthe PRC co ns iders an lsquoinalienable partrsquo o f its territo ry Japan co ns iders the so vereignty is sue s till unreso lved because the 1951 SanFrancis co Peace Treaty Art 2 (b) o nly s tipulated that lsquoJapan reno unces all right title and claim to Fo rmo sa and the Pescado res rsquowitho ut clarifying the recipient o f the territo ry The co mpro mise in 1972 was reached with the sentence that Japan lsquofully unders tandsand respects this s tand o f the Go vernment o f the Peo ples Republic o f China and it f irmly maintains its s tand under Article 8 o f thePo tsdam Pro clamatio nrsquo

POSSIBLE APPROACHES TO THE SOVEREIGNTY ISSUE

The mo s t diff icult pro blem is the so vereignty is sue which go es to the co re o f any co untry`s security interes ts It is no t imaginablethat either s ide will reno unce its claim to the is lands Sides tepping o r shelving the is sue is o nly useful if the lesso ns fro m the 1972and 1978 attempts as o utlined abo ve can be learned and applied but there is s till the fundamental pro blem with the implicitassumptio n that the quality o f the bilateral relatio nship will always be as go o d as when the s ides tepping agreement was achievedand can be maintained in perpetuity o r until the so vereignty is sue can be addressed But in o rder to so lve the so vereignty is sue aneven better relatio nship has to be created This better relatio nship co uld be bro ught abo ut by the s teps explained abo ve and furtherbelo w

An impo rtant co nditio n fo r any las ting territo rial co mpro mise wo uld be reducing the value o f the is lands fo r bo th co untries whichcan be achieved by o ne o f the measures pro po sed fo r s tage 1 ie reso lutely preventing anyo ne fro m appro aching the territo ries(including to tal demilitarizatio n) which in themselves are eco no mically wo rthless and are uninhabited The main po int is to preventany go vernmental act which co uld be interpreted as being part o f the `so vereignty game` The mo s t diff icult part here is to preventany act by no n-go vernmental acto rs This wo uld have to include the territo rial waters and the explo itatio n there in o f any kind o freso urces including fishing Scientif ic interes ts in the is lands co uld be served by bilateral surveys witho ut any po litical co nno tatio ns

There have been pro po sals to declare the is lands an Internatio nal Nature and Wildlife Preserve29 6 Such a preserve wo uld have to beadminis tered either bilaterally o r by a relevant internatio nal o rganisatio n and as such co uld serve as a co nfidence-building measure

The abo ve s teps wo uld then allo w the two s ides to deal with the co ns iderable eco no mic interes ts in fishing and the explo itatio n o fhydro carbo n reso urces and o ther seabed reso urces aro und the is lands ie in the Exclus ive Eco no mic Zo ne ando r the ExtendedCo ntinental Shelf Once the is lands` land area and the territo rial waters have been put as ide it wo uld be eas ier to co me to ano verall agreement o n the delimitatio n o f the EEZ bo rder (with the exceptio n o f the no rthern part which wo uld require a trilateralagreement between China Japan and Ko rea) which wo uld include the delimitatio n o f these surro unding waters It wo uld facilitate aco mpro mise if bo th s ides agree that the is lands do no t merit their o wn EEZ This might be diff icult fo r Japan which claims an EEZ fo rOkino to rishima refuted by China s ince it co ns iders the reef no t to be an is land acco rding to Art 121 o f UNCLOS

A co mpro mise o n the so vereignty is sue co uld o nly be the o utco me ndash if at all ndash o f a success ful pro cess o f the abo ve o r co mparables teps In o rder to avo id a `winner take all` s ituatio n the co mpro mise wo uld have to invo lve a sharing arrangement His to ry o ffers

quite a number o f internatio nal precedents o f shared so vereignty referred to as co ndo minium in internatio nal law29 7 One case withso me s imilarities to the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands is a small is land (3000 sq m) in the river separating France and Spain kno wn asPheasant Is land o r Co nference Is land which even to day s till changes every s ix mo nths between France and Spain as o wner Like theSenkakuDiao yu Is lands the is land has no eco no mic value anymo re and the is land is o ff limits It was the lo catio n o f the s igning o f

the Treaty o f the Pyrenees in 1659 which ended a lo ng war 29 8 Mo s t o ther examples o f jo int so vereignty co ncern territo ries with apo pulatio n which makes co o peratio n much mo re diff icult Other his to rical precedents o f sharing so vereignty are the es tablishmento f ldquoneutral zo nesrdquo Acco rdingly the is lands and po ss ibly a sea area aro und the is lands co uld be declared a neutral zo ne like the o nebetween Saudi Arabia and Kuwait (1922-1965) On July 7 1965 the two go vernments s igned an agreement (which to o k effect o nJuly 25 1966) to partitio n the Neutral Zo ne adjo ining their respective territo ries A demarcatio n agreement dividing the NeutralZo ne was s igned o n December 17 1967

Particularly relevant here is that Saudi Arabia as well as Kuwait explo ited the o il reso urces under a jo int o perating agreement29 9

Co nclus io ns

The actio n-reactio n pattern o f the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands dispute is accelerating and the initiative seems to be mo re o ften thanno t with the Chinese s ide while the Japanese s ide is in a defens ive po s itio n The danger o f a military co nfro ntatio n is lo o mingincreas ingly larger in what co uld be called a lsquochicken gamersquo At the same time the internal and external dynamics are undermining theenviro nment which is required fo r a peaceful so lutio n as well as fo r maintaining the number o f po s itive o ptio ns While the Japanesego vernment refuses to ackno wledge the very exis tence o f a territo rial dispute the Chinese go vernment is no w (July 2014) evenrefus ing to have a dialo gue with Japan`s current prime minis ter It is po ss ible that the Chinese s ide again wants to wait with anymo ve fo rward until the Japanese prime minis ter has changed as Beijing did with Prime Minis ter Sato Eisaku o r with Prime Minis terKo izumi Junichiro But waiting fo r an impro vement o f the bilateral atmo sphere as the Chinese s ide likes to s tress is a very riskyo ptio n and such an impro vement may anyway be a very sho rt windo w o f o ppo rtunity if lo o king at the ups and do wns o f the po s t-1949 his to ry o f the bilateral relatio nship

To s tart a s tep-by-s tep pro cess o f address ing the territo rial is sue s tro ng leadership is required which unders tands the widerinteres ts o f a functio ning Japanese-Chinese relatio nship Japan s imply asking China fo r a summit meeting is no t very sens ible ifthere is no willingness to engage in subs tantive dis cuss io ns and wo uld be very risky fo r China`s to p leader if the Japanese primeminis ter then vis its the Yasukuni Shrine The his to ry is sue sho uld no lo nger be a Chinese lever fo r pressuris ing Japan but the latterhas to abs tain fro m actio ns which are seen as pro vo cative no t o nly by China but also by Ko rea the US and many o thers There hasto be a co mmitted leadership o n bo th s ides which s tarts with a ro ugh ro ad map and tens io n-reducing s teps such as CSBMs en ro uteto agreeing o n a fo rmula which allo ws the parties to o btain eco no mic as well as security gains while reducing tens io ns

Reinhard Drifte is Emeritus Professor of Japanese Politics University of Newcastle UK and Visiting Professor at various Japanese Universities andPau University (France) He is the author of Japanrsquos Foreign Policy for the Twenty First Century His home page is here

Reco mmended citatio n Reinhard Drifte The Japan-China Confrontation Over the SenkakuDiaoyu Islands--Between shelving and dispute

Ryukyu Islands

Vice President Spiro Agnew wit h Prime Minist erEisaku Sat o o n reversio n o f Okinawa Empero rHiro hit o and Empress Nagako lo o k o n May 15 19 72

The Senkaku Is lands are no where mentio ned in these do cuments but because o f its assertio n that the is lands are part o f Taiwan

the Chinese co ns ider them to be included24 At the same time the PRC has never reco gnized the legality o f the San Francis co Peace

Treaty and the Treaty itself do es no t even clarify to which China Taiwan sho uld be returned25 In an uns igned draft planning do cumento f May 1950 fro m the Chinese Minis try o f Fo reign Affairs fo r the PRC`s po ss ible participatio n in the San Francis co Peace Treaty andpublished in the Japanese media o nly in December 2012 as pro o f o f China reco gniz ing Japan`s o wnership the is lands are referredto by their Japanese name and it is pro po sed to examine whether these is lands are part o f Taiwan thus cas ting do ubt o n China`s

claim to day that they have always been part o f Taiwan and no t Okinawa and had been ceded to Japan in 1895 as part o f Taiwan 26

Pro fesso r Liu Jiangyo ng o f Qinghua Univers ity brushed away such do ubts by explaining the use o f the Japanese name by the

circumstance that this name was after the Japanese co lo nizatio n o f Taiwan the mo re po pular name27

It is mo re likely that the Guo mindang go vernment and fro m 1949 o n also the go vernment o f the PRC did no t kno w ando r careabo ut these is lands until 1970 There was no clear unders tanding o f whether the is lands belo nged to Okinawa o r Taiwan and eventhe ROC po s itio n o n Okinawa was unclear During Wo rld War II and in its aftermath there was co ns iderable co nfus io n within the

Guo mindang go vernment abo ut whether it sho uld o r co uld claim the Ryukyu Is lands 28 Ishii mentio ns that the ROC go vernment at

o ne s tage demanded to take part in the Trus teeship o f Okinawa29 Acco rding to an article in the newspaper o f the ChineseCo mmunis t Party Ro o sevelt even o ffered Jiang Jieshi Okinawa (which then wo uld have naturally included the Senkaku Is lands)

during the Cairo co nference in 1943 but Jiang turned it do wn30

As a result o f the San Francis co Peace Treaty o f 1951 Okinawa including the Senkaku Is lands as part o f the Nansei Sho to Is lands(so uth o f 29degno rth latitude refers to all the is lands o f the Ryukyu chain) was placed under US adminis tratio n and became a centralancho r o f the US military deplo yment in As ia

During the San Francis co Peace Treaty nego tiatio ns the US and theUK agreed that Japan wo uld retain `res idual so vereignty` o verOkinawa and that the US wo uld no t require Japan to reno unce its

so vereignty o ver Okinawa31 It is o bvio us that the Japaneseco ns idered the Senkaku Is lands as being included in the `res idualso vereignty o ver Okinawa` s ince fo r To kyo the is lands were part o fOkinawa Mo reo ver when the go vernment o f the Republic o f Chinano rmalized diplo matic relatio ns with Japan in 1952 (Treaty o f Peacebetween Japan and the Republic o f China) the subject o f the is landswas no t raised by either s ide In a separate exchange o f no tes bo ths ides agreed that the Treaty `be applicable to all the territo rieswhich are no w o r which may hereafter be under the co ntro l o f its

Go vernment` referring to the ROC go vernment32 But when the USanno unced in 1953 its intentio n to return to Japan the Amami Is lands(no rth o f Okinawa main is land) as part o f the Nansei Sho to the ROCgo vernment (but no t the PRC) pro tes ted agains t the US legaljus tif icatio n o f do ing so under the co ncept o f Japan`s `res idualso vereignty` o ver these is lands because this co ncept was no t

specified in the San Francis co Peace Treaty33

- The revers io n o f Okinawa in 1972 and the disputed is lands

Co nsequently when the US s tarted to dis cuss with Japan thetrans fer o f the adminis trative rights o ver Okinawa to Japan leading to the co nclus io n o f the `Agreement Between Japan and theUnited States o f America Co ncerning the Ryukyu Is lands and the Daito Is lands` (s igned o n 17 June 1971) the ROC urged the US in

September 1970 no t to include the Senkaku Is lands and to keep the so vereignty is sue o pen34

The ROC ambassado r to the US in a no te o f 15 March 1971explained his go vernment`s s ilence co ncerning the Senkaku Is landsuntil then by saying `fo r regio nal security co ns ideratio ns theGo vernment o f the Republic o f China has hitherto no t challenged theUS military o ccupatio n o f the Senkaku Is lands under Article 3 o f theSan Francis co Peace Treaty Ho wever acco rding to internatio nal lawtempo rary military o ccupatio n o f an area do es no t affect the

ultimate determinatio n o f its so vereignty`35 He then asked fo r theres to ratio n o f the is lands to the ROC `Regio nal securityco ns ideratio ns` certainly meant that under the Co ld War co nditio nsand its co nfro ntatio n with Beijing the ROC go vernment did no t wantto do anything which might have diminished the military po wer o f o rits go o d relatio nship with its American pro tecto r Mo reo ver Japanwas an impo rtant anti-co mmunis t neighbo ur fo r Taiwan andtherefo re the ROC go vernment had in 1951 waived all reparatio nsfro m Japan

Under pressure fro m bo th allies (the US s till had diplo maticrelatio ns with Taiwan in 1971) the US had to cho o se whether to goagains t Japan o r Taiwan and in the end decided to suppo rt Japan`sdemand Mo reo ver the US felt driven into a co rner by Taiwanbecause the latter had the po wer to to rpedo the pending textileagreement which the US was jus t nego tiating with several co untries including Taiwan Henry Kis s inger the Pres ident`s Ass is tant fo rNatio nal Security Affairs sugges ted pro mis ing the ROC that apending US military delegatio n vis iting Taiwan in Augus t wo uld buy

them o ff with pro mises o f military aid 36

Suppo rting Japan rather than Taiwan in the end meant that the USwo uld arbitrarily ldquodetachrdquo the Senkaku Is lands fro m Okinawanterrito ry despite having clearly co ns idered the two as o ne territo rialunit o ver which Japan enjo yed ldquores idual so vereigntyrdquo despite US

o ccupatio n until 197237 This was do ne by differentiating between

Okinawa which was returned as a territo ry and where the US to day has a co nsulate-general and the Senkaku Is lands which wereo nly reco gnised as being under the adminis tratio n o f Japan Any co nflicting so vereignty claims were explicitly left fo r the partiesco ncerned to so rt o ut after the revers io n o f Okinawa which included the Senkaku Is lands Since Art V o f the bilateral security treatyapplied to all Japanese territo ry being under Japanese adminis tratio n the security guarantee therefo re applied also to the is lands In this way the US co ntributed s ignificantly to the current diff icult s ituatio n

This rather self-serving ambiguo us US po s itio n was enunciated when the US Adminis tratio n s tated during Senate hearings o n therevers io n that `The United States has made no claim to the Senkaku Is lands and co ns iders that any co nflicting claims to the is lands

are a matter fo r reso lutio n by the parties co ncerned` the latter including the ROC and the PRC38 Since the revers io n in 1971 the UShas s tuck to no t taking a po s itio n o n the so vereignty o f the Senkaku Is lands and emphas iz ing that the 1971 Agreement trans ferredo nly the `adminis trative rights` to Japan In this way the US allo wed Japan to regain co ntro l o ver the Senkaku Is lands and enabled itto reinfo rce its so vereignty claim thanks to the revers io n When reading the pro po sal by Natio nal Security Staff member Jo hnHo ldridge to return `the Ryukyus (sic) and the Senkakus` but to pass no judgement as to the co nflicting claims to them HenryKiss inger wro te candidly o n the margin o f the memo o f 13 April 1971 `But that is no nsense s ince it gives is lands back to Japan

Ho w can we get a mo re neutral po s itio n`39

While the abo ve sheds so me light o n why the ROC did no t make any public claims to the title o f the Senkakus between 1945 and1970 it do es no t explain its s ilence befo re that perio d o r even fo r the perio d 1945-1949 ie befo re the es tablishment o f the PRCShaw o ffers the theo ry that this was because the ROC go vernment did no t have any his to ry o f ruling Taiwan and had to rely o n

Japanese co lo nial reco rds and maps when it to o k o ver Taiwan in 194540 The US Department o f State do cuments (FRUS) reveal thatfo r the ROC go vernment it was very much the o ppo s itio n by public o pinio n in Taiwan to the is lands` return to Japan as well as by

o verseas Chinese which put pressure o n Taibei in 1970 to o ppo se the trans fer o f the is lands to Japan41 Ano ther reaso n no tmentio ned in these do cuments is the repo rt o f hydro carbo n reserves aro und the is lands The Co mmittee fo r Co o rdinatio n o f Jo intPro specting fo r Mineral Reso urces in As ian Offsho re Areas (CCOP) under the auspices o f the UN Eco no mic Co mmiss io n fo r As iaand the Far Eas t (ECAFE) had co nducted a geo phys ical survey in 1968 The Co mmittee said in a repo rt in May 1969 that the

co ntinental shelf between Taiwan and Japan may be extremely rich in o il reserves 42 So o n after the publicatio n o f this repo rt Japans tarted to explo re with Taiwan and the Republic o f Ko rea po ss ibilities fo r jo int develo pment o f the Sea`s hydro carbo n reso urces InMarch 1969 Japan began pro tracted nego tiatio ns with Taiwan and So uth Ko rea leading to an agreement in principle in September

1970 to set up a jo int develo pment pro ject43

If the ROC had until 1945 no experience o f ruling Taiwan then the PRC go vernment had even less experience with the area o f theSenkaku Is lands Their negligible s ize and remo te lo catio n befo re the likeliho o d o f hydro carbo n reserves was raised certainly didno t draw any attentio n to them The abo ve circumstances also explain the timing o f the PRC`s claim In additio n and pro bably mo reurgent at a time when the go vernment was jus t emerging fro m the po litical ravages o f the Cultural Revo lutio n the PRC co uld no ts tay quiet in the face o f ROC and o verseas Chinese claims if it wanted to be reco gnized as the so le representative o f China Thefirs t newspaper repo rts abo ut China`s claims came o ut in May 1970 after Japan and Taiwan had s tarted talks o n jo intly explo ringthe energy reso urces aro und the Senkaku Is lands and Okinawa`s revers io n was anno unced Only o n 30 December 1971 did the

Chinese Fo reign Minis try publish an o fficial s tatement claiming the is lands 44

The weakes t po int o f the territo rial claim to the Senkaku Is lands by the ROC and s ince 1949 also that by the PRC is therefo re thatuntil the ECAFE survey o f the Eas t China Sea the is lands were no t claimed by either go vernment and Japan`s co ntro l o ver the

is lands had been unco ntes ted Shaw calls this absence o f o bjectio n a `serio us po litical miss tep`45 The co ntras t to the Chineseclaims to almo s t the who le o f the So uth China Sea is revealing the 9 dash line (o riginally 11 dash line) o n which China`s claims tothe So uth China Sea is based was already es tablished in 1947 but had appeared in Chinese maps in o ne fo rm o r ano ther s ince

1936 and was then taken o ver in 1949 by the PRC46

In meetings with PRC academics in February 2013 this autho r was given several reaso ns fo r the lo ng s ilence o f the Beijinggo vernment including so me o f tho se mentio ned abo ve Firs t o f all the go vernment saw no reaso n to specifically claim the is landsbecause acco rding to the PRC interpretatio n o f the Shimo no seki Treaty o f 1895 Therefo re having been taken away fro m China aspart o f Taiwan Japan was o bligated to return them as a result o f the abo ve-mentio ned wartime and po s twar agreements Allco unterarguments abo ut the is lands no t having been mentio ned in these agreements (in co ntras t to eg the Penghu Is lands) wereswept away by the assertio n that the Diao yu Is lands are part o f Taiwan The US adminis tratio n o ver Okinawa which explicitly includesthe Senkaku Is lands and the USUK s tatement co ncerning Japan`s res idual so vereignty o ver Okinawa during the San Francis co PeaceTreaty nego tiatio ns (at that time no difference between Japanese so vereignty o ver Okinawa and adminis trative rights o ver theSenkaku Is lands had yet been made) were s imply co ns idered as having been addressed by two PRC s tatements in 1951 whichdeclared the treaty illegal Interes tingly in these s tatements Beijing claimed the Paracel Is lands the Spratly Is lands and the Pratas

Is lands as part o f China47 Even if the PRC co ns idered the Senkaku Is lands as part o f Taiwan it is s trange that no claim to theSenkaku Is lands was made altho ugh Taiwan was under the co ntro l o f the Guo mindang whereas the Senkaku Is lands in co ntras twere placed under US adminis tratio n (and mo reo ver jo ined to Okinawa) while the Pratas Is lands were placed under UN Trus teeshipAno ther explanatio n given by these PRC academics fo r China`s s ilence is the absence o f diplo matic relatio ns between Beijing andTo kyo until 1972 It is no t clear to this autho r why this sho uld have prevented Beijing fro m pro tes ting agains t Japan`s territo rialclaim to the is lands s ince the go vernment o n many o ccas io ns befo re 1972 pro tes ted Japanese po licies and even co ncluded`private` fishery agreements which managed to circumvent the territo rial dispute Ano ther reaso n mentio ned was China`s do mes ticins tability during the Cultural Revo lutio n 1966-69 which certainly dis tracted the PRC leadership fro m dealing with such a mino r is sueas these far away is lands

WAS THE SENKAKUDIAOYU ISSUE SHELVED IN 1972 AND 1978

What had kept the territo rial dispute between To kyo and Beijing under co ntro l fro m the 1970s until the beginning o f the 1990s wasa tacit unders tanding (`anmo ku no ryo kai` in Japanese) in 1972 and 1978 to shelve the dispute (`tana age` in Japanese `gezhi` inChinese) Ho wever the Japanese go vernment later explicitly denied such an unders tanding Since this shelving agreement helped tokeep the territo rial co nflict under wraps fo r such a lo ng time despite several incidents and played a critical ro le in the 2010 and 2012crises it is impo rtant to inves tigate the circumstances o f what was unders to o d in 1972 and 1978 and why this unders tanding fellapart Mo reo ver this autho r is co nvinced that ano ther ldquounders tandingrdquo will have to be fo und in o rder to escape fro m the currentdangero us co nfro ntatio n but this will o nly be po ss ible if the appro priate lesso ns can be learned fro m the demise o f the 19721978unders tanding

In 1972 the two co untries no rmalized diplo matic relatio ns and in 1978 they co ncluded a Peace and Friendship Treaty On theo ccas io n o f bo th nego tiatio ns it was the Japanese s ide which raised the is sue o f the Senkaku Is lands and agreed to pro ceed to aco nclus io n o f the respective nego tiatio ns despite diametrically o ppo sed claims to the o wnership o f the Senkaku Is lands In o therwo rds bo th go vernments agreed to shelve the is sue albeit no t in writing o r in any public o r legal fo rm In the case o f the September1972 nego tiatio ns between Prime Minis ter Tanaka Kakuei and Prime Minis ter Zho u Enlai the territo rial is sue (as well as the exactwo rding o f Japan`s apo lo gies abo ut its pas t actio ns in China which Tanaka o ffered to Zho u Enlai) was so sens itive fo r the

Japanese go vernment that the reco rd o f the Gaimusho o mits the reactio n o f Tanaka to Zho u Enlai`s refusal to dis cuss theterrito rial is sue This part was deleted by the then head o f the China Divis io n in the Gaimusho Hashimo to Hiro shi who lateradmitted this in an interview in 2000 In the interview he said that Tanaka Kakuei in reactio n to Zho u Enlai`s reaso ning that it wo uld

be better no t to dis cuss the pro blem o f the Senkaku Is lands replied `Let`s dis cuss it ano ther time`48 Yabuki Susumu co rro batesthis reactio n by quo ting the bo o k by Zhang Xiangshan an adviser to the Chinese Minis try o f Fo reign Affairs who was present at o neo f the meetings Acco rding to his reco rd Tanaka replied `All right Then it is no t necessary to talk anymo re abo ut it Let`s do it

ano ther time`49 Befo re this summit meeting Ko meito Chairman Takeiri Yo shikatsu who served as an impo rtant go -between fo r theJapanese go vernment to prepare the vis it by Prime Minis ter Tanaka had a s imilar exchange with Zho u Enlai in July 1972 when it wasalso decided to shelve the Senkaku is sue When Takeiri met Zho u Enlai o n 28 July 1972 the latter is quo ted as saying `There is noneed to to uch o n the Senkaku Is lands is sue Mr Takeiri yo u also had no interes t I also had no interes t But the his to rians raise itas a pro blem due to the o il is sue and Mr Ino ue Kiyo shi is very keen o n it Ho wever there is no need to place impo rtance o n it

(omoku miru)`50 It is an iro ny that Zho u Enlai even referred to a Japanese academic Pro fesso r Ino ue Kiyo shi who se his to ricals tudies favo ur China`s claim o n his to rical gro unds and who se views had been presented in an article in the People`s Daily in May1971 In these dis cuss io ns it was made quite clear by bo th s ides that the no rmalizatio n o f diplo matic relatio ns was the mo s timpo rtant go al and therefo re they agreed to shelve the Senkaku is sue

When bo th s ides nego tiated the Treaty o f Peace and Friendship in 1978 there was a s imilar willingness to put the territo rial pro blemas ide in o rder to achieve the co nclus io n o f the Treaty altho ugh the Gaimusho (Japan`s Minis try o f Fo reign Affairs ) has so far no treleased the do cuments Acco rding to Fravel a chro no lo gy (nianpu in Chinese) o f Dengrsquos activities published by a party researcho ffice summarizes a meeting between Deng Xiao ping and Japan`s Fo reign Minis ter So no da Sunao acco rding to which Deng s tated`Its no t that China and Japan do no t have any pro blems Fo r example [there are] the Diao yu Is land and co ntinental shelf is sues Do nt drag them in no w they can be set as ide to be calmly dis cussed later and we can s lo wly reach a way that bo th s ides can accept

If o ur generatio n canno t find a way the next generatio n o r the o ne after that will f ind a wayrsquo 51 After the ratif icatio n o f the TreatyDeng vis ited Japan and declared at a press co nference o n 25 Octo ber 1978 that the is sue sho uld be left to future generatio ns whomay be wiser In Diet dis cuss io ns it was also made clear by LDP Secretary General Ohira Masayo shi and Fo reign Minis ter So no daSunao that it was in Japan`s natio nal interes t to go alo ng with Deng Xiao ping`s pro po sal to leave things fo r the next 20 o r 30

years 52 Ohira declared at the time o n the ques tio n o f an agreement to shelve the is sue (tana age) that `tana age` was no t co rrect

rather the o ther party (senpo ) wo uld no t bring the is sue up (mo chidasanai)53 Or as So no da wro te later while it is true that Chinais claiming these is lands as their territo ry the is lands are currently in Japans hands and have no t beco me an actual is sue amo ngJapan and China If Japan takes the tro uble to bring up the subject at this o ccas io n and wakes up a s leeping giant ( literally `dis turb

a bush o nly to let a snake o utrsquo ndash yabu wo tsutsuite hebi wo dasu) it will be a to tal lo ss (moto mo ko mo nai) fo r Japan54

One canno t but co nclude fro m these acco unts that bo th s ides agreed to shelve the territo rial is sue while in no way abando ning theirclaims to the is lands o therwise there wo uld no t have been a no rmalizatio n o f diplo matic relatio ns in 1972 o r a Treaty o f Peace andFriendship in 1978 It did no t mean that the Chinese accepted Japan`s territo rial claim s ince China had s tated its o wn claim in thesenego tiatio ns and has s ince 1971 never abando ned the claim It is also o bvio us that bo th s ides knew that there was a territo rialpro blem o therwise `shelving` wo uld no t have made sense The directo r o f the Treaties Divis io n and later Directo r General o f theTreaties Bureau Kuriyama Takakazu who was invo lved in the nego tiatio ns in 1972 and in 1978 s tated in an interview in 2012 thathe unders to o d bo th then and to day that there was a `tacit unders tanding` (anmoku no ryokai) between Japan and China to shelve the

territo rial is sue55 Asai Mo to fumi who was directo r o f the Treaties Divis io n in 1978-80 and directo r o f the China Divis io n in 1983-85 also co nfirmed that it was the unders tanding no t o nly in the Gaimusho but also amo ng the po litical leadership (Nagatacho ) that

there was a territo rial pro blem co ncerning the Senkaku Is lands 56 Miyamo to Yuji also mentio ned in 2012 that in his time as head o fthe China Divis io n in the 1990s there was s till o n the o ne hand a clear po s itio n that the Senkaku Is lands were Japanese territo rybut o n the o ther the fundamental s tance o f maintaining the s tatus quo ( genjo iji) and a tacit unders tanding that no actio n needed to

be taken57 Tajima Atsushi who was the Directo r o f the China Divis io n in 1978 and participated in the dis cuss io n between Fo reignMinis ter So no da and Deng Xiao ping in 1978 emphas ized in an interview published in June 2013 that the Chinese s ide`s perceptio no f an ldquoagreement (go i)rdquo was o ne-s ided and that the Japanese s ide o nly lis tened to Deng`s explanatio n that the is sue o f theSenkaku Is lands (and o f the disputed sea bo rder) sho uld be left to future generatio ns The Japanese s ide was satis fied that Beijing

had no intentio n to change the s tatus quo and therefo re judged that ldquono reactio n was requiredrdquo58 Despite Tajima`s intentio n torefute the exis tence o f an ldquoagreementrdquo it is clear that there was an implicit unders tanding s ince the status quo was in Japan`sfavo ur

Ano ther indirect indicatio n that Japan tacitly accepted the exis tence o f a territo rial pro blem and was willing to suspend the is sue topro tect the o verall relatio nship with China was the go vernment`s res traint fo r so me time after 1972 and 1978 in taking actio nswhich might have been interpreted by China as inflaming the territo rial dispute The go vernment never allo wed pro specting anddrilling fo r o il o r gas reserves aro und the is lands and sho wed res traint in allo wing landing o n o r making eco no mic use o f theis lands As we will see in the next part ho wever this res traint was no t abso lute and s till left ro o m fo r measures which ero ded theshelving agreement

It is o bvio us fro m the his to rical co ntext o f the 1972 and 1978 nego tiatio ns that bo th s ides had much greater interes ts at s takethan the Senkaku Is lands Mo reo ver the shelving agreement was very much in favo ur o f Japan as the co untry in de facto co ntro l o verthe is lands thereby reinfo rcing To kyo `s o wnership claim in internatio nal law Later when China`s po litical eco no mic and militaryweight increased and it became do ubtful whether the US wo uld invo ke the Security Treaty guarantee to pro tect the militarily-indefens ible is lands agains t a Chinese military challenge the shelving agreement was useful fo r Japan agains t any such

co ntingency59

THE EROSION OF THE SHELVING UNDERSTANDING

While o ne can well unders tand the des ire by the Japanese and Chinese leaders to deepen the bilateral relatio nship thro ugh the twotacit unders tandings in 1972 and 1978 and to trus t that all remaining pro blems including the territo rial dispute wo uld then beeas ier to so lve with hinds ight this faith lo o ks mo re like wishful thinking It is indeed rather unusual to co nclude a Peace andFriendship Treaty witho ut clarifying an o pen territo rial is sue the very heart o f a co untry`s security po licy Since the 1970s thisdispute has no t o nly been a sens itive is sue within Japan but also within the much mo re limited circle o f the Chinese leadership withpo litical gro upings in bo th co untries ins trumentaliz ing it fo r their o wn narro w purpo ses

The main co nceptual pro blem with the bilateral unders tanding has been that it was based o n the assumptio n that the co nditio nsallo wing its fo rmulatio n in the 1970s co uld be fro zen fo r as lo ng as it wo uld take to find a so lutio n to the o ppo s ing territo rialclaims Ho wever maintaining the co nditio ns fo r the co ntinued reliance o n the bilateral unders tanding wo uld have demanded muchgreater effo rts by bo th s ides to clarify what the status quo is and what measures wo uld be seen as vio lating the status quo Ins teadas Ishii Akira put it the leaders o n bo th s ides pro cras tinated and allo wed the territo rial is sue to beco me the symbo l o f natio nalism

in bo th co untries 6 0 As a result vario us changes and pressures in the do mes tic and internatio nal enviro nment gradually ero dedthese co nditio ns with Japan`s go vernment in the end publicly even denying that there was a dispute which co uld have been theo bject o f shelving and pro mpting the PRC in the 2010 and 2012 crises to sho wer Japan with po litical and eco no mic sanctio ns which

were unprecedented fo r two co untries suppo sedly bo und by a Peace and Friendship Treaty

The shelving agreement o bvio us ly had no legal fo rce but denying its exis tence was po litically unwise and mo rally wro ng OkabeTatsumi argues that fo r po litical co nvenience Japan agreed in 1978 to shelve the is sue but that this was different fro m shelving the

dispute in a legal sense6 1 The fo llo wing o fficial Japanese s tatements can be interpreted in this light in Octo ber 1990 CabinetSecretary Sakamo to Miso ji after res tating Japan`s so vereignty claim s till declared that the is land is sue between Japan China and

Taiwan (sic) sho uld be so lved by a later generatio n thus implying that there was a territo rial dispute which had been put as ide6 2 Butby the time China pro mulgated its law o n territo rial waters in February 1992 (see belo w) the Japanese go vernment wo uldunequivo cally and publicly deny that there had been any agreement to shelve the is sue and even that there was a territo rial is sueWhen Prime Minis ter Miyazawa Kiichi pro tes ted agains t the Chinese law in February 1992 referring to a prio r unders tanding withDeng Xiao ping o ver the Senkaku Is lands the Minis try o f Fo reign Affairs (MOFA) is sued a co rrectio n denying such an

unders tanding6 3 In September 1996 Adminis trative Vice-Minis ter Hayashi Sadayuki said that Japan had no t agreed with Dengrsquos lsquoput

o n the shelfrsquo pro po sal ie arguing that there was no territo rial is sue6 4 In the fo llo wing the autho r analyses the three maincircumstances which acco unt fo r the breakdo wn o f the bilateral unders tanding

THE CORROSIVE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

The requirements o f internatio nal law regimes particularly the UN Co nventio n o n the Law o f the Sea (UNCLOS) which was ratif ied byJapan and the PRC in 1996 pro mpted bo th co untries to take do mes tic ando r internatio nal adminis trative and legal s teps (fo rexample pass ing legis latio n related to the adminis tratio n o f their maritime space demarcating their sea bo rders and claimingbo rders fo r their EEZ) which had a general purpo se but did no t sufficiently take into acco unt the need to pro tect the bilateralunders tanding o f putting the territo rial dispute as ide Mo reo ver internatio nal regimes have `ves ted o therwise wo rthless is lands

with immense eco no mic value`6 5 They enco urage the assertio n o f so vereignty and penalize s tates fo r appearing to acquiesce in arival s tate`s claim to a disputed territo ry Paul O`Shea applied the term `so vereignty game` to this diplo matic-legal tit-fo r-tat

based o n Alexander Wendt`s co nceptio n o f so vereignty as a so cially co ns tructed ins titutio n6 6 Finally the vagueness o f

internatio nal law allo ws s tates to cherry pick tho se no rms which fit bes t their interes ts and claims 6 7 It is pro bably with thiss ituatio n in mind that fo rmer Chinese ambassado r to Japan and the UN Chen Jian explained at the beginning o f a talk o n 30

Octo ber 2012 that internatio nal law is a ro o t cause o f the current territo rial disputes 6 8 This autho r has to o much respect fo rinternatio nal law no tably UNCLOS to agree with this s tro ng s tatement but is aware o f the weaknesses o f many legal s tipulatio ns

With regard to the Senkaku dispute internatio nal law regimes have thus bro ught with it the fo llo wing co mplicatio ns

- Bo th co untries mus t always co ns ider that whatever is decided in relatio n to the disputed Senkaku Is lands might have implicatio nsfo r the co untry`s o ther territo rial disputes (Japan`s territo rial disputes with Ko rea and Russ ia China`s EEZ dispute with Ko rea o rterrito rial disputes with the o ther litto ral claimants in the So uth China Sea )

- Any actio n taken by the Japanese go vernment with regard to the Senkaku Is lands can be interpreted as the o fficial express io n o fthe go vernment in co ntro l o f the is lands and China will therefo re feel o bliged to pro tes t in o rder to defend its claim

- Bo th co untries had to co mply with UNCLOS in o rder to benefit fro m this regime and o fficially draw sea bo rders which s tart withbase lines o n which are dependent the extent o f the Territo rial Waters (12 nm fro m the base line) o f the Co ntiguo us Zo ne (24 nmfro m the base line) o f the EEZ (200 nm fro m the baseline) and o f the Extended Co ntinental Shelf (under certain co nditio ns up to350 nm fro m the base line can be claimed) The is sues aris ing fro m this are whether Japan and China wo uld apply the drawing o f thesea bo rders to the disputed territo ry and if so whether the Senkaku Is lands co uld be class ified as `is lands` which are entitled toan EEZ o r jus t `ro cks` which wo uld entitle them o nly to territo rial waters under UNCLOS Article 123 and ho w to draw the EEZbo rder in the Eas t China Sea`s Senkaku area These is sues were bo und to have an impact o n the bilateral unders tanding in o ne wayo r the o ther and wo uld have required special actio n in o rder to keep the territo rial dispute shelved

When China passed its Territo rial Law in 1992 it explicitly included the Diao yu Is lands which naturally was immediately pro tes ted bythe Japanese go vernment while s till sho wing a co ns iderable amo unt o f unders tanding and specifically saying that the law did no t

vio late Japan`s so vereignty o ver the is lands 6 9 At that time the Japanese go vernment was s till preo ccupied with preventing China`siso latio n after the 1989 Tiananmen crackdo wn China also played do wn the impact o f this law and even referred to Deng Xiao ping`s

1978 s tatement o f leaving the territo rial is sue fo r the future70 When Jiang Zemin vis ited Japan in April 1992 he also reaffirmed the

shelving acco rding to Deng`s pro mise in 1978 while s till res tating China`s claim to the is lands 71 Ho wever the Chinese Minis try o f

Fo reign Affairs (hereafter Waijiaobu o r CMOFA) o riginally had no t wanted to include the Senkaku Is lands 72 When it ratif ied UNCLOS in1996 China referred to the 1992 Law and pro mulgated the precise lo catio n o f many o f its base lines but left o ut so me o f them

including tho se fo r the Senkaku Is lands 73 In 1998 the Natio nal Peo ple`s Co ngress pro mulgated the PRC Exclus ive Eco no mic Zo neand Co ntinental Shelf Act which did no t mentio n any specific geo graphical areas Clearly the Chinese leadership was trying to walka fine line between its territo rial and EEZ claims (including the need to respo nd to do mes tic demands increas ingly do minated bynatio nalis t tendencies ) the requirements o f the internatio nal law regime and the maintenance o f go o d relatio ns with Japan

Japan ratif ied UNCLOS in June 1996 and es tablished in the fo llo wing mo nth the Law o n the Territo rial Sea and the Co ntiguo us Zo neas well as the Law o n the EEZ and Co ntinental Shelf which were supplemented by guidelines fo r implementatio n The latter also

es tablished an EEZ aro und the Senkaku Is lands Japan did no t include the Senkaku Is lands in its s traight baseline claim74 Twoseparate bills creating the Bas ic Law o f the Ocean Sea and the Law o n Es tablishing Safety Areas fo r Maritime Structures were

passed by the Diet in April 2007 and came into effect o n 16 July 200775 The latter two laws were passed mainly having in mind anyfuture explo itatio n o f natural reso urces in the co ntes ted EEZs Naturally China do es no t reco gnize the validity o f these laws fo r theSenkaku Is lands o r fo r the EEZ bo rder between the two co untries The territo rial dispute is also a majo r o bs tacle fo r agreement o nthe EEZ bo rder in the so uthern area o f the Eas t China Sea which is no t made eas ier by the fact that an agreement o n the title to theSenkaku wo uld have a majo r impact o n the s ize o f the EEZ area o f the success ful claimant particularly if the is lands were acco rdedan EEZ

FISHING AND OTHER ECONOMIC INTERESTS

Fishing is a majo r interes t fo r all litto ral s tates o f the Eas t China Sea Altho ugh Japan and China have co ncluded co nsecutive fisheryagreements fo r the Eas t China Sea the 1997 agreement (effective fro m June 2000) excludes fro m the applicatio n o f the fisheriesagreement the territo rial waters adjacent to the Senkaku Is lands Ins tead the extant 1975 Fishery Agreement which deemed the

areas aro und the Senkakus as part o f the high seas was allo wed to prevail76 In 2012 a letter related to the 1997 Agreement abo utfishing in the EEZ was revealed in which Fo reign Minis ter Obuchi Keizo had s tated to the Chinese ambassado r in To kyo Xu Duxinthat Japanrsquos laws and regulatio ns wo uld no t apply to the `waters in ques tio n` (togai no suiiki) It is unders to o d that the `waters in

ques tio n` include the Senkaku Is lands altho ugh their name is no t mentio ned and the Japanese go vernment to day denies it77 SatoMasaru a fo rmer intelligence analys t o f the Japanese Fo reign Minis try explained that this letter referred to the EEZ aro und the

Senkaku Is lands and applied o nly to Chinese fishermen78 Ho wever the Japanese go vernment seems no t to want to allo w fo reignfishermen unco ntro lled access to the territo rial waters aro und the Senkaku Is lands and has been patro lling the area This has ledto the expuls io n o f Chinese fishermen and subsequent pro tes ts by Taiwan and the PRC The Japanese co ntro ls have apparently

increased in the decade s ince 2000 while Chinese fishing activities have also vas tly increased79 Mo re research is needed o n thesedevelo pments to judge whether yet ano ther `uno fficial unders tanding` between To kyo and Beijing has been undermined

Finally in this co ntext o ne has to mentio n the is sue o f private and s tate o wnership o f the Senkaku as well as the ro le o f no n-s tateacto rs In 1896 Ko ga Tatsushiro o btained a free lease o f 30 years fo r the is lands o f Uo tsurijima Kubajima Minami Ko jima and KitaKo jima After his death in 1918 his so n Ko ga Zenji to o k o ver the bus iness In 1926 after the end o f the free lease the Japanese

go vernment co nverted it to a rental bas is 8 0 In 1932 the Japanese go vernment changed the s tatus o f these fo ur is lands fro m s tate-o wned to privately-o wned land by selling them to the Ko ga family After 1945 Kubajima and Taisho jima (the latter was always s tate-o wned) were leased to the US as firing ranges In 1972 Ko ga Zenji so ld Kita Ko jima and Minami Ko jima fo llo wed by Uo tsurshima in1978 and Kubajima in 1988 to Kurihara Kunio ki a real es tate inves to r and his family In 2002 Kitako jima Minami Ko jima and

Uo tsurijima were leased to the s tate which paid Yen 25 millio n per year fo r them in rent8 1 The US military used Kubajima andTaisho jima fro m 1957 as firing ranges and after the revers io n o f Okinawa in 1972 co ntinued to do so until 1979 It paid rent to the

private o wner o f Kubajima but after 1971 the rental payment was effected by the Japanese go vernment8 2 It is also interes ting tono te that even in the Japan-US minutes o f 15 May 1972 abo ut these two firing ranges the is lands are s till referred to by their

Chinese characters which are transcribed in the English vers io n as Ko bisho and Sekibisho rather than Kubajima and Taisho jima8 3

The relevant po int here is that s ince the shelving o f the territo rial is sue in 1972 and 1978 the is lands changed private o wners andthe s tate rented three o f the is lands fro m their private o wner and o wned o ne The leas ing in 2002 and the `natio nalizatio n` (nomo ney was invo lved) o f the Uo tsurijima beaco n in 2005 caused Chinese pro tes ts but the private o wnership changes did no t cause

any Chinese reactio n8 4 This is an illus tratio n o f the deterio ratio n o f the bilateral relatio nship during the fo llo wing years because itwas the sale o f three is lands to the Japanese central s tate which to uched o ff the 2012 cris is

THE IMPACT OF OIL AND GAS INTERESTS

The 1969 ECAFE Repo rt had led to claims by the ROC and the PRC o ver the Senkaku Is lands The mo s t pro mis ing area defined in thisrepo rt fo r hydro carbo n reso urces happened to be aro und the Senkaku Is lands Since Japan abando ned its jo int explo ratio n planswith Taiwan in 1972 with the diplo matic reco gnitio n o f the PRC no Japanese activities have taken place because o f co ncern abo utChina`s reactio n

In o rder to fulfill its gro wing demand fo r o il and gas and to divers ify away fro m its high dependence o n Middle Eas tern supplies

China s tarted in the 1970s to pro spect and extract energy reso urces in the Eas t China Sea8 5 To o verco me the territo rial dispute inthe so uth o f the Eas t China Sea and the divergent po s itio n o n ho w to draw the EEZ bo rder in the res t o f the Eas t China Sea Chinapro po sed `jo int develo pment` o f hydro carbo n reso urces In Octo ber 1980 PRC Deputy Premier Yao Yilin even pro po sed to aJapanese bus iness delegatio n that develo pment o f o ff-sho re o il reso urces aro und the disputed is lands be do ne jo intly by China

Japan and the US8 6 Ano ther bilateral pro po sal was made in 1984 by Deng Xiao ping who urged so lving the territo rial pro blems o fthe Spratly Is lands in the So uth China Sea and the Senkaku Is lands by jo intly develo ping the disputed areas befo re dis cuss ing theques tio n o f so vereignty But in this case as well as later pro po sals until 1996 Japan firs t demanded a settlement o f the maritime

bo rder o r reco gnitio n o f its title to the Senkaku Is lands 8 7

China`s relentless pro gress and expans io n o f o il and gas develo pment increas ingly caused frictio n between Japan and China whichalso impacted o n the territo rial dispute Since 1996 Chinese research vessels have entered the waters o f the Senkaku Is lands

including its territo rial waters 8 8 Japan exerted great res traint and until 2004 did no t allo w Japanese co mpanies to survey the ECSeven in the area which it claimed as its EEZ let alo ne aro und the Senkaku Is lands Mo reo ver To kyo `s permiss io n fo r surveying in2004 by a Japanese explo ratio n co mpany (never fo llo wed up because o f the po litical risks invo lved) in respo nse to Chinese o il andgas develo pment near Japan`s claimed EEZ bo rder was o nly fo r an area further no rth away fro m the disputed is lands

The Senkaku Is lands dispute co ntributed to the failure to fo llo w up o n the jo int unders tanding in June 2008 (ryokai in Japaneseliangjie in Chinese) to engage in jo int develo pment o f an area in the no rth o f the Eas t China Sea and to allo w Japan to jo in the

Chunxiao gas field explo itatio n which had been develo ped by China in a disputed EEZ area8 9 During the nego tiatio n o f the 2008jo int unders tanding the Chinese demanded jo int develo pment o f energy reso urces in the area aro und the Senkaku Is lands inexchange fo r their co mpro mise o n jo int develo pment in o ther areas o f the Eas t China Sea Altho ugh the Chinese go vernment agreedto the unders tanding witho ut getting satis factio n o n its demand the failure to achieve greater recipro city fro m the Japanese in theSenkaku area then made it do mes tically impo ss ible fo r the Chinese go vernment to go any further with nego tiating an

implementatio n o f the unders tanding9 0 In December 2008 two Chinese patro l vessels o f the China Marine Surveillance (CMSHaijiandui in Chinese) which is under the State Ocean Adminis tratio n (SOA) entered fo r the firs t time the territo rial waters aro und

the Senkaku Is lands in an apparent mo ve to s trengthen its claim to the is lands 9 1

INSTRUMENTALIZATION OF THE SENKAKU DISPUTE BY POLITICIANS AND NON-STATE ACTORS

The rais ing o f the territo rial is sue by China (ROC and PRC) and the campaign o f the Bao Diao (Pro tect the Diao yu) mo vementno tably in Taiwan and Ho ng Ko ng s ince the ECAFE repo rt led to a s imilar invo lvement o f the Japanese po litical right and o thernatio nalis tic gro ups which to o k up the is sue as a symbo l o f natio nalism In 1973 several rightwing po liticians within the rulingLiberal Demo cratic Party including Ishihara Shintaro who in 2012 became the trigger fo r the central go vernment`s purchase o f so meo f the Senkaku is lands es tablished the so -called Seirankai It was particularly Ishihara who raised the territo rial is sue and o ppo sed

its shelving by Prime Minis ter Tanaka9 2 Agains t the increase o f tens io ns between Japan and China s ince the middle o f the 1990s the supra-partisan Diet Asso ciatio n fo r the Preservatio n o f Territo rial Integrity was es tablished in 2004 It had 60 members by 2011On 30 March 2004 the Security Co mmittee o f the Lo wer Ho use passed a reso lutio n o n preserving territo rial integrity and demanded

a s tro nger Japanese s tance It was the firs t time the Diet passed a reso lutio n relevant to the Senkaku Is lands in this vein9 3 EdanoYukio chief o f the Co ns titutio n Research Co mmittee o f the Demo cratic Party o f Japan (DPJ) then in o ppo s itio n pro po sed that

Self-Defense Fo rces (SDF) tro o ps sho uld be s tatio ned o n the disputed Senkaku Is lands to prevent incurs io ns by o ther co untries 9 4

Since SDF members are civil servants (komuin) this demand so unds very s imilar to the demands by Abe Shinzo o n 15 September2012 to s tatio n komuin o n the is lands (witho ut clarifying whether he meant so ldiers o r o ther civil servants ) altho ugh he po s tpo ned

a decis io n when taking o ver the go vernment in December 20129 5 This sho ws the o ppo rtunis tic explo itatio n o f the territo rial disputefo r electo ral purpo ses

Natio nalis t po liticians and activis ts have also been demanding to erect facilities o n the is lands such as a weather s tatio n a beaco na helipo rt o r a harbo r in o rder to assert Japan`s so vereignty The Niho n Seinensha (Japanese Yo uth Federatio n) a natio nalis to rganizatio n affiliated with the majo r yakuza gro up Sumiyo shi-kai caused several incidents by landing o n the is lands s tarting witherecting a light to wer o r beaco n firs t o n Uo tsurijima in September 1978 which was enlarged in 1988 and ano ther o ne o n Kitako jima

Is land in 19969 6 Each such landing caused pro tes ts in China and amo ng the Chinese diaspo ra and pro mpted the PRC go vernmentto co mplain o fficially It also led to demands by the Seinensha that the light to wers be o fficially reco gnized by the go vernment andthe maintenance be taken o n by the Maritime Safety Agency (later called Co as t Guard) But even the co mpro mise o f including thelight to wer into o fficial charts was an o fficial act reinfo rcing Japan`s effective co ntro l o ver the is lands The dis cuss io n abo ut theo fficial handling o f the light to wer also raised the natio nalis t fever in Taiwan and its military even prepared (but then cancelled at

the las t mo ment) a co mmando actio n at the end o f 1990 to des tro y the facility9 7 In February 2005 amids t ris ing tens io ns o verChina`s energy develo pments in co ntes ted parts o f the Eas t China Sea and Chinese pro tes ts agains t Prime Minis ter Ko izumi`sYasukuni Shrine vis its the Japanese go vernment finally ceded to the demands o f the gro up to take o ver the Uo tsurijima lightho use

s tructure and its maintenance9 8 Until then the Gaimusho had succeeded in delaying this s tate takeo ver as `to o premature` in

o rder no t to pro vo ke China9 9

As can be seen the Japanese go vernment tried to res is t these natio nalis t claims but it co uld no t fully circumvent them thus keepingChina`s suspicio ns alive Mo reo ver whereas the Japanese go vernment always tries to prevent the landing by fo reigners o n theis lands it has no t until fairly recently prevented the landing by Japanese In o rder to keep fo reigners o ut o f the is lands and theirterrito rial waters the Japanese Co as t Guard (CG) has been patro lling the area which again is an o fficial act It may have been thenatio nalis t pressure fro m within the LDP as well as fro m right wing circles which pro mpted Ohira Masayo shi when he was PrimeMinis ter to send in 1979 a general survey team o f 50 perso ns (including Kurihara Hiro yuki) to the is lands in o rder to inves tigate the

building o f facilities like a helipo rt Such demands had already been made by the LDP o n 24 March 197810 0 Altho ugh the final repo rto f the survey spo ke agains t building facilities and no thing fo llo wed fro m it the Kurihara family co ns idered Ohira ndash altho ughgenerally kno wn to be a pro -China po litician - to be the mo s t suppo rtive prime minis ter o f all fo r the Japanese assertio n o f effectiveco ntro l o ver the is lands Befo re that Ohira had also agreed to Kurihara Hiro yuki`s pro po sal to set up o n Uo tsurijima a mo nument

to ho no ur Ko ga Tatsushiro which was do ne with the go vernment`s material and financial suppo rt10 1

Even within the Chinese leadership the territo rial is sue has been divis ive Jus t when the two s ides were nego tiating the Peace andFriendship Treaty in April 1978 abo ut 100 Chinese fishing vessels so me armed appeared aro und the Senkaku area with bannersdeclaring China`s title to the is lands While this was explained at the time in Japan as a means to pressure the Japanese during thetreaty nego tiatio ns it no w seems no w mo re likely that the Senkaku is sue was used by fo llo wers o f the Chairman o f the MilitaryCo mmiss io n Hua Guo feng as a means o f attacking the re-emerging Deng Xiao ping The PRC central leadership explained at the

time that this was `accidental` and Deng Xiao ping pro mised it wo uld never happen again10 2

These latter incidents are also impo rtant when dis cuss io n turns to the ques tio n who s tarted to undermine the unders tanding abo utshelving the is lands dispute ndash Japan o r China Was it China when it passed the 1992 Territo rial Law as is o ften mentio ned in Japano r did it already vio late the unders tanding in April 1978 as so me o thers claim Ho wever if the latter incident was beyo nd the co ntro lo f the Chinese go vernment it co uld be argued that it was the Japanese go vernment with the erectio n o f a mo nument o r the 1979survey that to uched o ff frictio ns Yet the blame game do es no t help in finding a so lutio n ins tead these incidents sho uld make itclear that bo th s ides bear part o f the respo ns ibility fo r undermining the 197278 unders tanding and sho uld therefo re be willing toco me to a new unders tanding

THE DETERIORATION OF THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP SINCE THE 1990S

In additio n to the abo ve develo pments it was the general deterio ratio n o f the bilateral relatio nship s ince the middle o f the 1990sthat changed the co nditio ns fo r maintaining the shelving o f the territo rial dispute Japan became suspicio us o f China`s no n-transparent military mo dernizatio n particularly o f the navy which has been expanding its o peratio ns including the Eas t China

Sea10 3 Other negative develo pments were the pro gress o f Chinese o il and gas explo ratio n in the Eas t China Sea despitedisagreement o ver the co mmo n EEZ bo rder vis its by Japanese po litical leaders to the Yasukuni War Shrine and o ther is sues relatedto Japan`s pas t aggress io n agains t China

A nadir in the bilateral relatio nship was reached during the rule o f Prime Minis ter Ko izumi Junichiro (2001-2006) because o f hisannual vis its to the Yasukuni Shrine But while the po litical relatio nship go t co lder the eco no mic relatio nship expanded andpro spered (`Co ld Po litics Ho t Eco no mics`) This also had ndashat firs t glance co unter-intuitively ndash a deleterio us effect o n themo tivatio n to wo rk harder to maintain the co nditio ns fo r putting as ide the territo rial co nflict s ince this dicho to my gave the falseimpress io n that po litics and eco no mics co uld be kept separate fo rever while the territo rial is sue was pending The wo rsening o f theterrito rial co nflict fro m 2010 and particularly fro m 2012 with China`s harsh po litical and eco no mic retributio n wo uld bear this o ut

Part o f the ratio nale fo r the Chinese navy`s increased presence in the Eas t China Sea is China`s o il and gas develo pments as wellas the wish to preserve the navy`s access to the Pacific Ocean to prevent JapaneseUS o bservatio n o r to intervene in a cris is Thisco uld no t but affect the territo rial dispute In May 1999 12 Chinese warships co nducted a mano euvre in waters no rth o f the

Senkaku is lands The exercise was the firs t o f its kind to be carried o ut by China in that regio n10 4 Other Chinese naval mo vementsin the Eas t China Sea increased including repo rts abo ut intelligence-gathering ships In the las t few years the po litical influence o f

the PLA and particularly o f the PLA Navy (PLAN) has co ns iderably increased10 5 The Japanese reacted by increas ing their militarydeplo yment and a s trengthening o f Japanese-American military co o peratio n Ho wever the Senkaku area is co ntro lled by the Co as tGuard which is a law enfo rcement agency and the Japanese navy keeps away fro m po licing This incidentally reinfo rces Japan`sclaim as po licing is do ne o nly within natio nal territo ry o r EEZ areas

Until the central go vernment`s purchase o f three o f the is lands in September 2012 it was the activities o f no n-s tate acto rs fro mJapan Taiwan Ho ng Ko ng and the PRC whether natio nalis t activis ts o r fishermen which caused the greates t direct co nfro ntatio nss ince Japan`s co untermeasures were a demo ns tratio n o f the exercise o f so vereignty which the PRC became increas ingly unwilling toto lerate In 1996 a Ho ng Ko ng pro tes ter who tried to co ver the las t meters fro m his bo at to o ne o f the is lands dro wned Ano therincident o ccurred in 2008 when a Japanese Co as t Guard ship rammed a Taiwanese spo rt fishing bo at which had entered Senkaku

territo rial waters The actio n caused the bo at to s ink10 6

In March 2004 fo r the firs t time s ince 1996 seven Chinese activis ts landed o n Uo tsurijima When the Japanese po lice made arres ts the Chinese Fo reign Minis try pro tes ted calling it a serio us vio latio n o f Chinese so vereignty The arres ts were made under the

immigratio n management law which includes a clause o n expuls io n o f illegal fo reign trespassers 10 7 In light o f the 2010 incident inwhich a PRC fishing trawlere twice rammed a Japanese co as t guard ship it is impo rtant to no te that despite guidelines which were togive = law enfo rcement agencies the autho rity to deal with trespassers `acco rding to the law` it was repo rted that the centralgo vernment intervened at the las t minute did no t press fo r an indictment and o rdered the release o f the arres ted Chinese Thego vernment did no t want any further co mplicatio ns that might to rpedo the planned China vis it by Fo reign Minis ter Kawaguchi Yo riko

and was satis fied to have demo ns trated effective co ntro l o ver the Senkaku Is lands by arres ting and expelling the Chinese10 8 AJapanese jo urnal repo rted that there was a Japanese pledge to China fo llo wing this incident that in future an intruder wo uld no t beput in detentio n but o nly arres ted as lo ng as it was no t a serio us case in turn China agreed to prevent the departure o f vessels withpro tes ters fro m its harbo urs Such an unders tanding has no t surpris ingly been denied by the Japanese as well as by the Chinese

go vernment10 9

The China Marine Surveillance (CMS) s tarted irregular patro l activities near the Senkaku Is lands in December 2008 when two CMSvessels s tayed fo r o ver nine ho urs in the territo rial waters o f the Senkaku Is lands as mentio ned abo ve This was interpreted in

Japan as a majo r escalatio n110 Fo rmer ambassado r to China Miyamo to Yuji called this new develo pment a qualitative change in the

Senkaku dispute which went beyo nd previo us cases o f intrus io n by fishermen o r pro tes ters 111 This deplo yment was fo llo wed byo thers the fo llo wing year agains t a backgro und o f China reinfo rcing its maritime co ntro l Japan respo nded by building up its o wndefence effo rts in the so uth including planned s tatio ning o f so me tro o ps o n Yo naguni Is land o ne o f the clo ses t is lands to the

Senkaku Is lands 112

THE 2010 FISHING TRAWLER INCIDENT

It is agains t this co mplex backgro und that the Chinese fishing trawler Minjinyu 5179 with a crew o f 15 entered the territo rial waters o fthe Senkaku Is lands o n 7 September 2010 near Kubajima There were many o ther Chinese fishing trawlers in the same area andseveral ships o f the Japanese Co as t Guard were trying to chase them away Pursued by three Japanese CG vessels the Minjinyu 5179twice co llided with two o f the CG vessels There are different interpretatio ns whether the Chinese captain Zhan Qixio ng intentio nally

rammed the CG vessels and there are so me s trange inco ns is tencies highlighted in the repo rts o f the incident113 So me no n-Japanese autho rs like Sheila Smith and Linus Hags trouml m are no n-co mmittal o n the ques tio n o f the co llis io n but mo s t Japanese

autho rs blame the trawler and this autho r is mo re inclined to believe that the ramming was intentio nal114 The Chinese

unsurpris ingly blame the CG vessels 115 The is sue o f intentio n is impo rtant inso far as it gives so me indicatio n abo ut the risk o frecurrence and o f escalatio n The fo llo wing circumstantial evidence sugges ts intentio nal ramming by the Chinese captain

- There is ample video fo o tage leaked by a CG o fficer which specialis ts have interpreted as intentio nal ramming by the Chinese

captain116

- The captain seemed to have been drunk and is kno wn to be a vo latile perso n 117

- Fishing in the Eas t China Sea is very co mpetitive and Chinese fishermen are particularly anno yed abo ut the patro ls and co ntro ls byJapanese and Ko rean law enfo rcement agencies in the as yet un-demarcated EEZs amo ng all three co untries

Chinese fishermen have a reputatio n o f o ften being vio lent as many incidents in the So uth China Sea and in the Yello w Sea seem topro ve Only three mo nths later in December 2010 ano ther Chinese fishing trawler captain rammed a So uth Ko rean co as t guard

vessel in the Yello w Sea ho wever his bo at sank as a result and the Chinese captain dro wned 118 Chinese crews are o ften armed

with metal pipes and attack law enfo rcement agents which have led to o ther fatal casualties in 2011 and 2012119

The 2010 trawler incident is further relevant in o ur co ntext in view o f the Japanese go vernment`s handling it ( legal aspect denial o fthe shelving unders tanding) China`s co untermeasures and the aftermath o f the go vernment`s purchase o f three is lands inSeptember 2012 After the co llis io ns the Japanese go vernment arres ted the crew and co nfis cated the trawler The fo llo wing day theChinese go vernment demanded the release o f the crew and the trawler which the Japanese go vernment did o n the 13 September butkeeping the captain in cus to dy The Japanese ambassado r to China Niwa Uichiro was summo ned s ix times by the Chinese between8 and 19 September Beijing`s reactio n escalated after the Chinese captain`s term o f detentio n was extended o n 19 September tolas t fro m 20 to 29 September On 20 September Chinese autho rities detained fo ur Japanese citizens fo r entering a res trictedmilitary area in Hebei pro vince Even witho ut the trawler incident the detentio n o f the fo ur Japanese wo uld have harmed the bilateralrelatio nship but happening in this co ntext it was rightly o r wro ngly immediately linked by the Japanese to o ther Chinese sanctio ns

as dis cussed belo w The result ho wever was that the Japanese released the Chinese captain120 Even immediately after the crew`sarres t the Chinese go vernment had already begun to cancel the seco nd ro und o f nego tiatio ns fo r implementatio n o f theunders tanding o n energy co o peratio n in the Eas t China Sea co ncluded o n 18 June 2008 Other reprisals and sanctio ns fo llo wedincluding the suspens io n o f rare earth expo rts to Japan o n which the co untry`s high techno lo gy indus try is very dependentAltho ugh befo re the incident the Chinese go vernment had already mo ved to reduce rare earth expo rts which naturally hit Japan asthe bigges t impo rter Japanese media repo rted that the Chinese cus to ms autho rities to tally suspended expo rts in late

September121 The exact circumstances o f this alleged embargo are s till no t yet clear as dis cussed in detail by Alas tair Jo hns to n122

The cris is ended when the deputy pro secuto r in Ishigaki anno unced o n 24 September the release o f the captain citing the`diplo matic impact` o f the case o n the bilateral relatio nship So me co ns idered this as surrender by the Japanese and the result o fdubio us po litical interference into the legal pro cess The o ppo s itio n had a field day attacking the go vernment`s handling o f the

incident123 The Japanese Fo reign Minis try spo kesman declared that the go vernment had applied do mes tic law and again refuted the

idea o f there being a territo rial pro blem to be reso lved124 Others argue that the incident had several benefits fo r the Japanesego vernment because it o btained a reco nfirmatio n o f the US security guarantee to include the Senkaku Is lands it helped to co nvince

the public abo ut the necess ity o f mo re Japanese defence effo rts and it expo sed China as an assertive if no t aggress ive po wer125

China claimed that the incident sho wed that Japan had changed its appro ach to handling this type o f incident which co uld be

interpreted as a co nfirmatio n that bo th s ides had reached an info rmal unders tanding after the 2004 incident126 Ho wever thisincident was much mo re severe s ince the captain`s two co llis io ns with CG ships were interpreted by the Japanese go vernment asintentio nal ramming The captain was charged with o bs tructio n o f Perfo rmance o f Public Duty as a result o f the ramming On theo ther hand o ne canno t blame China fo r allo wing this bo at to leave its Chinese harbo ur because it was a fishing trawler and no t apro tes ters` campaign vessel What made this incident so serio us fo r the Chinese was Japan`s very public assertio n o f itsso vereignty o ver the is lands in the way it handled the Chinese captain and the explicit denial o f the shelving unders tanding o f the

1970s On 21 September Fo reign Minis ter Maehara s tated that Japan had no t agreed with China to shelve the territo rial dispute127

This declaratio n fo llo wed the seco nd extens io n o f the captain`s detentio n o n 19 September which pro mpted the Chinesego vernment to allo w widespread demo ns tratio ns in China and to place a series o f sanctio ns agains t Japan (cancellatio n o fminis terial meetings `self- res trictio ns` o n vis its to Japan by Chinese to uris ts and po s tpo nement at very sho rt no tice o f the vis ito f 1000 Japanese yo uth planned fro m 21 September to the Shanghai Wo rld Exhibitio n) Japan is es timated to have lo s t yen318

billio n due to a decline in the number o f Chinese to uris ts 128

It is diff icult to judge whether these unprecedented co untermeasures were centrally directed and it is likely that it was aco mbinatio n o f vario us po wer centres co mpeting ando r feeling the need to be seen acting in acco rdance with the increas ingly anti-Japanese mo o d

Japan`s do mes tic circumstances made a speedy so lutio n such as that in 2004 difficult The DPJ had co me to po wer o nly in 2009 andlacked fo reign po licy experience There was no effective co mmunicatio n between the two go vernments at leas t at the beginning o fthe incident in co ntras t to earlier times The Japanese leadership o bvio us ly mis judged ho w the Chinese wo uld interpret Japanesehandling o f the incident which it perceived as a reversal o f Japan`s previo us (albeit gradually diminishing) res traint Altho ugh theDPJ had initially a mo re pro -China leadership when it came to po wer (no tably Prime Minis ter Hato yama Yukio and Secretary General

Ozawa Ichiro ) this had changed by 2010 The minis ter in charge o f the CG (which is under the Minis try o f Land Infras tructureTranspo rt and To urism) o n the day o f the incident was Maehara Seiji a kno wn defence hawk who then became Minis ter o f Fo reignAffairs in a cabinet reshuffle o n 17 September He was therefo re much mo re at liberty to take a hard-line s tance agains t China whilethe DPJ pres idential electio n ndash wo n again by Kan Nao to ndash to o k place o n 14 September fo llo wed by the prime minis ter`s departure toNew Yo rk to attend the UN General Assembly o n 22 September The fo reign minis ter befo re the 17 September was Okada Katsuyawho was also mo re inclined to take a s tro ng s tance Maehara as well as Okada had seen the CG`s video o f the co llis io n which co uld

no t but have left them with a very negative impress io n o f the Chinese captain`s actio ns 129 It certainly did no t help when Maehara inhis new po s t as fo reign minis ter qualif ied China`s reactio n in the Diet o n 18 September as `very hys terical` and then declared o n

21 September that there had never been an unders tanding abo ut shelving the territo rial dispute130 On 23 September Secretary o fState Hillary Clinto n assured vis iting Fo reign Minis ter Maehara that the Senkaku Is lands were co vered by the bilateral Japan-USSecurity Treaty an interventio n that was certainly also no t welco me to the Chinese Ho wever there have been speculatio ns that inexchange fo r this s tro ng US reco nfirmatio n o f the security guarantee in o rder to get o ut o f the s talemate the Japanese had to

pro mise to release o f the Chinese captain which o ccurred the fo llo wing day131

The 2010 incident had several co nsequences which made a recurrence very likely Firs t o f all the incident raised tens io ns to a degreelas t seen during the anti-Japan demo ns tratio ns in 2004 and 2005 which had been mainly co ncerned with Japan`s attempt to gain apermanent UN Security Co uncil seat and the his to ry is sue These tens io ns had made it impo ss ible to have any new nego tiatio nro und to co nclude a treaty abo ut co o peratio n in the explo itatio n o f hydro carbo n reso urces in the Eas t China Sea and thus reduceano ther majo r so urce o f bilateral tens io ns and o ne mo reo ver related to the Senkaku is sue Agains t this backgro und but also inline with its previo us po s itio n Japan rejected a Chinese pro po sal made in Octo ber 2010 fo r jo int reso urce develo pment in the

Senkaku area132 The legal aftermath o f the incident co ntinued fo r so me time with Japan claiming co mpensatio n fro m the Chinesecaptain fo r the damage caused to the two CG vessels which was rejected by China and co untered with demands fo r co mpensatio nand an apo lo gy The Japanese pro secuto r dro pped the case agains t the captain o nly in January 2011 but the CG s till sent a bill to

the captain in February 2011133

While the incident helped the Japanese go vernment to o btain s tro ng US suppo rt o n the applicability o f the bilateral security treaty tothe Senkaku Is lands and generally helped to co nvince the Japanese public abo ut the need fo r greater Japanese defence effo rts(including a s trengthening o f US leverage vis-agrave-vis Japan co ncerning the realignment o f its fo rces o n Okinawa) it reduced Japan`sindependence with respect to the degree o f suppo rt it pro vided fo r US China po licy

Seco ndly the incident further undermined the co nditio ns which were the fo undatio n fo r the uno fficial shelving o f the Senkaku is sueIf it was no t yet clear to everybo dy that there was a territo rial dispute o ver the Senkaku Is lands then this incident with theunprecedented Chinese sanctio ns agains t Japan lifted the las t remnants o f do ubt Maehara Seji who repeated o n 25 o ccas io ns inDiet debates between 10 September and 16 No vember 2010 that there exis ted no territo rial dispute made this o fficial po s itio n

even less co nvincing134 The incident pro mpted Beijing to publicly undermine Japan`s territo rial claim further by anno uncing o n 29Octo ber 2010 permanent deplo yment o f large fisheries patro l vessels in waters near the Senkaku Is lands which was recipro cated by

the CG deplo ying patro l vessels o f o ver 1000 to ns in the same area135 In a further tit-fo r-tat o n 17 December 2010 the city

go vernment o f Ishigaki the adminis trative autho rity o f the Senkaku Is lands passed an o rdinance to des ignate 14 January the day to

co mmemo rate the Senkaku Is lands` inco rpo ratio n in 1895136

The further ero s io n o f the shelving agreement after Octo ber 2010

The next majo r co nfro ntatio n o ver the Senkaku Is lands in September 2012 o ccurred agains t the backgro und o f mo re measurestaken by bo th s ides to suppo rt their respective territo rial claims and do mes tic circumstances in bo th co untries which were evenless co nducive to re-es tablish trus t and go o d relatio ns The gro wing US-China po litical and military rivalry in Eas t As ia asexemplif ied by the As ia pivo t which China perceives as directed agains t its rise certainly did no t help Initially the year 2011 saw areco very o f relatio ns fro m the 2010 incident Bilateral trade reached a new high with a vo lume o f $345 billio n Japanese fo reign

direct inves tment in China so ared nearly 50 per cent in 2011 to $6 3bn137 Mo reo ver the Chinese public was very impressed with thedis ciplined way the Japanese peo ple reacted to wards the triple disas ters which hit the co untry o n 11 March 2011 and there was an

o utpo uring o f sympathy which also included the sending o f a Chinese search-and-rescue miss io n to the affected To ho ku area138

Yet this impro ved atmo sphere was quickly dispelled when the results o f the textbo o k review were published o n 27 March whichasserted Japan`s territo rial claim to the Senkaku Is lands (as well as to TakeshimaDo kto ) and denied the Chinese figure o f

300 000 victims in the Nanjing massacre139

In the meantime the Japanese go vernment co ntinued to turn the legal s crews which affected the Senkaku Is lands by implementingdo mes tic laws in o rder to be co ngruent with internatio nal law and s trengthening maritime co ntro l In February 2012 the Japanesecabinet passed bills to enhance the Japan Co as t Guards law enfo rcement po wers in territo rial waters which wo uld fo r example

autho rize the CG to o rder fo reign ships to leave Japan`s Territo rial Waters witho ut firs t bo arding them140 Other adminis trativemeasures derived fro m the Bas ic Law o n Ocean Po licy which had been enacted in 2007 and which pro vides the framewo rk fo radminis trating remo te is lands Since 2009 Japan has given names to hitherto unnamed is lands to subs tantiate its claims to anEEZ Fo r this purpo se in Augus t 2011 the go vernment placed 23 uninhabited is lands under s tate co ntro l but fo ur is lets near theSenkaku Is lands were exempt o ut o f co ns ideratio n fo r China In March 2012 ho wever the go vernment abando ned this cautio n and

regis tered Kitako jima as a natio nal asset141 In No vember 2011 the go vernment had let it be kno wn that it wo uld sho rtly release a

new lis t o f names fo r is lands which wo uld include is lets o f the Senkaku gro up142 China pro tes ted and a meeting in Beijing plannedin February 2012 between Pres ident Hu Jintao and representatives o f seven bilateral friendship gro ups fro m Japan was cancelled Ano pinio n piece in the Peoples Daily (RMRB) o n 17 January 2012 said Japans mo ve lsquois a blatant mo ve to damage Chinas co re

interes ts rsquo143 On 2 March 2012 To kyo finally anno unced a lis t o f 39 is lands which included fo ur is lets in the Senkaku Is lands

gro up144 The Chinese pro tes ted immediately o n the same day and in a tit-fo r-tat the State Oceanic Adminis tratio n released o n 3

March s tandard names and descriptio ns o f the Senkaku is lands and its 70 affiliated is lets 145 Ano ther Chinese co untermo ve was theanno uncement o n 16 March by the SOA that they had s tarted patro lling near the Senkaku Is lands This was fo llo wed pro mptly o n thesame day by o ne CMS ship entering the Territo rial Waters o f the Senkaku Is lands and the same vessels with ano ther CMS ship

cruis ing in the Co ntiguo us Waters o f the is lands 146 In No vember 2010 an o fficial o f the Minis try o f Agricultures Bureau o f Fisherieswhich o perates the Fisheries Law Enfo rcement Co mmand (FLEC) had already anno unced that his o rganizatio n wo uld fro m no w o n

deplo y fisheries patro l vessels o f o ver 1000 to ns to maintain co ntinuo us patro ls 147

THE 2012 CONFRONTATION ISHIHARA SHINTARO LIGHTING THE FUSE

It was in this tense enviro nment that To kyo Go verno r Ishihara Shintaro anno unced o n 16 April 2012 that the To kyo Metro po litanGo vernment (TMG) was nego tiating the purchase o f three o f the fo ur privately-held Senkaku is lands by the end o f the year ie

Uo tsurijima Kita Ko jima and Minami Ko jima The lease o f the central go vernment fo r these three is lands was due to expire in March2013 and no incident wo uld have o ccurred if the go vernment had quietly renewed the lease The central go vernment s tated that ithad no t kno wn abo ut Ishihara`s intentio n but that there had been co ntacts o n vario us o ccas io ns between the go vernment and the

private o wner148 This seems co nvincing s ince s tate o wnership wo uld have pro vided better preventio n o f incidents even mo re thanjus t leas ing Taken aback by Ishihara`s surprise mo ve the Chief Cabinet Secretary Fujimura Osamu declared the fo llo wing day thatthe central go vernment might acquire the is lands `if required` and Prime Minis ter No da implied in a Diet speech o n the 18 April that

a purchase by the central go vernment was o ne o f the o ptio ns Bo th s tatements were widely repo rted in China149 Ishihara hadcho sen his anno uncement fo r maximum effect o n the o ccas io n o f a speech at the co nservative Washingto n DC-based HeritageFo undatio n He made it clear that this pro ject was meant as a criticism o f the DPJ-led central go vernment which he co ns ideredfailing in its duty to sufficiently pro tect Japan`s so vereignty by saying that the central go vernment sho uld be buying the is lands butthat the Gaimusho was to o afraid o f o ffending China The lo catio n o f his anno uncement was meant to gain s tro nger suppo rt fro m

the US fo r Japan`s territo rial claim150 As we have seen abo ve fro m Ishihara`s activities in the 1970s this anno uncement was inmany ways the lo gical co nclus io n o f his lo ng las ting o bsess io n with the Senkaku Is lands and his hatred o f co mmunis t China It wasthe 2010 incident in particular which had enco uraged him to renew his o ld plan o f buying the is lands after his earlier failure to do so His go o d co nnectio ns with the o wner Kurihara Kunio ki who shared his natio nalis t pro clivities helped Ishihara to beco me the

favo ured purchaser151

The po ss ibility o f having the three is lands under the co ntro l o f the natio nalis tic go verno r o f To kyo who wanted to build facilities o nthe is lands to s trengthen Japan`s so vereignty was unpalatable to the No da go vernment which feared co mplicatio ns with China In a

meeting o n 18 May No da and his to p advisers decided in principle to purchase the is lands 152 Pressure o n the go vernmentincreased to pre-empt Ishihara because he was as to nishingly success ful in rais ing vo luntary co ntributio ns fro m the public to buythe three is lands thus circumventing any legal diff iculties in us ing To kyo `s taxpayer mo ney and also pro ving the po pularity o f his

mo ve By 1 June he had co llected 70 000 do natio ns to taling aro und yen101 billio n which increased to yen146 billio n by 6 September153

On 27 July the TMG ran an advertisement in the Wall Street Journal asking fo r US unders tanding and suppo rt fo r the purchase plan154

The TMG had to reques t central go vernment permiss io n to co nduct a survey o f the is lands which the go vernment refused to grant

o n 27 Augus t fo rcing the TMG to co nduct a survey fro m a ship o n 2 September155 In the end it was the higher sum and the sho rtes tdelay o f co ncluding the deal which pro mpted Kurihara Kunio ki who was apparently in so me financial diff iculties to accept the centralgo vernment`s o ffer o f yen205 billio n ($26 millio n) and to s ign the co ntract o n 11 September This was an embarrass ing turn fo rIshihara In additio n he did no t succeed in us ing the o ffer o f his co llected mo ney to entice the No da go vernment to pro mise thebuilding o f any facility o n the is lands No da was presented by his adminis tratio n with several o ptio ns including his favo ured o ptio no f repairing the exis ting light ho use o n Uo tsurijima but in the end was co nvinced by Fo reign Minis ter Gemba to leave things as they

were in o rder no t to further inflame the Chinese156

The central go vernment`s purchase o f the three is lands o n 11 September immediately led to a very harsh reactio n by the Chinesewhich was even wo rse than in 2010 But befo re lo o king at Chinese co untermeasures after 11 September in detail it is impo rtant toinves tigate why the Chinese reactio n was so s tro ng and why the Japanese apparently did no t anticipate it particularly in view o fChina`s unprecedented reactio n in September 2010

CHINESE WARNINGS BEFORE THE NATIONALIZATION ON 11 SEPTEMBER

Prime Minis ter No da admitted o n 19 September o nly eight days into the co mprehens ive Chinese sanctio ns and co unter measures

that he had underes timated their extent157

158 In a named co mmentary o f Xinhua o n 18 April attentio n was drawn to Ishihara`s kno wn right wing and anti-Chinese s tatementsbut also po inted o ut that the CMOFA `wo uld no t hes itate to take any necessary measures to safeguard so vereignty o ver the Diao yu

Is lands`159 Vice-Pres ident Xi Jinping to ld vis iting Ko no Yo hei a kno wn pro -China hand that Japan sho uld no t wo rsen the bilateral

relatio nship and that co re is sues sho uld be reso lved by the two co untries in an appro priate manner16 0 At the end o f April the StateOceanic Adminis tratio n anno unced a plan to des ignate is lands and their surro unding waters as s trategically vital and to pro tect their

enviro nments and develo p marine reso urces 16 1 Mo re specifically targeting the Senkaku Is lands was ho wever the entry o n 3 May o f

two FLEC vessels into the Senkaku Is lands` Co ntiguo us Waters fo r the firs t time s ince Ishihara`s anno uncement16 2 Bilateraltens io ns also increased after a Japanese right wing gro up suppo rted the ho lding o f a meeting o f the Wo rld Uyghur Co ngress in

To kyo fro m 14 to 18 May which led to the cancellatio n by Beijing o f several o fficial vis its 16 3 On 13 May Premier Wen Jiabao raisedthe Senkaku is sue and the Uighur meeting during talks in Beijing with Prime Minis ter Yo shihiko No da cautio ning that lsquoit is impo rtant

to respect Chinarsquos co re interes ts and matters o f great co ncernrsquo16 4 Wang Jiarui head o f the Co mmunis t Partys Internatio nalDepartment was quo ted by Eda Satsuki a fo reign po licy adviser o f the DPJ that bo th the Senkaku and the Uighur is sue were

described as `co re is sues` and Wen`s s tatement was s tressed in a Chinese TV bro adcas t16 5 The Xinjiang is sue as well as Taiwanand Tibet have been referred to fo r so me time by the Chinese go vernment as `co re is sues` but the Senkaku is sue had been called

a `co re is sue` apparently fo r the firs t time o nly in an o pinio n piece by the Renmin Ribao in January 201216 6 Only o n 23 March 2013did the Chinese Fo reign Minis try Spo kesperso n clearly s tate that China regards the Diao yu Is lands as its co re interes t altho ugh the

written reco rd subsequently so ftened this s tatement16 7

The abo ve chro no lo gy certainly gives the impress io n that there was a series o f Chinese reactio ns which expressed s tro ng Chineseco ncern with any purchase (whether by the TMG o r the central go vernment) o f the Senkaku Is lands If that had no t been eno ugh theinterview o f the Financial Times with Japan`s ambassado r in China Niwa Uichiro at the beginning o f June sho wed s tro ng co ncernabo ut the implicatio ns o f a purchase He was quo ted as saying that lsquoif Mr Ishihararsquos plans are acted upo n then it will result in anextremely grave cris is in relatio ns between Japan and ChinahellipWe canno t allo w decades o f pas t effo rt to be bro ught to no thingrsquo He

added that such a cris is wo uld affect bus iness 16 8 Niwa mus t have been truly co ncerned abo ut the severity o f the s ituatio n to makesuch an undiplo matic public s tatement fo r which he was reprimanded by Fo reign Minis ter Gemba and criticized by so me media

o utlets and po liticians ultimately leading to his recall later in the year16 9

The Chinese warnings became sharper at the seco nd s tage when Prime Minis ter No da anno unced o n 7 July that his go vernment wo uldseek to buy the is lands because the purchase co uld no lo nger be put do wn to a mere lo cal maverick with s tro ng anti-Chineseinclinatio ns The Global Times edito rial o f 9 July sho wed the frus tratio n by so me Chinese lsquoEach time Japan takes o ne s tep we sho uldtake o ne and half o r even two s teps fo rward making Japan aware o f the grave co nsequences caused by its aggress io n agains t

Chinarsquo170 A Xinhua co mmentary o n 7 July quo tes the CMOFA`s spo kesperso n referring pro bably fo r the firs t time in this ro w to a`co nsensus` agains t which the Japanese go vernment went by wanting to buy the is lands meaning o f co urse the shelving co nsensus

o f 1972 and 1978171 On 9 July a Xinhua co mmentary titled `Japan playing with fire o ver Diao yu Is lands` called the purchase by the

central go vernment a `farcical ambitio n` an express io n repeated thereafter many times 172 On 11 July the Japanese media repo rtedthe entry by three FLEC vessels into the territo rial waters o f Kubajima the firs t time s ince the 16 March 2012 fo llo wed by o ne vessel

cruis ing the fo llo wing day in the is land`s co ntiguo us zo ne173 Public o pinio n became increas ingly inflamed and the Global Timesrepo rted o n 19 July that 90 8 per cent o f Chinese peo ple surveyed appro ve us ing the military to enfo rce Chinas so vereignty o ver

the is lets with 521 per cent saying a military clash lsquois likelyrsquo between China and Japan o ver the is lands 174

Even the US gave Japan `s tro ng advice` no t to pro ceed with the purchase because it co uld `trigger a cris is` as was revealed in April2013 by Kurt Campbell who was at the time Ass is tant Secretary fo r Eas t As ian and Pacific Affairs Even tho ugh we warned JapanJapan decided to go in a different directio n and they tho ught they had gained the suppo rt o f China o r so me did which we were

certain that they had no t Campbell is quo ted in an interview with Kyo do 175

FAILURE OF COMMUNICATION

The abo ve chro no lo gy and escalatio n o f Chinese reactio ns to the planned purchase o f the is lands o ver the summer 2012 give aclear indicatio n that a Japanese purchase o f the three is lands was no t co ns idered jus t ano ther incident witho ut majo rco nsequences So why did the Japanese go vernment s till go ahead with the purchase In the final analys is the failure to avo id thecris is escalating in September 2012 lay in the wide difference between the interes ts o f the two go vernments Do mes ticcircumstances o n bo th s ides and the inherent zero sum nature o f territo rial disputes prevented the trans itio n fro m dialo gue topreventive actio n let alo ne so lutio n Aggravating events o ver the summer 2012 which raised tempers o n bo th s ides were thedemands by the TMG to send a survey team to the Senkaku Is lands (the No da go vernment after so me initial co nflicting repo rts didno t allo w a landing) the landing o f Ho ng Ko ng activis ts o n Uo tsurijima o n 15 Augus t (timed with the anniversary o f Japan`ssurrender) fo llo wed by the landing o f Japanese activis ts ( including lo cal parliamentarians ) o n 19 Augus t and an attack in Beijing o n27 Augus t o n the car carrying Ambassado r Niwa Despite o ngo ing co mmunicatio n and dialo gue thro ugh vario us channels theseadverse circumstances led to a hardening o f po s itio ns o ver the summer 2012 between the two go vernments

The Japanese central go vernment had been caught sho rt by Ishihara`s sudden anno uncement o n 16 April and became to tallyabso rbed with preventing the maverick po litician fro m go ing ahead with the purchase o f the is lands fearing rightly that this wo uldserio us ly co mplicate Japan-China relatio ns Ishihara wanted to embarrass the No da go vernment which was co ns tantly declining inpo pularity and to fo rce it to deal mo re assertively with the is lands As we have seen fo r Ishihara it was no t jus t abo ut purchas ingthe is lands but abo ut building facilities o n them Fo r the No da go vernment buying the is lands by the s tate was therefo re the lesserevil The go vernment tried all alo ng to co nvince the Chinese o f To kyo `s go o d intentio ns fo r example when Fo reign Minis ter Gembamet with his Chinese co unterpart Yang Jiechi o n 11 July that the purchase was o nly a `do mes tic co mmercial transactio n` and no t a

diplo matic matter and was o nly meant to ensure that the is lands wo uld be `adminis tered peacefully and s tably`176 In December2012 when the full extent o f China`s unprecedented reactio ns had beco me kno wn the new Japanese ambassado r Kitera s till s tatedthat lsquoThe change in o wnership sho uld no t have caused a pro blem in relatio ns with Chinarsquo adding that Japan had given China sufficient

explanatio ns ahead o f the purchase177 Fo reign Minis ter Gemba even tried to highlight in No vember that the purchase was actually areturn to the status quo ante lsquoThe measure taken by the go vernment o f Japan was jus t a trans fer o f title under Japanese do mes ticlaw and jus t means that the o wnership o f the is lands mdash held by the go vernment until 1932 mdash was returned fro m a private citizen to

the go vernmentrsquo178 In sho rt fo r the Japanese the purchase o f the is lands was aimed at maintaining the status quo in such a waythat it ho ped China wo uld co ns ider to be in its o wn interes t that is by cho o s ing the lesser o f two evils That express io ns like`peaceful adminis tratio n` o r `trans fer o f title under do mes tic Japanese law` co uld o nly be interpreted by the Chinese as acts o fasserting Japanese so vereignty was apparently s imply igno red Under these circumstances it was impo ss ible to co nvince theChinese that trans fer o f o wnership had no thing to do with so vereignty Ins tead the Chinese even suspected that the No da

go vernment and Ishihara were co nniving at s trengthening Japan`s co ntro l o ver the is lands 179

Any intended co nciliato ry o verto ne in the abo ve explanatio ns by Gemba and many s imilar declaratio ns befo re and later were furthernegated by the ins is tence that there was no territo rial dispute exactly the po s itio n the Chinese mo s t so ught to change Thefrequent references to `co re interes t` by China were igno red by the Japanese go vernment Fo r the Chinese leaders the `o ffer` tocho o se between the To kyo Metro po litan Go vernment o r the Go vernment o f Japan buying the is lands was as Vice Fo reign Minis ter

Zhang Zhijun later put it like being asked to cho o se between two do ses o f po iso n18 0

It was also unfo rtunate that the Japanese go vernment allo wed the express io n kokuyuka (natio nalizatio n) to prevail even amo ng

go vernment members ins tead o f the o riginal term agreed by the Japanese cabinet shutoku (acquis itio n)18 1 Chinese media hastaken o ver the Japanese term o f lsquonatio nalizatio nrsquo which certainly further co nfused Chinese public o pinio n Since it do es no t kno w thehis to rical backgro und and Japan`s effective co ntro l o f the is lands `natio nalizatio n` tended to be unders to o d as a radical change in

the status quo o r even as invas io n18 2 A well kno wn Japanese o bserver in China Kato Yo shikazu even argued therefo re that the 1972

and 1978 unders tanding abo ut shelving had prevented the Chinese peo ple fro m learning abo ut the is sue as perceived in Japan18 3

Bo th s ides made it impo ss ible with their extreme and diametrically o ppo sed po s itio ns to find a co mpro mise The No da go vernmentwas to o weak (and also to o preo ccupied with o ther is sues like the pass ing o f the law to intro duce a hike o f the value added taxco ping with the aftermath o f the triple disas ter o f March 2011 and s imply trying to s tay in po wer) to find an alternative to the no wabando ned `shelving co mpro mise` and to admit that there was a territo rial pro blem At the end o f Augus t No da was fo rced topro mise Lo wer Ho use electio ns `so metime so o n` despite the grim o utlo o k fo r his party`s chances in the electio ns Making aco mpro mise o n the territo rial is sue wo uld no t have helped to gain po pular suppo rt While the Chinese pro bably felt enco uraged toescalate pressure by their success in fo rcing the Japanese go vernment hand o ver the captain in September 2010 it mo s t likely hadthe effect o n the No da go vernment to remain inflexible in o rder to avo id being seen yet again as caving in to Chinese pressure Butthe Chinese were also no t able to co mpro mise o n their demand that the Japanese sho uld admit the exis tence o f a territo rial is sue

The preparatio n fo r the 18 th Natio nal Party Co ngress in No vember 2012 and the ensuing leadership change to be finalized o nly inspring 2013 s imilarly did no t allo w the Chinese leaders whether inco ming o r o utgo ing to appear so ft Eight o ut o f nine Po litbureaumembers publicly expressed o ppo s itio n to the purchase either befo re o r after the anno uncement o f the purchase o n 11

September18 4 There are also credible repo rts that during the CCP`s summer retreat to Beihaide in Augus t Hu Jintao came underpressure fro m the future gro up o f leaders to take a mo re severe po s itio n o n Japan`s intentio n to natio nalise the three is lands Asa result the leading fo reign po licy interlo cuto rs o f the Japanese go vernment Zhang Zhijun and Dai Bingguo hardened their po s itio n

as well18 5 Public o pinio n in China had gro wn increas ingly ho s tile to Japan o ver the summer and was particularly inflamed when thelanding o f the Ho ng Ko ng activis ts was fo llo wed by the landing o f Japanese activis ts which were treated by the Japanese autho ritiesmo re leniently than the fo rmer ie no t arres ted despite having vio lated private land leased to the s tate Rio ts in several Chinese

cities s tarted thereafter18 6

Altho ugh bo th s ides agreed to co ntinue dialo gue and several o fficial meetings at different levels to o k place they co uld o nly end inres tating kno wn po s itio ns China did no t make things eas ier by later cancelling such meetings depriving bo th s ides o f po ss ibleo ppo rtunities to find a breakthro ugh The s tart o f Chinese sanctio ns acro ss the who le gambit o f bilateral relatio ns deprived theJapanese o f even mo re do mes tic wriggle ro o m fo r a co mpro mise

It seems that the abo ve circumstances did no t allo w Japan`s central decis io n-makers co ncerned with the is sue in particular the

Prime Minis ter and his immediate circle to admit to ando r unders tand until the purchase anno uncement o n 11 September 2012ho w s tro ngly the Chinese felt abo ut it Ambassado r Niwa`s rather undiplo matic s tatements in the Financial Times interview seem toindicate that he felt that the central decis io n-makers did no t unders tand the s trength o f the feelings o f the Chinese and ho w far theymight go Niwa warned in his interview that even a po ss ible pre-purchase survey o f the is lands co uld be diplo matically incendiary

s ince such a survey was dis cussed already at the time to enable the TMG to go ahead with the purchase18 7 As late as the 3September the Yomiuri Shimbun repo rted that the Chinese go vernment was reacting calmly as lo ng as three co nditio ns wereo bserved to maintain the status quo The co nditio ns co ntained no o ppo s itio n to a po ss ible purchase and ins tead jus t mentio ned

abs tentio n fro m landing surveying and building facilities o n the is lands 18 8 Acco rding to Pro fesso r Takahara Akio General ZhuChenghu said o n 5 September that a purchase by the central go vernment wo uld be better and Qu Xing directo r o f the China Ins titute

o f Internatio nal Affairs is said to have expressed a s imilar o pinio n18 9 Even o n 12 September when the s to rm bro ke the deputydirecto r o f the Japan Ins titute o f the Chinese Academy o f So cial Science Gao Ho ng s tated in an interview with the o n-line vers io no f the Renmin Ribao that if Japan wo uld respect the three abs tentio ns mentio ned abo ve the s ituatio n co uld ultimately revert to the

status quo ante19 0 But these were no lo nger the decis ive vo ices o f the Chinese leadership after the Beihaide meeting The abo ve-mentio ned Campbell interview seems to sugges t that Japan was lo ng befo re mo re inclined to act upo n Chinese s tatements whichwere clo ser to what it wanted to unders tand

CHINESE REACTION RHETORICAL WARFARE

The final misco mmunicatio n o r clash o f irreco ncilable interes ts o ccurred when Prime Minis ter No da met Pres ident Hu o n thes idelines o f the As ia Pacific Eco no mic Co o peratio n (APEC) summit in Vladivo s to k o n 9 September then anno unced two days laterthe s igning o f the purchase co ntract with the Kurihara family Whether Hu had no t sufficiently co nveyed his s tro ng feelingsco ncerning the purchase which had been kno wn and bilaterally dis cussed at leas t s ince the Japanese o fficial anno uncement o f itspurchase intentio n o n 7 July o r No da had no t unders tanding the Chinese feeling fo r the po ss ible reaso ns dis cussed abo ve Hu

apparently felt he had lo s t face when Japan anno unced the purchase o n 11 September19 1 Mo reo ver the Japanese anno uncementco uld no t have co me at a mo re awkward time because o f the anniversary o f the Mukden Incident o n the 18 September which likeseveral o ther carefully cultivated anniversaries regarding Japan`s pas t misdeeds in China always aro use latent anti-Japanesefeelings As a result the Japanese anno uncement caused an avalanche o f virulent rheto rical o utburs ts relating to the pas t po liticalsanctio ns further measures to assert China`s territo rial claim (fo r example including the is lands in the Chinese TV weatherfo recas t an exhibitio n o f ancient maps to pro ve Chinese co ntro l) eco no mic sanctio ns and an escalatio n o f patro ls by ChineseFLEC and MSA ships and aircraft aro und the Senkaku Is lands

The mildes t part o f China`s rheto rical o ffens ive was calling the go vernment purchase a `farce` a rather undiplo matic express io nalready used by Xinhua in July 2012 but then taken up at the highes t level by Vice Pres ident Xi Jinping when meeting Secretary o f

Defence Leo n Panetta o n 19 September19 2 But the main line fro m no w o n was that Japan`s claim to the Senkaku Is lands was adenial o f the po s t-Wo rld War II results In its s tatements and rebuttals the Chinese sho wed their frus tratio n at no t having been ableto fundamentally change the status quo and they did no t hes itate to use express io ns which were rather undignified fo r diplo mats andpo litical leaders Japan o n the o ther hand argued fo r peaceful reso lutio n alo ng the lines o f internatio nal law and dialo gue whichpro bably infuriated the Chinese even mo re On 10 September the CMFA is sued a s tatement calling Japans po s itio n o n the disputedis lands `an o utright denial o f the o utco mes o f the victo ry o f the Wo rld Anti-Fascis t War and hellip a grave challenge to the po s t-war

internatio nal o rder`19 3 In a heated exchange at the UN General Assembly between Chinas UN ambassado r Li Bao do ng and JapansDeputy UN ambassado r Ko dama Kazuo Li called the mo tive fo r purchas ing the three is lands to lsquolegalize its s tealing and o ccupatio no f Chinese territo ryrsquo and s tated lsquoThis actio n o f Japan co ns titutes a serio us encro achment upo n Chinas so vereignty and intends toco ntinue and legalize the result o f Japans co lo nial po licy It is an o pen denial o f the o utco mes o f victo ry o f the wo rld anti-fascis twar and a grave challenge to the po s t-war internatio nal o rder and the purpo ses and principles o f the Charter o f the United

Natio ns rsquo19 4 In a further rebuttal o f Japan`s assertio n o f its claim Li characterized the is land purchase as lsquono thing different fro m

mo ney launderingrsquo19 5 At the As ia Euro pe Meeting (ASEM) in Lao s Fo reign Minis ter Yang Jiechi repeated the reference to the`o utco me o f the anti-Fascis t war` while Prime Minis ter No da spo ke o f peaceful reso lutio n o f co nflicts acco rding to internatio nal

law19 6 On 11 Octo ber the CMFA spo kesperso n Ho ng Lei refuted Fo reign Minis ter Gembarsquos his to rical acco unt jus tifying Japan`s

claim by calling it `gangs ter lo gic`19 7

On the Chinese s ide therefo re there are no w two clo sely-linked his to ry narratives o ne is abo ut the is lands having been part o fChina s ince the Ming and Qing dynas ties the o ther co nnects the is lands to the already well-rehearsed his to ry narrative ie Japanhaving victimised China s ince the Sino -Japanese war o f 1894-95 These two narratives co ntinue to be cultivated by the Chineseleadership In Octo ber 2012 the Chinese anno uncement o f the publicatio n o f 80 vo lumes o n the Far Eas t War Criminal Co urt was

clearly meant to link the latter narrative to Japan`s acquis itio n o f the Senkaku Is lands 19 8 Fo rmer Fo reign Minis ter Gemba explicitlytried in Octo ber 2012 to delink the territo rial is sue fro m Japan`s aggress io n agains t China o nly to be reminded by the Chineseambassado r to the UK in an article in the Financial Times (as part o f the ensuing wo rldwide press campaign by bo th s ides ) that lsquothe

Diao yu Dao is sue is all abo ut his to ryrsquo19 9 Since then until no w China has co ntinued this ldquohis to ry warfarerdquo by publishing endlessarticles o n Japan`s aggress io n agains t China befo re 1945 The mo s t recent mo ve in July 2014 is the serialised o n-line publicatio n o f

the hand-written co nfess io ns by 45 Japanese co nvicted war criminals by the State Archives Adminis tratio n20 0

POLITICAL SANCTIONS AND PUBLIC OPINION

Chinese po litical co untermeasures ranged fro m the cancellatio n o f o fficial and uno fficial vis its to further legal acts to reinfo rce

China`s claim to the Senkaku Is lands Aro und 40 per cent o f ceremo nial events in Japan to mark 2012 as the 40 th anniversary o f the

no rmalizatio n o f diplo matic relatio ns with China were cancelled o r po s tpo ned and even mo re events in China20 1 Thesecancellatio ns were no t always the result o f direct go vernment interventio n but so metimes mo re indirect o fficial `dis co uragement`helped by the Chinese preference fo r no t being seen to do so mething in co ntradictio n to the (initially fo mented and later self-pro pelling) anti-Japan atmo sphere o r by fear o f participants running into demo ns tratio ns if no t assaults The legal s crews werefurther turned with lo ng-term implicatio ns On 10 September the Chinese go vernment anno unced the base po ints and baselines o f

the territo rial waters o f the disputed is lands and their affiliated is lets as well as the names and co o rdinates o f 17 base po ints 20 2

On 16 September repo rts appeared that China was submitting pro po sals fo r its extended co ntinental shelf to the UN Co ntinental

Shelf Co mmiss io n which included the Senkaku Is lands but in fact the actual submiss io n o ccurred o nly o n 14 December 201220 3 On

20 September a go vernment agency published a thematic map o f the Diao yu Is land and its affiliated is lands 20 4 Chinarsquos

Meteo ro lo gical Adminis tratio n s tarted pro viding weather fo recas ts fo r the Senkaku area o n the s tate-run TV s tatio n20 5 On 16September the fishery bureau anno unced the lifting o f the fishery ban in the Eas t China Sea and s tressed that China planned to

s trengthen its so vereignty claim o ver the Senkakus 20 6

There were rumo urs that 1000 fishing vessels wo uld co me to the Senkaku area and tho ugh this did no t materialize it helped to

further raise tens io ns 20 7

Mo st attentio n in Japan was fo cused o n the widening s treet pro tes ts in o ver 100 Chinese cities the des tructio n o f Japanese sho ps

res taurants cars and pro ductio n facilities and the attacks o n Japanese citizens in China20 8 The webs ites o f at leas t 19 Japanese

banks univers ities and o ther ins titutio ns came under cyber-attack20 9 At a demo ns tratio n in Shanghai abo ut 7000 pro tes ters

chanted s lo gans such as lsquoBeat Japanese imperialismrsquo lsquoBo yco tt Japanese pro ducts rsquo and lsquoDes tro y Japan and retrieve Okinawarsquo210

Altho ugh o nly 63 per cent o f po lled Japanese in late September 2012 expressed suppo rt fo r their go vernment`s natio nalizatio n o fthe is lands do wn fro m 73 per cent in a previo us po ll o n 15 and 16 September 82 per cent o f respo ndents in a Mainichi Shimbun

survey said the Japanese go vernment had no t pro tes ted s tro ngly eno ugh to Beijing o ver anti-Japan pro tes ts 211 The Chinesego vernment denied any o fficial invo lvement and the spo kesperso n o f the Waijiao bu went o nly as far as saying that the pro tes ts anddemo ns tratio ns were `co mpletely caused by the Japanese go vernments illegal purchase o f the Diao yu Is lands and are peo ples

spo ntaneo us acts`212 There were ho wever repo rts that so me o f the demo ns tratio ns were to lerated if no t abetted by go vernment

agencies 213 The demo ns tratio ns so o n died do wn because to lerating them much lo nger wo uld have run the risk that they wo uld turninto anti-go vernment demo ns tratio ns Even the Chinese Academy o f So cial Sciences repo rted that so me demo ns trato rs who were

arres ted did no t even kno w where the Senkaku Is lands were and that anger o ver the widening wealth gap was behind their acts 214 Inco ntras t to these Chinese demo ns tratio ns and acts o f lawlessness there was hardly any public demo ns tratio n in Japan whichsho ws the relative detachment o f the Japanese fro m the dispute On 22 September `Nippo n Gambare` a right wing o rganizatio nchaired by fo rmer Air Self Defence Fo rce chief Tamo gami To shio s taged a march thro ugh parts o f To kyo which this autho rwitnessed A brief fire was s tarted at a Chinese scho o l in Ko be and two smo ke bo mbs were thro wn into the Chinese Co nsulate

General in Fukuo ka215 But such actio ns were relatively rare and small in s cale

ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND THE QUESTION OF WHO IS MORE DEPENDENT ON WHOM

Pro tes t measures o f a lo nger duratio n and as yet unpredictable co nsequences fo r the bilateral relatio nship have been China`seco no mic sanctio ns and a bo yco tt o f Japanese go o ds by the general public altho ugh the autho rities denied again any go vernmentinterventio n A co mmentary o f Xinhua half admitted ho wever go vernment interventio n when it made the unco nvincing dis tinctio nbetween `measures` and `sanctio ns` `Since Japan purchased Chinas Diao yu Is lands in September the Chinese go vernment hastaken a series o f co untermeasures in the eco no mic legal diplo matic and military fields which have helped it to wres t the initiativeto reso lve the is lands dispute despite China no t impo s ing any eco no mic sanctio ns the Japanese eco no my has been badly

hit`216 Renmin Ribao co mpared `eco no mic punishments` with a `gun` and warned that thro ugh its is land purchase Japan hadalready to uched the `trigger` In a rather heavy hint the paper po inted o ut ho w vulnerable Japan`s eco no my was because o f the

2011 earthquake and the dependence o f key eco no mic secto rs o n China217 Even mo re o fficial was Vice Minis ter o f Co mmerce Jiang

Zengwei`s warning that the is land purchase wo uld inevitably have a negative impact o n Sino -Japanese eco no mic and trade ties 218

After 11 September it so o n became very o bvio us that the heavy hand o f the Chinese go vernment was impo s ing sanctio ns andmaking life fo r Japanese bus iness mo re diff icult On 21 September it was repo rted that Chinese cus to ms autho rities were

s trengthening inspectio ns o f impo rts fro m and expo rts to Japan altho ugh the Chinese autho rities denied this 219 In the same week

repo rts appeared abo ut Japanese co mpanies experiencing delays in o btaining wo rking visas fo r their Japanese emplo yees 220 BigJapanese co mpanies with inves tments in China were experiencing ho ld-ups in gaining regulato ry appro vals fo r Merger amp

Acquis itio ns 221 In co ntras t to the interference in rare earth expo rts to Japan after the trawler incident in 2010 ho wever no such

embargo was implemented because this particular eco no mic weapo n had lo s t its effectiveness s ince then (see belo w)222

The greates t medium-term damage to Japanese eco no mic activities apart fro m the abo ve mentio ned des tructio n o f Japaneseco mmercial and indus trial s ites was caused by a partial co nsumer bo yco tt no tably the fall o f car sales in China and Chineseto urism to Japan Overall bilateral trade decreased by 39 per cent in 2012 to $329 billio n the firs t dro p s ince the co llapse o f theLehman inves tment bank in 2009 and in 2013 to $3125 billio n acco rding to Chinese figures Acco rding to Japanese figures trade in

2013 increased but declined in vo lume223

The wo rs t hit secto r was auto mo biles To yo ta so ld 840 500 vehicles in China in 2012 the firs t annual dro p s ince 2002 Nis san

experienced a 24 per cent dro p in December China sales and Ho nda saw a 19 per cent December fall224 Ho wever as o f 2014Japanese car sales in and to China have again been increas ing The to uris t indus try was also hard hit in bo th co untries Chinese

vis ito rs to Japan decreased by 44 per cent fro m September to December 2012 fro m the year befo re225 The number o f Japanese

to uris ts o n gro up to urs to China plunged by mo re than 70 per cent year-o n-year in the las t three mo nths o f 2012226 This fallco ntinued into 2013 when their number fell to 29 millio n Japanese to uris ts do wn 18 2 fro m 2012 and the 3rd s traight annual

decline227 Ho wever in March 2014 vis ito rs fro m mainland China surged 80 1 fro m the previo us March to to tal 184200 a reco rdhigh fo r the mo nth and a s teeper year-o n-year rise than vis ito rs fro m any o ther co untries and regio ns This was also helped by the

falling yen and the resumptio n o f cruise to urs with large ships which were to tally suspended in March 2012228

Ano ther mo re lo ng-term negative eco no mic effect o n the bilateral relatio nship can be gauged fro m falling Japanese FDI to Chinawhich acco rding to Chinese figures declined by 422 in the firs t five mo nths o f 2014 after having fallen by 43 to $71 billio n in

2013 acco rding to Chinese figures o r by 18 to $10 9 billio n acco rding to Japanese figures 229

China`s multiple eco no mic retributio ns cas t do ubt o n the co ntinued viability o f the earlier `Ho t Eco no mics and Co ld Po litics`dicho to my The answer to the ques tio n which co untry is mo re dependent o n the o ther o r mo re vulnerable to sanctio ns is dependento n the eco no mic indicato rs and secto rs being cho sen and is also a po litical ques tio n because the answer can be po liticallymanipulated Japan`s eco no mic diff iculties s ince the 1990s (and its dependence o n eco no mic interactio n with China to co pe withthese diff iculties ) and China pushing Japan to No 3 in wo rld GDP ranking has diminished the Chinese perceptio n o f Japan as aneco no mic po wer ho use It means that fo r China the relatio nship with Japan became less impo rtant while po litical relatio nsdeterio rated at the same time The s tro ng effect o f the Chinese embargo o n rare earth expo rts to Japan in 2010 can be viewed intwo diametrically o ppo sed ways Chinese o bservers may be inclined to put emphas is o n the s tro ng effect it had o n Japanese publico pinio n and indus trial circles co ntributing to a certain extent to the go vernment`s surrender o f the trawler captain Others maypo int o ut that the case demo ns trated the futility o f abus ing a do minant supplier po s itio n because within a sho rt time Japan`sindus try secured alternative reso urces and demand reductio n thro ugh recycling and pro duct re-engineering no t o nly pro videdeno ugh breathing space but in the end reduced China`s market po wer Still Chinese experts are co nvinced that Japan is no w mo redependent o n China than the o ther way ro und Acco rding to so me specialis ts Chinas impo rts acco unted in 2011fo r 237 per cent o fJapan`s expo rt vo lume The bilateral trade vo lume in 2011 to o k up 21 per cent o f Japanese gro ss trade vo lume o f that year while it

merely acco unted fo r 9 4 per cent o f Chinas annual gro ss trade vo lume230 There seem to be o nly few Chinese vo ices which expressco ncern o ver the negative impact o f China`s sanctio ns o n China`s eco no my itself no tably at a time o f wo rldwide eco no mic

co ntractio n231

The Chinese market is certainly to o impo rtant fo r many Japanese co mpanies to leave A survey in No vember 2012 to which mo rethan 10 000 Japanese co mpanies in China replied sho wed that fo r almo s t 30 per cent o f them the territo rial dispute had affected

their bus iness but s till mo re than half want to maintain their o peratio ns and o nly 16 per cent said that they wanted to either cut

back o r pull o ut232 Japanese co mpanies in certain secto rs are likely to beco me mo re reluctant to make inves tments in China all themo re as o ther So utheas t As ian co untries (no tably Myanmar is currently the New Fro ntier fo r Japanese bus iness ) have cheaper

labo ur co s ts 233 Ho wever Chinese co nsumers s till prefer Japanese pro ducts fo r safer fo o d drinks and daily necess ities and tho se

Japanese co mpanies were hardly affected by the bo yco tt234

A wide gap between bo th s ides` perceptio n abo ut their eco no mic dependence and vulnerability to sanctio ns is dangero us fo r themanagement o f their bilateral relatio nship particularly when o ne s ide tries to leverage its suppo sedly s tro nger po s itio n to achievevicto ry in a sens itive area like territo rial integrity While Chinese co mmentato rs and experts may be inclined to o verrate Japan`svulnerability their Japanese co unterparts have a tendency to lo o k at the is sues to o much in purely eco no mic terms neglecting theimpact o f Chinese emo tio ns and go vernment pro paganda as well as the wider public`s insufficient kno wledge abo ut the o verall

impact o f bad eco no mic relatio ns with Japan o n China`s o wn eco no my235 The Japanese perceptio n remains that China in the endneeds Japan mo re than the o ther way ro und which in view o f China`s huge pro blems and its dependence o n Japanese hightechno lo gy co mpo nents fo r its manufacturing indus try is arguably the case This Japanese perceptio n has fo s tered the co nvictio nas demo ns trated fo r example by the belief in the sus tainability o f `Ho t Eco no mics and Co ld Po litics` that despite recurring

po litical crises in the relatio nship China wo uld in the end co mpro mise as it had do ne several times in the pas t236 Yet the pro blemwith the perceptio n o f `needing Japan` is that it can be po litically manipulated particularly in an autho ritarian sys tem This gapbetween Japanese and Chinese o bservers and experts o n the is sue o f dependence can serio us ly influence the willingness o f bo th

s ides to co mpro mise237 It also challenges the liberal view that clo se eco no mic relatio ns can prevent o r at leas t so ften deeppo litical differences like territo rial co nflicts which mo reo ver are linked to eco no mic interes ts like hydro carbo n reso urces In thisco ntext it is interes ting to no te that China has recently been exchanging with Japan a number o f high-po wered bus iness delegatio ns(apart fro m exchanges with po litical parties and lo cal go vernment o fficials ) The willingness o f Japanese bus iness to take part maybe interpreted by China as an express io n o f Japan`s eco no mic dependence o n China while giving it also the o ppo rtunity to putpressure o n the Abe go vernment to make co ncess io ns and to keep links with Japan fo r the po s t-Abe era

In view o f the impo rtance o f the eco no mic relatio nship and the damage suffered by Japanese bus iness after September 2012 o newo uld have expected mo re pressure fro m the bus iness co mmunity to co me to a territo rial co mpro mise so lutio n and so impro verelatio ns Ho wever this has no t been the case and may have to do with the perceptio n gap dis cussed abo ve but also the relativelack o f influence o n the go vernment (the majo rity o f the China-relevant Japanese bus iness co mmunity co ns is ts o f small- andmedium-s ized co mpanies ) the fear that a mo re vo cal ro le wo uld get co mpanies into tro uble with the autho rities in Japan ando rChina o r the ho pe o f being able to weather the po litical s to rms either because o f alternative market o ppo rtunities o r theco mpany`s s ize

FROM POLICING TO MILITARY INVOLVEMENT

The mo s t serio us co nsequences fo r the bilateral relatio nship ndash let alo ne fo r the so lutio n o f the territo rial dispute and regio nalpeace ndash arise fro m the co ns tant intrus io ns o f Chinese o fficial vessels into the Co ntiguo us Zo ne (CZ) o r even Territo rial Waters(TW) o f the Senkaku Is lands s ince September 2012 and the gro wing invo lvement o f the armed fo rces o f bo th s ides The aim o f theChinese is o bvio us to demo ns trate that the Japanese can no lo nger claim exclus ive co ntro l o f the is lands and to fo rce To kyo toadmit the exis tence o f a territo rial dispute Apparently a task fo rce at the highes t level headed by Xi Jinping was set up in

September 2012 to achieve this go al thro ugh escalating pressure238 So far law enfo rcement actio ns by Japan in the Senkaku areahave been limited to the deplo yment o f the Japanese Co as t Guard and po lice which is no w ho wever co ns tantly challenged byChinese with patro ls by CMS and FLEC (s ince 22 July 2013 unified under the State Ocean Adminis tratio n and renamed China Co as tGuard CG) vessels asserting the same rights in the is lands` CZ and TW The Chinese s ide escalated its pressure o n Japan by firs tdeplo ying FLEC vessels in the CZ and TW o f the disputed is lands then ratcheting up their pressure with CMS vessels do ing the samefo llo wed later in December 2012 with air patro ls by CMS aircraft which led to the deplo yment o f the air fo rce o f bo th s ides inJanuary 2013

As we have seen after the September 2010 incident in No vember 2010 FLEC s tarted to regularly send its vessels to the Senkakuarea which entered fro m time to time the is lands` CZ and also in Augus t 2011 twice the TW Apparently the mo re serio usintrus io ns which are tho se into the TW were so metimes timed with specific spikes o f tens io ns such as the TW incurs io n o n 16March 2012 (the Japanese naming o f so me is lands) July 2012 (No da`s anno uncement o f purchase intentio n o n 7 July) and finallyo n 19 September when s ix vessels entered the TW s tarting a series o f mo re frequent and regular incurs io ns In December 2012

FLEC deplo yed its newes t and bigges t ship the 5800-to n FLEC vessel Yuzheng 206 a fo rmer ship o f the Chinese navy239

The entries o f the vessels o f the CMS into the is lands` CZ and TW seem meant to send an even higher degree o f warning and denialo f Japan`s co ntro l o ver the is lands On 17 September the number o f FLEC and CMS vessels in the CZ and TW had reached the reco rd

o f 17240 Thereafter the frequency o f incurs io ns into the CZ and TW increased but it decreased after March 2013 On 30 Octo berXinhua even repo rted that the CMS had `expelled a number o f Japanese vessels illegally sailing in waters aro und the Diao yu

Is lands` altho ugh it is no t clear what exactly this meant s ince the CG did no t co nfirm such an incident241 Acco rding to Xinhua NewsAgency in 2013 China sent 50 ldquopatro l miss io ns rdquo into the TW o f the disputed is lands and as o f 12 July 2014 by the autho r`s co unt

there had been 17 such Chinese ldquopatro l miss io ns rdquo in 2014 which are ldquoincurs io ns rdquo fo r the Japanese s ide242 Other needle pricks todemo ns trate China`s claims are the o ccas io nal incurs io ns o f Chinese survey ships into the Senkaku Is lands` EEZ o r the bo ardingo f Chinese fishing vessels in the EEZ Defence Minis ter Itsuno ri Ono dera in late Octo ber 2013 called these repeated incurs io ns a

threat to peace which fell in a ldquogray zo ne (between) peacetime and an emergency s ituatio nrdquo243

A new level o f depriving Japan o f the ability to claim so le effective co ntro l o ver the is lands was reached o n 13 December 2012 when

a small turbo pro p aircraft o f the CMS (Harbin Y12 type) flew o ver Uo tsurijima244 Since then regular CMS air patro ls have beenco nducted but the aircraft no rmally s tay abo ut 120 km fro m the is lands With this mo ve Chinese measures to undermine Japan`sco ntro l o ver the is lands were expanded to the air space which fo r o rganizatio nal reaso ns had immediately military implicatio nsbecause the Air Self Defense Fo rce (ASDF) is respo ns ible fo r intercepting aircraft which intrude illegally into Japan`s air space The

incident did no t happen o ut o f the blue because already in January 2012 the SOA had anno unced a plan to deplo y the Y12 in 2012245

On 24 September the SOA had also anno unced plans to deplo y dro nes by 2015 fo llo wing the success ful tes t the previo us day 246

The Chinese acts are apparently carefully planned and co o rdinated s ince the o fficials in the abo ve Kyo do repo rt also said that theairspace vio latio ns o n 13 December 2012 by an airplane o f the CMS was planned by the s taff sectio n o f the natio nal Land and SeaBo rder Defense Co mmittee which acts as a liaiso n o ffice fo r the Chinese military the State Oceanic Adminis tratio n and the fishing

bureau o f the Agriculture Minis try with the aim o f rais ing tens io ns 247

The lo w altitude flight o f the Y12 o n 13 December was particularly upsetting fo r the Japanese go vernment because it was no t pickedup by the ASDF radar (the clo ses t o ne being o n Miyako jima abo ut 200 km fro m the is lands) but ins tead by CG ships in the area Inthis case eight ASDF fighters s crambled but co uld no t detect the Y12 Interceptio n o f aircraft is by nature much mo re diff icult andcarries a certain risk o f accident as happened in 2001 when a US intelligence aircraft co llided with a Chinese intercepto r jet Witho ut

explaining the s tandard Japanese pro ceedures fo r aerial defence which so lely relies o n the ASDF the Chinese media interpreted theuse o f military aircraft by Japan as `aggress ive` and the Global Times cautio ned agains t any interceptio n warning that China might

respo nd by sending its air fo rce248 On the Japanese s ide even the centre-left Asahi Shimbun called the Y12 flight ` a highly

pro vo cative act that co uld lead to an armed co nflict between the two co untries`249 At the beginning o f January 2013 there wereapparently erro neo us repo rts that the ASDF might co ns ider firing warning sho ts (tracer bullets ) at intruding Chinese aircraft which

pro mpted further bellico se co mments in the Chinese press 250 As a co nsequence the Chinese air fo rce also became invo lved o n10 January when the Chinese Minis try o f Defence anno unced that the Peo ple`s Liberatio n Army Air Fo rce (PLAA) had sent two fighterjets agains t two ASDF F-15 intercepto rs because they were fo llo wing a Chinese military Y8 transpo rt aircraft patro lling the airspace

o f Chinese o il platfo rms in the Eas t China Sea251 The Japanese repo rted that mo re than ten Chinese aircraft including military

aircraft had appro ached the Japanese air defence identificatio n zo ne252 In a further escalatio n the Japanese s ide repo rted that o n11 June 2014 two Chinese military jets flew abno rmally clo se to two planes o f Japans Self Defence Fo rce abo ve the Eas t China Sea

an accusatio n which the Chinese s ide refuted speaking ins tead o f two incidents pro vo ked by Japanese fighters 253 Related to thisdevelo pment and further enhancing the po ss ibility o f an incident is the enhanced patro lling o f the PLAA o ver the Eas t China Seawhich caused the ASDF to increase scrambling agains t PLAA aircraft to 415 times between 1 April 2013 and 31 March 2014 (Fis cal

Year 2013) 109 times mo re than in the previo us Fis cal Year 2012254

Co ntinuing to increase the pressure o n Japan the Chinese go vernment decreed o n 23 No vember 2013 an Air Defence Identificatio nZo ne (ADIZ) which includes the airspace o ver the Senkaku Is lands and was certainly meant to reinfo rce China`s territo rial claimdespite the fact that an ADIZ has no territo rial implicatio ns in internatio nal law The threat o f military co untermeasures in the text o fthe decree (lsquoChinas armed fo rces will ado pt defens ive emergency measures to respo nd to aircraft that do no t co o perate in the

identificatio n o r refuse to fo llo w the ins tructio ns rsquo) has further heightened the po ss ibility o f a military clash255 Ho wever theJapanese s ide refuses to accept the ADIZ The Chinese mo ves have wider implicatio ns fo r peace and s tability in the regio n in o rderto pro tect the freedo m o f its military aircraft in Eas t As ian airspace and its ability to o bserve China`s military fo rces Washingto nrefused to reco gnise the zo ne co ntinued to igno re the requirements o f the ADIZ by pursuing its regular patro l f lights and criticisedits implementatio n Simultaneo us ly ho wever the Department o f State advised civilian airlines to fo llo w China`s ins tructio ns andVice Pres ident Biden advised bo th co untries o n his trip to No rtheas t As ia in December 2013 to es tablish a cris is managements tructure Since the US do es no t take a s tance o n the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands` so vereignty Washingto n seemed to igno re Japan`smain grievance abo ut the ADIZ which is China`s intentio n to further reinfo rce its so vereignty claim by extending the ADIZ o ver theis lands The mo s t far-reaching US s tatements were a reco nfirmatio n o f the applicatio n o f the security treaty to the is lands evenmentio ning the is lands by their Japanese and Chinese names and co mplaining that the Chinese actio n was an attempt to unilaterally

change the status quo in the Eas t China Sea which raised regio nal tens io n and increased the risk o f accident and miscalculatio n256

Ho wever in this way the Obama Adminis tratio n risked creating amo ng so me Japanese o bservers do ubts abo ut the Adminis tratio n`sreliability and so gave succo ur to China`s attempt to drive a wedge between the two allies Ano ther co mplicatio n is that the ChineseADIZ o verlaps that o f Ko rea and mo reo ver co vers the submerged ro ck called Ieo do in Ko rean and Suyan in Chinese which has animpact o n the no t yet demarcated EEZ bo rder between bo th co untries Interes tingly the Japanese ADIZ also co vers Ieo do but thishas never been underpinned by any Japanese EEZ claims But China kno ws ho w to play o n So uth Ko rea`s criticism o f Japan`sattitude to wards the his to ry is sue and the territo rial dispute with Japan o ver Do kto Takeshima is land Mo reo ver the As ian co untriesco ntes ting China`s claims to parts o f the So uth China Sea are co ncerned that China wo uld further co mplicate the territo rialdisputes in the area by es tablishing an ADIZ Yet the ASEAN member s tates have been very cautio us in directly criticis ing ChinaChina`s es tablishment o f the ADIZ directly affects many co untries because so many o f them have airlines flying thro ugh the zo neHo wever with the exceptio n o f Japan all o thers agred to co nfo rm with China`s reques t fo r no tif icatio n which undermines theJapanese go vernment`s po s itio n o f explicitly advis ing Japanese airlines no t to co nfo rm

With these escalating develo pments the Chinese s ide achieved its go al o f sho wing that the Japanese autho rities are no lo nger infull co ntro l o f the disputed is lands In the case o f Chinese Co as tguard vessel intrus io ns the reactio n o f the Japanese CG is limitedto shado wing the Chinese vessels to info rm them that they are vio lating Japan`s CZ o r TW and to ask them to leave whichho wever they do at their o wn dis cretio n (the time span ho vering in the CZ o r TW having beco me a further means o f Chinesepressure) fo llo wed by diplo matic pro tes ts Otherwise the CG has avo ided any phys ical co nfro ntatio n o r co ntact When co nfro ntedby the CG the Chinese vessels s imply declare (by radio o r even electro nic displays ) that they are patro lling Chinese waters and thatthe CG ships were o perating illegally in these waters This ritual has so far prevented vio lence This is in co ntras t to an exchange o fwater canno n salvo s between the CG and the Taiwanese co as t guard in the territo rial o f the Senkaku Is lands o n 25 September 2012

and again o n 24 January 2013257

The increase o f patro ls by Japan and China is caus ing o peratio nal s train fo r bo th s ides (also rais ing the risk o f miscalculatio ns o ro verreactio ns ) but this has no t reduced the willingness o f either go vernment to s cale do wn the almo s t daily demo ns tratio ns o f

`effective co ntro l` In Octo ber it was repo rted that the CG no w always maintains ten vessels agains t eight fro m China258 The 11th

regio nal headquarters respo ns ible fo r the Senkaku area is in Naha and has nine patro l ships (but o nly seven vessels o f at leas t

1000 to ns ) but no w needs additio nal ships which are dispatched fro m o ther regio nal headquarters 259 In April 2012 the CG had ato tal o f 357 patro l vessels but o nly 51 o ver 1000 to ns which are tho se mo s t needed fo r a far flung area like the Senkaku

Is lands 26 0 On 14 September 2012 Senio r Vice Minis ter o f Fisheries Iwamo to Tsukasa mentio ned plans to increase the number o f

fishery patro l vessels to ensure fishermens safety amid intens ifying territo rial disputes with China and So uth Ko rea26 1 On 26Octo ber the Minis try o f Land Infras tructure Transpo rt and To urism which heads the CG anno unced plans to increase budgetary

reques ts fo r mo re ships 26 2 The Abe go vernment plans to build mo re vessels o r advance the calendar retro fit vessels which were to

be retired and is co ns idering extending the retirement age o f the o fficers 26 3

The Chinese have fewer vessels which can be deplo yed as far as the Senkaku Is lands In additio n leave o f the sailo rs has been

res tricted and their deplo yment length at sea has increased26 4 In March 2013 the Chinese s ide anno unced clo ser co o peratio nbetween the military and vario us maritime law enfo rcement agencies as well as the merger o f fo ur maritime law enfo rcementagencies under the State Ocean Adminis tratio n (adminis tered by the Minis try o f Land and Reso urces ) ie the China MarineSurveillance the co as t guard fo rces o f the Public Security Minis try the fisheries law enfo rcement co mmand o f the Agriculture

Minis try and the maritime anti-smuggling po lice o f the General Adminis tratio n o f Cus to ms 26 5

Ano ther wo rrying develo pment is the gradual invo lvement o f the PLA navy (PLAN) and the Maritime Self Defence Fo rce (MSDF) TheJapanese MOD anno unced o n 16 Octo ber 2012 that fo r the firs t time PLAN ships were o bserved navigating in the 22-km-wide CZbetween Yo naguni and Irio mo te is lands altho ugh the minis try left o pen the po ss ibility that they did so in o rder to avo id a typho o n

Nevertheless the Gaimusho so ught explanatio ns fro m the Chinese abo ut these ship mo vements 26 6 In December 2012 fo ur PLANships sailed thro ugh the CW o f the Irio mo te-Yo naguni is lands o n the way back fro m drills in the Pacific after having go ne into the

Pacific thro ugh the mo re no rmal ro ute o f the s trait between the Okinawan main is land and Miyako jima26 7 Again there was no thingillegal abo ut it but it raised attentio n at a time o f tens io ns Ho wever there are s igns o f greater co o peratio n o f the PLAN withChinese Co as t Guard vessels as was sho wn in the s tando ff between China and the Philippines aro und the disputed Scarbo ro ugh

Sho al in the So uth China Sea and jo int exercises to o k place between the three in the Eas t China Sea in Octo ber 201226 8 The

patro lling activities o f the MSDF in the Senkaku area became kno wn when the Japanese repo rted at the end o f January 2013 that o n19 January a Chinese frigatersquos target radar had lo cked o nto an MSDF helico pter and o n 30 January ano ther frigate sailing clo se to

an MSDF des tro yer did likewise The Chinese vehemently denied it26 9 Ho wever in March this year the Kyo do news agency repo rtedthat senio r Chinese military o fficials had admitted the incident o f 29 January Even mo re wo rriso me is that the Chinese vessels

acted apparently witho ut prio r appro val fro m the fleet co mmand o r navy headquarters All this was denied by the Chinese s ide270 Itdid no t help that under Prime Minis ter No da the MSDF had been o rdered after the eruptio n o f the 2012 cris is to keep a greaterdis tance fro m PLAN ships than the hitherto 3 km in o rder avo id incidents but this po licy was reversed by the mo re hawkish Abe

adminis tratio n to the previo us 3 km dis tance271 The fire radar lo cking incident had happened at a dis tance o f 3 km

Agains t the backgro und o f greater invo lvement o f military fo rces it is particularly regrettable that a plan to build a maritime liaiso n

mechanism between their defense autho rities o n which they had agreed in June 2012 to make later that year was shelved272

Unfo rtunately it is s till Chinese practice to co ns ider Co nfidence Building Measures (CBM) no t as the firs t s tep to build co nfidencebut as a to o l to extract fro m the o ther s ide prio r co ncess io ns under the pretext o f `creating a better atmo sphere` fo r dis cuss ingCBM The o utbreak o f the September 2012 cris is was therefo re a co nvenient pretext fo r the Chinese to cancel the pro ject Thelates t co nfirmatio n was in March 2013 when General Yin Zhuo explained that there co uld be no military trus t if the po litical and

diplo matic relatio nship is bad273 Since the target radar lo ck-o n incidents the Japanese go vernment is publicly calling fo rresumptio n o f nego tiatio ns fo r the maritime liaiso n mechanism but the Chinese will certainly want to extract so me co ncess io nsbefo re even co ns idering a po s itive respo nse

Ho wever the co ns tant co nfro ntatio n between the po licing and military fo rces o f bo th s ides co uld eas ily lead to a military clasheither as a result o f an unfo reseen civilian o r military incident miscalculatio n o r malicio us intentio n at a lo wer level o f co mmandTwo recent examples o f unfo reseen civilian incidents co uld have escalated One is the attempted landing o n o ne o f the disputedis lands by a Chinese pro tes ter with a ballo o n in January 2014 This incident was peacefully reso lved because Japan did no t arres t theballo o nis t In this case the firs t repo rt o n the crash-landing in the territo rial waters o f Uo tsurijima came fro m the Taiwanese co as tguard which info rmed the Japanese co as t guard fo llo wed by the hand-o ver o f the ballo o nis t to the PRC autho rities o uts ide o f

Japan`s territo rial waters 274 The o ther incident was the s inking o f a Chinese fishing bo at ldquoto the no rth o f the Diao yu Is landsrdquo and

the mo ve o f two Chinese naval () vessels to rescue the crew275 This autho r co uld no t find o ut ho w clo se the fishing bo at came tothe is lands and apparently there has no t been any further repo rting abo ut the incident

The previo us ly mentio ned radar-targeting incidents and these two civilian incidents have no t led to an escalatio n but there is noguarantee fo r the future Shi Yinho ng a pro fesso r at Renmin Univers ity predicts that the territo rial co nflicts in the ECS So uth ChinaSea and alo ng the Sino -Indian bo rder will intens ify because o f po pular natio nalism dynamics within the armed fo rces and o f co urse

also o ur to p leaders perso nal beliefs and s trategic perso nalities 276 Hugh White argues that a war (which co uld lead to a nuclearexchange between China and the US) co uld also begin because the Chinese leadership may co ns ider that s tarting ho s tilities no wrather than later wo uld be mo re beneficial to either tes t US reso lve to defend Japan (which the Chinese leadership do ubts ) anddetermine the is sue o f Chinese supremacy in the As ian regio n which he co ns iders to be the real is sue rather than the is lands

themselves 277

IS THERE A WAY FORWARD

The current co nfro ntatio n is no t o nly co ntinuing but even escalating and do mes tic develo pments in bo th co untries are no t creatingan atmo sphere mo re co nducive to better management o f the cris is let alo ne finding a so lutio n Inactio n runs the risk o f a furtherescalatio n o r even a military clash while po s itive o ptio ns are beco ming fewer Meanwhile bo th co untries suffer fro m the eco no micfall-o ut and heightened tens io ns while the integratio n o f a ris ing China into a new s trategic enviro nment in As ia will beco me evenmo re fraught cas ting a shado w o n Japan`s clo se relatio nship with the US

The 2010 incident ended quickly with Japan`s release o f the captain One reaso n fo r this is certainly the fact that China`s demand in2010 was relatively clear and achievable (release o f the captain) if painful fo r Japan at a time o f a weak and inexperiencedgo vernment This time in September 2012 the cris is firs t hit a go vernment which reacted intrans igently because o f its previo usdefeat and o ther unfavo urable do mes tic circumstances and was then replaced by the mo re hawkish Abe go vernment The Abecabinet`s attitude to wards the pas t as exemplif ied by vario us s tatements by cabinet members and peo ple clo se to it the attempt torevise the Ko no s tatement reco gniz ing the fo rced war pro s titutio n (the military co mfo rt wo men) and Abe`s Yasukuni Shrine vis itall served China`s anti-Japan pro paganda wo rsened Japan-Ko rea relatio ns which China is cleverly explo iting and even angered theUS adminis tratio n Abe is seen as utiliz ing the tens io ns with China to win do mes tic and internatio nal suppo rt fo r Japan to have aldquono rmalrdquo natio nal defence po s ture The latter is welco me by the US adminis tratio n because it wo uld help with the US As ianrealignment and suppo rt its China po licy At the same time China`s actio ns cas t an o mino us shado w o n its intentio ns in the So uthChina Sea and Abe and mo re impo rtantly the US is suppo rting the claimants there agains t China

Under these bilateral multilateral and regio nal circumstances wo uld China be satis fied with go ing back to the `unders tanding abo utsetting as ide the dispute` in co njunctio n with Japan`s reco gnitio n o f the exis tence o f a territo rial dispute o r wo uld it demand areversal o f the purchase o f the three is lands Wo uld it demand the end o f Japanese CG patro ls aro und the is lands China`ss tandard demand no w that Japan `co rrect its mis takes` is rather ambiguo us because it co uld be interpreted as go ing back to theshelving unders tanding and the reco gnitio n o f the exis tence o f a dispute o r demanding a reversal o f the go vernment`s purchase o f

the is lands 278 The latter wo uld s imply be impo ss ible in legal and practical terms and o ne can o nly ho pe that the ambiguity is o nlyaimed at rais ing China`s nego tiatio n po s itio n ando r leaving eno ugh wiggle ro o m fo r nego tiatio ns which wo uld satis fy all Chineses takeho lders` interes ts

It seems that it is already to o late fo r go ing back to the shelving agreement o f 19721978 which wo uld imply that the two s ides canso meho w go back to the status quo o f the 1970s This as we have seen has been superseded by deeds and wo rds o n bo th s ides The Chinese have no w no t o nly publicly declared that the shelving agreement was lsquobro kenrsquo by Japan but after the firs t Y12 patro l o n13 December 2012 co mmented that ldquoThe s ituatio n has changed It has beco me no rmal fo r Chinas marine surveillance vessels to

enter the 12-nautical-mile zo ne Japans actual co ntro l o ver the is lands has go nerdquo279

The bilateral relatio nship has deterio rated to the extent that at leas t shelving the co nflicting so vereignty claims without o fficiallyadmitting that there is a territo rial dispute is no lo nger an o ptio n acceptable to China because it feels Japan has abused theshelving co nsensus thro ugh a series o f adminis trative measures with the final s traw having been the central go vernmentrsquos purchaseo f three is lands When s tudying the vario us Chinese o fficial s tatements and news repo rts after the 2012 cris is had fully erupted inSeptember it beco mes clear that until Octo ber 2012 the Chinese s till raised the demand that Japan sho uld go back to the previo uslsquounders tandingrsquo o r lsquoco nsensus rsquo but this demand was no t made o ften thereafter It reappeared in remarks by Wang Jiarui the head o fthe Co mmunis t partys Internatio nal Department when meeting Yamaguchi Natsuo the leader o f the junio r co alitio n partner

Ko meito in January 201328 0 Previo us ly a co mment o n the Xinhua internet s ite o n 29 Octo ber said that ldquoThe lsquopurchasersquo sho wed thatthe Japanese go vernment has who lly abando ned the attitude o f laying as ide disputes and has fundamentally changed the

s ituatio nrdquo28 1 On 30 Octo ber the CMOFA spo kesperso n declared that lsquoJapans illegal purchase o f the Diao yu Is lands bro ke the

impo rtant co nsensus The Japanese s ide sho uld no t have any mo re illus io n o f o ccupying the Diao yu Is lands What the Japaneses ide sho uld do is to face up to the reality admit the so vereignty dispute co rrect mis takes and co me back to the track o f a

nego tiated settlement`28 2 The lates t o fficial pro po sal to shelve the is lands is sue was made by the fo rmer fo reign minis ter Tang

Jiaxuan o n 16 July 201428 3

The reco gnitio n o f a territo rial pro blem wo uld be relatively easy fo r Japanese public o pinio n (and even mo re so fo r Japanrsquos friendsand allies ) to accept because they wo uld no t see the need fo r any kind o f diplo matic o r legal so phis try fo r what is o bvio us ly aterrito rial co nflict whatever the legitimacy o f the Chinese claim might be given also the fact that the current Japanese po s itio nco mes do wn to refus ing to even dis cuss whatever settlement might be po ss ible Acco rding to a survey co nducted by Genro nto gether with Zho ngguo Ribao she in June 2012 627 per cent o f Japanese agreed that there exis ts a territo rial pro blem dispute

(176 disagreed) co mpared with 822 o f the Chinese (139 disagreed)28 4 Ho wever co nsecutive Japanese cabinets haverefused to reco gnise the exis tence o f a territo rial dispute which is o ften the default po s itio n o f a go vernment in actual co ntro l o f adisputed territo ry (fo r example the Ko rean go vernmentrsquos po s itio n o n Do kto Takeshima) This po s itio n has been reinfo rced by theexplicit Japanese denial s ince the 1990s o f a shelving agreement which wo uld have been an implicit admiss io n that there is adispute To circumvent the risk o f being perceived as admitting the exis tence o f a territo rial pro blem the deputy prime minis ter o fthe previo us No da go vernment Okada Katsuya was repo rted to have mentio ned in a speech in Octo ber 2012 that there was no

territo rial dispute but as a matter o f fact a debate exis ted28 5 Ho wever this co mpro mise so lutio n was never co nfirmed by the No dago vernment and did no t beco me po licy It is even less likely to be acceptable to the new Abe go vernment Even amo ng influentialo pinio n makers there is hardly any suppo rt fo r admitting the exis tence o f a territo rial co nflict o r o f a shelving agreement Even mo reco nciliato ry s tatements o n this subject are rather vague Maehara Seiji o f the Demo cratic Party declared in a co nference at QinghuaUnivers ity in Beijing in September 2013 that the Japanese go vernment sho uld add (to its o wn po s itio n) that China has a differentview (Senkakusho to wo meguru Niho n seifu no tachiba ni tsuite lsquoChugo ku ga chigau kangaekata wo mo tte iru to iuko to wo ichigen

tsukekuwaerubeki darsquo) At the same time he emphas ised ho wever that there was no territo rial dispute28 6 Japan Bus inessFederatio n Chairman Yo nekura Hiro masa mentio ned in September 2012 in an NHK interview that the go vernment sho uld be mo re

flexible s ince o therwise its s tance co uld be taken to mean that Japan has no intentio n o f so lving the dispute28 7 Miyamo to Yuji thefo rmer Japanese ambassado r to China is quo ted as saying that lsquoThe go vernment do es no t need to alter its bas ic po s itio n but in

reality a co nflict do es exis t o ver the Senkaku is les rsquo 28 8 This is also the s tance which the previo us Japanese ambassado r Niwa

Uichiro takes in an article after his return to Japan28 9

Co ncerning co nflict reso lutio n it is interes ting to no te that when asked abo ut the mo dern s ignificance o f the 1978 Japan-ChinaPeace and Friendship Treaty 68 4 o f the po lled Japanese agreed with Art 12 (lsquoThe two parties shall settle all disputes by peacefulmeans and shall refrain fro m the use o r threat o f fo rcersquo) but o nly 525 o f the Chinese agreed Mo reo ver 58 1 o f the Chinese

favo ur China s trengthening its co ntro l o ver the area29 0

If therefo re a new ldquoimplicit unders tandingrdquo abo ut shelving the dispute is achievable it wo uld have to be based o n learning fro m thefailures o f the 19721978 shelving ie it wo uld be necessary to achieve a mutual unders tanding o f what the s tatus quo is whatwo uld undermine the s tatus quo and what has to be do ne to mo ve fro m co nflict management to so lutio n Quite clearly such a newunders tanding wo uld be less favo urable to Japan`s current s tance o n the dispute

FROM CONFLICT MANAGEMENT TO ADDRESSING THE SOVEREIGNTY ISSUE

Any mo ve fo rward will certainly require decis ive leadership o n bo th s ides be it to take the initiative o r to respo nd po s itively to theinitiative o f s tarting the pro cess to wards reso lutio n In view o f the co mplex backgro und o f the external and internal dynamics it iso bvio us that address ing the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands dispute requires a s tep-by-s tep appro ach The ultimate is sue to address is theso vereignty is sue and territo rial disputes are generally viewed as zero sum in nature given their clo se link to co re securityinteres ts Even tho se who reco gnize the impo rtance o f transcending such lo gic in favo ur o f co ndo minium o r shared so vereigntygenerally ho ld that the is sue can o nly be addressed at the las t s tage o f any nego tiated pro cess if at all

Two impo rtant is sues have to be co ns idered at the beginning to what extent have the vario us s tages o f the nego tiating pro cess tobe agreed befo rehand (lsquoro ad maprsquo) o r even the final o utco me whether a viable co ndo minium o r o nly shelving the is sues and co uldthe ro le o f a third party mediato r be helpfulacceptable In view o f the po litical diff iculties o n bo th s ides the s tart o f thenego tiatio n pro cess wo uld be endangered if there is no t sufficient ro o m fo r ambiguity and interpretatio n abo ut the vario us s tages altho ugh the general aim o f tens io n reductio n and suspens io n o f the so vereignty is sue mus t be clearly agreed

A third party mediato r is pro bably no t acceptable to the Chinese s ide The third party mo s t o ften mentio ned is the Internatio nalCo urt o f Jus tice (ICJ) o r any kind o f internatio nal arbitratio n Ho wever this seems unlikely in view o f China`s preference fo rbilateral nego tiatio ns and its refusal to accept judicial settlement by the ICJ o r any internatio nal arbitratio n except in no n-po litical

areas such as trade29 1 The Japanese go vernment wo uld be willing to accept the jurisdictio n o f the ICJ but o nly if China brings the

case to the Co urt les t it be perceived as ackno wledging the exis tence o f a territo rial dispute29 2 But there are also po litical andpro cedural arguments agains t the reco urse to the ICJ China`s legal argumentatio n is co mparatively weak and s ince a negativejudgement co uld have implicatio ns fo r China`s legal claim to mo s t o f the So uth China Sea there is even less o f a chance o f Chinamaking an exceptio n fo r the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands dispute In view o f the entrenched po s itio ns o f bo th s ides and the risk o f a`winner takes all` o utco me o f internatio nal litigatio n bo th go vernments wo uld face co ns iderable do mes tic res is tance in case o f anegative o utco me In view o f the urgency o f the dispute and the lo ng time it takes fo r a judgement there wo uld also be the risk o fdo mes tic fo rces trying to pre-empt a negative result

In view o f the security is sues invo lved (let alo ne the American his to rical `debt` as a result o f Washingto n`s ambiguity related toWashingto n`s ending o f the adminis tratio n o f Okinawa in 1972) an American mediatio n co uld be seen as natural and even inAmerican interes ts Such an American ro le ho wever is extremely unlikely as it wo uld be seen by China as unduly advantageo us toJapan Ho wever at so me po int during the Japan-China nego tiatio n pro cess the US might ass is t (o r even be reques ted) by agreeingto certain Co nfidence and Security Building Measures (CSBM) in the area aro und the is lands

The firs t s tage wo uld have to co ns is t o f measures which reduce the risk o f a military clash but in a way which prevents theperceptio n that o ne s ide is giving in to co ercio n This s tage wo uld be a gradual phas ing o ut o f intrus io ns by Chinese o fficial vesselsand aircraft into the territo rial waters co ntiguo us zo ne and airspace o f the is lands which is recipro cated by Japanrsquos reducing in thesame way its co as tguard patro ls in the two zo nes as well as its s crambling activities in the is lands` airspace There were repo rts in

June 2013 that China called o n Japan to agree to a 12-nautical-mile no -entry zo ne aro und the is lands 29 3 Japan rejected this co urse

Ano ther measure wo uld be to increase the dis tance at which vessels o f bo th maritime fo rces o bserve each o ther Such s teps sho uldultimately be o fficialised by a gradually expanding series o f CSBMs and a bilateral liaiso n mechanism This co uld also include ademilitarisatio n agreement as an incentive fo r the Chinese s ide It wo uld be vital that the s teps at this s tage be incremental that nos tep is explo ited in a o ne-s ided way and that they are co ns idered irrevers ible At the same time bo th s ides have to prevent peo plefro m appro aching the is lands s ince this wo uld be seen as a pro vo catio n by the o ther s ide This latter task is technically no t easy

because o f the co ntro vers ial character o f any co mpro mise with certain no n-s tate acto rs in Japan China Ho ng Ko ng and Taiwan The(failed) landing o f a Chinese ho t ballo o n o n o ne o f the is lands in January 2014 demo ns trated at the same time the technical

diff iculty o f a no -entry po licy as well as the po ss ibility o f a success ful co o peratio n o f the co as tguards o f all three co untries 29 4

At this firs t s tage o r leading to the next there will have to be a Japanese go vernment s tatement to the effect that there is alsquopro blemrsquo related to the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands This can be wo rded in such a way that the sens itive express io n `territo rialpro blem` (which is s trenuo us ly denied by the go vernment) is avo ided and it can be supplemented by a sentence that such as tatement in no way prejudices the legal po s itio n o f the go vernment Such a qualifying s tatement is fo r example included in the

Japan-China agreement fo r prio r no tif icatio n o f research vessels fro m bo th co untries in the Eas t China Sea in 200029 5 A s imilarqualif icatio n is part o f the 1997 Japan-China Fisheries Agreement In the jo int co mmuniqueacute o f 1972 which no rmalised diplo maticrelatio ns between Japan and China diplo matic wo rding also managed to bridge the huge gap between their s tances o n Taiwan whichthe PRC co ns iders an lsquoinalienable partrsquo o f its territo ry Japan co ns iders the so vereignty is sue s till unreso lved because the 1951 SanFrancis co Peace Treaty Art 2 (b) o nly s tipulated that lsquoJapan reno unces all right title and claim to Fo rmo sa and the Pescado res rsquowitho ut clarifying the recipient o f the territo ry The co mpro mise in 1972 was reached with the sentence that Japan lsquofully unders tandsand respects this s tand o f the Go vernment o f the Peo ples Republic o f China and it f irmly maintains its s tand under Article 8 o f thePo tsdam Pro clamatio nrsquo

POSSIBLE APPROACHES TO THE SOVEREIGNTY ISSUE

The mo s t diff icult pro blem is the so vereignty is sue which go es to the co re o f any co untry`s security interes ts It is no t imaginablethat either s ide will reno unce its claim to the is lands Sides tepping o r shelving the is sue is o nly useful if the lesso ns fro m the 1972and 1978 attempts as o utlined abo ve can be learned and applied but there is s till the fundamental pro blem with the implicitassumptio n that the quality o f the bilateral relatio nship will always be as go o d as when the s ides tepping agreement was achievedand can be maintained in perpetuity o r until the so vereignty is sue can be addressed But in o rder to so lve the so vereignty is sue aneven better relatio nship has to be created This better relatio nship co uld be bro ught abo ut by the s teps explained abo ve and furtherbelo w

An impo rtant co nditio n fo r any las ting territo rial co mpro mise wo uld be reducing the value o f the is lands fo r bo th co untries whichcan be achieved by o ne o f the measures pro po sed fo r s tage 1 ie reso lutely preventing anyo ne fro m appro aching the territo ries(including to tal demilitarizatio n) which in themselves are eco no mically wo rthless and are uninhabited The main po int is to preventany go vernmental act which co uld be interpreted as being part o f the `so vereignty game` The mo s t diff icult part here is to preventany act by no n-go vernmental acto rs This wo uld have to include the territo rial waters and the explo itatio n there in o f any kind o freso urces including fishing Scientif ic interes ts in the is lands co uld be served by bilateral surveys witho ut any po litical co nno tatio ns

There have been pro po sals to declare the is lands an Internatio nal Nature and Wildlife Preserve29 6 Such a preserve wo uld have to beadminis tered either bilaterally o r by a relevant internatio nal o rganisatio n and as such co uld serve as a co nfidence-building measure

The abo ve s teps wo uld then allo w the two s ides to deal with the co ns iderable eco no mic interes ts in fishing and the explo itatio n o fhydro carbo n reso urces and o ther seabed reso urces aro und the is lands ie in the Exclus ive Eco no mic Zo ne ando r the ExtendedCo ntinental Shelf Once the is lands` land area and the territo rial waters have been put as ide it wo uld be eas ier to co me to ano verall agreement o n the delimitatio n o f the EEZ bo rder (with the exceptio n o f the no rthern part which wo uld require a trilateralagreement between China Japan and Ko rea) which wo uld include the delimitatio n o f these surro unding waters It wo uld facilitate aco mpro mise if bo th s ides agree that the is lands do no t merit their o wn EEZ This might be diff icult fo r Japan which claims an EEZ fo rOkino to rishima refuted by China s ince it co ns iders the reef no t to be an is land acco rding to Art 121 o f UNCLOS

A co mpro mise o n the so vereignty is sue co uld o nly be the o utco me ndash if at all ndash o f a success ful pro cess o f the abo ve o r co mparables teps In o rder to avo id a `winner take all` s ituatio n the co mpro mise wo uld have to invo lve a sharing arrangement His to ry o ffers

quite a number o f internatio nal precedents o f shared so vereignty referred to as co ndo minium in internatio nal law29 7 One case withso me s imilarities to the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands is a small is land (3000 sq m) in the river separating France and Spain kno wn asPheasant Is land o r Co nference Is land which even to day s till changes every s ix mo nths between France and Spain as o wner Like theSenkakuDiao yu Is lands the is land has no eco no mic value anymo re and the is land is o ff limits It was the lo catio n o f the s igning o f

the Treaty o f the Pyrenees in 1659 which ended a lo ng war 29 8 Mo s t o ther examples o f jo int so vereignty co ncern territo ries with apo pulatio n which makes co o peratio n much mo re diff icult Other his to rical precedents o f sharing so vereignty are the es tablishmento f ldquoneutral zo nesrdquo Acco rdingly the is lands and po ss ibly a sea area aro und the is lands co uld be declared a neutral zo ne like the o nebetween Saudi Arabia and Kuwait (1922-1965) On July 7 1965 the two go vernments s igned an agreement (which to o k effect o nJuly 25 1966) to partitio n the Neutral Zo ne adjo ining their respective territo ries A demarcatio n agreement dividing the NeutralZo ne was s igned o n December 17 1967

Particularly relevant here is that Saudi Arabia as well as Kuwait explo ited the o il reso urces under a jo int o perating agreement29 9

Co nclus io ns

The actio n-reactio n pattern o f the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands dispute is accelerating and the initiative seems to be mo re o ften thanno t with the Chinese s ide while the Japanese s ide is in a defens ive po s itio n The danger o f a military co nfro ntatio n is lo o mingincreas ingly larger in what co uld be called a lsquochicken gamersquo At the same time the internal and external dynamics are undermining theenviro nment which is required fo r a peaceful so lutio n as well as fo r maintaining the number o f po s itive o ptio ns While the Japanesego vernment refuses to ackno wledge the very exis tence o f a territo rial dispute the Chinese go vernment is no w (July 2014) evenrefus ing to have a dialo gue with Japan`s current prime minis ter It is po ss ible that the Chinese s ide again wants to wait with anymo ve fo rward until the Japanese prime minis ter has changed as Beijing did with Prime Minis ter Sato Eisaku o r with Prime Minis terKo izumi Junichiro But waiting fo r an impro vement o f the bilateral atmo sphere as the Chinese s ide likes to s tress is a very riskyo ptio n and such an impro vement may anyway be a very sho rt windo w o f o ppo rtunity if lo o king at the ups and do wns o f the po s t-1949 his to ry o f the bilateral relatio nship

To s tart a s tep-by-s tep pro cess o f address ing the territo rial is sue s tro ng leadership is required which unders tands the widerinteres ts o f a functio ning Japanese-Chinese relatio nship Japan s imply asking China fo r a summit meeting is no t very sens ible ifthere is no willingness to engage in subs tantive dis cuss io ns and wo uld be very risky fo r China`s to p leader if the Japanese primeminis ter then vis its the Yasukuni Shrine The his to ry is sue sho uld no lo nger be a Chinese lever fo r pressuris ing Japan but the latterhas to abs tain fro m actio ns which are seen as pro vo cative no t o nly by China but also by Ko rea the US and many o thers There hasto be a co mmitted leadership o n bo th s ides which s tarts with a ro ugh ro ad map and tens io n-reducing s teps such as CSBMs en ro uteto agreeing o n a fo rmula which allo ws the parties to o btain eco no mic as well as security gains while reducing tens io ns

Reinhard Drifte is Emeritus Professor of Japanese Politics University of Newcastle UK and Visiting Professor at various Japanese Universities andPau University (France) He is the author of Japanrsquos Foreign Policy for the Twenty First Century His home page is here

Reco mmended citatio n Reinhard Drifte The Japan-China Confrontation Over the SenkakuDiaoyu Islands--Between shelving and dispute

Okinawa which was returned as a territo ry and where the US to day has a co nsulate-general and the Senkaku Is lands which wereo nly reco gnised as being under the adminis tratio n o f Japan Any co nflicting so vereignty claims were explicitly left fo r the partiesco ncerned to so rt o ut after the revers io n o f Okinawa which included the Senkaku Is lands Since Art V o f the bilateral security treatyapplied to all Japanese territo ry being under Japanese adminis tratio n the security guarantee therefo re applied also to the is lands In this way the US co ntributed s ignificantly to the current diff icult s ituatio n

This rather self-serving ambiguo us US po s itio n was enunciated when the US Adminis tratio n s tated during Senate hearings o n therevers io n that `The United States has made no claim to the Senkaku Is lands and co ns iders that any co nflicting claims to the is lands

are a matter fo r reso lutio n by the parties co ncerned` the latter including the ROC and the PRC38 Since the revers io n in 1971 the UShas s tuck to no t taking a po s itio n o n the so vereignty o f the Senkaku Is lands and emphas iz ing that the 1971 Agreement trans ferredo nly the `adminis trative rights` to Japan In this way the US allo wed Japan to regain co ntro l o ver the Senkaku Is lands and enabled itto reinfo rce its so vereignty claim thanks to the revers io n When reading the pro po sal by Natio nal Security Staff member Jo hnHo ldridge to return `the Ryukyus (sic) and the Senkakus` but to pass no judgement as to the co nflicting claims to them HenryKiss inger wro te candidly o n the margin o f the memo o f 13 April 1971 `But that is no nsense s ince it gives is lands back to Japan

Ho w can we get a mo re neutral po s itio n`39

While the abo ve sheds so me light o n why the ROC did no t make any public claims to the title o f the Senkakus between 1945 and1970 it do es no t explain its s ilence befo re that perio d o r even fo r the perio d 1945-1949 ie befo re the es tablishment o f the PRCShaw o ffers the theo ry that this was because the ROC go vernment did no t have any his to ry o f ruling Taiwan and had to rely o n

Japanese co lo nial reco rds and maps when it to o k o ver Taiwan in 194540 The US Department o f State do cuments (FRUS) reveal thatfo r the ROC go vernment it was very much the o ppo s itio n by public o pinio n in Taiwan to the is lands` return to Japan as well as by

o verseas Chinese which put pressure o n Taibei in 1970 to o ppo se the trans fer o f the is lands to Japan41 Ano ther reaso n no tmentio ned in these do cuments is the repo rt o f hydro carbo n reserves aro und the is lands The Co mmittee fo r Co o rdinatio n o f Jo intPro specting fo r Mineral Reso urces in As ian Offsho re Areas (CCOP) under the auspices o f the UN Eco no mic Co mmiss io n fo r As iaand the Far Eas t (ECAFE) had co nducted a geo phys ical survey in 1968 The Co mmittee said in a repo rt in May 1969 that the

co ntinental shelf between Taiwan and Japan may be extremely rich in o il reserves 42 So o n after the publicatio n o f this repo rt Japans tarted to explo re with Taiwan and the Republic o f Ko rea po ss ibilities fo r jo int develo pment o f the Sea`s hydro carbo n reso urces InMarch 1969 Japan began pro tracted nego tiatio ns with Taiwan and So uth Ko rea leading to an agreement in principle in September

1970 to set up a jo int develo pment pro ject43

If the ROC had until 1945 no experience o f ruling Taiwan then the PRC go vernment had even less experience with the area o f theSenkaku Is lands Their negligible s ize and remo te lo catio n befo re the likeliho o d o f hydro carbo n reserves was raised certainly didno t draw any attentio n to them The abo ve circumstances also explain the timing o f the PRC`s claim In additio n and pro bably mo reurgent at a time when the go vernment was jus t emerging fro m the po litical ravages o f the Cultural Revo lutio n the PRC co uld no ts tay quiet in the face o f ROC and o verseas Chinese claims if it wanted to be reco gnized as the so le representative o f China Thefirs t newspaper repo rts abo ut China`s claims came o ut in May 1970 after Japan and Taiwan had s tarted talks o n jo intly explo ringthe energy reso urces aro und the Senkaku Is lands and Okinawa`s revers io n was anno unced Only o n 30 December 1971 did the

Chinese Fo reign Minis try publish an o fficial s tatement claiming the is lands 44

The weakes t po int o f the territo rial claim to the Senkaku Is lands by the ROC and s ince 1949 also that by the PRC is therefo re thatuntil the ECAFE survey o f the Eas t China Sea the is lands were no t claimed by either go vernment and Japan`s co ntro l o ver the

is lands had been unco ntes ted Shaw calls this absence o f o bjectio n a `serio us po litical miss tep`45 The co ntras t to the Chineseclaims to almo s t the who le o f the So uth China Sea is revealing the 9 dash line (o riginally 11 dash line) o n which China`s claims tothe So uth China Sea is based was already es tablished in 1947 but had appeared in Chinese maps in o ne fo rm o r ano ther s ince

1936 and was then taken o ver in 1949 by the PRC46

In meetings with PRC academics in February 2013 this autho r was given several reaso ns fo r the lo ng s ilence o f the Beijinggo vernment including so me o f tho se mentio ned abo ve Firs t o f all the go vernment saw no reaso n to specifically claim the is landsbecause acco rding to the PRC interpretatio n o f the Shimo no seki Treaty o f 1895 Therefo re having been taken away fro m China aspart o f Taiwan Japan was o bligated to return them as a result o f the abo ve-mentio ned wartime and po s twar agreements Allco unterarguments abo ut the is lands no t having been mentio ned in these agreements (in co ntras t to eg the Penghu Is lands) wereswept away by the assertio n that the Diao yu Is lands are part o f Taiwan The US adminis tratio n o ver Okinawa which explicitly includesthe Senkaku Is lands and the USUK s tatement co ncerning Japan`s res idual so vereignty o ver Okinawa during the San Francis co PeaceTreaty nego tiatio ns (at that time no difference between Japanese so vereignty o ver Okinawa and adminis trative rights o ver theSenkaku Is lands had yet been made) were s imply co ns idered as having been addressed by two PRC s tatements in 1951 whichdeclared the treaty illegal Interes tingly in these s tatements Beijing claimed the Paracel Is lands the Spratly Is lands and the Pratas

Is lands as part o f China47 Even if the PRC co ns idered the Senkaku Is lands as part o f Taiwan it is s trange that no claim to theSenkaku Is lands was made altho ugh Taiwan was under the co ntro l o f the Guo mindang whereas the Senkaku Is lands in co ntras twere placed under US adminis tratio n (and mo reo ver jo ined to Okinawa) while the Pratas Is lands were placed under UN Trus teeshipAno ther explanatio n given by these PRC academics fo r China`s s ilence is the absence o f diplo matic relatio ns between Beijing andTo kyo until 1972 It is no t clear to this autho r why this sho uld have prevented Beijing fro m pro tes ting agains t Japan`s territo rialclaim to the is lands s ince the go vernment o n many o ccas io ns befo re 1972 pro tes ted Japanese po licies and even co ncluded`private` fishery agreements which managed to circumvent the territo rial dispute Ano ther reaso n mentio ned was China`s do mes ticins tability during the Cultural Revo lutio n 1966-69 which certainly dis tracted the PRC leadership fro m dealing with such a mino r is sueas these far away is lands

WAS THE SENKAKUDIAOYU ISSUE SHELVED IN 1972 AND 1978

What had kept the territo rial dispute between To kyo and Beijing under co ntro l fro m the 1970s until the beginning o f the 1990s wasa tacit unders tanding (`anmo ku no ryo kai` in Japanese) in 1972 and 1978 to shelve the dispute (`tana age` in Japanese `gezhi` inChinese) Ho wever the Japanese go vernment later explicitly denied such an unders tanding Since this shelving agreement helped tokeep the territo rial co nflict under wraps fo r such a lo ng time despite several incidents and played a critical ro le in the 2010 and 2012crises it is impo rtant to inves tigate the circumstances o f what was unders to o d in 1972 and 1978 and why this unders tanding fellapart Mo reo ver this autho r is co nvinced that ano ther ldquounders tandingrdquo will have to be fo und in o rder to escape fro m the currentdangero us co nfro ntatio n but this will o nly be po ss ible if the appro priate lesso ns can be learned fro m the demise o f the 19721978unders tanding

In 1972 the two co untries no rmalized diplo matic relatio ns and in 1978 they co ncluded a Peace and Friendship Treaty On theo ccas io n o f bo th nego tiatio ns it was the Japanese s ide which raised the is sue o f the Senkaku Is lands and agreed to pro ceed to aco nclus io n o f the respective nego tiatio ns despite diametrically o ppo sed claims to the o wnership o f the Senkaku Is lands In o therwo rds bo th go vernments agreed to shelve the is sue albeit no t in writing o r in any public o r legal fo rm In the case o f the September1972 nego tiatio ns between Prime Minis ter Tanaka Kakuei and Prime Minis ter Zho u Enlai the territo rial is sue (as well as the exactwo rding o f Japan`s apo lo gies abo ut its pas t actio ns in China which Tanaka o ffered to Zho u Enlai) was so sens itive fo r the

Japanese go vernment that the reco rd o f the Gaimusho o mits the reactio n o f Tanaka to Zho u Enlai`s refusal to dis cuss theterrito rial is sue This part was deleted by the then head o f the China Divis io n in the Gaimusho Hashimo to Hiro shi who lateradmitted this in an interview in 2000 In the interview he said that Tanaka Kakuei in reactio n to Zho u Enlai`s reaso ning that it wo uld

be better no t to dis cuss the pro blem o f the Senkaku Is lands replied `Let`s dis cuss it ano ther time`48 Yabuki Susumu co rro batesthis reactio n by quo ting the bo o k by Zhang Xiangshan an adviser to the Chinese Minis try o f Fo reign Affairs who was present at o neo f the meetings Acco rding to his reco rd Tanaka replied `All right Then it is no t necessary to talk anymo re abo ut it Let`s do it

ano ther time`49 Befo re this summit meeting Ko meito Chairman Takeiri Yo shikatsu who served as an impo rtant go -between fo r theJapanese go vernment to prepare the vis it by Prime Minis ter Tanaka had a s imilar exchange with Zho u Enlai in July 1972 when it wasalso decided to shelve the Senkaku is sue When Takeiri met Zho u Enlai o n 28 July 1972 the latter is quo ted as saying `There is noneed to to uch o n the Senkaku Is lands is sue Mr Takeiri yo u also had no interes t I also had no interes t But the his to rians raise itas a pro blem due to the o il is sue and Mr Ino ue Kiyo shi is very keen o n it Ho wever there is no need to place impo rtance o n it

(omoku miru)`50 It is an iro ny that Zho u Enlai even referred to a Japanese academic Pro fesso r Ino ue Kiyo shi who se his to ricals tudies favo ur China`s claim o n his to rical gro unds and who se views had been presented in an article in the People`s Daily in May1971 In these dis cuss io ns it was made quite clear by bo th s ides that the no rmalizatio n o f diplo matic relatio ns was the mo s timpo rtant go al and therefo re they agreed to shelve the Senkaku is sue

When bo th s ides nego tiated the Treaty o f Peace and Friendship in 1978 there was a s imilar willingness to put the territo rial pro blemas ide in o rder to achieve the co nclus io n o f the Treaty altho ugh the Gaimusho (Japan`s Minis try o f Fo reign Affairs ) has so far no treleased the do cuments Acco rding to Fravel a chro no lo gy (nianpu in Chinese) o f Dengrsquos activities published by a party researcho ffice summarizes a meeting between Deng Xiao ping and Japan`s Fo reign Minis ter So no da Sunao acco rding to which Deng s tated`Its no t that China and Japan do no t have any pro blems Fo r example [there are] the Diao yu Is land and co ntinental shelf is sues Do nt drag them in no w they can be set as ide to be calmly dis cussed later and we can s lo wly reach a way that bo th s ides can accept

If o ur generatio n canno t find a way the next generatio n o r the o ne after that will f ind a wayrsquo 51 After the ratif icatio n o f the TreatyDeng vis ited Japan and declared at a press co nference o n 25 Octo ber 1978 that the is sue sho uld be left to future generatio ns whomay be wiser In Diet dis cuss io ns it was also made clear by LDP Secretary General Ohira Masayo shi and Fo reign Minis ter So no daSunao that it was in Japan`s natio nal interes t to go alo ng with Deng Xiao ping`s pro po sal to leave things fo r the next 20 o r 30

years 52 Ohira declared at the time o n the ques tio n o f an agreement to shelve the is sue (tana age) that `tana age` was no t co rrect

rather the o ther party (senpo ) wo uld no t bring the is sue up (mo chidasanai)53 Or as So no da wro te later while it is true that Chinais claiming these is lands as their territo ry the is lands are currently in Japans hands and have no t beco me an actual is sue amo ngJapan and China If Japan takes the tro uble to bring up the subject at this o ccas io n and wakes up a s leeping giant ( literally `dis turb

a bush o nly to let a snake o utrsquo ndash yabu wo tsutsuite hebi wo dasu) it will be a to tal lo ss (moto mo ko mo nai) fo r Japan54

One canno t but co nclude fro m these acco unts that bo th s ides agreed to shelve the territo rial is sue while in no way abando ning theirclaims to the is lands o therwise there wo uld no t have been a no rmalizatio n o f diplo matic relatio ns in 1972 o r a Treaty o f Peace andFriendship in 1978 It did no t mean that the Chinese accepted Japan`s territo rial claim s ince China had s tated its o wn claim in thesenego tiatio ns and has s ince 1971 never abando ned the claim It is also o bvio us that bo th s ides knew that there was a territo rialpro blem o therwise `shelving` wo uld no t have made sense The directo r o f the Treaties Divis io n and later Directo r General o f theTreaties Bureau Kuriyama Takakazu who was invo lved in the nego tiatio ns in 1972 and in 1978 s tated in an interview in 2012 thathe unders to o d bo th then and to day that there was a `tacit unders tanding` (anmoku no ryokai) between Japan and China to shelve the

territo rial is sue55 Asai Mo to fumi who was directo r o f the Treaties Divis io n in 1978-80 and directo r o f the China Divis io n in 1983-85 also co nfirmed that it was the unders tanding no t o nly in the Gaimusho but also amo ng the po litical leadership (Nagatacho ) that

there was a territo rial pro blem co ncerning the Senkaku Is lands 56 Miyamo to Yuji also mentio ned in 2012 that in his time as head o fthe China Divis io n in the 1990s there was s till o n the o ne hand a clear po s itio n that the Senkaku Is lands were Japanese territo rybut o n the o ther the fundamental s tance o f maintaining the s tatus quo ( genjo iji) and a tacit unders tanding that no actio n needed to

be taken57 Tajima Atsushi who was the Directo r o f the China Divis io n in 1978 and participated in the dis cuss io n between Fo reignMinis ter So no da and Deng Xiao ping in 1978 emphas ized in an interview published in June 2013 that the Chinese s ide`s perceptio no f an ldquoagreement (go i)rdquo was o ne-s ided and that the Japanese s ide o nly lis tened to Deng`s explanatio n that the is sue o f theSenkaku Is lands (and o f the disputed sea bo rder) sho uld be left to future generatio ns The Japanese s ide was satis fied that Beijing

had no intentio n to change the s tatus quo and therefo re judged that ldquono reactio n was requiredrdquo58 Despite Tajima`s intentio n torefute the exis tence o f an ldquoagreementrdquo it is clear that there was an implicit unders tanding s ince the status quo was in Japan`sfavo ur

Ano ther indirect indicatio n that Japan tacitly accepted the exis tence o f a territo rial pro blem and was willing to suspend the is sue topro tect the o verall relatio nship with China was the go vernment`s res traint fo r so me time after 1972 and 1978 in taking actio nswhich might have been interpreted by China as inflaming the territo rial dispute The go vernment never allo wed pro specting anddrilling fo r o il o r gas reserves aro und the is lands and sho wed res traint in allo wing landing o n o r making eco no mic use o f theis lands As we will see in the next part ho wever this res traint was no t abso lute and s till left ro o m fo r measures which ero ded theshelving agreement

It is o bvio us fro m the his to rical co ntext o f the 1972 and 1978 nego tiatio ns that bo th s ides had much greater interes ts at s takethan the Senkaku Is lands Mo reo ver the shelving agreement was very much in favo ur o f Japan as the co untry in de facto co ntro l o verthe is lands thereby reinfo rcing To kyo `s o wnership claim in internatio nal law Later when China`s po litical eco no mic and militaryweight increased and it became do ubtful whether the US wo uld invo ke the Security Treaty guarantee to pro tect the militarily-indefens ible is lands agains t a Chinese military challenge the shelving agreement was useful fo r Japan agains t any such

co ntingency59

THE EROSION OF THE SHELVING UNDERSTANDING

While o ne can well unders tand the des ire by the Japanese and Chinese leaders to deepen the bilateral relatio nship thro ugh the twotacit unders tandings in 1972 and 1978 and to trus t that all remaining pro blems including the territo rial dispute wo uld then beeas ier to so lve with hinds ight this faith lo o ks mo re like wishful thinking It is indeed rather unusual to co nclude a Peace andFriendship Treaty witho ut clarifying an o pen territo rial is sue the very heart o f a co untry`s security po licy Since the 1970s thisdispute has no t o nly been a sens itive is sue within Japan but also within the much mo re limited circle o f the Chinese leadership withpo litical gro upings in bo th co untries ins trumentaliz ing it fo r their o wn narro w purpo ses

The main co nceptual pro blem with the bilateral unders tanding has been that it was based o n the assumptio n that the co nditio nsallo wing its fo rmulatio n in the 1970s co uld be fro zen fo r as lo ng as it wo uld take to find a so lutio n to the o ppo s ing territo rialclaims Ho wever maintaining the co nditio ns fo r the co ntinued reliance o n the bilateral unders tanding wo uld have demanded muchgreater effo rts by bo th s ides to clarify what the status quo is and what measures wo uld be seen as vio lating the status quo Ins teadas Ishii Akira put it the leaders o n bo th s ides pro cras tinated and allo wed the territo rial is sue to beco me the symbo l o f natio nalism

in bo th co untries 6 0 As a result vario us changes and pressures in the do mes tic and internatio nal enviro nment gradually ero dedthese co nditio ns with Japan`s go vernment in the end publicly even denying that there was a dispute which co uld have been theo bject o f shelving and pro mpting the PRC in the 2010 and 2012 crises to sho wer Japan with po litical and eco no mic sanctio ns which

were unprecedented fo r two co untries suppo sedly bo und by a Peace and Friendship Treaty

The shelving agreement o bvio us ly had no legal fo rce but denying its exis tence was po litically unwise and mo rally wro ng OkabeTatsumi argues that fo r po litical co nvenience Japan agreed in 1978 to shelve the is sue but that this was different fro m shelving the

dispute in a legal sense6 1 The fo llo wing o fficial Japanese s tatements can be interpreted in this light in Octo ber 1990 CabinetSecretary Sakamo to Miso ji after res tating Japan`s so vereignty claim s till declared that the is land is sue between Japan China and

Taiwan (sic) sho uld be so lved by a later generatio n thus implying that there was a territo rial dispute which had been put as ide6 2 Butby the time China pro mulgated its law o n territo rial waters in February 1992 (see belo w) the Japanese go vernment wo uldunequivo cally and publicly deny that there had been any agreement to shelve the is sue and even that there was a territo rial is sueWhen Prime Minis ter Miyazawa Kiichi pro tes ted agains t the Chinese law in February 1992 referring to a prio r unders tanding withDeng Xiao ping o ver the Senkaku Is lands the Minis try o f Fo reign Affairs (MOFA) is sued a co rrectio n denying such an

unders tanding6 3 In September 1996 Adminis trative Vice-Minis ter Hayashi Sadayuki said that Japan had no t agreed with Dengrsquos lsquoput

o n the shelfrsquo pro po sal ie arguing that there was no territo rial is sue6 4 In the fo llo wing the autho r analyses the three maincircumstances which acco unt fo r the breakdo wn o f the bilateral unders tanding

THE CORROSIVE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

The requirements o f internatio nal law regimes particularly the UN Co nventio n o n the Law o f the Sea (UNCLOS) which was ratif ied byJapan and the PRC in 1996 pro mpted bo th co untries to take do mes tic ando r internatio nal adminis trative and legal s teps (fo rexample pass ing legis latio n related to the adminis tratio n o f their maritime space demarcating their sea bo rders and claimingbo rders fo r their EEZ) which had a general purpo se but did no t sufficiently take into acco unt the need to pro tect the bilateralunders tanding o f putting the territo rial dispute as ide Mo reo ver internatio nal regimes have `ves ted o therwise wo rthless is lands

with immense eco no mic value`6 5 They enco urage the assertio n o f so vereignty and penalize s tates fo r appearing to acquiesce in arival s tate`s claim to a disputed territo ry Paul O`Shea applied the term `so vereignty game` to this diplo matic-legal tit-fo r-tat

based o n Alexander Wendt`s co nceptio n o f so vereignty as a so cially co ns tructed ins titutio n6 6 Finally the vagueness o f

internatio nal law allo ws s tates to cherry pick tho se no rms which fit bes t their interes ts and claims 6 7 It is pro bably with thiss ituatio n in mind that fo rmer Chinese ambassado r to Japan and the UN Chen Jian explained at the beginning o f a talk o n 30

Octo ber 2012 that internatio nal law is a ro o t cause o f the current territo rial disputes 6 8 This autho r has to o much respect fo rinternatio nal law no tably UNCLOS to agree with this s tro ng s tatement but is aware o f the weaknesses o f many legal s tipulatio ns

With regard to the Senkaku dispute internatio nal law regimes have thus bro ught with it the fo llo wing co mplicatio ns

- Bo th co untries mus t always co ns ider that whatever is decided in relatio n to the disputed Senkaku Is lands might have implicatio nsfo r the co untry`s o ther territo rial disputes (Japan`s territo rial disputes with Ko rea and Russ ia China`s EEZ dispute with Ko rea o rterrito rial disputes with the o ther litto ral claimants in the So uth China Sea )

- Any actio n taken by the Japanese go vernment with regard to the Senkaku Is lands can be interpreted as the o fficial express io n o fthe go vernment in co ntro l o f the is lands and China will therefo re feel o bliged to pro tes t in o rder to defend its claim

- Bo th co untries had to co mply with UNCLOS in o rder to benefit fro m this regime and o fficially draw sea bo rders which s tart withbase lines o n which are dependent the extent o f the Territo rial Waters (12 nm fro m the base line) o f the Co ntiguo us Zo ne (24 nmfro m the base line) o f the EEZ (200 nm fro m the baseline) and o f the Extended Co ntinental Shelf (under certain co nditio ns up to350 nm fro m the base line can be claimed) The is sues aris ing fro m this are whether Japan and China wo uld apply the drawing o f thesea bo rders to the disputed territo ry and if so whether the Senkaku Is lands co uld be class ified as `is lands` which are entitled toan EEZ o r jus t `ro cks` which wo uld entitle them o nly to territo rial waters under UNCLOS Article 123 and ho w to draw the EEZbo rder in the Eas t China Sea`s Senkaku area These is sues were bo und to have an impact o n the bilateral unders tanding in o ne wayo r the o ther and wo uld have required special actio n in o rder to keep the territo rial dispute shelved

When China passed its Territo rial Law in 1992 it explicitly included the Diao yu Is lands which naturally was immediately pro tes ted bythe Japanese go vernment while s till sho wing a co ns iderable amo unt o f unders tanding and specifically saying that the law did no t

vio late Japan`s so vereignty o ver the is lands 6 9 At that time the Japanese go vernment was s till preo ccupied with preventing China`siso latio n after the 1989 Tiananmen crackdo wn China also played do wn the impact o f this law and even referred to Deng Xiao ping`s

1978 s tatement o f leaving the territo rial is sue fo r the future70 When Jiang Zemin vis ited Japan in April 1992 he also reaffirmed the

shelving acco rding to Deng`s pro mise in 1978 while s till res tating China`s claim to the is lands 71 Ho wever the Chinese Minis try o f

Fo reign Affairs (hereafter Waijiaobu o r CMOFA) o riginally had no t wanted to include the Senkaku Is lands 72 When it ratif ied UNCLOS in1996 China referred to the 1992 Law and pro mulgated the precise lo catio n o f many o f its base lines but left o ut so me o f them

including tho se fo r the Senkaku Is lands 73 In 1998 the Natio nal Peo ple`s Co ngress pro mulgated the PRC Exclus ive Eco no mic Zo neand Co ntinental Shelf Act which did no t mentio n any specific geo graphical areas Clearly the Chinese leadership was trying to walka fine line between its territo rial and EEZ claims (including the need to respo nd to do mes tic demands increas ingly do minated bynatio nalis t tendencies ) the requirements o f the internatio nal law regime and the maintenance o f go o d relatio ns with Japan

Japan ratif ied UNCLOS in June 1996 and es tablished in the fo llo wing mo nth the Law o n the Territo rial Sea and the Co ntiguo us Zo neas well as the Law o n the EEZ and Co ntinental Shelf which were supplemented by guidelines fo r implementatio n The latter also

es tablished an EEZ aro und the Senkaku Is lands Japan did no t include the Senkaku Is lands in its s traight baseline claim74 Twoseparate bills creating the Bas ic Law o f the Ocean Sea and the Law o n Es tablishing Safety Areas fo r Maritime Structures were

passed by the Diet in April 2007 and came into effect o n 16 July 200775 The latter two laws were passed mainly having in mind anyfuture explo itatio n o f natural reso urces in the co ntes ted EEZs Naturally China do es no t reco gnize the validity o f these laws fo r theSenkaku Is lands o r fo r the EEZ bo rder between the two co untries The territo rial dispute is also a majo r o bs tacle fo r agreement o nthe EEZ bo rder in the so uthern area o f the Eas t China Sea which is no t made eas ier by the fact that an agreement o n the title to theSenkaku wo uld have a majo r impact o n the s ize o f the EEZ area o f the success ful claimant particularly if the is lands were acco rdedan EEZ

FISHING AND OTHER ECONOMIC INTERESTS

Fishing is a majo r interes t fo r all litto ral s tates o f the Eas t China Sea Altho ugh Japan and China have co ncluded co nsecutive fisheryagreements fo r the Eas t China Sea the 1997 agreement (effective fro m June 2000) excludes fro m the applicatio n o f the fisheriesagreement the territo rial waters adjacent to the Senkaku Is lands Ins tead the extant 1975 Fishery Agreement which deemed the

areas aro und the Senkakus as part o f the high seas was allo wed to prevail76 In 2012 a letter related to the 1997 Agreement abo utfishing in the EEZ was revealed in which Fo reign Minis ter Obuchi Keizo had s tated to the Chinese ambassado r in To kyo Xu Duxinthat Japanrsquos laws and regulatio ns wo uld no t apply to the `waters in ques tio n` (togai no suiiki) It is unders to o d that the `waters in

ques tio n` include the Senkaku Is lands altho ugh their name is no t mentio ned and the Japanese go vernment to day denies it77 SatoMasaru a fo rmer intelligence analys t o f the Japanese Fo reign Minis try explained that this letter referred to the EEZ aro und the

Senkaku Is lands and applied o nly to Chinese fishermen78 Ho wever the Japanese go vernment seems no t to want to allo w fo reignfishermen unco ntro lled access to the territo rial waters aro und the Senkaku Is lands and has been patro lling the area This has ledto the expuls io n o f Chinese fishermen and subsequent pro tes ts by Taiwan and the PRC The Japanese co ntro ls have apparently

increased in the decade s ince 2000 while Chinese fishing activities have also vas tly increased79 Mo re research is needed o n thesedevelo pments to judge whether yet ano ther `uno fficial unders tanding` between To kyo and Beijing has been undermined

Finally in this co ntext o ne has to mentio n the is sue o f private and s tate o wnership o f the Senkaku as well as the ro le o f no n-s tateacto rs In 1896 Ko ga Tatsushiro o btained a free lease o f 30 years fo r the is lands o f Uo tsurijima Kubajima Minami Ko jima and KitaKo jima After his death in 1918 his so n Ko ga Zenji to o k o ver the bus iness In 1926 after the end o f the free lease the Japanese

go vernment co nverted it to a rental bas is 8 0 In 1932 the Japanese go vernment changed the s tatus o f these fo ur is lands fro m s tate-o wned to privately-o wned land by selling them to the Ko ga family After 1945 Kubajima and Taisho jima (the latter was always s tate-o wned) were leased to the US as firing ranges In 1972 Ko ga Zenji so ld Kita Ko jima and Minami Ko jima fo llo wed by Uo tsurshima in1978 and Kubajima in 1988 to Kurihara Kunio ki a real es tate inves to r and his family In 2002 Kitako jima Minami Ko jima and

Uo tsurijima were leased to the s tate which paid Yen 25 millio n per year fo r them in rent8 1 The US military used Kubajima andTaisho jima fro m 1957 as firing ranges and after the revers io n o f Okinawa in 1972 co ntinued to do so until 1979 It paid rent to the

private o wner o f Kubajima but after 1971 the rental payment was effected by the Japanese go vernment8 2 It is also interes ting tono te that even in the Japan-US minutes o f 15 May 1972 abo ut these two firing ranges the is lands are s till referred to by their

Chinese characters which are transcribed in the English vers io n as Ko bisho and Sekibisho rather than Kubajima and Taisho jima8 3

The relevant po int here is that s ince the shelving o f the territo rial is sue in 1972 and 1978 the is lands changed private o wners andthe s tate rented three o f the is lands fro m their private o wner and o wned o ne The leas ing in 2002 and the `natio nalizatio n` (nomo ney was invo lved) o f the Uo tsurijima beaco n in 2005 caused Chinese pro tes ts but the private o wnership changes did no t cause

any Chinese reactio n8 4 This is an illus tratio n o f the deterio ratio n o f the bilateral relatio nship during the fo llo wing years because itwas the sale o f three is lands to the Japanese central s tate which to uched o ff the 2012 cris is

THE IMPACT OF OIL AND GAS INTERESTS

The 1969 ECAFE Repo rt had led to claims by the ROC and the PRC o ver the Senkaku Is lands The mo s t pro mis ing area defined in thisrepo rt fo r hydro carbo n reso urces happened to be aro und the Senkaku Is lands Since Japan abando ned its jo int explo ratio n planswith Taiwan in 1972 with the diplo matic reco gnitio n o f the PRC no Japanese activities have taken place because o f co ncern abo utChina`s reactio n

In o rder to fulfill its gro wing demand fo r o il and gas and to divers ify away fro m its high dependence o n Middle Eas tern supplies

China s tarted in the 1970s to pro spect and extract energy reso urces in the Eas t China Sea8 5 To o verco me the territo rial dispute inthe so uth o f the Eas t China Sea and the divergent po s itio n o n ho w to draw the EEZ bo rder in the res t o f the Eas t China Sea Chinapro po sed `jo int develo pment` o f hydro carbo n reso urces In Octo ber 1980 PRC Deputy Premier Yao Yilin even pro po sed to aJapanese bus iness delegatio n that develo pment o f o ff-sho re o il reso urces aro und the disputed is lands be do ne jo intly by China

Japan and the US8 6 Ano ther bilateral pro po sal was made in 1984 by Deng Xiao ping who urged so lving the territo rial pro blems o fthe Spratly Is lands in the So uth China Sea and the Senkaku Is lands by jo intly develo ping the disputed areas befo re dis cuss ing theques tio n o f so vereignty But in this case as well as later pro po sals until 1996 Japan firs t demanded a settlement o f the maritime

bo rder o r reco gnitio n o f its title to the Senkaku Is lands 8 7

China`s relentless pro gress and expans io n o f o il and gas develo pment increas ingly caused frictio n between Japan and China whichalso impacted o n the territo rial dispute Since 1996 Chinese research vessels have entered the waters o f the Senkaku Is lands

including its territo rial waters 8 8 Japan exerted great res traint and until 2004 did no t allo w Japanese co mpanies to survey the ECSeven in the area which it claimed as its EEZ let alo ne aro und the Senkaku Is lands Mo reo ver To kyo `s permiss io n fo r surveying in2004 by a Japanese explo ratio n co mpany (never fo llo wed up because o f the po litical risks invo lved) in respo nse to Chinese o il andgas develo pment near Japan`s claimed EEZ bo rder was o nly fo r an area further no rth away fro m the disputed is lands

The Senkaku Is lands dispute co ntributed to the failure to fo llo w up o n the jo int unders tanding in June 2008 (ryokai in Japaneseliangjie in Chinese) to engage in jo int develo pment o f an area in the no rth o f the Eas t China Sea and to allo w Japan to jo in the

Chunxiao gas field explo itatio n which had been develo ped by China in a disputed EEZ area8 9 During the nego tiatio n o f the 2008jo int unders tanding the Chinese demanded jo int develo pment o f energy reso urces in the area aro und the Senkaku Is lands inexchange fo r their co mpro mise o n jo int develo pment in o ther areas o f the Eas t China Sea Altho ugh the Chinese go vernment agreedto the unders tanding witho ut getting satis factio n o n its demand the failure to achieve greater recipro city fro m the Japanese in theSenkaku area then made it do mes tically impo ss ible fo r the Chinese go vernment to go any further with nego tiating an

implementatio n o f the unders tanding9 0 In December 2008 two Chinese patro l vessels o f the China Marine Surveillance (CMSHaijiandui in Chinese) which is under the State Ocean Adminis tratio n (SOA) entered fo r the firs t time the territo rial waters aro und

the Senkaku Is lands in an apparent mo ve to s trengthen its claim to the is lands 9 1

INSTRUMENTALIZATION OF THE SENKAKU DISPUTE BY POLITICIANS AND NON-STATE ACTORS

The rais ing o f the territo rial is sue by China (ROC and PRC) and the campaign o f the Bao Diao (Pro tect the Diao yu) mo vementno tably in Taiwan and Ho ng Ko ng s ince the ECAFE repo rt led to a s imilar invo lvement o f the Japanese po litical right and o thernatio nalis tic gro ups which to o k up the is sue as a symbo l o f natio nalism In 1973 several rightwing po liticians within the rulingLiberal Demo cratic Party including Ishihara Shintaro who in 2012 became the trigger fo r the central go vernment`s purchase o f so meo f the Senkaku is lands es tablished the so -called Seirankai It was particularly Ishihara who raised the territo rial is sue and o ppo sed

its shelving by Prime Minis ter Tanaka9 2 Agains t the increase o f tens io ns between Japan and China s ince the middle o f the 1990s the supra-partisan Diet Asso ciatio n fo r the Preservatio n o f Territo rial Integrity was es tablished in 2004 It had 60 members by 2011On 30 March 2004 the Security Co mmittee o f the Lo wer Ho use passed a reso lutio n o n preserving territo rial integrity and demanded

a s tro nger Japanese s tance It was the firs t time the Diet passed a reso lutio n relevant to the Senkaku Is lands in this vein9 3 EdanoYukio chief o f the Co ns titutio n Research Co mmittee o f the Demo cratic Party o f Japan (DPJ) then in o ppo s itio n pro po sed that

Self-Defense Fo rces (SDF) tro o ps sho uld be s tatio ned o n the disputed Senkaku Is lands to prevent incurs io ns by o ther co untries 9 4

Since SDF members are civil servants (komuin) this demand so unds very s imilar to the demands by Abe Shinzo o n 15 September2012 to s tatio n komuin o n the is lands (witho ut clarifying whether he meant so ldiers o r o ther civil servants ) altho ugh he po s tpo ned

a decis io n when taking o ver the go vernment in December 20129 5 This sho ws the o ppo rtunis tic explo itatio n o f the territo rial disputefo r electo ral purpo ses

Natio nalis t po liticians and activis ts have also been demanding to erect facilities o n the is lands such as a weather s tatio n a beaco na helipo rt o r a harbo r in o rder to assert Japan`s so vereignty The Niho n Seinensha (Japanese Yo uth Federatio n) a natio nalis to rganizatio n affiliated with the majo r yakuza gro up Sumiyo shi-kai caused several incidents by landing o n the is lands s tarting witherecting a light to wer o r beaco n firs t o n Uo tsurijima in September 1978 which was enlarged in 1988 and ano ther o ne o n Kitako jima

Is land in 19969 6 Each such landing caused pro tes ts in China and amo ng the Chinese diaspo ra and pro mpted the PRC go vernmentto co mplain o fficially It also led to demands by the Seinensha that the light to wers be o fficially reco gnized by the go vernment andthe maintenance be taken o n by the Maritime Safety Agency (later called Co as t Guard) But even the co mpro mise o f including thelight to wer into o fficial charts was an o fficial act reinfo rcing Japan`s effective co ntro l o ver the is lands The dis cuss io n abo ut theo fficial handling o f the light to wer also raised the natio nalis t fever in Taiwan and its military even prepared (but then cancelled at

the las t mo ment) a co mmando actio n at the end o f 1990 to des tro y the facility9 7 In February 2005 amids t ris ing tens io ns o verChina`s energy develo pments in co ntes ted parts o f the Eas t China Sea and Chinese pro tes ts agains t Prime Minis ter Ko izumi`sYasukuni Shrine vis its the Japanese go vernment finally ceded to the demands o f the gro up to take o ver the Uo tsurijima lightho use

s tructure and its maintenance9 8 Until then the Gaimusho had succeeded in delaying this s tate takeo ver as `to o premature` in

o rder no t to pro vo ke China9 9

As can be seen the Japanese go vernment tried to res is t these natio nalis t claims but it co uld no t fully circumvent them thus keepingChina`s suspicio ns alive Mo reo ver whereas the Japanese go vernment always tries to prevent the landing by fo reigners o n theis lands it has no t until fairly recently prevented the landing by Japanese In o rder to keep fo reigners o ut o f the is lands and theirterrito rial waters the Japanese Co as t Guard (CG) has been patro lling the area which again is an o fficial act It may have been thenatio nalis t pressure fro m within the LDP as well as fro m right wing circles which pro mpted Ohira Masayo shi when he was PrimeMinis ter to send in 1979 a general survey team o f 50 perso ns (including Kurihara Hiro yuki) to the is lands in o rder to inves tigate the

building o f facilities like a helipo rt Such demands had already been made by the LDP o n 24 March 197810 0 Altho ugh the final repo rto f the survey spo ke agains t building facilities and no thing fo llo wed fro m it the Kurihara family co ns idered Ohira ndash altho ughgenerally kno wn to be a pro -China po litician - to be the mo s t suppo rtive prime minis ter o f all fo r the Japanese assertio n o f effectiveco ntro l o ver the is lands Befo re that Ohira had also agreed to Kurihara Hiro yuki`s pro po sal to set up o n Uo tsurijima a mo nument

to ho no ur Ko ga Tatsushiro which was do ne with the go vernment`s material and financial suppo rt10 1

Even within the Chinese leadership the territo rial is sue has been divis ive Jus t when the two s ides were nego tiating the Peace andFriendship Treaty in April 1978 abo ut 100 Chinese fishing vessels so me armed appeared aro und the Senkaku area with bannersdeclaring China`s title to the is lands While this was explained at the time in Japan as a means to pressure the Japanese during thetreaty nego tiatio ns it no w seems no w mo re likely that the Senkaku is sue was used by fo llo wers o f the Chairman o f the MilitaryCo mmiss io n Hua Guo feng as a means o f attacking the re-emerging Deng Xiao ping The PRC central leadership explained at the

time that this was `accidental` and Deng Xiao ping pro mised it wo uld never happen again10 2

These latter incidents are also impo rtant when dis cuss io n turns to the ques tio n who s tarted to undermine the unders tanding abo utshelving the is lands dispute ndash Japan o r China Was it China when it passed the 1992 Territo rial Law as is o ften mentio ned in Japano r did it already vio late the unders tanding in April 1978 as so me o thers claim Ho wever if the latter incident was beyo nd the co ntro lo f the Chinese go vernment it co uld be argued that it was the Japanese go vernment with the erectio n o f a mo nument o r the 1979survey that to uched o ff frictio ns Yet the blame game do es no t help in finding a so lutio n ins tead these incidents sho uld make itclear that bo th s ides bear part o f the respo ns ibility fo r undermining the 197278 unders tanding and sho uld therefo re be willing toco me to a new unders tanding

THE DETERIORATION OF THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP SINCE THE 1990S

In additio n to the abo ve develo pments it was the general deterio ratio n o f the bilateral relatio nship s ince the middle o f the 1990sthat changed the co nditio ns fo r maintaining the shelving o f the territo rial dispute Japan became suspicio us o f China`s no n-transparent military mo dernizatio n particularly o f the navy which has been expanding its o peratio ns including the Eas t China

Sea10 3 Other negative develo pments were the pro gress o f Chinese o il and gas explo ratio n in the Eas t China Sea despitedisagreement o ver the co mmo n EEZ bo rder vis its by Japanese po litical leaders to the Yasukuni War Shrine and o ther is sues relatedto Japan`s pas t aggress io n agains t China

A nadir in the bilateral relatio nship was reached during the rule o f Prime Minis ter Ko izumi Junichiro (2001-2006) because o f hisannual vis its to the Yasukuni Shrine But while the po litical relatio nship go t co lder the eco no mic relatio nship expanded andpro spered (`Co ld Po litics Ho t Eco no mics`) This also had ndashat firs t glance co unter-intuitively ndash a deleterio us effect o n themo tivatio n to wo rk harder to maintain the co nditio ns fo r putting as ide the territo rial co nflict s ince this dicho to my gave the falseimpress io n that po litics and eco no mics co uld be kept separate fo rever while the territo rial is sue was pending The wo rsening o f theterrito rial co nflict fro m 2010 and particularly fro m 2012 with China`s harsh po litical and eco no mic retributio n wo uld bear this o ut

Part o f the ratio nale fo r the Chinese navy`s increased presence in the Eas t China Sea is China`s o il and gas develo pments as wellas the wish to preserve the navy`s access to the Pacific Ocean to prevent JapaneseUS o bservatio n o r to intervene in a cris is Thisco uld no t but affect the territo rial dispute In May 1999 12 Chinese warships co nducted a mano euvre in waters no rth o f the

Senkaku is lands The exercise was the firs t o f its kind to be carried o ut by China in that regio n10 4 Other Chinese naval mo vementsin the Eas t China Sea increased including repo rts abo ut intelligence-gathering ships In the las t few years the po litical influence o f

the PLA and particularly o f the PLA Navy (PLAN) has co ns iderably increased10 5 The Japanese reacted by increas ing their militarydeplo yment and a s trengthening o f Japanese-American military co o peratio n Ho wever the Senkaku area is co ntro lled by the Co as tGuard which is a law enfo rcement agency and the Japanese navy keeps away fro m po licing This incidentally reinfo rces Japan`sclaim as po licing is do ne o nly within natio nal territo ry o r EEZ areas

Until the central go vernment`s purchase o f three o f the is lands in September 2012 it was the activities o f no n-s tate acto rs fro mJapan Taiwan Ho ng Ko ng and the PRC whether natio nalis t activis ts o r fishermen which caused the greates t direct co nfro ntatio nss ince Japan`s co untermeasures were a demo ns tratio n o f the exercise o f so vereignty which the PRC became increas ingly unwilling toto lerate In 1996 a Ho ng Ko ng pro tes ter who tried to co ver the las t meters fro m his bo at to o ne o f the is lands dro wned Ano therincident o ccurred in 2008 when a Japanese Co as t Guard ship rammed a Taiwanese spo rt fishing bo at which had entered Senkaku

territo rial waters The actio n caused the bo at to s ink10 6

In March 2004 fo r the firs t time s ince 1996 seven Chinese activis ts landed o n Uo tsurijima When the Japanese po lice made arres ts the Chinese Fo reign Minis try pro tes ted calling it a serio us vio latio n o f Chinese so vereignty The arres ts were made under the

immigratio n management law which includes a clause o n expuls io n o f illegal fo reign trespassers 10 7 In light o f the 2010 incident inwhich a PRC fishing trawlere twice rammed a Japanese co as t guard ship it is impo rtant to no te that despite guidelines which were togive = law enfo rcement agencies the autho rity to deal with trespassers `acco rding to the law` it was repo rted that the centralgo vernment intervened at the las t minute did no t press fo r an indictment and o rdered the release o f the arres ted Chinese Thego vernment did no t want any further co mplicatio ns that might to rpedo the planned China vis it by Fo reign Minis ter Kawaguchi Yo riko

and was satis fied to have demo ns trated effective co ntro l o ver the Senkaku Is lands by arres ting and expelling the Chinese10 8 AJapanese jo urnal repo rted that there was a Japanese pledge to China fo llo wing this incident that in future an intruder wo uld no t beput in detentio n but o nly arres ted as lo ng as it was no t a serio us case in turn China agreed to prevent the departure o f vessels withpro tes ters fro m its harbo urs Such an unders tanding has no t surpris ingly been denied by the Japanese as well as by the Chinese

go vernment10 9

The China Marine Surveillance (CMS) s tarted irregular patro l activities near the Senkaku Is lands in December 2008 when two CMSvessels s tayed fo r o ver nine ho urs in the territo rial waters o f the Senkaku Is lands as mentio ned abo ve This was interpreted in

Japan as a majo r escalatio n110 Fo rmer ambassado r to China Miyamo to Yuji called this new develo pment a qualitative change in the

Senkaku dispute which went beyo nd previo us cases o f intrus io n by fishermen o r pro tes ters 111 This deplo yment was fo llo wed byo thers the fo llo wing year agains t a backgro und o f China reinfo rcing its maritime co ntro l Japan respo nded by building up its o wndefence effo rts in the so uth including planned s tatio ning o f so me tro o ps o n Yo naguni Is land o ne o f the clo ses t is lands to the

Senkaku Is lands 112

THE 2010 FISHING TRAWLER INCIDENT

It is agains t this co mplex backgro und that the Chinese fishing trawler Minjinyu 5179 with a crew o f 15 entered the territo rial waters o fthe Senkaku Is lands o n 7 September 2010 near Kubajima There were many o ther Chinese fishing trawlers in the same area andseveral ships o f the Japanese Co as t Guard were trying to chase them away Pursued by three Japanese CG vessels the Minjinyu 5179twice co llided with two o f the CG vessels There are different interpretatio ns whether the Chinese captain Zhan Qixio ng intentio nally

rammed the CG vessels and there are so me s trange inco ns is tencies highlighted in the repo rts o f the incident113 So me no n-Japanese autho rs like Sheila Smith and Linus Hags trouml m are no n-co mmittal o n the ques tio n o f the co llis io n but mo s t Japanese

autho rs blame the trawler and this autho r is mo re inclined to believe that the ramming was intentio nal114 The Chinese

unsurpris ingly blame the CG vessels 115 The is sue o f intentio n is impo rtant inso far as it gives so me indicatio n abo ut the risk o frecurrence and o f escalatio n The fo llo wing circumstantial evidence sugges ts intentio nal ramming by the Chinese captain

- There is ample video fo o tage leaked by a CG o fficer which specialis ts have interpreted as intentio nal ramming by the Chinese

captain116

- The captain seemed to have been drunk and is kno wn to be a vo latile perso n 117

- Fishing in the Eas t China Sea is very co mpetitive and Chinese fishermen are particularly anno yed abo ut the patro ls and co ntro ls byJapanese and Ko rean law enfo rcement agencies in the as yet un-demarcated EEZs amo ng all three co untries

Chinese fishermen have a reputatio n o f o ften being vio lent as many incidents in the So uth China Sea and in the Yello w Sea seem topro ve Only three mo nths later in December 2010 ano ther Chinese fishing trawler captain rammed a So uth Ko rean co as t guard

vessel in the Yello w Sea ho wever his bo at sank as a result and the Chinese captain dro wned 118 Chinese crews are o ften armed

with metal pipes and attack law enfo rcement agents which have led to o ther fatal casualties in 2011 and 2012119

The 2010 trawler incident is further relevant in o ur co ntext in view o f the Japanese go vernment`s handling it ( legal aspect denial o fthe shelving unders tanding) China`s co untermeasures and the aftermath o f the go vernment`s purchase o f three is lands inSeptember 2012 After the co llis io ns the Japanese go vernment arres ted the crew and co nfis cated the trawler The fo llo wing day theChinese go vernment demanded the release o f the crew and the trawler which the Japanese go vernment did o n the 13 September butkeeping the captain in cus to dy The Japanese ambassado r to China Niwa Uichiro was summo ned s ix times by the Chinese between8 and 19 September Beijing`s reactio n escalated after the Chinese captain`s term o f detentio n was extended o n 19 September tolas t fro m 20 to 29 September On 20 September Chinese autho rities detained fo ur Japanese citizens fo r entering a res trictedmilitary area in Hebei pro vince Even witho ut the trawler incident the detentio n o f the fo ur Japanese wo uld have harmed the bilateralrelatio nship but happening in this co ntext it was rightly o r wro ngly immediately linked by the Japanese to o ther Chinese sanctio ns

as dis cussed belo w The result ho wever was that the Japanese released the Chinese captain120 Even immediately after the crew`sarres t the Chinese go vernment had already begun to cancel the seco nd ro und o f nego tiatio ns fo r implementatio n o f theunders tanding o n energy co o peratio n in the Eas t China Sea co ncluded o n 18 June 2008 Other reprisals and sanctio ns fo llo wedincluding the suspens io n o f rare earth expo rts to Japan o n which the co untry`s high techno lo gy indus try is very dependentAltho ugh befo re the incident the Chinese go vernment had already mo ved to reduce rare earth expo rts which naturally hit Japan asthe bigges t impo rter Japanese media repo rted that the Chinese cus to ms autho rities to tally suspended expo rts in late

September121 The exact circumstances o f this alleged embargo are s till no t yet clear as dis cussed in detail by Alas tair Jo hns to n122

The cris is ended when the deputy pro secuto r in Ishigaki anno unced o n 24 September the release o f the captain citing the`diplo matic impact` o f the case o n the bilateral relatio nship So me co ns idered this as surrender by the Japanese and the result o fdubio us po litical interference into the legal pro cess The o ppo s itio n had a field day attacking the go vernment`s handling o f the

incident123 The Japanese Fo reign Minis try spo kesman declared that the go vernment had applied do mes tic law and again refuted the

idea o f there being a territo rial pro blem to be reso lved124 Others argue that the incident had several benefits fo r the Japanesego vernment because it o btained a reco nfirmatio n o f the US security guarantee to include the Senkaku Is lands it helped to co nvince

the public abo ut the necess ity o f mo re Japanese defence effo rts and it expo sed China as an assertive if no t aggress ive po wer125

China claimed that the incident sho wed that Japan had changed its appro ach to handling this type o f incident which co uld be

interpreted as a co nfirmatio n that bo th s ides had reached an info rmal unders tanding after the 2004 incident126 Ho wever thisincident was much mo re severe s ince the captain`s two co llis io ns with CG ships were interpreted by the Japanese go vernment asintentio nal ramming The captain was charged with o bs tructio n o f Perfo rmance o f Public Duty as a result o f the ramming On theo ther hand o ne canno t blame China fo r allo wing this bo at to leave its Chinese harbo ur because it was a fishing trawler and no t apro tes ters` campaign vessel What made this incident so serio us fo r the Chinese was Japan`s very public assertio n o f itsso vereignty o ver the is lands in the way it handled the Chinese captain and the explicit denial o f the shelving unders tanding o f the

1970s On 21 September Fo reign Minis ter Maehara s tated that Japan had no t agreed with China to shelve the territo rial dispute127

This declaratio n fo llo wed the seco nd extens io n o f the captain`s detentio n o n 19 September which pro mpted the Chinesego vernment to allo w widespread demo ns tratio ns in China and to place a series o f sanctio ns agains t Japan (cancellatio n o fminis terial meetings `self- res trictio ns` o n vis its to Japan by Chinese to uris ts and po s tpo nement at very sho rt no tice o f the vis ito f 1000 Japanese yo uth planned fro m 21 September to the Shanghai Wo rld Exhibitio n) Japan is es timated to have lo s t yen318

billio n due to a decline in the number o f Chinese to uris ts 128

It is diff icult to judge whether these unprecedented co untermeasures were centrally directed and it is likely that it was aco mbinatio n o f vario us po wer centres co mpeting ando r feeling the need to be seen acting in acco rdance with the increas ingly anti-Japanese mo o d

Japan`s do mes tic circumstances made a speedy so lutio n such as that in 2004 difficult The DPJ had co me to po wer o nly in 2009 andlacked fo reign po licy experience There was no effective co mmunicatio n between the two go vernments at leas t at the beginning o fthe incident in co ntras t to earlier times The Japanese leadership o bvio us ly mis judged ho w the Chinese wo uld interpret Japanesehandling o f the incident which it perceived as a reversal o f Japan`s previo us (albeit gradually diminishing) res traint Altho ugh theDPJ had initially a mo re pro -China leadership when it came to po wer (no tably Prime Minis ter Hato yama Yukio and Secretary General

Ozawa Ichiro ) this had changed by 2010 The minis ter in charge o f the CG (which is under the Minis try o f Land Infras tructureTranspo rt and To urism) o n the day o f the incident was Maehara Seiji a kno wn defence hawk who then became Minis ter o f Fo reignAffairs in a cabinet reshuffle o n 17 September He was therefo re much mo re at liberty to take a hard-line s tance agains t China whilethe DPJ pres idential electio n ndash wo n again by Kan Nao to ndash to o k place o n 14 September fo llo wed by the prime minis ter`s departure toNew Yo rk to attend the UN General Assembly o n 22 September The fo reign minis ter befo re the 17 September was Okada Katsuyawho was also mo re inclined to take a s tro ng s tance Maehara as well as Okada had seen the CG`s video o f the co llis io n which co uld

no t but have left them with a very negative impress io n o f the Chinese captain`s actio ns 129 It certainly did no t help when Maehara inhis new po s t as fo reign minis ter qualif ied China`s reactio n in the Diet o n 18 September as `very hys terical` and then declared o n

21 September that there had never been an unders tanding abo ut shelving the territo rial dispute130 On 23 September Secretary o fState Hillary Clinto n assured vis iting Fo reign Minis ter Maehara that the Senkaku Is lands were co vered by the bilateral Japan-USSecurity Treaty an interventio n that was certainly also no t welco me to the Chinese Ho wever there have been speculatio ns that inexchange fo r this s tro ng US reco nfirmatio n o f the security guarantee in o rder to get o ut o f the s talemate the Japanese had to

pro mise to release o f the Chinese captain which o ccurred the fo llo wing day131

The 2010 incident had several co nsequences which made a recurrence very likely Firs t o f all the incident raised tens io ns to a degreelas t seen during the anti-Japan demo ns tratio ns in 2004 and 2005 which had been mainly co ncerned with Japan`s attempt to gain apermanent UN Security Co uncil seat and the his to ry is sue These tens io ns had made it impo ss ible to have any new nego tiatio nro und to co nclude a treaty abo ut co o peratio n in the explo itatio n o f hydro carbo n reso urces in the Eas t China Sea and thus reduceano ther majo r so urce o f bilateral tens io ns and o ne mo reo ver related to the Senkaku is sue Agains t this backgro und but also inline with its previo us po s itio n Japan rejected a Chinese pro po sal made in Octo ber 2010 fo r jo int reso urce develo pment in the

Senkaku area132 The legal aftermath o f the incident co ntinued fo r so me time with Japan claiming co mpensatio n fro m the Chinesecaptain fo r the damage caused to the two CG vessels which was rejected by China and co untered with demands fo r co mpensatio nand an apo lo gy The Japanese pro secuto r dro pped the case agains t the captain o nly in January 2011 but the CG s till sent a bill to

the captain in February 2011133

While the incident helped the Japanese go vernment to o btain s tro ng US suppo rt o n the applicability o f the bilateral security treaty tothe Senkaku Is lands and generally helped to co nvince the Japanese public abo ut the need fo r greater Japanese defence effo rts(including a s trengthening o f US leverage vis-agrave-vis Japan co ncerning the realignment o f its fo rces o n Okinawa) it reduced Japan`sindependence with respect to the degree o f suppo rt it pro vided fo r US China po licy

Seco ndly the incident further undermined the co nditio ns which were the fo undatio n fo r the uno fficial shelving o f the Senkaku is sueIf it was no t yet clear to everybo dy that there was a territo rial dispute o ver the Senkaku Is lands then this incident with theunprecedented Chinese sanctio ns agains t Japan lifted the las t remnants o f do ubt Maehara Seji who repeated o n 25 o ccas io ns inDiet debates between 10 September and 16 No vember 2010 that there exis ted no territo rial dispute made this o fficial po s itio n

even less co nvincing134 The incident pro mpted Beijing to publicly undermine Japan`s territo rial claim further by anno uncing o n 29Octo ber 2010 permanent deplo yment o f large fisheries patro l vessels in waters near the Senkaku Is lands which was recipro cated by

the CG deplo ying patro l vessels o f o ver 1000 to ns in the same area135 In a further tit-fo r-tat o n 17 December 2010 the city

go vernment o f Ishigaki the adminis trative autho rity o f the Senkaku Is lands passed an o rdinance to des ignate 14 January the day to

co mmemo rate the Senkaku Is lands` inco rpo ratio n in 1895136

The further ero s io n o f the shelving agreement after Octo ber 2010

The next majo r co nfro ntatio n o ver the Senkaku Is lands in September 2012 o ccurred agains t the backgro und o f mo re measurestaken by bo th s ides to suppo rt their respective territo rial claims and do mes tic circumstances in bo th co untries which were evenless co nducive to re-es tablish trus t and go o d relatio ns The gro wing US-China po litical and military rivalry in Eas t As ia asexemplif ied by the As ia pivo t which China perceives as directed agains t its rise certainly did no t help Initially the year 2011 saw areco very o f relatio ns fro m the 2010 incident Bilateral trade reached a new high with a vo lume o f $345 billio n Japanese fo reign

direct inves tment in China so ared nearly 50 per cent in 2011 to $6 3bn137 Mo reo ver the Chinese public was very impressed with thedis ciplined way the Japanese peo ple reacted to wards the triple disas ters which hit the co untry o n 11 March 2011 and there was an

o utpo uring o f sympathy which also included the sending o f a Chinese search-and-rescue miss io n to the affected To ho ku area138

Yet this impro ved atmo sphere was quickly dispelled when the results o f the textbo o k review were published o n 27 March whichasserted Japan`s territo rial claim to the Senkaku Is lands (as well as to TakeshimaDo kto ) and denied the Chinese figure o f

300 000 victims in the Nanjing massacre139

In the meantime the Japanese go vernment co ntinued to turn the legal s crews which affected the Senkaku Is lands by implementingdo mes tic laws in o rder to be co ngruent with internatio nal law and s trengthening maritime co ntro l In February 2012 the Japanesecabinet passed bills to enhance the Japan Co as t Guards law enfo rcement po wers in territo rial waters which wo uld fo r example

autho rize the CG to o rder fo reign ships to leave Japan`s Territo rial Waters witho ut firs t bo arding them140 Other adminis trativemeasures derived fro m the Bas ic Law o n Ocean Po licy which had been enacted in 2007 and which pro vides the framewo rk fo radminis trating remo te is lands Since 2009 Japan has given names to hitherto unnamed is lands to subs tantiate its claims to anEEZ Fo r this purpo se in Augus t 2011 the go vernment placed 23 uninhabited is lands under s tate co ntro l but fo ur is lets near theSenkaku Is lands were exempt o ut o f co ns ideratio n fo r China In March 2012 ho wever the go vernment abando ned this cautio n and

regis tered Kitako jima as a natio nal asset141 In No vember 2011 the go vernment had let it be kno wn that it wo uld sho rtly release a

new lis t o f names fo r is lands which wo uld include is lets o f the Senkaku gro up142 China pro tes ted and a meeting in Beijing plannedin February 2012 between Pres ident Hu Jintao and representatives o f seven bilateral friendship gro ups fro m Japan was cancelled Ano pinio n piece in the Peoples Daily (RMRB) o n 17 January 2012 said Japans mo ve lsquois a blatant mo ve to damage Chinas co re

interes ts rsquo143 On 2 March 2012 To kyo finally anno unced a lis t o f 39 is lands which included fo ur is lets in the Senkaku Is lands

gro up144 The Chinese pro tes ted immediately o n the same day and in a tit-fo r-tat the State Oceanic Adminis tratio n released o n 3

March s tandard names and descriptio ns o f the Senkaku is lands and its 70 affiliated is lets 145 Ano ther Chinese co untermo ve was theanno uncement o n 16 March by the SOA that they had s tarted patro lling near the Senkaku Is lands This was fo llo wed pro mptly o n thesame day by o ne CMS ship entering the Territo rial Waters o f the Senkaku Is lands and the same vessels with ano ther CMS ship

cruis ing in the Co ntiguo us Waters o f the is lands 146 In No vember 2010 an o fficial o f the Minis try o f Agricultures Bureau o f Fisherieswhich o perates the Fisheries Law Enfo rcement Co mmand (FLEC) had already anno unced that his o rganizatio n wo uld fro m no w o n

deplo y fisheries patro l vessels o f o ver 1000 to ns to maintain co ntinuo us patro ls 147

THE 2012 CONFRONTATION ISHIHARA SHINTARO LIGHTING THE FUSE

It was in this tense enviro nment that To kyo Go verno r Ishihara Shintaro anno unced o n 16 April 2012 that the To kyo Metro po litanGo vernment (TMG) was nego tiating the purchase o f three o f the fo ur privately-held Senkaku is lands by the end o f the year ie

Uo tsurijima Kita Ko jima and Minami Ko jima The lease o f the central go vernment fo r these three is lands was due to expire in March2013 and no incident wo uld have o ccurred if the go vernment had quietly renewed the lease The central go vernment s tated that ithad no t kno wn abo ut Ishihara`s intentio n but that there had been co ntacts o n vario us o ccas io ns between the go vernment and the

private o wner148 This seems co nvincing s ince s tate o wnership wo uld have pro vided better preventio n o f incidents even mo re thanjus t leas ing Taken aback by Ishihara`s surprise mo ve the Chief Cabinet Secretary Fujimura Osamu declared the fo llo wing day thatthe central go vernment might acquire the is lands `if required` and Prime Minis ter No da implied in a Diet speech o n the 18 April that

a purchase by the central go vernment was o ne o f the o ptio ns Bo th s tatements were widely repo rted in China149 Ishihara hadcho sen his anno uncement fo r maximum effect o n the o ccas io n o f a speech at the co nservative Washingto n DC-based HeritageFo undatio n He made it clear that this pro ject was meant as a criticism o f the DPJ-led central go vernment which he co ns ideredfailing in its duty to sufficiently pro tect Japan`s so vereignty by saying that the central go vernment sho uld be buying the is lands butthat the Gaimusho was to o afraid o f o ffending China The lo catio n o f his anno uncement was meant to gain s tro nger suppo rt fro m

the US fo r Japan`s territo rial claim150 As we have seen abo ve fro m Ishihara`s activities in the 1970s this anno uncement was inmany ways the lo gical co nclus io n o f his lo ng las ting o bsess io n with the Senkaku Is lands and his hatred o f co mmunis t China It wasthe 2010 incident in particular which had enco uraged him to renew his o ld plan o f buying the is lands after his earlier failure to do so His go o d co nnectio ns with the o wner Kurihara Kunio ki who shared his natio nalis t pro clivities helped Ishihara to beco me the

favo ured purchaser151

The po ss ibility o f having the three is lands under the co ntro l o f the natio nalis tic go verno r o f To kyo who wanted to build facilities o nthe is lands to s trengthen Japan`s so vereignty was unpalatable to the No da go vernment which feared co mplicatio ns with China In a

meeting o n 18 May No da and his to p advisers decided in principle to purchase the is lands 152 Pressure o n the go vernmentincreased to pre-empt Ishihara because he was as to nishingly success ful in rais ing vo luntary co ntributio ns fro m the public to buythe three is lands thus circumventing any legal diff iculties in us ing To kyo `s taxpayer mo ney and also pro ving the po pularity o f his

mo ve By 1 June he had co llected 70 000 do natio ns to taling aro und yen101 billio n which increased to yen146 billio n by 6 September153

On 27 July the TMG ran an advertisement in the Wall Street Journal asking fo r US unders tanding and suppo rt fo r the purchase plan154

The TMG had to reques t central go vernment permiss io n to co nduct a survey o f the is lands which the go vernment refused to grant

o n 27 Augus t fo rcing the TMG to co nduct a survey fro m a ship o n 2 September155 In the end it was the higher sum and the sho rtes tdelay o f co ncluding the deal which pro mpted Kurihara Kunio ki who was apparently in so me financial diff iculties to accept the centralgo vernment`s o ffer o f yen205 billio n ($26 millio n) and to s ign the co ntract o n 11 September This was an embarrass ing turn fo rIshihara In additio n he did no t succeed in us ing the o ffer o f his co llected mo ney to entice the No da go vernment to pro mise thebuilding o f any facility o n the is lands No da was presented by his adminis tratio n with several o ptio ns including his favo ured o ptio no f repairing the exis ting light ho use o n Uo tsurijima but in the end was co nvinced by Fo reign Minis ter Gemba to leave things as they

were in o rder no t to further inflame the Chinese156

The central go vernment`s purchase o f the three is lands o n 11 September immediately led to a very harsh reactio n by the Chinesewhich was even wo rse than in 2010 But befo re lo o king at Chinese co untermeasures after 11 September in detail it is impo rtant toinves tigate why the Chinese reactio n was so s tro ng and why the Japanese apparently did no t anticipate it particularly in view o fChina`s unprecedented reactio n in September 2010

CHINESE WARNINGS BEFORE THE NATIONALIZATION ON 11 SEPTEMBER

Prime Minis ter No da admitted o n 19 September o nly eight days into the co mprehens ive Chinese sanctio ns and co unter measures

that he had underes timated their extent157

158 In a named co mmentary o f Xinhua o n 18 April attentio n was drawn to Ishihara`s kno wn right wing and anti-Chinese s tatementsbut also po inted o ut that the CMOFA `wo uld no t hes itate to take any necessary measures to safeguard so vereignty o ver the Diao yu

Is lands`159 Vice-Pres ident Xi Jinping to ld vis iting Ko no Yo hei a kno wn pro -China hand that Japan sho uld no t wo rsen the bilateral

relatio nship and that co re is sues sho uld be reso lved by the two co untries in an appro priate manner16 0 At the end o f April the StateOceanic Adminis tratio n anno unced a plan to des ignate is lands and their surro unding waters as s trategically vital and to pro tect their

enviro nments and develo p marine reso urces 16 1 Mo re specifically targeting the Senkaku Is lands was ho wever the entry o n 3 May o f

two FLEC vessels into the Senkaku Is lands` Co ntiguo us Waters fo r the firs t time s ince Ishihara`s anno uncement16 2 Bilateraltens io ns also increased after a Japanese right wing gro up suppo rted the ho lding o f a meeting o f the Wo rld Uyghur Co ngress in

To kyo fro m 14 to 18 May which led to the cancellatio n by Beijing o f several o fficial vis its 16 3 On 13 May Premier Wen Jiabao raisedthe Senkaku is sue and the Uighur meeting during talks in Beijing with Prime Minis ter Yo shihiko No da cautio ning that lsquoit is impo rtant

to respect Chinarsquos co re interes ts and matters o f great co ncernrsquo16 4 Wang Jiarui head o f the Co mmunis t Partys Internatio nalDepartment was quo ted by Eda Satsuki a fo reign po licy adviser o f the DPJ that bo th the Senkaku and the Uighur is sue were

described as `co re is sues` and Wen`s s tatement was s tressed in a Chinese TV bro adcas t16 5 The Xinjiang is sue as well as Taiwanand Tibet have been referred to fo r so me time by the Chinese go vernment as `co re is sues` but the Senkaku is sue had been called

a `co re is sue` apparently fo r the firs t time o nly in an o pinio n piece by the Renmin Ribao in January 201216 6 Only o n 23 March 2013did the Chinese Fo reign Minis try Spo kesperso n clearly s tate that China regards the Diao yu Is lands as its co re interes t altho ugh the

written reco rd subsequently so ftened this s tatement16 7

The abo ve chro no lo gy certainly gives the impress io n that there was a series o f Chinese reactio ns which expressed s tro ng Chineseco ncern with any purchase (whether by the TMG o r the central go vernment) o f the Senkaku Is lands If that had no t been eno ugh theinterview o f the Financial Times with Japan`s ambassado r in China Niwa Uichiro at the beginning o f June sho wed s tro ng co ncernabo ut the implicatio ns o f a purchase He was quo ted as saying that lsquoif Mr Ishihararsquos plans are acted upo n then it will result in anextremely grave cris is in relatio ns between Japan and ChinahellipWe canno t allo w decades o f pas t effo rt to be bro ught to no thingrsquo He

added that such a cris is wo uld affect bus iness 16 8 Niwa mus t have been truly co ncerned abo ut the severity o f the s ituatio n to makesuch an undiplo matic public s tatement fo r which he was reprimanded by Fo reign Minis ter Gemba and criticized by so me media

o utlets and po liticians ultimately leading to his recall later in the year16 9

The Chinese warnings became sharper at the seco nd s tage when Prime Minis ter No da anno unced o n 7 July that his go vernment wo uldseek to buy the is lands because the purchase co uld no lo nger be put do wn to a mere lo cal maverick with s tro ng anti-Chineseinclinatio ns The Global Times edito rial o f 9 July sho wed the frus tratio n by so me Chinese lsquoEach time Japan takes o ne s tep we sho uldtake o ne and half o r even two s teps fo rward making Japan aware o f the grave co nsequences caused by its aggress io n agains t

Chinarsquo170 A Xinhua co mmentary o n 7 July quo tes the CMOFA`s spo kesperso n referring pro bably fo r the firs t time in this ro w to a`co nsensus` agains t which the Japanese go vernment went by wanting to buy the is lands meaning o f co urse the shelving co nsensus

o f 1972 and 1978171 On 9 July a Xinhua co mmentary titled `Japan playing with fire o ver Diao yu Is lands` called the purchase by the

central go vernment a `farcical ambitio n` an express io n repeated thereafter many times 172 On 11 July the Japanese media repo rtedthe entry by three FLEC vessels into the territo rial waters o f Kubajima the firs t time s ince the 16 March 2012 fo llo wed by o ne vessel

cruis ing the fo llo wing day in the is land`s co ntiguo us zo ne173 Public o pinio n became increas ingly inflamed and the Global Timesrepo rted o n 19 July that 90 8 per cent o f Chinese peo ple surveyed appro ve us ing the military to enfo rce Chinas so vereignty o ver

the is lets with 521 per cent saying a military clash lsquois likelyrsquo between China and Japan o ver the is lands 174

Even the US gave Japan `s tro ng advice` no t to pro ceed with the purchase because it co uld `trigger a cris is` as was revealed in April2013 by Kurt Campbell who was at the time Ass is tant Secretary fo r Eas t As ian and Pacific Affairs Even tho ugh we warned JapanJapan decided to go in a different directio n and they tho ught they had gained the suppo rt o f China o r so me did which we were

certain that they had no t Campbell is quo ted in an interview with Kyo do 175

FAILURE OF COMMUNICATION

The abo ve chro no lo gy and escalatio n o f Chinese reactio ns to the planned purchase o f the is lands o ver the summer 2012 give aclear indicatio n that a Japanese purchase o f the three is lands was no t co ns idered jus t ano ther incident witho ut majo rco nsequences So why did the Japanese go vernment s till go ahead with the purchase In the final analys is the failure to avo id thecris is escalating in September 2012 lay in the wide difference between the interes ts o f the two go vernments Do mes ticcircumstances o n bo th s ides and the inherent zero sum nature o f territo rial disputes prevented the trans itio n fro m dialo gue topreventive actio n let alo ne so lutio n Aggravating events o ver the summer 2012 which raised tempers o n bo th s ides were thedemands by the TMG to send a survey team to the Senkaku Is lands (the No da go vernment after so me initial co nflicting repo rts didno t allo w a landing) the landing o f Ho ng Ko ng activis ts o n Uo tsurijima o n 15 Augus t (timed with the anniversary o f Japan`ssurrender) fo llo wed by the landing o f Japanese activis ts ( including lo cal parliamentarians ) o n 19 Augus t and an attack in Beijing o n27 Augus t o n the car carrying Ambassado r Niwa Despite o ngo ing co mmunicatio n and dialo gue thro ugh vario us channels theseadverse circumstances led to a hardening o f po s itio ns o ver the summer 2012 between the two go vernments

The Japanese central go vernment had been caught sho rt by Ishihara`s sudden anno uncement o n 16 April and became to tallyabso rbed with preventing the maverick po litician fro m go ing ahead with the purchase o f the is lands fearing rightly that this wo uldserio us ly co mplicate Japan-China relatio ns Ishihara wanted to embarrass the No da go vernment which was co ns tantly declining inpo pularity and to fo rce it to deal mo re assertively with the is lands As we have seen fo r Ishihara it was no t jus t abo ut purchas ingthe is lands but abo ut building facilities o n them Fo r the No da go vernment buying the is lands by the s tate was therefo re the lesserevil The go vernment tried all alo ng to co nvince the Chinese o f To kyo `s go o d intentio ns fo r example when Fo reign Minis ter Gembamet with his Chinese co unterpart Yang Jiechi o n 11 July that the purchase was o nly a `do mes tic co mmercial transactio n` and no t a

diplo matic matter and was o nly meant to ensure that the is lands wo uld be `adminis tered peacefully and s tably`176 In December2012 when the full extent o f China`s unprecedented reactio ns had beco me kno wn the new Japanese ambassado r Kitera s till s tatedthat lsquoThe change in o wnership sho uld no t have caused a pro blem in relatio ns with Chinarsquo adding that Japan had given China sufficient

explanatio ns ahead o f the purchase177 Fo reign Minis ter Gemba even tried to highlight in No vember that the purchase was actually areturn to the status quo ante lsquoThe measure taken by the go vernment o f Japan was jus t a trans fer o f title under Japanese do mes ticlaw and jus t means that the o wnership o f the is lands mdash held by the go vernment until 1932 mdash was returned fro m a private citizen to

the go vernmentrsquo178 In sho rt fo r the Japanese the purchase o f the is lands was aimed at maintaining the status quo in such a waythat it ho ped China wo uld co ns ider to be in its o wn interes t that is by cho o s ing the lesser o f two evils That express io ns like`peaceful adminis tratio n` o r `trans fer o f title under do mes tic Japanese law` co uld o nly be interpreted by the Chinese as acts o fasserting Japanese so vereignty was apparently s imply igno red Under these circumstances it was impo ss ible to co nvince theChinese that trans fer o f o wnership had no thing to do with so vereignty Ins tead the Chinese even suspected that the No da

go vernment and Ishihara were co nniving at s trengthening Japan`s co ntro l o ver the is lands 179

Any intended co nciliato ry o verto ne in the abo ve explanatio ns by Gemba and many s imilar declaratio ns befo re and later were furthernegated by the ins is tence that there was no territo rial dispute exactly the po s itio n the Chinese mo s t so ught to change Thefrequent references to `co re interes t` by China were igno red by the Japanese go vernment Fo r the Chinese leaders the `o ffer` tocho o se between the To kyo Metro po litan Go vernment o r the Go vernment o f Japan buying the is lands was as Vice Fo reign Minis ter

Zhang Zhijun later put it like being asked to cho o se between two do ses o f po iso n18 0

It was also unfo rtunate that the Japanese go vernment allo wed the express io n kokuyuka (natio nalizatio n) to prevail even amo ng

go vernment members ins tead o f the o riginal term agreed by the Japanese cabinet shutoku (acquis itio n)18 1 Chinese media hastaken o ver the Japanese term o f lsquonatio nalizatio nrsquo which certainly further co nfused Chinese public o pinio n Since it do es no t kno w thehis to rical backgro und and Japan`s effective co ntro l o f the is lands `natio nalizatio n` tended to be unders to o d as a radical change in

the status quo o r even as invas io n18 2 A well kno wn Japanese o bserver in China Kato Yo shikazu even argued therefo re that the 1972

and 1978 unders tanding abo ut shelving had prevented the Chinese peo ple fro m learning abo ut the is sue as perceived in Japan18 3

Bo th s ides made it impo ss ible with their extreme and diametrically o ppo sed po s itio ns to find a co mpro mise The No da go vernmentwas to o weak (and also to o preo ccupied with o ther is sues like the pass ing o f the law to intro duce a hike o f the value added taxco ping with the aftermath o f the triple disas ter o f March 2011 and s imply trying to s tay in po wer) to find an alternative to the no wabando ned `shelving co mpro mise` and to admit that there was a territo rial pro blem At the end o f Augus t No da was fo rced topro mise Lo wer Ho use electio ns `so metime so o n` despite the grim o utlo o k fo r his party`s chances in the electio ns Making aco mpro mise o n the territo rial is sue wo uld no t have helped to gain po pular suppo rt While the Chinese pro bably felt enco uraged toescalate pressure by their success in fo rcing the Japanese go vernment hand o ver the captain in September 2010 it mo s t likely hadthe effect o n the No da go vernment to remain inflexible in o rder to avo id being seen yet again as caving in to Chinese pressure Butthe Chinese were also no t able to co mpro mise o n their demand that the Japanese sho uld admit the exis tence o f a territo rial is sue

The preparatio n fo r the 18 th Natio nal Party Co ngress in No vember 2012 and the ensuing leadership change to be finalized o nly inspring 2013 s imilarly did no t allo w the Chinese leaders whether inco ming o r o utgo ing to appear so ft Eight o ut o f nine Po litbureaumembers publicly expressed o ppo s itio n to the purchase either befo re o r after the anno uncement o f the purchase o n 11

September18 4 There are also credible repo rts that during the CCP`s summer retreat to Beihaide in Augus t Hu Jintao came underpressure fro m the future gro up o f leaders to take a mo re severe po s itio n o n Japan`s intentio n to natio nalise the three is lands Asa result the leading fo reign po licy interlo cuto rs o f the Japanese go vernment Zhang Zhijun and Dai Bingguo hardened their po s itio n

as well18 5 Public o pinio n in China had gro wn increas ingly ho s tile to Japan o ver the summer and was particularly inflamed when thelanding o f the Ho ng Ko ng activis ts was fo llo wed by the landing o f Japanese activis ts which were treated by the Japanese autho ritiesmo re leniently than the fo rmer ie no t arres ted despite having vio lated private land leased to the s tate Rio ts in several Chinese

cities s tarted thereafter18 6

Altho ugh bo th s ides agreed to co ntinue dialo gue and several o fficial meetings at different levels to o k place they co uld o nly end inres tating kno wn po s itio ns China did no t make things eas ier by later cancelling such meetings depriving bo th s ides o f po ss ibleo ppo rtunities to find a breakthro ugh The s tart o f Chinese sanctio ns acro ss the who le gambit o f bilateral relatio ns deprived theJapanese o f even mo re do mes tic wriggle ro o m fo r a co mpro mise

It seems that the abo ve circumstances did no t allo w Japan`s central decis io n-makers co ncerned with the is sue in particular the

Prime Minis ter and his immediate circle to admit to ando r unders tand until the purchase anno uncement o n 11 September 2012ho w s tro ngly the Chinese felt abo ut it Ambassado r Niwa`s rather undiplo matic s tatements in the Financial Times interview seem toindicate that he felt that the central decis io n-makers did no t unders tand the s trength o f the feelings o f the Chinese and ho w far theymight go Niwa warned in his interview that even a po ss ible pre-purchase survey o f the is lands co uld be diplo matically incendiary

s ince such a survey was dis cussed already at the time to enable the TMG to go ahead with the purchase18 7 As late as the 3September the Yomiuri Shimbun repo rted that the Chinese go vernment was reacting calmly as lo ng as three co nditio ns wereo bserved to maintain the status quo The co nditio ns co ntained no o ppo s itio n to a po ss ible purchase and ins tead jus t mentio ned

abs tentio n fro m landing surveying and building facilities o n the is lands 18 8 Acco rding to Pro fesso r Takahara Akio General ZhuChenghu said o n 5 September that a purchase by the central go vernment wo uld be better and Qu Xing directo r o f the China Ins titute

o f Internatio nal Affairs is said to have expressed a s imilar o pinio n18 9 Even o n 12 September when the s to rm bro ke the deputydirecto r o f the Japan Ins titute o f the Chinese Academy o f So cial Science Gao Ho ng s tated in an interview with the o n-line vers io no f the Renmin Ribao that if Japan wo uld respect the three abs tentio ns mentio ned abo ve the s ituatio n co uld ultimately revert to the

status quo ante19 0 But these were no lo nger the decis ive vo ices o f the Chinese leadership after the Beihaide meeting The abo ve-mentio ned Campbell interview seems to sugges t that Japan was lo ng befo re mo re inclined to act upo n Chinese s tatements whichwere clo ser to what it wanted to unders tand

CHINESE REACTION RHETORICAL WARFARE

The final misco mmunicatio n o r clash o f irreco ncilable interes ts o ccurred when Prime Minis ter No da met Pres ident Hu o n thes idelines o f the As ia Pacific Eco no mic Co o peratio n (APEC) summit in Vladivo s to k o n 9 September then anno unced two days laterthe s igning o f the purchase co ntract with the Kurihara family Whether Hu had no t sufficiently co nveyed his s tro ng feelingsco ncerning the purchase which had been kno wn and bilaterally dis cussed at leas t s ince the Japanese o fficial anno uncement o f itspurchase intentio n o n 7 July o r No da had no t unders tanding the Chinese feeling fo r the po ss ible reaso ns dis cussed abo ve Hu

apparently felt he had lo s t face when Japan anno unced the purchase o n 11 September19 1 Mo reo ver the Japanese anno uncementco uld no t have co me at a mo re awkward time because o f the anniversary o f the Mukden Incident o n the 18 September which likeseveral o ther carefully cultivated anniversaries regarding Japan`s pas t misdeeds in China always aro use latent anti-Japanesefeelings As a result the Japanese anno uncement caused an avalanche o f virulent rheto rical o utburs ts relating to the pas t po liticalsanctio ns further measures to assert China`s territo rial claim (fo r example including the is lands in the Chinese TV weatherfo recas t an exhibitio n o f ancient maps to pro ve Chinese co ntro l) eco no mic sanctio ns and an escalatio n o f patro ls by ChineseFLEC and MSA ships and aircraft aro und the Senkaku Is lands

The mildes t part o f China`s rheto rical o ffens ive was calling the go vernment purchase a `farce` a rather undiplo matic express io nalready used by Xinhua in July 2012 but then taken up at the highes t level by Vice Pres ident Xi Jinping when meeting Secretary o f

Defence Leo n Panetta o n 19 September19 2 But the main line fro m no w o n was that Japan`s claim to the Senkaku Is lands was adenial o f the po s t-Wo rld War II results In its s tatements and rebuttals the Chinese sho wed their frus tratio n at no t having been ableto fundamentally change the status quo and they did no t hes itate to use express io ns which were rather undignified fo r diplo mats andpo litical leaders Japan o n the o ther hand argued fo r peaceful reso lutio n alo ng the lines o f internatio nal law and dialo gue whichpro bably infuriated the Chinese even mo re On 10 September the CMFA is sued a s tatement calling Japans po s itio n o n the disputedis lands `an o utright denial o f the o utco mes o f the victo ry o f the Wo rld Anti-Fascis t War and hellip a grave challenge to the po s t-war

internatio nal o rder`19 3 In a heated exchange at the UN General Assembly between Chinas UN ambassado r Li Bao do ng and JapansDeputy UN ambassado r Ko dama Kazuo Li called the mo tive fo r purchas ing the three is lands to lsquolegalize its s tealing and o ccupatio no f Chinese territo ryrsquo and s tated lsquoThis actio n o f Japan co ns titutes a serio us encro achment upo n Chinas so vereignty and intends toco ntinue and legalize the result o f Japans co lo nial po licy It is an o pen denial o f the o utco mes o f victo ry o f the wo rld anti-fascis twar and a grave challenge to the po s t-war internatio nal o rder and the purpo ses and principles o f the Charter o f the United

Natio ns rsquo19 4 In a further rebuttal o f Japan`s assertio n o f its claim Li characterized the is land purchase as lsquono thing different fro m

mo ney launderingrsquo19 5 At the As ia Euro pe Meeting (ASEM) in Lao s Fo reign Minis ter Yang Jiechi repeated the reference to the`o utco me o f the anti-Fascis t war` while Prime Minis ter No da spo ke o f peaceful reso lutio n o f co nflicts acco rding to internatio nal

law19 6 On 11 Octo ber the CMFA spo kesperso n Ho ng Lei refuted Fo reign Minis ter Gembarsquos his to rical acco unt jus tifying Japan`s

claim by calling it `gangs ter lo gic`19 7

On the Chinese s ide therefo re there are no w two clo sely-linked his to ry narratives o ne is abo ut the is lands having been part o fChina s ince the Ming and Qing dynas ties the o ther co nnects the is lands to the already well-rehearsed his to ry narrative ie Japanhaving victimised China s ince the Sino -Japanese war o f 1894-95 These two narratives co ntinue to be cultivated by the Chineseleadership In Octo ber 2012 the Chinese anno uncement o f the publicatio n o f 80 vo lumes o n the Far Eas t War Criminal Co urt was

clearly meant to link the latter narrative to Japan`s acquis itio n o f the Senkaku Is lands 19 8 Fo rmer Fo reign Minis ter Gemba explicitlytried in Octo ber 2012 to delink the territo rial is sue fro m Japan`s aggress io n agains t China o nly to be reminded by the Chineseambassado r to the UK in an article in the Financial Times (as part o f the ensuing wo rldwide press campaign by bo th s ides ) that lsquothe

Diao yu Dao is sue is all abo ut his to ryrsquo19 9 Since then until no w China has co ntinued this ldquohis to ry warfarerdquo by publishing endlessarticles o n Japan`s aggress io n agains t China befo re 1945 The mo s t recent mo ve in July 2014 is the serialised o n-line publicatio n o f

the hand-written co nfess io ns by 45 Japanese co nvicted war criminals by the State Archives Adminis tratio n20 0

POLITICAL SANCTIONS AND PUBLIC OPINION

Chinese po litical co untermeasures ranged fro m the cancellatio n o f o fficial and uno fficial vis its to further legal acts to reinfo rce

China`s claim to the Senkaku Is lands Aro und 40 per cent o f ceremo nial events in Japan to mark 2012 as the 40 th anniversary o f the

no rmalizatio n o f diplo matic relatio ns with China were cancelled o r po s tpo ned and even mo re events in China20 1 Thesecancellatio ns were no t always the result o f direct go vernment interventio n but so metimes mo re indirect o fficial `dis co uragement`helped by the Chinese preference fo r no t being seen to do so mething in co ntradictio n to the (initially fo mented and later self-pro pelling) anti-Japan atmo sphere o r by fear o f participants running into demo ns tratio ns if no t assaults The legal s crews werefurther turned with lo ng-term implicatio ns On 10 September the Chinese go vernment anno unced the base po ints and baselines o f

the territo rial waters o f the disputed is lands and their affiliated is lets as well as the names and co o rdinates o f 17 base po ints 20 2

On 16 September repo rts appeared that China was submitting pro po sals fo r its extended co ntinental shelf to the UN Co ntinental

Shelf Co mmiss io n which included the Senkaku Is lands but in fact the actual submiss io n o ccurred o nly o n 14 December 201220 3 On

20 September a go vernment agency published a thematic map o f the Diao yu Is land and its affiliated is lands 20 4 Chinarsquos

Meteo ro lo gical Adminis tratio n s tarted pro viding weather fo recas ts fo r the Senkaku area o n the s tate-run TV s tatio n20 5 On 16September the fishery bureau anno unced the lifting o f the fishery ban in the Eas t China Sea and s tressed that China planned to

s trengthen its so vereignty claim o ver the Senkakus 20 6

There were rumo urs that 1000 fishing vessels wo uld co me to the Senkaku area and tho ugh this did no t materialize it helped to

further raise tens io ns 20 7

Mo st attentio n in Japan was fo cused o n the widening s treet pro tes ts in o ver 100 Chinese cities the des tructio n o f Japanese sho ps

res taurants cars and pro ductio n facilities and the attacks o n Japanese citizens in China20 8 The webs ites o f at leas t 19 Japanese

banks univers ities and o ther ins titutio ns came under cyber-attack20 9 At a demo ns tratio n in Shanghai abo ut 7000 pro tes ters

chanted s lo gans such as lsquoBeat Japanese imperialismrsquo lsquoBo yco tt Japanese pro ducts rsquo and lsquoDes tro y Japan and retrieve Okinawarsquo210

Altho ugh o nly 63 per cent o f po lled Japanese in late September 2012 expressed suppo rt fo r their go vernment`s natio nalizatio n o fthe is lands do wn fro m 73 per cent in a previo us po ll o n 15 and 16 September 82 per cent o f respo ndents in a Mainichi Shimbun

survey said the Japanese go vernment had no t pro tes ted s tro ngly eno ugh to Beijing o ver anti-Japan pro tes ts 211 The Chinesego vernment denied any o fficial invo lvement and the spo kesperso n o f the Waijiao bu went o nly as far as saying that the pro tes ts anddemo ns tratio ns were `co mpletely caused by the Japanese go vernments illegal purchase o f the Diao yu Is lands and are peo ples

spo ntaneo us acts`212 There were ho wever repo rts that so me o f the demo ns tratio ns were to lerated if no t abetted by go vernment

agencies 213 The demo ns tratio ns so o n died do wn because to lerating them much lo nger wo uld have run the risk that they wo uld turninto anti-go vernment demo ns tratio ns Even the Chinese Academy o f So cial Sciences repo rted that so me demo ns trato rs who were

arres ted did no t even kno w where the Senkaku Is lands were and that anger o ver the widening wealth gap was behind their acts 214 Inco ntras t to these Chinese demo ns tratio ns and acts o f lawlessness there was hardly any public demo ns tratio n in Japan whichsho ws the relative detachment o f the Japanese fro m the dispute On 22 September `Nippo n Gambare` a right wing o rganizatio nchaired by fo rmer Air Self Defence Fo rce chief Tamo gami To shio s taged a march thro ugh parts o f To kyo which this autho rwitnessed A brief fire was s tarted at a Chinese scho o l in Ko be and two smo ke bo mbs were thro wn into the Chinese Co nsulate

General in Fukuo ka215 But such actio ns were relatively rare and small in s cale

ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND THE QUESTION OF WHO IS MORE DEPENDENT ON WHOM

Pro tes t measures o f a lo nger duratio n and as yet unpredictable co nsequences fo r the bilateral relatio nship have been China`seco no mic sanctio ns and a bo yco tt o f Japanese go o ds by the general public altho ugh the autho rities denied again any go vernmentinterventio n A co mmentary o f Xinhua half admitted ho wever go vernment interventio n when it made the unco nvincing dis tinctio nbetween `measures` and `sanctio ns` `Since Japan purchased Chinas Diao yu Is lands in September the Chinese go vernment hastaken a series o f co untermeasures in the eco no mic legal diplo matic and military fields which have helped it to wres t the initiativeto reso lve the is lands dispute despite China no t impo s ing any eco no mic sanctio ns the Japanese eco no my has been badly

hit`216 Renmin Ribao co mpared `eco no mic punishments` with a `gun` and warned that thro ugh its is land purchase Japan hadalready to uched the `trigger` In a rather heavy hint the paper po inted o ut ho w vulnerable Japan`s eco no my was because o f the

2011 earthquake and the dependence o f key eco no mic secto rs o n China217 Even mo re o fficial was Vice Minis ter o f Co mmerce Jiang

Zengwei`s warning that the is land purchase wo uld inevitably have a negative impact o n Sino -Japanese eco no mic and trade ties 218

After 11 September it so o n became very o bvio us that the heavy hand o f the Chinese go vernment was impo s ing sanctio ns andmaking life fo r Japanese bus iness mo re diff icult On 21 September it was repo rted that Chinese cus to ms autho rities were

s trengthening inspectio ns o f impo rts fro m and expo rts to Japan altho ugh the Chinese autho rities denied this 219 In the same week

repo rts appeared abo ut Japanese co mpanies experiencing delays in o btaining wo rking visas fo r their Japanese emplo yees 220 BigJapanese co mpanies with inves tments in China were experiencing ho ld-ups in gaining regulato ry appro vals fo r Merger amp

Acquis itio ns 221 In co ntras t to the interference in rare earth expo rts to Japan after the trawler incident in 2010 ho wever no such

embargo was implemented because this particular eco no mic weapo n had lo s t its effectiveness s ince then (see belo w)222

The greates t medium-term damage to Japanese eco no mic activities apart fro m the abo ve mentio ned des tructio n o f Japaneseco mmercial and indus trial s ites was caused by a partial co nsumer bo yco tt no tably the fall o f car sales in China and Chineseto urism to Japan Overall bilateral trade decreased by 39 per cent in 2012 to $329 billio n the firs t dro p s ince the co llapse o f theLehman inves tment bank in 2009 and in 2013 to $3125 billio n acco rding to Chinese figures Acco rding to Japanese figures trade in

2013 increased but declined in vo lume223

The wo rs t hit secto r was auto mo biles To yo ta so ld 840 500 vehicles in China in 2012 the firs t annual dro p s ince 2002 Nis san

experienced a 24 per cent dro p in December China sales and Ho nda saw a 19 per cent December fall224 Ho wever as o f 2014Japanese car sales in and to China have again been increas ing The to uris t indus try was also hard hit in bo th co untries Chinese

vis ito rs to Japan decreased by 44 per cent fro m September to December 2012 fro m the year befo re225 The number o f Japanese

to uris ts o n gro up to urs to China plunged by mo re than 70 per cent year-o n-year in the las t three mo nths o f 2012226 This fallco ntinued into 2013 when their number fell to 29 millio n Japanese to uris ts do wn 18 2 fro m 2012 and the 3rd s traight annual

decline227 Ho wever in March 2014 vis ito rs fro m mainland China surged 80 1 fro m the previo us March to to tal 184200 a reco rdhigh fo r the mo nth and a s teeper year-o n-year rise than vis ito rs fro m any o ther co untries and regio ns This was also helped by the

falling yen and the resumptio n o f cruise to urs with large ships which were to tally suspended in March 2012228

Ano ther mo re lo ng-term negative eco no mic effect o n the bilateral relatio nship can be gauged fro m falling Japanese FDI to Chinawhich acco rding to Chinese figures declined by 422 in the firs t five mo nths o f 2014 after having fallen by 43 to $71 billio n in

2013 acco rding to Chinese figures o r by 18 to $10 9 billio n acco rding to Japanese figures 229

China`s multiple eco no mic retributio ns cas t do ubt o n the co ntinued viability o f the earlier `Ho t Eco no mics and Co ld Po litics`dicho to my The answer to the ques tio n which co untry is mo re dependent o n the o ther o r mo re vulnerable to sanctio ns is dependento n the eco no mic indicato rs and secto rs being cho sen and is also a po litical ques tio n because the answer can be po liticallymanipulated Japan`s eco no mic diff iculties s ince the 1990s (and its dependence o n eco no mic interactio n with China to co pe withthese diff iculties ) and China pushing Japan to No 3 in wo rld GDP ranking has diminished the Chinese perceptio n o f Japan as aneco no mic po wer ho use It means that fo r China the relatio nship with Japan became less impo rtant while po litical relatio nsdeterio rated at the same time The s tro ng effect o f the Chinese embargo o n rare earth expo rts to Japan in 2010 can be viewed intwo diametrically o ppo sed ways Chinese o bservers may be inclined to put emphas is o n the s tro ng effect it had o n Japanese publico pinio n and indus trial circles co ntributing to a certain extent to the go vernment`s surrender o f the trawler captain Others maypo int o ut that the case demo ns trated the futility o f abus ing a do minant supplier po s itio n because within a sho rt time Japan`sindus try secured alternative reso urces and demand reductio n thro ugh recycling and pro duct re-engineering no t o nly pro videdeno ugh breathing space but in the end reduced China`s market po wer Still Chinese experts are co nvinced that Japan is no w mo redependent o n China than the o ther way ro und Acco rding to so me specialis ts Chinas impo rts acco unted in 2011fo r 237 per cent o fJapan`s expo rt vo lume The bilateral trade vo lume in 2011 to o k up 21 per cent o f Japanese gro ss trade vo lume o f that year while it

merely acco unted fo r 9 4 per cent o f Chinas annual gro ss trade vo lume230 There seem to be o nly few Chinese vo ices which expressco ncern o ver the negative impact o f China`s sanctio ns o n China`s eco no my itself no tably at a time o f wo rldwide eco no mic

co ntractio n231

The Chinese market is certainly to o impo rtant fo r many Japanese co mpanies to leave A survey in No vember 2012 to which mo rethan 10 000 Japanese co mpanies in China replied sho wed that fo r almo s t 30 per cent o f them the territo rial dispute had affected

their bus iness but s till mo re than half want to maintain their o peratio ns and o nly 16 per cent said that they wanted to either cut

back o r pull o ut232 Japanese co mpanies in certain secto rs are likely to beco me mo re reluctant to make inves tments in China all themo re as o ther So utheas t As ian co untries (no tably Myanmar is currently the New Fro ntier fo r Japanese bus iness ) have cheaper

labo ur co s ts 233 Ho wever Chinese co nsumers s till prefer Japanese pro ducts fo r safer fo o d drinks and daily necess ities and tho se

Japanese co mpanies were hardly affected by the bo yco tt234

A wide gap between bo th s ides` perceptio n abo ut their eco no mic dependence and vulnerability to sanctio ns is dangero us fo r themanagement o f their bilateral relatio nship particularly when o ne s ide tries to leverage its suppo sedly s tro nger po s itio n to achievevicto ry in a sens itive area like territo rial integrity While Chinese co mmentato rs and experts may be inclined to o verrate Japan`svulnerability their Japanese co unterparts have a tendency to lo o k at the is sues to o much in purely eco no mic terms neglecting theimpact o f Chinese emo tio ns and go vernment pro paganda as well as the wider public`s insufficient kno wledge abo ut the o verall

impact o f bad eco no mic relatio ns with Japan o n China`s o wn eco no my235 The Japanese perceptio n remains that China in the endneeds Japan mo re than the o ther way ro und which in view o f China`s huge pro blems and its dependence o n Japanese hightechno lo gy co mpo nents fo r its manufacturing indus try is arguably the case This Japanese perceptio n has fo s tered the co nvictio nas demo ns trated fo r example by the belief in the sus tainability o f `Ho t Eco no mics and Co ld Po litics` that despite recurring

po litical crises in the relatio nship China wo uld in the end co mpro mise as it had do ne several times in the pas t236 Yet the pro blemwith the perceptio n o f `needing Japan` is that it can be po litically manipulated particularly in an autho ritarian sys tem This gapbetween Japanese and Chinese o bservers and experts o n the is sue o f dependence can serio us ly influence the willingness o f bo th

s ides to co mpro mise237 It also challenges the liberal view that clo se eco no mic relatio ns can prevent o r at leas t so ften deeppo litical differences like territo rial co nflicts which mo reo ver are linked to eco no mic interes ts like hydro carbo n reso urces In thisco ntext it is interes ting to no te that China has recently been exchanging with Japan a number o f high-po wered bus iness delegatio ns(apart fro m exchanges with po litical parties and lo cal go vernment o fficials ) The willingness o f Japanese bus iness to take part maybe interpreted by China as an express io n o f Japan`s eco no mic dependence o n China while giving it also the o ppo rtunity to putpressure o n the Abe go vernment to make co ncess io ns and to keep links with Japan fo r the po s t-Abe era

In view o f the impo rtance o f the eco no mic relatio nship and the damage suffered by Japanese bus iness after September 2012 o newo uld have expected mo re pressure fro m the bus iness co mmunity to co me to a territo rial co mpro mise so lutio n and so impro verelatio ns Ho wever this has no t been the case and may have to do with the perceptio n gap dis cussed abo ve but also the relativelack o f influence o n the go vernment (the majo rity o f the China-relevant Japanese bus iness co mmunity co ns is ts o f small- andmedium-s ized co mpanies ) the fear that a mo re vo cal ro le wo uld get co mpanies into tro uble with the autho rities in Japan ando rChina o r the ho pe o f being able to weather the po litical s to rms either because o f alternative market o ppo rtunities o r theco mpany`s s ize

FROM POLICING TO MILITARY INVOLVEMENT

The mo s t serio us co nsequences fo r the bilateral relatio nship ndash let alo ne fo r the so lutio n o f the territo rial dispute and regio nalpeace ndash arise fro m the co ns tant intrus io ns o f Chinese o fficial vessels into the Co ntiguo us Zo ne (CZ) o r even Territo rial Waters(TW) o f the Senkaku Is lands s ince September 2012 and the gro wing invo lvement o f the armed fo rces o f bo th s ides The aim o f theChinese is o bvio us to demo ns trate that the Japanese can no lo nger claim exclus ive co ntro l o f the is lands and to fo rce To kyo toadmit the exis tence o f a territo rial dispute Apparently a task fo rce at the highes t level headed by Xi Jinping was set up in

September 2012 to achieve this go al thro ugh escalating pressure238 So far law enfo rcement actio ns by Japan in the Senkaku areahave been limited to the deplo yment o f the Japanese Co as t Guard and po lice which is no w ho wever co ns tantly challenged byChinese with patro ls by CMS and FLEC (s ince 22 July 2013 unified under the State Ocean Adminis tratio n and renamed China Co as tGuard CG) vessels asserting the same rights in the is lands` CZ and TW The Chinese s ide escalated its pressure o n Japan by firs tdeplo ying FLEC vessels in the CZ and TW o f the disputed is lands then ratcheting up their pressure with CMS vessels do ing the samefo llo wed later in December 2012 with air patro ls by CMS aircraft which led to the deplo yment o f the air fo rce o f bo th s ides inJanuary 2013

As we have seen after the September 2010 incident in No vember 2010 FLEC s tarted to regularly send its vessels to the Senkakuarea which entered fro m time to time the is lands` CZ and also in Augus t 2011 twice the TW Apparently the mo re serio usintrus io ns which are tho se into the TW were so metimes timed with specific spikes o f tens io ns such as the TW incurs io n o n 16March 2012 (the Japanese naming o f so me is lands) July 2012 (No da`s anno uncement o f purchase intentio n o n 7 July) and finallyo n 19 September when s ix vessels entered the TW s tarting a series o f mo re frequent and regular incurs io ns In December 2012

FLEC deplo yed its newes t and bigges t ship the 5800-to n FLEC vessel Yuzheng 206 a fo rmer ship o f the Chinese navy239

The entries o f the vessels o f the CMS into the is lands` CZ and TW seem meant to send an even higher degree o f warning and denialo f Japan`s co ntro l o ver the is lands On 17 September the number o f FLEC and CMS vessels in the CZ and TW had reached the reco rd

o f 17240 Thereafter the frequency o f incurs io ns into the CZ and TW increased but it decreased after March 2013 On 30 Octo berXinhua even repo rted that the CMS had `expelled a number o f Japanese vessels illegally sailing in waters aro und the Diao yu

Is lands` altho ugh it is no t clear what exactly this meant s ince the CG did no t co nfirm such an incident241 Acco rding to Xinhua NewsAgency in 2013 China sent 50 ldquopatro l miss io ns rdquo into the TW o f the disputed is lands and as o f 12 July 2014 by the autho r`s co unt

there had been 17 such Chinese ldquopatro l miss io ns rdquo in 2014 which are ldquoincurs io ns rdquo fo r the Japanese s ide242 Other needle pricks todemo ns trate China`s claims are the o ccas io nal incurs io ns o f Chinese survey ships into the Senkaku Is lands` EEZ o r the bo ardingo f Chinese fishing vessels in the EEZ Defence Minis ter Itsuno ri Ono dera in late Octo ber 2013 called these repeated incurs io ns a

threat to peace which fell in a ldquogray zo ne (between) peacetime and an emergency s ituatio nrdquo243

A new level o f depriving Japan o f the ability to claim so le effective co ntro l o ver the is lands was reached o n 13 December 2012 when

a small turbo pro p aircraft o f the CMS (Harbin Y12 type) flew o ver Uo tsurijima244 Since then regular CMS air patro ls have beenco nducted but the aircraft no rmally s tay abo ut 120 km fro m the is lands With this mo ve Chinese measures to undermine Japan`sco ntro l o ver the is lands were expanded to the air space which fo r o rganizatio nal reaso ns had immediately military implicatio nsbecause the Air Self Defense Fo rce (ASDF) is respo ns ible fo r intercepting aircraft which intrude illegally into Japan`s air space The

incident did no t happen o ut o f the blue because already in January 2012 the SOA had anno unced a plan to deplo y the Y12 in 2012245

On 24 September the SOA had also anno unced plans to deplo y dro nes by 2015 fo llo wing the success ful tes t the previo us day 246

The Chinese acts are apparently carefully planned and co o rdinated s ince the o fficials in the abo ve Kyo do repo rt also said that theairspace vio latio ns o n 13 December 2012 by an airplane o f the CMS was planned by the s taff sectio n o f the natio nal Land and SeaBo rder Defense Co mmittee which acts as a liaiso n o ffice fo r the Chinese military the State Oceanic Adminis tratio n and the fishing

bureau o f the Agriculture Minis try with the aim o f rais ing tens io ns 247

The lo w altitude flight o f the Y12 o n 13 December was particularly upsetting fo r the Japanese go vernment because it was no t pickedup by the ASDF radar (the clo ses t o ne being o n Miyako jima abo ut 200 km fro m the is lands) but ins tead by CG ships in the area Inthis case eight ASDF fighters s crambled but co uld no t detect the Y12 Interceptio n o f aircraft is by nature much mo re diff icult andcarries a certain risk o f accident as happened in 2001 when a US intelligence aircraft co llided with a Chinese intercepto r jet Witho ut

explaining the s tandard Japanese pro ceedures fo r aerial defence which so lely relies o n the ASDF the Chinese media interpreted theuse o f military aircraft by Japan as `aggress ive` and the Global Times cautio ned agains t any interceptio n warning that China might

respo nd by sending its air fo rce248 On the Japanese s ide even the centre-left Asahi Shimbun called the Y12 flight ` a highly

pro vo cative act that co uld lead to an armed co nflict between the two co untries`249 At the beginning o f January 2013 there wereapparently erro neo us repo rts that the ASDF might co ns ider firing warning sho ts (tracer bullets ) at intruding Chinese aircraft which

pro mpted further bellico se co mments in the Chinese press 250 As a co nsequence the Chinese air fo rce also became invo lved o n10 January when the Chinese Minis try o f Defence anno unced that the Peo ple`s Liberatio n Army Air Fo rce (PLAA) had sent two fighterjets agains t two ASDF F-15 intercepto rs because they were fo llo wing a Chinese military Y8 transpo rt aircraft patro lling the airspace

o f Chinese o il platfo rms in the Eas t China Sea251 The Japanese repo rted that mo re than ten Chinese aircraft including military

aircraft had appro ached the Japanese air defence identificatio n zo ne252 In a further escalatio n the Japanese s ide repo rted that o n11 June 2014 two Chinese military jets flew abno rmally clo se to two planes o f Japans Self Defence Fo rce abo ve the Eas t China Sea

an accusatio n which the Chinese s ide refuted speaking ins tead o f two incidents pro vo ked by Japanese fighters 253 Related to thisdevelo pment and further enhancing the po ss ibility o f an incident is the enhanced patro lling o f the PLAA o ver the Eas t China Seawhich caused the ASDF to increase scrambling agains t PLAA aircraft to 415 times between 1 April 2013 and 31 March 2014 (Fis cal

Year 2013) 109 times mo re than in the previo us Fis cal Year 2012254

Co ntinuing to increase the pressure o n Japan the Chinese go vernment decreed o n 23 No vember 2013 an Air Defence Identificatio nZo ne (ADIZ) which includes the airspace o ver the Senkaku Is lands and was certainly meant to reinfo rce China`s territo rial claimdespite the fact that an ADIZ has no territo rial implicatio ns in internatio nal law The threat o f military co untermeasures in the text o fthe decree (lsquoChinas armed fo rces will ado pt defens ive emergency measures to respo nd to aircraft that do no t co o perate in the

identificatio n o r refuse to fo llo w the ins tructio ns rsquo) has further heightened the po ss ibility o f a military clash255 Ho wever theJapanese s ide refuses to accept the ADIZ The Chinese mo ves have wider implicatio ns fo r peace and s tability in the regio n in o rderto pro tect the freedo m o f its military aircraft in Eas t As ian airspace and its ability to o bserve China`s military fo rces Washingto nrefused to reco gnise the zo ne co ntinued to igno re the requirements o f the ADIZ by pursuing its regular patro l f lights and criticisedits implementatio n Simultaneo us ly ho wever the Department o f State advised civilian airlines to fo llo w China`s ins tructio ns andVice Pres ident Biden advised bo th co untries o n his trip to No rtheas t As ia in December 2013 to es tablish a cris is managements tructure Since the US do es no t take a s tance o n the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands` so vereignty Washingto n seemed to igno re Japan`smain grievance abo ut the ADIZ which is China`s intentio n to further reinfo rce its so vereignty claim by extending the ADIZ o ver theis lands The mo s t far-reaching US s tatements were a reco nfirmatio n o f the applicatio n o f the security treaty to the is lands evenmentio ning the is lands by their Japanese and Chinese names and co mplaining that the Chinese actio n was an attempt to unilaterally

change the status quo in the Eas t China Sea which raised regio nal tens io n and increased the risk o f accident and miscalculatio n256

Ho wever in this way the Obama Adminis tratio n risked creating amo ng so me Japanese o bservers do ubts abo ut the Adminis tratio n`sreliability and so gave succo ur to China`s attempt to drive a wedge between the two allies Ano ther co mplicatio n is that the ChineseADIZ o verlaps that o f Ko rea and mo reo ver co vers the submerged ro ck called Ieo do in Ko rean and Suyan in Chinese which has animpact o n the no t yet demarcated EEZ bo rder between bo th co untries Interes tingly the Japanese ADIZ also co vers Ieo do but thishas never been underpinned by any Japanese EEZ claims But China kno ws ho w to play o n So uth Ko rea`s criticism o f Japan`sattitude to wards the his to ry is sue and the territo rial dispute with Japan o ver Do kto Takeshima is land Mo reo ver the As ian co untriesco ntes ting China`s claims to parts o f the So uth China Sea are co ncerned that China wo uld further co mplicate the territo rialdisputes in the area by es tablishing an ADIZ Yet the ASEAN member s tates have been very cautio us in directly criticis ing ChinaChina`s es tablishment o f the ADIZ directly affects many co untries because so many o f them have airlines flying thro ugh the zo neHo wever with the exceptio n o f Japan all o thers agred to co nfo rm with China`s reques t fo r no tif icatio n which undermines theJapanese go vernment`s po s itio n o f explicitly advis ing Japanese airlines no t to co nfo rm

With these escalating develo pments the Chinese s ide achieved its go al o f sho wing that the Japanese autho rities are no lo nger infull co ntro l o f the disputed is lands In the case o f Chinese Co as tguard vessel intrus io ns the reactio n o f the Japanese CG is limitedto shado wing the Chinese vessels to info rm them that they are vio lating Japan`s CZ o r TW and to ask them to leave whichho wever they do at their o wn dis cretio n (the time span ho vering in the CZ o r TW having beco me a further means o f Chinesepressure) fo llo wed by diplo matic pro tes ts Otherwise the CG has avo ided any phys ical co nfro ntatio n o r co ntact When co nfro ntedby the CG the Chinese vessels s imply declare (by radio o r even electro nic displays ) that they are patro lling Chinese waters and thatthe CG ships were o perating illegally in these waters This ritual has so far prevented vio lence This is in co ntras t to an exchange o fwater canno n salvo s between the CG and the Taiwanese co as t guard in the territo rial o f the Senkaku Is lands o n 25 September 2012

and again o n 24 January 2013257

The increase o f patro ls by Japan and China is caus ing o peratio nal s train fo r bo th s ides (also rais ing the risk o f miscalculatio ns o ro verreactio ns ) but this has no t reduced the willingness o f either go vernment to s cale do wn the almo s t daily demo ns tratio ns o f

`effective co ntro l` In Octo ber it was repo rted that the CG no w always maintains ten vessels agains t eight fro m China258 The 11th

regio nal headquarters respo ns ible fo r the Senkaku area is in Naha and has nine patro l ships (but o nly seven vessels o f at leas t

1000 to ns ) but no w needs additio nal ships which are dispatched fro m o ther regio nal headquarters 259 In April 2012 the CG had ato tal o f 357 patro l vessels but o nly 51 o ver 1000 to ns which are tho se mo s t needed fo r a far flung area like the Senkaku

Is lands 26 0 On 14 September 2012 Senio r Vice Minis ter o f Fisheries Iwamo to Tsukasa mentio ned plans to increase the number o f

fishery patro l vessels to ensure fishermens safety amid intens ifying territo rial disputes with China and So uth Ko rea26 1 On 26Octo ber the Minis try o f Land Infras tructure Transpo rt and To urism which heads the CG anno unced plans to increase budgetary

reques ts fo r mo re ships 26 2 The Abe go vernment plans to build mo re vessels o r advance the calendar retro fit vessels which were to

be retired and is co ns idering extending the retirement age o f the o fficers 26 3

The Chinese have fewer vessels which can be deplo yed as far as the Senkaku Is lands In additio n leave o f the sailo rs has been

res tricted and their deplo yment length at sea has increased26 4 In March 2013 the Chinese s ide anno unced clo ser co o peratio nbetween the military and vario us maritime law enfo rcement agencies as well as the merger o f fo ur maritime law enfo rcementagencies under the State Ocean Adminis tratio n (adminis tered by the Minis try o f Land and Reso urces ) ie the China MarineSurveillance the co as t guard fo rces o f the Public Security Minis try the fisheries law enfo rcement co mmand o f the Agriculture

Minis try and the maritime anti-smuggling po lice o f the General Adminis tratio n o f Cus to ms 26 5

Ano ther wo rrying develo pment is the gradual invo lvement o f the PLA navy (PLAN) and the Maritime Self Defence Fo rce (MSDF) TheJapanese MOD anno unced o n 16 Octo ber 2012 that fo r the firs t time PLAN ships were o bserved navigating in the 22-km-wide CZbetween Yo naguni and Irio mo te is lands altho ugh the minis try left o pen the po ss ibility that they did so in o rder to avo id a typho o n

Nevertheless the Gaimusho so ught explanatio ns fro m the Chinese abo ut these ship mo vements 26 6 In December 2012 fo ur PLANships sailed thro ugh the CW o f the Irio mo te-Yo naguni is lands o n the way back fro m drills in the Pacific after having go ne into the

Pacific thro ugh the mo re no rmal ro ute o f the s trait between the Okinawan main is land and Miyako jima26 7 Again there was no thingillegal abo ut it but it raised attentio n at a time o f tens io ns Ho wever there are s igns o f greater co o peratio n o f the PLAN withChinese Co as t Guard vessels as was sho wn in the s tando ff between China and the Philippines aro und the disputed Scarbo ro ugh

Sho al in the So uth China Sea and jo int exercises to o k place between the three in the Eas t China Sea in Octo ber 201226 8 The

patro lling activities o f the MSDF in the Senkaku area became kno wn when the Japanese repo rted at the end o f January 2013 that o n19 January a Chinese frigatersquos target radar had lo cked o nto an MSDF helico pter and o n 30 January ano ther frigate sailing clo se to

an MSDF des tro yer did likewise The Chinese vehemently denied it26 9 Ho wever in March this year the Kyo do news agency repo rtedthat senio r Chinese military o fficials had admitted the incident o f 29 January Even mo re wo rriso me is that the Chinese vessels

acted apparently witho ut prio r appro val fro m the fleet co mmand o r navy headquarters All this was denied by the Chinese s ide270 Itdid no t help that under Prime Minis ter No da the MSDF had been o rdered after the eruptio n o f the 2012 cris is to keep a greaterdis tance fro m PLAN ships than the hitherto 3 km in o rder avo id incidents but this po licy was reversed by the mo re hawkish Abe

adminis tratio n to the previo us 3 km dis tance271 The fire radar lo cking incident had happened at a dis tance o f 3 km

Agains t the backgro und o f greater invo lvement o f military fo rces it is particularly regrettable that a plan to build a maritime liaiso n

mechanism between their defense autho rities o n which they had agreed in June 2012 to make later that year was shelved272

Unfo rtunately it is s till Chinese practice to co ns ider Co nfidence Building Measures (CBM) no t as the firs t s tep to build co nfidencebut as a to o l to extract fro m the o ther s ide prio r co ncess io ns under the pretext o f `creating a better atmo sphere` fo r dis cuss ingCBM The o utbreak o f the September 2012 cris is was therefo re a co nvenient pretext fo r the Chinese to cancel the pro ject Thelates t co nfirmatio n was in March 2013 when General Yin Zhuo explained that there co uld be no military trus t if the po litical and

diplo matic relatio nship is bad273 Since the target radar lo ck-o n incidents the Japanese go vernment is publicly calling fo rresumptio n o f nego tiatio ns fo r the maritime liaiso n mechanism but the Chinese will certainly want to extract so me co ncess io nsbefo re even co ns idering a po s itive respo nse

Ho wever the co ns tant co nfro ntatio n between the po licing and military fo rces o f bo th s ides co uld eas ily lead to a military clasheither as a result o f an unfo reseen civilian o r military incident miscalculatio n o r malicio us intentio n at a lo wer level o f co mmandTwo recent examples o f unfo reseen civilian incidents co uld have escalated One is the attempted landing o n o ne o f the disputedis lands by a Chinese pro tes ter with a ballo o n in January 2014 This incident was peacefully reso lved because Japan did no t arres t theballo o nis t In this case the firs t repo rt o n the crash-landing in the territo rial waters o f Uo tsurijima came fro m the Taiwanese co as tguard which info rmed the Japanese co as t guard fo llo wed by the hand-o ver o f the ballo o nis t to the PRC autho rities o uts ide o f

Japan`s territo rial waters 274 The o ther incident was the s inking o f a Chinese fishing bo at ldquoto the no rth o f the Diao yu Is landsrdquo and

the mo ve o f two Chinese naval () vessels to rescue the crew275 This autho r co uld no t find o ut ho w clo se the fishing bo at came tothe is lands and apparently there has no t been any further repo rting abo ut the incident

The previo us ly mentio ned radar-targeting incidents and these two civilian incidents have no t led to an escalatio n but there is noguarantee fo r the future Shi Yinho ng a pro fesso r at Renmin Univers ity predicts that the territo rial co nflicts in the ECS So uth ChinaSea and alo ng the Sino -Indian bo rder will intens ify because o f po pular natio nalism dynamics within the armed fo rces and o f co urse

also o ur to p leaders perso nal beliefs and s trategic perso nalities 276 Hugh White argues that a war (which co uld lead to a nuclearexchange between China and the US) co uld also begin because the Chinese leadership may co ns ider that s tarting ho s tilities no wrather than later wo uld be mo re beneficial to either tes t US reso lve to defend Japan (which the Chinese leadership do ubts ) anddetermine the is sue o f Chinese supremacy in the As ian regio n which he co ns iders to be the real is sue rather than the is lands

themselves 277

IS THERE A WAY FORWARD

The current co nfro ntatio n is no t o nly co ntinuing but even escalating and do mes tic develo pments in bo th co untries are no t creatingan atmo sphere mo re co nducive to better management o f the cris is let alo ne finding a so lutio n Inactio n runs the risk o f a furtherescalatio n o r even a military clash while po s itive o ptio ns are beco ming fewer Meanwhile bo th co untries suffer fro m the eco no micfall-o ut and heightened tens io ns while the integratio n o f a ris ing China into a new s trategic enviro nment in As ia will beco me evenmo re fraught cas ting a shado w o n Japan`s clo se relatio nship with the US

The 2010 incident ended quickly with Japan`s release o f the captain One reaso n fo r this is certainly the fact that China`s demand in2010 was relatively clear and achievable (release o f the captain) if painful fo r Japan at a time o f a weak and inexperiencedgo vernment This time in September 2012 the cris is firs t hit a go vernment which reacted intrans igently because o f its previo usdefeat and o ther unfavo urable do mes tic circumstances and was then replaced by the mo re hawkish Abe go vernment The Abecabinet`s attitude to wards the pas t as exemplif ied by vario us s tatements by cabinet members and peo ple clo se to it the attempt torevise the Ko no s tatement reco gniz ing the fo rced war pro s titutio n (the military co mfo rt wo men) and Abe`s Yasukuni Shrine vis itall served China`s anti-Japan pro paganda wo rsened Japan-Ko rea relatio ns which China is cleverly explo iting and even angered theUS adminis tratio n Abe is seen as utiliz ing the tens io ns with China to win do mes tic and internatio nal suppo rt fo r Japan to have aldquono rmalrdquo natio nal defence po s ture The latter is welco me by the US adminis tratio n because it wo uld help with the US As ianrealignment and suppo rt its China po licy At the same time China`s actio ns cas t an o mino us shado w o n its intentio ns in the So uthChina Sea and Abe and mo re impo rtantly the US is suppo rting the claimants there agains t China

Under these bilateral multilateral and regio nal circumstances wo uld China be satis fied with go ing back to the `unders tanding abo utsetting as ide the dispute` in co njunctio n with Japan`s reco gnitio n o f the exis tence o f a territo rial dispute o r wo uld it demand areversal o f the purchase o f the three is lands Wo uld it demand the end o f Japanese CG patro ls aro und the is lands China`ss tandard demand no w that Japan `co rrect its mis takes` is rather ambiguo us because it co uld be interpreted as go ing back to theshelving unders tanding and the reco gnitio n o f the exis tence o f a dispute o r demanding a reversal o f the go vernment`s purchase o f

the is lands 278 The latter wo uld s imply be impo ss ible in legal and practical terms and o ne can o nly ho pe that the ambiguity is o nlyaimed at rais ing China`s nego tiatio n po s itio n ando r leaving eno ugh wiggle ro o m fo r nego tiatio ns which wo uld satis fy all Chineses takeho lders` interes ts

It seems that it is already to o late fo r go ing back to the shelving agreement o f 19721978 which wo uld imply that the two s ides canso meho w go back to the status quo o f the 1970s This as we have seen has been superseded by deeds and wo rds o n bo th s ides The Chinese have no w no t o nly publicly declared that the shelving agreement was lsquobro kenrsquo by Japan but after the firs t Y12 patro l o n13 December 2012 co mmented that ldquoThe s ituatio n has changed It has beco me no rmal fo r Chinas marine surveillance vessels to

enter the 12-nautical-mile zo ne Japans actual co ntro l o ver the is lands has go nerdquo279

The bilateral relatio nship has deterio rated to the extent that at leas t shelving the co nflicting so vereignty claims without o fficiallyadmitting that there is a territo rial dispute is no lo nger an o ptio n acceptable to China because it feels Japan has abused theshelving co nsensus thro ugh a series o f adminis trative measures with the final s traw having been the central go vernmentrsquos purchaseo f three is lands When s tudying the vario us Chinese o fficial s tatements and news repo rts after the 2012 cris is had fully erupted inSeptember it beco mes clear that until Octo ber 2012 the Chinese s till raised the demand that Japan sho uld go back to the previo uslsquounders tandingrsquo o r lsquoco nsensus rsquo but this demand was no t made o ften thereafter It reappeared in remarks by Wang Jiarui the head o fthe Co mmunis t partys Internatio nal Department when meeting Yamaguchi Natsuo the leader o f the junio r co alitio n partner

Ko meito in January 201328 0 Previo us ly a co mment o n the Xinhua internet s ite o n 29 Octo ber said that ldquoThe lsquopurchasersquo sho wed thatthe Japanese go vernment has who lly abando ned the attitude o f laying as ide disputes and has fundamentally changed the

s ituatio nrdquo28 1 On 30 Octo ber the CMOFA spo kesperso n declared that lsquoJapans illegal purchase o f the Diao yu Is lands bro ke the

impo rtant co nsensus The Japanese s ide sho uld no t have any mo re illus io n o f o ccupying the Diao yu Is lands What the Japaneses ide sho uld do is to face up to the reality admit the so vereignty dispute co rrect mis takes and co me back to the track o f a

nego tiated settlement`28 2 The lates t o fficial pro po sal to shelve the is lands is sue was made by the fo rmer fo reign minis ter Tang

Jiaxuan o n 16 July 201428 3

The reco gnitio n o f a territo rial pro blem wo uld be relatively easy fo r Japanese public o pinio n (and even mo re so fo r Japanrsquos friendsand allies ) to accept because they wo uld no t see the need fo r any kind o f diplo matic o r legal so phis try fo r what is o bvio us ly aterrito rial co nflict whatever the legitimacy o f the Chinese claim might be given also the fact that the current Japanese po s itio nco mes do wn to refus ing to even dis cuss whatever settlement might be po ss ible Acco rding to a survey co nducted by Genro nto gether with Zho ngguo Ribao she in June 2012 627 per cent o f Japanese agreed that there exis ts a territo rial pro blem dispute

(176 disagreed) co mpared with 822 o f the Chinese (139 disagreed)28 4 Ho wever co nsecutive Japanese cabinets haverefused to reco gnise the exis tence o f a territo rial dispute which is o ften the default po s itio n o f a go vernment in actual co ntro l o f adisputed territo ry (fo r example the Ko rean go vernmentrsquos po s itio n o n Do kto Takeshima) This po s itio n has been reinfo rced by theexplicit Japanese denial s ince the 1990s o f a shelving agreement which wo uld have been an implicit admiss io n that there is adispute To circumvent the risk o f being perceived as admitting the exis tence o f a territo rial pro blem the deputy prime minis ter o fthe previo us No da go vernment Okada Katsuya was repo rted to have mentio ned in a speech in Octo ber 2012 that there was no

territo rial dispute but as a matter o f fact a debate exis ted28 5 Ho wever this co mpro mise so lutio n was never co nfirmed by the No dago vernment and did no t beco me po licy It is even less likely to be acceptable to the new Abe go vernment Even amo ng influentialo pinio n makers there is hardly any suppo rt fo r admitting the exis tence o f a territo rial co nflict o r o f a shelving agreement Even mo reco nciliato ry s tatements o n this subject are rather vague Maehara Seiji o f the Demo cratic Party declared in a co nference at QinghuaUnivers ity in Beijing in September 2013 that the Japanese go vernment sho uld add (to its o wn po s itio n) that China has a differentview (Senkakusho to wo meguru Niho n seifu no tachiba ni tsuite lsquoChugo ku ga chigau kangaekata wo mo tte iru to iuko to wo ichigen

tsukekuwaerubeki darsquo) At the same time he emphas ised ho wever that there was no territo rial dispute28 6 Japan Bus inessFederatio n Chairman Yo nekura Hiro masa mentio ned in September 2012 in an NHK interview that the go vernment sho uld be mo re

flexible s ince o therwise its s tance co uld be taken to mean that Japan has no intentio n o f so lving the dispute28 7 Miyamo to Yuji thefo rmer Japanese ambassado r to China is quo ted as saying that lsquoThe go vernment do es no t need to alter its bas ic po s itio n but in

reality a co nflict do es exis t o ver the Senkaku is les rsquo 28 8 This is also the s tance which the previo us Japanese ambassado r Niwa

Uichiro takes in an article after his return to Japan28 9

Co ncerning co nflict reso lutio n it is interes ting to no te that when asked abo ut the mo dern s ignificance o f the 1978 Japan-ChinaPeace and Friendship Treaty 68 4 o f the po lled Japanese agreed with Art 12 (lsquoThe two parties shall settle all disputes by peacefulmeans and shall refrain fro m the use o r threat o f fo rcersquo) but o nly 525 o f the Chinese agreed Mo reo ver 58 1 o f the Chinese

favo ur China s trengthening its co ntro l o ver the area29 0

If therefo re a new ldquoimplicit unders tandingrdquo abo ut shelving the dispute is achievable it wo uld have to be based o n learning fro m thefailures o f the 19721978 shelving ie it wo uld be necessary to achieve a mutual unders tanding o f what the s tatus quo is whatwo uld undermine the s tatus quo and what has to be do ne to mo ve fro m co nflict management to so lutio n Quite clearly such a newunders tanding wo uld be less favo urable to Japan`s current s tance o n the dispute

FROM CONFLICT MANAGEMENT TO ADDRESSING THE SOVEREIGNTY ISSUE

Any mo ve fo rward will certainly require decis ive leadership o n bo th s ides be it to take the initiative o r to respo nd po s itively to theinitiative o f s tarting the pro cess to wards reso lutio n In view o f the co mplex backgro und o f the external and internal dynamics it iso bvio us that address ing the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands dispute requires a s tep-by-s tep appro ach The ultimate is sue to address is theso vereignty is sue and territo rial disputes are generally viewed as zero sum in nature given their clo se link to co re securityinteres ts Even tho se who reco gnize the impo rtance o f transcending such lo gic in favo ur o f co ndo minium o r shared so vereigntygenerally ho ld that the is sue can o nly be addressed at the las t s tage o f any nego tiated pro cess if at all

Two impo rtant is sues have to be co ns idered at the beginning to what extent have the vario us s tages o f the nego tiating pro cess tobe agreed befo rehand (lsquoro ad maprsquo) o r even the final o utco me whether a viable co ndo minium o r o nly shelving the is sues and co uldthe ro le o f a third party mediato r be helpfulacceptable In view o f the po litical diff iculties o n bo th s ides the s tart o f thenego tiatio n pro cess wo uld be endangered if there is no t sufficient ro o m fo r ambiguity and interpretatio n abo ut the vario us s tages altho ugh the general aim o f tens io n reductio n and suspens io n o f the so vereignty is sue mus t be clearly agreed

A third party mediato r is pro bably no t acceptable to the Chinese s ide The third party mo s t o ften mentio ned is the Internatio nalCo urt o f Jus tice (ICJ) o r any kind o f internatio nal arbitratio n Ho wever this seems unlikely in view o f China`s preference fo rbilateral nego tiatio ns and its refusal to accept judicial settlement by the ICJ o r any internatio nal arbitratio n except in no n-po litical

areas such as trade29 1 The Japanese go vernment wo uld be willing to accept the jurisdictio n o f the ICJ but o nly if China brings the

case to the Co urt les t it be perceived as ackno wledging the exis tence o f a territo rial dispute29 2 But there are also po litical andpro cedural arguments agains t the reco urse to the ICJ China`s legal argumentatio n is co mparatively weak and s ince a negativejudgement co uld have implicatio ns fo r China`s legal claim to mo s t o f the So uth China Sea there is even less o f a chance o f Chinamaking an exceptio n fo r the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands dispute In view o f the entrenched po s itio ns o f bo th s ides and the risk o f a`winner takes all` o utco me o f internatio nal litigatio n bo th go vernments wo uld face co ns iderable do mes tic res is tance in case o f anegative o utco me In view o f the urgency o f the dispute and the lo ng time it takes fo r a judgement there wo uld also be the risk o fdo mes tic fo rces trying to pre-empt a negative result

In view o f the security is sues invo lved (let alo ne the American his to rical `debt` as a result o f Washingto n`s ambiguity related toWashingto n`s ending o f the adminis tratio n o f Okinawa in 1972) an American mediatio n co uld be seen as natural and even inAmerican interes ts Such an American ro le ho wever is extremely unlikely as it wo uld be seen by China as unduly advantageo us toJapan Ho wever at so me po int during the Japan-China nego tiatio n pro cess the US might ass is t (o r even be reques ted) by agreeingto certain Co nfidence and Security Building Measures (CSBM) in the area aro und the is lands

The firs t s tage wo uld have to co ns is t o f measures which reduce the risk o f a military clash but in a way which prevents theperceptio n that o ne s ide is giving in to co ercio n This s tage wo uld be a gradual phas ing o ut o f intrus io ns by Chinese o fficial vesselsand aircraft into the territo rial waters co ntiguo us zo ne and airspace o f the is lands which is recipro cated by Japanrsquos reducing in thesame way its co as tguard patro ls in the two zo nes as well as its s crambling activities in the is lands` airspace There were repo rts in

June 2013 that China called o n Japan to agree to a 12-nautical-mile no -entry zo ne aro und the is lands 29 3 Japan rejected this co urse

Ano ther measure wo uld be to increase the dis tance at which vessels o f bo th maritime fo rces o bserve each o ther Such s teps sho uldultimately be o fficialised by a gradually expanding series o f CSBMs and a bilateral liaiso n mechanism This co uld also include ademilitarisatio n agreement as an incentive fo r the Chinese s ide It wo uld be vital that the s teps at this s tage be incremental that nos tep is explo ited in a o ne-s ided way and that they are co ns idered irrevers ible At the same time bo th s ides have to prevent peo plefro m appro aching the is lands s ince this wo uld be seen as a pro vo catio n by the o ther s ide This latter task is technically no t easy

because o f the co ntro vers ial character o f any co mpro mise with certain no n-s tate acto rs in Japan China Ho ng Ko ng and Taiwan The(failed) landing o f a Chinese ho t ballo o n o n o ne o f the is lands in January 2014 demo ns trated at the same time the technical

diff iculty o f a no -entry po licy as well as the po ss ibility o f a success ful co o peratio n o f the co as tguards o f all three co untries 29 4

At this firs t s tage o r leading to the next there will have to be a Japanese go vernment s tatement to the effect that there is alsquopro blemrsquo related to the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands This can be wo rded in such a way that the sens itive express io n `territo rialpro blem` (which is s trenuo us ly denied by the go vernment) is avo ided and it can be supplemented by a sentence that such as tatement in no way prejudices the legal po s itio n o f the go vernment Such a qualifying s tatement is fo r example included in the

Japan-China agreement fo r prio r no tif icatio n o f research vessels fro m bo th co untries in the Eas t China Sea in 200029 5 A s imilarqualif icatio n is part o f the 1997 Japan-China Fisheries Agreement In the jo int co mmuniqueacute o f 1972 which no rmalised diplo maticrelatio ns between Japan and China diplo matic wo rding also managed to bridge the huge gap between their s tances o n Taiwan whichthe PRC co ns iders an lsquoinalienable partrsquo o f its territo ry Japan co ns iders the so vereignty is sue s till unreso lved because the 1951 SanFrancis co Peace Treaty Art 2 (b) o nly s tipulated that lsquoJapan reno unces all right title and claim to Fo rmo sa and the Pescado res rsquowitho ut clarifying the recipient o f the territo ry The co mpro mise in 1972 was reached with the sentence that Japan lsquofully unders tandsand respects this s tand o f the Go vernment o f the Peo ples Republic o f China and it f irmly maintains its s tand under Article 8 o f thePo tsdam Pro clamatio nrsquo

POSSIBLE APPROACHES TO THE SOVEREIGNTY ISSUE

The mo s t diff icult pro blem is the so vereignty is sue which go es to the co re o f any co untry`s security interes ts It is no t imaginablethat either s ide will reno unce its claim to the is lands Sides tepping o r shelving the is sue is o nly useful if the lesso ns fro m the 1972and 1978 attempts as o utlined abo ve can be learned and applied but there is s till the fundamental pro blem with the implicitassumptio n that the quality o f the bilateral relatio nship will always be as go o d as when the s ides tepping agreement was achievedand can be maintained in perpetuity o r until the so vereignty is sue can be addressed But in o rder to so lve the so vereignty is sue aneven better relatio nship has to be created This better relatio nship co uld be bro ught abo ut by the s teps explained abo ve and furtherbelo w

An impo rtant co nditio n fo r any las ting territo rial co mpro mise wo uld be reducing the value o f the is lands fo r bo th co untries whichcan be achieved by o ne o f the measures pro po sed fo r s tage 1 ie reso lutely preventing anyo ne fro m appro aching the territo ries(including to tal demilitarizatio n) which in themselves are eco no mically wo rthless and are uninhabited The main po int is to preventany go vernmental act which co uld be interpreted as being part o f the `so vereignty game` The mo s t diff icult part here is to preventany act by no n-go vernmental acto rs This wo uld have to include the territo rial waters and the explo itatio n there in o f any kind o freso urces including fishing Scientif ic interes ts in the is lands co uld be served by bilateral surveys witho ut any po litical co nno tatio ns

There have been pro po sals to declare the is lands an Internatio nal Nature and Wildlife Preserve29 6 Such a preserve wo uld have to beadminis tered either bilaterally o r by a relevant internatio nal o rganisatio n and as such co uld serve as a co nfidence-building measure

The abo ve s teps wo uld then allo w the two s ides to deal with the co ns iderable eco no mic interes ts in fishing and the explo itatio n o fhydro carbo n reso urces and o ther seabed reso urces aro und the is lands ie in the Exclus ive Eco no mic Zo ne ando r the ExtendedCo ntinental Shelf Once the is lands` land area and the territo rial waters have been put as ide it wo uld be eas ier to co me to ano verall agreement o n the delimitatio n o f the EEZ bo rder (with the exceptio n o f the no rthern part which wo uld require a trilateralagreement between China Japan and Ko rea) which wo uld include the delimitatio n o f these surro unding waters It wo uld facilitate aco mpro mise if bo th s ides agree that the is lands do no t merit their o wn EEZ This might be diff icult fo r Japan which claims an EEZ fo rOkino to rishima refuted by China s ince it co ns iders the reef no t to be an is land acco rding to Art 121 o f UNCLOS

A co mpro mise o n the so vereignty is sue co uld o nly be the o utco me ndash if at all ndash o f a success ful pro cess o f the abo ve o r co mparables teps In o rder to avo id a `winner take all` s ituatio n the co mpro mise wo uld have to invo lve a sharing arrangement His to ry o ffers

quite a number o f internatio nal precedents o f shared so vereignty referred to as co ndo minium in internatio nal law29 7 One case withso me s imilarities to the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands is a small is land (3000 sq m) in the river separating France and Spain kno wn asPheasant Is land o r Co nference Is land which even to day s till changes every s ix mo nths between France and Spain as o wner Like theSenkakuDiao yu Is lands the is land has no eco no mic value anymo re and the is land is o ff limits It was the lo catio n o f the s igning o f

the Treaty o f the Pyrenees in 1659 which ended a lo ng war 29 8 Mo s t o ther examples o f jo int so vereignty co ncern territo ries with apo pulatio n which makes co o peratio n much mo re diff icult Other his to rical precedents o f sharing so vereignty are the es tablishmento f ldquoneutral zo nesrdquo Acco rdingly the is lands and po ss ibly a sea area aro und the is lands co uld be declared a neutral zo ne like the o nebetween Saudi Arabia and Kuwait (1922-1965) On July 7 1965 the two go vernments s igned an agreement (which to o k effect o nJuly 25 1966) to partitio n the Neutral Zo ne adjo ining their respective territo ries A demarcatio n agreement dividing the NeutralZo ne was s igned o n December 17 1967

Particularly relevant here is that Saudi Arabia as well as Kuwait explo ited the o il reso urces under a jo int o perating agreement29 9

Co nclus io ns

The actio n-reactio n pattern o f the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands dispute is accelerating and the initiative seems to be mo re o ften thanno t with the Chinese s ide while the Japanese s ide is in a defens ive po s itio n The danger o f a military co nfro ntatio n is lo o mingincreas ingly larger in what co uld be called a lsquochicken gamersquo At the same time the internal and external dynamics are undermining theenviro nment which is required fo r a peaceful so lutio n as well as fo r maintaining the number o f po s itive o ptio ns While the Japanesego vernment refuses to ackno wledge the very exis tence o f a territo rial dispute the Chinese go vernment is no w (July 2014) evenrefus ing to have a dialo gue with Japan`s current prime minis ter It is po ss ible that the Chinese s ide again wants to wait with anymo ve fo rward until the Japanese prime minis ter has changed as Beijing did with Prime Minis ter Sato Eisaku o r with Prime Minis terKo izumi Junichiro But waiting fo r an impro vement o f the bilateral atmo sphere as the Chinese s ide likes to s tress is a very riskyo ptio n and such an impro vement may anyway be a very sho rt windo w o f o ppo rtunity if lo o king at the ups and do wns o f the po s t-1949 his to ry o f the bilateral relatio nship

To s tart a s tep-by-s tep pro cess o f address ing the territo rial is sue s tro ng leadership is required which unders tands the widerinteres ts o f a functio ning Japanese-Chinese relatio nship Japan s imply asking China fo r a summit meeting is no t very sens ible ifthere is no willingness to engage in subs tantive dis cuss io ns and wo uld be very risky fo r China`s to p leader if the Japanese primeminis ter then vis its the Yasukuni Shrine The his to ry is sue sho uld no lo nger be a Chinese lever fo r pressuris ing Japan but the latterhas to abs tain fro m actio ns which are seen as pro vo cative no t o nly by China but also by Ko rea the US and many o thers There hasto be a co mmitted leadership o n bo th s ides which s tarts with a ro ugh ro ad map and tens io n-reducing s teps such as CSBMs en ro uteto agreeing o n a fo rmula which allo ws the parties to o btain eco no mic as well as security gains while reducing tens io ns

Reinhard Drifte is Emeritus Professor of Japanese Politics University of Newcastle UK and Visiting Professor at various Japanese Universities andPau University (France) He is the author of Japanrsquos Foreign Policy for the Twenty First Century His home page is here

Reco mmended citatio n Reinhard Drifte The Japan-China Confrontation Over the SenkakuDiaoyu Islands--Between shelving and dispute

Japanese go vernment that the reco rd o f the Gaimusho o mits the reactio n o f Tanaka to Zho u Enlai`s refusal to dis cuss theterrito rial is sue This part was deleted by the then head o f the China Divis io n in the Gaimusho Hashimo to Hiro shi who lateradmitted this in an interview in 2000 In the interview he said that Tanaka Kakuei in reactio n to Zho u Enlai`s reaso ning that it wo uld

be better no t to dis cuss the pro blem o f the Senkaku Is lands replied `Let`s dis cuss it ano ther time`48 Yabuki Susumu co rro batesthis reactio n by quo ting the bo o k by Zhang Xiangshan an adviser to the Chinese Minis try o f Fo reign Affairs who was present at o neo f the meetings Acco rding to his reco rd Tanaka replied `All right Then it is no t necessary to talk anymo re abo ut it Let`s do it

ano ther time`49 Befo re this summit meeting Ko meito Chairman Takeiri Yo shikatsu who served as an impo rtant go -between fo r theJapanese go vernment to prepare the vis it by Prime Minis ter Tanaka had a s imilar exchange with Zho u Enlai in July 1972 when it wasalso decided to shelve the Senkaku is sue When Takeiri met Zho u Enlai o n 28 July 1972 the latter is quo ted as saying `There is noneed to to uch o n the Senkaku Is lands is sue Mr Takeiri yo u also had no interes t I also had no interes t But the his to rians raise itas a pro blem due to the o il is sue and Mr Ino ue Kiyo shi is very keen o n it Ho wever there is no need to place impo rtance o n it

(omoku miru)`50 It is an iro ny that Zho u Enlai even referred to a Japanese academic Pro fesso r Ino ue Kiyo shi who se his to ricals tudies favo ur China`s claim o n his to rical gro unds and who se views had been presented in an article in the People`s Daily in May1971 In these dis cuss io ns it was made quite clear by bo th s ides that the no rmalizatio n o f diplo matic relatio ns was the mo s timpo rtant go al and therefo re they agreed to shelve the Senkaku is sue

When bo th s ides nego tiated the Treaty o f Peace and Friendship in 1978 there was a s imilar willingness to put the territo rial pro blemas ide in o rder to achieve the co nclus io n o f the Treaty altho ugh the Gaimusho (Japan`s Minis try o f Fo reign Affairs ) has so far no treleased the do cuments Acco rding to Fravel a chro no lo gy (nianpu in Chinese) o f Dengrsquos activities published by a party researcho ffice summarizes a meeting between Deng Xiao ping and Japan`s Fo reign Minis ter So no da Sunao acco rding to which Deng s tated`Its no t that China and Japan do no t have any pro blems Fo r example [there are] the Diao yu Is land and co ntinental shelf is sues Do nt drag them in no w they can be set as ide to be calmly dis cussed later and we can s lo wly reach a way that bo th s ides can accept

If o ur generatio n canno t find a way the next generatio n o r the o ne after that will f ind a wayrsquo 51 After the ratif icatio n o f the TreatyDeng vis ited Japan and declared at a press co nference o n 25 Octo ber 1978 that the is sue sho uld be left to future generatio ns whomay be wiser In Diet dis cuss io ns it was also made clear by LDP Secretary General Ohira Masayo shi and Fo reign Minis ter So no daSunao that it was in Japan`s natio nal interes t to go alo ng with Deng Xiao ping`s pro po sal to leave things fo r the next 20 o r 30

years 52 Ohira declared at the time o n the ques tio n o f an agreement to shelve the is sue (tana age) that `tana age` was no t co rrect

rather the o ther party (senpo ) wo uld no t bring the is sue up (mo chidasanai)53 Or as So no da wro te later while it is true that Chinais claiming these is lands as their territo ry the is lands are currently in Japans hands and have no t beco me an actual is sue amo ngJapan and China If Japan takes the tro uble to bring up the subject at this o ccas io n and wakes up a s leeping giant ( literally `dis turb

a bush o nly to let a snake o utrsquo ndash yabu wo tsutsuite hebi wo dasu) it will be a to tal lo ss (moto mo ko mo nai) fo r Japan54

One canno t but co nclude fro m these acco unts that bo th s ides agreed to shelve the territo rial is sue while in no way abando ning theirclaims to the is lands o therwise there wo uld no t have been a no rmalizatio n o f diplo matic relatio ns in 1972 o r a Treaty o f Peace andFriendship in 1978 It did no t mean that the Chinese accepted Japan`s territo rial claim s ince China had s tated its o wn claim in thesenego tiatio ns and has s ince 1971 never abando ned the claim It is also o bvio us that bo th s ides knew that there was a territo rialpro blem o therwise `shelving` wo uld no t have made sense The directo r o f the Treaties Divis io n and later Directo r General o f theTreaties Bureau Kuriyama Takakazu who was invo lved in the nego tiatio ns in 1972 and in 1978 s tated in an interview in 2012 thathe unders to o d bo th then and to day that there was a `tacit unders tanding` (anmoku no ryokai) between Japan and China to shelve the

territo rial is sue55 Asai Mo to fumi who was directo r o f the Treaties Divis io n in 1978-80 and directo r o f the China Divis io n in 1983-85 also co nfirmed that it was the unders tanding no t o nly in the Gaimusho but also amo ng the po litical leadership (Nagatacho ) that

there was a territo rial pro blem co ncerning the Senkaku Is lands 56 Miyamo to Yuji also mentio ned in 2012 that in his time as head o fthe China Divis io n in the 1990s there was s till o n the o ne hand a clear po s itio n that the Senkaku Is lands were Japanese territo rybut o n the o ther the fundamental s tance o f maintaining the s tatus quo ( genjo iji) and a tacit unders tanding that no actio n needed to

be taken57 Tajima Atsushi who was the Directo r o f the China Divis io n in 1978 and participated in the dis cuss io n between Fo reignMinis ter So no da and Deng Xiao ping in 1978 emphas ized in an interview published in June 2013 that the Chinese s ide`s perceptio no f an ldquoagreement (go i)rdquo was o ne-s ided and that the Japanese s ide o nly lis tened to Deng`s explanatio n that the is sue o f theSenkaku Is lands (and o f the disputed sea bo rder) sho uld be left to future generatio ns The Japanese s ide was satis fied that Beijing

had no intentio n to change the s tatus quo and therefo re judged that ldquono reactio n was requiredrdquo58 Despite Tajima`s intentio n torefute the exis tence o f an ldquoagreementrdquo it is clear that there was an implicit unders tanding s ince the status quo was in Japan`sfavo ur

Ano ther indirect indicatio n that Japan tacitly accepted the exis tence o f a territo rial pro blem and was willing to suspend the is sue topro tect the o verall relatio nship with China was the go vernment`s res traint fo r so me time after 1972 and 1978 in taking actio nswhich might have been interpreted by China as inflaming the territo rial dispute The go vernment never allo wed pro specting anddrilling fo r o il o r gas reserves aro und the is lands and sho wed res traint in allo wing landing o n o r making eco no mic use o f theis lands As we will see in the next part ho wever this res traint was no t abso lute and s till left ro o m fo r measures which ero ded theshelving agreement

It is o bvio us fro m the his to rical co ntext o f the 1972 and 1978 nego tiatio ns that bo th s ides had much greater interes ts at s takethan the Senkaku Is lands Mo reo ver the shelving agreement was very much in favo ur o f Japan as the co untry in de facto co ntro l o verthe is lands thereby reinfo rcing To kyo `s o wnership claim in internatio nal law Later when China`s po litical eco no mic and militaryweight increased and it became do ubtful whether the US wo uld invo ke the Security Treaty guarantee to pro tect the militarily-indefens ible is lands agains t a Chinese military challenge the shelving agreement was useful fo r Japan agains t any such

co ntingency59

THE EROSION OF THE SHELVING UNDERSTANDING

While o ne can well unders tand the des ire by the Japanese and Chinese leaders to deepen the bilateral relatio nship thro ugh the twotacit unders tandings in 1972 and 1978 and to trus t that all remaining pro blems including the territo rial dispute wo uld then beeas ier to so lve with hinds ight this faith lo o ks mo re like wishful thinking It is indeed rather unusual to co nclude a Peace andFriendship Treaty witho ut clarifying an o pen territo rial is sue the very heart o f a co untry`s security po licy Since the 1970s thisdispute has no t o nly been a sens itive is sue within Japan but also within the much mo re limited circle o f the Chinese leadership withpo litical gro upings in bo th co untries ins trumentaliz ing it fo r their o wn narro w purpo ses

The main co nceptual pro blem with the bilateral unders tanding has been that it was based o n the assumptio n that the co nditio nsallo wing its fo rmulatio n in the 1970s co uld be fro zen fo r as lo ng as it wo uld take to find a so lutio n to the o ppo s ing territo rialclaims Ho wever maintaining the co nditio ns fo r the co ntinued reliance o n the bilateral unders tanding wo uld have demanded muchgreater effo rts by bo th s ides to clarify what the status quo is and what measures wo uld be seen as vio lating the status quo Ins teadas Ishii Akira put it the leaders o n bo th s ides pro cras tinated and allo wed the territo rial is sue to beco me the symbo l o f natio nalism

in bo th co untries 6 0 As a result vario us changes and pressures in the do mes tic and internatio nal enviro nment gradually ero dedthese co nditio ns with Japan`s go vernment in the end publicly even denying that there was a dispute which co uld have been theo bject o f shelving and pro mpting the PRC in the 2010 and 2012 crises to sho wer Japan with po litical and eco no mic sanctio ns which

were unprecedented fo r two co untries suppo sedly bo und by a Peace and Friendship Treaty

The shelving agreement o bvio us ly had no legal fo rce but denying its exis tence was po litically unwise and mo rally wro ng OkabeTatsumi argues that fo r po litical co nvenience Japan agreed in 1978 to shelve the is sue but that this was different fro m shelving the

dispute in a legal sense6 1 The fo llo wing o fficial Japanese s tatements can be interpreted in this light in Octo ber 1990 CabinetSecretary Sakamo to Miso ji after res tating Japan`s so vereignty claim s till declared that the is land is sue between Japan China and

Taiwan (sic) sho uld be so lved by a later generatio n thus implying that there was a territo rial dispute which had been put as ide6 2 Butby the time China pro mulgated its law o n territo rial waters in February 1992 (see belo w) the Japanese go vernment wo uldunequivo cally and publicly deny that there had been any agreement to shelve the is sue and even that there was a territo rial is sueWhen Prime Minis ter Miyazawa Kiichi pro tes ted agains t the Chinese law in February 1992 referring to a prio r unders tanding withDeng Xiao ping o ver the Senkaku Is lands the Minis try o f Fo reign Affairs (MOFA) is sued a co rrectio n denying such an

unders tanding6 3 In September 1996 Adminis trative Vice-Minis ter Hayashi Sadayuki said that Japan had no t agreed with Dengrsquos lsquoput

o n the shelfrsquo pro po sal ie arguing that there was no territo rial is sue6 4 In the fo llo wing the autho r analyses the three maincircumstances which acco unt fo r the breakdo wn o f the bilateral unders tanding

THE CORROSIVE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

The requirements o f internatio nal law regimes particularly the UN Co nventio n o n the Law o f the Sea (UNCLOS) which was ratif ied byJapan and the PRC in 1996 pro mpted bo th co untries to take do mes tic ando r internatio nal adminis trative and legal s teps (fo rexample pass ing legis latio n related to the adminis tratio n o f their maritime space demarcating their sea bo rders and claimingbo rders fo r their EEZ) which had a general purpo se but did no t sufficiently take into acco unt the need to pro tect the bilateralunders tanding o f putting the territo rial dispute as ide Mo reo ver internatio nal regimes have `ves ted o therwise wo rthless is lands

with immense eco no mic value`6 5 They enco urage the assertio n o f so vereignty and penalize s tates fo r appearing to acquiesce in arival s tate`s claim to a disputed territo ry Paul O`Shea applied the term `so vereignty game` to this diplo matic-legal tit-fo r-tat

based o n Alexander Wendt`s co nceptio n o f so vereignty as a so cially co ns tructed ins titutio n6 6 Finally the vagueness o f

internatio nal law allo ws s tates to cherry pick tho se no rms which fit bes t their interes ts and claims 6 7 It is pro bably with thiss ituatio n in mind that fo rmer Chinese ambassado r to Japan and the UN Chen Jian explained at the beginning o f a talk o n 30

Octo ber 2012 that internatio nal law is a ro o t cause o f the current territo rial disputes 6 8 This autho r has to o much respect fo rinternatio nal law no tably UNCLOS to agree with this s tro ng s tatement but is aware o f the weaknesses o f many legal s tipulatio ns

With regard to the Senkaku dispute internatio nal law regimes have thus bro ught with it the fo llo wing co mplicatio ns

- Bo th co untries mus t always co ns ider that whatever is decided in relatio n to the disputed Senkaku Is lands might have implicatio nsfo r the co untry`s o ther territo rial disputes (Japan`s territo rial disputes with Ko rea and Russ ia China`s EEZ dispute with Ko rea o rterrito rial disputes with the o ther litto ral claimants in the So uth China Sea )

- Any actio n taken by the Japanese go vernment with regard to the Senkaku Is lands can be interpreted as the o fficial express io n o fthe go vernment in co ntro l o f the is lands and China will therefo re feel o bliged to pro tes t in o rder to defend its claim

- Bo th co untries had to co mply with UNCLOS in o rder to benefit fro m this regime and o fficially draw sea bo rders which s tart withbase lines o n which are dependent the extent o f the Territo rial Waters (12 nm fro m the base line) o f the Co ntiguo us Zo ne (24 nmfro m the base line) o f the EEZ (200 nm fro m the baseline) and o f the Extended Co ntinental Shelf (under certain co nditio ns up to350 nm fro m the base line can be claimed) The is sues aris ing fro m this are whether Japan and China wo uld apply the drawing o f thesea bo rders to the disputed territo ry and if so whether the Senkaku Is lands co uld be class ified as `is lands` which are entitled toan EEZ o r jus t `ro cks` which wo uld entitle them o nly to territo rial waters under UNCLOS Article 123 and ho w to draw the EEZbo rder in the Eas t China Sea`s Senkaku area These is sues were bo und to have an impact o n the bilateral unders tanding in o ne wayo r the o ther and wo uld have required special actio n in o rder to keep the territo rial dispute shelved

When China passed its Territo rial Law in 1992 it explicitly included the Diao yu Is lands which naturally was immediately pro tes ted bythe Japanese go vernment while s till sho wing a co ns iderable amo unt o f unders tanding and specifically saying that the law did no t

vio late Japan`s so vereignty o ver the is lands 6 9 At that time the Japanese go vernment was s till preo ccupied with preventing China`siso latio n after the 1989 Tiananmen crackdo wn China also played do wn the impact o f this law and even referred to Deng Xiao ping`s

1978 s tatement o f leaving the territo rial is sue fo r the future70 When Jiang Zemin vis ited Japan in April 1992 he also reaffirmed the

shelving acco rding to Deng`s pro mise in 1978 while s till res tating China`s claim to the is lands 71 Ho wever the Chinese Minis try o f

Fo reign Affairs (hereafter Waijiaobu o r CMOFA) o riginally had no t wanted to include the Senkaku Is lands 72 When it ratif ied UNCLOS in1996 China referred to the 1992 Law and pro mulgated the precise lo catio n o f many o f its base lines but left o ut so me o f them

including tho se fo r the Senkaku Is lands 73 In 1998 the Natio nal Peo ple`s Co ngress pro mulgated the PRC Exclus ive Eco no mic Zo neand Co ntinental Shelf Act which did no t mentio n any specific geo graphical areas Clearly the Chinese leadership was trying to walka fine line between its territo rial and EEZ claims (including the need to respo nd to do mes tic demands increas ingly do minated bynatio nalis t tendencies ) the requirements o f the internatio nal law regime and the maintenance o f go o d relatio ns with Japan

Japan ratif ied UNCLOS in June 1996 and es tablished in the fo llo wing mo nth the Law o n the Territo rial Sea and the Co ntiguo us Zo neas well as the Law o n the EEZ and Co ntinental Shelf which were supplemented by guidelines fo r implementatio n The latter also

es tablished an EEZ aro und the Senkaku Is lands Japan did no t include the Senkaku Is lands in its s traight baseline claim74 Twoseparate bills creating the Bas ic Law o f the Ocean Sea and the Law o n Es tablishing Safety Areas fo r Maritime Structures were

passed by the Diet in April 2007 and came into effect o n 16 July 200775 The latter two laws were passed mainly having in mind anyfuture explo itatio n o f natural reso urces in the co ntes ted EEZs Naturally China do es no t reco gnize the validity o f these laws fo r theSenkaku Is lands o r fo r the EEZ bo rder between the two co untries The territo rial dispute is also a majo r o bs tacle fo r agreement o nthe EEZ bo rder in the so uthern area o f the Eas t China Sea which is no t made eas ier by the fact that an agreement o n the title to theSenkaku wo uld have a majo r impact o n the s ize o f the EEZ area o f the success ful claimant particularly if the is lands were acco rdedan EEZ

FISHING AND OTHER ECONOMIC INTERESTS

Fishing is a majo r interes t fo r all litto ral s tates o f the Eas t China Sea Altho ugh Japan and China have co ncluded co nsecutive fisheryagreements fo r the Eas t China Sea the 1997 agreement (effective fro m June 2000) excludes fro m the applicatio n o f the fisheriesagreement the territo rial waters adjacent to the Senkaku Is lands Ins tead the extant 1975 Fishery Agreement which deemed the

areas aro und the Senkakus as part o f the high seas was allo wed to prevail76 In 2012 a letter related to the 1997 Agreement abo utfishing in the EEZ was revealed in which Fo reign Minis ter Obuchi Keizo had s tated to the Chinese ambassado r in To kyo Xu Duxinthat Japanrsquos laws and regulatio ns wo uld no t apply to the `waters in ques tio n` (togai no suiiki) It is unders to o d that the `waters in

ques tio n` include the Senkaku Is lands altho ugh their name is no t mentio ned and the Japanese go vernment to day denies it77 SatoMasaru a fo rmer intelligence analys t o f the Japanese Fo reign Minis try explained that this letter referred to the EEZ aro und the

Senkaku Is lands and applied o nly to Chinese fishermen78 Ho wever the Japanese go vernment seems no t to want to allo w fo reignfishermen unco ntro lled access to the territo rial waters aro und the Senkaku Is lands and has been patro lling the area This has ledto the expuls io n o f Chinese fishermen and subsequent pro tes ts by Taiwan and the PRC The Japanese co ntro ls have apparently

increased in the decade s ince 2000 while Chinese fishing activities have also vas tly increased79 Mo re research is needed o n thesedevelo pments to judge whether yet ano ther `uno fficial unders tanding` between To kyo and Beijing has been undermined

Finally in this co ntext o ne has to mentio n the is sue o f private and s tate o wnership o f the Senkaku as well as the ro le o f no n-s tateacto rs In 1896 Ko ga Tatsushiro o btained a free lease o f 30 years fo r the is lands o f Uo tsurijima Kubajima Minami Ko jima and KitaKo jima After his death in 1918 his so n Ko ga Zenji to o k o ver the bus iness In 1926 after the end o f the free lease the Japanese

go vernment co nverted it to a rental bas is 8 0 In 1932 the Japanese go vernment changed the s tatus o f these fo ur is lands fro m s tate-o wned to privately-o wned land by selling them to the Ko ga family After 1945 Kubajima and Taisho jima (the latter was always s tate-o wned) were leased to the US as firing ranges In 1972 Ko ga Zenji so ld Kita Ko jima and Minami Ko jima fo llo wed by Uo tsurshima in1978 and Kubajima in 1988 to Kurihara Kunio ki a real es tate inves to r and his family In 2002 Kitako jima Minami Ko jima and

Uo tsurijima were leased to the s tate which paid Yen 25 millio n per year fo r them in rent8 1 The US military used Kubajima andTaisho jima fro m 1957 as firing ranges and after the revers io n o f Okinawa in 1972 co ntinued to do so until 1979 It paid rent to the

private o wner o f Kubajima but after 1971 the rental payment was effected by the Japanese go vernment8 2 It is also interes ting tono te that even in the Japan-US minutes o f 15 May 1972 abo ut these two firing ranges the is lands are s till referred to by their

Chinese characters which are transcribed in the English vers io n as Ko bisho and Sekibisho rather than Kubajima and Taisho jima8 3

The relevant po int here is that s ince the shelving o f the territo rial is sue in 1972 and 1978 the is lands changed private o wners andthe s tate rented three o f the is lands fro m their private o wner and o wned o ne The leas ing in 2002 and the `natio nalizatio n` (nomo ney was invo lved) o f the Uo tsurijima beaco n in 2005 caused Chinese pro tes ts but the private o wnership changes did no t cause

any Chinese reactio n8 4 This is an illus tratio n o f the deterio ratio n o f the bilateral relatio nship during the fo llo wing years because itwas the sale o f three is lands to the Japanese central s tate which to uched o ff the 2012 cris is

THE IMPACT OF OIL AND GAS INTERESTS

The 1969 ECAFE Repo rt had led to claims by the ROC and the PRC o ver the Senkaku Is lands The mo s t pro mis ing area defined in thisrepo rt fo r hydro carbo n reso urces happened to be aro und the Senkaku Is lands Since Japan abando ned its jo int explo ratio n planswith Taiwan in 1972 with the diplo matic reco gnitio n o f the PRC no Japanese activities have taken place because o f co ncern abo utChina`s reactio n

In o rder to fulfill its gro wing demand fo r o il and gas and to divers ify away fro m its high dependence o n Middle Eas tern supplies

China s tarted in the 1970s to pro spect and extract energy reso urces in the Eas t China Sea8 5 To o verco me the territo rial dispute inthe so uth o f the Eas t China Sea and the divergent po s itio n o n ho w to draw the EEZ bo rder in the res t o f the Eas t China Sea Chinapro po sed `jo int develo pment` o f hydro carbo n reso urces In Octo ber 1980 PRC Deputy Premier Yao Yilin even pro po sed to aJapanese bus iness delegatio n that develo pment o f o ff-sho re o il reso urces aro und the disputed is lands be do ne jo intly by China

Japan and the US8 6 Ano ther bilateral pro po sal was made in 1984 by Deng Xiao ping who urged so lving the territo rial pro blems o fthe Spratly Is lands in the So uth China Sea and the Senkaku Is lands by jo intly develo ping the disputed areas befo re dis cuss ing theques tio n o f so vereignty But in this case as well as later pro po sals until 1996 Japan firs t demanded a settlement o f the maritime

bo rder o r reco gnitio n o f its title to the Senkaku Is lands 8 7

China`s relentless pro gress and expans io n o f o il and gas develo pment increas ingly caused frictio n between Japan and China whichalso impacted o n the territo rial dispute Since 1996 Chinese research vessels have entered the waters o f the Senkaku Is lands

including its territo rial waters 8 8 Japan exerted great res traint and until 2004 did no t allo w Japanese co mpanies to survey the ECSeven in the area which it claimed as its EEZ let alo ne aro und the Senkaku Is lands Mo reo ver To kyo `s permiss io n fo r surveying in2004 by a Japanese explo ratio n co mpany (never fo llo wed up because o f the po litical risks invo lved) in respo nse to Chinese o il andgas develo pment near Japan`s claimed EEZ bo rder was o nly fo r an area further no rth away fro m the disputed is lands

The Senkaku Is lands dispute co ntributed to the failure to fo llo w up o n the jo int unders tanding in June 2008 (ryokai in Japaneseliangjie in Chinese) to engage in jo int develo pment o f an area in the no rth o f the Eas t China Sea and to allo w Japan to jo in the

Chunxiao gas field explo itatio n which had been develo ped by China in a disputed EEZ area8 9 During the nego tiatio n o f the 2008jo int unders tanding the Chinese demanded jo int develo pment o f energy reso urces in the area aro und the Senkaku Is lands inexchange fo r their co mpro mise o n jo int develo pment in o ther areas o f the Eas t China Sea Altho ugh the Chinese go vernment agreedto the unders tanding witho ut getting satis factio n o n its demand the failure to achieve greater recipro city fro m the Japanese in theSenkaku area then made it do mes tically impo ss ible fo r the Chinese go vernment to go any further with nego tiating an

implementatio n o f the unders tanding9 0 In December 2008 two Chinese patro l vessels o f the China Marine Surveillance (CMSHaijiandui in Chinese) which is under the State Ocean Adminis tratio n (SOA) entered fo r the firs t time the territo rial waters aro und

the Senkaku Is lands in an apparent mo ve to s trengthen its claim to the is lands 9 1

INSTRUMENTALIZATION OF THE SENKAKU DISPUTE BY POLITICIANS AND NON-STATE ACTORS

The rais ing o f the territo rial is sue by China (ROC and PRC) and the campaign o f the Bao Diao (Pro tect the Diao yu) mo vementno tably in Taiwan and Ho ng Ko ng s ince the ECAFE repo rt led to a s imilar invo lvement o f the Japanese po litical right and o thernatio nalis tic gro ups which to o k up the is sue as a symbo l o f natio nalism In 1973 several rightwing po liticians within the rulingLiberal Demo cratic Party including Ishihara Shintaro who in 2012 became the trigger fo r the central go vernment`s purchase o f so meo f the Senkaku is lands es tablished the so -called Seirankai It was particularly Ishihara who raised the territo rial is sue and o ppo sed

its shelving by Prime Minis ter Tanaka9 2 Agains t the increase o f tens io ns between Japan and China s ince the middle o f the 1990s the supra-partisan Diet Asso ciatio n fo r the Preservatio n o f Territo rial Integrity was es tablished in 2004 It had 60 members by 2011On 30 March 2004 the Security Co mmittee o f the Lo wer Ho use passed a reso lutio n o n preserving territo rial integrity and demanded

a s tro nger Japanese s tance It was the firs t time the Diet passed a reso lutio n relevant to the Senkaku Is lands in this vein9 3 EdanoYukio chief o f the Co ns titutio n Research Co mmittee o f the Demo cratic Party o f Japan (DPJ) then in o ppo s itio n pro po sed that

Self-Defense Fo rces (SDF) tro o ps sho uld be s tatio ned o n the disputed Senkaku Is lands to prevent incurs io ns by o ther co untries 9 4

Since SDF members are civil servants (komuin) this demand so unds very s imilar to the demands by Abe Shinzo o n 15 September2012 to s tatio n komuin o n the is lands (witho ut clarifying whether he meant so ldiers o r o ther civil servants ) altho ugh he po s tpo ned

a decis io n when taking o ver the go vernment in December 20129 5 This sho ws the o ppo rtunis tic explo itatio n o f the territo rial disputefo r electo ral purpo ses

Natio nalis t po liticians and activis ts have also been demanding to erect facilities o n the is lands such as a weather s tatio n a beaco na helipo rt o r a harbo r in o rder to assert Japan`s so vereignty The Niho n Seinensha (Japanese Yo uth Federatio n) a natio nalis to rganizatio n affiliated with the majo r yakuza gro up Sumiyo shi-kai caused several incidents by landing o n the is lands s tarting witherecting a light to wer o r beaco n firs t o n Uo tsurijima in September 1978 which was enlarged in 1988 and ano ther o ne o n Kitako jima

Is land in 19969 6 Each such landing caused pro tes ts in China and amo ng the Chinese diaspo ra and pro mpted the PRC go vernmentto co mplain o fficially It also led to demands by the Seinensha that the light to wers be o fficially reco gnized by the go vernment andthe maintenance be taken o n by the Maritime Safety Agency (later called Co as t Guard) But even the co mpro mise o f including thelight to wer into o fficial charts was an o fficial act reinfo rcing Japan`s effective co ntro l o ver the is lands The dis cuss io n abo ut theo fficial handling o f the light to wer also raised the natio nalis t fever in Taiwan and its military even prepared (but then cancelled at

the las t mo ment) a co mmando actio n at the end o f 1990 to des tro y the facility9 7 In February 2005 amids t ris ing tens io ns o verChina`s energy develo pments in co ntes ted parts o f the Eas t China Sea and Chinese pro tes ts agains t Prime Minis ter Ko izumi`sYasukuni Shrine vis its the Japanese go vernment finally ceded to the demands o f the gro up to take o ver the Uo tsurijima lightho use

s tructure and its maintenance9 8 Until then the Gaimusho had succeeded in delaying this s tate takeo ver as `to o premature` in

o rder no t to pro vo ke China9 9

As can be seen the Japanese go vernment tried to res is t these natio nalis t claims but it co uld no t fully circumvent them thus keepingChina`s suspicio ns alive Mo reo ver whereas the Japanese go vernment always tries to prevent the landing by fo reigners o n theis lands it has no t until fairly recently prevented the landing by Japanese In o rder to keep fo reigners o ut o f the is lands and theirterrito rial waters the Japanese Co as t Guard (CG) has been patro lling the area which again is an o fficial act It may have been thenatio nalis t pressure fro m within the LDP as well as fro m right wing circles which pro mpted Ohira Masayo shi when he was PrimeMinis ter to send in 1979 a general survey team o f 50 perso ns (including Kurihara Hiro yuki) to the is lands in o rder to inves tigate the

building o f facilities like a helipo rt Such demands had already been made by the LDP o n 24 March 197810 0 Altho ugh the final repo rto f the survey spo ke agains t building facilities and no thing fo llo wed fro m it the Kurihara family co ns idered Ohira ndash altho ughgenerally kno wn to be a pro -China po litician - to be the mo s t suppo rtive prime minis ter o f all fo r the Japanese assertio n o f effectiveco ntro l o ver the is lands Befo re that Ohira had also agreed to Kurihara Hiro yuki`s pro po sal to set up o n Uo tsurijima a mo nument

to ho no ur Ko ga Tatsushiro which was do ne with the go vernment`s material and financial suppo rt10 1

Even within the Chinese leadership the territo rial is sue has been divis ive Jus t when the two s ides were nego tiating the Peace andFriendship Treaty in April 1978 abo ut 100 Chinese fishing vessels so me armed appeared aro und the Senkaku area with bannersdeclaring China`s title to the is lands While this was explained at the time in Japan as a means to pressure the Japanese during thetreaty nego tiatio ns it no w seems no w mo re likely that the Senkaku is sue was used by fo llo wers o f the Chairman o f the MilitaryCo mmiss io n Hua Guo feng as a means o f attacking the re-emerging Deng Xiao ping The PRC central leadership explained at the

time that this was `accidental` and Deng Xiao ping pro mised it wo uld never happen again10 2

These latter incidents are also impo rtant when dis cuss io n turns to the ques tio n who s tarted to undermine the unders tanding abo utshelving the is lands dispute ndash Japan o r China Was it China when it passed the 1992 Territo rial Law as is o ften mentio ned in Japano r did it already vio late the unders tanding in April 1978 as so me o thers claim Ho wever if the latter incident was beyo nd the co ntro lo f the Chinese go vernment it co uld be argued that it was the Japanese go vernment with the erectio n o f a mo nument o r the 1979survey that to uched o ff frictio ns Yet the blame game do es no t help in finding a so lutio n ins tead these incidents sho uld make itclear that bo th s ides bear part o f the respo ns ibility fo r undermining the 197278 unders tanding and sho uld therefo re be willing toco me to a new unders tanding

THE DETERIORATION OF THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP SINCE THE 1990S

In additio n to the abo ve develo pments it was the general deterio ratio n o f the bilateral relatio nship s ince the middle o f the 1990sthat changed the co nditio ns fo r maintaining the shelving o f the territo rial dispute Japan became suspicio us o f China`s no n-transparent military mo dernizatio n particularly o f the navy which has been expanding its o peratio ns including the Eas t China

Sea10 3 Other negative develo pments were the pro gress o f Chinese o il and gas explo ratio n in the Eas t China Sea despitedisagreement o ver the co mmo n EEZ bo rder vis its by Japanese po litical leaders to the Yasukuni War Shrine and o ther is sues relatedto Japan`s pas t aggress io n agains t China

A nadir in the bilateral relatio nship was reached during the rule o f Prime Minis ter Ko izumi Junichiro (2001-2006) because o f hisannual vis its to the Yasukuni Shrine But while the po litical relatio nship go t co lder the eco no mic relatio nship expanded andpro spered (`Co ld Po litics Ho t Eco no mics`) This also had ndashat firs t glance co unter-intuitively ndash a deleterio us effect o n themo tivatio n to wo rk harder to maintain the co nditio ns fo r putting as ide the territo rial co nflict s ince this dicho to my gave the falseimpress io n that po litics and eco no mics co uld be kept separate fo rever while the territo rial is sue was pending The wo rsening o f theterrito rial co nflict fro m 2010 and particularly fro m 2012 with China`s harsh po litical and eco no mic retributio n wo uld bear this o ut

Part o f the ratio nale fo r the Chinese navy`s increased presence in the Eas t China Sea is China`s o il and gas develo pments as wellas the wish to preserve the navy`s access to the Pacific Ocean to prevent JapaneseUS o bservatio n o r to intervene in a cris is Thisco uld no t but affect the territo rial dispute In May 1999 12 Chinese warships co nducted a mano euvre in waters no rth o f the

Senkaku is lands The exercise was the firs t o f its kind to be carried o ut by China in that regio n10 4 Other Chinese naval mo vementsin the Eas t China Sea increased including repo rts abo ut intelligence-gathering ships In the las t few years the po litical influence o f

the PLA and particularly o f the PLA Navy (PLAN) has co ns iderably increased10 5 The Japanese reacted by increas ing their militarydeplo yment and a s trengthening o f Japanese-American military co o peratio n Ho wever the Senkaku area is co ntro lled by the Co as tGuard which is a law enfo rcement agency and the Japanese navy keeps away fro m po licing This incidentally reinfo rces Japan`sclaim as po licing is do ne o nly within natio nal territo ry o r EEZ areas

Until the central go vernment`s purchase o f three o f the is lands in September 2012 it was the activities o f no n-s tate acto rs fro mJapan Taiwan Ho ng Ko ng and the PRC whether natio nalis t activis ts o r fishermen which caused the greates t direct co nfro ntatio nss ince Japan`s co untermeasures were a demo ns tratio n o f the exercise o f so vereignty which the PRC became increas ingly unwilling toto lerate In 1996 a Ho ng Ko ng pro tes ter who tried to co ver the las t meters fro m his bo at to o ne o f the is lands dro wned Ano therincident o ccurred in 2008 when a Japanese Co as t Guard ship rammed a Taiwanese spo rt fishing bo at which had entered Senkaku

territo rial waters The actio n caused the bo at to s ink10 6

In March 2004 fo r the firs t time s ince 1996 seven Chinese activis ts landed o n Uo tsurijima When the Japanese po lice made arres ts the Chinese Fo reign Minis try pro tes ted calling it a serio us vio latio n o f Chinese so vereignty The arres ts were made under the

immigratio n management law which includes a clause o n expuls io n o f illegal fo reign trespassers 10 7 In light o f the 2010 incident inwhich a PRC fishing trawlere twice rammed a Japanese co as t guard ship it is impo rtant to no te that despite guidelines which were togive = law enfo rcement agencies the autho rity to deal with trespassers `acco rding to the law` it was repo rted that the centralgo vernment intervened at the las t minute did no t press fo r an indictment and o rdered the release o f the arres ted Chinese Thego vernment did no t want any further co mplicatio ns that might to rpedo the planned China vis it by Fo reign Minis ter Kawaguchi Yo riko

and was satis fied to have demo ns trated effective co ntro l o ver the Senkaku Is lands by arres ting and expelling the Chinese10 8 AJapanese jo urnal repo rted that there was a Japanese pledge to China fo llo wing this incident that in future an intruder wo uld no t beput in detentio n but o nly arres ted as lo ng as it was no t a serio us case in turn China agreed to prevent the departure o f vessels withpro tes ters fro m its harbo urs Such an unders tanding has no t surpris ingly been denied by the Japanese as well as by the Chinese

go vernment10 9

The China Marine Surveillance (CMS) s tarted irregular patro l activities near the Senkaku Is lands in December 2008 when two CMSvessels s tayed fo r o ver nine ho urs in the territo rial waters o f the Senkaku Is lands as mentio ned abo ve This was interpreted in

Japan as a majo r escalatio n110 Fo rmer ambassado r to China Miyamo to Yuji called this new develo pment a qualitative change in the

Senkaku dispute which went beyo nd previo us cases o f intrus io n by fishermen o r pro tes ters 111 This deplo yment was fo llo wed byo thers the fo llo wing year agains t a backgro und o f China reinfo rcing its maritime co ntro l Japan respo nded by building up its o wndefence effo rts in the so uth including planned s tatio ning o f so me tro o ps o n Yo naguni Is land o ne o f the clo ses t is lands to the

Senkaku Is lands 112

THE 2010 FISHING TRAWLER INCIDENT

It is agains t this co mplex backgro und that the Chinese fishing trawler Minjinyu 5179 with a crew o f 15 entered the territo rial waters o fthe Senkaku Is lands o n 7 September 2010 near Kubajima There were many o ther Chinese fishing trawlers in the same area andseveral ships o f the Japanese Co as t Guard were trying to chase them away Pursued by three Japanese CG vessels the Minjinyu 5179twice co llided with two o f the CG vessels There are different interpretatio ns whether the Chinese captain Zhan Qixio ng intentio nally

rammed the CG vessels and there are so me s trange inco ns is tencies highlighted in the repo rts o f the incident113 So me no n-Japanese autho rs like Sheila Smith and Linus Hags trouml m are no n-co mmittal o n the ques tio n o f the co llis io n but mo s t Japanese

autho rs blame the trawler and this autho r is mo re inclined to believe that the ramming was intentio nal114 The Chinese

unsurpris ingly blame the CG vessels 115 The is sue o f intentio n is impo rtant inso far as it gives so me indicatio n abo ut the risk o frecurrence and o f escalatio n The fo llo wing circumstantial evidence sugges ts intentio nal ramming by the Chinese captain

- There is ample video fo o tage leaked by a CG o fficer which specialis ts have interpreted as intentio nal ramming by the Chinese

captain116

- The captain seemed to have been drunk and is kno wn to be a vo latile perso n 117

- Fishing in the Eas t China Sea is very co mpetitive and Chinese fishermen are particularly anno yed abo ut the patro ls and co ntro ls byJapanese and Ko rean law enfo rcement agencies in the as yet un-demarcated EEZs amo ng all three co untries

Chinese fishermen have a reputatio n o f o ften being vio lent as many incidents in the So uth China Sea and in the Yello w Sea seem topro ve Only three mo nths later in December 2010 ano ther Chinese fishing trawler captain rammed a So uth Ko rean co as t guard

vessel in the Yello w Sea ho wever his bo at sank as a result and the Chinese captain dro wned 118 Chinese crews are o ften armed

with metal pipes and attack law enfo rcement agents which have led to o ther fatal casualties in 2011 and 2012119

The 2010 trawler incident is further relevant in o ur co ntext in view o f the Japanese go vernment`s handling it ( legal aspect denial o fthe shelving unders tanding) China`s co untermeasures and the aftermath o f the go vernment`s purchase o f three is lands inSeptember 2012 After the co llis io ns the Japanese go vernment arres ted the crew and co nfis cated the trawler The fo llo wing day theChinese go vernment demanded the release o f the crew and the trawler which the Japanese go vernment did o n the 13 September butkeeping the captain in cus to dy The Japanese ambassado r to China Niwa Uichiro was summo ned s ix times by the Chinese between8 and 19 September Beijing`s reactio n escalated after the Chinese captain`s term o f detentio n was extended o n 19 September tolas t fro m 20 to 29 September On 20 September Chinese autho rities detained fo ur Japanese citizens fo r entering a res trictedmilitary area in Hebei pro vince Even witho ut the trawler incident the detentio n o f the fo ur Japanese wo uld have harmed the bilateralrelatio nship but happening in this co ntext it was rightly o r wro ngly immediately linked by the Japanese to o ther Chinese sanctio ns

as dis cussed belo w The result ho wever was that the Japanese released the Chinese captain120 Even immediately after the crew`sarres t the Chinese go vernment had already begun to cancel the seco nd ro und o f nego tiatio ns fo r implementatio n o f theunders tanding o n energy co o peratio n in the Eas t China Sea co ncluded o n 18 June 2008 Other reprisals and sanctio ns fo llo wedincluding the suspens io n o f rare earth expo rts to Japan o n which the co untry`s high techno lo gy indus try is very dependentAltho ugh befo re the incident the Chinese go vernment had already mo ved to reduce rare earth expo rts which naturally hit Japan asthe bigges t impo rter Japanese media repo rted that the Chinese cus to ms autho rities to tally suspended expo rts in late

September121 The exact circumstances o f this alleged embargo are s till no t yet clear as dis cussed in detail by Alas tair Jo hns to n122

The cris is ended when the deputy pro secuto r in Ishigaki anno unced o n 24 September the release o f the captain citing the`diplo matic impact` o f the case o n the bilateral relatio nship So me co ns idered this as surrender by the Japanese and the result o fdubio us po litical interference into the legal pro cess The o ppo s itio n had a field day attacking the go vernment`s handling o f the

incident123 The Japanese Fo reign Minis try spo kesman declared that the go vernment had applied do mes tic law and again refuted the

idea o f there being a territo rial pro blem to be reso lved124 Others argue that the incident had several benefits fo r the Japanesego vernment because it o btained a reco nfirmatio n o f the US security guarantee to include the Senkaku Is lands it helped to co nvince

the public abo ut the necess ity o f mo re Japanese defence effo rts and it expo sed China as an assertive if no t aggress ive po wer125

China claimed that the incident sho wed that Japan had changed its appro ach to handling this type o f incident which co uld be

interpreted as a co nfirmatio n that bo th s ides had reached an info rmal unders tanding after the 2004 incident126 Ho wever thisincident was much mo re severe s ince the captain`s two co llis io ns with CG ships were interpreted by the Japanese go vernment asintentio nal ramming The captain was charged with o bs tructio n o f Perfo rmance o f Public Duty as a result o f the ramming On theo ther hand o ne canno t blame China fo r allo wing this bo at to leave its Chinese harbo ur because it was a fishing trawler and no t apro tes ters` campaign vessel What made this incident so serio us fo r the Chinese was Japan`s very public assertio n o f itsso vereignty o ver the is lands in the way it handled the Chinese captain and the explicit denial o f the shelving unders tanding o f the

1970s On 21 September Fo reign Minis ter Maehara s tated that Japan had no t agreed with China to shelve the territo rial dispute127

This declaratio n fo llo wed the seco nd extens io n o f the captain`s detentio n o n 19 September which pro mpted the Chinesego vernment to allo w widespread demo ns tratio ns in China and to place a series o f sanctio ns agains t Japan (cancellatio n o fminis terial meetings `self- res trictio ns` o n vis its to Japan by Chinese to uris ts and po s tpo nement at very sho rt no tice o f the vis ito f 1000 Japanese yo uth planned fro m 21 September to the Shanghai Wo rld Exhibitio n) Japan is es timated to have lo s t yen318

billio n due to a decline in the number o f Chinese to uris ts 128

It is diff icult to judge whether these unprecedented co untermeasures were centrally directed and it is likely that it was aco mbinatio n o f vario us po wer centres co mpeting ando r feeling the need to be seen acting in acco rdance with the increas ingly anti-Japanese mo o d

Japan`s do mes tic circumstances made a speedy so lutio n such as that in 2004 difficult The DPJ had co me to po wer o nly in 2009 andlacked fo reign po licy experience There was no effective co mmunicatio n between the two go vernments at leas t at the beginning o fthe incident in co ntras t to earlier times The Japanese leadership o bvio us ly mis judged ho w the Chinese wo uld interpret Japanesehandling o f the incident which it perceived as a reversal o f Japan`s previo us (albeit gradually diminishing) res traint Altho ugh theDPJ had initially a mo re pro -China leadership when it came to po wer (no tably Prime Minis ter Hato yama Yukio and Secretary General

Ozawa Ichiro ) this had changed by 2010 The minis ter in charge o f the CG (which is under the Minis try o f Land Infras tructureTranspo rt and To urism) o n the day o f the incident was Maehara Seiji a kno wn defence hawk who then became Minis ter o f Fo reignAffairs in a cabinet reshuffle o n 17 September He was therefo re much mo re at liberty to take a hard-line s tance agains t China whilethe DPJ pres idential electio n ndash wo n again by Kan Nao to ndash to o k place o n 14 September fo llo wed by the prime minis ter`s departure toNew Yo rk to attend the UN General Assembly o n 22 September The fo reign minis ter befo re the 17 September was Okada Katsuyawho was also mo re inclined to take a s tro ng s tance Maehara as well as Okada had seen the CG`s video o f the co llis io n which co uld

no t but have left them with a very negative impress io n o f the Chinese captain`s actio ns 129 It certainly did no t help when Maehara inhis new po s t as fo reign minis ter qualif ied China`s reactio n in the Diet o n 18 September as `very hys terical` and then declared o n

21 September that there had never been an unders tanding abo ut shelving the territo rial dispute130 On 23 September Secretary o fState Hillary Clinto n assured vis iting Fo reign Minis ter Maehara that the Senkaku Is lands were co vered by the bilateral Japan-USSecurity Treaty an interventio n that was certainly also no t welco me to the Chinese Ho wever there have been speculatio ns that inexchange fo r this s tro ng US reco nfirmatio n o f the security guarantee in o rder to get o ut o f the s talemate the Japanese had to

pro mise to release o f the Chinese captain which o ccurred the fo llo wing day131

The 2010 incident had several co nsequences which made a recurrence very likely Firs t o f all the incident raised tens io ns to a degreelas t seen during the anti-Japan demo ns tratio ns in 2004 and 2005 which had been mainly co ncerned with Japan`s attempt to gain apermanent UN Security Co uncil seat and the his to ry is sue These tens io ns had made it impo ss ible to have any new nego tiatio nro und to co nclude a treaty abo ut co o peratio n in the explo itatio n o f hydro carbo n reso urces in the Eas t China Sea and thus reduceano ther majo r so urce o f bilateral tens io ns and o ne mo reo ver related to the Senkaku is sue Agains t this backgro und but also inline with its previo us po s itio n Japan rejected a Chinese pro po sal made in Octo ber 2010 fo r jo int reso urce develo pment in the

Senkaku area132 The legal aftermath o f the incident co ntinued fo r so me time with Japan claiming co mpensatio n fro m the Chinesecaptain fo r the damage caused to the two CG vessels which was rejected by China and co untered with demands fo r co mpensatio nand an apo lo gy The Japanese pro secuto r dro pped the case agains t the captain o nly in January 2011 but the CG s till sent a bill to

the captain in February 2011133

While the incident helped the Japanese go vernment to o btain s tro ng US suppo rt o n the applicability o f the bilateral security treaty tothe Senkaku Is lands and generally helped to co nvince the Japanese public abo ut the need fo r greater Japanese defence effo rts(including a s trengthening o f US leverage vis-agrave-vis Japan co ncerning the realignment o f its fo rces o n Okinawa) it reduced Japan`sindependence with respect to the degree o f suppo rt it pro vided fo r US China po licy

Seco ndly the incident further undermined the co nditio ns which were the fo undatio n fo r the uno fficial shelving o f the Senkaku is sueIf it was no t yet clear to everybo dy that there was a territo rial dispute o ver the Senkaku Is lands then this incident with theunprecedented Chinese sanctio ns agains t Japan lifted the las t remnants o f do ubt Maehara Seji who repeated o n 25 o ccas io ns inDiet debates between 10 September and 16 No vember 2010 that there exis ted no territo rial dispute made this o fficial po s itio n

even less co nvincing134 The incident pro mpted Beijing to publicly undermine Japan`s territo rial claim further by anno uncing o n 29Octo ber 2010 permanent deplo yment o f large fisheries patro l vessels in waters near the Senkaku Is lands which was recipro cated by

the CG deplo ying patro l vessels o f o ver 1000 to ns in the same area135 In a further tit-fo r-tat o n 17 December 2010 the city

go vernment o f Ishigaki the adminis trative autho rity o f the Senkaku Is lands passed an o rdinance to des ignate 14 January the day to

co mmemo rate the Senkaku Is lands` inco rpo ratio n in 1895136

The further ero s io n o f the shelving agreement after Octo ber 2010

The next majo r co nfro ntatio n o ver the Senkaku Is lands in September 2012 o ccurred agains t the backgro und o f mo re measurestaken by bo th s ides to suppo rt their respective territo rial claims and do mes tic circumstances in bo th co untries which were evenless co nducive to re-es tablish trus t and go o d relatio ns The gro wing US-China po litical and military rivalry in Eas t As ia asexemplif ied by the As ia pivo t which China perceives as directed agains t its rise certainly did no t help Initially the year 2011 saw areco very o f relatio ns fro m the 2010 incident Bilateral trade reached a new high with a vo lume o f $345 billio n Japanese fo reign

direct inves tment in China so ared nearly 50 per cent in 2011 to $6 3bn137 Mo reo ver the Chinese public was very impressed with thedis ciplined way the Japanese peo ple reacted to wards the triple disas ters which hit the co untry o n 11 March 2011 and there was an

o utpo uring o f sympathy which also included the sending o f a Chinese search-and-rescue miss io n to the affected To ho ku area138

Yet this impro ved atmo sphere was quickly dispelled when the results o f the textbo o k review were published o n 27 March whichasserted Japan`s territo rial claim to the Senkaku Is lands (as well as to TakeshimaDo kto ) and denied the Chinese figure o f

300 000 victims in the Nanjing massacre139

In the meantime the Japanese go vernment co ntinued to turn the legal s crews which affected the Senkaku Is lands by implementingdo mes tic laws in o rder to be co ngruent with internatio nal law and s trengthening maritime co ntro l In February 2012 the Japanesecabinet passed bills to enhance the Japan Co as t Guards law enfo rcement po wers in territo rial waters which wo uld fo r example

autho rize the CG to o rder fo reign ships to leave Japan`s Territo rial Waters witho ut firs t bo arding them140 Other adminis trativemeasures derived fro m the Bas ic Law o n Ocean Po licy which had been enacted in 2007 and which pro vides the framewo rk fo radminis trating remo te is lands Since 2009 Japan has given names to hitherto unnamed is lands to subs tantiate its claims to anEEZ Fo r this purpo se in Augus t 2011 the go vernment placed 23 uninhabited is lands under s tate co ntro l but fo ur is lets near theSenkaku Is lands were exempt o ut o f co ns ideratio n fo r China In March 2012 ho wever the go vernment abando ned this cautio n and

regis tered Kitako jima as a natio nal asset141 In No vember 2011 the go vernment had let it be kno wn that it wo uld sho rtly release a

new lis t o f names fo r is lands which wo uld include is lets o f the Senkaku gro up142 China pro tes ted and a meeting in Beijing plannedin February 2012 between Pres ident Hu Jintao and representatives o f seven bilateral friendship gro ups fro m Japan was cancelled Ano pinio n piece in the Peoples Daily (RMRB) o n 17 January 2012 said Japans mo ve lsquois a blatant mo ve to damage Chinas co re

interes ts rsquo143 On 2 March 2012 To kyo finally anno unced a lis t o f 39 is lands which included fo ur is lets in the Senkaku Is lands

gro up144 The Chinese pro tes ted immediately o n the same day and in a tit-fo r-tat the State Oceanic Adminis tratio n released o n 3

March s tandard names and descriptio ns o f the Senkaku is lands and its 70 affiliated is lets 145 Ano ther Chinese co untermo ve was theanno uncement o n 16 March by the SOA that they had s tarted patro lling near the Senkaku Is lands This was fo llo wed pro mptly o n thesame day by o ne CMS ship entering the Territo rial Waters o f the Senkaku Is lands and the same vessels with ano ther CMS ship

cruis ing in the Co ntiguo us Waters o f the is lands 146 In No vember 2010 an o fficial o f the Minis try o f Agricultures Bureau o f Fisherieswhich o perates the Fisheries Law Enfo rcement Co mmand (FLEC) had already anno unced that his o rganizatio n wo uld fro m no w o n

deplo y fisheries patro l vessels o f o ver 1000 to ns to maintain co ntinuo us patro ls 147

THE 2012 CONFRONTATION ISHIHARA SHINTARO LIGHTING THE FUSE

It was in this tense enviro nment that To kyo Go verno r Ishihara Shintaro anno unced o n 16 April 2012 that the To kyo Metro po litanGo vernment (TMG) was nego tiating the purchase o f three o f the fo ur privately-held Senkaku is lands by the end o f the year ie

Uo tsurijima Kita Ko jima and Minami Ko jima The lease o f the central go vernment fo r these three is lands was due to expire in March2013 and no incident wo uld have o ccurred if the go vernment had quietly renewed the lease The central go vernment s tated that ithad no t kno wn abo ut Ishihara`s intentio n but that there had been co ntacts o n vario us o ccas io ns between the go vernment and the

private o wner148 This seems co nvincing s ince s tate o wnership wo uld have pro vided better preventio n o f incidents even mo re thanjus t leas ing Taken aback by Ishihara`s surprise mo ve the Chief Cabinet Secretary Fujimura Osamu declared the fo llo wing day thatthe central go vernment might acquire the is lands `if required` and Prime Minis ter No da implied in a Diet speech o n the 18 April that

a purchase by the central go vernment was o ne o f the o ptio ns Bo th s tatements were widely repo rted in China149 Ishihara hadcho sen his anno uncement fo r maximum effect o n the o ccas io n o f a speech at the co nservative Washingto n DC-based HeritageFo undatio n He made it clear that this pro ject was meant as a criticism o f the DPJ-led central go vernment which he co ns ideredfailing in its duty to sufficiently pro tect Japan`s so vereignty by saying that the central go vernment sho uld be buying the is lands butthat the Gaimusho was to o afraid o f o ffending China The lo catio n o f his anno uncement was meant to gain s tro nger suppo rt fro m

the US fo r Japan`s territo rial claim150 As we have seen abo ve fro m Ishihara`s activities in the 1970s this anno uncement was inmany ways the lo gical co nclus io n o f his lo ng las ting o bsess io n with the Senkaku Is lands and his hatred o f co mmunis t China It wasthe 2010 incident in particular which had enco uraged him to renew his o ld plan o f buying the is lands after his earlier failure to do so His go o d co nnectio ns with the o wner Kurihara Kunio ki who shared his natio nalis t pro clivities helped Ishihara to beco me the

favo ured purchaser151

The po ss ibility o f having the three is lands under the co ntro l o f the natio nalis tic go verno r o f To kyo who wanted to build facilities o nthe is lands to s trengthen Japan`s so vereignty was unpalatable to the No da go vernment which feared co mplicatio ns with China In a

meeting o n 18 May No da and his to p advisers decided in principle to purchase the is lands 152 Pressure o n the go vernmentincreased to pre-empt Ishihara because he was as to nishingly success ful in rais ing vo luntary co ntributio ns fro m the public to buythe three is lands thus circumventing any legal diff iculties in us ing To kyo `s taxpayer mo ney and also pro ving the po pularity o f his

mo ve By 1 June he had co llected 70 000 do natio ns to taling aro und yen101 billio n which increased to yen146 billio n by 6 September153

On 27 July the TMG ran an advertisement in the Wall Street Journal asking fo r US unders tanding and suppo rt fo r the purchase plan154

The TMG had to reques t central go vernment permiss io n to co nduct a survey o f the is lands which the go vernment refused to grant

o n 27 Augus t fo rcing the TMG to co nduct a survey fro m a ship o n 2 September155 In the end it was the higher sum and the sho rtes tdelay o f co ncluding the deal which pro mpted Kurihara Kunio ki who was apparently in so me financial diff iculties to accept the centralgo vernment`s o ffer o f yen205 billio n ($26 millio n) and to s ign the co ntract o n 11 September This was an embarrass ing turn fo rIshihara In additio n he did no t succeed in us ing the o ffer o f his co llected mo ney to entice the No da go vernment to pro mise thebuilding o f any facility o n the is lands No da was presented by his adminis tratio n with several o ptio ns including his favo ured o ptio no f repairing the exis ting light ho use o n Uo tsurijima but in the end was co nvinced by Fo reign Minis ter Gemba to leave things as they

were in o rder no t to further inflame the Chinese156

The central go vernment`s purchase o f the three is lands o n 11 September immediately led to a very harsh reactio n by the Chinesewhich was even wo rse than in 2010 But befo re lo o king at Chinese co untermeasures after 11 September in detail it is impo rtant toinves tigate why the Chinese reactio n was so s tro ng and why the Japanese apparently did no t anticipate it particularly in view o fChina`s unprecedented reactio n in September 2010

CHINESE WARNINGS BEFORE THE NATIONALIZATION ON 11 SEPTEMBER

Prime Minis ter No da admitted o n 19 September o nly eight days into the co mprehens ive Chinese sanctio ns and co unter measures

that he had underes timated their extent157

158 In a named co mmentary o f Xinhua o n 18 April attentio n was drawn to Ishihara`s kno wn right wing and anti-Chinese s tatementsbut also po inted o ut that the CMOFA `wo uld no t hes itate to take any necessary measures to safeguard so vereignty o ver the Diao yu

Is lands`159 Vice-Pres ident Xi Jinping to ld vis iting Ko no Yo hei a kno wn pro -China hand that Japan sho uld no t wo rsen the bilateral

relatio nship and that co re is sues sho uld be reso lved by the two co untries in an appro priate manner16 0 At the end o f April the StateOceanic Adminis tratio n anno unced a plan to des ignate is lands and their surro unding waters as s trategically vital and to pro tect their

enviro nments and develo p marine reso urces 16 1 Mo re specifically targeting the Senkaku Is lands was ho wever the entry o n 3 May o f

two FLEC vessels into the Senkaku Is lands` Co ntiguo us Waters fo r the firs t time s ince Ishihara`s anno uncement16 2 Bilateraltens io ns also increased after a Japanese right wing gro up suppo rted the ho lding o f a meeting o f the Wo rld Uyghur Co ngress in

To kyo fro m 14 to 18 May which led to the cancellatio n by Beijing o f several o fficial vis its 16 3 On 13 May Premier Wen Jiabao raisedthe Senkaku is sue and the Uighur meeting during talks in Beijing with Prime Minis ter Yo shihiko No da cautio ning that lsquoit is impo rtant

to respect Chinarsquos co re interes ts and matters o f great co ncernrsquo16 4 Wang Jiarui head o f the Co mmunis t Partys Internatio nalDepartment was quo ted by Eda Satsuki a fo reign po licy adviser o f the DPJ that bo th the Senkaku and the Uighur is sue were

described as `co re is sues` and Wen`s s tatement was s tressed in a Chinese TV bro adcas t16 5 The Xinjiang is sue as well as Taiwanand Tibet have been referred to fo r so me time by the Chinese go vernment as `co re is sues` but the Senkaku is sue had been called

a `co re is sue` apparently fo r the firs t time o nly in an o pinio n piece by the Renmin Ribao in January 201216 6 Only o n 23 March 2013did the Chinese Fo reign Minis try Spo kesperso n clearly s tate that China regards the Diao yu Is lands as its co re interes t altho ugh the

written reco rd subsequently so ftened this s tatement16 7

The abo ve chro no lo gy certainly gives the impress io n that there was a series o f Chinese reactio ns which expressed s tro ng Chineseco ncern with any purchase (whether by the TMG o r the central go vernment) o f the Senkaku Is lands If that had no t been eno ugh theinterview o f the Financial Times with Japan`s ambassado r in China Niwa Uichiro at the beginning o f June sho wed s tro ng co ncernabo ut the implicatio ns o f a purchase He was quo ted as saying that lsquoif Mr Ishihararsquos plans are acted upo n then it will result in anextremely grave cris is in relatio ns between Japan and ChinahellipWe canno t allo w decades o f pas t effo rt to be bro ught to no thingrsquo He

added that such a cris is wo uld affect bus iness 16 8 Niwa mus t have been truly co ncerned abo ut the severity o f the s ituatio n to makesuch an undiplo matic public s tatement fo r which he was reprimanded by Fo reign Minis ter Gemba and criticized by so me media

o utlets and po liticians ultimately leading to his recall later in the year16 9

The Chinese warnings became sharper at the seco nd s tage when Prime Minis ter No da anno unced o n 7 July that his go vernment wo uldseek to buy the is lands because the purchase co uld no lo nger be put do wn to a mere lo cal maverick with s tro ng anti-Chineseinclinatio ns The Global Times edito rial o f 9 July sho wed the frus tratio n by so me Chinese lsquoEach time Japan takes o ne s tep we sho uldtake o ne and half o r even two s teps fo rward making Japan aware o f the grave co nsequences caused by its aggress io n agains t

Chinarsquo170 A Xinhua co mmentary o n 7 July quo tes the CMOFA`s spo kesperso n referring pro bably fo r the firs t time in this ro w to a`co nsensus` agains t which the Japanese go vernment went by wanting to buy the is lands meaning o f co urse the shelving co nsensus

o f 1972 and 1978171 On 9 July a Xinhua co mmentary titled `Japan playing with fire o ver Diao yu Is lands` called the purchase by the

central go vernment a `farcical ambitio n` an express io n repeated thereafter many times 172 On 11 July the Japanese media repo rtedthe entry by three FLEC vessels into the territo rial waters o f Kubajima the firs t time s ince the 16 March 2012 fo llo wed by o ne vessel

cruis ing the fo llo wing day in the is land`s co ntiguo us zo ne173 Public o pinio n became increas ingly inflamed and the Global Timesrepo rted o n 19 July that 90 8 per cent o f Chinese peo ple surveyed appro ve us ing the military to enfo rce Chinas so vereignty o ver

the is lets with 521 per cent saying a military clash lsquois likelyrsquo between China and Japan o ver the is lands 174

Even the US gave Japan `s tro ng advice` no t to pro ceed with the purchase because it co uld `trigger a cris is` as was revealed in April2013 by Kurt Campbell who was at the time Ass is tant Secretary fo r Eas t As ian and Pacific Affairs Even tho ugh we warned JapanJapan decided to go in a different directio n and they tho ught they had gained the suppo rt o f China o r so me did which we were

certain that they had no t Campbell is quo ted in an interview with Kyo do 175

FAILURE OF COMMUNICATION

The abo ve chro no lo gy and escalatio n o f Chinese reactio ns to the planned purchase o f the is lands o ver the summer 2012 give aclear indicatio n that a Japanese purchase o f the three is lands was no t co ns idered jus t ano ther incident witho ut majo rco nsequences So why did the Japanese go vernment s till go ahead with the purchase In the final analys is the failure to avo id thecris is escalating in September 2012 lay in the wide difference between the interes ts o f the two go vernments Do mes ticcircumstances o n bo th s ides and the inherent zero sum nature o f territo rial disputes prevented the trans itio n fro m dialo gue topreventive actio n let alo ne so lutio n Aggravating events o ver the summer 2012 which raised tempers o n bo th s ides were thedemands by the TMG to send a survey team to the Senkaku Is lands (the No da go vernment after so me initial co nflicting repo rts didno t allo w a landing) the landing o f Ho ng Ko ng activis ts o n Uo tsurijima o n 15 Augus t (timed with the anniversary o f Japan`ssurrender) fo llo wed by the landing o f Japanese activis ts ( including lo cal parliamentarians ) o n 19 Augus t and an attack in Beijing o n27 Augus t o n the car carrying Ambassado r Niwa Despite o ngo ing co mmunicatio n and dialo gue thro ugh vario us channels theseadverse circumstances led to a hardening o f po s itio ns o ver the summer 2012 between the two go vernments

The Japanese central go vernment had been caught sho rt by Ishihara`s sudden anno uncement o n 16 April and became to tallyabso rbed with preventing the maverick po litician fro m go ing ahead with the purchase o f the is lands fearing rightly that this wo uldserio us ly co mplicate Japan-China relatio ns Ishihara wanted to embarrass the No da go vernment which was co ns tantly declining inpo pularity and to fo rce it to deal mo re assertively with the is lands As we have seen fo r Ishihara it was no t jus t abo ut purchas ingthe is lands but abo ut building facilities o n them Fo r the No da go vernment buying the is lands by the s tate was therefo re the lesserevil The go vernment tried all alo ng to co nvince the Chinese o f To kyo `s go o d intentio ns fo r example when Fo reign Minis ter Gembamet with his Chinese co unterpart Yang Jiechi o n 11 July that the purchase was o nly a `do mes tic co mmercial transactio n` and no t a

diplo matic matter and was o nly meant to ensure that the is lands wo uld be `adminis tered peacefully and s tably`176 In December2012 when the full extent o f China`s unprecedented reactio ns had beco me kno wn the new Japanese ambassado r Kitera s till s tatedthat lsquoThe change in o wnership sho uld no t have caused a pro blem in relatio ns with Chinarsquo adding that Japan had given China sufficient

explanatio ns ahead o f the purchase177 Fo reign Minis ter Gemba even tried to highlight in No vember that the purchase was actually areturn to the status quo ante lsquoThe measure taken by the go vernment o f Japan was jus t a trans fer o f title under Japanese do mes ticlaw and jus t means that the o wnership o f the is lands mdash held by the go vernment until 1932 mdash was returned fro m a private citizen to

the go vernmentrsquo178 In sho rt fo r the Japanese the purchase o f the is lands was aimed at maintaining the status quo in such a waythat it ho ped China wo uld co ns ider to be in its o wn interes t that is by cho o s ing the lesser o f two evils That express io ns like`peaceful adminis tratio n` o r `trans fer o f title under do mes tic Japanese law` co uld o nly be interpreted by the Chinese as acts o fasserting Japanese so vereignty was apparently s imply igno red Under these circumstances it was impo ss ible to co nvince theChinese that trans fer o f o wnership had no thing to do with so vereignty Ins tead the Chinese even suspected that the No da

go vernment and Ishihara were co nniving at s trengthening Japan`s co ntro l o ver the is lands 179

Any intended co nciliato ry o verto ne in the abo ve explanatio ns by Gemba and many s imilar declaratio ns befo re and later were furthernegated by the ins is tence that there was no territo rial dispute exactly the po s itio n the Chinese mo s t so ught to change Thefrequent references to `co re interes t` by China were igno red by the Japanese go vernment Fo r the Chinese leaders the `o ffer` tocho o se between the To kyo Metro po litan Go vernment o r the Go vernment o f Japan buying the is lands was as Vice Fo reign Minis ter

Zhang Zhijun later put it like being asked to cho o se between two do ses o f po iso n18 0

It was also unfo rtunate that the Japanese go vernment allo wed the express io n kokuyuka (natio nalizatio n) to prevail even amo ng

go vernment members ins tead o f the o riginal term agreed by the Japanese cabinet shutoku (acquis itio n)18 1 Chinese media hastaken o ver the Japanese term o f lsquonatio nalizatio nrsquo which certainly further co nfused Chinese public o pinio n Since it do es no t kno w thehis to rical backgro und and Japan`s effective co ntro l o f the is lands `natio nalizatio n` tended to be unders to o d as a radical change in

the status quo o r even as invas io n18 2 A well kno wn Japanese o bserver in China Kato Yo shikazu even argued therefo re that the 1972

and 1978 unders tanding abo ut shelving had prevented the Chinese peo ple fro m learning abo ut the is sue as perceived in Japan18 3

Bo th s ides made it impo ss ible with their extreme and diametrically o ppo sed po s itio ns to find a co mpro mise The No da go vernmentwas to o weak (and also to o preo ccupied with o ther is sues like the pass ing o f the law to intro duce a hike o f the value added taxco ping with the aftermath o f the triple disas ter o f March 2011 and s imply trying to s tay in po wer) to find an alternative to the no wabando ned `shelving co mpro mise` and to admit that there was a territo rial pro blem At the end o f Augus t No da was fo rced topro mise Lo wer Ho use electio ns `so metime so o n` despite the grim o utlo o k fo r his party`s chances in the electio ns Making aco mpro mise o n the territo rial is sue wo uld no t have helped to gain po pular suppo rt While the Chinese pro bably felt enco uraged toescalate pressure by their success in fo rcing the Japanese go vernment hand o ver the captain in September 2010 it mo s t likely hadthe effect o n the No da go vernment to remain inflexible in o rder to avo id being seen yet again as caving in to Chinese pressure Butthe Chinese were also no t able to co mpro mise o n their demand that the Japanese sho uld admit the exis tence o f a territo rial is sue

The preparatio n fo r the 18 th Natio nal Party Co ngress in No vember 2012 and the ensuing leadership change to be finalized o nly inspring 2013 s imilarly did no t allo w the Chinese leaders whether inco ming o r o utgo ing to appear so ft Eight o ut o f nine Po litbureaumembers publicly expressed o ppo s itio n to the purchase either befo re o r after the anno uncement o f the purchase o n 11

September18 4 There are also credible repo rts that during the CCP`s summer retreat to Beihaide in Augus t Hu Jintao came underpressure fro m the future gro up o f leaders to take a mo re severe po s itio n o n Japan`s intentio n to natio nalise the three is lands Asa result the leading fo reign po licy interlo cuto rs o f the Japanese go vernment Zhang Zhijun and Dai Bingguo hardened their po s itio n

as well18 5 Public o pinio n in China had gro wn increas ingly ho s tile to Japan o ver the summer and was particularly inflamed when thelanding o f the Ho ng Ko ng activis ts was fo llo wed by the landing o f Japanese activis ts which were treated by the Japanese autho ritiesmo re leniently than the fo rmer ie no t arres ted despite having vio lated private land leased to the s tate Rio ts in several Chinese

cities s tarted thereafter18 6

Altho ugh bo th s ides agreed to co ntinue dialo gue and several o fficial meetings at different levels to o k place they co uld o nly end inres tating kno wn po s itio ns China did no t make things eas ier by later cancelling such meetings depriving bo th s ides o f po ss ibleo ppo rtunities to find a breakthro ugh The s tart o f Chinese sanctio ns acro ss the who le gambit o f bilateral relatio ns deprived theJapanese o f even mo re do mes tic wriggle ro o m fo r a co mpro mise

It seems that the abo ve circumstances did no t allo w Japan`s central decis io n-makers co ncerned with the is sue in particular the

Prime Minis ter and his immediate circle to admit to ando r unders tand until the purchase anno uncement o n 11 September 2012ho w s tro ngly the Chinese felt abo ut it Ambassado r Niwa`s rather undiplo matic s tatements in the Financial Times interview seem toindicate that he felt that the central decis io n-makers did no t unders tand the s trength o f the feelings o f the Chinese and ho w far theymight go Niwa warned in his interview that even a po ss ible pre-purchase survey o f the is lands co uld be diplo matically incendiary

s ince such a survey was dis cussed already at the time to enable the TMG to go ahead with the purchase18 7 As late as the 3September the Yomiuri Shimbun repo rted that the Chinese go vernment was reacting calmly as lo ng as three co nditio ns wereo bserved to maintain the status quo The co nditio ns co ntained no o ppo s itio n to a po ss ible purchase and ins tead jus t mentio ned

abs tentio n fro m landing surveying and building facilities o n the is lands 18 8 Acco rding to Pro fesso r Takahara Akio General ZhuChenghu said o n 5 September that a purchase by the central go vernment wo uld be better and Qu Xing directo r o f the China Ins titute

o f Internatio nal Affairs is said to have expressed a s imilar o pinio n18 9 Even o n 12 September when the s to rm bro ke the deputydirecto r o f the Japan Ins titute o f the Chinese Academy o f So cial Science Gao Ho ng s tated in an interview with the o n-line vers io no f the Renmin Ribao that if Japan wo uld respect the three abs tentio ns mentio ned abo ve the s ituatio n co uld ultimately revert to the

status quo ante19 0 But these were no lo nger the decis ive vo ices o f the Chinese leadership after the Beihaide meeting The abo ve-mentio ned Campbell interview seems to sugges t that Japan was lo ng befo re mo re inclined to act upo n Chinese s tatements whichwere clo ser to what it wanted to unders tand

CHINESE REACTION RHETORICAL WARFARE

The final misco mmunicatio n o r clash o f irreco ncilable interes ts o ccurred when Prime Minis ter No da met Pres ident Hu o n thes idelines o f the As ia Pacific Eco no mic Co o peratio n (APEC) summit in Vladivo s to k o n 9 September then anno unced two days laterthe s igning o f the purchase co ntract with the Kurihara family Whether Hu had no t sufficiently co nveyed his s tro ng feelingsco ncerning the purchase which had been kno wn and bilaterally dis cussed at leas t s ince the Japanese o fficial anno uncement o f itspurchase intentio n o n 7 July o r No da had no t unders tanding the Chinese feeling fo r the po ss ible reaso ns dis cussed abo ve Hu

apparently felt he had lo s t face when Japan anno unced the purchase o n 11 September19 1 Mo reo ver the Japanese anno uncementco uld no t have co me at a mo re awkward time because o f the anniversary o f the Mukden Incident o n the 18 September which likeseveral o ther carefully cultivated anniversaries regarding Japan`s pas t misdeeds in China always aro use latent anti-Japanesefeelings As a result the Japanese anno uncement caused an avalanche o f virulent rheto rical o utburs ts relating to the pas t po liticalsanctio ns further measures to assert China`s territo rial claim (fo r example including the is lands in the Chinese TV weatherfo recas t an exhibitio n o f ancient maps to pro ve Chinese co ntro l) eco no mic sanctio ns and an escalatio n o f patro ls by ChineseFLEC and MSA ships and aircraft aro und the Senkaku Is lands

The mildes t part o f China`s rheto rical o ffens ive was calling the go vernment purchase a `farce` a rather undiplo matic express io nalready used by Xinhua in July 2012 but then taken up at the highes t level by Vice Pres ident Xi Jinping when meeting Secretary o f

Defence Leo n Panetta o n 19 September19 2 But the main line fro m no w o n was that Japan`s claim to the Senkaku Is lands was adenial o f the po s t-Wo rld War II results In its s tatements and rebuttals the Chinese sho wed their frus tratio n at no t having been ableto fundamentally change the status quo and they did no t hes itate to use express io ns which were rather undignified fo r diplo mats andpo litical leaders Japan o n the o ther hand argued fo r peaceful reso lutio n alo ng the lines o f internatio nal law and dialo gue whichpro bably infuriated the Chinese even mo re On 10 September the CMFA is sued a s tatement calling Japans po s itio n o n the disputedis lands `an o utright denial o f the o utco mes o f the victo ry o f the Wo rld Anti-Fascis t War and hellip a grave challenge to the po s t-war

internatio nal o rder`19 3 In a heated exchange at the UN General Assembly between Chinas UN ambassado r Li Bao do ng and JapansDeputy UN ambassado r Ko dama Kazuo Li called the mo tive fo r purchas ing the three is lands to lsquolegalize its s tealing and o ccupatio no f Chinese territo ryrsquo and s tated lsquoThis actio n o f Japan co ns titutes a serio us encro achment upo n Chinas so vereignty and intends toco ntinue and legalize the result o f Japans co lo nial po licy It is an o pen denial o f the o utco mes o f victo ry o f the wo rld anti-fascis twar and a grave challenge to the po s t-war internatio nal o rder and the purpo ses and principles o f the Charter o f the United

Natio ns rsquo19 4 In a further rebuttal o f Japan`s assertio n o f its claim Li characterized the is land purchase as lsquono thing different fro m

mo ney launderingrsquo19 5 At the As ia Euro pe Meeting (ASEM) in Lao s Fo reign Minis ter Yang Jiechi repeated the reference to the`o utco me o f the anti-Fascis t war` while Prime Minis ter No da spo ke o f peaceful reso lutio n o f co nflicts acco rding to internatio nal

law19 6 On 11 Octo ber the CMFA spo kesperso n Ho ng Lei refuted Fo reign Minis ter Gembarsquos his to rical acco unt jus tifying Japan`s

claim by calling it `gangs ter lo gic`19 7

On the Chinese s ide therefo re there are no w two clo sely-linked his to ry narratives o ne is abo ut the is lands having been part o fChina s ince the Ming and Qing dynas ties the o ther co nnects the is lands to the already well-rehearsed his to ry narrative ie Japanhaving victimised China s ince the Sino -Japanese war o f 1894-95 These two narratives co ntinue to be cultivated by the Chineseleadership In Octo ber 2012 the Chinese anno uncement o f the publicatio n o f 80 vo lumes o n the Far Eas t War Criminal Co urt was

clearly meant to link the latter narrative to Japan`s acquis itio n o f the Senkaku Is lands 19 8 Fo rmer Fo reign Minis ter Gemba explicitlytried in Octo ber 2012 to delink the territo rial is sue fro m Japan`s aggress io n agains t China o nly to be reminded by the Chineseambassado r to the UK in an article in the Financial Times (as part o f the ensuing wo rldwide press campaign by bo th s ides ) that lsquothe

Diao yu Dao is sue is all abo ut his to ryrsquo19 9 Since then until no w China has co ntinued this ldquohis to ry warfarerdquo by publishing endlessarticles o n Japan`s aggress io n agains t China befo re 1945 The mo s t recent mo ve in July 2014 is the serialised o n-line publicatio n o f

the hand-written co nfess io ns by 45 Japanese co nvicted war criminals by the State Archives Adminis tratio n20 0

POLITICAL SANCTIONS AND PUBLIC OPINION

Chinese po litical co untermeasures ranged fro m the cancellatio n o f o fficial and uno fficial vis its to further legal acts to reinfo rce

China`s claim to the Senkaku Is lands Aro und 40 per cent o f ceremo nial events in Japan to mark 2012 as the 40 th anniversary o f the

no rmalizatio n o f diplo matic relatio ns with China were cancelled o r po s tpo ned and even mo re events in China20 1 Thesecancellatio ns were no t always the result o f direct go vernment interventio n but so metimes mo re indirect o fficial `dis co uragement`helped by the Chinese preference fo r no t being seen to do so mething in co ntradictio n to the (initially fo mented and later self-pro pelling) anti-Japan atmo sphere o r by fear o f participants running into demo ns tratio ns if no t assaults The legal s crews werefurther turned with lo ng-term implicatio ns On 10 September the Chinese go vernment anno unced the base po ints and baselines o f

the territo rial waters o f the disputed is lands and their affiliated is lets as well as the names and co o rdinates o f 17 base po ints 20 2

On 16 September repo rts appeared that China was submitting pro po sals fo r its extended co ntinental shelf to the UN Co ntinental

Shelf Co mmiss io n which included the Senkaku Is lands but in fact the actual submiss io n o ccurred o nly o n 14 December 201220 3 On

20 September a go vernment agency published a thematic map o f the Diao yu Is land and its affiliated is lands 20 4 Chinarsquos

Meteo ro lo gical Adminis tratio n s tarted pro viding weather fo recas ts fo r the Senkaku area o n the s tate-run TV s tatio n20 5 On 16September the fishery bureau anno unced the lifting o f the fishery ban in the Eas t China Sea and s tressed that China planned to

s trengthen its so vereignty claim o ver the Senkakus 20 6

There were rumo urs that 1000 fishing vessels wo uld co me to the Senkaku area and tho ugh this did no t materialize it helped to

further raise tens io ns 20 7

Mo st attentio n in Japan was fo cused o n the widening s treet pro tes ts in o ver 100 Chinese cities the des tructio n o f Japanese sho ps

res taurants cars and pro ductio n facilities and the attacks o n Japanese citizens in China20 8 The webs ites o f at leas t 19 Japanese

banks univers ities and o ther ins titutio ns came under cyber-attack20 9 At a demo ns tratio n in Shanghai abo ut 7000 pro tes ters

chanted s lo gans such as lsquoBeat Japanese imperialismrsquo lsquoBo yco tt Japanese pro ducts rsquo and lsquoDes tro y Japan and retrieve Okinawarsquo210

Altho ugh o nly 63 per cent o f po lled Japanese in late September 2012 expressed suppo rt fo r their go vernment`s natio nalizatio n o fthe is lands do wn fro m 73 per cent in a previo us po ll o n 15 and 16 September 82 per cent o f respo ndents in a Mainichi Shimbun

survey said the Japanese go vernment had no t pro tes ted s tro ngly eno ugh to Beijing o ver anti-Japan pro tes ts 211 The Chinesego vernment denied any o fficial invo lvement and the spo kesperso n o f the Waijiao bu went o nly as far as saying that the pro tes ts anddemo ns tratio ns were `co mpletely caused by the Japanese go vernments illegal purchase o f the Diao yu Is lands and are peo ples

spo ntaneo us acts`212 There were ho wever repo rts that so me o f the demo ns tratio ns were to lerated if no t abetted by go vernment

agencies 213 The demo ns tratio ns so o n died do wn because to lerating them much lo nger wo uld have run the risk that they wo uld turninto anti-go vernment demo ns tratio ns Even the Chinese Academy o f So cial Sciences repo rted that so me demo ns trato rs who were

arres ted did no t even kno w where the Senkaku Is lands were and that anger o ver the widening wealth gap was behind their acts 214 Inco ntras t to these Chinese demo ns tratio ns and acts o f lawlessness there was hardly any public demo ns tratio n in Japan whichsho ws the relative detachment o f the Japanese fro m the dispute On 22 September `Nippo n Gambare` a right wing o rganizatio nchaired by fo rmer Air Self Defence Fo rce chief Tamo gami To shio s taged a march thro ugh parts o f To kyo which this autho rwitnessed A brief fire was s tarted at a Chinese scho o l in Ko be and two smo ke bo mbs were thro wn into the Chinese Co nsulate

General in Fukuo ka215 But such actio ns were relatively rare and small in s cale

ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND THE QUESTION OF WHO IS MORE DEPENDENT ON WHOM

Pro tes t measures o f a lo nger duratio n and as yet unpredictable co nsequences fo r the bilateral relatio nship have been China`seco no mic sanctio ns and a bo yco tt o f Japanese go o ds by the general public altho ugh the autho rities denied again any go vernmentinterventio n A co mmentary o f Xinhua half admitted ho wever go vernment interventio n when it made the unco nvincing dis tinctio nbetween `measures` and `sanctio ns` `Since Japan purchased Chinas Diao yu Is lands in September the Chinese go vernment hastaken a series o f co untermeasures in the eco no mic legal diplo matic and military fields which have helped it to wres t the initiativeto reso lve the is lands dispute despite China no t impo s ing any eco no mic sanctio ns the Japanese eco no my has been badly

hit`216 Renmin Ribao co mpared `eco no mic punishments` with a `gun` and warned that thro ugh its is land purchase Japan hadalready to uched the `trigger` In a rather heavy hint the paper po inted o ut ho w vulnerable Japan`s eco no my was because o f the

2011 earthquake and the dependence o f key eco no mic secto rs o n China217 Even mo re o fficial was Vice Minis ter o f Co mmerce Jiang

Zengwei`s warning that the is land purchase wo uld inevitably have a negative impact o n Sino -Japanese eco no mic and trade ties 218

After 11 September it so o n became very o bvio us that the heavy hand o f the Chinese go vernment was impo s ing sanctio ns andmaking life fo r Japanese bus iness mo re diff icult On 21 September it was repo rted that Chinese cus to ms autho rities were

s trengthening inspectio ns o f impo rts fro m and expo rts to Japan altho ugh the Chinese autho rities denied this 219 In the same week

repo rts appeared abo ut Japanese co mpanies experiencing delays in o btaining wo rking visas fo r their Japanese emplo yees 220 BigJapanese co mpanies with inves tments in China were experiencing ho ld-ups in gaining regulato ry appro vals fo r Merger amp

Acquis itio ns 221 In co ntras t to the interference in rare earth expo rts to Japan after the trawler incident in 2010 ho wever no such

embargo was implemented because this particular eco no mic weapo n had lo s t its effectiveness s ince then (see belo w)222

The greates t medium-term damage to Japanese eco no mic activities apart fro m the abo ve mentio ned des tructio n o f Japaneseco mmercial and indus trial s ites was caused by a partial co nsumer bo yco tt no tably the fall o f car sales in China and Chineseto urism to Japan Overall bilateral trade decreased by 39 per cent in 2012 to $329 billio n the firs t dro p s ince the co llapse o f theLehman inves tment bank in 2009 and in 2013 to $3125 billio n acco rding to Chinese figures Acco rding to Japanese figures trade in

2013 increased but declined in vo lume223

The wo rs t hit secto r was auto mo biles To yo ta so ld 840 500 vehicles in China in 2012 the firs t annual dro p s ince 2002 Nis san

experienced a 24 per cent dro p in December China sales and Ho nda saw a 19 per cent December fall224 Ho wever as o f 2014Japanese car sales in and to China have again been increas ing The to uris t indus try was also hard hit in bo th co untries Chinese

vis ito rs to Japan decreased by 44 per cent fro m September to December 2012 fro m the year befo re225 The number o f Japanese

to uris ts o n gro up to urs to China plunged by mo re than 70 per cent year-o n-year in the las t three mo nths o f 2012226 This fallco ntinued into 2013 when their number fell to 29 millio n Japanese to uris ts do wn 18 2 fro m 2012 and the 3rd s traight annual

decline227 Ho wever in March 2014 vis ito rs fro m mainland China surged 80 1 fro m the previo us March to to tal 184200 a reco rdhigh fo r the mo nth and a s teeper year-o n-year rise than vis ito rs fro m any o ther co untries and regio ns This was also helped by the

falling yen and the resumptio n o f cruise to urs with large ships which were to tally suspended in March 2012228

Ano ther mo re lo ng-term negative eco no mic effect o n the bilateral relatio nship can be gauged fro m falling Japanese FDI to Chinawhich acco rding to Chinese figures declined by 422 in the firs t five mo nths o f 2014 after having fallen by 43 to $71 billio n in

2013 acco rding to Chinese figures o r by 18 to $10 9 billio n acco rding to Japanese figures 229

China`s multiple eco no mic retributio ns cas t do ubt o n the co ntinued viability o f the earlier `Ho t Eco no mics and Co ld Po litics`dicho to my The answer to the ques tio n which co untry is mo re dependent o n the o ther o r mo re vulnerable to sanctio ns is dependento n the eco no mic indicato rs and secto rs being cho sen and is also a po litical ques tio n because the answer can be po liticallymanipulated Japan`s eco no mic diff iculties s ince the 1990s (and its dependence o n eco no mic interactio n with China to co pe withthese diff iculties ) and China pushing Japan to No 3 in wo rld GDP ranking has diminished the Chinese perceptio n o f Japan as aneco no mic po wer ho use It means that fo r China the relatio nship with Japan became less impo rtant while po litical relatio nsdeterio rated at the same time The s tro ng effect o f the Chinese embargo o n rare earth expo rts to Japan in 2010 can be viewed intwo diametrically o ppo sed ways Chinese o bservers may be inclined to put emphas is o n the s tro ng effect it had o n Japanese publico pinio n and indus trial circles co ntributing to a certain extent to the go vernment`s surrender o f the trawler captain Others maypo int o ut that the case demo ns trated the futility o f abus ing a do minant supplier po s itio n because within a sho rt time Japan`sindus try secured alternative reso urces and demand reductio n thro ugh recycling and pro duct re-engineering no t o nly pro videdeno ugh breathing space but in the end reduced China`s market po wer Still Chinese experts are co nvinced that Japan is no w mo redependent o n China than the o ther way ro und Acco rding to so me specialis ts Chinas impo rts acco unted in 2011fo r 237 per cent o fJapan`s expo rt vo lume The bilateral trade vo lume in 2011 to o k up 21 per cent o f Japanese gro ss trade vo lume o f that year while it

merely acco unted fo r 9 4 per cent o f Chinas annual gro ss trade vo lume230 There seem to be o nly few Chinese vo ices which expressco ncern o ver the negative impact o f China`s sanctio ns o n China`s eco no my itself no tably at a time o f wo rldwide eco no mic

co ntractio n231

The Chinese market is certainly to o impo rtant fo r many Japanese co mpanies to leave A survey in No vember 2012 to which mo rethan 10 000 Japanese co mpanies in China replied sho wed that fo r almo s t 30 per cent o f them the territo rial dispute had affected

their bus iness but s till mo re than half want to maintain their o peratio ns and o nly 16 per cent said that they wanted to either cut

back o r pull o ut232 Japanese co mpanies in certain secto rs are likely to beco me mo re reluctant to make inves tments in China all themo re as o ther So utheas t As ian co untries (no tably Myanmar is currently the New Fro ntier fo r Japanese bus iness ) have cheaper

labo ur co s ts 233 Ho wever Chinese co nsumers s till prefer Japanese pro ducts fo r safer fo o d drinks and daily necess ities and tho se

Japanese co mpanies were hardly affected by the bo yco tt234

A wide gap between bo th s ides` perceptio n abo ut their eco no mic dependence and vulnerability to sanctio ns is dangero us fo r themanagement o f their bilateral relatio nship particularly when o ne s ide tries to leverage its suppo sedly s tro nger po s itio n to achievevicto ry in a sens itive area like territo rial integrity While Chinese co mmentato rs and experts may be inclined to o verrate Japan`svulnerability their Japanese co unterparts have a tendency to lo o k at the is sues to o much in purely eco no mic terms neglecting theimpact o f Chinese emo tio ns and go vernment pro paganda as well as the wider public`s insufficient kno wledge abo ut the o verall

impact o f bad eco no mic relatio ns with Japan o n China`s o wn eco no my235 The Japanese perceptio n remains that China in the endneeds Japan mo re than the o ther way ro und which in view o f China`s huge pro blems and its dependence o n Japanese hightechno lo gy co mpo nents fo r its manufacturing indus try is arguably the case This Japanese perceptio n has fo s tered the co nvictio nas demo ns trated fo r example by the belief in the sus tainability o f `Ho t Eco no mics and Co ld Po litics` that despite recurring

po litical crises in the relatio nship China wo uld in the end co mpro mise as it had do ne several times in the pas t236 Yet the pro blemwith the perceptio n o f `needing Japan` is that it can be po litically manipulated particularly in an autho ritarian sys tem This gapbetween Japanese and Chinese o bservers and experts o n the is sue o f dependence can serio us ly influence the willingness o f bo th

s ides to co mpro mise237 It also challenges the liberal view that clo se eco no mic relatio ns can prevent o r at leas t so ften deeppo litical differences like territo rial co nflicts which mo reo ver are linked to eco no mic interes ts like hydro carbo n reso urces In thisco ntext it is interes ting to no te that China has recently been exchanging with Japan a number o f high-po wered bus iness delegatio ns(apart fro m exchanges with po litical parties and lo cal go vernment o fficials ) The willingness o f Japanese bus iness to take part maybe interpreted by China as an express io n o f Japan`s eco no mic dependence o n China while giving it also the o ppo rtunity to putpressure o n the Abe go vernment to make co ncess io ns and to keep links with Japan fo r the po s t-Abe era

In view o f the impo rtance o f the eco no mic relatio nship and the damage suffered by Japanese bus iness after September 2012 o newo uld have expected mo re pressure fro m the bus iness co mmunity to co me to a territo rial co mpro mise so lutio n and so impro verelatio ns Ho wever this has no t been the case and may have to do with the perceptio n gap dis cussed abo ve but also the relativelack o f influence o n the go vernment (the majo rity o f the China-relevant Japanese bus iness co mmunity co ns is ts o f small- andmedium-s ized co mpanies ) the fear that a mo re vo cal ro le wo uld get co mpanies into tro uble with the autho rities in Japan ando rChina o r the ho pe o f being able to weather the po litical s to rms either because o f alternative market o ppo rtunities o r theco mpany`s s ize

FROM POLICING TO MILITARY INVOLVEMENT

The mo s t serio us co nsequences fo r the bilateral relatio nship ndash let alo ne fo r the so lutio n o f the territo rial dispute and regio nalpeace ndash arise fro m the co ns tant intrus io ns o f Chinese o fficial vessels into the Co ntiguo us Zo ne (CZ) o r even Territo rial Waters(TW) o f the Senkaku Is lands s ince September 2012 and the gro wing invo lvement o f the armed fo rces o f bo th s ides The aim o f theChinese is o bvio us to demo ns trate that the Japanese can no lo nger claim exclus ive co ntro l o f the is lands and to fo rce To kyo toadmit the exis tence o f a territo rial dispute Apparently a task fo rce at the highes t level headed by Xi Jinping was set up in

September 2012 to achieve this go al thro ugh escalating pressure238 So far law enfo rcement actio ns by Japan in the Senkaku areahave been limited to the deplo yment o f the Japanese Co as t Guard and po lice which is no w ho wever co ns tantly challenged byChinese with patro ls by CMS and FLEC (s ince 22 July 2013 unified under the State Ocean Adminis tratio n and renamed China Co as tGuard CG) vessels asserting the same rights in the is lands` CZ and TW The Chinese s ide escalated its pressure o n Japan by firs tdeplo ying FLEC vessels in the CZ and TW o f the disputed is lands then ratcheting up their pressure with CMS vessels do ing the samefo llo wed later in December 2012 with air patro ls by CMS aircraft which led to the deplo yment o f the air fo rce o f bo th s ides inJanuary 2013

As we have seen after the September 2010 incident in No vember 2010 FLEC s tarted to regularly send its vessels to the Senkakuarea which entered fro m time to time the is lands` CZ and also in Augus t 2011 twice the TW Apparently the mo re serio usintrus io ns which are tho se into the TW were so metimes timed with specific spikes o f tens io ns such as the TW incurs io n o n 16March 2012 (the Japanese naming o f so me is lands) July 2012 (No da`s anno uncement o f purchase intentio n o n 7 July) and finallyo n 19 September when s ix vessels entered the TW s tarting a series o f mo re frequent and regular incurs io ns In December 2012

FLEC deplo yed its newes t and bigges t ship the 5800-to n FLEC vessel Yuzheng 206 a fo rmer ship o f the Chinese navy239

The entries o f the vessels o f the CMS into the is lands` CZ and TW seem meant to send an even higher degree o f warning and denialo f Japan`s co ntro l o ver the is lands On 17 September the number o f FLEC and CMS vessels in the CZ and TW had reached the reco rd

o f 17240 Thereafter the frequency o f incurs io ns into the CZ and TW increased but it decreased after March 2013 On 30 Octo berXinhua even repo rted that the CMS had `expelled a number o f Japanese vessels illegally sailing in waters aro und the Diao yu

Is lands` altho ugh it is no t clear what exactly this meant s ince the CG did no t co nfirm such an incident241 Acco rding to Xinhua NewsAgency in 2013 China sent 50 ldquopatro l miss io ns rdquo into the TW o f the disputed is lands and as o f 12 July 2014 by the autho r`s co unt

there had been 17 such Chinese ldquopatro l miss io ns rdquo in 2014 which are ldquoincurs io ns rdquo fo r the Japanese s ide242 Other needle pricks todemo ns trate China`s claims are the o ccas io nal incurs io ns o f Chinese survey ships into the Senkaku Is lands` EEZ o r the bo ardingo f Chinese fishing vessels in the EEZ Defence Minis ter Itsuno ri Ono dera in late Octo ber 2013 called these repeated incurs io ns a

threat to peace which fell in a ldquogray zo ne (between) peacetime and an emergency s ituatio nrdquo243

A new level o f depriving Japan o f the ability to claim so le effective co ntro l o ver the is lands was reached o n 13 December 2012 when

a small turbo pro p aircraft o f the CMS (Harbin Y12 type) flew o ver Uo tsurijima244 Since then regular CMS air patro ls have beenco nducted but the aircraft no rmally s tay abo ut 120 km fro m the is lands With this mo ve Chinese measures to undermine Japan`sco ntro l o ver the is lands were expanded to the air space which fo r o rganizatio nal reaso ns had immediately military implicatio nsbecause the Air Self Defense Fo rce (ASDF) is respo ns ible fo r intercepting aircraft which intrude illegally into Japan`s air space The

incident did no t happen o ut o f the blue because already in January 2012 the SOA had anno unced a plan to deplo y the Y12 in 2012245

On 24 September the SOA had also anno unced plans to deplo y dro nes by 2015 fo llo wing the success ful tes t the previo us day 246

The Chinese acts are apparently carefully planned and co o rdinated s ince the o fficials in the abo ve Kyo do repo rt also said that theairspace vio latio ns o n 13 December 2012 by an airplane o f the CMS was planned by the s taff sectio n o f the natio nal Land and SeaBo rder Defense Co mmittee which acts as a liaiso n o ffice fo r the Chinese military the State Oceanic Adminis tratio n and the fishing

bureau o f the Agriculture Minis try with the aim o f rais ing tens io ns 247

The lo w altitude flight o f the Y12 o n 13 December was particularly upsetting fo r the Japanese go vernment because it was no t pickedup by the ASDF radar (the clo ses t o ne being o n Miyako jima abo ut 200 km fro m the is lands) but ins tead by CG ships in the area Inthis case eight ASDF fighters s crambled but co uld no t detect the Y12 Interceptio n o f aircraft is by nature much mo re diff icult andcarries a certain risk o f accident as happened in 2001 when a US intelligence aircraft co llided with a Chinese intercepto r jet Witho ut

explaining the s tandard Japanese pro ceedures fo r aerial defence which so lely relies o n the ASDF the Chinese media interpreted theuse o f military aircraft by Japan as `aggress ive` and the Global Times cautio ned agains t any interceptio n warning that China might

respo nd by sending its air fo rce248 On the Japanese s ide even the centre-left Asahi Shimbun called the Y12 flight ` a highly

pro vo cative act that co uld lead to an armed co nflict between the two co untries`249 At the beginning o f January 2013 there wereapparently erro neo us repo rts that the ASDF might co ns ider firing warning sho ts (tracer bullets ) at intruding Chinese aircraft which

pro mpted further bellico se co mments in the Chinese press 250 As a co nsequence the Chinese air fo rce also became invo lved o n10 January when the Chinese Minis try o f Defence anno unced that the Peo ple`s Liberatio n Army Air Fo rce (PLAA) had sent two fighterjets agains t two ASDF F-15 intercepto rs because they were fo llo wing a Chinese military Y8 transpo rt aircraft patro lling the airspace

o f Chinese o il platfo rms in the Eas t China Sea251 The Japanese repo rted that mo re than ten Chinese aircraft including military

aircraft had appro ached the Japanese air defence identificatio n zo ne252 In a further escalatio n the Japanese s ide repo rted that o n11 June 2014 two Chinese military jets flew abno rmally clo se to two planes o f Japans Self Defence Fo rce abo ve the Eas t China Sea

an accusatio n which the Chinese s ide refuted speaking ins tead o f two incidents pro vo ked by Japanese fighters 253 Related to thisdevelo pment and further enhancing the po ss ibility o f an incident is the enhanced patro lling o f the PLAA o ver the Eas t China Seawhich caused the ASDF to increase scrambling agains t PLAA aircraft to 415 times between 1 April 2013 and 31 March 2014 (Fis cal

Year 2013) 109 times mo re than in the previo us Fis cal Year 2012254

Co ntinuing to increase the pressure o n Japan the Chinese go vernment decreed o n 23 No vember 2013 an Air Defence Identificatio nZo ne (ADIZ) which includes the airspace o ver the Senkaku Is lands and was certainly meant to reinfo rce China`s territo rial claimdespite the fact that an ADIZ has no territo rial implicatio ns in internatio nal law The threat o f military co untermeasures in the text o fthe decree (lsquoChinas armed fo rces will ado pt defens ive emergency measures to respo nd to aircraft that do no t co o perate in the

identificatio n o r refuse to fo llo w the ins tructio ns rsquo) has further heightened the po ss ibility o f a military clash255 Ho wever theJapanese s ide refuses to accept the ADIZ The Chinese mo ves have wider implicatio ns fo r peace and s tability in the regio n in o rderto pro tect the freedo m o f its military aircraft in Eas t As ian airspace and its ability to o bserve China`s military fo rces Washingto nrefused to reco gnise the zo ne co ntinued to igno re the requirements o f the ADIZ by pursuing its regular patro l f lights and criticisedits implementatio n Simultaneo us ly ho wever the Department o f State advised civilian airlines to fo llo w China`s ins tructio ns andVice Pres ident Biden advised bo th co untries o n his trip to No rtheas t As ia in December 2013 to es tablish a cris is managements tructure Since the US do es no t take a s tance o n the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands` so vereignty Washingto n seemed to igno re Japan`smain grievance abo ut the ADIZ which is China`s intentio n to further reinfo rce its so vereignty claim by extending the ADIZ o ver theis lands The mo s t far-reaching US s tatements were a reco nfirmatio n o f the applicatio n o f the security treaty to the is lands evenmentio ning the is lands by their Japanese and Chinese names and co mplaining that the Chinese actio n was an attempt to unilaterally

change the status quo in the Eas t China Sea which raised regio nal tens io n and increased the risk o f accident and miscalculatio n256

Ho wever in this way the Obama Adminis tratio n risked creating amo ng so me Japanese o bservers do ubts abo ut the Adminis tratio n`sreliability and so gave succo ur to China`s attempt to drive a wedge between the two allies Ano ther co mplicatio n is that the ChineseADIZ o verlaps that o f Ko rea and mo reo ver co vers the submerged ro ck called Ieo do in Ko rean and Suyan in Chinese which has animpact o n the no t yet demarcated EEZ bo rder between bo th co untries Interes tingly the Japanese ADIZ also co vers Ieo do but thishas never been underpinned by any Japanese EEZ claims But China kno ws ho w to play o n So uth Ko rea`s criticism o f Japan`sattitude to wards the his to ry is sue and the territo rial dispute with Japan o ver Do kto Takeshima is land Mo reo ver the As ian co untriesco ntes ting China`s claims to parts o f the So uth China Sea are co ncerned that China wo uld further co mplicate the territo rialdisputes in the area by es tablishing an ADIZ Yet the ASEAN member s tates have been very cautio us in directly criticis ing ChinaChina`s es tablishment o f the ADIZ directly affects many co untries because so many o f them have airlines flying thro ugh the zo neHo wever with the exceptio n o f Japan all o thers agred to co nfo rm with China`s reques t fo r no tif icatio n which undermines theJapanese go vernment`s po s itio n o f explicitly advis ing Japanese airlines no t to co nfo rm

With these escalating develo pments the Chinese s ide achieved its go al o f sho wing that the Japanese autho rities are no lo nger infull co ntro l o f the disputed is lands In the case o f Chinese Co as tguard vessel intrus io ns the reactio n o f the Japanese CG is limitedto shado wing the Chinese vessels to info rm them that they are vio lating Japan`s CZ o r TW and to ask them to leave whichho wever they do at their o wn dis cretio n (the time span ho vering in the CZ o r TW having beco me a further means o f Chinesepressure) fo llo wed by diplo matic pro tes ts Otherwise the CG has avo ided any phys ical co nfro ntatio n o r co ntact When co nfro ntedby the CG the Chinese vessels s imply declare (by radio o r even electro nic displays ) that they are patro lling Chinese waters and thatthe CG ships were o perating illegally in these waters This ritual has so far prevented vio lence This is in co ntras t to an exchange o fwater canno n salvo s between the CG and the Taiwanese co as t guard in the territo rial o f the Senkaku Is lands o n 25 September 2012

and again o n 24 January 2013257

The increase o f patro ls by Japan and China is caus ing o peratio nal s train fo r bo th s ides (also rais ing the risk o f miscalculatio ns o ro verreactio ns ) but this has no t reduced the willingness o f either go vernment to s cale do wn the almo s t daily demo ns tratio ns o f

`effective co ntro l` In Octo ber it was repo rted that the CG no w always maintains ten vessels agains t eight fro m China258 The 11th

regio nal headquarters respo ns ible fo r the Senkaku area is in Naha and has nine patro l ships (but o nly seven vessels o f at leas t

1000 to ns ) but no w needs additio nal ships which are dispatched fro m o ther regio nal headquarters 259 In April 2012 the CG had ato tal o f 357 patro l vessels but o nly 51 o ver 1000 to ns which are tho se mo s t needed fo r a far flung area like the Senkaku

Is lands 26 0 On 14 September 2012 Senio r Vice Minis ter o f Fisheries Iwamo to Tsukasa mentio ned plans to increase the number o f

fishery patro l vessels to ensure fishermens safety amid intens ifying territo rial disputes with China and So uth Ko rea26 1 On 26Octo ber the Minis try o f Land Infras tructure Transpo rt and To urism which heads the CG anno unced plans to increase budgetary

reques ts fo r mo re ships 26 2 The Abe go vernment plans to build mo re vessels o r advance the calendar retro fit vessels which were to

be retired and is co ns idering extending the retirement age o f the o fficers 26 3

The Chinese have fewer vessels which can be deplo yed as far as the Senkaku Is lands In additio n leave o f the sailo rs has been

res tricted and their deplo yment length at sea has increased26 4 In March 2013 the Chinese s ide anno unced clo ser co o peratio nbetween the military and vario us maritime law enfo rcement agencies as well as the merger o f fo ur maritime law enfo rcementagencies under the State Ocean Adminis tratio n (adminis tered by the Minis try o f Land and Reso urces ) ie the China MarineSurveillance the co as t guard fo rces o f the Public Security Minis try the fisheries law enfo rcement co mmand o f the Agriculture

Minis try and the maritime anti-smuggling po lice o f the General Adminis tratio n o f Cus to ms 26 5

Ano ther wo rrying develo pment is the gradual invo lvement o f the PLA navy (PLAN) and the Maritime Self Defence Fo rce (MSDF) TheJapanese MOD anno unced o n 16 Octo ber 2012 that fo r the firs t time PLAN ships were o bserved navigating in the 22-km-wide CZbetween Yo naguni and Irio mo te is lands altho ugh the minis try left o pen the po ss ibility that they did so in o rder to avo id a typho o n

Nevertheless the Gaimusho so ught explanatio ns fro m the Chinese abo ut these ship mo vements 26 6 In December 2012 fo ur PLANships sailed thro ugh the CW o f the Irio mo te-Yo naguni is lands o n the way back fro m drills in the Pacific after having go ne into the

Pacific thro ugh the mo re no rmal ro ute o f the s trait between the Okinawan main is land and Miyako jima26 7 Again there was no thingillegal abo ut it but it raised attentio n at a time o f tens io ns Ho wever there are s igns o f greater co o peratio n o f the PLAN withChinese Co as t Guard vessels as was sho wn in the s tando ff between China and the Philippines aro und the disputed Scarbo ro ugh

Sho al in the So uth China Sea and jo int exercises to o k place between the three in the Eas t China Sea in Octo ber 201226 8 The

patro lling activities o f the MSDF in the Senkaku area became kno wn when the Japanese repo rted at the end o f January 2013 that o n19 January a Chinese frigatersquos target radar had lo cked o nto an MSDF helico pter and o n 30 January ano ther frigate sailing clo se to

an MSDF des tro yer did likewise The Chinese vehemently denied it26 9 Ho wever in March this year the Kyo do news agency repo rtedthat senio r Chinese military o fficials had admitted the incident o f 29 January Even mo re wo rriso me is that the Chinese vessels

acted apparently witho ut prio r appro val fro m the fleet co mmand o r navy headquarters All this was denied by the Chinese s ide270 Itdid no t help that under Prime Minis ter No da the MSDF had been o rdered after the eruptio n o f the 2012 cris is to keep a greaterdis tance fro m PLAN ships than the hitherto 3 km in o rder avo id incidents but this po licy was reversed by the mo re hawkish Abe

adminis tratio n to the previo us 3 km dis tance271 The fire radar lo cking incident had happened at a dis tance o f 3 km

Agains t the backgro und o f greater invo lvement o f military fo rces it is particularly regrettable that a plan to build a maritime liaiso n

mechanism between their defense autho rities o n which they had agreed in June 2012 to make later that year was shelved272

Unfo rtunately it is s till Chinese practice to co ns ider Co nfidence Building Measures (CBM) no t as the firs t s tep to build co nfidencebut as a to o l to extract fro m the o ther s ide prio r co ncess io ns under the pretext o f `creating a better atmo sphere` fo r dis cuss ingCBM The o utbreak o f the September 2012 cris is was therefo re a co nvenient pretext fo r the Chinese to cancel the pro ject Thelates t co nfirmatio n was in March 2013 when General Yin Zhuo explained that there co uld be no military trus t if the po litical and

diplo matic relatio nship is bad273 Since the target radar lo ck-o n incidents the Japanese go vernment is publicly calling fo rresumptio n o f nego tiatio ns fo r the maritime liaiso n mechanism but the Chinese will certainly want to extract so me co ncess io nsbefo re even co ns idering a po s itive respo nse

Ho wever the co ns tant co nfro ntatio n between the po licing and military fo rces o f bo th s ides co uld eas ily lead to a military clasheither as a result o f an unfo reseen civilian o r military incident miscalculatio n o r malicio us intentio n at a lo wer level o f co mmandTwo recent examples o f unfo reseen civilian incidents co uld have escalated One is the attempted landing o n o ne o f the disputedis lands by a Chinese pro tes ter with a ballo o n in January 2014 This incident was peacefully reso lved because Japan did no t arres t theballo o nis t In this case the firs t repo rt o n the crash-landing in the territo rial waters o f Uo tsurijima came fro m the Taiwanese co as tguard which info rmed the Japanese co as t guard fo llo wed by the hand-o ver o f the ballo o nis t to the PRC autho rities o uts ide o f

Japan`s territo rial waters 274 The o ther incident was the s inking o f a Chinese fishing bo at ldquoto the no rth o f the Diao yu Is landsrdquo and

the mo ve o f two Chinese naval () vessels to rescue the crew275 This autho r co uld no t find o ut ho w clo se the fishing bo at came tothe is lands and apparently there has no t been any further repo rting abo ut the incident

The previo us ly mentio ned radar-targeting incidents and these two civilian incidents have no t led to an escalatio n but there is noguarantee fo r the future Shi Yinho ng a pro fesso r at Renmin Univers ity predicts that the territo rial co nflicts in the ECS So uth ChinaSea and alo ng the Sino -Indian bo rder will intens ify because o f po pular natio nalism dynamics within the armed fo rces and o f co urse

also o ur to p leaders perso nal beliefs and s trategic perso nalities 276 Hugh White argues that a war (which co uld lead to a nuclearexchange between China and the US) co uld also begin because the Chinese leadership may co ns ider that s tarting ho s tilities no wrather than later wo uld be mo re beneficial to either tes t US reso lve to defend Japan (which the Chinese leadership do ubts ) anddetermine the is sue o f Chinese supremacy in the As ian regio n which he co ns iders to be the real is sue rather than the is lands

themselves 277

IS THERE A WAY FORWARD

The current co nfro ntatio n is no t o nly co ntinuing but even escalating and do mes tic develo pments in bo th co untries are no t creatingan atmo sphere mo re co nducive to better management o f the cris is let alo ne finding a so lutio n Inactio n runs the risk o f a furtherescalatio n o r even a military clash while po s itive o ptio ns are beco ming fewer Meanwhile bo th co untries suffer fro m the eco no micfall-o ut and heightened tens io ns while the integratio n o f a ris ing China into a new s trategic enviro nment in As ia will beco me evenmo re fraught cas ting a shado w o n Japan`s clo se relatio nship with the US

The 2010 incident ended quickly with Japan`s release o f the captain One reaso n fo r this is certainly the fact that China`s demand in2010 was relatively clear and achievable (release o f the captain) if painful fo r Japan at a time o f a weak and inexperiencedgo vernment This time in September 2012 the cris is firs t hit a go vernment which reacted intrans igently because o f its previo usdefeat and o ther unfavo urable do mes tic circumstances and was then replaced by the mo re hawkish Abe go vernment The Abecabinet`s attitude to wards the pas t as exemplif ied by vario us s tatements by cabinet members and peo ple clo se to it the attempt torevise the Ko no s tatement reco gniz ing the fo rced war pro s titutio n (the military co mfo rt wo men) and Abe`s Yasukuni Shrine vis itall served China`s anti-Japan pro paganda wo rsened Japan-Ko rea relatio ns which China is cleverly explo iting and even angered theUS adminis tratio n Abe is seen as utiliz ing the tens io ns with China to win do mes tic and internatio nal suppo rt fo r Japan to have aldquono rmalrdquo natio nal defence po s ture The latter is welco me by the US adminis tratio n because it wo uld help with the US As ianrealignment and suppo rt its China po licy At the same time China`s actio ns cas t an o mino us shado w o n its intentio ns in the So uthChina Sea and Abe and mo re impo rtantly the US is suppo rting the claimants there agains t China

Under these bilateral multilateral and regio nal circumstances wo uld China be satis fied with go ing back to the `unders tanding abo utsetting as ide the dispute` in co njunctio n with Japan`s reco gnitio n o f the exis tence o f a territo rial dispute o r wo uld it demand areversal o f the purchase o f the three is lands Wo uld it demand the end o f Japanese CG patro ls aro und the is lands China`ss tandard demand no w that Japan `co rrect its mis takes` is rather ambiguo us because it co uld be interpreted as go ing back to theshelving unders tanding and the reco gnitio n o f the exis tence o f a dispute o r demanding a reversal o f the go vernment`s purchase o f

the is lands 278 The latter wo uld s imply be impo ss ible in legal and practical terms and o ne can o nly ho pe that the ambiguity is o nlyaimed at rais ing China`s nego tiatio n po s itio n ando r leaving eno ugh wiggle ro o m fo r nego tiatio ns which wo uld satis fy all Chineses takeho lders` interes ts

It seems that it is already to o late fo r go ing back to the shelving agreement o f 19721978 which wo uld imply that the two s ides canso meho w go back to the status quo o f the 1970s This as we have seen has been superseded by deeds and wo rds o n bo th s ides The Chinese have no w no t o nly publicly declared that the shelving agreement was lsquobro kenrsquo by Japan but after the firs t Y12 patro l o n13 December 2012 co mmented that ldquoThe s ituatio n has changed It has beco me no rmal fo r Chinas marine surveillance vessels to

enter the 12-nautical-mile zo ne Japans actual co ntro l o ver the is lands has go nerdquo279

The bilateral relatio nship has deterio rated to the extent that at leas t shelving the co nflicting so vereignty claims without o fficiallyadmitting that there is a territo rial dispute is no lo nger an o ptio n acceptable to China because it feels Japan has abused theshelving co nsensus thro ugh a series o f adminis trative measures with the final s traw having been the central go vernmentrsquos purchaseo f three is lands When s tudying the vario us Chinese o fficial s tatements and news repo rts after the 2012 cris is had fully erupted inSeptember it beco mes clear that until Octo ber 2012 the Chinese s till raised the demand that Japan sho uld go back to the previo uslsquounders tandingrsquo o r lsquoco nsensus rsquo but this demand was no t made o ften thereafter It reappeared in remarks by Wang Jiarui the head o fthe Co mmunis t partys Internatio nal Department when meeting Yamaguchi Natsuo the leader o f the junio r co alitio n partner

Ko meito in January 201328 0 Previo us ly a co mment o n the Xinhua internet s ite o n 29 Octo ber said that ldquoThe lsquopurchasersquo sho wed thatthe Japanese go vernment has who lly abando ned the attitude o f laying as ide disputes and has fundamentally changed the

s ituatio nrdquo28 1 On 30 Octo ber the CMOFA spo kesperso n declared that lsquoJapans illegal purchase o f the Diao yu Is lands bro ke the

impo rtant co nsensus The Japanese s ide sho uld no t have any mo re illus io n o f o ccupying the Diao yu Is lands What the Japaneses ide sho uld do is to face up to the reality admit the so vereignty dispute co rrect mis takes and co me back to the track o f a

nego tiated settlement`28 2 The lates t o fficial pro po sal to shelve the is lands is sue was made by the fo rmer fo reign minis ter Tang

Jiaxuan o n 16 July 201428 3

The reco gnitio n o f a territo rial pro blem wo uld be relatively easy fo r Japanese public o pinio n (and even mo re so fo r Japanrsquos friendsand allies ) to accept because they wo uld no t see the need fo r any kind o f diplo matic o r legal so phis try fo r what is o bvio us ly aterrito rial co nflict whatever the legitimacy o f the Chinese claim might be given also the fact that the current Japanese po s itio nco mes do wn to refus ing to even dis cuss whatever settlement might be po ss ible Acco rding to a survey co nducted by Genro nto gether with Zho ngguo Ribao she in June 2012 627 per cent o f Japanese agreed that there exis ts a territo rial pro blem dispute

(176 disagreed) co mpared with 822 o f the Chinese (139 disagreed)28 4 Ho wever co nsecutive Japanese cabinets haverefused to reco gnise the exis tence o f a territo rial dispute which is o ften the default po s itio n o f a go vernment in actual co ntro l o f adisputed territo ry (fo r example the Ko rean go vernmentrsquos po s itio n o n Do kto Takeshima) This po s itio n has been reinfo rced by theexplicit Japanese denial s ince the 1990s o f a shelving agreement which wo uld have been an implicit admiss io n that there is adispute To circumvent the risk o f being perceived as admitting the exis tence o f a territo rial pro blem the deputy prime minis ter o fthe previo us No da go vernment Okada Katsuya was repo rted to have mentio ned in a speech in Octo ber 2012 that there was no

territo rial dispute but as a matter o f fact a debate exis ted28 5 Ho wever this co mpro mise so lutio n was never co nfirmed by the No dago vernment and did no t beco me po licy It is even less likely to be acceptable to the new Abe go vernment Even amo ng influentialo pinio n makers there is hardly any suppo rt fo r admitting the exis tence o f a territo rial co nflict o r o f a shelving agreement Even mo reco nciliato ry s tatements o n this subject are rather vague Maehara Seiji o f the Demo cratic Party declared in a co nference at QinghuaUnivers ity in Beijing in September 2013 that the Japanese go vernment sho uld add (to its o wn po s itio n) that China has a differentview (Senkakusho to wo meguru Niho n seifu no tachiba ni tsuite lsquoChugo ku ga chigau kangaekata wo mo tte iru to iuko to wo ichigen

tsukekuwaerubeki darsquo) At the same time he emphas ised ho wever that there was no territo rial dispute28 6 Japan Bus inessFederatio n Chairman Yo nekura Hiro masa mentio ned in September 2012 in an NHK interview that the go vernment sho uld be mo re

flexible s ince o therwise its s tance co uld be taken to mean that Japan has no intentio n o f so lving the dispute28 7 Miyamo to Yuji thefo rmer Japanese ambassado r to China is quo ted as saying that lsquoThe go vernment do es no t need to alter its bas ic po s itio n but in

reality a co nflict do es exis t o ver the Senkaku is les rsquo 28 8 This is also the s tance which the previo us Japanese ambassado r Niwa

Uichiro takes in an article after his return to Japan28 9

Co ncerning co nflict reso lutio n it is interes ting to no te that when asked abo ut the mo dern s ignificance o f the 1978 Japan-ChinaPeace and Friendship Treaty 68 4 o f the po lled Japanese agreed with Art 12 (lsquoThe two parties shall settle all disputes by peacefulmeans and shall refrain fro m the use o r threat o f fo rcersquo) but o nly 525 o f the Chinese agreed Mo reo ver 58 1 o f the Chinese

favo ur China s trengthening its co ntro l o ver the area29 0

If therefo re a new ldquoimplicit unders tandingrdquo abo ut shelving the dispute is achievable it wo uld have to be based o n learning fro m thefailures o f the 19721978 shelving ie it wo uld be necessary to achieve a mutual unders tanding o f what the s tatus quo is whatwo uld undermine the s tatus quo and what has to be do ne to mo ve fro m co nflict management to so lutio n Quite clearly such a newunders tanding wo uld be less favo urable to Japan`s current s tance o n the dispute

FROM CONFLICT MANAGEMENT TO ADDRESSING THE SOVEREIGNTY ISSUE

Any mo ve fo rward will certainly require decis ive leadership o n bo th s ides be it to take the initiative o r to respo nd po s itively to theinitiative o f s tarting the pro cess to wards reso lutio n In view o f the co mplex backgro und o f the external and internal dynamics it iso bvio us that address ing the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands dispute requires a s tep-by-s tep appro ach The ultimate is sue to address is theso vereignty is sue and territo rial disputes are generally viewed as zero sum in nature given their clo se link to co re securityinteres ts Even tho se who reco gnize the impo rtance o f transcending such lo gic in favo ur o f co ndo minium o r shared so vereigntygenerally ho ld that the is sue can o nly be addressed at the las t s tage o f any nego tiated pro cess if at all

Two impo rtant is sues have to be co ns idered at the beginning to what extent have the vario us s tages o f the nego tiating pro cess tobe agreed befo rehand (lsquoro ad maprsquo) o r even the final o utco me whether a viable co ndo minium o r o nly shelving the is sues and co uldthe ro le o f a third party mediato r be helpfulacceptable In view o f the po litical diff iculties o n bo th s ides the s tart o f thenego tiatio n pro cess wo uld be endangered if there is no t sufficient ro o m fo r ambiguity and interpretatio n abo ut the vario us s tages altho ugh the general aim o f tens io n reductio n and suspens io n o f the so vereignty is sue mus t be clearly agreed

A third party mediato r is pro bably no t acceptable to the Chinese s ide The third party mo s t o ften mentio ned is the Internatio nalCo urt o f Jus tice (ICJ) o r any kind o f internatio nal arbitratio n Ho wever this seems unlikely in view o f China`s preference fo rbilateral nego tiatio ns and its refusal to accept judicial settlement by the ICJ o r any internatio nal arbitratio n except in no n-po litical

areas such as trade29 1 The Japanese go vernment wo uld be willing to accept the jurisdictio n o f the ICJ but o nly if China brings the

case to the Co urt les t it be perceived as ackno wledging the exis tence o f a territo rial dispute29 2 But there are also po litical andpro cedural arguments agains t the reco urse to the ICJ China`s legal argumentatio n is co mparatively weak and s ince a negativejudgement co uld have implicatio ns fo r China`s legal claim to mo s t o f the So uth China Sea there is even less o f a chance o f Chinamaking an exceptio n fo r the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands dispute In view o f the entrenched po s itio ns o f bo th s ides and the risk o f a`winner takes all` o utco me o f internatio nal litigatio n bo th go vernments wo uld face co ns iderable do mes tic res is tance in case o f anegative o utco me In view o f the urgency o f the dispute and the lo ng time it takes fo r a judgement there wo uld also be the risk o fdo mes tic fo rces trying to pre-empt a negative result

In view o f the security is sues invo lved (let alo ne the American his to rical `debt` as a result o f Washingto n`s ambiguity related toWashingto n`s ending o f the adminis tratio n o f Okinawa in 1972) an American mediatio n co uld be seen as natural and even inAmerican interes ts Such an American ro le ho wever is extremely unlikely as it wo uld be seen by China as unduly advantageo us toJapan Ho wever at so me po int during the Japan-China nego tiatio n pro cess the US might ass is t (o r even be reques ted) by agreeingto certain Co nfidence and Security Building Measures (CSBM) in the area aro und the is lands

The firs t s tage wo uld have to co ns is t o f measures which reduce the risk o f a military clash but in a way which prevents theperceptio n that o ne s ide is giving in to co ercio n This s tage wo uld be a gradual phas ing o ut o f intrus io ns by Chinese o fficial vesselsand aircraft into the territo rial waters co ntiguo us zo ne and airspace o f the is lands which is recipro cated by Japanrsquos reducing in thesame way its co as tguard patro ls in the two zo nes as well as its s crambling activities in the is lands` airspace There were repo rts in

June 2013 that China called o n Japan to agree to a 12-nautical-mile no -entry zo ne aro und the is lands 29 3 Japan rejected this co urse

Ano ther measure wo uld be to increase the dis tance at which vessels o f bo th maritime fo rces o bserve each o ther Such s teps sho uldultimately be o fficialised by a gradually expanding series o f CSBMs and a bilateral liaiso n mechanism This co uld also include ademilitarisatio n agreement as an incentive fo r the Chinese s ide It wo uld be vital that the s teps at this s tage be incremental that nos tep is explo ited in a o ne-s ided way and that they are co ns idered irrevers ible At the same time bo th s ides have to prevent peo plefro m appro aching the is lands s ince this wo uld be seen as a pro vo catio n by the o ther s ide This latter task is technically no t easy

because o f the co ntro vers ial character o f any co mpro mise with certain no n-s tate acto rs in Japan China Ho ng Ko ng and Taiwan The(failed) landing o f a Chinese ho t ballo o n o n o ne o f the is lands in January 2014 demo ns trated at the same time the technical

diff iculty o f a no -entry po licy as well as the po ss ibility o f a success ful co o peratio n o f the co as tguards o f all three co untries 29 4

At this firs t s tage o r leading to the next there will have to be a Japanese go vernment s tatement to the effect that there is alsquopro blemrsquo related to the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands This can be wo rded in such a way that the sens itive express io n `territo rialpro blem` (which is s trenuo us ly denied by the go vernment) is avo ided and it can be supplemented by a sentence that such as tatement in no way prejudices the legal po s itio n o f the go vernment Such a qualifying s tatement is fo r example included in the

Japan-China agreement fo r prio r no tif icatio n o f research vessels fro m bo th co untries in the Eas t China Sea in 200029 5 A s imilarqualif icatio n is part o f the 1997 Japan-China Fisheries Agreement In the jo int co mmuniqueacute o f 1972 which no rmalised diplo maticrelatio ns between Japan and China diplo matic wo rding also managed to bridge the huge gap between their s tances o n Taiwan whichthe PRC co ns iders an lsquoinalienable partrsquo o f its territo ry Japan co ns iders the so vereignty is sue s till unreso lved because the 1951 SanFrancis co Peace Treaty Art 2 (b) o nly s tipulated that lsquoJapan reno unces all right title and claim to Fo rmo sa and the Pescado res rsquowitho ut clarifying the recipient o f the territo ry The co mpro mise in 1972 was reached with the sentence that Japan lsquofully unders tandsand respects this s tand o f the Go vernment o f the Peo ples Republic o f China and it f irmly maintains its s tand under Article 8 o f thePo tsdam Pro clamatio nrsquo

POSSIBLE APPROACHES TO THE SOVEREIGNTY ISSUE

The mo s t diff icult pro blem is the so vereignty is sue which go es to the co re o f any co untry`s security interes ts It is no t imaginablethat either s ide will reno unce its claim to the is lands Sides tepping o r shelving the is sue is o nly useful if the lesso ns fro m the 1972and 1978 attempts as o utlined abo ve can be learned and applied but there is s till the fundamental pro blem with the implicitassumptio n that the quality o f the bilateral relatio nship will always be as go o d as when the s ides tepping agreement was achievedand can be maintained in perpetuity o r until the so vereignty is sue can be addressed But in o rder to so lve the so vereignty is sue aneven better relatio nship has to be created This better relatio nship co uld be bro ught abo ut by the s teps explained abo ve and furtherbelo w

An impo rtant co nditio n fo r any las ting territo rial co mpro mise wo uld be reducing the value o f the is lands fo r bo th co untries whichcan be achieved by o ne o f the measures pro po sed fo r s tage 1 ie reso lutely preventing anyo ne fro m appro aching the territo ries(including to tal demilitarizatio n) which in themselves are eco no mically wo rthless and are uninhabited The main po int is to preventany go vernmental act which co uld be interpreted as being part o f the `so vereignty game` The mo s t diff icult part here is to preventany act by no n-go vernmental acto rs This wo uld have to include the territo rial waters and the explo itatio n there in o f any kind o freso urces including fishing Scientif ic interes ts in the is lands co uld be served by bilateral surveys witho ut any po litical co nno tatio ns

There have been pro po sals to declare the is lands an Internatio nal Nature and Wildlife Preserve29 6 Such a preserve wo uld have to beadminis tered either bilaterally o r by a relevant internatio nal o rganisatio n and as such co uld serve as a co nfidence-building measure

The abo ve s teps wo uld then allo w the two s ides to deal with the co ns iderable eco no mic interes ts in fishing and the explo itatio n o fhydro carbo n reso urces and o ther seabed reso urces aro und the is lands ie in the Exclus ive Eco no mic Zo ne ando r the ExtendedCo ntinental Shelf Once the is lands` land area and the territo rial waters have been put as ide it wo uld be eas ier to co me to ano verall agreement o n the delimitatio n o f the EEZ bo rder (with the exceptio n o f the no rthern part which wo uld require a trilateralagreement between China Japan and Ko rea) which wo uld include the delimitatio n o f these surro unding waters It wo uld facilitate aco mpro mise if bo th s ides agree that the is lands do no t merit their o wn EEZ This might be diff icult fo r Japan which claims an EEZ fo rOkino to rishima refuted by China s ince it co ns iders the reef no t to be an is land acco rding to Art 121 o f UNCLOS

A co mpro mise o n the so vereignty is sue co uld o nly be the o utco me ndash if at all ndash o f a success ful pro cess o f the abo ve o r co mparables teps In o rder to avo id a `winner take all` s ituatio n the co mpro mise wo uld have to invo lve a sharing arrangement His to ry o ffers

quite a number o f internatio nal precedents o f shared so vereignty referred to as co ndo minium in internatio nal law29 7 One case withso me s imilarities to the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands is a small is land (3000 sq m) in the river separating France and Spain kno wn asPheasant Is land o r Co nference Is land which even to day s till changes every s ix mo nths between France and Spain as o wner Like theSenkakuDiao yu Is lands the is land has no eco no mic value anymo re and the is land is o ff limits It was the lo catio n o f the s igning o f

the Treaty o f the Pyrenees in 1659 which ended a lo ng war 29 8 Mo s t o ther examples o f jo int so vereignty co ncern territo ries with apo pulatio n which makes co o peratio n much mo re diff icult Other his to rical precedents o f sharing so vereignty are the es tablishmento f ldquoneutral zo nesrdquo Acco rdingly the is lands and po ss ibly a sea area aro und the is lands co uld be declared a neutral zo ne like the o nebetween Saudi Arabia and Kuwait (1922-1965) On July 7 1965 the two go vernments s igned an agreement (which to o k effect o nJuly 25 1966) to partitio n the Neutral Zo ne adjo ining their respective territo ries A demarcatio n agreement dividing the NeutralZo ne was s igned o n December 17 1967

Particularly relevant here is that Saudi Arabia as well as Kuwait explo ited the o il reso urces under a jo int o perating agreement29 9

Co nclus io ns

The actio n-reactio n pattern o f the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands dispute is accelerating and the initiative seems to be mo re o ften thanno t with the Chinese s ide while the Japanese s ide is in a defens ive po s itio n The danger o f a military co nfro ntatio n is lo o mingincreas ingly larger in what co uld be called a lsquochicken gamersquo At the same time the internal and external dynamics are undermining theenviro nment which is required fo r a peaceful so lutio n as well as fo r maintaining the number o f po s itive o ptio ns While the Japanesego vernment refuses to ackno wledge the very exis tence o f a territo rial dispute the Chinese go vernment is no w (July 2014) evenrefus ing to have a dialo gue with Japan`s current prime minis ter It is po ss ible that the Chinese s ide again wants to wait with anymo ve fo rward until the Japanese prime minis ter has changed as Beijing did with Prime Minis ter Sato Eisaku o r with Prime Minis terKo izumi Junichiro But waiting fo r an impro vement o f the bilateral atmo sphere as the Chinese s ide likes to s tress is a very riskyo ptio n and such an impro vement may anyway be a very sho rt windo w o f o ppo rtunity if lo o king at the ups and do wns o f the po s t-1949 his to ry o f the bilateral relatio nship

To s tart a s tep-by-s tep pro cess o f address ing the territo rial is sue s tro ng leadership is required which unders tands the widerinteres ts o f a functio ning Japanese-Chinese relatio nship Japan s imply asking China fo r a summit meeting is no t very sens ible ifthere is no willingness to engage in subs tantive dis cuss io ns and wo uld be very risky fo r China`s to p leader if the Japanese primeminis ter then vis its the Yasukuni Shrine The his to ry is sue sho uld no lo nger be a Chinese lever fo r pressuris ing Japan but the latterhas to abs tain fro m actio ns which are seen as pro vo cative no t o nly by China but also by Ko rea the US and many o thers There hasto be a co mmitted leadership o n bo th s ides which s tarts with a ro ugh ro ad map and tens io n-reducing s teps such as CSBMs en ro uteto agreeing o n a fo rmula which allo ws the parties to o btain eco no mic as well as security gains while reducing tens io ns

Reinhard Drifte is Emeritus Professor of Japanese Politics University of Newcastle UK and Visiting Professor at various Japanese Universities andPau University (France) He is the author of Japanrsquos Foreign Policy for the Twenty First Century His home page is here

Reco mmended citatio n Reinhard Drifte The Japan-China Confrontation Over the SenkakuDiaoyu Islands--Between shelving and dispute

were unprecedented fo r two co untries suppo sedly bo und by a Peace and Friendship Treaty

The shelving agreement o bvio us ly had no legal fo rce but denying its exis tence was po litically unwise and mo rally wro ng OkabeTatsumi argues that fo r po litical co nvenience Japan agreed in 1978 to shelve the is sue but that this was different fro m shelving the

dispute in a legal sense6 1 The fo llo wing o fficial Japanese s tatements can be interpreted in this light in Octo ber 1990 CabinetSecretary Sakamo to Miso ji after res tating Japan`s so vereignty claim s till declared that the is land is sue between Japan China and

Taiwan (sic) sho uld be so lved by a later generatio n thus implying that there was a territo rial dispute which had been put as ide6 2 Butby the time China pro mulgated its law o n territo rial waters in February 1992 (see belo w) the Japanese go vernment wo uldunequivo cally and publicly deny that there had been any agreement to shelve the is sue and even that there was a territo rial is sueWhen Prime Minis ter Miyazawa Kiichi pro tes ted agains t the Chinese law in February 1992 referring to a prio r unders tanding withDeng Xiao ping o ver the Senkaku Is lands the Minis try o f Fo reign Affairs (MOFA) is sued a co rrectio n denying such an

unders tanding6 3 In September 1996 Adminis trative Vice-Minis ter Hayashi Sadayuki said that Japan had no t agreed with Dengrsquos lsquoput

o n the shelfrsquo pro po sal ie arguing that there was no territo rial is sue6 4 In the fo llo wing the autho r analyses the three maincircumstances which acco unt fo r the breakdo wn o f the bilateral unders tanding

THE CORROSIVE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

The requirements o f internatio nal law regimes particularly the UN Co nventio n o n the Law o f the Sea (UNCLOS) which was ratif ied byJapan and the PRC in 1996 pro mpted bo th co untries to take do mes tic ando r internatio nal adminis trative and legal s teps (fo rexample pass ing legis latio n related to the adminis tratio n o f their maritime space demarcating their sea bo rders and claimingbo rders fo r their EEZ) which had a general purpo se but did no t sufficiently take into acco unt the need to pro tect the bilateralunders tanding o f putting the territo rial dispute as ide Mo reo ver internatio nal regimes have `ves ted o therwise wo rthless is lands

with immense eco no mic value`6 5 They enco urage the assertio n o f so vereignty and penalize s tates fo r appearing to acquiesce in arival s tate`s claim to a disputed territo ry Paul O`Shea applied the term `so vereignty game` to this diplo matic-legal tit-fo r-tat

based o n Alexander Wendt`s co nceptio n o f so vereignty as a so cially co ns tructed ins titutio n6 6 Finally the vagueness o f

internatio nal law allo ws s tates to cherry pick tho se no rms which fit bes t their interes ts and claims 6 7 It is pro bably with thiss ituatio n in mind that fo rmer Chinese ambassado r to Japan and the UN Chen Jian explained at the beginning o f a talk o n 30

Octo ber 2012 that internatio nal law is a ro o t cause o f the current territo rial disputes 6 8 This autho r has to o much respect fo rinternatio nal law no tably UNCLOS to agree with this s tro ng s tatement but is aware o f the weaknesses o f many legal s tipulatio ns

With regard to the Senkaku dispute internatio nal law regimes have thus bro ught with it the fo llo wing co mplicatio ns

- Bo th co untries mus t always co ns ider that whatever is decided in relatio n to the disputed Senkaku Is lands might have implicatio nsfo r the co untry`s o ther territo rial disputes (Japan`s territo rial disputes with Ko rea and Russ ia China`s EEZ dispute with Ko rea o rterrito rial disputes with the o ther litto ral claimants in the So uth China Sea )

- Any actio n taken by the Japanese go vernment with regard to the Senkaku Is lands can be interpreted as the o fficial express io n o fthe go vernment in co ntro l o f the is lands and China will therefo re feel o bliged to pro tes t in o rder to defend its claim

- Bo th co untries had to co mply with UNCLOS in o rder to benefit fro m this regime and o fficially draw sea bo rders which s tart withbase lines o n which are dependent the extent o f the Territo rial Waters (12 nm fro m the base line) o f the Co ntiguo us Zo ne (24 nmfro m the base line) o f the EEZ (200 nm fro m the baseline) and o f the Extended Co ntinental Shelf (under certain co nditio ns up to350 nm fro m the base line can be claimed) The is sues aris ing fro m this are whether Japan and China wo uld apply the drawing o f thesea bo rders to the disputed territo ry and if so whether the Senkaku Is lands co uld be class ified as `is lands` which are entitled toan EEZ o r jus t `ro cks` which wo uld entitle them o nly to territo rial waters under UNCLOS Article 123 and ho w to draw the EEZbo rder in the Eas t China Sea`s Senkaku area These is sues were bo und to have an impact o n the bilateral unders tanding in o ne wayo r the o ther and wo uld have required special actio n in o rder to keep the territo rial dispute shelved

When China passed its Territo rial Law in 1992 it explicitly included the Diao yu Is lands which naturally was immediately pro tes ted bythe Japanese go vernment while s till sho wing a co ns iderable amo unt o f unders tanding and specifically saying that the law did no t

vio late Japan`s so vereignty o ver the is lands 6 9 At that time the Japanese go vernment was s till preo ccupied with preventing China`siso latio n after the 1989 Tiananmen crackdo wn China also played do wn the impact o f this law and even referred to Deng Xiao ping`s

1978 s tatement o f leaving the territo rial is sue fo r the future70 When Jiang Zemin vis ited Japan in April 1992 he also reaffirmed the

shelving acco rding to Deng`s pro mise in 1978 while s till res tating China`s claim to the is lands 71 Ho wever the Chinese Minis try o f

Fo reign Affairs (hereafter Waijiaobu o r CMOFA) o riginally had no t wanted to include the Senkaku Is lands 72 When it ratif ied UNCLOS in1996 China referred to the 1992 Law and pro mulgated the precise lo catio n o f many o f its base lines but left o ut so me o f them

including tho se fo r the Senkaku Is lands 73 In 1998 the Natio nal Peo ple`s Co ngress pro mulgated the PRC Exclus ive Eco no mic Zo neand Co ntinental Shelf Act which did no t mentio n any specific geo graphical areas Clearly the Chinese leadership was trying to walka fine line between its territo rial and EEZ claims (including the need to respo nd to do mes tic demands increas ingly do minated bynatio nalis t tendencies ) the requirements o f the internatio nal law regime and the maintenance o f go o d relatio ns with Japan

Japan ratif ied UNCLOS in June 1996 and es tablished in the fo llo wing mo nth the Law o n the Territo rial Sea and the Co ntiguo us Zo neas well as the Law o n the EEZ and Co ntinental Shelf which were supplemented by guidelines fo r implementatio n The latter also

es tablished an EEZ aro und the Senkaku Is lands Japan did no t include the Senkaku Is lands in its s traight baseline claim74 Twoseparate bills creating the Bas ic Law o f the Ocean Sea and the Law o n Es tablishing Safety Areas fo r Maritime Structures were

passed by the Diet in April 2007 and came into effect o n 16 July 200775 The latter two laws were passed mainly having in mind anyfuture explo itatio n o f natural reso urces in the co ntes ted EEZs Naturally China do es no t reco gnize the validity o f these laws fo r theSenkaku Is lands o r fo r the EEZ bo rder between the two co untries The territo rial dispute is also a majo r o bs tacle fo r agreement o nthe EEZ bo rder in the so uthern area o f the Eas t China Sea which is no t made eas ier by the fact that an agreement o n the title to theSenkaku wo uld have a majo r impact o n the s ize o f the EEZ area o f the success ful claimant particularly if the is lands were acco rdedan EEZ

FISHING AND OTHER ECONOMIC INTERESTS

Fishing is a majo r interes t fo r all litto ral s tates o f the Eas t China Sea Altho ugh Japan and China have co ncluded co nsecutive fisheryagreements fo r the Eas t China Sea the 1997 agreement (effective fro m June 2000) excludes fro m the applicatio n o f the fisheriesagreement the territo rial waters adjacent to the Senkaku Is lands Ins tead the extant 1975 Fishery Agreement which deemed the

areas aro und the Senkakus as part o f the high seas was allo wed to prevail76 In 2012 a letter related to the 1997 Agreement abo utfishing in the EEZ was revealed in which Fo reign Minis ter Obuchi Keizo had s tated to the Chinese ambassado r in To kyo Xu Duxinthat Japanrsquos laws and regulatio ns wo uld no t apply to the `waters in ques tio n` (togai no suiiki) It is unders to o d that the `waters in

ques tio n` include the Senkaku Is lands altho ugh their name is no t mentio ned and the Japanese go vernment to day denies it77 SatoMasaru a fo rmer intelligence analys t o f the Japanese Fo reign Minis try explained that this letter referred to the EEZ aro und the

Senkaku Is lands and applied o nly to Chinese fishermen78 Ho wever the Japanese go vernment seems no t to want to allo w fo reignfishermen unco ntro lled access to the territo rial waters aro und the Senkaku Is lands and has been patro lling the area This has ledto the expuls io n o f Chinese fishermen and subsequent pro tes ts by Taiwan and the PRC The Japanese co ntro ls have apparently

increased in the decade s ince 2000 while Chinese fishing activities have also vas tly increased79 Mo re research is needed o n thesedevelo pments to judge whether yet ano ther `uno fficial unders tanding` between To kyo and Beijing has been undermined

Finally in this co ntext o ne has to mentio n the is sue o f private and s tate o wnership o f the Senkaku as well as the ro le o f no n-s tateacto rs In 1896 Ko ga Tatsushiro o btained a free lease o f 30 years fo r the is lands o f Uo tsurijima Kubajima Minami Ko jima and KitaKo jima After his death in 1918 his so n Ko ga Zenji to o k o ver the bus iness In 1926 after the end o f the free lease the Japanese

go vernment co nverted it to a rental bas is 8 0 In 1932 the Japanese go vernment changed the s tatus o f these fo ur is lands fro m s tate-o wned to privately-o wned land by selling them to the Ko ga family After 1945 Kubajima and Taisho jima (the latter was always s tate-o wned) were leased to the US as firing ranges In 1972 Ko ga Zenji so ld Kita Ko jima and Minami Ko jima fo llo wed by Uo tsurshima in1978 and Kubajima in 1988 to Kurihara Kunio ki a real es tate inves to r and his family In 2002 Kitako jima Minami Ko jima and

Uo tsurijima were leased to the s tate which paid Yen 25 millio n per year fo r them in rent8 1 The US military used Kubajima andTaisho jima fro m 1957 as firing ranges and after the revers io n o f Okinawa in 1972 co ntinued to do so until 1979 It paid rent to the

private o wner o f Kubajima but after 1971 the rental payment was effected by the Japanese go vernment8 2 It is also interes ting tono te that even in the Japan-US minutes o f 15 May 1972 abo ut these two firing ranges the is lands are s till referred to by their

Chinese characters which are transcribed in the English vers io n as Ko bisho and Sekibisho rather than Kubajima and Taisho jima8 3

The relevant po int here is that s ince the shelving o f the territo rial is sue in 1972 and 1978 the is lands changed private o wners andthe s tate rented three o f the is lands fro m their private o wner and o wned o ne The leas ing in 2002 and the `natio nalizatio n` (nomo ney was invo lved) o f the Uo tsurijima beaco n in 2005 caused Chinese pro tes ts but the private o wnership changes did no t cause

any Chinese reactio n8 4 This is an illus tratio n o f the deterio ratio n o f the bilateral relatio nship during the fo llo wing years because itwas the sale o f three is lands to the Japanese central s tate which to uched o ff the 2012 cris is

THE IMPACT OF OIL AND GAS INTERESTS

The 1969 ECAFE Repo rt had led to claims by the ROC and the PRC o ver the Senkaku Is lands The mo s t pro mis ing area defined in thisrepo rt fo r hydro carbo n reso urces happened to be aro und the Senkaku Is lands Since Japan abando ned its jo int explo ratio n planswith Taiwan in 1972 with the diplo matic reco gnitio n o f the PRC no Japanese activities have taken place because o f co ncern abo utChina`s reactio n

In o rder to fulfill its gro wing demand fo r o il and gas and to divers ify away fro m its high dependence o n Middle Eas tern supplies

China s tarted in the 1970s to pro spect and extract energy reso urces in the Eas t China Sea8 5 To o verco me the territo rial dispute inthe so uth o f the Eas t China Sea and the divergent po s itio n o n ho w to draw the EEZ bo rder in the res t o f the Eas t China Sea Chinapro po sed `jo int develo pment` o f hydro carbo n reso urces In Octo ber 1980 PRC Deputy Premier Yao Yilin even pro po sed to aJapanese bus iness delegatio n that develo pment o f o ff-sho re o il reso urces aro und the disputed is lands be do ne jo intly by China

Japan and the US8 6 Ano ther bilateral pro po sal was made in 1984 by Deng Xiao ping who urged so lving the territo rial pro blems o fthe Spratly Is lands in the So uth China Sea and the Senkaku Is lands by jo intly develo ping the disputed areas befo re dis cuss ing theques tio n o f so vereignty But in this case as well as later pro po sals until 1996 Japan firs t demanded a settlement o f the maritime

bo rder o r reco gnitio n o f its title to the Senkaku Is lands 8 7

China`s relentless pro gress and expans io n o f o il and gas develo pment increas ingly caused frictio n between Japan and China whichalso impacted o n the territo rial dispute Since 1996 Chinese research vessels have entered the waters o f the Senkaku Is lands

including its territo rial waters 8 8 Japan exerted great res traint and until 2004 did no t allo w Japanese co mpanies to survey the ECSeven in the area which it claimed as its EEZ let alo ne aro und the Senkaku Is lands Mo reo ver To kyo `s permiss io n fo r surveying in2004 by a Japanese explo ratio n co mpany (never fo llo wed up because o f the po litical risks invo lved) in respo nse to Chinese o il andgas develo pment near Japan`s claimed EEZ bo rder was o nly fo r an area further no rth away fro m the disputed is lands

The Senkaku Is lands dispute co ntributed to the failure to fo llo w up o n the jo int unders tanding in June 2008 (ryokai in Japaneseliangjie in Chinese) to engage in jo int develo pment o f an area in the no rth o f the Eas t China Sea and to allo w Japan to jo in the

Chunxiao gas field explo itatio n which had been develo ped by China in a disputed EEZ area8 9 During the nego tiatio n o f the 2008jo int unders tanding the Chinese demanded jo int develo pment o f energy reso urces in the area aro und the Senkaku Is lands inexchange fo r their co mpro mise o n jo int develo pment in o ther areas o f the Eas t China Sea Altho ugh the Chinese go vernment agreedto the unders tanding witho ut getting satis factio n o n its demand the failure to achieve greater recipro city fro m the Japanese in theSenkaku area then made it do mes tically impo ss ible fo r the Chinese go vernment to go any further with nego tiating an

implementatio n o f the unders tanding9 0 In December 2008 two Chinese patro l vessels o f the China Marine Surveillance (CMSHaijiandui in Chinese) which is under the State Ocean Adminis tratio n (SOA) entered fo r the firs t time the territo rial waters aro und

the Senkaku Is lands in an apparent mo ve to s trengthen its claim to the is lands 9 1

INSTRUMENTALIZATION OF THE SENKAKU DISPUTE BY POLITICIANS AND NON-STATE ACTORS

The rais ing o f the territo rial is sue by China (ROC and PRC) and the campaign o f the Bao Diao (Pro tect the Diao yu) mo vementno tably in Taiwan and Ho ng Ko ng s ince the ECAFE repo rt led to a s imilar invo lvement o f the Japanese po litical right and o thernatio nalis tic gro ups which to o k up the is sue as a symbo l o f natio nalism In 1973 several rightwing po liticians within the rulingLiberal Demo cratic Party including Ishihara Shintaro who in 2012 became the trigger fo r the central go vernment`s purchase o f so meo f the Senkaku is lands es tablished the so -called Seirankai It was particularly Ishihara who raised the territo rial is sue and o ppo sed

its shelving by Prime Minis ter Tanaka9 2 Agains t the increase o f tens io ns between Japan and China s ince the middle o f the 1990s the supra-partisan Diet Asso ciatio n fo r the Preservatio n o f Territo rial Integrity was es tablished in 2004 It had 60 members by 2011On 30 March 2004 the Security Co mmittee o f the Lo wer Ho use passed a reso lutio n o n preserving territo rial integrity and demanded

a s tro nger Japanese s tance It was the firs t time the Diet passed a reso lutio n relevant to the Senkaku Is lands in this vein9 3 EdanoYukio chief o f the Co ns titutio n Research Co mmittee o f the Demo cratic Party o f Japan (DPJ) then in o ppo s itio n pro po sed that

Self-Defense Fo rces (SDF) tro o ps sho uld be s tatio ned o n the disputed Senkaku Is lands to prevent incurs io ns by o ther co untries 9 4

Since SDF members are civil servants (komuin) this demand so unds very s imilar to the demands by Abe Shinzo o n 15 September2012 to s tatio n komuin o n the is lands (witho ut clarifying whether he meant so ldiers o r o ther civil servants ) altho ugh he po s tpo ned

a decis io n when taking o ver the go vernment in December 20129 5 This sho ws the o ppo rtunis tic explo itatio n o f the territo rial disputefo r electo ral purpo ses

Natio nalis t po liticians and activis ts have also been demanding to erect facilities o n the is lands such as a weather s tatio n a beaco na helipo rt o r a harbo r in o rder to assert Japan`s so vereignty The Niho n Seinensha (Japanese Yo uth Federatio n) a natio nalis to rganizatio n affiliated with the majo r yakuza gro up Sumiyo shi-kai caused several incidents by landing o n the is lands s tarting witherecting a light to wer o r beaco n firs t o n Uo tsurijima in September 1978 which was enlarged in 1988 and ano ther o ne o n Kitako jima

Is land in 19969 6 Each such landing caused pro tes ts in China and amo ng the Chinese diaspo ra and pro mpted the PRC go vernmentto co mplain o fficially It also led to demands by the Seinensha that the light to wers be o fficially reco gnized by the go vernment andthe maintenance be taken o n by the Maritime Safety Agency (later called Co as t Guard) But even the co mpro mise o f including thelight to wer into o fficial charts was an o fficial act reinfo rcing Japan`s effective co ntro l o ver the is lands The dis cuss io n abo ut theo fficial handling o f the light to wer also raised the natio nalis t fever in Taiwan and its military even prepared (but then cancelled at

the las t mo ment) a co mmando actio n at the end o f 1990 to des tro y the facility9 7 In February 2005 amids t ris ing tens io ns o verChina`s energy develo pments in co ntes ted parts o f the Eas t China Sea and Chinese pro tes ts agains t Prime Minis ter Ko izumi`sYasukuni Shrine vis its the Japanese go vernment finally ceded to the demands o f the gro up to take o ver the Uo tsurijima lightho use

s tructure and its maintenance9 8 Until then the Gaimusho had succeeded in delaying this s tate takeo ver as `to o premature` in

o rder no t to pro vo ke China9 9

As can be seen the Japanese go vernment tried to res is t these natio nalis t claims but it co uld no t fully circumvent them thus keepingChina`s suspicio ns alive Mo reo ver whereas the Japanese go vernment always tries to prevent the landing by fo reigners o n theis lands it has no t until fairly recently prevented the landing by Japanese In o rder to keep fo reigners o ut o f the is lands and theirterrito rial waters the Japanese Co as t Guard (CG) has been patro lling the area which again is an o fficial act It may have been thenatio nalis t pressure fro m within the LDP as well as fro m right wing circles which pro mpted Ohira Masayo shi when he was PrimeMinis ter to send in 1979 a general survey team o f 50 perso ns (including Kurihara Hiro yuki) to the is lands in o rder to inves tigate the

building o f facilities like a helipo rt Such demands had already been made by the LDP o n 24 March 197810 0 Altho ugh the final repo rto f the survey spo ke agains t building facilities and no thing fo llo wed fro m it the Kurihara family co ns idered Ohira ndash altho ughgenerally kno wn to be a pro -China po litician - to be the mo s t suppo rtive prime minis ter o f all fo r the Japanese assertio n o f effectiveco ntro l o ver the is lands Befo re that Ohira had also agreed to Kurihara Hiro yuki`s pro po sal to set up o n Uo tsurijima a mo nument

to ho no ur Ko ga Tatsushiro which was do ne with the go vernment`s material and financial suppo rt10 1

Even within the Chinese leadership the territo rial is sue has been divis ive Jus t when the two s ides were nego tiating the Peace andFriendship Treaty in April 1978 abo ut 100 Chinese fishing vessels so me armed appeared aro und the Senkaku area with bannersdeclaring China`s title to the is lands While this was explained at the time in Japan as a means to pressure the Japanese during thetreaty nego tiatio ns it no w seems no w mo re likely that the Senkaku is sue was used by fo llo wers o f the Chairman o f the MilitaryCo mmiss io n Hua Guo feng as a means o f attacking the re-emerging Deng Xiao ping The PRC central leadership explained at the

time that this was `accidental` and Deng Xiao ping pro mised it wo uld never happen again10 2

These latter incidents are also impo rtant when dis cuss io n turns to the ques tio n who s tarted to undermine the unders tanding abo utshelving the is lands dispute ndash Japan o r China Was it China when it passed the 1992 Territo rial Law as is o ften mentio ned in Japano r did it already vio late the unders tanding in April 1978 as so me o thers claim Ho wever if the latter incident was beyo nd the co ntro lo f the Chinese go vernment it co uld be argued that it was the Japanese go vernment with the erectio n o f a mo nument o r the 1979survey that to uched o ff frictio ns Yet the blame game do es no t help in finding a so lutio n ins tead these incidents sho uld make itclear that bo th s ides bear part o f the respo ns ibility fo r undermining the 197278 unders tanding and sho uld therefo re be willing toco me to a new unders tanding

THE DETERIORATION OF THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP SINCE THE 1990S

In additio n to the abo ve develo pments it was the general deterio ratio n o f the bilateral relatio nship s ince the middle o f the 1990sthat changed the co nditio ns fo r maintaining the shelving o f the territo rial dispute Japan became suspicio us o f China`s no n-transparent military mo dernizatio n particularly o f the navy which has been expanding its o peratio ns including the Eas t China

Sea10 3 Other negative develo pments were the pro gress o f Chinese o il and gas explo ratio n in the Eas t China Sea despitedisagreement o ver the co mmo n EEZ bo rder vis its by Japanese po litical leaders to the Yasukuni War Shrine and o ther is sues relatedto Japan`s pas t aggress io n agains t China

A nadir in the bilateral relatio nship was reached during the rule o f Prime Minis ter Ko izumi Junichiro (2001-2006) because o f hisannual vis its to the Yasukuni Shrine But while the po litical relatio nship go t co lder the eco no mic relatio nship expanded andpro spered (`Co ld Po litics Ho t Eco no mics`) This also had ndashat firs t glance co unter-intuitively ndash a deleterio us effect o n themo tivatio n to wo rk harder to maintain the co nditio ns fo r putting as ide the territo rial co nflict s ince this dicho to my gave the falseimpress io n that po litics and eco no mics co uld be kept separate fo rever while the territo rial is sue was pending The wo rsening o f theterrito rial co nflict fro m 2010 and particularly fro m 2012 with China`s harsh po litical and eco no mic retributio n wo uld bear this o ut

Part o f the ratio nale fo r the Chinese navy`s increased presence in the Eas t China Sea is China`s o il and gas develo pments as wellas the wish to preserve the navy`s access to the Pacific Ocean to prevent JapaneseUS o bservatio n o r to intervene in a cris is Thisco uld no t but affect the territo rial dispute In May 1999 12 Chinese warships co nducted a mano euvre in waters no rth o f the

Senkaku is lands The exercise was the firs t o f its kind to be carried o ut by China in that regio n10 4 Other Chinese naval mo vementsin the Eas t China Sea increased including repo rts abo ut intelligence-gathering ships In the las t few years the po litical influence o f

the PLA and particularly o f the PLA Navy (PLAN) has co ns iderably increased10 5 The Japanese reacted by increas ing their militarydeplo yment and a s trengthening o f Japanese-American military co o peratio n Ho wever the Senkaku area is co ntro lled by the Co as tGuard which is a law enfo rcement agency and the Japanese navy keeps away fro m po licing This incidentally reinfo rces Japan`sclaim as po licing is do ne o nly within natio nal territo ry o r EEZ areas

Until the central go vernment`s purchase o f three o f the is lands in September 2012 it was the activities o f no n-s tate acto rs fro mJapan Taiwan Ho ng Ko ng and the PRC whether natio nalis t activis ts o r fishermen which caused the greates t direct co nfro ntatio nss ince Japan`s co untermeasures were a demo ns tratio n o f the exercise o f so vereignty which the PRC became increas ingly unwilling toto lerate In 1996 a Ho ng Ko ng pro tes ter who tried to co ver the las t meters fro m his bo at to o ne o f the is lands dro wned Ano therincident o ccurred in 2008 when a Japanese Co as t Guard ship rammed a Taiwanese spo rt fishing bo at which had entered Senkaku

territo rial waters The actio n caused the bo at to s ink10 6

In March 2004 fo r the firs t time s ince 1996 seven Chinese activis ts landed o n Uo tsurijima When the Japanese po lice made arres ts the Chinese Fo reign Minis try pro tes ted calling it a serio us vio latio n o f Chinese so vereignty The arres ts were made under the

immigratio n management law which includes a clause o n expuls io n o f illegal fo reign trespassers 10 7 In light o f the 2010 incident inwhich a PRC fishing trawlere twice rammed a Japanese co as t guard ship it is impo rtant to no te that despite guidelines which were togive = law enfo rcement agencies the autho rity to deal with trespassers `acco rding to the law` it was repo rted that the centralgo vernment intervened at the las t minute did no t press fo r an indictment and o rdered the release o f the arres ted Chinese Thego vernment did no t want any further co mplicatio ns that might to rpedo the planned China vis it by Fo reign Minis ter Kawaguchi Yo riko

and was satis fied to have demo ns trated effective co ntro l o ver the Senkaku Is lands by arres ting and expelling the Chinese10 8 AJapanese jo urnal repo rted that there was a Japanese pledge to China fo llo wing this incident that in future an intruder wo uld no t beput in detentio n but o nly arres ted as lo ng as it was no t a serio us case in turn China agreed to prevent the departure o f vessels withpro tes ters fro m its harbo urs Such an unders tanding has no t surpris ingly been denied by the Japanese as well as by the Chinese

go vernment10 9

The China Marine Surveillance (CMS) s tarted irregular patro l activities near the Senkaku Is lands in December 2008 when two CMSvessels s tayed fo r o ver nine ho urs in the territo rial waters o f the Senkaku Is lands as mentio ned abo ve This was interpreted in

Japan as a majo r escalatio n110 Fo rmer ambassado r to China Miyamo to Yuji called this new develo pment a qualitative change in the

Senkaku dispute which went beyo nd previo us cases o f intrus io n by fishermen o r pro tes ters 111 This deplo yment was fo llo wed byo thers the fo llo wing year agains t a backgro und o f China reinfo rcing its maritime co ntro l Japan respo nded by building up its o wndefence effo rts in the so uth including planned s tatio ning o f so me tro o ps o n Yo naguni Is land o ne o f the clo ses t is lands to the

Senkaku Is lands 112

THE 2010 FISHING TRAWLER INCIDENT

It is agains t this co mplex backgro und that the Chinese fishing trawler Minjinyu 5179 with a crew o f 15 entered the territo rial waters o fthe Senkaku Is lands o n 7 September 2010 near Kubajima There were many o ther Chinese fishing trawlers in the same area andseveral ships o f the Japanese Co as t Guard were trying to chase them away Pursued by three Japanese CG vessels the Minjinyu 5179twice co llided with two o f the CG vessels There are different interpretatio ns whether the Chinese captain Zhan Qixio ng intentio nally

rammed the CG vessels and there are so me s trange inco ns is tencies highlighted in the repo rts o f the incident113 So me no n-Japanese autho rs like Sheila Smith and Linus Hags trouml m are no n-co mmittal o n the ques tio n o f the co llis io n but mo s t Japanese

autho rs blame the trawler and this autho r is mo re inclined to believe that the ramming was intentio nal114 The Chinese

unsurpris ingly blame the CG vessels 115 The is sue o f intentio n is impo rtant inso far as it gives so me indicatio n abo ut the risk o frecurrence and o f escalatio n The fo llo wing circumstantial evidence sugges ts intentio nal ramming by the Chinese captain

- There is ample video fo o tage leaked by a CG o fficer which specialis ts have interpreted as intentio nal ramming by the Chinese

captain116

- The captain seemed to have been drunk and is kno wn to be a vo latile perso n 117

- Fishing in the Eas t China Sea is very co mpetitive and Chinese fishermen are particularly anno yed abo ut the patro ls and co ntro ls byJapanese and Ko rean law enfo rcement agencies in the as yet un-demarcated EEZs amo ng all three co untries

Chinese fishermen have a reputatio n o f o ften being vio lent as many incidents in the So uth China Sea and in the Yello w Sea seem topro ve Only three mo nths later in December 2010 ano ther Chinese fishing trawler captain rammed a So uth Ko rean co as t guard

vessel in the Yello w Sea ho wever his bo at sank as a result and the Chinese captain dro wned 118 Chinese crews are o ften armed

with metal pipes and attack law enfo rcement agents which have led to o ther fatal casualties in 2011 and 2012119

The 2010 trawler incident is further relevant in o ur co ntext in view o f the Japanese go vernment`s handling it ( legal aspect denial o fthe shelving unders tanding) China`s co untermeasures and the aftermath o f the go vernment`s purchase o f three is lands inSeptember 2012 After the co llis io ns the Japanese go vernment arres ted the crew and co nfis cated the trawler The fo llo wing day theChinese go vernment demanded the release o f the crew and the trawler which the Japanese go vernment did o n the 13 September butkeeping the captain in cus to dy The Japanese ambassado r to China Niwa Uichiro was summo ned s ix times by the Chinese between8 and 19 September Beijing`s reactio n escalated after the Chinese captain`s term o f detentio n was extended o n 19 September tolas t fro m 20 to 29 September On 20 September Chinese autho rities detained fo ur Japanese citizens fo r entering a res trictedmilitary area in Hebei pro vince Even witho ut the trawler incident the detentio n o f the fo ur Japanese wo uld have harmed the bilateralrelatio nship but happening in this co ntext it was rightly o r wro ngly immediately linked by the Japanese to o ther Chinese sanctio ns

as dis cussed belo w The result ho wever was that the Japanese released the Chinese captain120 Even immediately after the crew`sarres t the Chinese go vernment had already begun to cancel the seco nd ro und o f nego tiatio ns fo r implementatio n o f theunders tanding o n energy co o peratio n in the Eas t China Sea co ncluded o n 18 June 2008 Other reprisals and sanctio ns fo llo wedincluding the suspens io n o f rare earth expo rts to Japan o n which the co untry`s high techno lo gy indus try is very dependentAltho ugh befo re the incident the Chinese go vernment had already mo ved to reduce rare earth expo rts which naturally hit Japan asthe bigges t impo rter Japanese media repo rted that the Chinese cus to ms autho rities to tally suspended expo rts in late

September121 The exact circumstances o f this alleged embargo are s till no t yet clear as dis cussed in detail by Alas tair Jo hns to n122

The cris is ended when the deputy pro secuto r in Ishigaki anno unced o n 24 September the release o f the captain citing the`diplo matic impact` o f the case o n the bilateral relatio nship So me co ns idered this as surrender by the Japanese and the result o fdubio us po litical interference into the legal pro cess The o ppo s itio n had a field day attacking the go vernment`s handling o f the

incident123 The Japanese Fo reign Minis try spo kesman declared that the go vernment had applied do mes tic law and again refuted the

idea o f there being a territo rial pro blem to be reso lved124 Others argue that the incident had several benefits fo r the Japanesego vernment because it o btained a reco nfirmatio n o f the US security guarantee to include the Senkaku Is lands it helped to co nvince

the public abo ut the necess ity o f mo re Japanese defence effo rts and it expo sed China as an assertive if no t aggress ive po wer125

China claimed that the incident sho wed that Japan had changed its appro ach to handling this type o f incident which co uld be

interpreted as a co nfirmatio n that bo th s ides had reached an info rmal unders tanding after the 2004 incident126 Ho wever thisincident was much mo re severe s ince the captain`s two co llis io ns with CG ships were interpreted by the Japanese go vernment asintentio nal ramming The captain was charged with o bs tructio n o f Perfo rmance o f Public Duty as a result o f the ramming On theo ther hand o ne canno t blame China fo r allo wing this bo at to leave its Chinese harbo ur because it was a fishing trawler and no t apro tes ters` campaign vessel What made this incident so serio us fo r the Chinese was Japan`s very public assertio n o f itsso vereignty o ver the is lands in the way it handled the Chinese captain and the explicit denial o f the shelving unders tanding o f the

1970s On 21 September Fo reign Minis ter Maehara s tated that Japan had no t agreed with China to shelve the territo rial dispute127

This declaratio n fo llo wed the seco nd extens io n o f the captain`s detentio n o n 19 September which pro mpted the Chinesego vernment to allo w widespread demo ns tratio ns in China and to place a series o f sanctio ns agains t Japan (cancellatio n o fminis terial meetings `self- res trictio ns` o n vis its to Japan by Chinese to uris ts and po s tpo nement at very sho rt no tice o f the vis ito f 1000 Japanese yo uth planned fro m 21 September to the Shanghai Wo rld Exhibitio n) Japan is es timated to have lo s t yen318

billio n due to a decline in the number o f Chinese to uris ts 128

It is diff icult to judge whether these unprecedented co untermeasures were centrally directed and it is likely that it was aco mbinatio n o f vario us po wer centres co mpeting ando r feeling the need to be seen acting in acco rdance with the increas ingly anti-Japanese mo o d

Japan`s do mes tic circumstances made a speedy so lutio n such as that in 2004 difficult The DPJ had co me to po wer o nly in 2009 andlacked fo reign po licy experience There was no effective co mmunicatio n between the two go vernments at leas t at the beginning o fthe incident in co ntras t to earlier times The Japanese leadership o bvio us ly mis judged ho w the Chinese wo uld interpret Japanesehandling o f the incident which it perceived as a reversal o f Japan`s previo us (albeit gradually diminishing) res traint Altho ugh theDPJ had initially a mo re pro -China leadership when it came to po wer (no tably Prime Minis ter Hato yama Yukio and Secretary General

Ozawa Ichiro ) this had changed by 2010 The minis ter in charge o f the CG (which is under the Minis try o f Land Infras tructureTranspo rt and To urism) o n the day o f the incident was Maehara Seiji a kno wn defence hawk who then became Minis ter o f Fo reignAffairs in a cabinet reshuffle o n 17 September He was therefo re much mo re at liberty to take a hard-line s tance agains t China whilethe DPJ pres idential electio n ndash wo n again by Kan Nao to ndash to o k place o n 14 September fo llo wed by the prime minis ter`s departure toNew Yo rk to attend the UN General Assembly o n 22 September The fo reign minis ter befo re the 17 September was Okada Katsuyawho was also mo re inclined to take a s tro ng s tance Maehara as well as Okada had seen the CG`s video o f the co llis io n which co uld

no t but have left them with a very negative impress io n o f the Chinese captain`s actio ns 129 It certainly did no t help when Maehara inhis new po s t as fo reign minis ter qualif ied China`s reactio n in the Diet o n 18 September as `very hys terical` and then declared o n

21 September that there had never been an unders tanding abo ut shelving the territo rial dispute130 On 23 September Secretary o fState Hillary Clinto n assured vis iting Fo reign Minis ter Maehara that the Senkaku Is lands were co vered by the bilateral Japan-USSecurity Treaty an interventio n that was certainly also no t welco me to the Chinese Ho wever there have been speculatio ns that inexchange fo r this s tro ng US reco nfirmatio n o f the security guarantee in o rder to get o ut o f the s talemate the Japanese had to

pro mise to release o f the Chinese captain which o ccurred the fo llo wing day131

The 2010 incident had several co nsequences which made a recurrence very likely Firs t o f all the incident raised tens io ns to a degreelas t seen during the anti-Japan demo ns tratio ns in 2004 and 2005 which had been mainly co ncerned with Japan`s attempt to gain apermanent UN Security Co uncil seat and the his to ry is sue These tens io ns had made it impo ss ible to have any new nego tiatio nro und to co nclude a treaty abo ut co o peratio n in the explo itatio n o f hydro carbo n reso urces in the Eas t China Sea and thus reduceano ther majo r so urce o f bilateral tens io ns and o ne mo reo ver related to the Senkaku is sue Agains t this backgro und but also inline with its previo us po s itio n Japan rejected a Chinese pro po sal made in Octo ber 2010 fo r jo int reso urce develo pment in the

Senkaku area132 The legal aftermath o f the incident co ntinued fo r so me time with Japan claiming co mpensatio n fro m the Chinesecaptain fo r the damage caused to the two CG vessels which was rejected by China and co untered with demands fo r co mpensatio nand an apo lo gy The Japanese pro secuto r dro pped the case agains t the captain o nly in January 2011 but the CG s till sent a bill to

the captain in February 2011133

While the incident helped the Japanese go vernment to o btain s tro ng US suppo rt o n the applicability o f the bilateral security treaty tothe Senkaku Is lands and generally helped to co nvince the Japanese public abo ut the need fo r greater Japanese defence effo rts(including a s trengthening o f US leverage vis-agrave-vis Japan co ncerning the realignment o f its fo rces o n Okinawa) it reduced Japan`sindependence with respect to the degree o f suppo rt it pro vided fo r US China po licy

Seco ndly the incident further undermined the co nditio ns which were the fo undatio n fo r the uno fficial shelving o f the Senkaku is sueIf it was no t yet clear to everybo dy that there was a territo rial dispute o ver the Senkaku Is lands then this incident with theunprecedented Chinese sanctio ns agains t Japan lifted the las t remnants o f do ubt Maehara Seji who repeated o n 25 o ccas io ns inDiet debates between 10 September and 16 No vember 2010 that there exis ted no territo rial dispute made this o fficial po s itio n

even less co nvincing134 The incident pro mpted Beijing to publicly undermine Japan`s territo rial claim further by anno uncing o n 29Octo ber 2010 permanent deplo yment o f large fisheries patro l vessels in waters near the Senkaku Is lands which was recipro cated by

the CG deplo ying patro l vessels o f o ver 1000 to ns in the same area135 In a further tit-fo r-tat o n 17 December 2010 the city

go vernment o f Ishigaki the adminis trative autho rity o f the Senkaku Is lands passed an o rdinance to des ignate 14 January the day to

co mmemo rate the Senkaku Is lands` inco rpo ratio n in 1895136

The further ero s io n o f the shelving agreement after Octo ber 2010

The next majo r co nfro ntatio n o ver the Senkaku Is lands in September 2012 o ccurred agains t the backgro und o f mo re measurestaken by bo th s ides to suppo rt their respective territo rial claims and do mes tic circumstances in bo th co untries which were evenless co nducive to re-es tablish trus t and go o d relatio ns The gro wing US-China po litical and military rivalry in Eas t As ia asexemplif ied by the As ia pivo t which China perceives as directed agains t its rise certainly did no t help Initially the year 2011 saw areco very o f relatio ns fro m the 2010 incident Bilateral trade reached a new high with a vo lume o f $345 billio n Japanese fo reign

direct inves tment in China so ared nearly 50 per cent in 2011 to $6 3bn137 Mo reo ver the Chinese public was very impressed with thedis ciplined way the Japanese peo ple reacted to wards the triple disas ters which hit the co untry o n 11 March 2011 and there was an

o utpo uring o f sympathy which also included the sending o f a Chinese search-and-rescue miss io n to the affected To ho ku area138

Yet this impro ved atmo sphere was quickly dispelled when the results o f the textbo o k review were published o n 27 March whichasserted Japan`s territo rial claim to the Senkaku Is lands (as well as to TakeshimaDo kto ) and denied the Chinese figure o f

300 000 victims in the Nanjing massacre139

In the meantime the Japanese go vernment co ntinued to turn the legal s crews which affected the Senkaku Is lands by implementingdo mes tic laws in o rder to be co ngruent with internatio nal law and s trengthening maritime co ntro l In February 2012 the Japanesecabinet passed bills to enhance the Japan Co as t Guards law enfo rcement po wers in territo rial waters which wo uld fo r example

autho rize the CG to o rder fo reign ships to leave Japan`s Territo rial Waters witho ut firs t bo arding them140 Other adminis trativemeasures derived fro m the Bas ic Law o n Ocean Po licy which had been enacted in 2007 and which pro vides the framewo rk fo radminis trating remo te is lands Since 2009 Japan has given names to hitherto unnamed is lands to subs tantiate its claims to anEEZ Fo r this purpo se in Augus t 2011 the go vernment placed 23 uninhabited is lands under s tate co ntro l but fo ur is lets near theSenkaku Is lands were exempt o ut o f co ns ideratio n fo r China In March 2012 ho wever the go vernment abando ned this cautio n and

regis tered Kitako jima as a natio nal asset141 In No vember 2011 the go vernment had let it be kno wn that it wo uld sho rtly release a

new lis t o f names fo r is lands which wo uld include is lets o f the Senkaku gro up142 China pro tes ted and a meeting in Beijing plannedin February 2012 between Pres ident Hu Jintao and representatives o f seven bilateral friendship gro ups fro m Japan was cancelled Ano pinio n piece in the Peoples Daily (RMRB) o n 17 January 2012 said Japans mo ve lsquois a blatant mo ve to damage Chinas co re

interes ts rsquo143 On 2 March 2012 To kyo finally anno unced a lis t o f 39 is lands which included fo ur is lets in the Senkaku Is lands

gro up144 The Chinese pro tes ted immediately o n the same day and in a tit-fo r-tat the State Oceanic Adminis tratio n released o n 3

March s tandard names and descriptio ns o f the Senkaku is lands and its 70 affiliated is lets 145 Ano ther Chinese co untermo ve was theanno uncement o n 16 March by the SOA that they had s tarted patro lling near the Senkaku Is lands This was fo llo wed pro mptly o n thesame day by o ne CMS ship entering the Territo rial Waters o f the Senkaku Is lands and the same vessels with ano ther CMS ship

cruis ing in the Co ntiguo us Waters o f the is lands 146 In No vember 2010 an o fficial o f the Minis try o f Agricultures Bureau o f Fisherieswhich o perates the Fisheries Law Enfo rcement Co mmand (FLEC) had already anno unced that his o rganizatio n wo uld fro m no w o n

deplo y fisheries patro l vessels o f o ver 1000 to ns to maintain co ntinuo us patro ls 147

THE 2012 CONFRONTATION ISHIHARA SHINTARO LIGHTING THE FUSE

It was in this tense enviro nment that To kyo Go verno r Ishihara Shintaro anno unced o n 16 April 2012 that the To kyo Metro po litanGo vernment (TMG) was nego tiating the purchase o f three o f the fo ur privately-held Senkaku is lands by the end o f the year ie

Uo tsurijima Kita Ko jima and Minami Ko jima The lease o f the central go vernment fo r these three is lands was due to expire in March2013 and no incident wo uld have o ccurred if the go vernment had quietly renewed the lease The central go vernment s tated that ithad no t kno wn abo ut Ishihara`s intentio n but that there had been co ntacts o n vario us o ccas io ns between the go vernment and the

private o wner148 This seems co nvincing s ince s tate o wnership wo uld have pro vided better preventio n o f incidents even mo re thanjus t leas ing Taken aback by Ishihara`s surprise mo ve the Chief Cabinet Secretary Fujimura Osamu declared the fo llo wing day thatthe central go vernment might acquire the is lands `if required` and Prime Minis ter No da implied in a Diet speech o n the 18 April that

a purchase by the central go vernment was o ne o f the o ptio ns Bo th s tatements were widely repo rted in China149 Ishihara hadcho sen his anno uncement fo r maximum effect o n the o ccas io n o f a speech at the co nservative Washingto n DC-based HeritageFo undatio n He made it clear that this pro ject was meant as a criticism o f the DPJ-led central go vernment which he co ns ideredfailing in its duty to sufficiently pro tect Japan`s so vereignty by saying that the central go vernment sho uld be buying the is lands butthat the Gaimusho was to o afraid o f o ffending China The lo catio n o f his anno uncement was meant to gain s tro nger suppo rt fro m

the US fo r Japan`s territo rial claim150 As we have seen abo ve fro m Ishihara`s activities in the 1970s this anno uncement was inmany ways the lo gical co nclus io n o f his lo ng las ting o bsess io n with the Senkaku Is lands and his hatred o f co mmunis t China It wasthe 2010 incident in particular which had enco uraged him to renew his o ld plan o f buying the is lands after his earlier failure to do so His go o d co nnectio ns with the o wner Kurihara Kunio ki who shared his natio nalis t pro clivities helped Ishihara to beco me the

favo ured purchaser151

The po ss ibility o f having the three is lands under the co ntro l o f the natio nalis tic go verno r o f To kyo who wanted to build facilities o nthe is lands to s trengthen Japan`s so vereignty was unpalatable to the No da go vernment which feared co mplicatio ns with China In a

meeting o n 18 May No da and his to p advisers decided in principle to purchase the is lands 152 Pressure o n the go vernmentincreased to pre-empt Ishihara because he was as to nishingly success ful in rais ing vo luntary co ntributio ns fro m the public to buythe three is lands thus circumventing any legal diff iculties in us ing To kyo `s taxpayer mo ney and also pro ving the po pularity o f his

mo ve By 1 June he had co llected 70 000 do natio ns to taling aro und yen101 billio n which increased to yen146 billio n by 6 September153

On 27 July the TMG ran an advertisement in the Wall Street Journal asking fo r US unders tanding and suppo rt fo r the purchase plan154

The TMG had to reques t central go vernment permiss io n to co nduct a survey o f the is lands which the go vernment refused to grant

o n 27 Augus t fo rcing the TMG to co nduct a survey fro m a ship o n 2 September155 In the end it was the higher sum and the sho rtes tdelay o f co ncluding the deal which pro mpted Kurihara Kunio ki who was apparently in so me financial diff iculties to accept the centralgo vernment`s o ffer o f yen205 billio n ($26 millio n) and to s ign the co ntract o n 11 September This was an embarrass ing turn fo rIshihara In additio n he did no t succeed in us ing the o ffer o f his co llected mo ney to entice the No da go vernment to pro mise thebuilding o f any facility o n the is lands No da was presented by his adminis tratio n with several o ptio ns including his favo ured o ptio no f repairing the exis ting light ho use o n Uo tsurijima but in the end was co nvinced by Fo reign Minis ter Gemba to leave things as they

were in o rder no t to further inflame the Chinese156

The central go vernment`s purchase o f the three is lands o n 11 September immediately led to a very harsh reactio n by the Chinesewhich was even wo rse than in 2010 But befo re lo o king at Chinese co untermeasures after 11 September in detail it is impo rtant toinves tigate why the Chinese reactio n was so s tro ng and why the Japanese apparently did no t anticipate it particularly in view o fChina`s unprecedented reactio n in September 2010

CHINESE WARNINGS BEFORE THE NATIONALIZATION ON 11 SEPTEMBER

Prime Minis ter No da admitted o n 19 September o nly eight days into the co mprehens ive Chinese sanctio ns and co unter measures

that he had underes timated their extent157

158 In a named co mmentary o f Xinhua o n 18 April attentio n was drawn to Ishihara`s kno wn right wing and anti-Chinese s tatementsbut also po inted o ut that the CMOFA `wo uld no t hes itate to take any necessary measures to safeguard so vereignty o ver the Diao yu

Is lands`159 Vice-Pres ident Xi Jinping to ld vis iting Ko no Yo hei a kno wn pro -China hand that Japan sho uld no t wo rsen the bilateral

relatio nship and that co re is sues sho uld be reso lved by the two co untries in an appro priate manner16 0 At the end o f April the StateOceanic Adminis tratio n anno unced a plan to des ignate is lands and their surro unding waters as s trategically vital and to pro tect their

enviro nments and develo p marine reso urces 16 1 Mo re specifically targeting the Senkaku Is lands was ho wever the entry o n 3 May o f

two FLEC vessels into the Senkaku Is lands` Co ntiguo us Waters fo r the firs t time s ince Ishihara`s anno uncement16 2 Bilateraltens io ns also increased after a Japanese right wing gro up suppo rted the ho lding o f a meeting o f the Wo rld Uyghur Co ngress in

To kyo fro m 14 to 18 May which led to the cancellatio n by Beijing o f several o fficial vis its 16 3 On 13 May Premier Wen Jiabao raisedthe Senkaku is sue and the Uighur meeting during talks in Beijing with Prime Minis ter Yo shihiko No da cautio ning that lsquoit is impo rtant

to respect Chinarsquos co re interes ts and matters o f great co ncernrsquo16 4 Wang Jiarui head o f the Co mmunis t Partys Internatio nalDepartment was quo ted by Eda Satsuki a fo reign po licy adviser o f the DPJ that bo th the Senkaku and the Uighur is sue were

described as `co re is sues` and Wen`s s tatement was s tressed in a Chinese TV bro adcas t16 5 The Xinjiang is sue as well as Taiwanand Tibet have been referred to fo r so me time by the Chinese go vernment as `co re is sues` but the Senkaku is sue had been called

a `co re is sue` apparently fo r the firs t time o nly in an o pinio n piece by the Renmin Ribao in January 201216 6 Only o n 23 March 2013did the Chinese Fo reign Minis try Spo kesperso n clearly s tate that China regards the Diao yu Is lands as its co re interes t altho ugh the

written reco rd subsequently so ftened this s tatement16 7

The abo ve chro no lo gy certainly gives the impress io n that there was a series o f Chinese reactio ns which expressed s tro ng Chineseco ncern with any purchase (whether by the TMG o r the central go vernment) o f the Senkaku Is lands If that had no t been eno ugh theinterview o f the Financial Times with Japan`s ambassado r in China Niwa Uichiro at the beginning o f June sho wed s tro ng co ncernabo ut the implicatio ns o f a purchase He was quo ted as saying that lsquoif Mr Ishihararsquos plans are acted upo n then it will result in anextremely grave cris is in relatio ns between Japan and ChinahellipWe canno t allo w decades o f pas t effo rt to be bro ught to no thingrsquo He

added that such a cris is wo uld affect bus iness 16 8 Niwa mus t have been truly co ncerned abo ut the severity o f the s ituatio n to makesuch an undiplo matic public s tatement fo r which he was reprimanded by Fo reign Minis ter Gemba and criticized by so me media

o utlets and po liticians ultimately leading to his recall later in the year16 9

The Chinese warnings became sharper at the seco nd s tage when Prime Minis ter No da anno unced o n 7 July that his go vernment wo uldseek to buy the is lands because the purchase co uld no lo nger be put do wn to a mere lo cal maverick with s tro ng anti-Chineseinclinatio ns The Global Times edito rial o f 9 July sho wed the frus tratio n by so me Chinese lsquoEach time Japan takes o ne s tep we sho uldtake o ne and half o r even two s teps fo rward making Japan aware o f the grave co nsequences caused by its aggress io n agains t

Chinarsquo170 A Xinhua co mmentary o n 7 July quo tes the CMOFA`s spo kesperso n referring pro bably fo r the firs t time in this ro w to a`co nsensus` agains t which the Japanese go vernment went by wanting to buy the is lands meaning o f co urse the shelving co nsensus

o f 1972 and 1978171 On 9 July a Xinhua co mmentary titled `Japan playing with fire o ver Diao yu Is lands` called the purchase by the

central go vernment a `farcical ambitio n` an express io n repeated thereafter many times 172 On 11 July the Japanese media repo rtedthe entry by three FLEC vessels into the territo rial waters o f Kubajima the firs t time s ince the 16 March 2012 fo llo wed by o ne vessel

cruis ing the fo llo wing day in the is land`s co ntiguo us zo ne173 Public o pinio n became increas ingly inflamed and the Global Timesrepo rted o n 19 July that 90 8 per cent o f Chinese peo ple surveyed appro ve us ing the military to enfo rce Chinas so vereignty o ver

the is lets with 521 per cent saying a military clash lsquois likelyrsquo between China and Japan o ver the is lands 174

Even the US gave Japan `s tro ng advice` no t to pro ceed with the purchase because it co uld `trigger a cris is` as was revealed in April2013 by Kurt Campbell who was at the time Ass is tant Secretary fo r Eas t As ian and Pacific Affairs Even tho ugh we warned JapanJapan decided to go in a different directio n and they tho ught they had gained the suppo rt o f China o r so me did which we were

certain that they had no t Campbell is quo ted in an interview with Kyo do 175

FAILURE OF COMMUNICATION

The abo ve chro no lo gy and escalatio n o f Chinese reactio ns to the planned purchase o f the is lands o ver the summer 2012 give aclear indicatio n that a Japanese purchase o f the three is lands was no t co ns idered jus t ano ther incident witho ut majo rco nsequences So why did the Japanese go vernment s till go ahead with the purchase In the final analys is the failure to avo id thecris is escalating in September 2012 lay in the wide difference between the interes ts o f the two go vernments Do mes ticcircumstances o n bo th s ides and the inherent zero sum nature o f territo rial disputes prevented the trans itio n fro m dialo gue topreventive actio n let alo ne so lutio n Aggravating events o ver the summer 2012 which raised tempers o n bo th s ides were thedemands by the TMG to send a survey team to the Senkaku Is lands (the No da go vernment after so me initial co nflicting repo rts didno t allo w a landing) the landing o f Ho ng Ko ng activis ts o n Uo tsurijima o n 15 Augus t (timed with the anniversary o f Japan`ssurrender) fo llo wed by the landing o f Japanese activis ts ( including lo cal parliamentarians ) o n 19 Augus t and an attack in Beijing o n27 Augus t o n the car carrying Ambassado r Niwa Despite o ngo ing co mmunicatio n and dialo gue thro ugh vario us channels theseadverse circumstances led to a hardening o f po s itio ns o ver the summer 2012 between the two go vernments

The Japanese central go vernment had been caught sho rt by Ishihara`s sudden anno uncement o n 16 April and became to tallyabso rbed with preventing the maverick po litician fro m go ing ahead with the purchase o f the is lands fearing rightly that this wo uldserio us ly co mplicate Japan-China relatio ns Ishihara wanted to embarrass the No da go vernment which was co ns tantly declining inpo pularity and to fo rce it to deal mo re assertively with the is lands As we have seen fo r Ishihara it was no t jus t abo ut purchas ingthe is lands but abo ut building facilities o n them Fo r the No da go vernment buying the is lands by the s tate was therefo re the lesserevil The go vernment tried all alo ng to co nvince the Chinese o f To kyo `s go o d intentio ns fo r example when Fo reign Minis ter Gembamet with his Chinese co unterpart Yang Jiechi o n 11 July that the purchase was o nly a `do mes tic co mmercial transactio n` and no t a

diplo matic matter and was o nly meant to ensure that the is lands wo uld be `adminis tered peacefully and s tably`176 In December2012 when the full extent o f China`s unprecedented reactio ns had beco me kno wn the new Japanese ambassado r Kitera s till s tatedthat lsquoThe change in o wnership sho uld no t have caused a pro blem in relatio ns with Chinarsquo adding that Japan had given China sufficient

explanatio ns ahead o f the purchase177 Fo reign Minis ter Gemba even tried to highlight in No vember that the purchase was actually areturn to the status quo ante lsquoThe measure taken by the go vernment o f Japan was jus t a trans fer o f title under Japanese do mes ticlaw and jus t means that the o wnership o f the is lands mdash held by the go vernment until 1932 mdash was returned fro m a private citizen to

the go vernmentrsquo178 In sho rt fo r the Japanese the purchase o f the is lands was aimed at maintaining the status quo in such a waythat it ho ped China wo uld co ns ider to be in its o wn interes t that is by cho o s ing the lesser o f two evils That express io ns like`peaceful adminis tratio n` o r `trans fer o f title under do mes tic Japanese law` co uld o nly be interpreted by the Chinese as acts o fasserting Japanese so vereignty was apparently s imply igno red Under these circumstances it was impo ss ible to co nvince theChinese that trans fer o f o wnership had no thing to do with so vereignty Ins tead the Chinese even suspected that the No da

go vernment and Ishihara were co nniving at s trengthening Japan`s co ntro l o ver the is lands 179

Any intended co nciliato ry o verto ne in the abo ve explanatio ns by Gemba and many s imilar declaratio ns befo re and later were furthernegated by the ins is tence that there was no territo rial dispute exactly the po s itio n the Chinese mo s t so ught to change Thefrequent references to `co re interes t` by China were igno red by the Japanese go vernment Fo r the Chinese leaders the `o ffer` tocho o se between the To kyo Metro po litan Go vernment o r the Go vernment o f Japan buying the is lands was as Vice Fo reign Minis ter

Zhang Zhijun later put it like being asked to cho o se between two do ses o f po iso n18 0

It was also unfo rtunate that the Japanese go vernment allo wed the express io n kokuyuka (natio nalizatio n) to prevail even amo ng

go vernment members ins tead o f the o riginal term agreed by the Japanese cabinet shutoku (acquis itio n)18 1 Chinese media hastaken o ver the Japanese term o f lsquonatio nalizatio nrsquo which certainly further co nfused Chinese public o pinio n Since it do es no t kno w thehis to rical backgro und and Japan`s effective co ntro l o f the is lands `natio nalizatio n` tended to be unders to o d as a radical change in

the status quo o r even as invas io n18 2 A well kno wn Japanese o bserver in China Kato Yo shikazu even argued therefo re that the 1972

and 1978 unders tanding abo ut shelving had prevented the Chinese peo ple fro m learning abo ut the is sue as perceived in Japan18 3

Bo th s ides made it impo ss ible with their extreme and diametrically o ppo sed po s itio ns to find a co mpro mise The No da go vernmentwas to o weak (and also to o preo ccupied with o ther is sues like the pass ing o f the law to intro duce a hike o f the value added taxco ping with the aftermath o f the triple disas ter o f March 2011 and s imply trying to s tay in po wer) to find an alternative to the no wabando ned `shelving co mpro mise` and to admit that there was a territo rial pro blem At the end o f Augus t No da was fo rced topro mise Lo wer Ho use electio ns `so metime so o n` despite the grim o utlo o k fo r his party`s chances in the electio ns Making aco mpro mise o n the territo rial is sue wo uld no t have helped to gain po pular suppo rt While the Chinese pro bably felt enco uraged toescalate pressure by their success in fo rcing the Japanese go vernment hand o ver the captain in September 2010 it mo s t likely hadthe effect o n the No da go vernment to remain inflexible in o rder to avo id being seen yet again as caving in to Chinese pressure Butthe Chinese were also no t able to co mpro mise o n their demand that the Japanese sho uld admit the exis tence o f a territo rial is sue

The preparatio n fo r the 18 th Natio nal Party Co ngress in No vember 2012 and the ensuing leadership change to be finalized o nly inspring 2013 s imilarly did no t allo w the Chinese leaders whether inco ming o r o utgo ing to appear so ft Eight o ut o f nine Po litbureaumembers publicly expressed o ppo s itio n to the purchase either befo re o r after the anno uncement o f the purchase o n 11

September18 4 There are also credible repo rts that during the CCP`s summer retreat to Beihaide in Augus t Hu Jintao came underpressure fro m the future gro up o f leaders to take a mo re severe po s itio n o n Japan`s intentio n to natio nalise the three is lands Asa result the leading fo reign po licy interlo cuto rs o f the Japanese go vernment Zhang Zhijun and Dai Bingguo hardened their po s itio n

as well18 5 Public o pinio n in China had gro wn increas ingly ho s tile to Japan o ver the summer and was particularly inflamed when thelanding o f the Ho ng Ko ng activis ts was fo llo wed by the landing o f Japanese activis ts which were treated by the Japanese autho ritiesmo re leniently than the fo rmer ie no t arres ted despite having vio lated private land leased to the s tate Rio ts in several Chinese

cities s tarted thereafter18 6

Altho ugh bo th s ides agreed to co ntinue dialo gue and several o fficial meetings at different levels to o k place they co uld o nly end inres tating kno wn po s itio ns China did no t make things eas ier by later cancelling such meetings depriving bo th s ides o f po ss ibleo ppo rtunities to find a breakthro ugh The s tart o f Chinese sanctio ns acro ss the who le gambit o f bilateral relatio ns deprived theJapanese o f even mo re do mes tic wriggle ro o m fo r a co mpro mise

It seems that the abo ve circumstances did no t allo w Japan`s central decis io n-makers co ncerned with the is sue in particular the

Prime Minis ter and his immediate circle to admit to ando r unders tand until the purchase anno uncement o n 11 September 2012ho w s tro ngly the Chinese felt abo ut it Ambassado r Niwa`s rather undiplo matic s tatements in the Financial Times interview seem toindicate that he felt that the central decis io n-makers did no t unders tand the s trength o f the feelings o f the Chinese and ho w far theymight go Niwa warned in his interview that even a po ss ible pre-purchase survey o f the is lands co uld be diplo matically incendiary

s ince such a survey was dis cussed already at the time to enable the TMG to go ahead with the purchase18 7 As late as the 3September the Yomiuri Shimbun repo rted that the Chinese go vernment was reacting calmly as lo ng as three co nditio ns wereo bserved to maintain the status quo The co nditio ns co ntained no o ppo s itio n to a po ss ible purchase and ins tead jus t mentio ned

abs tentio n fro m landing surveying and building facilities o n the is lands 18 8 Acco rding to Pro fesso r Takahara Akio General ZhuChenghu said o n 5 September that a purchase by the central go vernment wo uld be better and Qu Xing directo r o f the China Ins titute

o f Internatio nal Affairs is said to have expressed a s imilar o pinio n18 9 Even o n 12 September when the s to rm bro ke the deputydirecto r o f the Japan Ins titute o f the Chinese Academy o f So cial Science Gao Ho ng s tated in an interview with the o n-line vers io no f the Renmin Ribao that if Japan wo uld respect the three abs tentio ns mentio ned abo ve the s ituatio n co uld ultimately revert to the

status quo ante19 0 But these were no lo nger the decis ive vo ices o f the Chinese leadership after the Beihaide meeting The abo ve-mentio ned Campbell interview seems to sugges t that Japan was lo ng befo re mo re inclined to act upo n Chinese s tatements whichwere clo ser to what it wanted to unders tand

CHINESE REACTION RHETORICAL WARFARE

The final misco mmunicatio n o r clash o f irreco ncilable interes ts o ccurred when Prime Minis ter No da met Pres ident Hu o n thes idelines o f the As ia Pacific Eco no mic Co o peratio n (APEC) summit in Vladivo s to k o n 9 September then anno unced two days laterthe s igning o f the purchase co ntract with the Kurihara family Whether Hu had no t sufficiently co nveyed his s tro ng feelingsco ncerning the purchase which had been kno wn and bilaterally dis cussed at leas t s ince the Japanese o fficial anno uncement o f itspurchase intentio n o n 7 July o r No da had no t unders tanding the Chinese feeling fo r the po ss ible reaso ns dis cussed abo ve Hu

apparently felt he had lo s t face when Japan anno unced the purchase o n 11 September19 1 Mo reo ver the Japanese anno uncementco uld no t have co me at a mo re awkward time because o f the anniversary o f the Mukden Incident o n the 18 September which likeseveral o ther carefully cultivated anniversaries regarding Japan`s pas t misdeeds in China always aro use latent anti-Japanesefeelings As a result the Japanese anno uncement caused an avalanche o f virulent rheto rical o utburs ts relating to the pas t po liticalsanctio ns further measures to assert China`s territo rial claim (fo r example including the is lands in the Chinese TV weatherfo recas t an exhibitio n o f ancient maps to pro ve Chinese co ntro l) eco no mic sanctio ns and an escalatio n o f patro ls by ChineseFLEC and MSA ships and aircraft aro und the Senkaku Is lands

The mildes t part o f China`s rheto rical o ffens ive was calling the go vernment purchase a `farce` a rather undiplo matic express io nalready used by Xinhua in July 2012 but then taken up at the highes t level by Vice Pres ident Xi Jinping when meeting Secretary o f

Defence Leo n Panetta o n 19 September19 2 But the main line fro m no w o n was that Japan`s claim to the Senkaku Is lands was adenial o f the po s t-Wo rld War II results In its s tatements and rebuttals the Chinese sho wed their frus tratio n at no t having been ableto fundamentally change the status quo and they did no t hes itate to use express io ns which were rather undignified fo r diplo mats andpo litical leaders Japan o n the o ther hand argued fo r peaceful reso lutio n alo ng the lines o f internatio nal law and dialo gue whichpro bably infuriated the Chinese even mo re On 10 September the CMFA is sued a s tatement calling Japans po s itio n o n the disputedis lands `an o utright denial o f the o utco mes o f the victo ry o f the Wo rld Anti-Fascis t War and hellip a grave challenge to the po s t-war

internatio nal o rder`19 3 In a heated exchange at the UN General Assembly between Chinas UN ambassado r Li Bao do ng and JapansDeputy UN ambassado r Ko dama Kazuo Li called the mo tive fo r purchas ing the three is lands to lsquolegalize its s tealing and o ccupatio no f Chinese territo ryrsquo and s tated lsquoThis actio n o f Japan co ns titutes a serio us encro achment upo n Chinas so vereignty and intends toco ntinue and legalize the result o f Japans co lo nial po licy It is an o pen denial o f the o utco mes o f victo ry o f the wo rld anti-fascis twar and a grave challenge to the po s t-war internatio nal o rder and the purpo ses and principles o f the Charter o f the United

Natio ns rsquo19 4 In a further rebuttal o f Japan`s assertio n o f its claim Li characterized the is land purchase as lsquono thing different fro m

mo ney launderingrsquo19 5 At the As ia Euro pe Meeting (ASEM) in Lao s Fo reign Minis ter Yang Jiechi repeated the reference to the`o utco me o f the anti-Fascis t war` while Prime Minis ter No da spo ke o f peaceful reso lutio n o f co nflicts acco rding to internatio nal

law19 6 On 11 Octo ber the CMFA spo kesperso n Ho ng Lei refuted Fo reign Minis ter Gembarsquos his to rical acco unt jus tifying Japan`s

claim by calling it `gangs ter lo gic`19 7

On the Chinese s ide therefo re there are no w two clo sely-linked his to ry narratives o ne is abo ut the is lands having been part o fChina s ince the Ming and Qing dynas ties the o ther co nnects the is lands to the already well-rehearsed his to ry narrative ie Japanhaving victimised China s ince the Sino -Japanese war o f 1894-95 These two narratives co ntinue to be cultivated by the Chineseleadership In Octo ber 2012 the Chinese anno uncement o f the publicatio n o f 80 vo lumes o n the Far Eas t War Criminal Co urt was

clearly meant to link the latter narrative to Japan`s acquis itio n o f the Senkaku Is lands 19 8 Fo rmer Fo reign Minis ter Gemba explicitlytried in Octo ber 2012 to delink the territo rial is sue fro m Japan`s aggress io n agains t China o nly to be reminded by the Chineseambassado r to the UK in an article in the Financial Times (as part o f the ensuing wo rldwide press campaign by bo th s ides ) that lsquothe

Diao yu Dao is sue is all abo ut his to ryrsquo19 9 Since then until no w China has co ntinued this ldquohis to ry warfarerdquo by publishing endlessarticles o n Japan`s aggress io n agains t China befo re 1945 The mo s t recent mo ve in July 2014 is the serialised o n-line publicatio n o f

the hand-written co nfess io ns by 45 Japanese co nvicted war criminals by the State Archives Adminis tratio n20 0

POLITICAL SANCTIONS AND PUBLIC OPINION

Chinese po litical co untermeasures ranged fro m the cancellatio n o f o fficial and uno fficial vis its to further legal acts to reinfo rce

China`s claim to the Senkaku Is lands Aro und 40 per cent o f ceremo nial events in Japan to mark 2012 as the 40 th anniversary o f the

no rmalizatio n o f diplo matic relatio ns with China were cancelled o r po s tpo ned and even mo re events in China20 1 Thesecancellatio ns were no t always the result o f direct go vernment interventio n but so metimes mo re indirect o fficial `dis co uragement`helped by the Chinese preference fo r no t being seen to do so mething in co ntradictio n to the (initially fo mented and later self-pro pelling) anti-Japan atmo sphere o r by fear o f participants running into demo ns tratio ns if no t assaults The legal s crews werefurther turned with lo ng-term implicatio ns On 10 September the Chinese go vernment anno unced the base po ints and baselines o f

the territo rial waters o f the disputed is lands and their affiliated is lets as well as the names and co o rdinates o f 17 base po ints 20 2

On 16 September repo rts appeared that China was submitting pro po sals fo r its extended co ntinental shelf to the UN Co ntinental

Shelf Co mmiss io n which included the Senkaku Is lands but in fact the actual submiss io n o ccurred o nly o n 14 December 201220 3 On

20 September a go vernment agency published a thematic map o f the Diao yu Is land and its affiliated is lands 20 4 Chinarsquos

Meteo ro lo gical Adminis tratio n s tarted pro viding weather fo recas ts fo r the Senkaku area o n the s tate-run TV s tatio n20 5 On 16September the fishery bureau anno unced the lifting o f the fishery ban in the Eas t China Sea and s tressed that China planned to

s trengthen its so vereignty claim o ver the Senkakus 20 6

There were rumo urs that 1000 fishing vessels wo uld co me to the Senkaku area and tho ugh this did no t materialize it helped to

further raise tens io ns 20 7

Mo st attentio n in Japan was fo cused o n the widening s treet pro tes ts in o ver 100 Chinese cities the des tructio n o f Japanese sho ps

res taurants cars and pro ductio n facilities and the attacks o n Japanese citizens in China20 8 The webs ites o f at leas t 19 Japanese

banks univers ities and o ther ins titutio ns came under cyber-attack20 9 At a demo ns tratio n in Shanghai abo ut 7000 pro tes ters

chanted s lo gans such as lsquoBeat Japanese imperialismrsquo lsquoBo yco tt Japanese pro ducts rsquo and lsquoDes tro y Japan and retrieve Okinawarsquo210

Altho ugh o nly 63 per cent o f po lled Japanese in late September 2012 expressed suppo rt fo r their go vernment`s natio nalizatio n o fthe is lands do wn fro m 73 per cent in a previo us po ll o n 15 and 16 September 82 per cent o f respo ndents in a Mainichi Shimbun

survey said the Japanese go vernment had no t pro tes ted s tro ngly eno ugh to Beijing o ver anti-Japan pro tes ts 211 The Chinesego vernment denied any o fficial invo lvement and the spo kesperso n o f the Waijiao bu went o nly as far as saying that the pro tes ts anddemo ns tratio ns were `co mpletely caused by the Japanese go vernments illegal purchase o f the Diao yu Is lands and are peo ples

spo ntaneo us acts`212 There were ho wever repo rts that so me o f the demo ns tratio ns were to lerated if no t abetted by go vernment

agencies 213 The demo ns tratio ns so o n died do wn because to lerating them much lo nger wo uld have run the risk that they wo uld turninto anti-go vernment demo ns tratio ns Even the Chinese Academy o f So cial Sciences repo rted that so me demo ns trato rs who were

arres ted did no t even kno w where the Senkaku Is lands were and that anger o ver the widening wealth gap was behind their acts 214 Inco ntras t to these Chinese demo ns tratio ns and acts o f lawlessness there was hardly any public demo ns tratio n in Japan whichsho ws the relative detachment o f the Japanese fro m the dispute On 22 September `Nippo n Gambare` a right wing o rganizatio nchaired by fo rmer Air Self Defence Fo rce chief Tamo gami To shio s taged a march thro ugh parts o f To kyo which this autho rwitnessed A brief fire was s tarted at a Chinese scho o l in Ko be and two smo ke bo mbs were thro wn into the Chinese Co nsulate

General in Fukuo ka215 But such actio ns were relatively rare and small in s cale

ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND THE QUESTION OF WHO IS MORE DEPENDENT ON WHOM

Pro tes t measures o f a lo nger duratio n and as yet unpredictable co nsequences fo r the bilateral relatio nship have been China`seco no mic sanctio ns and a bo yco tt o f Japanese go o ds by the general public altho ugh the autho rities denied again any go vernmentinterventio n A co mmentary o f Xinhua half admitted ho wever go vernment interventio n when it made the unco nvincing dis tinctio nbetween `measures` and `sanctio ns` `Since Japan purchased Chinas Diao yu Is lands in September the Chinese go vernment hastaken a series o f co untermeasures in the eco no mic legal diplo matic and military fields which have helped it to wres t the initiativeto reso lve the is lands dispute despite China no t impo s ing any eco no mic sanctio ns the Japanese eco no my has been badly

hit`216 Renmin Ribao co mpared `eco no mic punishments` with a `gun` and warned that thro ugh its is land purchase Japan hadalready to uched the `trigger` In a rather heavy hint the paper po inted o ut ho w vulnerable Japan`s eco no my was because o f the

2011 earthquake and the dependence o f key eco no mic secto rs o n China217 Even mo re o fficial was Vice Minis ter o f Co mmerce Jiang

Zengwei`s warning that the is land purchase wo uld inevitably have a negative impact o n Sino -Japanese eco no mic and trade ties 218

After 11 September it so o n became very o bvio us that the heavy hand o f the Chinese go vernment was impo s ing sanctio ns andmaking life fo r Japanese bus iness mo re diff icult On 21 September it was repo rted that Chinese cus to ms autho rities were

s trengthening inspectio ns o f impo rts fro m and expo rts to Japan altho ugh the Chinese autho rities denied this 219 In the same week

repo rts appeared abo ut Japanese co mpanies experiencing delays in o btaining wo rking visas fo r their Japanese emplo yees 220 BigJapanese co mpanies with inves tments in China were experiencing ho ld-ups in gaining regulato ry appro vals fo r Merger amp

Acquis itio ns 221 In co ntras t to the interference in rare earth expo rts to Japan after the trawler incident in 2010 ho wever no such

embargo was implemented because this particular eco no mic weapo n had lo s t its effectiveness s ince then (see belo w)222

The greates t medium-term damage to Japanese eco no mic activities apart fro m the abo ve mentio ned des tructio n o f Japaneseco mmercial and indus trial s ites was caused by a partial co nsumer bo yco tt no tably the fall o f car sales in China and Chineseto urism to Japan Overall bilateral trade decreased by 39 per cent in 2012 to $329 billio n the firs t dro p s ince the co llapse o f theLehman inves tment bank in 2009 and in 2013 to $3125 billio n acco rding to Chinese figures Acco rding to Japanese figures trade in

2013 increased but declined in vo lume223

The wo rs t hit secto r was auto mo biles To yo ta so ld 840 500 vehicles in China in 2012 the firs t annual dro p s ince 2002 Nis san

experienced a 24 per cent dro p in December China sales and Ho nda saw a 19 per cent December fall224 Ho wever as o f 2014Japanese car sales in and to China have again been increas ing The to uris t indus try was also hard hit in bo th co untries Chinese

vis ito rs to Japan decreased by 44 per cent fro m September to December 2012 fro m the year befo re225 The number o f Japanese

to uris ts o n gro up to urs to China plunged by mo re than 70 per cent year-o n-year in the las t three mo nths o f 2012226 This fallco ntinued into 2013 when their number fell to 29 millio n Japanese to uris ts do wn 18 2 fro m 2012 and the 3rd s traight annual

decline227 Ho wever in March 2014 vis ito rs fro m mainland China surged 80 1 fro m the previo us March to to tal 184200 a reco rdhigh fo r the mo nth and a s teeper year-o n-year rise than vis ito rs fro m any o ther co untries and regio ns This was also helped by the

falling yen and the resumptio n o f cruise to urs with large ships which were to tally suspended in March 2012228

Ano ther mo re lo ng-term negative eco no mic effect o n the bilateral relatio nship can be gauged fro m falling Japanese FDI to Chinawhich acco rding to Chinese figures declined by 422 in the firs t five mo nths o f 2014 after having fallen by 43 to $71 billio n in

2013 acco rding to Chinese figures o r by 18 to $10 9 billio n acco rding to Japanese figures 229

China`s multiple eco no mic retributio ns cas t do ubt o n the co ntinued viability o f the earlier `Ho t Eco no mics and Co ld Po litics`dicho to my The answer to the ques tio n which co untry is mo re dependent o n the o ther o r mo re vulnerable to sanctio ns is dependento n the eco no mic indicato rs and secto rs being cho sen and is also a po litical ques tio n because the answer can be po liticallymanipulated Japan`s eco no mic diff iculties s ince the 1990s (and its dependence o n eco no mic interactio n with China to co pe withthese diff iculties ) and China pushing Japan to No 3 in wo rld GDP ranking has diminished the Chinese perceptio n o f Japan as aneco no mic po wer ho use It means that fo r China the relatio nship with Japan became less impo rtant while po litical relatio nsdeterio rated at the same time The s tro ng effect o f the Chinese embargo o n rare earth expo rts to Japan in 2010 can be viewed intwo diametrically o ppo sed ways Chinese o bservers may be inclined to put emphas is o n the s tro ng effect it had o n Japanese publico pinio n and indus trial circles co ntributing to a certain extent to the go vernment`s surrender o f the trawler captain Others maypo int o ut that the case demo ns trated the futility o f abus ing a do minant supplier po s itio n because within a sho rt time Japan`sindus try secured alternative reso urces and demand reductio n thro ugh recycling and pro duct re-engineering no t o nly pro videdeno ugh breathing space but in the end reduced China`s market po wer Still Chinese experts are co nvinced that Japan is no w mo redependent o n China than the o ther way ro und Acco rding to so me specialis ts Chinas impo rts acco unted in 2011fo r 237 per cent o fJapan`s expo rt vo lume The bilateral trade vo lume in 2011 to o k up 21 per cent o f Japanese gro ss trade vo lume o f that year while it

merely acco unted fo r 9 4 per cent o f Chinas annual gro ss trade vo lume230 There seem to be o nly few Chinese vo ices which expressco ncern o ver the negative impact o f China`s sanctio ns o n China`s eco no my itself no tably at a time o f wo rldwide eco no mic

co ntractio n231

The Chinese market is certainly to o impo rtant fo r many Japanese co mpanies to leave A survey in No vember 2012 to which mo rethan 10 000 Japanese co mpanies in China replied sho wed that fo r almo s t 30 per cent o f them the territo rial dispute had affected

their bus iness but s till mo re than half want to maintain their o peratio ns and o nly 16 per cent said that they wanted to either cut

back o r pull o ut232 Japanese co mpanies in certain secto rs are likely to beco me mo re reluctant to make inves tments in China all themo re as o ther So utheas t As ian co untries (no tably Myanmar is currently the New Fro ntier fo r Japanese bus iness ) have cheaper

labo ur co s ts 233 Ho wever Chinese co nsumers s till prefer Japanese pro ducts fo r safer fo o d drinks and daily necess ities and tho se

Japanese co mpanies were hardly affected by the bo yco tt234

A wide gap between bo th s ides` perceptio n abo ut their eco no mic dependence and vulnerability to sanctio ns is dangero us fo r themanagement o f their bilateral relatio nship particularly when o ne s ide tries to leverage its suppo sedly s tro nger po s itio n to achievevicto ry in a sens itive area like territo rial integrity While Chinese co mmentato rs and experts may be inclined to o verrate Japan`svulnerability their Japanese co unterparts have a tendency to lo o k at the is sues to o much in purely eco no mic terms neglecting theimpact o f Chinese emo tio ns and go vernment pro paganda as well as the wider public`s insufficient kno wledge abo ut the o verall

impact o f bad eco no mic relatio ns with Japan o n China`s o wn eco no my235 The Japanese perceptio n remains that China in the endneeds Japan mo re than the o ther way ro und which in view o f China`s huge pro blems and its dependence o n Japanese hightechno lo gy co mpo nents fo r its manufacturing indus try is arguably the case This Japanese perceptio n has fo s tered the co nvictio nas demo ns trated fo r example by the belief in the sus tainability o f `Ho t Eco no mics and Co ld Po litics` that despite recurring

po litical crises in the relatio nship China wo uld in the end co mpro mise as it had do ne several times in the pas t236 Yet the pro blemwith the perceptio n o f `needing Japan` is that it can be po litically manipulated particularly in an autho ritarian sys tem This gapbetween Japanese and Chinese o bservers and experts o n the is sue o f dependence can serio us ly influence the willingness o f bo th

s ides to co mpro mise237 It also challenges the liberal view that clo se eco no mic relatio ns can prevent o r at leas t so ften deeppo litical differences like territo rial co nflicts which mo reo ver are linked to eco no mic interes ts like hydro carbo n reso urces In thisco ntext it is interes ting to no te that China has recently been exchanging with Japan a number o f high-po wered bus iness delegatio ns(apart fro m exchanges with po litical parties and lo cal go vernment o fficials ) The willingness o f Japanese bus iness to take part maybe interpreted by China as an express io n o f Japan`s eco no mic dependence o n China while giving it also the o ppo rtunity to putpressure o n the Abe go vernment to make co ncess io ns and to keep links with Japan fo r the po s t-Abe era

In view o f the impo rtance o f the eco no mic relatio nship and the damage suffered by Japanese bus iness after September 2012 o newo uld have expected mo re pressure fro m the bus iness co mmunity to co me to a territo rial co mpro mise so lutio n and so impro verelatio ns Ho wever this has no t been the case and may have to do with the perceptio n gap dis cussed abo ve but also the relativelack o f influence o n the go vernment (the majo rity o f the China-relevant Japanese bus iness co mmunity co ns is ts o f small- andmedium-s ized co mpanies ) the fear that a mo re vo cal ro le wo uld get co mpanies into tro uble with the autho rities in Japan ando rChina o r the ho pe o f being able to weather the po litical s to rms either because o f alternative market o ppo rtunities o r theco mpany`s s ize

FROM POLICING TO MILITARY INVOLVEMENT

The mo s t serio us co nsequences fo r the bilateral relatio nship ndash let alo ne fo r the so lutio n o f the territo rial dispute and regio nalpeace ndash arise fro m the co ns tant intrus io ns o f Chinese o fficial vessels into the Co ntiguo us Zo ne (CZ) o r even Territo rial Waters(TW) o f the Senkaku Is lands s ince September 2012 and the gro wing invo lvement o f the armed fo rces o f bo th s ides The aim o f theChinese is o bvio us to demo ns trate that the Japanese can no lo nger claim exclus ive co ntro l o f the is lands and to fo rce To kyo toadmit the exis tence o f a territo rial dispute Apparently a task fo rce at the highes t level headed by Xi Jinping was set up in

September 2012 to achieve this go al thro ugh escalating pressure238 So far law enfo rcement actio ns by Japan in the Senkaku areahave been limited to the deplo yment o f the Japanese Co as t Guard and po lice which is no w ho wever co ns tantly challenged byChinese with patro ls by CMS and FLEC (s ince 22 July 2013 unified under the State Ocean Adminis tratio n and renamed China Co as tGuard CG) vessels asserting the same rights in the is lands` CZ and TW The Chinese s ide escalated its pressure o n Japan by firs tdeplo ying FLEC vessels in the CZ and TW o f the disputed is lands then ratcheting up their pressure with CMS vessels do ing the samefo llo wed later in December 2012 with air patro ls by CMS aircraft which led to the deplo yment o f the air fo rce o f bo th s ides inJanuary 2013

As we have seen after the September 2010 incident in No vember 2010 FLEC s tarted to regularly send its vessels to the Senkakuarea which entered fro m time to time the is lands` CZ and also in Augus t 2011 twice the TW Apparently the mo re serio usintrus io ns which are tho se into the TW were so metimes timed with specific spikes o f tens io ns such as the TW incurs io n o n 16March 2012 (the Japanese naming o f so me is lands) July 2012 (No da`s anno uncement o f purchase intentio n o n 7 July) and finallyo n 19 September when s ix vessels entered the TW s tarting a series o f mo re frequent and regular incurs io ns In December 2012

FLEC deplo yed its newes t and bigges t ship the 5800-to n FLEC vessel Yuzheng 206 a fo rmer ship o f the Chinese navy239

The entries o f the vessels o f the CMS into the is lands` CZ and TW seem meant to send an even higher degree o f warning and denialo f Japan`s co ntro l o ver the is lands On 17 September the number o f FLEC and CMS vessels in the CZ and TW had reached the reco rd

o f 17240 Thereafter the frequency o f incurs io ns into the CZ and TW increased but it decreased after March 2013 On 30 Octo berXinhua even repo rted that the CMS had `expelled a number o f Japanese vessels illegally sailing in waters aro und the Diao yu

Is lands` altho ugh it is no t clear what exactly this meant s ince the CG did no t co nfirm such an incident241 Acco rding to Xinhua NewsAgency in 2013 China sent 50 ldquopatro l miss io ns rdquo into the TW o f the disputed is lands and as o f 12 July 2014 by the autho r`s co unt

there had been 17 such Chinese ldquopatro l miss io ns rdquo in 2014 which are ldquoincurs io ns rdquo fo r the Japanese s ide242 Other needle pricks todemo ns trate China`s claims are the o ccas io nal incurs io ns o f Chinese survey ships into the Senkaku Is lands` EEZ o r the bo ardingo f Chinese fishing vessels in the EEZ Defence Minis ter Itsuno ri Ono dera in late Octo ber 2013 called these repeated incurs io ns a

threat to peace which fell in a ldquogray zo ne (between) peacetime and an emergency s ituatio nrdquo243

A new level o f depriving Japan o f the ability to claim so le effective co ntro l o ver the is lands was reached o n 13 December 2012 when

a small turbo pro p aircraft o f the CMS (Harbin Y12 type) flew o ver Uo tsurijima244 Since then regular CMS air patro ls have beenco nducted but the aircraft no rmally s tay abo ut 120 km fro m the is lands With this mo ve Chinese measures to undermine Japan`sco ntro l o ver the is lands were expanded to the air space which fo r o rganizatio nal reaso ns had immediately military implicatio nsbecause the Air Self Defense Fo rce (ASDF) is respo ns ible fo r intercepting aircraft which intrude illegally into Japan`s air space The

incident did no t happen o ut o f the blue because already in January 2012 the SOA had anno unced a plan to deplo y the Y12 in 2012245

On 24 September the SOA had also anno unced plans to deplo y dro nes by 2015 fo llo wing the success ful tes t the previo us day 246

The Chinese acts are apparently carefully planned and co o rdinated s ince the o fficials in the abo ve Kyo do repo rt also said that theairspace vio latio ns o n 13 December 2012 by an airplane o f the CMS was planned by the s taff sectio n o f the natio nal Land and SeaBo rder Defense Co mmittee which acts as a liaiso n o ffice fo r the Chinese military the State Oceanic Adminis tratio n and the fishing

bureau o f the Agriculture Minis try with the aim o f rais ing tens io ns 247

The lo w altitude flight o f the Y12 o n 13 December was particularly upsetting fo r the Japanese go vernment because it was no t pickedup by the ASDF radar (the clo ses t o ne being o n Miyako jima abo ut 200 km fro m the is lands) but ins tead by CG ships in the area Inthis case eight ASDF fighters s crambled but co uld no t detect the Y12 Interceptio n o f aircraft is by nature much mo re diff icult andcarries a certain risk o f accident as happened in 2001 when a US intelligence aircraft co llided with a Chinese intercepto r jet Witho ut

explaining the s tandard Japanese pro ceedures fo r aerial defence which so lely relies o n the ASDF the Chinese media interpreted theuse o f military aircraft by Japan as `aggress ive` and the Global Times cautio ned agains t any interceptio n warning that China might

respo nd by sending its air fo rce248 On the Japanese s ide even the centre-left Asahi Shimbun called the Y12 flight ` a highly

pro vo cative act that co uld lead to an armed co nflict between the two co untries`249 At the beginning o f January 2013 there wereapparently erro neo us repo rts that the ASDF might co ns ider firing warning sho ts (tracer bullets ) at intruding Chinese aircraft which

pro mpted further bellico se co mments in the Chinese press 250 As a co nsequence the Chinese air fo rce also became invo lved o n10 January when the Chinese Minis try o f Defence anno unced that the Peo ple`s Liberatio n Army Air Fo rce (PLAA) had sent two fighterjets agains t two ASDF F-15 intercepto rs because they were fo llo wing a Chinese military Y8 transpo rt aircraft patro lling the airspace

o f Chinese o il platfo rms in the Eas t China Sea251 The Japanese repo rted that mo re than ten Chinese aircraft including military

aircraft had appro ached the Japanese air defence identificatio n zo ne252 In a further escalatio n the Japanese s ide repo rted that o n11 June 2014 two Chinese military jets flew abno rmally clo se to two planes o f Japans Self Defence Fo rce abo ve the Eas t China Sea

an accusatio n which the Chinese s ide refuted speaking ins tead o f two incidents pro vo ked by Japanese fighters 253 Related to thisdevelo pment and further enhancing the po ss ibility o f an incident is the enhanced patro lling o f the PLAA o ver the Eas t China Seawhich caused the ASDF to increase scrambling agains t PLAA aircraft to 415 times between 1 April 2013 and 31 March 2014 (Fis cal

Year 2013) 109 times mo re than in the previo us Fis cal Year 2012254

Co ntinuing to increase the pressure o n Japan the Chinese go vernment decreed o n 23 No vember 2013 an Air Defence Identificatio nZo ne (ADIZ) which includes the airspace o ver the Senkaku Is lands and was certainly meant to reinfo rce China`s territo rial claimdespite the fact that an ADIZ has no territo rial implicatio ns in internatio nal law The threat o f military co untermeasures in the text o fthe decree (lsquoChinas armed fo rces will ado pt defens ive emergency measures to respo nd to aircraft that do no t co o perate in the

identificatio n o r refuse to fo llo w the ins tructio ns rsquo) has further heightened the po ss ibility o f a military clash255 Ho wever theJapanese s ide refuses to accept the ADIZ The Chinese mo ves have wider implicatio ns fo r peace and s tability in the regio n in o rderto pro tect the freedo m o f its military aircraft in Eas t As ian airspace and its ability to o bserve China`s military fo rces Washingto nrefused to reco gnise the zo ne co ntinued to igno re the requirements o f the ADIZ by pursuing its regular patro l f lights and criticisedits implementatio n Simultaneo us ly ho wever the Department o f State advised civilian airlines to fo llo w China`s ins tructio ns andVice Pres ident Biden advised bo th co untries o n his trip to No rtheas t As ia in December 2013 to es tablish a cris is managements tructure Since the US do es no t take a s tance o n the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands` so vereignty Washingto n seemed to igno re Japan`smain grievance abo ut the ADIZ which is China`s intentio n to further reinfo rce its so vereignty claim by extending the ADIZ o ver theis lands The mo s t far-reaching US s tatements were a reco nfirmatio n o f the applicatio n o f the security treaty to the is lands evenmentio ning the is lands by their Japanese and Chinese names and co mplaining that the Chinese actio n was an attempt to unilaterally

change the status quo in the Eas t China Sea which raised regio nal tens io n and increased the risk o f accident and miscalculatio n256

Ho wever in this way the Obama Adminis tratio n risked creating amo ng so me Japanese o bservers do ubts abo ut the Adminis tratio n`sreliability and so gave succo ur to China`s attempt to drive a wedge between the two allies Ano ther co mplicatio n is that the ChineseADIZ o verlaps that o f Ko rea and mo reo ver co vers the submerged ro ck called Ieo do in Ko rean and Suyan in Chinese which has animpact o n the no t yet demarcated EEZ bo rder between bo th co untries Interes tingly the Japanese ADIZ also co vers Ieo do but thishas never been underpinned by any Japanese EEZ claims But China kno ws ho w to play o n So uth Ko rea`s criticism o f Japan`sattitude to wards the his to ry is sue and the territo rial dispute with Japan o ver Do kto Takeshima is land Mo reo ver the As ian co untriesco ntes ting China`s claims to parts o f the So uth China Sea are co ncerned that China wo uld further co mplicate the territo rialdisputes in the area by es tablishing an ADIZ Yet the ASEAN member s tates have been very cautio us in directly criticis ing ChinaChina`s es tablishment o f the ADIZ directly affects many co untries because so many o f them have airlines flying thro ugh the zo neHo wever with the exceptio n o f Japan all o thers agred to co nfo rm with China`s reques t fo r no tif icatio n which undermines theJapanese go vernment`s po s itio n o f explicitly advis ing Japanese airlines no t to co nfo rm

With these escalating develo pments the Chinese s ide achieved its go al o f sho wing that the Japanese autho rities are no lo nger infull co ntro l o f the disputed is lands In the case o f Chinese Co as tguard vessel intrus io ns the reactio n o f the Japanese CG is limitedto shado wing the Chinese vessels to info rm them that they are vio lating Japan`s CZ o r TW and to ask them to leave whichho wever they do at their o wn dis cretio n (the time span ho vering in the CZ o r TW having beco me a further means o f Chinesepressure) fo llo wed by diplo matic pro tes ts Otherwise the CG has avo ided any phys ical co nfro ntatio n o r co ntact When co nfro ntedby the CG the Chinese vessels s imply declare (by radio o r even electro nic displays ) that they are patro lling Chinese waters and thatthe CG ships were o perating illegally in these waters This ritual has so far prevented vio lence This is in co ntras t to an exchange o fwater canno n salvo s between the CG and the Taiwanese co as t guard in the territo rial o f the Senkaku Is lands o n 25 September 2012

and again o n 24 January 2013257

The increase o f patro ls by Japan and China is caus ing o peratio nal s train fo r bo th s ides (also rais ing the risk o f miscalculatio ns o ro verreactio ns ) but this has no t reduced the willingness o f either go vernment to s cale do wn the almo s t daily demo ns tratio ns o f

`effective co ntro l` In Octo ber it was repo rted that the CG no w always maintains ten vessels agains t eight fro m China258 The 11th

regio nal headquarters respo ns ible fo r the Senkaku area is in Naha and has nine patro l ships (but o nly seven vessels o f at leas t

1000 to ns ) but no w needs additio nal ships which are dispatched fro m o ther regio nal headquarters 259 In April 2012 the CG had ato tal o f 357 patro l vessels but o nly 51 o ver 1000 to ns which are tho se mo s t needed fo r a far flung area like the Senkaku

Is lands 26 0 On 14 September 2012 Senio r Vice Minis ter o f Fisheries Iwamo to Tsukasa mentio ned plans to increase the number o f

fishery patro l vessels to ensure fishermens safety amid intens ifying territo rial disputes with China and So uth Ko rea26 1 On 26Octo ber the Minis try o f Land Infras tructure Transpo rt and To urism which heads the CG anno unced plans to increase budgetary

reques ts fo r mo re ships 26 2 The Abe go vernment plans to build mo re vessels o r advance the calendar retro fit vessels which were to

be retired and is co ns idering extending the retirement age o f the o fficers 26 3

The Chinese have fewer vessels which can be deplo yed as far as the Senkaku Is lands In additio n leave o f the sailo rs has been

res tricted and their deplo yment length at sea has increased26 4 In March 2013 the Chinese s ide anno unced clo ser co o peratio nbetween the military and vario us maritime law enfo rcement agencies as well as the merger o f fo ur maritime law enfo rcementagencies under the State Ocean Adminis tratio n (adminis tered by the Minis try o f Land and Reso urces ) ie the China MarineSurveillance the co as t guard fo rces o f the Public Security Minis try the fisheries law enfo rcement co mmand o f the Agriculture

Minis try and the maritime anti-smuggling po lice o f the General Adminis tratio n o f Cus to ms 26 5

Ano ther wo rrying develo pment is the gradual invo lvement o f the PLA navy (PLAN) and the Maritime Self Defence Fo rce (MSDF) TheJapanese MOD anno unced o n 16 Octo ber 2012 that fo r the firs t time PLAN ships were o bserved navigating in the 22-km-wide CZbetween Yo naguni and Irio mo te is lands altho ugh the minis try left o pen the po ss ibility that they did so in o rder to avo id a typho o n

Nevertheless the Gaimusho so ught explanatio ns fro m the Chinese abo ut these ship mo vements 26 6 In December 2012 fo ur PLANships sailed thro ugh the CW o f the Irio mo te-Yo naguni is lands o n the way back fro m drills in the Pacific after having go ne into the

Pacific thro ugh the mo re no rmal ro ute o f the s trait between the Okinawan main is land and Miyako jima26 7 Again there was no thingillegal abo ut it but it raised attentio n at a time o f tens io ns Ho wever there are s igns o f greater co o peratio n o f the PLAN withChinese Co as t Guard vessels as was sho wn in the s tando ff between China and the Philippines aro und the disputed Scarbo ro ugh

Sho al in the So uth China Sea and jo int exercises to o k place between the three in the Eas t China Sea in Octo ber 201226 8 The

patro lling activities o f the MSDF in the Senkaku area became kno wn when the Japanese repo rted at the end o f January 2013 that o n19 January a Chinese frigatersquos target radar had lo cked o nto an MSDF helico pter and o n 30 January ano ther frigate sailing clo se to

an MSDF des tro yer did likewise The Chinese vehemently denied it26 9 Ho wever in March this year the Kyo do news agency repo rtedthat senio r Chinese military o fficials had admitted the incident o f 29 January Even mo re wo rriso me is that the Chinese vessels

acted apparently witho ut prio r appro val fro m the fleet co mmand o r navy headquarters All this was denied by the Chinese s ide270 Itdid no t help that under Prime Minis ter No da the MSDF had been o rdered after the eruptio n o f the 2012 cris is to keep a greaterdis tance fro m PLAN ships than the hitherto 3 km in o rder avo id incidents but this po licy was reversed by the mo re hawkish Abe

adminis tratio n to the previo us 3 km dis tance271 The fire radar lo cking incident had happened at a dis tance o f 3 km

Agains t the backgro und o f greater invo lvement o f military fo rces it is particularly regrettable that a plan to build a maritime liaiso n

mechanism between their defense autho rities o n which they had agreed in June 2012 to make later that year was shelved272

Unfo rtunately it is s till Chinese practice to co ns ider Co nfidence Building Measures (CBM) no t as the firs t s tep to build co nfidencebut as a to o l to extract fro m the o ther s ide prio r co ncess io ns under the pretext o f `creating a better atmo sphere` fo r dis cuss ingCBM The o utbreak o f the September 2012 cris is was therefo re a co nvenient pretext fo r the Chinese to cancel the pro ject Thelates t co nfirmatio n was in March 2013 when General Yin Zhuo explained that there co uld be no military trus t if the po litical and

diplo matic relatio nship is bad273 Since the target radar lo ck-o n incidents the Japanese go vernment is publicly calling fo rresumptio n o f nego tiatio ns fo r the maritime liaiso n mechanism but the Chinese will certainly want to extract so me co ncess io nsbefo re even co ns idering a po s itive respo nse

Ho wever the co ns tant co nfro ntatio n between the po licing and military fo rces o f bo th s ides co uld eas ily lead to a military clasheither as a result o f an unfo reseen civilian o r military incident miscalculatio n o r malicio us intentio n at a lo wer level o f co mmandTwo recent examples o f unfo reseen civilian incidents co uld have escalated One is the attempted landing o n o ne o f the disputedis lands by a Chinese pro tes ter with a ballo o n in January 2014 This incident was peacefully reso lved because Japan did no t arres t theballo o nis t In this case the firs t repo rt o n the crash-landing in the territo rial waters o f Uo tsurijima came fro m the Taiwanese co as tguard which info rmed the Japanese co as t guard fo llo wed by the hand-o ver o f the ballo o nis t to the PRC autho rities o uts ide o f

Japan`s territo rial waters 274 The o ther incident was the s inking o f a Chinese fishing bo at ldquoto the no rth o f the Diao yu Is landsrdquo and

the mo ve o f two Chinese naval () vessels to rescue the crew275 This autho r co uld no t find o ut ho w clo se the fishing bo at came tothe is lands and apparently there has no t been any further repo rting abo ut the incident

The previo us ly mentio ned radar-targeting incidents and these two civilian incidents have no t led to an escalatio n but there is noguarantee fo r the future Shi Yinho ng a pro fesso r at Renmin Univers ity predicts that the territo rial co nflicts in the ECS So uth ChinaSea and alo ng the Sino -Indian bo rder will intens ify because o f po pular natio nalism dynamics within the armed fo rces and o f co urse

also o ur to p leaders perso nal beliefs and s trategic perso nalities 276 Hugh White argues that a war (which co uld lead to a nuclearexchange between China and the US) co uld also begin because the Chinese leadership may co ns ider that s tarting ho s tilities no wrather than later wo uld be mo re beneficial to either tes t US reso lve to defend Japan (which the Chinese leadership do ubts ) anddetermine the is sue o f Chinese supremacy in the As ian regio n which he co ns iders to be the real is sue rather than the is lands

themselves 277

IS THERE A WAY FORWARD

The current co nfro ntatio n is no t o nly co ntinuing but even escalating and do mes tic develo pments in bo th co untries are no t creatingan atmo sphere mo re co nducive to better management o f the cris is let alo ne finding a so lutio n Inactio n runs the risk o f a furtherescalatio n o r even a military clash while po s itive o ptio ns are beco ming fewer Meanwhile bo th co untries suffer fro m the eco no micfall-o ut and heightened tens io ns while the integratio n o f a ris ing China into a new s trategic enviro nment in As ia will beco me evenmo re fraught cas ting a shado w o n Japan`s clo se relatio nship with the US

The 2010 incident ended quickly with Japan`s release o f the captain One reaso n fo r this is certainly the fact that China`s demand in2010 was relatively clear and achievable (release o f the captain) if painful fo r Japan at a time o f a weak and inexperiencedgo vernment This time in September 2012 the cris is firs t hit a go vernment which reacted intrans igently because o f its previo usdefeat and o ther unfavo urable do mes tic circumstances and was then replaced by the mo re hawkish Abe go vernment The Abecabinet`s attitude to wards the pas t as exemplif ied by vario us s tatements by cabinet members and peo ple clo se to it the attempt torevise the Ko no s tatement reco gniz ing the fo rced war pro s titutio n (the military co mfo rt wo men) and Abe`s Yasukuni Shrine vis itall served China`s anti-Japan pro paganda wo rsened Japan-Ko rea relatio ns which China is cleverly explo iting and even angered theUS adminis tratio n Abe is seen as utiliz ing the tens io ns with China to win do mes tic and internatio nal suppo rt fo r Japan to have aldquono rmalrdquo natio nal defence po s ture The latter is welco me by the US adminis tratio n because it wo uld help with the US As ianrealignment and suppo rt its China po licy At the same time China`s actio ns cas t an o mino us shado w o n its intentio ns in the So uthChina Sea and Abe and mo re impo rtantly the US is suppo rting the claimants there agains t China

Under these bilateral multilateral and regio nal circumstances wo uld China be satis fied with go ing back to the `unders tanding abo utsetting as ide the dispute` in co njunctio n with Japan`s reco gnitio n o f the exis tence o f a territo rial dispute o r wo uld it demand areversal o f the purchase o f the three is lands Wo uld it demand the end o f Japanese CG patro ls aro und the is lands China`ss tandard demand no w that Japan `co rrect its mis takes` is rather ambiguo us because it co uld be interpreted as go ing back to theshelving unders tanding and the reco gnitio n o f the exis tence o f a dispute o r demanding a reversal o f the go vernment`s purchase o f

the is lands 278 The latter wo uld s imply be impo ss ible in legal and practical terms and o ne can o nly ho pe that the ambiguity is o nlyaimed at rais ing China`s nego tiatio n po s itio n ando r leaving eno ugh wiggle ro o m fo r nego tiatio ns which wo uld satis fy all Chineses takeho lders` interes ts

It seems that it is already to o late fo r go ing back to the shelving agreement o f 19721978 which wo uld imply that the two s ides canso meho w go back to the status quo o f the 1970s This as we have seen has been superseded by deeds and wo rds o n bo th s ides The Chinese have no w no t o nly publicly declared that the shelving agreement was lsquobro kenrsquo by Japan but after the firs t Y12 patro l o n13 December 2012 co mmented that ldquoThe s ituatio n has changed It has beco me no rmal fo r Chinas marine surveillance vessels to

enter the 12-nautical-mile zo ne Japans actual co ntro l o ver the is lands has go nerdquo279

The bilateral relatio nship has deterio rated to the extent that at leas t shelving the co nflicting so vereignty claims without o fficiallyadmitting that there is a territo rial dispute is no lo nger an o ptio n acceptable to China because it feels Japan has abused theshelving co nsensus thro ugh a series o f adminis trative measures with the final s traw having been the central go vernmentrsquos purchaseo f three is lands When s tudying the vario us Chinese o fficial s tatements and news repo rts after the 2012 cris is had fully erupted inSeptember it beco mes clear that until Octo ber 2012 the Chinese s till raised the demand that Japan sho uld go back to the previo uslsquounders tandingrsquo o r lsquoco nsensus rsquo but this demand was no t made o ften thereafter It reappeared in remarks by Wang Jiarui the head o fthe Co mmunis t partys Internatio nal Department when meeting Yamaguchi Natsuo the leader o f the junio r co alitio n partner

Ko meito in January 201328 0 Previo us ly a co mment o n the Xinhua internet s ite o n 29 Octo ber said that ldquoThe lsquopurchasersquo sho wed thatthe Japanese go vernment has who lly abando ned the attitude o f laying as ide disputes and has fundamentally changed the

s ituatio nrdquo28 1 On 30 Octo ber the CMOFA spo kesperso n declared that lsquoJapans illegal purchase o f the Diao yu Is lands bro ke the

impo rtant co nsensus The Japanese s ide sho uld no t have any mo re illus io n o f o ccupying the Diao yu Is lands What the Japaneses ide sho uld do is to face up to the reality admit the so vereignty dispute co rrect mis takes and co me back to the track o f a

nego tiated settlement`28 2 The lates t o fficial pro po sal to shelve the is lands is sue was made by the fo rmer fo reign minis ter Tang

Jiaxuan o n 16 July 201428 3

The reco gnitio n o f a territo rial pro blem wo uld be relatively easy fo r Japanese public o pinio n (and even mo re so fo r Japanrsquos friendsand allies ) to accept because they wo uld no t see the need fo r any kind o f diplo matic o r legal so phis try fo r what is o bvio us ly aterrito rial co nflict whatever the legitimacy o f the Chinese claim might be given also the fact that the current Japanese po s itio nco mes do wn to refus ing to even dis cuss whatever settlement might be po ss ible Acco rding to a survey co nducted by Genro nto gether with Zho ngguo Ribao she in June 2012 627 per cent o f Japanese agreed that there exis ts a territo rial pro blem dispute

(176 disagreed) co mpared with 822 o f the Chinese (139 disagreed)28 4 Ho wever co nsecutive Japanese cabinets haverefused to reco gnise the exis tence o f a territo rial dispute which is o ften the default po s itio n o f a go vernment in actual co ntro l o f adisputed territo ry (fo r example the Ko rean go vernmentrsquos po s itio n o n Do kto Takeshima) This po s itio n has been reinfo rced by theexplicit Japanese denial s ince the 1990s o f a shelving agreement which wo uld have been an implicit admiss io n that there is adispute To circumvent the risk o f being perceived as admitting the exis tence o f a territo rial pro blem the deputy prime minis ter o fthe previo us No da go vernment Okada Katsuya was repo rted to have mentio ned in a speech in Octo ber 2012 that there was no

territo rial dispute but as a matter o f fact a debate exis ted28 5 Ho wever this co mpro mise so lutio n was never co nfirmed by the No dago vernment and did no t beco me po licy It is even less likely to be acceptable to the new Abe go vernment Even amo ng influentialo pinio n makers there is hardly any suppo rt fo r admitting the exis tence o f a territo rial co nflict o r o f a shelving agreement Even mo reco nciliato ry s tatements o n this subject are rather vague Maehara Seiji o f the Demo cratic Party declared in a co nference at QinghuaUnivers ity in Beijing in September 2013 that the Japanese go vernment sho uld add (to its o wn po s itio n) that China has a differentview (Senkakusho to wo meguru Niho n seifu no tachiba ni tsuite lsquoChugo ku ga chigau kangaekata wo mo tte iru to iuko to wo ichigen

tsukekuwaerubeki darsquo) At the same time he emphas ised ho wever that there was no territo rial dispute28 6 Japan Bus inessFederatio n Chairman Yo nekura Hiro masa mentio ned in September 2012 in an NHK interview that the go vernment sho uld be mo re

flexible s ince o therwise its s tance co uld be taken to mean that Japan has no intentio n o f so lving the dispute28 7 Miyamo to Yuji thefo rmer Japanese ambassado r to China is quo ted as saying that lsquoThe go vernment do es no t need to alter its bas ic po s itio n but in

reality a co nflict do es exis t o ver the Senkaku is les rsquo 28 8 This is also the s tance which the previo us Japanese ambassado r Niwa

Uichiro takes in an article after his return to Japan28 9

Co ncerning co nflict reso lutio n it is interes ting to no te that when asked abo ut the mo dern s ignificance o f the 1978 Japan-ChinaPeace and Friendship Treaty 68 4 o f the po lled Japanese agreed with Art 12 (lsquoThe two parties shall settle all disputes by peacefulmeans and shall refrain fro m the use o r threat o f fo rcersquo) but o nly 525 o f the Chinese agreed Mo reo ver 58 1 o f the Chinese

favo ur China s trengthening its co ntro l o ver the area29 0

If therefo re a new ldquoimplicit unders tandingrdquo abo ut shelving the dispute is achievable it wo uld have to be based o n learning fro m thefailures o f the 19721978 shelving ie it wo uld be necessary to achieve a mutual unders tanding o f what the s tatus quo is whatwo uld undermine the s tatus quo and what has to be do ne to mo ve fro m co nflict management to so lutio n Quite clearly such a newunders tanding wo uld be less favo urable to Japan`s current s tance o n the dispute

FROM CONFLICT MANAGEMENT TO ADDRESSING THE SOVEREIGNTY ISSUE

Any mo ve fo rward will certainly require decis ive leadership o n bo th s ides be it to take the initiative o r to respo nd po s itively to theinitiative o f s tarting the pro cess to wards reso lutio n In view o f the co mplex backgro und o f the external and internal dynamics it iso bvio us that address ing the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands dispute requires a s tep-by-s tep appro ach The ultimate is sue to address is theso vereignty is sue and territo rial disputes are generally viewed as zero sum in nature given their clo se link to co re securityinteres ts Even tho se who reco gnize the impo rtance o f transcending such lo gic in favo ur o f co ndo minium o r shared so vereigntygenerally ho ld that the is sue can o nly be addressed at the las t s tage o f any nego tiated pro cess if at all

Two impo rtant is sues have to be co ns idered at the beginning to what extent have the vario us s tages o f the nego tiating pro cess tobe agreed befo rehand (lsquoro ad maprsquo) o r even the final o utco me whether a viable co ndo minium o r o nly shelving the is sues and co uldthe ro le o f a third party mediato r be helpfulacceptable In view o f the po litical diff iculties o n bo th s ides the s tart o f thenego tiatio n pro cess wo uld be endangered if there is no t sufficient ro o m fo r ambiguity and interpretatio n abo ut the vario us s tages altho ugh the general aim o f tens io n reductio n and suspens io n o f the so vereignty is sue mus t be clearly agreed

A third party mediato r is pro bably no t acceptable to the Chinese s ide The third party mo s t o ften mentio ned is the Internatio nalCo urt o f Jus tice (ICJ) o r any kind o f internatio nal arbitratio n Ho wever this seems unlikely in view o f China`s preference fo rbilateral nego tiatio ns and its refusal to accept judicial settlement by the ICJ o r any internatio nal arbitratio n except in no n-po litical

areas such as trade29 1 The Japanese go vernment wo uld be willing to accept the jurisdictio n o f the ICJ but o nly if China brings the

case to the Co urt les t it be perceived as ackno wledging the exis tence o f a territo rial dispute29 2 But there are also po litical andpro cedural arguments agains t the reco urse to the ICJ China`s legal argumentatio n is co mparatively weak and s ince a negativejudgement co uld have implicatio ns fo r China`s legal claim to mo s t o f the So uth China Sea there is even less o f a chance o f Chinamaking an exceptio n fo r the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands dispute In view o f the entrenched po s itio ns o f bo th s ides and the risk o f a`winner takes all` o utco me o f internatio nal litigatio n bo th go vernments wo uld face co ns iderable do mes tic res is tance in case o f anegative o utco me In view o f the urgency o f the dispute and the lo ng time it takes fo r a judgement there wo uld also be the risk o fdo mes tic fo rces trying to pre-empt a negative result

In view o f the security is sues invo lved (let alo ne the American his to rical `debt` as a result o f Washingto n`s ambiguity related toWashingto n`s ending o f the adminis tratio n o f Okinawa in 1972) an American mediatio n co uld be seen as natural and even inAmerican interes ts Such an American ro le ho wever is extremely unlikely as it wo uld be seen by China as unduly advantageo us toJapan Ho wever at so me po int during the Japan-China nego tiatio n pro cess the US might ass is t (o r even be reques ted) by agreeingto certain Co nfidence and Security Building Measures (CSBM) in the area aro und the is lands

The firs t s tage wo uld have to co ns is t o f measures which reduce the risk o f a military clash but in a way which prevents theperceptio n that o ne s ide is giving in to co ercio n This s tage wo uld be a gradual phas ing o ut o f intrus io ns by Chinese o fficial vesselsand aircraft into the territo rial waters co ntiguo us zo ne and airspace o f the is lands which is recipro cated by Japanrsquos reducing in thesame way its co as tguard patro ls in the two zo nes as well as its s crambling activities in the is lands` airspace There were repo rts in

June 2013 that China called o n Japan to agree to a 12-nautical-mile no -entry zo ne aro und the is lands 29 3 Japan rejected this co urse

Ano ther measure wo uld be to increase the dis tance at which vessels o f bo th maritime fo rces o bserve each o ther Such s teps sho uldultimately be o fficialised by a gradually expanding series o f CSBMs and a bilateral liaiso n mechanism This co uld also include ademilitarisatio n agreement as an incentive fo r the Chinese s ide It wo uld be vital that the s teps at this s tage be incremental that nos tep is explo ited in a o ne-s ided way and that they are co ns idered irrevers ible At the same time bo th s ides have to prevent peo plefro m appro aching the is lands s ince this wo uld be seen as a pro vo catio n by the o ther s ide This latter task is technically no t easy

because o f the co ntro vers ial character o f any co mpro mise with certain no n-s tate acto rs in Japan China Ho ng Ko ng and Taiwan The(failed) landing o f a Chinese ho t ballo o n o n o ne o f the is lands in January 2014 demo ns trated at the same time the technical

diff iculty o f a no -entry po licy as well as the po ss ibility o f a success ful co o peratio n o f the co as tguards o f all three co untries 29 4

At this firs t s tage o r leading to the next there will have to be a Japanese go vernment s tatement to the effect that there is alsquopro blemrsquo related to the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands This can be wo rded in such a way that the sens itive express io n `territo rialpro blem` (which is s trenuo us ly denied by the go vernment) is avo ided and it can be supplemented by a sentence that such as tatement in no way prejudices the legal po s itio n o f the go vernment Such a qualifying s tatement is fo r example included in the

Japan-China agreement fo r prio r no tif icatio n o f research vessels fro m bo th co untries in the Eas t China Sea in 200029 5 A s imilarqualif icatio n is part o f the 1997 Japan-China Fisheries Agreement In the jo int co mmuniqueacute o f 1972 which no rmalised diplo maticrelatio ns between Japan and China diplo matic wo rding also managed to bridge the huge gap between their s tances o n Taiwan whichthe PRC co ns iders an lsquoinalienable partrsquo o f its territo ry Japan co ns iders the so vereignty is sue s till unreso lved because the 1951 SanFrancis co Peace Treaty Art 2 (b) o nly s tipulated that lsquoJapan reno unces all right title and claim to Fo rmo sa and the Pescado res rsquowitho ut clarifying the recipient o f the territo ry The co mpro mise in 1972 was reached with the sentence that Japan lsquofully unders tandsand respects this s tand o f the Go vernment o f the Peo ples Republic o f China and it f irmly maintains its s tand under Article 8 o f thePo tsdam Pro clamatio nrsquo

POSSIBLE APPROACHES TO THE SOVEREIGNTY ISSUE

The mo s t diff icult pro blem is the so vereignty is sue which go es to the co re o f any co untry`s security interes ts It is no t imaginablethat either s ide will reno unce its claim to the is lands Sides tepping o r shelving the is sue is o nly useful if the lesso ns fro m the 1972and 1978 attempts as o utlined abo ve can be learned and applied but there is s till the fundamental pro blem with the implicitassumptio n that the quality o f the bilateral relatio nship will always be as go o d as when the s ides tepping agreement was achievedand can be maintained in perpetuity o r until the so vereignty is sue can be addressed But in o rder to so lve the so vereignty is sue aneven better relatio nship has to be created This better relatio nship co uld be bro ught abo ut by the s teps explained abo ve and furtherbelo w

An impo rtant co nditio n fo r any las ting territo rial co mpro mise wo uld be reducing the value o f the is lands fo r bo th co untries whichcan be achieved by o ne o f the measures pro po sed fo r s tage 1 ie reso lutely preventing anyo ne fro m appro aching the territo ries(including to tal demilitarizatio n) which in themselves are eco no mically wo rthless and are uninhabited The main po int is to preventany go vernmental act which co uld be interpreted as being part o f the `so vereignty game` The mo s t diff icult part here is to preventany act by no n-go vernmental acto rs This wo uld have to include the territo rial waters and the explo itatio n there in o f any kind o freso urces including fishing Scientif ic interes ts in the is lands co uld be served by bilateral surveys witho ut any po litical co nno tatio ns

There have been pro po sals to declare the is lands an Internatio nal Nature and Wildlife Preserve29 6 Such a preserve wo uld have to beadminis tered either bilaterally o r by a relevant internatio nal o rganisatio n and as such co uld serve as a co nfidence-building measure

The abo ve s teps wo uld then allo w the two s ides to deal with the co ns iderable eco no mic interes ts in fishing and the explo itatio n o fhydro carbo n reso urces and o ther seabed reso urces aro und the is lands ie in the Exclus ive Eco no mic Zo ne ando r the ExtendedCo ntinental Shelf Once the is lands` land area and the territo rial waters have been put as ide it wo uld be eas ier to co me to ano verall agreement o n the delimitatio n o f the EEZ bo rder (with the exceptio n o f the no rthern part which wo uld require a trilateralagreement between China Japan and Ko rea) which wo uld include the delimitatio n o f these surro unding waters It wo uld facilitate aco mpro mise if bo th s ides agree that the is lands do no t merit their o wn EEZ This might be diff icult fo r Japan which claims an EEZ fo rOkino to rishima refuted by China s ince it co ns iders the reef no t to be an is land acco rding to Art 121 o f UNCLOS

A co mpro mise o n the so vereignty is sue co uld o nly be the o utco me ndash if at all ndash o f a success ful pro cess o f the abo ve o r co mparables teps In o rder to avo id a `winner take all` s ituatio n the co mpro mise wo uld have to invo lve a sharing arrangement His to ry o ffers

quite a number o f internatio nal precedents o f shared so vereignty referred to as co ndo minium in internatio nal law29 7 One case withso me s imilarities to the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands is a small is land (3000 sq m) in the river separating France and Spain kno wn asPheasant Is land o r Co nference Is land which even to day s till changes every s ix mo nths between France and Spain as o wner Like theSenkakuDiao yu Is lands the is land has no eco no mic value anymo re and the is land is o ff limits It was the lo catio n o f the s igning o f

the Treaty o f the Pyrenees in 1659 which ended a lo ng war 29 8 Mo s t o ther examples o f jo int so vereignty co ncern territo ries with apo pulatio n which makes co o peratio n much mo re diff icult Other his to rical precedents o f sharing so vereignty are the es tablishmento f ldquoneutral zo nesrdquo Acco rdingly the is lands and po ss ibly a sea area aro und the is lands co uld be declared a neutral zo ne like the o nebetween Saudi Arabia and Kuwait (1922-1965) On July 7 1965 the two go vernments s igned an agreement (which to o k effect o nJuly 25 1966) to partitio n the Neutral Zo ne adjo ining their respective territo ries A demarcatio n agreement dividing the NeutralZo ne was s igned o n December 17 1967

Particularly relevant here is that Saudi Arabia as well as Kuwait explo ited the o il reso urces under a jo int o perating agreement29 9

Co nclus io ns

The actio n-reactio n pattern o f the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands dispute is accelerating and the initiative seems to be mo re o ften thanno t with the Chinese s ide while the Japanese s ide is in a defens ive po s itio n The danger o f a military co nfro ntatio n is lo o mingincreas ingly larger in what co uld be called a lsquochicken gamersquo At the same time the internal and external dynamics are undermining theenviro nment which is required fo r a peaceful so lutio n as well as fo r maintaining the number o f po s itive o ptio ns While the Japanesego vernment refuses to ackno wledge the very exis tence o f a territo rial dispute the Chinese go vernment is no w (July 2014) evenrefus ing to have a dialo gue with Japan`s current prime minis ter It is po ss ible that the Chinese s ide again wants to wait with anymo ve fo rward until the Japanese prime minis ter has changed as Beijing did with Prime Minis ter Sato Eisaku o r with Prime Minis terKo izumi Junichiro But waiting fo r an impro vement o f the bilateral atmo sphere as the Chinese s ide likes to s tress is a very riskyo ptio n and such an impro vement may anyway be a very sho rt windo w o f o ppo rtunity if lo o king at the ups and do wns o f the po s t-1949 his to ry o f the bilateral relatio nship

To s tart a s tep-by-s tep pro cess o f address ing the territo rial is sue s tro ng leadership is required which unders tands the widerinteres ts o f a functio ning Japanese-Chinese relatio nship Japan s imply asking China fo r a summit meeting is no t very sens ible ifthere is no willingness to engage in subs tantive dis cuss io ns and wo uld be very risky fo r China`s to p leader if the Japanese primeminis ter then vis its the Yasukuni Shrine The his to ry is sue sho uld no lo nger be a Chinese lever fo r pressuris ing Japan but the latterhas to abs tain fro m actio ns which are seen as pro vo cative no t o nly by China but also by Ko rea the US and many o thers There hasto be a co mmitted leadership o n bo th s ides which s tarts with a ro ugh ro ad map and tens io n-reducing s teps such as CSBMs en ro uteto agreeing o n a fo rmula which allo ws the parties to o btain eco no mic as well as security gains while reducing tens io ns

Reinhard Drifte is Emeritus Professor of Japanese Politics University of Newcastle UK and Visiting Professor at various Japanese Universities andPau University (France) He is the author of Japanrsquos Foreign Policy for the Twenty First Century His home page is here

Reco mmended citatio n Reinhard Drifte The Japan-China Confrontation Over the SenkakuDiaoyu Islands--Between shelving and dispute

Senkaku Is lands and applied o nly to Chinese fishermen78 Ho wever the Japanese go vernment seems no t to want to allo w fo reignfishermen unco ntro lled access to the territo rial waters aro und the Senkaku Is lands and has been patro lling the area This has ledto the expuls io n o f Chinese fishermen and subsequent pro tes ts by Taiwan and the PRC The Japanese co ntro ls have apparently

increased in the decade s ince 2000 while Chinese fishing activities have also vas tly increased79 Mo re research is needed o n thesedevelo pments to judge whether yet ano ther `uno fficial unders tanding` between To kyo and Beijing has been undermined

Finally in this co ntext o ne has to mentio n the is sue o f private and s tate o wnership o f the Senkaku as well as the ro le o f no n-s tateacto rs In 1896 Ko ga Tatsushiro o btained a free lease o f 30 years fo r the is lands o f Uo tsurijima Kubajima Minami Ko jima and KitaKo jima After his death in 1918 his so n Ko ga Zenji to o k o ver the bus iness In 1926 after the end o f the free lease the Japanese

go vernment co nverted it to a rental bas is 8 0 In 1932 the Japanese go vernment changed the s tatus o f these fo ur is lands fro m s tate-o wned to privately-o wned land by selling them to the Ko ga family After 1945 Kubajima and Taisho jima (the latter was always s tate-o wned) were leased to the US as firing ranges In 1972 Ko ga Zenji so ld Kita Ko jima and Minami Ko jima fo llo wed by Uo tsurshima in1978 and Kubajima in 1988 to Kurihara Kunio ki a real es tate inves to r and his family In 2002 Kitako jima Minami Ko jima and

Uo tsurijima were leased to the s tate which paid Yen 25 millio n per year fo r them in rent8 1 The US military used Kubajima andTaisho jima fro m 1957 as firing ranges and after the revers io n o f Okinawa in 1972 co ntinued to do so until 1979 It paid rent to the

private o wner o f Kubajima but after 1971 the rental payment was effected by the Japanese go vernment8 2 It is also interes ting tono te that even in the Japan-US minutes o f 15 May 1972 abo ut these two firing ranges the is lands are s till referred to by their

Chinese characters which are transcribed in the English vers io n as Ko bisho and Sekibisho rather than Kubajima and Taisho jima8 3

The relevant po int here is that s ince the shelving o f the territo rial is sue in 1972 and 1978 the is lands changed private o wners andthe s tate rented three o f the is lands fro m their private o wner and o wned o ne The leas ing in 2002 and the `natio nalizatio n` (nomo ney was invo lved) o f the Uo tsurijima beaco n in 2005 caused Chinese pro tes ts but the private o wnership changes did no t cause

any Chinese reactio n8 4 This is an illus tratio n o f the deterio ratio n o f the bilateral relatio nship during the fo llo wing years because itwas the sale o f three is lands to the Japanese central s tate which to uched o ff the 2012 cris is

THE IMPACT OF OIL AND GAS INTERESTS

The 1969 ECAFE Repo rt had led to claims by the ROC and the PRC o ver the Senkaku Is lands The mo s t pro mis ing area defined in thisrepo rt fo r hydro carbo n reso urces happened to be aro und the Senkaku Is lands Since Japan abando ned its jo int explo ratio n planswith Taiwan in 1972 with the diplo matic reco gnitio n o f the PRC no Japanese activities have taken place because o f co ncern abo utChina`s reactio n

In o rder to fulfill its gro wing demand fo r o il and gas and to divers ify away fro m its high dependence o n Middle Eas tern supplies

China s tarted in the 1970s to pro spect and extract energy reso urces in the Eas t China Sea8 5 To o verco me the territo rial dispute inthe so uth o f the Eas t China Sea and the divergent po s itio n o n ho w to draw the EEZ bo rder in the res t o f the Eas t China Sea Chinapro po sed `jo int develo pment` o f hydro carbo n reso urces In Octo ber 1980 PRC Deputy Premier Yao Yilin even pro po sed to aJapanese bus iness delegatio n that develo pment o f o ff-sho re o il reso urces aro und the disputed is lands be do ne jo intly by China

Japan and the US8 6 Ano ther bilateral pro po sal was made in 1984 by Deng Xiao ping who urged so lving the territo rial pro blems o fthe Spratly Is lands in the So uth China Sea and the Senkaku Is lands by jo intly develo ping the disputed areas befo re dis cuss ing theques tio n o f so vereignty But in this case as well as later pro po sals until 1996 Japan firs t demanded a settlement o f the maritime

bo rder o r reco gnitio n o f its title to the Senkaku Is lands 8 7

China`s relentless pro gress and expans io n o f o il and gas develo pment increas ingly caused frictio n between Japan and China whichalso impacted o n the territo rial dispute Since 1996 Chinese research vessels have entered the waters o f the Senkaku Is lands

including its territo rial waters 8 8 Japan exerted great res traint and until 2004 did no t allo w Japanese co mpanies to survey the ECSeven in the area which it claimed as its EEZ let alo ne aro und the Senkaku Is lands Mo reo ver To kyo `s permiss io n fo r surveying in2004 by a Japanese explo ratio n co mpany (never fo llo wed up because o f the po litical risks invo lved) in respo nse to Chinese o il andgas develo pment near Japan`s claimed EEZ bo rder was o nly fo r an area further no rth away fro m the disputed is lands

The Senkaku Is lands dispute co ntributed to the failure to fo llo w up o n the jo int unders tanding in June 2008 (ryokai in Japaneseliangjie in Chinese) to engage in jo int develo pment o f an area in the no rth o f the Eas t China Sea and to allo w Japan to jo in the

Chunxiao gas field explo itatio n which had been develo ped by China in a disputed EEZ area8 9 During the nego tiatio n o f the 2008jo int unders tanding the Chinese demanded jo int develo pment o f energy reso urces in the area aro und the Senkaku Is lands inexchange fo r their co mpro mise o n jo int develo pment in o ther areas o f the Eas t China Sea Altho ugh the Chinese go vernment agreedto the unders tanding witho ut getting satis factio n o n its demand the failure to achieve greater recipro city fro m the Japanese in theSenkaku area then made it do mes tically impo ss ible fo r the Chinese go vernment to go any further with nego tiating an

implementatio n o f the unders tanding9 0 In December 2008 two Chinese patro l vessels o f the China Marine Surveillance (CMSHaijiandui in Chinese) which is under the State Ocean Adminis tratio n (SOA) entered fo r the firs t time the territo rial waters aro und

the Senkaku Is lands in an apparent mo ve to s trengthen its claim to the is lands 9 1

INSTRUMENTALIZATION OF THE SENKAKU DISPUTE BY POLITICIANS AND NON-STATE ACTORS

The rais ing o f the territo rial is sue by China (ROC and PRC) and the campaign o f the Bao Diao (Pro tect the Diao yu) mo vementno tably in Taiwan and Ho ng Ko ng s ince the ECAFE repo rt led to a s imilar invo lvement o f the Japanese po litical right and o thernatio nalis tic gro ups which to o k up the is sue as a symbo l o f natio nalism In 1973 several rightwing po liticians within the rulingLiberal Demo cratic Party including Ishihara Shintaro who in 2012 became the trigger fo r the central go vernment`s purchase o f so meo f the Senkaku is lands es tablished the so -called Seirankai It was particularly Ishihara who raised the territo rial is sue and o ppo sed

its shelving by Prime Minis ter Tanaka9 2 Agains t the increase o f tens io ns between Japan and China s ince the middle o f the 1990s the supra-partisan Diet Asso ciatio n fo r the Preservatio n o f Territo rial Integrity was es tablished in 2004 It had 60 members by 2011On 30 March 2004 the Security Co mmittee o f the Lo wer Ho use passed a reso lutio n o n preserving territo rial integrity and demanded

a s tro nger Japanese s tance It was the firs t time the Diet passed a reso lutio n relevant to the Senkaku Is lands in this vein9 3 EdanoYukio chief o f the Co ns titutio n Research Co mmittee o f the Demo cratic Party o f Japan (DPJ) then in o ppo s itio n pro po sed that

Self-Defense Fo rces (SDF) tro o ps sho uld be s tatio ned o n the disputed Senkaku Is lands to prevent incurs io ns by o ther co untries 9 4

Since SDF members are civil servants (komuin) this demand so unds very s imilar to the demands by Abe Shinzo o n 15 September2012 to s tatio n komuin o n the is lands (witho ut clarifying whether he meant so ldiers o r o ther civil servants ) altho ugh he po s tpo ned

a decis io n when taking o ver the go vernment in December 20129 5 This sho ws the o ppo rtunis tic explo itatio n o f the territo rial disputefo r electo ral purpo ses

Natio nalis t po liticians and activis ts have also been demanding to erect facilities o n the is lands such as a weather s tatio n a beaco na helipo rt o r a harbo r in o rder to assert Japan`s so vereignty The Niho n Seinensha (Japanese Yo uth Federatio n) a natio nalis to rganizatio n affiliated with the majo r yakuza gro up Sumiyo shi-kai caused several incidents by landing o n the is lands s tarting witherecting a light to wer o r beaco n firs t o n Uo tsurijima in September 1978 which was enlarged in 1988 and ano ther o ne o n Kitako jima

Is land in 19969 6 Each such landing caused pro tes ts in China and amo ng the Chinese diaspo ra and pro mpted the PRC go vernmentto co mplain o fficially It also led to demands by the Seinensha that the light to wers be o fficially reco gnized by the go vernment andthe maintenance be taken o n by the Maritime Safety Agency (later called Co as t Guard) But even the co mpro mise o f including thelight to wer into o fficial charts was an o fficial act reinfo rcing Japan`s effective co ntro l o ver the is lands The dis cuss io n abo ut theo fficial handling o f the light to wer also raised the natio nalis t fever in Taiwan and its military even prepared (but then cancelled at

the las t mo ment) a co mmando actio n at the end o f 1990 to des tro y the facility9 7 In February 2005 amids t ris ing tens io ns o verChina`s energy develo pments in co ntes ted parts o f the Eas t China Sea and Chinese pro tes ts agains t Prime Minis ter Ko izumi`sYasukuni Shrine vis its the Japanese go vernment finally ceded to the demands o f the gro up to take o ver the Uo tsurijima lightho use

s tructure and its maintenance9 8 Until then the Gaimusho had succeeded in delaying this s tate takeo ver as `to o premature` in

o rder no t to pro vo ke China9 9

As can be seen the Japanese go vernment tried to res is t these natio nalis t claims but it co uld no t fully circumvent them thus keepingChina`s suspicio ns alive Mo reo ver whereas the Japanese go vernment always tries to prevent the landing by fo reigners o n theis lands it has no t until fairly recently prevented the landing by Japanese In o rder to keep fo reigners o ut o f the is lands and theirterrito rial waters the Japanese Co as t Guard (CG) has been patro lling the area which again is an o fficial act It may have been thenatio nalis t pressure fro m within the LDP as well as fro m right wing circles which pro mpted Ohira Masayo shi when he was PrimeMinis ter to send in 1979 a general survey team o f 50 perso ns (including Kurihara Hiro yuki) to the is lands in o rder to inves tigate the

building o f facilities like a helipo rt Such demands had already been made by the LDP o n 24 March 197810 0 Altho ugh the final repo rto f the survey spo ke agains t building facilities and no thing fo llo wed fro m it the Kurihara family co ns idered Ohira ndash altho ughgenerally kno wn to be a pro -China po litician - to be the mo s t suppo rtive prime minis ter o f all fo r the Japanese assertio n o f effectiveco ntro l o ver the is lands Befo re that Ohira had also agreed to Kurihara Hiro yuki`s pro po sal to set up o n Uo tsurijima a mo nument

to ho no ur Ko ga Tatsushiro which was do ne with the go vernment`s material and financial suppo rt10 1

Even within the Chinese leadership the territo rial is sue has been divis ive Jus t when the two s ides were nego tiating the Peace andFriendship Treaty in April 1978 abo ut 100 Chinese fishing vessels so me armed appeared aro und the Senkaku area with bannersdeclaring China`s title to the is lands While this was explained at the time in Japan as a means to pressure the Japanese during thetreaty nego tiatio ns it no w seems no w mo re likely that the Senkaku is sue was used by fo llo wers o f the Chairman o f the MilitaryCo mmiss io n Hua Guo feng as a means o f attacking the re-emerging Deng Xiao ping The PRC central leadership explained at the

time that this was `accidental` and Deng Xiao ping pro mised it wo uld never happen again10 2

These latter incidents are also impo rtant when dis cuss io n turns to the ques tio n who s tarted to undermine the unders tanding abo utshelving the is lands dispute ndash Japan o r China Was it China when it passed the 1992 Territo rial Law as is o ften mentio ned in Japano r did it already vio late the unders tanding in April 1978 as so me o thers claim Ho wever if the latter incident was beyo nd the co ntro lo f the Chinese go vernment it co uld be argued that it was the Japanese go vernment with the erectio n o f a mo nument o r the 1979survey that to uched o ff frictio ns Yet the blame game do es no t help in finding a so lutio n ins tead these incidents sho uld make itclear that bo th s ides bear part o f the respo ns ibility fo r undermining the 197278 unders tanding and sho uld therefo re be willing toco me to a new unders tanding

THE DETERIORATION OF THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP SINCE THE 1990S

In additio n to the abo ve develo pments it was the general deterio ratio n o f the bilateral relatio nship s ince the middle o f the 1990sthat changed the co nditio ns fo r maintaining the shelving o f the territo rial dispute Japan became suspicio us o f China`s no n-transparent military mo dernizatio n particularly o f the navy which has been expanding its o peratio ns including the Eas t China

Sea10 3 Other negative develo pments were the pro gress o f Chinese o il and gas explo ratio n in the Eas t China Sea despitedisagreement o ver the co mmo n EEZ bo rder vis its by Japanese po litical leaders to the Yasukuni War Shrine and o ther is sues relatedto Japan`s pas t aggress io n agains t China

A nadir in the bilateral relatio nship was reached during the rule o f Prime Minis ter Ko izumi Junichiro (2001-2006) because o f hisannual vis its to the Yasukuni Shrine But while the po litical relatio nship go t co lder the eco no mic relatio nship expanded andpro spered (`Co ld Po litics Ho t Eco no mics`) This also had ndashat firs t glance co unter-intuitively ndash a deleterio us effect o n themo tivatio n to wo rk harder to maintain the co nditio ns fo r putting as ide the territo rial co nflict s ince this dicho to my gave the falseimpress io n that po litics and eco no mics co uld be kept separate fo rever while the territo rial is sue was pending The wo rsening o f theterrito rial co nflict fro m 2010 and particularly fro m 2012 with China`s harsh po litical and eco no mic retributio n wo uld bear this o ut

Part o f the ratio nale fo r the Chinese navy`s increased presence in the Eas t China Sea is China`s o il and gas develo pments as wellas the wish to preserve the navy`s access to the Pacific Ocean to prevent JapaneseUS o bservatio n o r to intervene in a cris is Thisco uld no t but affect the territo rial dispute In May 1999 12 Chinese warships co nducted a mano euvre in waters no rth o f the

Senkaku is lands The exercise was the firs t o f its kind to be carried o ut by China in that regio n10 4 Other Chinese naval mo vementsin the Eas t China Sea increased including repo rts abo ut intelligence-gathering ships In the las t few years the po litical influence o f

the PLA and particularly o f the PLA Navy (PLAN) has co ns iderably increased10 5 The Japanese reacted by increas ing their militarydeplo yment and a s trengthening o f Japanese-American military co o peratio n Ho wever the Senkaku area is co ntro lled by the Co as tGuard which is a law enfo rcement agency and the Japanese navy keeps away fro m po licing This incidentally reinfo rces Japan`sclaim as po licing is do ne o nly within natio nal territo ry o r EEZ areas

Until the central go vernment`s purchase o f three o f the is lands in September 2012 it was the activities o f no n-s tate acto rs fro mJapan Taiwan Ho ng Ko ng and the PRC whether natio nalis t activis ts o r fishermen which caused the greates t direct co nfro ntatio nss ince Japan`s co untermeasures were a demo ns tratio n o f the exercise o f so vereignty which the PRC became increas ingly unwilling toto lerate In 1996 a Ho ng Ko ng pro tes ter who tried to co ver the las t meters fro m his bo at to o ne o f the is lands dro wned Ano therincident o ccurred in 2008 when a Japanese Co as t Guard ship rammed a Taiwanese spo rt fishing bo at which had entered Senkaku

territo rial waters The actio n caused the bo at to s ink10 6

In March 2004 fo r the firs t time s ince 1996 seven Chinese activis ts landed o n Uo tsurijima When the Japanese po lice made arres ts the Chinese Fo reign Minis try pro tes ted calling it a serio us vio latio n o f Chinese so vereignty The arres ts were made under the

immigratio n management law which includes a clause o n expuls io n o f illegal fo reign trespassers 10 7 In light o f the 2010 incident inwhich a PRC fishing trawlere twice rammed a Japanese co as t guard ship it is impo rtant to no te that despite guidelines which were togive = law enfo rcement agencies the autho rity to deal with trespassers `acco rding to the law` it was repo rted that the centralgo vernment intervened at the las t minute did no t press fo r an indictment and o rdered the release o f the arres ted Chinese Thego vernment did no t want any further co mplicatio ns that might to rpedo the planned China vis it by Fo reign Minis ter Kawaguchi Yo riko

and was satis fied to have demo ns trated effective co ntro l o ver the Senkaku Is lands by arres ting and expelling the Chinese10 8 AJapanese jo urnal repo rted that there was a Japanese pledge to China fo llo wing this incident that in future an intruder wo uld no t beput in detentio n but o nly arres ted as lo ng as it was no t a serio us case in turn China agreed to prevent the departure o f vessels withpro tes ters fro m its harbo urs Such an unders tanding has no t surpris ingly been denied by the Japanese as well as by the Chinese

go vernment10 9

The China Marine Surveillance (CMS) s tarted irregular patro l activities near the Senkaku Is lands in December 2008 when two CMSvessels s tayed fo r o ver nine ho urs in the territo rial waters o f the Senkaku Is lands as mentio ned abo ve This was interpreted in

Japan as a majo r escalatio n110 Fo rmer ambassado r to China Miyamo to Yuji called this new develo pment a qualitative change in the

Senkaku dispute which went beyo nd previo us cases o f intrus io n by fishermen o r pro tes ters 111 This deplo yment was fo llo wed byo thers the fo llo wing year agains t a backgro und o f China reinfo rcing its maritime co ntro l Japan respo nded by building up its o wndefence effo rts in the so uth including planned s tatio ning o f so me tro o ps o n Yo naguni Is land o ne o f the clo ses t is lands to the

Senkaku Is lands 112

THE 2010 FISHING TRAWLER INCIDENT

It is agains t this co mplex backgro und that the Chinese fishing trawler Minjinyu 5179 with a crew o f 15 entered the territo rial waters o fthe Senkaku Is lands o n 7 September 2010 near Kubajima There were many o ther Chinese fishing trawlers in the same area andseveral ships o f the Japanese Co as t Guard were trying to chase them away Pursued by three Japanese CG vessels the Minjinyu 5179twice co llided with two o f the CG vessels There are different interpretatio ns whether the Chinese captain Zhan Qixio ng intentio nally

rammed the CG vessels and there are so me s trange inco ns is tencies highlighted in the repo rts o f the incident113 So me no n-Japanese autho rs like Sheila Smith and Linus Hags trouml m are no n-co mmittal o n the ques tio n o f the co llis io n but mo s t Japanese

autho rs blame the trawler and this autho r is mo re inclined to believe that the ramming was intentio nal114 The Chinese

unsurpris ingly blame the CG vessels 115 The is sue o f intentio n is impo rtant inso far as it gives so me indicatio n abo ut the risk o frecurrence and o f escalatio n The fo llo wing circumstantial evidence sugges ts intentio nal ramming by the Chinese captain

- There is ample video fo o tage leaked by a CG o fficer which specialis ts have interpreted as intentio nal ramming by the Chinese

captain116

- The captain seemed to have been drunk and is kno wn to be a vo latile perso n 117

- Fishing in the Eas t China Sea is very co mpetitive and Chinese fishermen are particularly anno yed abo ut the patro ls and co ntro ls byJapanese and Ko rean law enfo rcement agencies in the as yet un-demarcated EEZs amo ng all three co untries

Chinese fishermen have a reputatio n o f o ften being vio lent as many incidents in the So uth China Sea and in the Yello w Sea seem topro ve Only three mo nths later in December 2010 ano ther Chinese fishing trawler captain rammed a So uth Ko rean co as t guard

vessel in the Yello w Sea ho wever his bo at sank as a result and the Chinese captain dro wned 118 Chinese crews are o ften armed

with metal pipes and attack law enfo rcement agents which have led to o ther fatal casualties in 2011 and 2012119

The 2010 trawler incident is further relevant in o ur co ntext in view o f the Japanese go vernment`s handling it ( legal aspect denial o fthe shelving unders tanding) China`s co untermeasures and the aftermath o f the go vernment`s purchase o f three is lands inSeptember 2012 After the co llis io ns the Japanese go vernment arres ted the crew and co nfis cated the trawler The fo llo wing day theChinese go vernment demanded the release o f the crew and the trawler which the Japanese go vernment did o n the 13 September butkeeping the captain in cus to dy The Japanese ambassado r to China Niwa Uichiro was summo ned s ix times by the Chinese between8 and 19 September Beijing`s reactio n escalated after the Chinese captain`s term o f detentio n was extended o n 19 September tolas t fro m 20 to 29 September On 20 September Chinese autho rities detained fo ur Japanese citizens fo r entering a res trictedmilitary area in Hebei pro vince Even witho ut the trawler incident the detentio n o f the fo ur Japanese wo uld have harmed the bilateralrelatio nship but happening in this co ntext it was rightly o r wro ngly immediately linked by the Japanese to o ther Chinese sanctio ns

as dis cussed belo w The result ho wever was that the Japanese released the Chinese captain120 Even immediately after the crew`sarres t the Chinese go vernment had already begun to cancel the seco nd ro und o f nego tiatio ns fo r implementatio n o f theunders tanding o n energy co o peratio n in the Eas t China Sea co ncluded o n 18 June 2008 Other reprisals and sanctio ns fo llo wedincluding the suspens io n o f rare earth expo rts to Japan o n which the co untry`s high techno lo gy indus try is very dependentAltho ugh befo re the incident the Chinese go vernment had already mo ved to reduce rare earth expo rts which naturally hit Japan asthe bigges t impo rter Japanese media repo rted that the Chinese cus to ms autho rities to tally suspended expo rts in late

September121 The exact circumstances o f this alleged embargo are s till no t yet clear as dis cussed in detail by Alas tair Jo hns to n122

The cris is ended when the deputy pro secuto r in Ishigaki anno unced o n 24 September the release o f the captain citing the`diplo matic impact` o f the case o n the bilateral relatio nship So me co ns idered this as surrender by the Japanese and the result o fdubio us po litical interference into the legal pro cess The o ppo s itio n had a field day attacking the go vernment`s handling o f the

incident123 The Japanese Fo reign Minis try spo kesman declared that the go vernment had applied do mes tic law and again refuted the

idea o f there being a territo rial pro blem to be reso lved124 Others argue that the incident had several benefits fo r the Japanesego vernment because it o btained a reco nfirmatio n o f the US security guarantee to include the Senkaku Is lands it helped to co nvince

the public abo ut the necess ity o f mo re Japanese defence effo rts and it expo sed China as an assertive if no t aggress ive po wer125

China claimed that the incident sho wed that Japan had changed its appro ach to handling this type o f incident which co uld be

interpreted as a co nfirmatio n that bo th s ides had reached an info rmal unders tanding after the 2004 incident126 Ho wever thisincident was much mo re severe s ince the captain`s two co llis io ns with CG ships were interpreted by the Japanese go vernment asintentio nal ramming The captain was charged with o bs tructio n o f Perfo rmance o f Public Duty as a result o f the ramming On theo ther hand o ne canno t blame China fo r allo wing this bo at to leave its Chinese harbo ur because it was a fishing trawler and no t apro tes ters` campaign vessel What made this incident so serio us fo r the Chinese was Japan`s very public assertio n o f itsso vereignty o ver the is lands in the way it handled the Chinese captain and the explicit denial o f the shelving unders tanding o f the

1970s On 21 September Fo reign Minis ter Maehara s tated that Japan had no t agreed with China to shelve the territo rial dispute127

This declaratio n fo llo wed the seco nd extens io n o f the captain`s detentio n o n 19 September which pro mpted the Chinesego vernment to allo w widespread demo ns tratio ns in China and to place a series o f sanctio ns agains t Japan (cancellatio n o fminis terial meetings `self- res trictio ns` o n vis its to Japan by Chinese to uris ts and po s tpo nement at very sho rt no tice o f the vis ito f 1000 Japanese yo uth planned fro m 21 September to the Shanghai Wo rld Exhibitio n) Japan is es timated to have lo s t yen318

billio n due to a decline in the number o f Chinese to uris ts 128

It is diff icult to judge whether these unprecedented co untermeasures were centrally directed and it is likely that it was aco mbinatio n o f vario us po wer centres co mpeting ando r feeling the need to be seen acting in acco rdance with the increas ingly anti-Japanese mo o d

Japan`s do mes tic circumstances made a speedy so lutio n such as that in 2004 difficult The DPJ had co me to po wer o nly in 2009 andlacked fo reign po licy experience There was no effective co mmunicatio n between the two go vernments at leas t at the beginning o fthe incident in co ntras t to earlier times The Japanese leadership o bvio us ly mis judged ho w the Chinese wo uld interpret Japanesehandling o f the incident which it perceived as a reversal o f Japan`s previo us (albeit gradually diminishing) res traint Altho ugh theDPJ had initially a mo re pro -China leadership when it came to po wer (no tably Prime Minis ter Hato yama Yukio and Secretary General

Ozawa Ichiro ) this had changed by 2010 The minis ter in charge o f the CG (which is under the Minis try o f Land Infras tructureTranspo rt and To urism) o n the day o f the incident was Maehara Seiji a kno wn defence hawk who then became Minis ter o f Fo reignAffairs in a cabinet reshuffle o n 17 September He was therefo re much mo re at liberty to take a hard-line s tance agains t China whilethe DPJ pres idential electio n ndash wo n again by Kan Nao to ndash to o k place o n 14 September fo llo wed by the prime minis ter`s departure toNew Yo rk to attend the UN General Assembly o n 22 September The fo reign minis ter befo re the 17 September was Okada Katsuyawho was also mo re inclined to take a s tro ng s tance Maehara as well as Okada had seen the CG`s video o f the co llis io n which co uld

no t but have left them with a very negative impress io n o f the Chinese captain`s actio ns 129 It certainly did no t help when Maehara inhis new po s t as fo reign minis ter qualif ied China`s reactio n in the Diet o n 18 September as `very hys terical` and then declared o n

21 September that there had never been an unders tanding abo ut shelving the territo rial dispute130 On 23 September Secretary o fState Hillary Clinto n assured vis iting Fo reign Minis ter Maehara that the Senkaku Is lands were co vered by the bilateral Japan-USSecurity Treaty an interventio n that was certainly also no t welco me to the Chinese Ho wever there have been speculatio ns that inexchange fo r this s tro ng US reco nfirmatio n o f the security guarantee in o rder to get o ut o f the s talemate the Japanese had to

pro mise to release o f the Chinese captain which o ccurred the fo llo wing day131

The 2010 incident had several co nsequences which made a recurrence very likely Firs t o f all the incident raised tens io ns to a degreelas t seen during the anti-Japan demo ns tratio ns in 2004 and 2005 which had been mainly co ncerned with Japan`s attempt to gain apermanent UN Security Co uncil seat and the his to ry is sue These tens io ns had made it impo ss ible to have any new nego tiatio nro und to co nclude a treaty abo ut co o peratio n in the explo itatio n o f hydro carbo n reso urces in the Eas t China Sea and thus reduceano ther majo r so urce o f bilateral tens io ns and o ne mo reo ver related to the Senkaku is sue Agains t this backgro und but also inline with its previo us po s itio n Japan rejected a Chinese pro po sal made in Octo ber 2010 fo r jo int reso urce develo pment in the

Senkaku area132 The legal aftermath o f the incident co ntinued fo r so me time with Japan claiming co mpensatio n fro m the Chinesecaptain fo r the damage caused to the two CG vessels which was rejected by China and co untered with demands fo r co mpensatio nand an apo lo gy The Japanese pro secuto r dro pped the case agains t the captain o nly in January 2011 but the CG s till sent a bill to

the captain in February 2011133

While the incident helped the Japanese go vernment to o btain s tro ng US suppo rt o n the applicability o f the bilateral security treaty tothe Senkaku Is lands and generally helped to co nvince the Japanese public abo ut the need fo r greater Japanese defence effo rts(including a s trengthening o f US leverage vis-agrave-vis Japan co ncerning the realignment o f its fo rces o n Okinawa) it reduced Japan`sindependence with respect to the degree o f suppo rt it pro vided fo r US China po licy

Seco ndly the incident further undermined the co nditio ns which were the fo undatio n fo r the uno fficial shelving o f the Senkaku is sueIf it was no t yet clear to everybo dy that there was a territo rial dispute o ver the Senkaku Is lands then this incident with theunprecedented Chinese sanctio ns agains t Japan lifted the las t remnants o f do ubt Maehara Seji who repeated o n 25 o ccas io ns inDiet debates between 10 September and 16 No vember 2010 that there exis ted no territo rial dispute made this o fficial po s itio n

even less co nvincing134 The incident pro mpted Beijing to publicly undermine Japan`s territo rial claim further by anno uncing o n 29Octo ber 2010 permanent deplo yment o f large fisheries patro l vessels in waters near the Senkaku Is lands which was recipro cated by

the CG deplo ying patro l vessels o f o ver 1000 to ns in the same area135 In a further tit-fo r-tat o n 17 December 2010 the city

go vernment o f Ishigaki the adminis trative autho rity o f the Senkaku Is lands passed an o rdinance to des ignate 14 January the day to

co mmemo rate the Senkaku Is lands` inco rpo ratio n in 1895136

The further ero s io n o f the shelving agreement after Octo ber 2010

The next majo r co nfro ntatio n o ver the Senkaku Is lands in September 2012 o ccurred agains t the backgro und o f mo re measurestaken by bo th s ides to suppo rt their respective territo rial claims and do mes tic circumstances in bo th co untries which were evenless co nducive to re-es tablish trus t and go o d relatio ns The gro wing US-China po litical and military rivalry in Eas t As ia asexemplif ied by the As ia pivo t which China perceives as directed agains t its rise certainly did no t help Initially the year 2011 saw areco very o f relatio ns fro m the 2010 incident Bilateral trade reached a new high with a vo lume o f $345 billio n Japanese fo reign

direct inves tment in China so ared nearly 50 per cent in 2011 to $6 3bn137 Mo reo ver the Chinese public was very impressed with thedis ciplined way the Japanese peo ple reacted to wards the triple disas ters which hit the co untry o n 11 March 2011 and there was an

o utpo uring o f sympathy which also included the sending o f a Chinese search-and-rescue miss io n to the affected To ho ku area138

Yet this impro ved atmo sphere was quickly dispelled when the results o f the textbo o k review were published o n 27 March whichasserted Japan`s territo rial claim to the Senkaku Is lands (as well as to TakeshimaDo kto ) and denied the Chinese figure o f

300 000 victims in the Nanjing massacre139

In the meantime the Japanese go vernment co ntinued to turn the legal s crews which affected the Senkaku Is lands by implementingdo mes tic laws in o rder to be co ngruent with internatio nal law and s trengthening maritime co ntro l In February 2012 the Japanesecabinet passed bills to enhance the Japan Co as t Guards law enfo rcement po wers in territo rial waters which wo uld fo r example

autho rize the CG to o rder fo reign ships to leave Japan`s Territo rial Waters witho ut firs t bo arding them140 Other adminis trativemeasures derived fro m the Bas ic Law o n Ocean Po licy which had been enacted in 2007 and which pro vides the framewo rk fo radminis trating remo te is lands Since 2009 Japan has given names to hitherto unnamed is lands to subs tantiate its claims to anEEZ Fo r this purpo se in Augus t 2011 the go vernment placed 23 uninhabited is lands under s tate co ntro l but fo ur is lets near theSenkaku Is lands were exempt o ut o f co ns ideratio n fo r China In March 2012 ho wever the go vernment abando ned this cautio n and

regis tered Kitako jima as a natio nal asset141 In No vember 2011 the go vernment had let it be kno wn that it wo uld sho rtly release a

new lis t o f names fo r is lands which wo uld include is lets o f the Senkaku gro up142 China pro tes ted and a meeting in Beijing plannedin February 2012 between Pres ident Hu Jintao and representatives o f seven bilateral friendship gro ups fro m Japan was cancelled Ano pinio n piece in the Peoples Daily (RMRB) o n 17 January 2012 said Japans mo ve lsquois a blatant mo ve to damage Chinas co re

interes ts rsquo143 On 2 March 2012 To kyo finally anno unced a lis t o f 39 is lands which included fo ur is lets in the Senkaku Is lands

gro up144 The Chinese pro tes ted immediately o n the same day and in a tit-fo r-tat the State Oceanic Adminis tratio n released o n 3

March s tandard names and descriptio ns o f the Senkaku is lands and its 70 affiliated is lets 145 Ano ther Chinese co untermo ve was theanno uncement o n 16 March by the SOA that they had s tarted patro lling near the Senkaku Is lands This was fo llo wed pro mptly o n thesame day by o ne CMS ship entering the Territo rial Waters o f the Senkaku Is lands and the same vessels with ano ther CMS ship

cruis ing in the Co ntiguo us Waters o f the is lands 146 In No vember 2010 an o fficial o f the Minis try o f Agricultures Bureau o f Fisherieswhich o perates the Fisheries Law Enfo rcement Co mmand (FLEC) had already anno unced that his o rganizatio n wo uld fro m no w o n

deplo y fisheries patro l vessels o f o ver 1000 to ns to maintain co ntinuo us patro ls 147

THE 2012 CONFRONTATION ISHIHARA SHINTARO LIGHTING THE FUSE

It was in this tense enviro nment that To kyo Go verno r Ishihara Shintaro anno unced o n 16 April 2012 that the To kyo Metro po litanGo vernment (TMG) was nego tiating the purchase o f three o f the fo ur privately-held Senkaku is lands by the end o f the year ie

Uo tsurijima Kita Ko jima and Minami Ko jima The lease o f the central go vernment fo r these three is lands was due to expire in March2013 and no incident wo uld have o ccurred if the go vernment had quietly renewed the lease The central go vernment s tated that ithad no t kno wn abo ut Ishihara`s intentio n but that there had been co ntacts o n vario us o ccas io ns between the go vernment and the

private o wner148 This seems co nvincing s ince s tate o wnership wo uld have pro vided better preventio n o f incidents even mo re thanjus t leas ing Taken aback by Ishihara`s surprise mo ve the Chief Cabinet Secretary Fujimura Osamu declared the fo llo wing day thatthe central go vernment might acquire the is lands `if required` and Prime Minis ter No da implied in a Diet speech o n the 18 April that

a purchase by the central go vernment was o ne o f the o ptio ns Bo th s tatements were widely repo rted in China149 Ishihara hadcho sen his anno uncement fo r maximum effect o n the o ccas io n o f a speech at the co nservative Washingto n DC-based HeritageFo undatio n He made it clear that this pro ject was meant as a criticism o f the DPJ-led central go vernment which he co ns ideredfailing in its duty to sufficiently pro tect Japan`s so vereignty by saying that the central go vernment sho uld be buying the is lands butthat the Gaimusho was to o afraid o f o ffending China The lo catio n o f his anno uncement was meant to gain s tro nger suppo rt fro m

the US fo r Japan`s territo rial claim150 As we have seen abo ve fro m Ishihara`s activities in the 1970s this anno uncement was inmany ways the lo gical co nclus io n o f his lo ng las ting o bsess io n with the Senkaku Is lands and his hatred o f co mmunis t China It wasthe 2010 incident in particular which had enco uraged him to renew his o ld plan o f buying the is lands after his earlier failure to do so His go o d co nnectio ns with the o wner Kurihara Kunio ki who shared his natio nalis t pro clivities helped Ishihara to beco me the

favo ured purchaser151

The po ss ibility o f having the three is lands under the co ntro l o f the natio nalis tic go verno r o f To kyo who wanted to build facilities o nthe is lands to s trengthen Japan`s so vereignty was unpalatable to the No da go vernment which feared co mplicatio ns with China In a

meeting o n 18 May No da and his to p advisers decided in principle to purchase the is lands 152 Pressure o n the go vernmentincreased to pre-empt Ishihara because he was as to nishingly success ful in rais ing vo luntary co ntributio ns fro m the public to buythe three is lands thus circumventing any legal diff iculties in us ing To kyo `s taxpayer mo ney and also pro ving the po pularity o f his

mo ve By 1 June he had co llected 70 000 do natio ns to taling aro und yen101 billio n which increased to yen146 billio n by 6 September153

On 27 July the TMG ran an advertisement in the Wall Street Journal asking fo r US unders tanding and suppo rt fo r the purchase plan154

The TMG had to reques t central go vernment permiss io n to co nduct a survey o f the is lands which the go vernment refused to grant

o n 27 Augus t fo rcing the TMG to co nduct a survey fro m a ship o n 2 September155 In the end it was the higher sum and the sho rtes tdelay o f co ncluding the deal which pro mpted Kurihara Kunio ki who was apparently in so me financial diff iculties to accept the centralgo vernment`s o ffer o f yen205 billio n ($26 millio n) and to s ign the co ntract o n 11 September This was an embarrass ing turn fo rIshihara In additio n he did no t succeed in us ing the o ffer o f his co llected mo ney to entice the No da go vernment to pro mise thebuilding o f any facility o n the is lands No da was presented by his adminis tratio n with several o ptio ns including his favo ured o ptio no f repairing the exis ting light ho use o n Uo tsurijima but in the end was co nvinced by Fo reign Minis ter Gemba to leave things as they

were in o rder no t to further inflame the Chinese156

The central go vernment`s purchase o f the three is lands o n 11 September immediately led to a very harsh reactio n by the Chinesewhich was even wo rse than in 2010 But befo re lo o king at Chinese co untermeasures after 11 September in detail it is impo rtant toinves tigate why the Chinese reactio n was so s tro ng and why the Japanese apparently did no t anticipate it particularly in view o fChina`s unprecedented reactio n in September 2010

CHINESE WARNINGS BEFORE THE NATIONALIZATION ON 11 SEPTEMBER

Prime Minis ter No da admitted o n 19 September o nly eight days into the co mprehens ive Chinese sanctio ns and co unter measures

that he had underes timated their extent157

158 In a named co mmentary o f Xinhua o n 18 April attentio n was drawn to Ishihara`s kno wn right wing and anti-Chinese s tatementsbut also po inted o ut that the CMOFA `wo uld no t hes itate to take any necessary measures to safeguard so vereignty o ver the Diao yu

Is lands`159 Vice-Pres ident Xi Jinping to ld vis iting Ko no Yo hei a kno wn pro -China hand that Japan sho uld no t wo rsen the bilateral

relatio nship and that co re is sues sho uld be reso lved by the two co untries in an appro priate manner16 0 At the end o f April the StateOceanic Adminis tratio n anno unced a plan to des ignate is lands and their surro unding waters as s trategically vital and to pro tect their

enviro nments and develo p marine reso urces 16 1 Mo re specifically targeting the Senkaku Is lands was ho wever the entry o n 3 May o f

two FLEC vessels into the Senkaku Is lands` Co ntiguo us Waters fo r the firs t time s ince Ishihara`s anno uncement16 2 Bilateraltens io ns also increased after a Japanese right wing gro up suppo rted the ho lding o f a meeting o f the Wo rld Uyghur Co ngress in

To kyo fro m 14 to 18 May which led to the cancellatio n by Beijing o f several o fficial vis its 16 3 On 13 May Premier Wen Jiabao raisedthe Senkaku is sue and the Uighur meeting during talks in Beijing with Prime Minis ter Yo shihiko No da cautio ning that lsquoit is impo rtant

to respect Chinarsquos co re interes ts and matters o f great co ncernrsquo16 4 Wang Jiarui head o f the Co mmunis t Partys Internatio nalDepartment was quo ted by Eda Satsuki a fo reign po licy adviser o f the DPJ that bo th the Senkaku and the Uighur is sue were

described as `co re is sues` and Wen`s s tatement was s tressed in a Chinese TV bro adcas t16 5 The Xinjiang is sue as well as Taiwanand Tibet have been referred to fo r so me time by the Chinese go vernment as `co re is sues` but the Senkaku is sue had been called

a `co re is sue` apparently fo r the firs t time o nly in an o pinio n piece by the Renmin Ribao in January 201216 6 Only o n 23 March 2013did the Chinese Fo reign Minis try Spo kesperso n clearly s tate that China regards the Diao yu Is lands as its co re interes t altho ugh the

written reco rd subsequently so ftened this s tatement16 7

The abo ve chro no lo gy certainly gives the impress io n that there was a series o f Chinese reactio ns which expressed s tro ng Chineseco ncern with any purchase (whether by the TMG o r the central go vernment) o f the Senkaku Is lands If that had no t been eno ugh theinterview o f the Financial Times with Japan`s ambassado r in China Niwa Uichiro at the beginning o f June sho wed s tro ng co ncernabo ut the implicatio ns o f a purchase He was quo ted as saying that lsquoif Mr Ishihararsquos plans are acted upo n then it will result in anextremely grave cris is in relatio ns between Japan and ChinahellipWe canno t allo w decades o f pas t effo rt to be bro ught to no thingrsquo He

added that such a cris is wo uld affect bus iness 16 8 Niwa mus t have been truly co ncerned abo ut the severity o f the s ituatio n to makesuch an undiplo matic public s tatement fo r which he was reprimanded by Fo reign Minis ter Gemba and criticized by so me media

o utlets and po liticians ultimately leading to his recall later in the year16 9

The Chinese warnings became sharper at the seco nd s tage when Prime Minis ter No da anno unced o n 7 July that his go vernment wo uldseek to buy the is lands because the purchase co uld no lo nger be put do wn to a mere lo cal maverick with s tro ng anti-Chineseinclinatio ns The Global Times edito rial o f 9 July sho wed the frus tratio n by so me Chinese lsquoEach time Japan takes o ne s tep we sho uldtake o ne and half o r even two s teps fo rward making Japan aware o f the grave co nsequences caused by its aggress io n agains t

Chinarsquo170 A Xinhua co mmentary o n 7 July quo tes the CMOFA`s spo kesperso n referring pro bably fo r the firs t time in this ro w to a`co nsensus` agains t which the Japanese go vernment went by wanting to buy the is lands meaning o f co urse the shelving co nsensus

o f 1972 and 1978171 On 9 July a Xinhua co mmentary titled `Japan playing with fire o ver Diao yu Is lands` called the purchase by the

central go vernment a `farcical ambitio n` an express io n repeated thereafter many times 172 On 11 July the Japanese media repo rtedthe entry by three FLEC vessels into the territo rial waters o f Kubajima the firs t time s ince the 16 March 2012 fo llo wed by o ne vessel

cruis ing the fo llo wing day in the is land`s co ntiguo us zo ne173 Public o pinio n became increas ingly inflamed and the Global Timesrepo rted o n 19 July that 90 8 per cent o f Chinese peo ple surveyed appro ve us ing the military to enfo rce Chinas so vereignty o ver

the is lets with 521 per cent saying a military clash lsquois likelyrsquo between China and Japan o ver the is lands 174

Even the US gave Japan `s tro ng advice` no t to pro ceed with the purchase because it co uld `trigger a cris is` as was revealed in April2013 by Kurt Campbell who was at the time Ass is tant Secretary fo r Eas t As ian and Pacific Affairs Even tho ugh we warned JapanJapan decided to go in a different directio n and they tho ught they had gained the suppo rt o f China o r so me did which we were

certain that they had no t Campbell is quo ted in an interview with Kyo do 175

FAILURE OF COMMUNICATION

The abo ve chro no lo gy and escalatio n o f Chinese reactio ns to the planned purchase o f the is lands o ver the summer 2012 give aclear indicatio n that a Japanese purchase o f the three is lands was no t co ns idered jus t ano ther incident witho ut majo rco nsequences So why did the Japanese go vernment s till go ahead with the purchase In the final analys is the failure to avo id thecris is escalating in September 2012 lay in the wide difference between the interes ts o f the two go vernments Do mes ticcircumstances o n bo th s ides and the inherent zero sum nature o f territo rial disputes prevented the trans itio n fro m dialo gue topreventive actio n let alo ne so lutio n Aggravating events o ver the summer 2012 which raised tempers o n bo th s ides were thedemands by the TMG to send a survey team to the Senkaku Is lands (the No da go vernment after so me initial co nflicting repo rts didno t allo w a landing) the landing o f Ho ng Ko ng activis ts o n Uo tsurijima o n 15 Augus t (timed with the anniversary o f Japan`ssurrender) fo llo wed by the landing o f Japanese activis ts ( including lo cal parliamentarians ) o n 19 Augus t and an attack in Beijing o n27 Augus t o n the car carrying Ambassado r Niwa Despite o ngo ing co mmunicatio n and dialo gue thro ugh vario us channels theseadverse circumstances led to a hardening o f po s itio ns o ver the summer 2012 between the two go vernments

The Japanese central go vernment had been caught sho rt by Ishihara`s sudden anno uncement o n 16 April and became to tallyabso rbed with preventing the maverick po litician fro m go ing ahead with the purchase o f the is lands fearing rightly that this wo uldserio us ly co mplicate Japan-China relatio ns Ishihara wanted to embarrass the No da go vernment which was co ns tantly declining inpo pularity and to fo rce it to deal mo re assertively with the is lands As we have seen fo r Ishihara it was no t jus t abo ut purchas ingthe is lands but abo ut building facilities o n them Fo r the No da go vernment buying the is lands by the s tate was therefo re the lesserevil The go vernment tried all alo ng to co nvince the Chinese o f To kyo `s go o d intentio ns fo r example when Fo reign Minis ter Gembamet with his Chinese co unterpart Yang Jiechi o n 11 July that the purchase was o nly a `do mes tic co mmercial transactio n` and no t a

diplo matic matter and was o nly meant to ensure that the is lands wo uld be `adminis tered peacefully and s tably`176 In December2012 when the full extent o f China`s unprecedented reactio ns had beco me kno wn the new Japanese ambassado r Kitera s till s tatedthat lsquoThe change in o wnership sho uld no t have caused a pro blem in relatio ns with Chinarsquo adding that Japan had given China sufficient

explanatio ns ahead o f the purchase177 Fo reign Minis ter Gemba even tried to highlight in No vember that the purchase was actually areturn to the status quo ante lsquoThe measure taken by the go vernment o f Japan was jus t a trans fer o f title under Japanese do mes ticlaw and jus t means that the o wnership o f the is lands mdash held by the go vernment until 1932 mdash was returned fro m a private citizen to

the go vernmentrsquo178 In sho rt fo r the Japanese the purchase o f the is lands was aimed at maintaining the status quo in such a waythat it ho ped China wo uld co ns ider to be in its o wn interes t that is by cho o s ing the lesser o f two evils That express io ns like`peaceful adminis tratio n` o r `trans fer o f title under do mes tic Japanese law` co uld o nly be interpreted by the Chinese as acts o fasserting Japanese so vereignty was apparently s imply igno red Under these circumstances it was impo ss ible to co nvince theChinese that trans fer o f o wnership had no thing to do with so vereignty Ins tead the Chinese even suspected that the No da

go vernment and Ishihara were co nniving at s trengthening Japan`s co ntro l o ver the is lands 179

Any intended co nciliato ry o verto ne in the abo ve explanatio ns by Gemba and many s imilar declaratio ns befo re and later were furthernegated by the ins is tence that there was no territo rial dispute exactly the po s itio n the Chinese mo s t so ught to change Thefrequent references to `co re interes t` by China were igno red by the Japanese go vernment Fo r the Chinese leaders the `o ffer` tocho o se between the To kyo Metro po litan Go vernment o r the Go vernment o f Japan buying the is lands was as Vice Fo reign Minis ter

Zhang Zhijun later put it like being asked to cho o se between two do ses o f po iso n18 0

It was also unfo rtunate that the Japanese go vernment allo wed the express io n kokuyuka (natio nalizatio n) to prevail even amo ng

go vernment members ins tead o f the o riginal term agreed by the Japanese cabinet shutoku (acquis itio n)18 1 Chinese media hastaken o ver the Japanese term o f lsquonatio nalizatio nrsquo which certainly further co nfused Chinese public o pinio n Since it do es no t kno w thehis to rical backgro und and Japan`s effective co ntro l o f the is lands `natio nalizatio n` tended to be unders to o d as a radical change in

the status quo o r even as invas io n18 2 A well kno wn Japanese o bserver in China Kato Yo shikazu even argued therefo re that the 1972

and 1978 unders tanding abo ut shelving had prevented the Chinese peo ple fro m learning abo ut the is sue as perceived in Japan18 3

Bo th s ides made it impo ss ible with their extreme and diametrically o ppo sed po s itio ns to find a co mpro mise The No da go vernmentwas to o weak (and also to o preo ccupied with o ther is sues like the pass ing o f the law to intro duce a hike o f the value added taxco ping with the aftermath o f the triple disas ter o f March 2011 and s imply trying to s tay in po wer) to find an alternative to the no wabando ned `shelving co mpro mise` and to admit that there was a territo rial pro blem At the end o f Augus t No da was fo rced topro mise Lo wer Ho use electio ns `so metime so o n` despite the grim o utlo o k fo r his party`s chances in the electio ns Making aco mpro mise o n the territo rial is sue wo uld no t have helped to gain po pular suppo rt While the Chinese pro bably felt enco uraged toescalate pressure by their success in fo rcing the Japanese go vernment hand o ver the captain in September 2010 it mo s t likely hadthe effect o n the No da go vernment to remain inflexible in o rder to avo id being seen yet again as caving in to Chinese pressure Butthe Chinese were also no t able to co mpro mise o n their demand that the Japanese sho uld admit the exis tence o f a territo rial is sue

The preparatio n fo r the 18 th Natio nal Party Co ngress in No vember 2012 and the ensuing leadership change to be finalized o nly inspring 2013 s imilarly did no t allo w the Chinese leaders whether inco ming o r o utgo ing to appear so ft Eight o ut o f nine Po litbureaumembers publicly expressed o ppo s itio n to the purchase either befo re o r after the anno uncement o f the purchase o n 11

September18 4 There are also credible repo rts that during the CCP`s summer retreat to Beihaide in Augus t Hu Jintao came underpressure fro m the future gro up o f leaders to take a mo re severe po s itio n o n Japan`s intentio n to natio nalise the three is lands Asa result the leading fo reign po licy interlo cuto rs o f the Japanese go vernment Zhang Zhijun and Dai Bingguo hardened their po s itio n

as well18 5 Public o pinio n in China had gro wn increas ingly ho s tile to Japan o ver the summer and was particularly inflamed when thelanding o f the Ho ng Ko ng activis ts was fo llo wed by the landing o f Japanese activis ts which were treated by the Japanese autho ritiesmo re leniently than the fo rmer ie no t arres ted despite having vio lated private land leased to the s tate Rio ts in several Chinese

cities s tarted thereafter18 6

Altho ugh bo th s ides agreed to co ntinue dialo gue and several o fficial meetings at different levels to o k place they co uld o nly end inres tating kno wn po s itio ns China did no t make things eas ier by later cancelling such meetings depriving bo th s ides o f po ss ibleo ppo rtunities to find a breakthro ugh The s tart o f Chinese sanctio ns acro ss the who le gambit o f bilateral relatio ns deprived theJapanese o f even mo re do mes tic wriggle ro o m fo r a co mpro mise

It seems that the abo ve circumstances did no t allo w Japan`s central decis io n-makers co ncerned with the is sue in particular the

Prime Minis ter and his immediate circle to admit to ando r unders tand until the purchase anno uncement o n 11 September 2012ho w s tro ngly the Chinese felt abo ut it Ambassado r Niwa`s rather undiplo matic s tatements in the Financial Times interview seem toindicate that he felt that the central decis io n-makers did no t unders tand the s trength o f the feelings o f the Chinese and ho w far theymight go Niwa warned in his interview that even a po ss ible pre-purchase survey o f the is lands co uld be diplo matically incendiary

s ince such a survey was dis cussed already at the time to enable the TMG to go ahead with the purchase18 7 As late as the 3September the Yomiuri Shimbun repo rted that the Chinese go vernment was reacting calmly as lo ng as three co nditio ns wereo bserved to maintain the status quo The co nditio ns co ntained no o ppo s itio n to a po ss ible purchase and ins tead jus t mentio ned

abs tentio n fro m landing surveying and building facilities o n the is lands 18 8 Acco rding to Pro fesso r Takahara Akio General ZhuChenghu said o n 5 September that a purchase by the central go vernment wo uld be better and Qu Xing directo r o f the China Ins titute

o f Internatio nal Affairs is said to have expressed a s imilar o pinio n18 9 Even o n 12 September when the s to rm bro ke the deputydirecto r o f the Japan Ins titute o f the Chinese Academy o f So cial Science Gao Ho ng s tated in an interview with the o n-line vers io no f the Renmin Ribao that if Japan wo uld respect the three abs tentio ns mentio ned abo ve the s ituatio n co uld ultimately revert to the

status quo ante19 0 But these were no lo nger the decis ive vo ices o f the Chinese leadership after the Beihaide meeting The abo ve-mentio ned Campbell interview seems to sugges t that Japan was lo ng befo re mo re inclined to act upo n Chinese s tatements whichwere clo ser to what it wanted to unders tand

CHINESE REACTION RHETORICAL WARFARE

The final misco mmunicatio n o r clash o f irreco ncilable interes ts o ccurred when Prime Minis ter No da met Pres ident Hu o n thes idelines o f the As ia Pacific Eco no mic Co o peratio n (APEC) summit in Vladivo s to k o n 9 September then anno unced two days laterthe s igning o f the purchase co ntract with the Kurihara family Whether Hu had no t sufficiently co nveyed his s tro ng feelingsco ncerning the purchase which had been kno wn and bilaterally dis cussed at leas t s ince the Japanese o fficial anno uncement o f itspurchase intentio n o n 7 July o r No da had no t unders tanding the Chinese feeling fo r the po ss ible reaso ns dis cussed abo ve Hu

apparently felt he had lo s t face when Japan anno unced the purchase o n 11 September19 1 Mo reo ver the Japanese anno uncementco uld no t have co me at a mo re awkward time because o f the anniversary o f the Mukden Incident o n the 18 September which likeseveral o ther carefully cultivated anniversaries regarding Japan`s pas t misdeeds in China always aro use latent anti-Japanesefeelings As a result the Japanese anno uncement caused an avalanche o f virulent rheto rical o utburs ts relating to the pas t po liticalsanctio ns further measures to assert China`s territo rial claim (fo r example including the is lands in the Chinese TV weatherfo recas t an exhibitio n o f ancient maps to pro ve Chinese co ntro l) eco no mic sanctio ns and an escalatio n o f patro ls by ChineseFLEC and MSA ships and aircraft aro und the Senkaku Is lands

The mildes t part o f China`s rheto rical o ffens ive was calling the go vernment purchase a `farce` a rather undiplo matic express io nalready used by Xinhua in July 2012 but then taken up at the highes t level by Vice Pres ident Xi Jinping when meeting Secretary o f

Defence Leo n Panetta o n 19 September19 2 But the main line fro m no w o n was that Japan`s claim to the Senkaku Is lands was adenial o f the po s t-Wo rld War II results In its s tatements and rebuttals the Chinese sho wed their frus tratio n at no t having been ableto fundamentally change the status quo and they did no t hes itate to use express io ns which were rather undignified fo r diplo mats andpo litical leaders Japan o n the o ther hand argued fo r peaceful reso lutio n alo ng the lines o f internatio nal law and dialo gue whichpro bably infuriated the Chinese even mo re On 10 September the CMFA is sued a s tatement calling Japans po s itio n o n the disputedis lands `an o utright denial o f the o utco mes o f the victo ry o f the Wo rld Anti-Fascis t War and hellip a grave challenge to the po s t-war

internatio nal o rder`19 3 In a heated exchange at the UN General Assembly between Chinas UN ambassado r Li Bao do ng and JapansDeputy UN ambassado r Ko dama Kazuo Li called the mo tive fo r purchas ing the three is lands to lsquolegalize its s tealing and o ccupatio no f Chinese territo ryrsquo and s tated lsquoThis actio n o f Japan co ns titutes a serio us encro achment upo n Chinas so vereignty and intends toco ntinue and legalize the result o f Japans co lo nial po licy It is an o pen denial o f the o utco mes o f victo ry o f the wo rld anti-fascis twar and a grave challenge to the po s t-war internatio nal o rder and the purpo ses and principles o f the Charter o f the United

Natio ns rsquo19 4 In a further rebuttal o f Japan`s assertio n o f its claim Li characterized the is land purchase as lsquono thing different fro m

mo ney launderingrsquo19 5 At the As ia Euro pe Meeting (ASEM) in Lao s Fo reign Minis ter Yang Jiechi repeated the reference to the`o utco me o f the anti-Fascis t war` while Prime Minis ter No da spo ke o f peaceful reso lutio n o f co nflicts acco rding to internatio nal

law19 6 On 11 Octo ber the CMFA spo kesperso n Ho ng Lei refuted Fo reign Minis ter Gembarsquos his to rical acco unt jus tifying Japan`s

claim by calling it `gangs ter lo gic`19 7

On the Chinese s ide therefo re there are no w two clo sely-linked his to ry narratives o ne is abo ut the is lands having been part o fChina s ince the Ming and Qing dynas ties the o ther co nnects the is lands to the already well-rehearsed his to ry narrative ie Japanhaving victimised China s ince the Sino -Japanese war o f 1894-95 These two narratives co ntinue to be cultivated by the Chineseleadership In Octo ber 2012 the Chinese anno uncement o f the publicatio n o f 80 vo lumes o n the Far Eas t War Criminal Co urt was

clearly meant to link the latter narrative to Japan`s acquis itio n o f the Senkaku Is lands 19 8 Fo rmer Fo reign Minis ter Gemba explicitlytried in Octo ber 2012 to delink the territo rial is sue fro m Japan`s aggress io n agains t China o nly to be reminded by the Chineseambassado r to the UK in an article in the Financial Times (as part o f the ensuing wo rldwide press campaign by bo th s ides ) that lsquothe

Diao yu Dao is sue is all abo ut his to ryrsquo19 9 Since then until no w China has co ntinued this ldquohis to ry warfarerdquo by publishing endlessarticles o n Japan`s aggress io n agains t China befo re 1945 The mo s t recent mo ve in July 2014 is the serialised o n-line publicatio n o f

the hand-written co nfess io ns by 45 Japanese co nvicted war criminals by the State Archives Adminis tratio n20 0

POLITICAL SANCTIONS AND PUBLIC OPINION

Chinese po litical co untermeasures ranged fro m the cancellatio n o f o fficial and uno fficial vis its to further legal acts to reinfo rce

China`s claim to the Senkaku Is lands Aro und 40 per cent o f ceremo nial events in Japan to mark 2012 as the 40 th anniversary o f the

no rmalizatio n o f diplo matic relatio ns with China were cancelled o r po s tpo ned and even mo re events in China20 1 Thesecancellatio ns were no t always the result o f direct go vernment interventio n but so metimes mo re indirect o fficial `dis co uragement`helped by the Chinese preference fo r no t being seen to do so mething in co ntradictio n to the (initially fo mented and later self-pro pelling) anti-Japan atmo sphere o r by fear o f participants running into demo ns tratio ns if no t assaults The legal s crews werefurther turned with lo ng-term implicatio ns On 10 September the Chinese go vernment anno unced the base po ints and baselines o f

the territo rial waters o f the disputed is lands and their affiliated is lets as well as the names and co o rdinates o f 17 base po ints 20 2

On 16 September repo rts appeared that China was submitting pro po sals fo r its extended co ntinental shelf to the UN Co ntinental

Shelf Co mmiss io n which included the Senkaku Is lands but in fact the actual submiss io n o ccurred o nly o n 14 December 201220 3 On

20 September a go vernment agency published a thematic map o f the Diao yu Is land and its affiliated is lands 20 4 Chinarsquos

Meteo ro lo gical Adminis tratio n s tarted pro viding weather fo recas ts fo r the Senkaku area o n the s tate-run TV s tatio n20 5 On 16September the fishery bureau anno unced the lifting o f the fishery ban in the Eas t China Sea and s tressed that China planned to

s trengthen its so vereignty claim o ver the Senkakus 20 6

There were rumo urs that 1000 fishing vessels wo uld co me to the Senkaku area and tho ugh this did no t materialize it helped to

further raise tens io ns 20 7

Mo st attentio n in Japan was fo cused o n the widening s treet pro tes ts in o ver 100 Chinese cities the des tructio n o f Japanese sho ps

res taurants cars and pro ductio n facilities and the attacks o n Japanese citizens in China20 8 The webs ites o f at leas t 19 Japanese

banks univers ities and o ther ins titutio ns came under cyber-attack20 9 At a demo ns tratio n in Shanghai abo ut 7000 pro tes ters

chanted s lo gans such as lsquoBeat Japanese imperialismrsquo lsquoBo yco tt Japanese pro ducts rsquo and lsquoDes tro y Japan and retrieve Okinawarsquo210

Altho ugh o nly 63 per cent o f po lled Japanese in late September 2012 expressed suppo rt fo r their go vernment`s natio nalizatio n o fthe is lands do wn fro m 73 per cent in a previo us po ll o n 15 and 16 September 82 per cent o f respo ndents in a Mainichi Shimbun

survey said the Japanese go vernment had no t pro tes ted s tro ngly eno ugh to Beijing o ver anti-Japan pro tes ts 211 The Chinesego vernment denied any o fficial invo lvement and the spo kesperso n o f the Waijiao bu went o nly as far as saying that the pro tes ts anddemo ns tratio ns were `co mpletely caused by the Japanese go vernments illegal purchase o f the Diao yu Is lands and are peo ples

spo ntaneo us acts`212 There were ho wever repo rts that so me o f the demo ns tratio ns were to lerated if no t abetted by go vernment

agencies 213 The demo ns tratio ns so o n died do wn because to lerating them much lo nger wo uld have run the risk that they wo uld turninto anti-go vernment demo ns tratio ns Even the Chinese Academy o f So cial Sciences repo rted that so me demo ns trato rs who were

arres ted did no t even kno w where the Senkaku Is lands were and that anger o ver the widening wealth gap was behind their acts 214 Inco ntras t to these Chinese demo ns tratio ns and acts o f lawlessness there was hardly any public demo ns tratio n in Japan whichsho ws the relative detachment o f the Japanese fro m the dispute On 22 September `Nippo n Gambare` a right wing o rganizatio nchaired by fo rmer Air Self Defence Fo rce chief Tamo gami To shio s taged a march thro ugh parts o f To kyo which this autho rwitnessed A brief fire was s tarted at a Chinese scho o l in Ko be and two smo ke bo mbs were thro wn into the Chinese Co nsulate

General in Fukuo ka215 But such actio ns were relatively rare and small in s cale

ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND THE QUESTION OF WHO IS MORE DEPENDENT ON WHOM

Pro tes t measures o f a lo nger duratio n and as yet unpredictable co nsequences fo r the bilateral relatio nship have been China`seco no mic sanctio ns and a bo yco tt o f Japanese go o ds by the general public altho ugh the autho rities denied again any go vernmentinterventio n A co mmentary o f Xinhua half admitted ho wever go vernment interventio n when it made the unco nvincing dis tinctio nbetween `measures` and `sanctio ns` `Since Japan purchased Chinas Diao yu Is lands in September the Chinese go vernment hastaken a series o f co untermeasures in the eco no mic legal diplo matic and military fields which have helped it to wres t the initiativeto reso lve the is lands dispute despite China no t impo s ing any eco no mic sanctio ns the Japanese eco no my has been badly

hit`216 Renmin Ribao co mpared `eco no mic punishments` with a `gun` and warned that thro ugh its is land purchase Japan hadalready to uched the `trigger` In a rather heavy hint the paper po inted o ut ho w vulnerable Japan`s eco no my was because o f the

2011 earthquake and the dependence o f key eco no mic secto rs o n China217 Even mo re o fficial was Vice Minis ter o f Co mmerce Jiang

Zengwei`s warning that the is land purchase wo uld inevitably have a negative impact o n Sino -Japanese eco no mic and trade ties 218

After 11 September it so o n became very o bvio us that the heavy hand o f the Chinese go vernment was impo s ing sanctio ns andmaking life fo r Japanese bus iness mo re diff icult On 21 September it was repo rted that Chinese cus to ms autho rities were

s trengthening inspectio ns o f impo rts fro m and expo rts to Japan altho ugh the Chinese autho rities denied this 219 In the same week

repo rts appeared abo ut Japanese co mpanies experiencing delays in o btaining wo rking visas fo r their Japanese emplo yees 220 BigJapanese co mpanies with inves tments in China were experiencing ho ld-ups in gaining regulato ry appro vals fo r Merger amp

Acquis itio ns 221 In co ntras t to the interference in rare earth expo rts to Japan after the trawler incident in 2010 ho wever no such

embargo was implemented because this particular eco no mic weapo n had lo s t its effectiveness s ince then (see belo w)222

The greates t medium-term damage to Japanese eco no mic activities apart fro m the abo ve mentio ned des tructio n o f Japaneseco mmercial and indus trial s ites was caused by a partial co nsumer bo yco tt no tably the fall o f car sales in China and Chineseto urism to Japan Overall bilateral trade decreased by 39 per cent in 2012 to $329 billio n the firs t dro p s ince the co llapse o f theLehman inves tment bank in 2009 and in 2013 to $3125 billio n acco rding to Chinese figures Acco rding to Japanese figures trade in

2013 increased but declined in vo lume223

The wo rs t hit secto r was auto mo biles To yo ta so ld 840 500 vehicles in China in 2012 the firs t annual dro p s ince 2002 Nis san

experienced a 24 per cent dro p in December China sales and Ho nda saw a 19 per cent December fall224 Ho wever as o f 2014Japanese car sales in and to China have again been increas ing The to uris t indus try was also hard hit in bo th co untries Chinese

vis ito rs to Japan decreased by 44 per cent fro m September to December 2012 fro m the year befo re225 The number o f Japanese

to uris ts o n gro up to urs to China plunged by mo re than 70 per cent year-o n-year in the las t three mo nths o f 2012226 This fallco ntinued into 2013 when their number fell to 29 millio n Japanese to uris ts do wn 18 2 fro m 2012 and the 3rd s traight annual

decline227 Ho wever in March 2014 vis ito rs fro m mainland China surged 80 1 fro m the previo us March to to tal 184200 a reco rdhigh fo r the mo nth and a s teeper year-o n-year rise than vis ito rs fro m any o ther co untries and regio ns This was also helped by the

falling yen and the resumptio n o f cruise to urs with large ships which were to tally suspended in March 2012228

Ano ther mo re lo ng-term negative eco no mic effect o n the bilateral relatio nship can be gauged fro m falling Japanese FDI to Chinawhich acco rding to Chinese figures declined by 422 in the firs t five mo nths o f 2014 after having fallen by 43 to $71 billio n in

2013 acco rding to Chinese figures o r by 18 to $10 9 billio n acco rding to Japanese figures 229

China`s multiple eco no mic retributio ns cas t do ubt o n the co ntinued viability o f the earlier `Ho t Eco no mics and Co ld Po litics`dicho to my The answer to the ques tio n which co untry is mo re dependent o n the o ther o r mo re vulnerable to sanctio ns is dependento n the eco no mic indicato rs and secto rs being cho sen and is also a po litical ques tio n because the answer can be po liticallymanipulated Japan`s eco no mic diff iculties s ince the 1990s (and its dependence o n eco no mic interactio n with China to co pe withthese diff iculties ) and China pushing Japan to No 3 in wo rld GDP ranking has diminished the Chinese perceptio n o f Japan as aneco no mic po wer ho use It means that fo r China the relatio nship with Japan became less impo rtant while po litical relatio nsdeterio rated at the same time The s tro ng effect o f the Chinese embargo o n rare earth expo rts to Japan in 2010 can be viewed intwo diametrically o ppo sed ways Chinese o bservers may be inclined to put emphas is o n the s tro ng effect it had o n Japanese publico pinio n and indus trial circles co ntributing to a certain extent to the go vernment`s surrender o f the trawler captain Others maypo int o ut that the case demo ns trated the futility o f abus ing a do minant supplier po s itio n because within a sho rt time Japan`sindus try secured alternative reso urces and demand reductio n thro ugh recycling and pro duct re-engineering no t o nly pro videdeno ugh breathing space but in the end reduced China`s market po wer Still Chinese experts are co nvinced that Japan is no w mo redependent o n China than the o ther way ro und Acco rding to so me specialis ts Chinas impo rts acco unted in 2011fo r 237 per cent o fJapan`s expo rt vo lume The bilateral trade vo lume in 2011 to o k up 21 per cent o f Japanese gro ss trade vo lume o f that year while it

merely acco unted fo r 9 4 per cent o f Chinas annual gro ss trade vo lume230 There seem to be o nly few Chinese vo ices which expressco ncern o ver the negative impact o f China`s sanctio ns o n China`s eco no my itself no tably at a time o f wo rldwide eco no mic

co ntractio n231

The Chinese market is certainly to o impo rtant fo r many Japanese co mpanies to leave A survey in No vember 2012 to which mo rethan 10 000 Japanese co mpanies in China replied sho wed that fo r almo s t 30 per cent o f them the territo rial dispute had affected

their bus iness but s till mo re than half want to maintain their o peratio ns and o nly 16 per cent said that they wanted to either cut

back o r pull o ut232 Japanese co mpanies in certain secto rs are likely to beco me mo re reluctant to make inves tments in China all themo re as o ther So utheas t As ian co untries (no tably Myanmar is currently the New Fro ntier fo r Japanese bus iness ) have cheaper

labo ur co s ts 233 Ho wever Chinese co nsumers s till prefer Japanese pro ducts fo r safer fo o d drinks and daily necess ities and tho se

Japanese co mpanies were hardly affected by the bo yco tt234

A wide gap between bo th s ides` perceptio n abo ut their eco no mic dependence and vulnerability to sanctio ns is dangero us fo r themanagement o f their bilateral relatio nship particularly when o ne s ide tries to leverage its suppo sedly s tro nger po s itio n to achievevicto ry in a sens itive area like territo rial integrity While Chinese co mmentato rs and experts may be inclined to o verrate Japan`svulnerability their Japanese co unterparts have a tendency to lo o k at the is sues to o much in purely eco no mic terms neglecting theimpact o f Chinese emo tio ns and go vernment pro paganda as well as the wider public`s insufficient kno wledge abo ut the o verall

impact o f bad eco no mic relatio ns with Japan o n China`s o wn eco no my235 The Japanese perceptio n remains that China in the endneeds Japan mo re than the o ther way ro und which in view o f China`s huge pro blems and its dependence o n Japanese hightechno lo gy co mpo nents fo r its manufacturing indus try is arguably the case This Japanese perceptio n has fo s tered the co nvictio nas demo ns trated fo r example by the belief in the sus tainability o f `Ho t Eco no mics and Co ld Po litics` that despite recurring

po litical crises in the relatio nship China wo uld in the end co mpro mise as it had do ne several times in the pas t236 Yet the pro blemwith the perceptio n o f `needing Japan` is that it can be po litically manipulated particularly in an autho ritarian sys tem This gapbetween Japanese and Chinese o bservers and experts o n the is sue o f dependence can serio us ly influence the willingness o f bo th

s ides to co mpro mise237 It also challenges the liberal view that clo se eco no mic relatio ns can prevent o r at leas t so ften deeppo litical differences like territo rial co nflicts which mo reo ver are linked to eco no mic interes ts like hydro carbo n reso urces In thisco ntext it is interes ting to no te that China has recently been exchanging with Japan a number o f high-po wered bus iness delegatio ns(apart fro m exchanges with po litical parties and lo cal go vernment o fficials ) The willingness o f Japanese bus iness to take part maybe interpreted by China as an express io n o f Japan`s eco no mic dependence o n China while giving it also the o ppo rtunity to putpressure o n the Abe go vernment to make co ncess io ns and to keep links with Japan fo r the po s t-Abe era

In view o f the impo rtance o f the eco no mic relatio nship and the damage suffered by Japanese bus iness after September 2012 o newo uld have expected mo re pressure fro m the bus iness co mmunity to co me to a territo rial co mpro mise so lutio n and so impro verelatio ns Ho wever this has no t been the case and may have to do with the perceptio n gap dis cussed abo ve but also the relativelack o f influence o n the go vernment (the majo rity o f the China-relevant Japanese bus iness co mmunity co ns is ts o f small- andmedium-s ized co mpanies ) the fear that a mo re vo cal ro le wo uld get co mpanies into tro uble with the autho rities in Japan ando rChina o r the ho pe o f being able to weather the po litical s to rms either because o f alternative market o ppo rtunities o r theco mpany`s s ize

FROM POLICING TO MILITARY INVOLVEMENT

The mo s t serio us co nsequences fo r the bilateral relatio nship ndash let alo ne fo r the so lutio n o f the territo rial dispute and regio nalpeace ndash arise fro m the co ns tant intrus io ns o f Chinese o fficial vessels into the Co ntiguo us Zo ne (CZ) o r even Territo rial Waters(TW) o f the Senkaku Is lands s ince September 2012 and the gro wing invo lvement o f the armed fo rces o f bo th s ides The aim o f theChinese is o bvio us to demo ns trate that the Japanese can no lo nger claim exclus ive co ntro l o f the is lands and to fo rce To kyo toadmit the exis tence o f a territo rial dispute Apparently a task fo rce at the highes t level headed by Xi Jinping was set up in

September 2012 to achieve this go al thro ugh escalating pressure238 So far law enfo rcement actio ns by Japan in the Senkaku areahave been limited to the deplo yment o f the Japanese Co as t Guard and po lice which is no w ho wever co ns tantly challenged byChinese with patro ls by CMS and FLEC (s ince 22 July 2013 unified under the State Ocean Adminis tratio n and renamed China Co as tGuard CG) vessels asserting the same rights in the is lands` CZ and TW The Chinese s ide escalated its pressure o n Japan by firs tdeplo ying FLEC vessels in the CZ and TW o f the disputed is lands then ratcheting up their pressure with CMS vessels do ing the samefo llo wed later in December 2012 with air patro ls by CMS aircraft which led to the deplo yment o f the air fo rce o f bo th s ides inJanuary 2013

As we have seen after the September 2010 incident in No vember 2010 FLEC s tarted to regularly send its vessels to the Senkakuarea which entered fro m time to time the is lands` CZ and also in Augus t 2011 twice the TW Apparently the mo re serio usintrus io ns which are tho se into the TW were so metimes timed with specific spikes o f tens io ns such as the TW incurs io n o n 16March 2012 (the Japanese naming o f so me is lands) July 2012 (No da`s anno uncement o f purchase intentio n o n 7 July) and finallyo n 19 September when s ix vessels entered the TW s tarting a series o f mo re frequent and regular incurs io ns In December 2012

FLEC deplo yed its newes t and bigges t ship the 5800-to n FLEC vessel Yuzheng 206 a fo rmer ship o f the Chinese navy239

The entries o f the vessels o f the CMS into the is lands` CZ and TW seem meant to send an even higher degree o f warning and denialo f Japan`s co ntro l o ver the is lands On 17 September the number o f FLEC and CMS vessels in the CZ and TW had reached the reco rd

o f 17240 Thereafter the frequency o f incurs io ns into the CZ and TW increased but it decreased after March 2013 On 30 Octo berXinhua even repo rted that the CMS had `expelled a number o f Japanese vessels illegally sailing in waters aro und the Diao yu

Is lands` altho ugh it is no t clear what exactly this meant s ince the CG did no t co nfirm such an incident241 Acco rding to Xinhua NewsAgency in 2013 China sent 50 ldquopatro l miss io ns rdquo into the TW o f the disputed is lands and as o f 12 July 2014 by the autho r`s co unt

there had been 17 such Chinese ldquopatro l miss io ns rdquo in 2014 which are ldquoincurs io ns rdquo fo r the Japanese s ide242 Other needle pricks todemo ns trate China`s claims are the o ccas io nal incurs io ns o f Chinese survey ships into the Senkaku Is lands` EEZ o r the bo ardingo f Chinese fishing vessels in the EEZ Defence Minis ter Itsuno ri Ono dera in late Octo ber 2013 called these repeated incurs io ns a

threat to peace which fell in a ldquogray zo ne (between) peacetime and an emergency s ituatio nrdquo243

A new level o f depriving Japan o f the ability to claim so le effective co ntro l o ver the is lands was reached o n 13 December 2012 when

a small turbo pro p aircraft o f the CMS (Harbin Y12 type) flew o ver Uo tsurijima244 Since then regular CMS air patro ls have beenco nducted but the aircraft no rmally s tay abo ut 120 km fro m the is lands With this mo ve Chinese measures to undermine Japan`sco ntro l o ver the is lands were expanded to the air space which fo r o rganizatio nal reaso ns had immediately military implicatio nsbecause the Air Self Defense Fo rce (ASDF) is respo ns ible fo r intercepting aircraft which intrude illegally into Japan`s air space The

incident did no t happen o ut o f the blue because already in January 2012 the SOA had anno unced a plan to deplo y the Y12 in 2012245

On 24 September the SOA had also anno unced plans to deplo y dro nes by 2015 fo llo wing the success ful tes t the previo us day 246

The Chinese acts are apparently carefully planned and co o rdinated s ince the o fficials in the abo ve Kyo do repo rt also said that theairspace vio latio ns o n 13 December 2012 by an airplane o f the CMS was planned by the s taff sectio n o f the natio nal Land and SeaBo rder Defense Co mmittee which acts as a liaiso n o ffice fo r the Chinese military the State Oceanic Adminis tratio n and the fishing

bureau o f the Agriculture Minis try with the aim o f rais ing tens io ns 247

The lo w altitude flight o f the Y12 o n 13 December was particularly upsetting fo r the Japanese go vernment because it was no t pickedup by the ASDF radar (the clo ses t o ne being o n Miyako jima abo ut 200 km fro m the is lands) but ins tead by CG ships in the area Inthis case eight ASDF fighters s crambled but co uld no t detect the Y12 Interceptio n o f aircraft is by nature much mo re diff icult andcarries a certain risk o f accident as happened in 2001 when a US intelligence aircraft co llided with a Chinese intercepto r jet Witho ut

explaining the s tandard Japanese pro ceedures fo r aerial defence which so lely relies o n the ASDF the Chinese media interpreted theuse o f military aircraft by Japan as `aggress ive` and the Global Times cautio ned agains t any interceptio n warning that China might

respo nd by sending its air fo rce248 On the Japanese s ide even the centre-left Asahi Shimbun called the Y12 flight ` a highly

pro vo cative act that co uld lead to an armed co nflict between the two co untries`249 At the beginning o f January 2013 there wereapparently erro neo us repo rts that the ASDF might co ns ider firing warning sho ts (tracer bullets ) at intruding Chinese aircraft which

pro mpted further bellico se co mments in the Chinese press 250 As a co nsequence the Chinese air fo rce also became invo lved o n10 January when the Chinese Minis try o f Defence anno unced that the Peo ple`s Liberatio n Army Air Fo rce (PLAA) had sent two fighterjets agains t two ASDF F-15 intercepto rs because they were fo llo wing a Chinese military Y8 transpo rt aircraft patro lling the airspace

o f Chinese o il platfo rms in the Eas t China Sea251 The Japanese repo rted that mo re than ten Chinese aircraft including military

aircraft had appro ached the Japanese air defence identificatio n zo ne252 In a further escalatio n the Japanese s ide repo rted that o n11 June 2014 two Chinese military jets flew abno rmally clo se to two planes o f Japans Self Defence Fo rce abo ve the Eas t China Sea

an accusatio n which the Chinese s ide refuted speaking ins tead o f two incidents pro vo ked by Japanese fighters 253 Related to thisdevelo pment and further enhancing the po ss ibility o f an incident is the enhanced patro lling o f the PLAA o ver the Eas t China Seawhich caused the ASDF to increase scrambling agains t PLAA aircraft to 415 times between 1 April 2013 and 31 March 2014 (Fis cal

Year 2013) 109 times mo re than in the previo us Fis cal Year 2012254

Co ntinuing to increase the pressure o n Japan the Chinese go vernment decreed o n 23 No vember 2013 an Air Defence Identificatio nZo ne (ADIZ) which includes the airspace o ver the Senkaku Is lands and was certainly meant to reinfo rce China`s territo rial claimdespite the fact that an ADIZ has no territo rial implicatio ns in internatio nal law The threat o f military co untermeasures in the text o fthe decree (lsquoChinas armed fo rces will ado pt defens ive emergency measures to respo nd to aircraft that do no t co o perate in the

identificatio n o r refuse to fo llo w the ins tructio ns rsquo) has further heightened the po ss ibility o f a military clash255 Ho wever theJapanese s ide refuses to accept the ADIZ The Chinese mo ves have wider implicatio ns fo r peace and s tability in the regio n in o rderto pro tect the freedo m o f its military aircraft in Eas t As ian airspace and its ability to o bserve China`s military fo rces Washingto nrefused to reco gnise the zo ne co ntinued to igno re the requirements o f the ADIZ by pursuing its regular patro l f lights and criticisedits implementatio n Simultaneo us ly ho wever the Department o f State advised civilian airlines to fo llo w China`s ins tructio ns andVice Pres ident Biden advised bo th co untries o n his trip to No rtheas t As ia in December 2013 to es tablish a cris is managements tructure Since the US do es no t take a s tance o n the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands` so vereignty Washingto n seemed to igno re Japan`smain grievance abo ut the ADIZ which is China`s intentio n to further reinfo rce its so vereignty claim by extending the ADIZ o ver theis lands The mo s t far-reaching US s tatements were a reco nfirmatio n o f the applicatio n o f the security treaty to the is lands evenmentio ning the is lands by their Japanese and Chinese names and co mplaining that the Chinese actio n was an attempt to unilaterally

change the status quo in the Eas t China Sea which raised regio nal tens io n and increased the risk o f accident and miscalculatio n256

Ho wever in this way the Obama Adminis tratio n risked creating amo ng so me Japanese o bservers do ubts abo ut the Adminis tratio n`sreliability and so gave succo ur to China`s attempt to drive a wedge between the two allies Ano ther co mplicatio n is that the ChineseADIZ o verlaps that o f Ko rea and mo reo ver co vers the submerged ro ck called Ieo do in Ko rean and Suyan in Chinese which has animpact o n the no t yet demarcated EEZ bo rder between bo th co untries Interes tingly the Japanese ADIZ also co vers Ieo do but thishas never been underpinned by any Japanese EEZ claims But China kno ws ho w to play o n So uth Ko rea`s criticism o f Japan`sattitude to wards the his to ry is sue and the territo rial dispute with Japan o ver Do kto Takeshima is land Mo reo ver the As ian co untriesco ntes ting China`s claims to parts o f the So uth China Sea are co ncerned that China wo uld further co mplicate the territo rialdisputes in the area by es tablishing an ADIZ Yet the ASEAN member s tates have been very cautio us in directly criticis ing ChinaChina`s es tablishment o f the ADIZ directly affects many co untries because so many o f them have airlines flying thro ugh the zo neHo wever with the exceptio n o f Japan all o thers agred to co nfo rm with China`s reques t fo r no tif icatio n which undermines theJapanese go vernment`s po s itio n o f explicitly advis ing Japanese airlines no t to co nfo rm

With these escalating develo pments the Chinese s ide achieved its go al o f sho wing that the Japanese autho rities are no lo nger infull co ntro l o f the disputed is lands In the case o f Chinese Co as tguard vessel intrus io ns the reactio n o f the Japanese CG is limitedto shado wing the Chinese vessels to info rm them that they are vio lating Japan`s CZ o r TW and to ask them to leave whichho wever they do at their o wn dis cretio n (the time span ho vering in the CZ o r TW having beco me a further means o f Chinesepressure) fo llo wed by diplo matic pro tes ts Otherwise the CG has avo ided any phys ical co nfro ntatio n o r co ntact When co nfro ntedby the CG the Chinese vessels s imply declare (by radio o r even electro nic displays ) that they are patro lling Chinese waters and thatthe CG ships were o perating illegally in these waters This ritual has so far prevented vio lence This is in co ntras t to an exchange o fwater canno n salvo s between the CG and the Taiwanese co as t guard in the territo rial o f the Senkaku Is lands o n 25 September 2012

and again o n 24 January 2013257

The increase o f patro ls by Japan and China is caus ing o peratio nal s train fo r bo th s ides (also rais ing the risk o f miscalculatio ns o ro verreactio ns ) but this has no t reduced the willingness o f either go vernment to s cale do wn the almo s t daily demo ns tratio ns o f

`effective co ntro l` In Octo ber it was repo rted that the CG no w always maintains ten vessels agains t eight fro m China258 The 11th

regio nal headquarters respo ns ible fo r the Senkaku area is in Naha and has nine patro l ships (but o nly seven vessels o f at leas t

1000 to ns ) but no w needs additio nal ships which are dispatched fro m o ther regio nal headquarters 259 In April 2012 the CG had ato tal o f 357 patro l vessels but o nly 51 o ver 1000 to ns which are tho se mo s t needed fo r a far flung area like the Senkaku

Is lands 26 0 On 14 September 2012 Senio r Vice Minis ter o f Fisheries Iwamo to Tsukasa mentio ned plans to increase the number o f

fishery patro l vessels to ensure fishermens safety amid intens ifying territo rial disputes with China and So uth Ko rea26 1 On 26Octo ber the Minis try o f Land Infras tructure Transpo rt and To urism which heads the CG anno unced plans to increase budgetary

reques ts fo r mo re ships 26 2 The Abe go vernment plans to build mo re vessels o r advance the calendar retro fit vessels which were to

be retired and is co ns idering extending the retirement age o f the o fficers 26 3

The Chinese have fewer vessels which can be deplo yed as far as the Senkaku Is lands In additio n leave o f the sailo rs has been

res tricted and their deplo yment length at sea has increased26 4 In March 2013 the Chinese s ide anno unced clo ser co o peratio nbetween the military and vario us maritime law enfo rcement agencies as well as the merger o f fo ur maritime law enfo rcementagencies under the State Ocean Adminis tratio n (adminis tered by the Minis try o f Land and Reso urces ) ie the China MarineSurveillance the co as t guard fo rces o f the Public Security Minis try the fisheries law enfo rcement co mmand o f the Agriculture

Minis try and the maritime anti-smuggling po lice o f the General Adminis tratio n o f Cus to ms 26 5

Ano ther wo rrying develo pment is the gradual invo lvement o f the PLA navy (PLAN) and the Maritime Self Defence Fo rce (MSDF) TheJapanese MOD anno unced o n 16 Octo ber 2012 that fo r the firs t time PLAN ships were o bserved navigating in the 22-km-wide CZbetween Yo naguni and Irio mo te is lands altho ugh the minis try left o pen the po ss ibility that they did so in o rder to avo id a typho o n

Nevertheless the Gaimusho so ught explanatio ns fro m the Chinese abo ut these ship mo vements 26 6 In December 2012 fo ur PLANships sailed thro ugh the CW o f the Irio mo te-Yo naguni is lands o n the way back fro m drills in the Pacific after having go ne into the

Pacific thro ugh the mo re no rmal ro ute o f the s trait between the Okinawan main is land and Miyako jima26 7 Again there was no thingillegal abo ut it but it raised attentio n at a time o f tens io ns Ho wever there are s igns o f greater co o peratio n o f the PLAN withChinese Co as t Guard vessels as was sho wn in the s tando ff between China and the Philippines aro und the disputed Scarbo ro ugh

Sho al in the So uth China Sea and jo int exercises to o k place between the three in the Eas t China Sea in Octo ber 201226 8 The

patro lling activities o f the MSDF in the Senkaku area became kno wn when the Japanese repo rted at the end o f January 2013 that o n19 January a Chinese frigatersquos target radar had lo cked o nto an MSDF helico pter and o n 30 January ano ther frigate sailing clo se to

an MSDF des tro yer did likewise The Chinese vehemently denied it26 9 Ho wever in March this year the Kyo do news agency repo rtedthat senio r Chinese military o fficials had admitted the incident o f 29 January Even mo re wo rriso me is that the Chinese vessels

acted apparently witho ut prio r appro val fro m the fleet co mmand o r navy headquarters All this was denied by the Chinese s ide270 Itdid no t help that under Prime Minis ter No da the MSDF had been o rdered after the eruptio n o f the 2012 cris is to keep a greaterdis tance fro m PLAN ships than the hitherto 3 km in o rder avo id incidents but this po licy was reversed by the mo re hawkish Abe

adminis tratio n to the previo us 3 km dis tance271 The fire radar lo cking incident had happened at a dis tance o f 3 km

Agains t the backgro und o f greater invo lvement o f military fo rces it is particularly regrettable that a plan to build a maritime liaiso n

mechanism between their defense autho rities o n which they had agreed in June 2012 to make later that year was shelved272

Unfo rtunately it is s till Chinese practice to co ns ider Co nfidence Building Measures (CBM) no t as the firs t s tep to build co nfidencebut as a to o l to extract fro m the o ther s ide prio r co ncess io ns under the pretext o f `creating a better atmo sphere` fo r dis cuss ingCBM The o utbreak o f the September 2012 cris is was therefo re a co nvenient pretext fo r the Chinese to cancel the pro ject Thelates t co nfirmatio n was in March 2013 when General Yin Zhuo explained that there co uld be no military trus t if the po litical and

diplo matic relatio nship is bad273 Since the target radar lo ck-o n incidents the Japanese go vernment is publicly calling fo rresumptio n o f nego tiatio ns fo r the maritime liaiso n mechanism but the Chinese will certainly want to extract so me co ncess io nsbefo re even co ns idering a po s itive respo nse

Ho wever the co ns tant co nfro ntatio n between the po licing and military fo rces o f bo th s ides co uld eas ily lead to a military clasheither as a result o f an unfo reseen civilian o r military incident miscalculatio n o r malicio us intentio n at a lo wer level o f co mmandTwo recent examples o f unfo reseen civilian incidents co uld have escalated One is the attempted landing o n o ne o f the disputedis lands by a Chinese pro tes ter with a ballo o n in January 2014 This incident was peacefully reso lved because Japan did no t arres t theballo o nis t In this case the firs t repo rt o n the crash-landing in the territo rial waters o f Uo tsurijima came fro m the Taiwanese co as tguard which info rmed the Japanese co as t guard fo llo wed by the hand-o ver o f the ballo o nis t to the PRC autho rities o uts ide o f

Japan`s territo rial waters 274 The o ther incident was the s inking o f a Chinese fishing bo at ldquoto the no rth o f the Diao yu Is landsrdquo and

the mo ve o f two Chinese naval () vessels to rescue the crew275 This autho r co uld no t find o ut ho w clo se the fishing bo at came tothe is lands and apparently there has no t been any further repo rting abo ut the incident

The previo us ly mentio ned radar-targeting incidents and these two civilian incidents have no t led to an escalatio n but there is noguarantee fo r the future Shi Yinho ng a pro fesso r at Renmin Univers ity predicts that the territo rial co nflicts in the ECS So uth ChinaSea and alo ng the Sino -Indian bo rder will intens ify because o f po pular natio nalism dynamics within the armed fo rces and o f co urse

also o ur to p leaders perso nal beliefs and s trategic perso nalities 276 Hugh White argues that a war (which co uld lead to a nuclearexchange between China and the US) co uld also begin because the Chinese leadership may co ns ider that s tarting ho s tilities no wrather than later wo uld be mo re beneficial to either tes t US reso lve to defend Japan (which the Chinese leadership do ubts ) anddetermine the is sue o f Chinese supremacy in the As ian regio n which he co ns iders to be the real is sue rather than the is lands

themselves 277

IS THERE A WAY FORWARD

The current co nfro ntatio n is no t o nly co ntinuing but even escalating and do mes tic develo pments in bo th co untries are no t creatingan atmo sphere mo re co nducive to better management o f the cris is let alo ne finding a so lutio n Inactio n runs the risk o f a furtherescalatio n o r even a military clash while po s itive o ptio ns are beco ming fewer Meanwhile bo th co untries suffer fro m the eco no micfall-o ut and heightened tens io ns while the integratio n o f a ris ing China into a new s trategic enviro nment in As ia will beco me evenmo re fraught cas ting a shado w o n Japan`s clo se relatio nship with the US

The 2010 incident ended quickly with Japan`s release o f the captain One reaso n fo r this is certainly the fact that China`s demand in2010 was relatively clear and achievable (release o f the captain) if painful fo r Japan at a time o f a weak and inexperiencedgo vernment This time in September 2012 the cris is firs t hit a go vernment which reacted intrans igently because o f its previo usdefeat and o ther unfavo urable do mes tic circumstances and was then replaced by the mo re hawkish Abe go vernment The Abecabinet`s attitude to wards the pas t as exemplif ied by vario us s tatements by cabinet members and peo ple clo se to it the attempt torevise the Ko no s tatement reco gniz ing the fo rced war pro s titutio n (the military co mfo rt wo men) and Abe`s Yasukuni Shrine vis itall served China`s anti-Japan pro paganda wo rsened Japan-Ko rea relatio ns which China is cleverly explo iting and even angered theUS adminis tratio n Abe is seen as utiliz ing the tens io ns with China to win do mes tic and internatio nal suppo rt fo r Japan to have aldquono rmalrdquo natio nal defence po s ture The latter is welco me by the US adminis tratio n because it wo uld help with the US As ianrealignment and suppo rt its China po licy At the same time China`s actio ns cas t an o mino us shado w o n its intentio ns in the So uthChina Sea and Abe and mo re impo rtantly the US is suppo rting the claimants there agains t China

Under these bilateral multilateral and regio nal circumstances wo uld China be satis fied with go ing back to the `unders tanding abo utsetting as ide the dispute` in co njunctio n with Japan`s reco gnitio n o f the exis tence o f a territo rial dispute o r wo uld it demand areversal o f the purchase o f the three is lands Wo uld it demand the end o f Japanese CG patro ls aro und the is lands China`ss tandard demand no w that Japan `co rrect its mis takes` is rather ambiguo us because it co uld be interpreted as go ing back to theshelving unders tanding and the reco gnitio n o f the exis tence o f a dispute o r demanding a reversal o f the go vernment`s purchase o f

the is lands 278 The latter wo uld s imply be impo ss ible in legal and practical terms and o ne can o nly ho pe that the ambiguity is o nlyaimed at rais ing China`s nego tiatio n po s itio n ando r leaving eno ugh wiggle ro o m fo r nego tiatio ns which wo uld satis fy all Chineses takeho lders` interes ts

It seems that it is already to o late fo r go ing back to the shelving agreement o f 19721978 which wo uld imply that the two s ides canso meho w go back to the status quo o f the 1970s This as we have seen has been superseded by deeds and wo rds o n bo th s ides The Chinese have no w no t o nly publicly declared that the shelving agreement was lsquobro kenrsquo by Japan but after the firs t Y12 patro l o n13 December 2012 co mmented that ldquoThe s ituatio n has changed It has beco me no rmal fo r Chinas marine surveillance vessels to

enter the 12-nautical-mile zo ne Japans actual co ntro l o ver the is lands has go nerdquo279

The bilateral relatio nship has deterio rated to the extent that at leas t shelving the co nflicting so vereignty claims without o fficiallyadmitting that there is a territo rial dispute is no lo nger an o ptio n acceptable to China because it feels Japan has abused theshelving co nsensus thro ugh a series o f adminis trative measures with the final s traw having been the central go vernmentrsquos purchaseo f three is lands When s tudying the vario us Chinese o fficial s tatements and news repo rts after the 2012 cris is had fully erupted inSeptember it beco mes clear that until Octo ber 2012 the Chinese s till raised the demand that Japan sho uld go back to the previo uslsquounders tandingrsquo o r lsquoco nsensus rsquo but this demand was no t made o ften thereafter It reappeared in remarks by Wang Jiarui the head o fthe Co mmunis t partys Internatio nal Department when meeting Yamaguchi Natsuo the leader o f the junio r co alitio n partner

Ko meito in January 201328 0 Previo us ly a co mment o n the Xinhua internet s ite o n 29 Octo ber said that ldquoThe lsquopurchasersquo sho wed thatthe Japanese go vernment has who lly abando ned the attitude o f laying as ide disputes and has fundamentally changed the

s ituatio nrdquo28 1 On 30 Octo ber the CMOFA spo kesperso n declared that lsquoJapans illegal purchase o f the Diao yu Is lands bro ke the

impo rtant co nsensus The Japanese s ide sho uld no t have any mo re illus io n o f o ccupying the Diao yu Is lands What the Japaneses ide sho uld do is to face up to the reality admit the so vereignty dispute co rrect mis takes and co me back to the track o f a

nego tiated settlement`28 2 The lates t o fficial pro po sal to shelve the is lands is sue was made by the fo rmer fo reign minis ter Tang

Jiaxuan o n 16 July 201428 3

The reco gnitio n o f a territo rial pro blem wo uld be relatively easy fo r Japanese public o pinio n (and even mo re so fo r Japanrsquos friendsand allies ) to accept because they wo uld no t see the need fo r any kind o f diplo matic o r legal so phis try fo r what is o bvio us ly aterrito rial co nflict whatever the legitimacy o f the Chinese claim might be given also the fact that the current Japanese po s itio nco mes do wn to refus ing to even dis cuss whatever settlement might be po ss ible Acco rding to a survey co nducted by Genro nto gether with Zho ngguo Ribao she in June 2012 627 per cent o f Japanese agreed that there exis ts a territo rial pro blem dispute

(176 disagreed) co mpared with 822 o f the Chinese (139 disagreed)28 4 Ho wever co nsecutive Japanese cabinets haverefused to reco gnise the exis tence o f a territo rial dispute which is o ften the default po s itio n o f a go vernment in actual co ntro l o f adisputed territo ry (fo r example the Ko rean go vernmentrsquos po s itio n o n Do kto Takeshima) This po s itio n has been reinfo rced by theexplicit Japanese denial s ince the 1990s o f a shelving agreement which wo uld have been an implicit admiss io n that there is adispute To circumvent the risk o f being perceived as admitting the exis tence o f a territo rial pro blem the deputy prime minis ter o fthe previo us No da go vernment Okada Katsuya was repo rted to have mentio ned in a speech in Octo ber 2012 that there was no

territo rial dispute but as a matter o f fact a debate exis ted28 5 Ho wever this co mpro mise so lutio n was never co nfirmed by the No dago vernment and did no t beco me po licy It is even less likely to be acceptable to the new Abe go vernment Even amo ng influentialo pinio n makers there is hardly any suppo rt fo r admitting the exis tence o f a territo rial co nflict o r o f a shelving agreement Even mo reco nciliato ry s tatements o n this subject are rather vague Maehara Seiji o f the Demo cratic Party declared in a co nference at QinghuaUnivers ity in Beijing in September 2013 that the Japanese go vernment sho uld add (to its o wn po s itio n) that China has a differentview (Senkakusho to wo meguru Niho n seifu no tachiba ni tsuite lsquoChugo ku ga chigau kangaekata wo mo tte iru to iuko to wo ichigen

tsukekuwaerubeki darsquo) At the same time he emphas ised ho wever that there was no territo rial dispute28 6 Japan Bus inessFederatio n Chairman Yo nekura Hiro masa mentio ned in September 2012 in an NHK interview that the go vernment sho uld be mo re

flexible s ince o therwise its s tance co uld be taken to mean that Japan has no intentio n o f so lving the dispute28 7 Miyamo to Yuji thefo rmer Japanese ambassado r to China is quo ted as saying that lsquoThe go vernment do es no t need to alter its bas ic po s itio n but in

reality a co nflict do es exis t o ver the Senkaku is les rsquo 28 8 This is also the s tance which the previo us Japanese ambassado r Niwa

Uichiro takes in an article after his return to Japan28 9

Co ncerning co nflict reso lutio n it is interes ting to no te that when asked abo ut the mo dern s ignificance o f the 1978 Japan-ChinaPeace and Friendship Treaty 68 4 o f the po lled Japanese agreed with Art 12 (lsquoThe two parties shall settle all disputes by peacefulmeans and shall refrain fro m the use o r threat o f fo rcersquo) but o nly 525 o f the Chinese agreed Mo reo ver 58 1 o f the Chinese

favo ur China s trengthening its co ntro l o ver the area29 0

If therefo re a new ldquoimplicit unders tandingrdquo abo ut shelving the dispute is achievable it wo uld have to be based o n learning fro m thefailures o f the 19721978 shelving ie it wo uld be necessary to achieve a mutual unders tanding o f what the s tatus quo is whatwo uld undermine the s tatus quo and what has to be do ne to mo ve fro m co nflict management to so lutio n Quite clearly such a newunders tanding wo uld be less favo urable to Japan`s current s tance o n the dispute

FROM CONFLICT MANAGEMENT TO ADDRESSING THE SOVEREIGNTY ISSUE

Any mo ve fo rward will certainly require decis ive leadership o n bo th s ides be it to take the initiative o r to respo nd po s itively to theinitiative o f s tarting the pro cess to wards reso lutio n In view o f the co mplex backgro und o f the external and internal dynamics it iso bvio us that address ing the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands dispute requires a s tep-by-s tep appro ach The ultimate is sue to address is theso vereignty is sue and territo rial disputes are generally viewed as zero sum in nature given their clo se link to co re securityinteres ts Even tho se who reco gnize the impo rtance o f transcending such lo gic in favo ur o f co ndo minium o r shared so vereigntygenerally ho ld that the is sue can o nly be addressed at the las t s tage o f any nego tiated pro cess if at all

Two impo rtant is sues have to be co ns idered at the beginning to what extent have the vario us s tages o f the nego tiating pro cess tobe agreed befo rehand (lsquoro ad maprsquo) o r even the final o utco me whether a viable co ndo minium o r o nly shelving the is sues and co uldthe ro le o f a third party mediato r be helpfulacceptable In view o f the po litical diff iculties o n bo th s ides the s tart o f thenego tiatio n pro cess wo uld be endangered if there is no t sufficient ro o m fo r ambiguity and interpretatio n abo ut the vario us s tages altho ugh the general aim o f tens io n reductio n and suspens io n o f the so vereignty is sue mus t be clearly agreed

A third party mediato r is pro bably no t acceptable to the Chinese s ide The third party mo s t o ften mentio ned is the Internatio nalCo urt o f Jus tice (ICJ) o r any kind o f internatio nal arbitratio n Ho wever this seems unlikely in view o f China`s preference fo rbilateral nego tiatio ns and its refusal to accept judicial settlement by the ICJ o r any internatio nal arbitratio n except in no n-po litical

areas such as trade29 1 The Japanese go vernment wo uld be willing to accept the jurisdictio n o f the ICJ but o nly if China brings the

case to the Co urt les t it be perceived as ackno wledging the exis tence o f a territo rial dispute29 2 But there are also po litical andpro cedural arguments agains t the reco urse to the ICJ China`s legal argumentatio n is co mparatively weak and s ince a negativejudgement co uld have implicatio ns fo r China`s legal claim to mo s t o f the So uth China Sea there is even less o f a chance o f Chinamaking an exceptio n fo r the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands dispute In view o f the entrenched po s itio ns o f bo th s ides and the risk o f a`winner takes all` o utco me o f internatio nal litigatio n bo th go vernments wo uld face co ns iderable do mes tic res is tance in case o f anegative o utco me In view o f the urgency o f the dispute and the lo ng time it takes fo r a judgement there wo uld also be the risk o fdo mes tic fo rces trying to pre-empt a negative result

In view o f the security is sues invo lved (let alo ne the American his to rical `debt` as a result o f Washingto n`s ambiguity related toWashingto n`s ending o f the adminis tratio n o f Okinawa in 1972) an American mediatio n co uld be seen as natural and even inAmerican interes ts Such an American ro le ho wever is extremely unlikely as it wo uld be seen by China as unduly advantageo us toJapan Ho wever at so me po int during the Japan-China nego tiatio n pro cess the US might ass is t (o r even be reques ted) by agreeingto certain Co nfidence and Security Building Measures (CSBM) in the area aro und the is lands

The firs t s tage wo uld have to co ns is t o f measures which reduce the risk o f a military clash but in a way which prevents theperceptio n that o ne s ide is giving in to co ercio n This s tage wo uld be a gradual phas ing o ut o f intrus io ns by Chinese o fficial vesselsand aircraft into the territo rial waters co ntiguo us zo ne and airspace o f the is lands which is recipro cated by Japanrsquos reducing in thesame way its co as tguard patro ls in the two zo nes as well as its s crambling activities in the is lands` airspace There were repo rts in

June 2013 that China called o n Japan to agree to a 12-nautical-mile no -entry zo ne aro und the is lands 29 3 Japan rejected this co urse

Ano ther measure wo uld be to increase the dis tance at which vessels o f bo th maritime fo rces o bserve each o ther Such s teps sho uldultimately be o fficialised by a gradually expanding series o f CSBMs and a bilateral liaiso n mechanism This co uld also include ademilitarisatio n agreement as an incentive fo r the Chinese s ide It wo uld be vital that the s teps at this s tage be incremental that nos tep is explo ited in a o ne-s ided way and that they are co ns idered irrevers ible At the same time bo th s ides have to prevent peo plefro m appro aching the is lands s ince this wo uld be seen as a pro vo catio n by the o ther s ide This latter task is technically no t easy

because o f the co ntro vers ial character o f any co mpro mise with certain no n-s tate acto rs in Japan China Ho ng Ko ng and Taiwan The(failed) landing o f a Chinese ho t ballo o n o n o ne o f the is lands in January 2014 demo ns trated at the same time the technical

diff iculty o f a no -entry po licy as well as the po ss ibility o f a success ful co o peratio n o f the co as tguards o f all three co untries 29 4

At this firs t s tage o r leading to the next there will have to be a Japanese go vernment s tatement to the effect that there is alsquopro blemrsquo related to the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands This can be wo rded in such a way that the sens itive express io n `territo rialpro blem` (which is s trenuo us ly denied by the go vernment) is avo ided and it can be supplemented by a sentence that such as tatement in no way prejudices the legal po s itio n o f the go vernment Such a qualifying s tatement is fo r example included in the

Japan-China agreement fo r prio r no tif icatio n o f research vessels fro m bo th co untries in the Eas t China Sea in 200029 5 A s imilarqualif icatio n is part o f the 1997 Japan-China Fisheries Agreement In the jo int co mmuniqueacute o f 1972 which no rmalised diplo maticrelatio ns between Japan and China diplo matic wo rding also managed to bridge the huge gap between their s tances o n Taiwan whichthe PRC co ns iders an lsquoinalienable partrsquo o f its territo ry Japan co ns iders the so vereignty is sue s till unreso lved because the 1951 SanFrancis co Peace Treaty Art 2 (b) o nly s tipulated that lsquoJapan reno unces all right title and claim to Fo rmo sa and the Pescado res rsquowitho ut clarifying the recipient o f the territo ry The co mpro mise in 1972 was reached with the sentence that Japan lsquofully unders tandsand respects this s tand o f the Go vernment o f the Peo ples Republic o f China and it f irmly maintains its s tand under Article 8 o f thePo tsdam Pro clamatio nrsquo

POSSIBLE APPROACHES TO THE SOVEREIGNTY ISSUE

The mo s t diff icult pro blem is the so vereignty is sue which go es to the co re o f any co untry`s security interes ts It is no t imaginablethat either s ide will reno unce its claim to the is lands Sides tepping o r shelving the is sue is o nly useful if the lesso ns fro m the 1972and 1978 attempts as o utlined abo ve can be learned and applied but there is s till the fundamental pro blem with the implicitassumptio n that the quality o f the bilateral relatio nship will always be as go o d as when the s ides tepping agreement was achievedand can be maintained in perpetuity o r until the so vereignty is sue can be addressed But in o rder to so lve the so vereignty is sue aneven better relatio nship has to be created This better relatio nship co uld be bro ught abo ut by the s teps explained abo ve and furtherbelo w

An impo rtant co nditio n fo r any las ting territo rial co mpro mise wo uld be reducing the value o f the is lands fo r bo th co untries whichcan be achieved by o ne o f the measures pro po sed fo r s tage 1 ie reso lutely preventing anyo ne fro m appro aching the territo ries(including to tal demilitarizatio n) which in themselves are eco no mically wo rthless and are uninhabited The main po int is to preventany go vernmental act which co uld be interpreted as being part o f the `so vereignty game` The mo s t diff icult part here is to preventany act by no n-go vernmental acto rs This wo uld have to include the territo rial waters and the explo itatio n there in o f any kind o freso urces including fishing Scientif ic interes ts in the is lands co uld be served by bilateral surveys witho ut any po litical co nno tatio ns

There have been pro po sals to declare the is lands an Internatio nal Nature and Wildlife Preserve29 6 Such a preserve wo uld have to beadminis tered either bilaterally o r by a relevant internatio nal o rganisatio n and as such co uld serve as a co nfidence-building measure

The abo ve s teps wo uld then allo w the two s ides to deal with the co ns iderable eco no mic interes ts in fishing and the explo itatio n o fhydro carbo n reso urces and o ther seabed reso urces aro und the is lands ie in the Exclus ive Eco no mic Zo ne ando r the ExtendedCo ntinental Shelf Once the is lands` land area and the territo rial waters have been put as ide it wo uld be eas ier to co me to ano verall agreement o n the delimitatio n o f the EEZ bo rder (with the exceptio n o f the no rthern part which wo uld require a trilateralagreement between China Japan and Ko rea) which wo uld include the delimitatio n o f these surro unding waters It wo uld facilitate aco mpro mise if bo th s ides agree that the is lands do no t merit their o wn EEZ This might be diff icult fo r Japan which claims an EEZ fo rOkino to rishima refuted by China s ince it co ns iders the reef no t to be an is land acco rding to Art 121 o f UNCLOS

A co mpro mise o n the so vereignty is sue co uld o nly be the o utco me ndash if at all ndash o f a success ful pro cess o f the abo ve o r co mparables teps In o rder to avo id a `winner take all` s ituatio n the co mpro mise wo uld have to invo lve a sharing arrangement His to ry o ffers

quite a number o f internatio nal precedents o f shared so vereignty referred to as co ndo minium in internatio nal law29 7 One case withso me s imilarities to the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands is a small is land (3000 sq m) in the river separating France and Spain kno wn asPheasant Is land o r Co nference Is land which even to day s till changes every s ix mo nths between France and Spain as o wner Like theSenkakuDiao yu Is lands the is land has no eco no mic value anymo re and the is land is o ff limits It was the lo catio n o f the s igning o f

the Treaty o f the Pyrenees in 1659 which ended a lo ng war 29 8 Mo s t o ther examples o f jo int so vereignty co ncern territo ries with apo pulatio n which makes co o peratio n much mo re diff icult Other his to rical precedents o f sharing so vereignty are the es tablishmento f ldquoneutral zo nesrdquo Acco rdingly the is lands and po ss ibly a sea area aro und the is lands co uld be declared a neutral zo ne like the o nebetween Saudi Arabia and Kuwait (1922-1965) On July 7 1965 the two go vernments s igned an agreement (which to o k effect o nJuly 25 1966) to partitio n the Neutral Zo ne adjo ining their respective territo ries A demarcatio n agreement dividing the NeutralZo ne was s igned o n December 17 1967

Particularly relevant here is that Saudi Arabia as well as Kuwait explo ited the o il reso urces under a jo int o perating agreement29 9

Co nclus io ns

The actio n-reactio n pattern o f the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands dispute is accelerating and the initiative seems to be mo re o ften thanno t with the Chinese s ide while the Japanese s ide is in a defens ive po s itio n The danger o f a military co nfro ntatio n is lo o mingincreas ingly larger in what co uld be called a lsquochicken gamersquo At the same time the internal and external dynamics are undermining theenviro nment which is required fo r a peaceful so lutio n as well as fo r maintaining the number o f po s itive o ptio ns While the Japanesego vernment refuses to ackno wledge the very exis tence o f a territo rial dispute the Chinese go vernment is no w (July 2014) evenrefus ing to have a dialo gue with Japan`s current prime minis ter It is po ss ible that the Chinese s ide again wants to wait with anymo ve fo rward until the Japanese prime minis ter has changed as Beijing did with Prime Minis ter Sato Eisaku o r with Prime Minis terKo izumi Junichiro But waiting fo r an impro vement o f the bilateral atmo sphere as the Chinese s ide likes to s tress is a very riskyo ptio n and such an impro vement may anyway be a very sho rt windo w o f o ppo rtunity if lo o king at the ups and do wns o f the po s t-1949 his to ry o f the bilateral relatio nship

To s tart a s tep-by-s tep pro cess o f address ing the territo rial is sue s tro ng leadership is required which unders tands the widerinteres ts o f a functio ning Japanese-Chinese relatio nship Japan s imply asking China fo r a summit meeting is no t very sens ible ifthere is no willingness to engage in subs tantive dis cuss io ns and wo uld be very risky fo r China`s to p leader if the Japanese primeminis ter then vis its the Yasukuni Shrine The his to ry is sue sho uld no lo nger be a Chinese lever fo r pressuris ing Japan but the latterhas to abs tain fro m actio ns which are seen as pro vo cative no t o nly by China but also by Ko rea the US and many o thers There hasto be a co mmitted leadership o n bo th s ides which s tarts with a ro ugh ro ad map and tens io n-reducing s teps such as CSBMs en ro uteto agreeing o n a fo rmula which allo ws the parties to o btain eco no mic as well as security gains while reducing tens io ns

Reinhard Drifte is Emeritus Professor of Japanese Politics University of Newcastle UK and Visiting Professor at various Japanese Universities andPau University (France) He is the author of Japanrsquos Foreign Policy for the Twenty First Century His home page is here

Reco mmended citatio n Reinhard Drifte The Japan-China Confrontation Over the SenkakuDiaoyu Islands--Between shelving and dispute

Is land in 19969 6 Each such landing caused pro tes ts in China and amo ng the Chinese diaspo ra and pro mpted the PRC go vernmentto co mplain o fficially It also led to demands by the Seinensha that the light to wers be o fficially reco gnized by the go vernment andthe maintenance be taken o n by the Maritime Safety Agency (later called Co as t Guard) But even the co mpro mise o f including thelight to wer into o fficial charts was an o fficial act reinfo rcing Japan`s effective co ntro l o ver the is lands The dis cuss io n abo ut theo fficial handling o f the light to wer also raised the natio nalis t fever in Taiwan and its military even prepared (but then cancelled at

the las t mo ment) a co mmando actio n at the end o f 1990 to des tro y the facility9 7 In February 2005 amids t ris ing tens io ns o verChina`s energy develo pments in co ntes ted parts o f the Eas t China Sea and Chinese pro tes ts agains t Prime Minis ter Ko izumi`sYasukuni Shrine vis its the Japanese go vernment finally ceded to the demands o f the gro up to take o ver the Uo tsurijima lightho use

s tructure and its maintenance9 8 Until then the Gaimusho had succeeded in delaying this s tate takeo ver as `to o premature` in

o rder no t to pro vo ke China9 9

As can be seen the Japanese go vernment tried to res is t these natio nalis t claims but it co uld no t fully circumvent them thus keepingChina`s suspicio ns alive Mo reo ver whereas the Japanese go vernment always tries to prevent the landing by fo reigners o n theis lands it has no t until fairly recently prevented the landing by Japanese In o rder to keep fo reigners o ut o f the is lands and theirterrito rial waters the Japanese Co as t Guard (CG) has been patro lling the area which again is an o fficial act It may have been thenatio nalis t pressure fro m within the LDP as well as fro m right wing circles which pro mpted Ohira Masayo shi when he was PrimeMinis ter to send in 1979 a general survey team o f 50 perso ns (including Kurihara Hiro yuki) to the is lands in o rder to inves tigate the

building o f facilities like a helipo rt Such demands had already been made by the LDP o n 24 March 197810 0 Altho ugh the final repo rto f the survey spo ke agains t building facilities and no thing fo llo wed fro m it the Kurihara family co ns idered Ohira ndash altho ughgenerally kno wn to be a pro -China po litician - to be the mo s t suppo rtive prime minis ter o f all fo r the Japanese assertio n o f effectiveco ntro l o ver the is lands Befo re that Ohira had also agreed to Kurihara Hiro yuki`s pro po sal to set up o n Uo tsurijima a mo nument

to ho no ur Ko ga Tatsushiro which was do ne with the go vernment`s material and financial suppo rt10 1

Even within the Chinese leadership the territo rial is sue has been divis ive Jus t when the two s ides were nego tiating the Peace andFriendship Treaty in April 1978 abo ut 100 Chinese fishing vessels so me armed appeared aro und the Senkaku area with bannersdeclaring China`s title to the is lands While this was explained at the time in Japan as a means to pressure the Japanese during thetreaty nego tiatio ns it no w seems no w mo re likely that the Senkaku is sue was used by fo llo wers o f the Chairman o f the MilitaryCo mmiss io n Hua Guo feng as a means o f attacking the re-emerging Deng Xiao ping The PRC central leadership explained at the

time that this was `accidental` and Deng Xiao ping pro mised it wo uld never happen again10 2

These latter incidents are also impo rtant when dis cuss io n turns to the ques tio n who s tarted to undermine the unders tanding abo utshelving the is lands dispute ndash Japan o r China Was it China when it passed the 1992 Territo rial Law as is o ften mentio ned in Japano r did it already vio late the unders tanding in April 1978 as so me o thers claim Ho wever if the latter incident was beyo nd the co ntro lo f the Chinese go vernment it co uld be argued that it was the Japanese go vernment with the erectio n o f a mo nument o r the 1979survey that to uched o ff frictio ns Yet the blame game do es no t help in finding a so lutio n ins tead these incidents sho uld make itclear that bo th s ides bear part o f the respo ns ibility fo r undermining the 197278 unders tanding and sho uld therefo re be willing toco me to a new unders tanding

THE DETERIORATION OF THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP SINCE THE 1990S

In additio n to the abo ve develo pments it was the general deterio ratio n o f the bilateral relatio nship s ince the middle o f the 1990sthat changed the co nditio ns fo r maintaining the shelving o f the territo rial dispute Japan became suspicio us o f China`s no n-transparent military mo dernizatio n particularly o f the navy which has been expanding its o peratio ns including the Eas t China

Sea10 3 Other negative develo pments were the pro gress o f Chinese o il and gas explo ratio n in the Eas t China Sea despitedisagreement o ver the co mmo n EEZ bo rder vis its by Japanese po litical leaders to the Yasukuni War Shrine and o ther is sues relatedto Japan`s pas t aggress io n agains t China

A nadir in the bilateral relatio nship was reached during the rule o f Prime Minis ter Ko izumi Junichiro (2001-2006) because o f hisannual vis its to the Yasukuni Shrine But while the po litical relatio nship go t co lder the eco no mic relatio nship expanded andpro spered (`Co ld Po litics Ho t Eco no mics`) This also had ndashat firs t glance co unter-intuitively ndash a deleterio us effect o n themo tivatio n to wo rk harder to maintain the co nditio ns fo r putting as ide the territo rial co nflict s ince this dicho to my gave the falseimpress io n that po litics and eco no mics co uld be kept separate fo rever while the territo rial is sue was pending The wo rsening o f theterrito rial co nflict fro m 2010 and particularly fro m 2012 with China`s harsh po litical and eco no mic retributio n wo uld bear this o ut

Part o f the ratio nale fo r the Chinese navy`s increased presence in the Eas t China Sea is China`s o il and gas develo pments as wellas the wish to preserve the navy`s access to the Pacific Ocean to prevent JapaneseUS o bservatio n o r to intervene in a cris is Thisco uld no t but affect the territo rial dispute In May 1999 12 Chinese warships co nducted a mano euvre in waters no rth o f the

Senkaku is lands The exercise was the firs t o f its kind to be carried o ut by China in that regio n10 4 Other Chinese naval mo vementsin the Eas t China Sea increased including repo rts abo ut intelligence-gathering ships In the las t few years the po litical influence o f

the PLA and particularly o f the PLA Navy (PLAN) has co ns iderably increased10 5 The Japanese reacted by increas ing their militarydeplo yment and a s trengthening o f Japanese-American military co o peratio n Ho wever the Senkaku area is co ntro lled by the Co as tGuard which is a law enfo rcement agency and the Japanese navy keeps away fro m po licing This incidentally reinfo rces Japan`sclaim as po licing is do ne o nly within natio nal territo ry o r EEZ areas

Until the central go vernment`s purchase o f three o f the is lands in September 2012 it was the activities o f no n-s tate acto rs fro mJapan Taiwan Ho ng Ko ng and the PRC whether natio nalis t activis ts o r fishermen which caused the greates t direct co nfro ntatio nss ince Japan`s co untermeasures were a demo ns tratio n o f the exercise o f so vereignty which the PRC became increas ingly unwilling toto lerate In 1996 a Ho ng Ko ng pro tes ter who tried to co ver the las t meters fro m his bo at to o ne o f the is lands dro wned Ano therincident o ccurred in 2008 when a Japanese Co as t Guard ship rammed a Taiwanese spo rt fishing bo at which had entered Senkaku

territo rial waters The actio n caused the bo at to s ink10 6

In March 2004 fo r the firs t time s ince 1996 seven Chinese activis ts landed o n Uo tsurijima When the Japanese po lice made arres ts the Chinese Fo reign Minis try pro tes ted calling it a serio us vio latio n o f Chinese so vereignty The arres ts were made under the

immigratio n management law which includes a clause o n expuls io n o f illegal fo reign trespassers 10 7 In light o f the 2010 incident inwhich a PRC fishing trawlere twice rammed a Japanese co as t guard ship it is impo rtant to no te that despite guidelines which were togive = law enfo rcement agencies the autho rity to deal with trespassers `acco rding to the law` it was repo rted that the centralgo vernment intervened at the las t minute did no t press fo r an indictment and o rdered the release o f the arres ted Chinese Thego vernment did no t want any further co mplicatio ns that might to rpedo the planned China vis it by Fo reign Minis ter Kawaguchi Yo riko

and was satis fied to have demo ns trated effective co ntro l o ver the Senkaku Is lands by arres ting and expelling the Chinese10 8 AJapanese jo urnal repo rted that there was a Japanese pledge to China fo llo wing this incident that in future an intruder wo uld no t beput in detentio n but o nly arres ted as lo ng as it was no t a serio us case in turn China agreed to prevent the departure o f vessels withpro tes ters fro m its harbo urs Such an unders tanding has no t surpris ingly been denied by the Japanese as well as by the Chinese

go vernment10 9

The China Marine Surveillance (CMS) s tarted irregular patro l activities near the Senkaku Is lands in December 2008 when two CMSvessels s tayed fo r o ver nine ho urs in the territo rial waters o f the Senkaku Is lands as mentio ned abo ve This was interpreted in

Japan as a majo r escalatio n110 Fo rmer ambassado r to China Miyamo to Yuji called this new develo pment a qualitative change in the

Senkaku dispute which went beyo nd previo us cases o f intrus io n by fishermen o r pro tes ters 111 This deplo yment was fo llo wed byo thers the fo llo wing year agains t a backgro und o f China reinfo rcing its maritime co ntro l Japan respo nded by building up its o wndefence effo rts in the so uth including planned s tatio ning o f so me tro o ps o n Yo naguni Is land o ne o f the clo ses t is lands to the

Senkaku Is lands 112

THE 2010 FISHING TRAWLER INCIDENT

It is agains t this co mplex backgro und that the Chinese fishing trawler Minjinyu 5179 with a crew o f 15 entered the territo rial waters o fthe Senkaku Is lands o n 7 September 2010 near Kubajima There were many o ther Chinese fishing trawlers in the same area andseveral ships o f the Japanese Co as t Guard were trying to chase them away Pursued by three Japanese CG vessels the Minjinyu 5179twice co llided with two o f the CG vessels There are different interpretatio ns whether the Chinese captain Zhan Qixio ng intentio nally

rammed the CG vessels and there are so me s trange inco ns is tencies highlighted in the repo rts o f the incident113 So me no n-Japanese autho rs like Sheila Smith and Linus Hags trouml m are no n-co mmittal o n the ques tio n o f the co llis io n but mo s t Japanese

autho rs blame the trawler and this autho r is mo re inclined to believe that the ramming was intentio nal114 The Chinese

unsurpris ingly blame the CG vessels 115 The is sue o f intentio n is impo rtant inso far as it gives so me indicatio n abo ut the risk o frecurrence and o f escalatio n The fo llo wing circumstantial evidence sugges ts intentio nal ramming by the Chinese captain

- There is ample video fo o tage leaked by a CG o fficer which specialis ts have interpreted as intentio nal ramming by the Chinese

captain116

- The captain seemed to have been drunk and is kno wn to be a vo latile perso n 117

- Fishing in the Eas t China Sea is very co mpetitive and Chinese fishermen are particularly anno yed abo ut the patro ls and co ntro ls byJapanese and Ko rean law enfo rcement agencies in the as yet un-demarcated EEZs amo ng all three co untries

Chinese fishermen have a reputatio n o f o ften being vio lent as many incidents in the So uth China Sea and in the Yello w Sea seem topro ve Only three mo nths later in December 2010 ano ther Chinese fishing trawler captain rammed a So uth Ko rean co as t guard

vessel in the Yello w Sea ho wever his bo at sank as a result and the Chinese captain dro wned 118 Chinese crews are o ften armed

with metal pipes and attack law enfo rcement agents which have led to o ther fatal casualties in 2011 and 2012119

The 2010 trawler incident is further relevant in o ur co ntext in view o f the Japanese go vernment`s handling it ( legal aspect denial o fthe shelving unders tanding) China`s co untermeasures and the aftermath o f the go vernment`s purchase o f three is lands inSeptember 2012 After the co llis io ns the Japanese go vernment arres ted the crew and co nfis cated the trawler The fo llo wing day theChinese go vernment demanded the release o f the crew and the trawler which the Japanese go vernment did o n the 13 September butkeeping the captain in cus to dy The Japanese ambassado r to China Niwa Uichiro was summo ned s ix times by the Chinese between8 and 19 September Beijing`s reactio n escalated after the Chinese captain`s term o f detentio n was extended o n 19 September tolas t fro m 20 to 29 September On 20 September Chinese autho rities detained fo ur Japanese citizens fo r entering a res trictedmilitary area in Hebei pro vince Even witho ut the trawler incident the detentio n o f the fo ur Japanese wo uld have harmed the bilateralrelatio nship but happening in this co ntext it was rightly o r wro ngly immediately linked by the Japanese to o ther Chinese sanctio ns

as dis cussed belo w The result ho wever was that the Japanese released the Chinese captain120 Even immediately after the crew`sarres t the Chinese go vernment had already begun to cancel the seco nd ro und o f nego tiatio ns fo r implementatio n o f theunders tanding o n energy co o peratio n in the Eas t China Sea co ncluded o n 18 June 2008 Other reprisals and sanctio ns fo llo wedincluding the suspens io n o f rare earth expo rts to Japan o n which the co untry`s high techno lo gy indus try is very dependentAltho ugh befo re the incident the Chinese go vernment had already mo ved to reduce rare earth expo rts which naturally hit Japan asthe bigges t impo rter Japanese media repo rted that the Chinese cus to ms autho rities to tally suspended expo rts in late

September121 The exact circumstances o f this alleged embargo are s till no t yet clear as dis cussed in detail by Alas tair Jo hns to n122

The cris is ended when the deputy pro secuto r in Ishigaki anno unced o n 24 September the release o f the captain citing the`diplo matic impact` o f the case o n the bilateral relatio nship So me co ns idered this as surrender by the Japanese and the result o fdubio us po litical interference into the legal pro cess The o ppo s itio n had a field day attacking the go vernment`s handling o f the

incident123 The Japanese Fo reign Minis try spo kesman declared that the go vernment had applied do mes tic law and again refuted the

idea o f there being a territo rial pro blem to be reso lved124 Others argue that the incident had several benefits fo r the Japanesego vernment because it o btained a reco nfirmatio n o f the US security guarantee to include the Senkaku Is lands it helped to co nvince

the public abo ut the necess ity o f mo re Japanese defence effo rts and it expo sed China as an assertive if no t aggress ive po wer125

China claimed that the incident sho wed that Japan had changed its appro ach to handling this type o f incident which co uld be

interpreted as a co nfirmatio n that bo th s ides had reached an info rmal unders tanding after the 2004 incident126 Ho wever thisincident was much mo re severe s ince the captain`s two co llis io ns with CG ships were interpreted by the Japanese go vernment asintentio nal ramming The captain was charged with o bs tructio n o f Perfo rmance o f Public Duty as a result o f the ramming On theo ther hand o ne canno t blame China fo r allo wing this bo at to leave its Chinese harbo ur because it was a fishing trawler and no t apro tes ters` campaign vessel What made this incident so serio us fo r the Chinese was Japan`s very public assertio n o f itsso vereignty o ver the is lands in the way it handled the Chinese captain and the explicit denial o f the shelving unders tanding o f the

1970s On 21 September Fo reign Minis ter Maehara s tated that Japan had no t agreed with China to shelve the territo rial dispute127

This declaratio n fo llo wed the seco nd extens io n o f the captain`s detentio n o n 19 September which pro mpted the Chinesego vernment to allo w widespread demo ns tratio ns in China and to place a series o f sanctio ns agains t Japan (cancellatio n o fminis terial meetings `self- res trictio ns` o n vis its to Japan by Chinese to uris ts and po s tpo nement at very sho rt no tice o f the vis ito f 1000 Japanese yo uth planned fro m 21 September to the Shanghai Wo rld Exhibitio n) Japan is es timated to have lo s t yen318

billio n due to a decline in the number o f Chinese to uris ts 128

It is diff icult to judge whether these unprecedented co untermeasures were centrally directed and it is likely that it was aco mbinatio n o f vario us po wer centres co mpeting ando r feeling the need to be seen acting in acco rdance with the increas ingly anti-Japanese mo o d

Japan`s do mes tic circumstances made a speedy so lutio n such as that in 2004 difficult The DPJ had co me to po wer o nly in 2009 andlacked fo reign po licy experience There was no effective co mmunicatio n between the two go vernments at leas t at the beginning o fthe incident in co ntras t to earlier times The Japanese leadership o bvio us ly mis judged ho w the Chinese wo uld interpret Japanesehandling o f the incident which it perceived as a reversal o f Japan`s previo us (albeit gradually diminishing) res traint Altho ugh theDPJ had initially a mo re pro -China leadership when it came to po wer (no tably Prime Minis ter Hato yama Yukio and Secretary General

Ozawa Ichiro ) this had changed by 2010 The minis ter in charge o f the CG (which is under the Minis try o f Land Infras tructureTranspo rt and To urism) o n the day o f the incident was Maehara Seiji a kno wn defence hawk who then became Minis ter o f Fo reignAffairs in a cabinet reshuffle o n 17 September He was therefo re much mo re at liberty to take a hard-line s tance agains t China whilethe DPJ pres idential electio n ndash wo n again by Kan Nao to ndash to o k place o n 14 September fo llo wed by the prime minis ter`s departure toNew Yo rk to attend the UN General Assembly o n 22 September The fo reign minis ter befo re the 17 September was Okada Katsuyawho was also mo re inclined to take a s tro ng s tance Maehara as well as Okada had seen the CG`s video o f the co llis io n which co uld

no t but have left them with a very negative impress io n o f the Chinese captain`s actio ns 129 It certainly did no t help when Maehara inhis new po s t as fo reign minis ter qualif ied China`s reactio n in the Diet o n 18 September as `very hys terical` and then declared o n

21 September that there had never been an unders tanding abo ut shelving the territo rial dispute130 On 23 September Secretary o fState Hillary Clinto n assured vis iting Fo reign Minis ter Maehara that the Senkaku Is lands were co vered by the bilateral Japan-USSecurity Treaty an interventio n that was certainly also no t welco me to the Chinese Ho wever there have been speculatio ns that inexchange fo r this s tro ng US reco nfirmatio n o f the security guarantee in o rder to get o ut o f the s talemate the Japanese had to

pro mise to release o f the Chinese captain which o ccurred the fo llo wing day131

The 2010 incident had several co nsequences which made a recurrence very likely Firs t o f all the incident raised tens io ns to a degreelas t seen during the anti-Japan demo ns tratio ns in 2004 and 2005 which had been mainly co ncerned with Japan`s attempt to gain apermanent UN Security Co uncil seat and the his to ry is sue These tens io ns had made it impo ss ible to have any new nego tiatio nro und to co nclude a treaty abo ut co o peratio n in the explo itatio n o f hydro carbo n reso urces in the Eas t China Sea and thus reduceano ther majo r so urce o f bilateral tens io ns and o ne mo reo ver related to the Senkaku is sue Agains t this backgro und but also inline with its previo us po s itio n Japan rejected a Chinese pro po sal made in Octo ber 2010 fo r jo int reso urce develo pment in the

Senkaku area132 The legal aftermath o f the incident co ntinued fo r so me time with Japan claiming co mpensatio n fro m the Chinesecaptain fo r the damage caused to the two CG vessels which was rejected by China and co untered with demands fo r co mpensatio nand an apo lo gy The Japanese pro secuto r dro pped the case agains t the captain o nly in January 2011 but the CG s till sent a bill to

the captain in February 2011133

While the incident helped the Japanese go vernment to o btain s tro ng US suppo rt o n the applicability o f the bilateral security treaty tothe Senkaku Is lands and generally helped to co nvince the Japanese public abo ut the need fo r greater Japanese defence effo rts(including a s trengthening o f US leverage vis-agrave-vis Japan co ncerning the realignment o f its fo rces o n Okinawa) it reduced Japan`sindependence with respect to the degree o f suppo rt it pro vided fo r US China po licy

Seco ndly the incident further undermined the co nditio ns which were the fo undatio n fo r the uno fficial shelving o f the Senkaku is sueIf it was no t yet clear to everybo dy that there was a territo rial dispute o ver the Senkaku Is lands then this incident with theunprecedented Chinese sanctio ns agains t Japan lifted the las t remnants o f do ubt Maehara Seji who repeated o n 25 o ccas io ns inDiet debates between 10 September and 16 No vember 2010 that there exis ted no territo rial dispute made this o fficial po s itio n

even less co nvincing134 The incident pro mpted Beijing to publicly undermine Japan`s territo rial claim further by anno uncing o n 29Octo ber 2010 permanent deplo yment o f large fisheries patro l vessels in waters near the Senkaku Is lands which was recipro cated by

the CG deplo ying patro l vessels o f o ver 1000 to ns in the same area135 In a further tit-fo r-tat o n 17 December 2010 the city

go vernment o f Ishigaki the adminis trative autho rity o f the Senkaku Is lands passed an o rdinance to des ignate 14 January the day to

co mmemo rate the Senkaku Is lands` inco rpo ratio n in 1895136

The further ero s io n o f the shelving agreement after Octo ber 2010

The next majo r co nfro ntatio n o ver the Senkaku Is lands in September 2012 o ccurred agains t the backgro und o f mo re measurestaken by bo th s ides to suppo rt their respective territo rial claims and do mes tic circumstances in bo th co untries which were evenless co nducive to re-es tablish trus t and go o d relatio ns The gro wing US-China po litical and military rivalry in Eas t As ia asexemplif ied by the As ia pivo t which China perceives as directed agains t its rise certainly did no t help Initially the year 2011 saw areco very o f relatio ns fro m the 2010 incident Bilateral trade reached a new high with a vo lume o f $345 billio n Japanese fo reign

direct inves tment in China so ared nearly 50 per cent in 2011 to $6 3bn137 Mo reo ver the Chinese public was very impressed with thedis ciplined way the Japanese peo ple reacted to wards the triple disas ters which hit the co untry o n 11 March 2011 and there was an

o utpo uring o f sympathy which also included the sending o f a Chinese search-and-rescue miss io n to the affected To ho ku area138

Yet this impro ved atmo sphere was quickly dispelled when the results o f the textbo o k review were published o n 27 March whichasserted Japan`s territo rial claim to the Senkaku Is lands (as well as to TakeshimaDo kto ) and denied the Chinese figure o f

300 000 victims in the Nanjing massacre139

In the meantime the Japanese go vernment co ntinued to turn the legal s crews which affected the Senkaku Is lands by implementingdo mes tic laws in o rder to be co ngruent with internatio nal law and s trengthening maritime co ntro l In February 2012 the Japanesecabinet passed bills to enhance the Japan Co as t Guards law enfo rcement po wers in territo rial waters which wo uld fo r example

autho rize the CG to o rder fo reign ships to leave Japan`s Territo rial Waters witho ut firs t bo arding them140 Other adminis trativemeasures derived fro m the Bas ic Law o n Ocean Po licy which had been enacted in 2007 and which pro vides the framewo rk fo radminis trating remo te is lands Since 2009 Japan has given names to hitherto unnamed is lands to subs tantiate its claims to anEEZ Fo r this purpo se in Augus t 2011 the go vernment placed 23 uninhabited is lands under s tate co ntro l but fo ur is lets near theSenkaku Is lands were exempt o ut o f co ns ideratio n fo r China In March 2012 ho wever the go vernment abando ned this cautio n and

regis tered Kitako jima as a natio nal asset141 In No vember 2011 the go vernment had let it be kno wn that it wo uld sho rtly release a

new lis t o f names fo r is lands which wo uld include is lets o f the Senkaku gro up142 China pro tes ted and a meeting in Beijing plannedin February 2012 between Pres ident Hu Jintao and representatives o f seven bilateral friendship gro ups fro m Japan was cancelled Ano pinio n piece in the Peoples Daily (RMRB) o n 17 January 2012 said Japans mo ve lsquois a blatant mo ve to damage Chinas co re

interes ts rsquo143 On 2 March 2012 To kyo finally anno unced a lis t o f 39 is lands which included fo ur is lets in the Senkaku Is lands

gro up144 The Chinese pro tes ted immediately o n the same day and in a tit-fo r-tat the State Oceanic Adminis tratio n released o n 3

March s tandard names and descriptio ns o f the Senkaku is lands and its 70 affiliated is lets 145 Ano ther Chinese co untermo ve was theanno uncement o n 16 March by the SOA that they had s tarted patro lling near the Senkaku Is lands This was fo llo wed pro mptly o n thesame day by o ne CMS ship entering the Territo rial Waters o f the Senkaku Is lands and the same vessels with ano ther CMS ship

cruis ing in the Co ntiguo us Waters o f the is lands 146 In No vember 2010 an o fficial o f the Minis try o f Agricultures Bureau o f Fisherieswhich o perates the Fisheries Law Enfo rcement Co mmand (FLEC) had already anno unced that his o rganizatio n wo uld fro m no w o n

deplo y fisheries patro l vessels o f o ver 1000 to ns to maintain co ntinuo us patro ls 147

THE 2012 CONFRONTATION ISHIHARA SHINTARO LIGHTING THE FUSE

It was in this tense enviro nment that To kyo Go verno r Ishihara Shintaro anno unced o n 16 April 2012 that the To kyo Metro po litanGo vernment (TMG) was nego tiating the purchase o f three o f the fo ur privately-held Senkaku is lands by the end o f the year ie

Uo tsurijima Kita Ko jima and Minami Ko jima The lease o f the central go vernment fo r these three is lands was due to expire in March2013 and no incident wo uld have o ccurred if the go vernment had quietly renewed the lease The central go vernment s tated that ithad no t kno wn abo ut Ishihara`s intentio n but that there had been co ntacts o n vario us o ccas io ns between the go vernment and the

private o wner148 This seems co nvincing s ince s tate o wnership wo uld have pro vided better preventio n o f incidents even mo re thanjus t leas ing Taken aback by Ishihara`s surprise mo ve the Chief Cabinet Secretary Fujimura Osamu declared the fo llo wing day thatthe central go vernment might acquire the is lands `if required` and Prime Minis ter No da implied in a Diet speech o n the 18 April that

a purchase by the central go vernment was o ne o f the o ptio ns Bo th s tatements were widely repo rted in China149 Ishihara hadcho sen his anno uncement fo r maximum effect o n the o ccas io n o f a speech at the co nservative Washingto n DC-based HeritageFo undatio n He made it clear that this pro ject was meant as a criticism o f the DPJ-led central go vernment which he co ns ideredfailing in its duty to sufficiently pro tect Japan`s so vereignty by saying that the central go vernment sho uld be buying the is lands butthat the Gaimusho was to o afraid o f o ffending China The lo catio n o f his anno uncement was meant to gain s tro nger suppo rt fro m

the US fo r Japan`s territo rial claim150 As we have seen abo ve fro m Ishihara`s activities in the 1970s this anno uncement was inmany ways the lo gical co nclus io n o f his lo ng las ting o bsess io n with the Senkaku Is lands and his hatred o f co mmunis t China It wasthe 2010 incident in particular which had enco uraged him to renew his o ld plan o f buying the is lands after his earlier failure to do so His go o d co nnectio ns with the o wner Kurihara Kunio ki who shared his natio nalis t pro clivities helped Ishihara to beco me the

favo ured purchaser151

The po ss ibility o f having the three is lands under the co ntro l o f the natio nalis tic go verno r o f To kyo who wanted to build facilities o nthe is lands to s trengthen Japan`s so vereignty was unpalatable to the No da go vernment which feared co mplicatio ns with China In a

meeting o n 18 May No da and his to p advisers decided in principle to purchase the is lands 152 Pressure o n the go vernmentincreased to pre-empt Ishihara because he was as to nishingly success ful in rais ing vo luntary co ntributio ns fro m the public to buythe three is lands thus circumventing any legal diff iculties in us ing To kyo `s taxpayer mo ney and also pro ving the po pularity o f his

mo ve By 1 June he had co llected 70 000 do natio ns to taling aro und yen101 billio n which increased to yen146 billio n by 6 September153

On 27 July the TMG ran an advertisement in the Wall Street Journal asking fo r US unders tanding and suppo rt fo r the purchase plan154

The TMG had to reques t central go vernment permiss io n to co nduct a survey o f the is lands which the go vernment refused to grant

o n 27 Augus t fo rcing the TMG to co nduct a survey fro m a ship o n 2 September155 In the end it was the higher sum and the sho rtes tdelay o f co ncluding the deal which pro mpted Kurihara Kunio ki who was apparently in so me financial diff iculties to accept the centralgo vernment`s o ffer o f yen205 billio n ($26 millio n) and to s ign the co ntract o n 11 September This was an embarrass ing turn fo rIshihara In additio n he did no t succeed in us ing the o ffer o f his co llected mo ney to entice the No da go vernment to pro mise thebuilding o f any facility o n the is lands No da was presented by his adminis tratio n with several o ptio ns including his favo ured o ptio no f repairing the exis ting light ho use o n Uo tsurijima but in the end was co nvinced by Fo reign Minis ter Gemba to leave things as they

were in o rder no t to further inflame the Chinese156

The central go vernment`s purchase o f the three is lands o n 11 September immediately led to a very harsh reactio n by the Chinesewhich was even wo rse than in 2010 But befo re lo o king at Chinese co untermeasures after 11 September in detail it is impo rtant toinves tigate why the Chinese reactio n was so s tro ng and why the Japanese apparently did no t anticipate it particularly in view o fChina`s unprecedented reactio n in September 2010

CHINESE WARNINGS BEFORE THE NATIONALIZATION ON 11 SEPTEMBER

Prime Minis ter No da admitted o n 19 September o nly eight days into the co mprehens ive Chinese sanctio ns and co unter measures

that he had underes timated their extent157

158 In a named co mmentary o f Xinhua o n 18 April attentio n was drawn to Ishihara`s kno wn right wing and anti-Chinese s tatementsbut also po inted o ut that the CMOFA `wo uld no t hes itate to take any necessary measures to safeguard so vereignty o ver the Diao yu

Is lands`159 Vice-Pres ident Xi Jinping to ld vis iting Ko no Yo hei a kno wn pro -China hand that Japan sho uld no t wo rsen the bilateral

relatio nship and that co re is sues sho uld be reso lved by the two co untries in an appro priate manner16 0 At the end o f April the StateOceanic Adminis tratio n anno unced a plan to des ignate is lands and their surro unding waters as s trategically vital and to pro tect their

enviro nments and develo p marine reso urces 16 1 Mo re specifically targeting the Senkaku Is lands was ho wever the entry o n 3 May o f

two FLEC vessels into the Senkaku Is lands` Co ntiguo us Waters fo r the firs t time s ince Ishihara`s anno uncement16 2 Bilateraltens io ns also increased after a Japanese right wing gro up suppo rted the ho lding o f a meeting o f the Wo rld Uyghur Co ngress in

To kyo fro m 14 to 18 May which led to the cancellatio n by Beijing o f several o fficial vis its 16 3 On 13 May Premier Wen Jiabao raisedthe Senkaku is sue and the Uighur meeting during talks in Beijing with Prime Minis ter Yo shihiko No da cautio ning that lsquoit is impo rtant

to respect Chinarsquos co re interes ts and matters o f great co ncernrsquo16 4 Wang Jiarui head o f the Co mmunis t Partys Internatio nalDepartment was quo ted by Eda Satsuki a fo reign po licy adviser o f the DPJ that bo th the Senkaku and the Uighur is sue were

described as `co re is sues` and Wen`s s tatement was s tressed in a Chinese TV bro adcas t16 5 The Xinjiang is sue as well as Taiwanand Tibet have been referred to fo r so me time by the Chinese go vernment as `co re is sues` but the Senkaku is sue had been called

a `co re is sue` apparently fo r the firs t time o nly in an o pinio n piece by the Renmin Ribao in January 201216 6 Only o n 23 March 2013did the Chinese Fo reign Minis try Spo kesperso n clearly s tate that China regards the Diao yu Is lands as its co re interes t altho ugh the

written reco rd subsequently so ftened this s tatement16 7

The abo ve chro no lo gy certainly gives the impress io n that there was a series o f Chinese reactio ns which expressed s tro ng Chineseco ncern with any purchase (whether by the TMG o r the central go vernment) o f the Senkaku Is lands If that had no t been eno ugh theinterview o f the Financial Times with Japan`s ambassado r in China Niwa Uichiro at the beginning o f June sho wed s tro ng co ncernabo ut the implicatio ns o f a purchase He was quo ted as saying that lsquoif Mr Ishihararsquos plans are acted upo n then it will result in anextremely grave cris is in relatio ns between Japan and ChinahellipWe canno t allo w decades o f pas t effo rt to be bro ught to no thingrsquo He

added that such a cris is wo uld affect bus iness 16 8 Niwa mus t have been truly co ncerned abo ut the severity o f the s ituatio n to makesuch an undiplo matic public s tatement fo r which he was reprimanded by Fo reign Minis ter Gemba and criticized by so me media

o utlets and po liticians ultimately leading to his recall later in the year16 9

The Chinese warnings became sharper at the seco nd s tage when Prime Minis ter No da anno unced o n 7 July that his go vernment wo uldseek to buy the is lands because the purchase co uld no lo nger be put do wn to a mere lo cal maverick with s tro ng anti-Chineseinclinatio ns The Global Times edito rial o f 9 July sho wed the frus tratio n by so me Chinese lsquoEach time Japan takes o ne s tep we sho uldtake o ne and half o r even two s teps fo rward making Japan aware o f the grave co nsequences caused by its aggress io n agains t

Chinarsquo170 A Xinhua co mmentary o n 7 July quo tes the CMOFA`s spo kesperso n referring pro bably fo r the firs t time in this ro w to a`co nsensus` agains t which the Japanese go vernment went by wanting to buy the is lands meaning o f co urse the shelving co nsensus

o f 1972 and 1978171 On 9 July a Xinhua co mmentary titled `Japan playing with fire o ver Diao yu Is lands` called the purchase by the

central go vernment a `farcical ambitio n` an express io n repeated thereafter many times 172 On 11 July the Japanese media repo rtedthe entry by three FLEC vessels into the territo rial waters o f Kubajima the firs t time s ince the 16 March 2012 fo llo wed by o ne vessel

cruis ing the fo llo wing day in the is land`s co ntiguo us zo ne173 Public o pinio n became increas ingly inflamed and the Global Timesrepo rted o n 19 July that 90 8 per cent o f Chinese peo ple surveyed appro ve us ing the military to enfo rce Chinas so vereignty o ver

the is lets with 521 per cent saying a military clash lsquois likelyrsquo between China and Japan o ver the is lands 174

Even the US gave Japan `s tro ng advice` no t to pro ceed with the purchase because it co uld `trigger a cris is` as was revealed in April2013 by Kurt Campbell who was at the time Ass is tant Secretary fo r Eas t As ian and Pacific Affairs Even tho ugh we warned JapanJapan decided to go in a different directio n and they tho ught they had gained the suppo rt o f China o r so me did which we were

certain that they had no t Campbell is quo ted in an interview with Kyo do 175

FAILURE OF COMMUNICATION

The abo ve chro no lo gy and escalatio n o f Chinese reactio ns to the planned purchase o f the is lands o ver the summer 2012 give aclear indicatio n that a Japanese purchase o f the three is lands was no t co ns idered jus t ano ther incident witho ut majo rco nsequences So why did the Japanese go vernment s till go ahead with the purchase In the final analys is the failure to avo id thecris is escalating in September 2012 lay in the wide difference between the interes ts o f the two go vernments Do mes ticcircumstances o n bo th s ides and the inherent zero sum nature o f territo rial disputes prevented the trans itio n fro m dialo gue topreventive actio n let alo ne so lutio n Aggravating events o ver the summer 2012 which raised tempers o n bo th s ides were thedemands by the TMG to send a survey team to the Senkaku Is lands (the No da go vernment after so me initial co nflicting repo rts didno t allo w a landing) the landing o f Ho ng Ko ng activis ts o n Uo tsurijima o n 15 Augus t (timed with the anniversary o f Japan`ssurrender) fo llo wed by the landing o f Japanese activis ts ( including lo cal parliamentarians ) o n 19 Augus t and an attack in Beijing o n27 Augus t o n the car carrying Ambassado r Niwa Despite o ngo ing co mmunicatio n and dialo gue thro ugh vario us channels theseadverse circumstances led to a hardening o f po s itio ns o ver the summer 2012 between the two go vernments

The Japanese central go vernment had been caught sho rt by Ishihara`s sudden anno uncement o n 16 April and became to tallyabso rbed with preventing the maverick po litician fro m go ing ahead with the purchase o f the is lands fearing rightly that this wo uldserio us ly co mplicate Japan-China relatio ns Ishihara wanted to embarrass the No da go vernment which was co ns tantly declining inpo pularity and to fo rce it to deal mo re assertively with the is lands As we have seen fo r Ishihara it was no t jus t abo ut purchas ingthe is lands but abo ut building facilities o n them Fo r the No da go vernment buying the is lands by the s tate was therefo re the lesserevil The go vernment tried all alo ng to co nvince the Chinese o f To kyo `s go o d intentio ns fo r example when Fo reign Minis ter Gembamet with his Chinese co unterpart Yang Jiechi o n 11 July that the purchase was o nly a `do mes tic co mmercial transactio n` and no t a

diplo matic matter and was o nly meant to ensure that the is lands wo uld be `adminis tered peacefully and s tably`176 In December2012 when the full extent o f China`s unprecedented reactio ns had beco me kno wn the new Japanese ambassado r Kitera s till s tatedthat lsquoThe change in o wnership sho uld no t have caused a pro blem in relatio ns with Chinarsquo adding that Japan had given China sufficient

explanatio ns ahead o f the purchase177 Fo reign Minis ter Gemba even tried to highlight in No vember that the purchase was actually areturn to the status quo ante lsquoThe measure taken by the go vernment o f Japan was jus t a trans fer o f title under Japanese do mes ticlaw and jus t means that the o wnership o f the is lands mdash held by the go vernment until 1932 mdash was returned fro m a private citizen to

the go vernmentrsquo178 In sho rt fo r the Japanese the purchase o f the is lands was aimed at maintaining the status quo in such a waythat it ho ped China wo uld co ns ider to be in its o wn interes t that is by cho o s ing the lesser o f two evils That express io ns like`peaceful adminis tratio n` o r `trans fer o f title under do mes tic Japanese law` co uld o nly be interpreted by the Chinese as acts o fasserting Japanese so vereignty was apparently s imply igno red Under these circumstances it was impo ss ible to co nvince theChinese that trans fer o f o wnership had no thing to do with so vereignty Ins tead the Chinese even suspected that the No da

go vernment and Ishihara were co nniving at s trengthening Japan`s co ntro l o ver the is lands 179

Any intended co nciliato ry o verto ne in the abo ve explanatio ns by Gemba and many s imilar declaratio ns befo re and later were furthernegated by the ins is tence that there was no territo rial dispute exactly the po s itio n the Chinese mo s t so ught to change Thefrequent references to `co re interes t` by China were igno red by the Japanese go vernment Fo r the Chinese leaders the `o ffer` tocho o se between the To kyo Metro po litan Go vernment o r the Go vernment o f Japan buying the is lands was as Vice Fo reign Minis ter

Zhang Zhijun later put it like being asked to cho o se between two do ses o f po iso n18 0

It was also unfo rtunate that the Japanese go vernment allo wed the express io n kokuyuka (natio nalizatio n) to prevail even amo ng

go vernment members ins tead o f the o riginal term agreed by the Japanese cabinet shutoku (acquis itio n)18 1 Chinese media hastaken o ver the Japanese term o f lsquonatio nalizatio nrsquo which certainly further co nfused Chinese public o pinio n Since it do es no t kno w thehis to rical backgro und and Japan`s effective co ntro l o f the is lands `natio nalizatio n` tended to be unders to o d as a radical change in

the status quo o r even as invas io n18 2 A well kno wn Japanese o bserver in China Kato Yo shikazu even argued therefo re that the 1972

and 1978 unders tanding abo ut shelving had prevented the Chinese peo ple fro m learning abo ut the is sue as perceived in Japan18 3

Bo th s ides made it impo ss ible with their extreme and diametrically o ppo sed po s itio ns to find a co mpro mise The No da go vernmentwas to o weak (and also to o preo ccupied with o ther is sues like the pass ing o f the law to intro duce a hike o f the value added taxco ping with the aftermath o f the triple disas ter o f March 2011 and s imply trying to s tay in po wer) to find an alternative to the no wabando ned `shelving co mpro mise` and to admit that there was a territo rial pro blem At the end o f Augus t No da was fo rced topro mise Lo wer Ho use electio ns `so metime so o n` despite the grim o utlo o k fo r his party`s chances in the electio ns Making aco mpro mise o n the territo rial is sue wo uld no t have helped to gain po pular suppo rt While the Chinese pro bably felt enco uraged toescalate pressure by their success in fo rcing the Japanese go vernment hand o ver the captain in September 2010 it mo s t likely hadthe effect o n the No da go vernment to remain inflexible in o rder to avo id being seen yet again as caving in to Chinese pressure Butthe Chinese were also no t able to co mpro mise o n their demand that the Japanese sho uld admit the exis tence o f a territo rial is sue

The preparatio n fo r the 18 th Natio nal Party Co ngress in No vember 2012 and the ensuing leadership change to be finalized o nly inspring 2013 s imilarly did no t allo w the Chinese leaders whether inco ming o r o utgo ing to appear so ft Eight o ut o f nine Po litbureaumembers publicly expressed o ppo s itio n to the purchase either befo re o r after the anno uncement o f the purchase o n 11

September18 4 There are also credible repo rts that during the CCP`s summer retreat to Beihaide in Augus t Hu Jintao came underpressure fro m the future gro up o f leaders to take a mo re severe po s itio n o n Japan`s intentio n to natio nalise the three is lands Asa result the leading fo reign po licy interlo cuto rs o f the Japanese go vernment Zhang Zhijun and Dai Bingguo hardened their po s itio n

as well18 5 Public o pinio n in China had gro wn increas ingly ho s tile to Japan o ver the summer and was particularly inflamed when thelanding o f the Ho ng Ko ng activis ts was fo llo wed by the landing o f Japanese activis ts which were treated by the Japanese autho ritiesmo re leniently than the fo rmer ie no t arres ted despite having vio lated private land leased to the s tate Rio ts in several Chinese

cities s tarted thereafter18 6

Altho ugh bo th s ides agreed to co ntinue dialo gue and several o fficial meetings at different levels to o k place they co uld o nly end inres tating kno wn po s itio ns China did no t make things eas ier by later cancelling such meetings depriving bo th s ides o f po ss ibleo ppo rtunities to find a breakthro ugh The s tart o f Chinese sanctio ns acro ss the who le gambit o f bilateral relatio ns deprived theJapanese o f even mo re do mes tic wriggle ro o m fo r a co mpro mise

It seems that the abo ve circumstances did no t allo w Japan`s central decis io n-makers co ncerned with the is sue in particular the

Prime Minis ter and his immediate circle to admit to ando r unders tand until the purchase anno uncement o n 11 September 2012ho w s tro ngly the Chinese felt abo ut it Ambassado r Niwa`s rather undiplo matic s tatements in the Financial Times interview seem toindicate that he felt that the central decis io n-makers did no t unders tand the s trength o f the feelings o f the Chinese and ho w far theymight go Niwa warned in his interview that even a po ss ible pre-purchase survey o f the is lands co uld be diplo matically incendiary

s ince such a survey was dis cussed already at the time to enable the TMG to go ahead with the purchase18 7 As late as the 3September the Yomiuri Shimbun repo rted that the Chinese go vernment was reacting calmly as lo ng as three co nditio ns wereo bserved to maintain the status quo The co nditio ns co ntained no o ppo s itio n to a po ss ible purchase and ins tead jus t mentio ned

abs tentio n fro m landing surveying and building facilities o n the is lands 18 8 Acco rding to Pro fesso r Takahara Akio General ZhuChenghu said o n 5 September that a purchase by the central go vernment wo uld be better and Qu Xing directo r o f the China Ins titute

o f Internatio nal Affairs is said to have expressed a s imilar o pinio n18 9 Even o n 12 September when the s to rm bro ke the deputydirecto r o f the Japan Ins titute o f the Chinese Academy o f So cial Science Gao Ho ng s tated in an interview with the o n-line vers io no f the Renmin Ribao that if Japan wo uld respect the three abs tentio ns mentio ned abo ve the s ituatio n co uld ultimately revert to the

status quo ante19 0 But these were no lo nger the decis ive vo ices o f the Chinese leadership after the Beihaide meeting The abo ve-mentio ned Campbell interview seems to sugges t that Japan was lo ng befo re mo re inclined to act upo n Chinese s tatements whichwere clo ser to what it wanted to unders tand

CHINESE REACTION RHETORICAL WARFARE

The final misco mmunicatio n o r clash o f irreco ncilable interes ts o ccurred when Prime Minis ter No da met Pres ident Hu o n thes idelines o f the As ia Pacific Eco no mic Co o peratio n (APEC) summit in Vladivo s to k o n 9 September then anno unced two days laterthe s igning o f the purchase co ntract with the Kurihara family Whether Hu had no t sufficiently co nveyed his s tro ng feelingsco ncerning the purchase which had been kno wn and bilaterally dis cussed at leas t s ince the Japanese o fficial anno uncement o f itspurchase intentio n o n 7 July o r No da had no t unders tanding the Chinese feeling fo r the po ss ible reaso ns dis cussed abo ve Hu

apparently felt he had lo s t face when Japan anno unced the purchase o n 11 September19 1 Mo reo ver the Japanese anno uncementco uld no t have co me at a mo re awkward time because o f the anniversary o f the Mukden Incident o n the 18 September which likeseveral o ther carefully cultivated anniversaries regarding Japan`s pas t misdeeds in China always aro use latent anti-Japanesefeelings As a result the Japanese anno uncement caused an avalanche o f virulent rheto rical o utburs ts relating to the pas t po liticalsanctio ns further measures to assert China`s territo rial claim (fo r example including the is lands in the Chinese TV weatherfo recas t an exhibitio n o f ancient maps to pro ve Chinese co ntro l) eco no mic sanctio ns and an escalatio n o f patro ls by ChineseFLEC and MSA ships and aircraft aro und the Senkaku Is lands

The mildes t part o f China`s rheto rical o ffens ive was calling the go vernment purchase a `farce` a rather undiplo matic express io nalready used by Xinhua in July 2012 but then taken up at the highes t level by Vice Pres ident Xi Jinping when meeting Secretary o f

Defence Leo n Panetta o n 19 September19 2 But the main line fro m no w o n was that Japan`s claim to the Senkaku Is lands was adenial o f the po s t-Wo rld War II results In its s tatements and rebuttals the Chinese sho wed their frus tratio n at no t having been ableto fundamentally change the status quo and they did no t hes itate to use express io ns which were rather undignified fo r diplo mats andpo litical leaders Japan o n the o ther hand argued fo r peaceful reso lutio n alo ng the lines o f internatio nal law and dialo gue whichpro bably infuriated the Chinese even mo re On 10 September the CMFA is sued a s tatement calling Japans po s itio n o n the disputedis lands `an o utright denial o f the o utco mes o f the victo ry o f the Wo rld Anti-Fascis t War and hellip a grave challenge to the po s t-war

internatio nal o rder`19 3 In a heated exchange at the UN General Assembly between Chinas UN ambassado r Li Bao do ng and JapansDeputy UN ambassado r Ko dama Kazuo Li called the mo tive fo r purchas ing the three is lands to lsquolegalize its s tealing and o ccupatio no f Chinese territo ryrsquo and s tated lsquoThis actio n o f Japan co ns titutes a serio us encro achment upo n Chinas so vereignty and intends toco ntinue and legalize the result o f Japans co lo nial po licy It is an o pen denial o f the o utco mes o f victo ry o f the wo rld anti-fascis twar and a grave challenge to the po s t-war internatio nal o rder and the purpo ses and principles o f the Charter o f the United

Natio ns rsquo19 4 In a further rebuttal o f Japan`s assertio n o f its claim Li characterized the is land purchase as lsquono thing different fro m

mo ney launderingrsquo19 5 At the As ia Euro pe Meeting (ASEM) in Lao s Fo reign Minis ter Yang Jiechi repeated the reference to the`o utco me o f the anti-Fascis t war` while Prime Minis ter No da spo ke o f peaceful reso lutio n o f co nflicts acco rding to internatio nal

law19 6 On 11 Octo ber the CMFA spo kesperso n Ho ng Lei refuted Fo reign Minis ter Gembarsquos his to rical acco unt jus tifying Japan`s

claim by calling it `gangs ter lo gic`19 7

On the Chinese s ide therefo re there are no w two clo sely-linked his to ry narratives o ne is abo ut the is lands having been part o fChina s ince the Ming and Qing dynas ties the o ther co nnects the is lands to the already well-rehearsed his to ry narrative ie Japanhaving victimised China s ince the Sino -Japanese war o f 1894-95 These two narratives co ntinue to be cultivated by the Chineseleadership In Octo ber 2012 the Chinese anno uncement o f the publicatio n o f 80 vo lumes o n the Far Eas t War Criminal Co urt was

clearly meant to link the latter narrative to Japan`s acquis itio n o f the Senkaku Is lands 19 8 Fo rmer Fo reign Minis ter Gemba explicitlytried in Octo ber 2012 to delink the territo rial is sue fro m Japan`s aggress io n agains t China o nly to be reminded by the Chineseambassado r to the UK in an article in the Financial Times (as part o f the ensuing wo rldwide press campaign by bo th s ides ) that lsquothe

Diao yu Dao is sue is all abo ut his to ryrsquo19 9 Since then until no w China has co ntinued this ldquohis to ry warfarerdquo by publishing endlessarticles o n Japan`s aggress io n agains t China befo re 1945 The mo s t recent mo ve in July 2014 is the serialised o n-line publicatio n o f

the hand-written co nfess io ns by 45 Japanese co nvicted war criminals by the State Archives Adminis tratio n20 0

POLITICAL SANCTIONS AND PUBLIC OPINION

Chinese po litical co untermeasures ranged fro m the cancellatio n o f o fficial and uno fficial vis its to further legal acts to reinfo rce

China`s claim to the Senkaku Is lands Aro und 40 per cent o f ceremo nial events in Japan to mark 2012 as the 40 th anniversary o f the

no rmalizatio n o f diplo matic relatio ns with China were cancelled o r po s tpo ned and even mo re events in China20 1 Thesecancellatio ns were no t always the result o f direct go vernment interventio n but so metimes mo re indirect o fficial `dis co uragement`helped by the Chinese preference fo r no t being seen to do so mething in co ntradictio n to the (initially fo mented and later self-pro pelling) anti-Japan atmo sphere o r by fear o f participants running into demo ns tratio ns if no t assaults The legal s crews werefurther turned with lo ng-term implicatio ns On 10 September the Chinese go vernment anno unced the base po ints and baselines o f

the territo rial waters o f the disputed is lands and their affiliated is lets as well as the names and co o rdinates o f 17 base po ints 20 2

On 16 September repo rts appeared that China was submitting pro po sals fo r its extended co ntinental shelf to the UN Co ntinental

Shelf Co mmiss io n which included the Senkaku Is lands but in fact the actual submiss io n o ccurred o nly o n 14 December 201220 3 On

20 September a go vernment agency published a thematic map o f the Diao yu Is land and its affiliated is lands 20 4 Chinarsquos

Meteo ro lo gical Adminis tratio n s tarted pro viding weather fo recas ts fo r the Senkaku area o n the s tate-run TV s tatio n20 5 On 16September the fishery bureau anno unced the lifting o f the fishery ban in the Eas t China Sea and s tressed that China planned to

s trengthen its so vereignty claim o ver the Senkakus 20 6

There were rumo urs that 1000 fishing vessels wo uld co me to the Senkaku area and tho ugh this did no t materialize it helped to

further raise tens io ns 20 7

Mo st attentio n in Japan was fo cused o n the widening s treet pro tes ts in o ver 100 Chinese cities the des tructio n o f Japanese sho ps

res taurants cars and pro ductio n facilities and the attacks o n Japanese citizens in China20 8 The webs ites o f at leas t 19 Japanese

banks univers ities and o ther ins titutio ns came under cyber-attack20 9 At a demo ns tratio n in Shanghai abo ut 7000 pro tes ters

chanted s lo gans such as lsquoBeat Japanese imperialismrsquo lsquoBo yco tt Japanese pro ducts rsquo and lsquoDes tro y Japan and retrieve Okinawarsquo210

Altho ugh o nly 63 per cent o f po lled Japanese in late September 2012 expressed suppo rt fo r their go vernment`s natio nalizatio n o fthe is lands do wn fro m 73 per cent in a previo us po ll o n 15 and 16 September 82 per cent o f respo ndents in a Mainichi Shimbun

survey said the Japanese go vernment had no t pro tes ted s tro ngly eno ugh to Beijing o ver anti-Japan pro tes ts 211 The Chinesego vernment denied any o fficial invo lvement and the spo kesperso n o f the Waijiao bu went o nly as far as saying that the pro tes ts anddemo ns tratio ns were `co mpletely caused by the Japanese go vernments illegal purchase o f the Diao yu Is lands and are peo ples

spo ntaneo us acts`212 There were ho wever repo rts that so me o f the demo ns tratio ns were to lerated if no t abetted by go vernment

agencies 213 The demo ns tratio ns so o n died do wn because to lerating them much lo nger wo uld have run the risk that they wo uld turninto anti-go vernment demo ns tratio ns Even the Chinese Academy o f So cial Sciences repo rted that so me demo ns trato rs who were

arres ted did no t even kno w where the Senkaku Is lands were and that anger o ver the widening wealth gap was behind their acts 214 Inco ntras t to these Chinese demo ns tratio ns and acts o f lawlessness there was hardly any public demo ns tratio n in Japan whichsho ws the relative detachment o f the Japanese fro m the dispute On 22 September `Nippo n Gambare` a right wing o rganizatio nchaired by fo rmer Air Self Defence Fo rce chief Tamo gami To shio s taged a march thro ugh parts o f To kyo which this autho rwitnessed A brief fire was s tarted at a Chinese scho o l in Ko be and two smo ke bo mbs were thro wn into the Chinese Co nsulate

General in Fukuo ka215 But such actio ns were relatively rare and small in s cale

ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND THE QUESTION OF WHO IS MORE DEPENDENT ON WHOM

Pro tes t measures o f a lo nger duratio n and as yet unpredictable co nsequences fo r the bilateral relatio nship have been China`seco no mic sanctio ns and a bo yco tt o f Japanese go o ds by the general public altho ugh the autho rities denied again any go vernmentinterventio n A co mmentary o f Xinhua half admitted ho wever go vernment interventio n when it made the unco nvincing dis tinctio nbetween `measures` and `sanctio ns` `Since Japan purchased Chinas Diao yu Is lands in September the Chinese go vernment hastaken a series o f co untermeasures in the eco no mic legal diplo matic and military fields which have helped it to wres t the initiativeto reso lve the is lands dispute despite China no t impo s ing any eco no mic sanctio ns the Japanese eco no my has been badly

hit`216 Renmin Ribao co mpared `eco no mic punishments` with a `gun` and warned that thro ugh its is land purchase Japan hadalready to uched the `trigger` In a rather heavy hint the paper po inted o ut ho w vulnerable Japan`s eco no my was because o f the

2011 earthquake and the dependence o f key eco no mic secto rs o n China217 Even mo re o fficial was Vice Minis ter o f Co mmerce Jiang

Zengwei`s warning that the is land purchase wo uld inevitably have a negative impact o n Sino -Japanese eco no mic and trade ties 218

After 11 September it so o n became very o bvio us that the heavy hand o f the Chinese go vernment was impo s ing sanctio ns andmaking life fo r Japanese bus iness mo re diff icult On 21 September it was repo rted that Chinese cus to ms autho rities were

s trengthening inspectio ns o f impo rts fro m and expo rts to Japan altho ugh the Chinese autho rities denied this 219 In the same week

repo rts appeared abo ut Japanese co mpanies experiencing delays in o btaining wo rking visas fo r their Japanese emplo yees 220 BigJapanese co mpanies with inves tments in China were experiencing ho ld-ups in gaining regulato ry appro vals fo r Merger amp

Acquis itio ns 221 In co ntras t to the interference in rare earth expo rts to Japan after the trawler incident in 2010 ho wever no such

embargo was implemented because this particular eco no mic weapo n had lo s t its effectiveness s ince then (see belo w)222

The greates t medium-term damage to Japanese eco no mic activities apart fro m the abo ve mentio ned des tructio n o f Japaneseco mmercial and indus trial s ites was caused by a partial co nsumer bo yco tt no tably the fall o f car sales in China and Chineseto urism to Japan Overall bilateral trade decreased by 39 per cent in 2012 to $329 billio n the firs t dro p s ince the co llapse o f theLehman inves tment bank in 2009 and in 2013 to $3125 billio n acco rding to Chinese figures Acco rding to Japanese figures trade in

2013 increased but declined in vo lume223

The wo rs t hit secto r was auto mo biles To yo ta so ld 840 500 vehicles in China in 2012 the firs t annual dro p s ince 2002 Nis san

experienced a 24 per cent dro p in December China sales and Ho nda saw a 19 per cent December fall224 Ho wever as o f 2014Japanese car sales in and to China have again been increas ing The to uris t indus try was also hard hit in bo th co untries Chinese

vis ito rs to Japan decreased by 44 per cent fro m September to December 2012 fro m the year befo re225 The number o f Japanese

to uris ts o n gro up to urs to China plunged by mo re than 70 per cent year-o n-year in the las t three mo nths o f 2012226 This fallco ntinued into 2013 when their number fell to 29 millio n Japanese to uris ts do wn 18 2 fro m 2012 and the 3rd s traight annual

decline227 Ho wever in March 2014 vis ito rs fro m mainland China surged 80 1 fro m the previo us March to to tal 184200 a reco rdhigh fo r the mo nth and a s teeper year-o n-year rise than vis ito rs fro m any o ther co untries and regio ns This was also helped by the

falling yen and the resumptio n o f cruise to urs with large ships which were to tally suspended in March 2012228

Ano ther mo re lo ng-term negative eco no mic effect o n the bilateral relatio nship can be gauged fro m falling Japanese FDI to Chinawhich acco rding to Chinese figures declined by 422 in the firs t five mo nths o f 2014 after having fallen by 43 to $71 billio n in

2013 acco rding to Chinese figures o r by 18 to $10 9 billio n acco rding to Japanese figures 229

China`s multiple eco no mic retributio ns cas t do ubt o n the co ntinued viability o f the earlier `Ho t Eco no mics and Co ld Po litics`dicho to my The answer to the ques tio n which co untry is mo re dependent o n the o ther o r mo re vulnerable to sanctio ns is dependento n the eco no mic indicato rs and secto rs being cho sen and is also a po litical ques tio n because the answer can be po liticallymanipulated Japan`s eco no mic diff iculties s ince the 1990s (and its dependence o n eco no mic interactio n with China to co pe withthese diff iculties ) and China pushing Japan to No 3 in wo rld GDP ranking has diminished the Chinese perceptio n o f Japan as aneco no mic po wer ho use It means that fo r China the relatio nship with Japan became less impo rtant while po litical relatio nsdeterio rated at the same time The s tro ng effect o f the Chinese embargo o n rare earth expo rts to Japan in 2010 can be viewed intwo diametrically o ppo sed ways Chinese o bservers may be inclined to put emphas is o n the s tro ng effect it had o n Japanese publico pinio n and indus trial circles co ntributing to a certain extent to the go vernment`s surrender o f the trawler captain Others maypo int o ut that the case demo ns trated the futility o f abus ing a do minant supplier po s itio n because within a sho rt time Japan`sindus try secured alternative reso urces and demand reductio n thro ugh recycling and pro duct re-engineering no t o nly pro videdeno ugh breathing space but in the end reduced China`s market po wer Still Chinese experts are co nvinced that Japan is no w mo redependent o n China than the o ther way ro und Acco rding to so me specialis ts Chinas impo rts acco unted in 2011fo r 237 per cent o fJapan`s expo rt vo lume The bilateral trade vo lume in 2011 to o k up 21 per cent o f Japanese gro ss trade vo lume o f that year while it

merely acco unted fo r 9 4 per cent o f Chinas annual gro ss trade vo lume230 There seem to be o nly few Chinese vo ices which expressco ncern o ver the negative impact o f China`s sanctio ns o n China`s eco no my itself no tably at a time o f wo rldwide eco no mic

co ntractio n231

The Chinese market is certainly to o impo rtant fo r many Japanese co mpanies to leave A survey in No vember 2012 to which mo rethan 10 000 Japanese co mpanies in China replied sho wed that fo r almo s t 30 per cent o f them the territo rial dispute had affected

their bus iness but s till mo re than half want to maintain their o peratio ns and o nly 16 per cent said that they wanted to either cut

back o r pull o ut232 Japanese co mpanies in certain secto rs are likely to beco me mo re reluctant to make inves tments in China all themo re as o ther So utheas t As ian co untries (no tably Myanmar is currently the New Fro ntier fo r Japanese bus iness ) have cheaper

labo ur co s ts 233 Ho wever Chinese co nsumers s till prefer Japanese pro ducts fo r safer fo o d drinks and daily necess ities and tho se

Japanese co mpanies were hardly affected by the bo yco tt234

A wide gap between bo th s ides` perceptio n abo ut their eco no mic dependence and vulnerability to sanctio ns is dangero us fo r themanagement o f their bilateral relatio nship particularly when o ne s ide tries to leverage its suppo sedly s tro nger po s itio n to achievevicto ry in a sens itive area like territo rial integrity While Chinese co mmentato rs and experts may be inclined to o verrate Japan`svulnerability their Japanese co unterparts have a tendency to lo o k at the is sues to o much in purely eco no mic terms neglecting theimpact o f Chinese emo tio ns and go vernment pro paganda as well as the wider public`s insufficient kno wledge abo ut the o verall

impact o f bad eco no mic relatio ns with Japan o n China`s o wn eco no my235 The Japanese perceptio n remains that China in the endneeds Japan mo re than the o ther way ro und which in view o f China`s huge pro blems and its dependence o n Japanese hightechno lo gy co mpo nents fo r its manufacturing indus try is arguably the case This Japanese perceptio n has fo s tered the co nvictio nas demo ns trated fo r example by the belief in the sus tainability o f `Ho t Eco no mics and Co ld Po litics` that despite recurring

po litical crises in the relatio nship China wo uld in the end co mpro mise as it had do ne several times in the pas t236 Yet the pro blemwith the perceptio n o f `needing Japan` is that it can be po litically manipulated particularly in an autho ritarian sys tem This gapbetween Japanese and Chinese o bservers and experts o n the is sue o f dependence can serio us ly influence the willingness o f bo th

s ides to co mpro mise237 It also challenges the liberal view that clo se eco no mic relatio ns can prevent o r at leas t so ften deeppo litical differences like territo rial co nflicts which mo reo ver are linked to eco no mic interes ts like hydro carbo n reso urces In thisco ntext it is interes ting to no te that China has recently been exchanging with Japan a number o f high-po wered bus iness delegatio ns(apart fro m exchanges with po litical parties and lo cal go vernment o fficials ) The willingness o f Japanese bus iness to take part maybe interpreted by China as an express io n o f Japan`s eco no mic dependence o n China while giving it also the o ppo rtunity to putpressure o n the Abe go vernment to make co ncess io ns and to keep links with Japan fo r the po s t-Abe era

In view o f the impo rtance o f the eco no mic relatio nship and the damage suffered by Japanese bus iness after September 2012 o newo uld have expected mo re pressure fro m the bus iness co mmunity to co me to a territo rial co mpro mise so lutio n and so impro verelatio ns Ho wever this has no t been the case and may have to do with the perceptio n gap dis cussed abo ve but also the relativelack o f influence o n the go vernment (the majo rity o f the China-relevant Japanese bus iness co mmunity co ns is ts o f small- andmedium-s ized co mpanies ) the fear that a mo re vo cal ro le wo uld get co mpanies into tro uble with the autho rities in Japan ando rChina o r the ho pe o f being able to weather the po litical s to rms either because o f alternative market o ppo rtunities o r theco mpany`s s ize

FROM POLICING TO MILITARY INVOLVEMENT

The mo s t serio us co nsequences fo r the bilateral relatio nship ndash let alo ne fo r the so lutio n o f the territo rial dispute and regio nalpeace ndash arise fro m the co ns tant intrus io ns o f Chinese o fficial vessels into the Co ntiguo us Zo ne (CZ) o r even Territo rial Waters(TW) o f the Senkaku Is lands s ince September 2012 and the gro wing invo lvement o f the armed fo rces o f bo th s ides The aim o f theChinese is o bvio us to demo ns trate that the Japanese can no lo nger claim exclus ive co ntro l o f the is lands and to fo rce To kyo toadmit the exis tence o f a territo rial dispute Apparently a task fo rce at the highes t level headed by Xi Jinping was set up in

September 2012 to achieve this go al thro ugh escalating pressure238 So far law enfo rcement actio ns by Japan in the Senkaku areahave been limited to the deplo yment o f the Japanese Co as t Guard and po lice which is no w ho wever co ns tantly challenged byChinese with patro ls by CMS and FLEC (s ince 22 July 2013 unified under the State Ocean Adminis tratio n and renamed China Co as tGuard CG) vessels asserting the same rights in the is lands` CZ and TW The Chinese s ide escalated its pressure o n Japan by firs tdeplo ying FLEC vessels in the CZ and TW o f the disputed is lands then ratcheting up their pressure with CMS vessels do ing the samefo llo wed later in December 2012 with air patro ls by CMS aircraft which led to the deplo yment o f the air fo rce o f bo th s ides inJanuary 2013

As we have seen after the September 2010 incident in No vember 2010 FLEC s tarted to regularly send its vessels to the Senkakuarea which entered fro m time to time the is lands` CZ and also in Augus t 2011 twice the TW Apparently the mo re serio usintrus io ns which are tho se into the TW were so metimes timed with specific spikes o f tens io ns such as the TW incurs io n o n 16March 2012 (the Japanese naming o f so me is lands) July 2012 (No da`s anno uncement o f purchase intentio n o n 7 July) and finallyo n 19 September when s ix vessels entered the TW s tarting a series o f mo re frequent and regular incurs io ns In December 2012

FLEC deplo yed its newes t and bigges t ship the 5800-to n FLEC vessel Yuzheng 206 a fo rmer ship o f the Chinese navy239

The entries o f the vessels o f the CMS into the is lands` CZ and TW seem meant to send an even higher degree o f warning and denialo f Japan`s co ntro l o ver the is lands On 17 September the number o f FLEC and CMS vessels in the CZ and TW had reached the reco rd

o f 17240 Thereafter the frequency o f incurs io ns into the CZ and TW increased but it decreased after March 2013 On 30 Octo berXinhua even repo rted that the CMS had `expelled a number o f Japanese vessels illegally sailing in waters aro und the Diao yu

Is lands` altho ugh it is no t clear what exactly this meant s ince the CG did no t co nfirm such an incident241 Acco rding to Xinhua NewsAgency in 2013 China sent 50 ldquopatro l miss io ns rdquo into the TW o f the disputed is lands and as o f 12 July 2014 by the autho r`s co unt

there had been 17 such Chinese ldquopatro l miss io ns rdquo in 2014 which are ldquoincurs io ns rdquo fo r the Japanese s ide242 Other needle pricks todemo ns trate China`s claims are the o ccas io nal incurs io ns o f Chinese survey ships into the Senkaku Is lands` EEZ o r the bo ardingo f Chinese fishing vessels in the EEZ Defence Minis ter Itsuno ri Ono dera in late Octo ber 2013 called these repeated incurs io ns a

threat to peace which fell in a ldquogray zo ne (between) peacetime and an emergency s ituatio nrdquo243

A new level o f depriving Japan o f the ability to claim so le effective co ntro l o ver the is lands was reached o n 13 December 2012 when

a small turbo pro p aircraft o f the CMS (Harbin Y12 type) flew o ver Uo tsurijima244 Since then regular CMS air patro ls have beenco nducted but the aircraft no rmally s tay abo ut 120 km fro m the is lands With this mo ve Chinese measures to undermine Japan`sco ntro l o ver the is lands were expanded to the air space which fo r o rganizatio nal reaso ns had immediately military implicatio nsbecause the Air Self Defense Fo rce (ASDF) is respo ns ible fo r intercepting aircraft which intrude illegally into Japan`s air space The

incident did no t happen o ut o f the blue because already in January 2012 the SOA had anno unced a plan to deplo y the Y12 in 2012245

On 24 September the SOA had also anno unced plans to deplo y dro nes by 2015 fo llo wing the success ful tes t the previo us day 246

The Chinese acts are apparently carefully planned and co o rdinated s ince the o fficials in the abo ve Kyo do repo rt also said that theairspace vio latio ns o n 13 December 2012 by an airplane o f the CMS was planned by the s taff sectio n o f the natio nal Land and SeaBo rder Defense Co mmittee which acts as a liaiso n o ffice fo r the Chinese military the State Oceanic Adminis tratio n and the fishing

bureau o f the Agriculture Minis try with the aim o f rais ing tens io ns 247

The lo w altitude flight o f the Y12 o n 13 December was particularly upsetting fo r the Japanese go vernment because it was no t pickedup by the ASDF radar (the clo ses t o ne being o n Miyako jima abo ut 200 km fro m the is lands) but ins tead by CG ships in the area Inthis case eight ASDF fighters s crambled but co uld no t detect the Y12 Interceptio n o f aircraft is by nature much mo re diff icult andcarries a certain risk o f accident as happened in 2001 when a US intelligence aircraft co llided with a Chinese intercepto r jet Witho ut

explaining the s tandard Japanese pro ceedures fo r aerial defence which so lely relies o n the ASDF the Chinese media interpreted theuse o f military aircraft by Japan as `aggress ive` and the Global Times cautio ned agains t any interceptio n warning that China might

respo nd by sending its air fo rce248 On the Japanese s ide even the centre-left Asahi Shimbun called the Y12 flight ` a highly

pro vo cative act that co uld lead to an armed co nflict between the two co untries`249 At the beginning o f January 2013 there wereapparently erro neo us repo rts that the ASDF might co ns ider firing warning sho ts (tracer bullets ) at intruding Chinese aircraft which

pro mpted further bellico se co mments in the Chinese press 250 As a co nsequence the Chinese air fo rce also became invo lved o n10 January when the Chinese Minis try o f Defence anno unced that the Peo ple`s Liberatio n Army Air Fo rce (PLAA) had sent two fighterjets agains t two ASDF F-15 intercepto rs because they were fo llo wing a Chinese military Y8 transpo rt aircraft patro lling the airspace

o f Chinese o il platfo rms in the Eas t China Sea251 The Japanese repo rted that mo re than ten Chinese aircraft including military

aircraft had appro ached the Japanese air defence identificatio n zo ne252 In a further escalatio n the Japanese s ide repo rted that o n11 June 2014 two Chinese military jets flew abno rmally clo se to two planes o f Japans Self Defence Fo rce abo ve the Eas t China Sea

an accusatio n which the Chinese s ide refuted speaking ins tead o f two incidents pro vo ked by Japanese fighters 253 Related to thisdevelo pment and further enhancing the po ss ibility o f an incident is the enhanced patro lling o f the PLAA o ver the Eas t China Seawhich caused the ASDF to increase scrambling agains t PLAA aircraft to 415 times between 1 April 2013 and 31 March 2014 (Fis cal

Year 2013) 109 times mo re than in the previo us Fis cal Year 2012254

Co ntinuing to increase the pressure o n Japan the Chinese go vernment decreed o n 23 No vember 2013 an Air Defence Identificatio nZo ne (ADIZ) which includes the airspace o ver the Senkaku Is lands and was certainly meant to reinfo rce China`s territo rial claimdespite the fact that an ADIZ has no territo rial implicatio ns in internatio nal law The threat o f military co untermeasures in the text o fthe decree (lsquoChinas armed fo rces will ado pt defens ive emergency measures to respo nd to aircraft that do no t co o perate in the

identificatio n o r refuse to fo llo w the ins tructio ns rsquo) has further heightened the po ss ibility o f a military clash255 Ho wever theJapanese s ide refuses to accept the ADIZ The Chinese mo ves have wider implicatio ns fo r peace and s tability in the regio n in o rderto pro tect the freedo m o f its military aircraft in Eas t As ian airspace and its ability to o bserve China`s military fo rces Washingto nrefused to reco gnise the zo ne co ntinued to igno re the requirements o f the ADIZ by pursuing its regular patro l f lights and criticisedits implementatio n Simultaneo us ly ho wever the Department o f State advised civilian airlines to fo llo w China`s ins tructio ns andVice Pres ident Biden advised bo th co untries o n his trip to No rtheas t As ia in December 2013 to es tablish a cris is managements tructure Since the US do es no t take a s tance o n the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands` so vereignty Washingto n seemed to igno re Japan`smain grievance abo ut the ADIZ which is China`s intentio n to further reinfo rce its so vereignty claim by extending the ADIZ o ver theis lands The mo s t far-reaching US s tatements were a reco nfirmatio n o f the applicatio n o f the security treaty to the is lands evenmentio ning the is lands by their Japanese and Chinese names and co mplaining that the Chinese actio n was an attempt to unilaterally

change the status quo in the Eas t China Sea which raised regio nal tens io n and increased the risk o f accident and miscalculatio n256

Ho wever in this way the Obama Adminis tratio n risked creating amo ng so me Japanese o bservers do ubts abo ut the Adminis tratio n`sreliability and so gave succo ur to China`s attempt to drive a wedge between the two allies Ano ther co mplicatio n is that the ChineseADIZ o verlaps that o f Ko rea and mo reo ver co vers the submerged ro ck called Ieo do in Ko rean and Suyan in Chinese which has animpact o n the no t yet demarcated EEZ bo rder between bo th co untries Interes tingly the Japanese ADIZ also co vers Ieo do but thishas never been underpinned by any Japanese EEZ claims But China kno ws ho w to play o n So uth Ko rea`s criticism o f Japan`sattitude to wards the his to ry is sue and the territo rial dispute with Japan o ver Do kto Takeshima is land Mo reo ver the As ian co untriesco ntes ting China`s claims to parts o f the So uth China Sea are co ncerned that China wo uld further co mplicate the territo rialdisputes in the area by es tablishing an ADIZ Yet the ASEAN member s tates have been very cautio us in directly criticis ing ChinaChina`s es tablishment o f the ADIZ directly affects many co untries because so many o f them have airlines flying thro ugh the zo neHo wever with the exceptio n o f Japan all o thers agred to co nfo rm with China`s reques t fo r no tif icatio n which undermines theJapanese go vernment`s po s itio n o f explicitly advis ing Japanese airlines no t to co nfo rm

With these escalating develo pments the Chinese s ide achieved its go al o f sho wing that the Japanese autho rities are no lo nger infull co ntro l o f the disputed is lands In the case o f Chinese Co as tguard vessel intrus io ns the reactio n o f the Japanese CG is limitedto shado wing the Chinese vessels to info rm them that they are vio lating Japan`s CZ o r TW and to ask them to leave whichho wever they do at their o wn dis cretio n (the time span ho vering in the CZ o r TW having beco me a further means o f Chinesepressure) fo llo wed by diplo matic pro tes ts Otherwise the CG has avo ided any phys ical co nfro ntatio n o r co ntact When co nfro ntedby the CG the Chinese vessels s imply declare (by radio o r even electro nic displays ) that they are patro lling Chinese waters and thatthe CG ships were o perating illegally in these waters This ritual has so far prevented vio lence This is in co ntras t to an exchange o fwater canno n salvo s between the CG and the Taiwanese co as t guard in the territo rial o f the Senkaku Is lands o n 25 September 2012

and again o n 24 January 2013257

The increase o f patro ls by Japan and China is caus ing o peratio nal s train fo r bo th s ides (also rais ing the risk o f miscalculatio ns o ro verreactio ns ) but this has no t reduced the willingness o f either go vernment to s cale do wn the almo s t daily demo ns tratio ns o f

`effective co ntro l` In Octo ber it was repo rted that the CG no w always maintains ten vessels agains t eight fro m China258 The 11th

regio nal headquarters respo ns ible fo r the Senkaku area is in Naha and has nine patro l ships (but o nly seven vessels o f at leas t

1000 to ns ) but no w needs additio nal ships which are dispatched fro m o ther regio nal headquarters 259 In April 2012 the CG had ato tal o f 357 patro l vessels but o nly 51 o ver 1000 to ns which are tho se mo s t needed fo r a far flung area like the Senkaku

Is lands 26 0 On 14 September 2012 Senio r Vice Minis ter o f Fisheries Iwamo to Tsukasa mentio ned plans to increase the number o f

fishery patro l vessels to ensure fishermens safety amid intens ifying territo rial disputes with China and So uth Ko rea26 1 On 26Octo ber the Minis try o f Land Infras tructure Transpo rt and To urism which heads the CG anno unced plans to increase budgetary

reques ts fo r mo re ships 26 2 The Abe go vernment plans to build mo re vessels o r advance the calendar retro fit vessels which were to

be retired and is co ns idering extending the retirement age o f the o fficers 26 3

The Chinese have fewer vessels which can be deplo yed as far as the Senkaku Is lands In additio n leave o f the sailo rs has been

res tricted and their deplo yment length at sea has increased26 4 In March 2013 the Chinese s ide anno unced clo ser co o peratio nbetween the military and vario us maritime law enfo rcement agencies as well as the merger o f fo ur maritime law enfo rcementagencies under the State Ocean Adminis tratio n (adminis tered by the Minis try o f Land and Reso urces ) ie the China MarineSurveillance the co as t guard fo rces o f the Public Security Minis try the fisheries law enfo rcement co mmand o f the Agriculture

Minis try and the maritime anti-smuggling po lice o f the General Adminis tratio n o f Cus to ms 26 5

Ano ther wo rrying develo pment is the gradual invo lvement o f the PLA navy (PLAN) and the Maritime Self Defence Fo rce (MSDF) TheJapanese MOD anno unced o n 16 Octo ber 2012 that fo r the firs t time PLAN ships were o bserved navigating in the 22-km-wide CZbetween Yo naguni and Irio mo te is lands altho ugh the minis try left o pen the po ss ibility that they did so in o rder to avo id a typho o n

Nevertheless the Gaimusho so ught explanatio ns fro m the Chinese abo ut these ship mo vements 26 6 In December 2012 fo ur PLANships sailed thro ugh the CW o f the Irio mo te-Yo naguni is lands o n the way back fro m drills in the Pacific after having go ne into the

Pacific thro ugh the mo re no rmal ro ute o f the s trait between the Okinawan main is land and Miyako jima26 7 Again there was no thingillegal abo ut it but it raised attentio n at a time o f tens io ns Ho wever there are s igns o f greater co o peratio n o f the PLAN withChinese Co as t Guard vessels as was sho wn in the s tando ff between China and the Philippines aro und the disputed Scarbo ro ugh

Sho al in the So uth China Sea and jo int exercises to o k place between the three in the Eas t China Sea in Octo ber 201226 8 The

patro lling activities o f the MSDF in the Senkaku area became kno wn when the Japanese repo rted at the end o f January 2013 that o n19 January a Chinese frigatersquos target radar had lo cked o nto an MSDF helico pter and o n 30 January ano ther frigate sailing clo se to

an MSDF des tro yer did likewise The Chinese vehemently denied it26 9 Ho wever in March this year the Kyo do news agency repo rtedthat senio r Chinese military o fficials had admitted the incident o f 29 January Even mo re wo rriso me is that the Chinese vessels

acted apparently witho ut prio r appro val fro m the fleet co mmand o r navy headquarters All this was denied by the Chinese s ide270 Itdid no t help that under Prime Minis ter No da the MSDF had been o rdered after the eruptio n o f the 2012 cris is to keep a greaterdis tance fro m PLAN ships than the hitherto 3 km in o rder avo id incidents but this po licy was reversed by the mo re hawkish Abe

adminis tratio n to the previo us 3 km dis tance271 The fire radar lo cking incident had happened at a dis tance o f 3 km

Agains t the backgro und o f greater invo lvement o f military fo rces it is particularly regrettable that a plan to build a maritime liaiso n

mechanism between their defense autho rities o n which they had agreed in June 2012 to make later that year was shelved272

Unfo rtunately it is s till Chinese practice to co ns ider Co nfidence Building Measures (CBM) no t as the firs t s tep to build co nfidencebut as a to o l to extract fro m the o ther s ide prio r co ncess io ns under the pretext o f `creating a better atmo sphere` fo r dis cuss ingCBM The o utbreak o f the September 2012 cris is was therefo re a co nvenient pretext fo r the Chinese to cancel the pro ject Thelates t co nfirmatio n was in March 2013 when General Yin Zhuo explained that there co uld be no military trus t if the po litical and

diplo matic relatio nship is bad273 Since the target radar lo ck-o n incidents the Japanese go vernment is publicly calling fo rresumptio n o f nego tiatio ns fo r the maritime liaiso n mechanism but the Chinese will certainly want to extract so me co ncess io nsbefo re even co ns idering a po s itive respo nse

Ho wever the co ns tant co nfro ntatio n between the po licing and military fo rces o f bo th s ides co uld eas ily lead to a military clasheither as a result o f an unfo reseen civilian o r military incident miscalculatio n o r malicio us intentio n at a lo wer level o f co mmandTwo recent examples o f unfo reseen civilian incidents co uld have escalated One is the attempted landing o n o ne o f the disputedis lands by a Chinese pro tes ter with a ballo o n in January 2014 This incident was peacefully reso lved because Japan did no t arres t theballo o nis t In this case the firs t repo rt o n the crash-landing in the territo rial waters o f Uo tsurijima came fro m the Taiwanese co as tguard which info rmed the Japanese co as t guard fo llo wed by the hand-o ver o f the ballo o nis t to the PRC autho rities o uts ide o f

Japan`s territo rial waters 274 The o ther incident was the s inking o f a Chinese fishing bo at ldquoto the no rth o f the Diao yu Is landsrdquo and

the mo ve o f two Chinese naval () vessels to rescue the crew275 This autho r co uld no t find o ut ho w clo se the fishing bo at came tothe is lands and apparently there has no t been any further repo rting abo ut the incident

The previo us ly mentio ned radar-targeting incidents and these two civilian incidents have no t led to an escalatio n but there is noguarantee fo r the future Shi Yinho ng a pro fesso r at Renmin Univers ity predicts that the territo rial co nflicts in the ECS So uth ChinaSea and alo ng the Sino -Indian bo rder will intens ify because o f po pular natio nalism dynamics within the armed fo rces and o f co urse

also o ur to p leaders perso nal beliefs and s trategic perso nalities 276 Hugh White argues that a war (which co uld lead to a nuclearexchange between China and the US) co uld also begin because the Chinese leadership may co ns ider that s tarting ho s tilities no wrather than later wo uld be mo re beneficial to either tes t US reso lve to defend Japan (which the Chinese leadership do ubts ) anddetermine the is sue o f Chinese supremacy in the As ian regio n which he co ns iders to be the real is sue rather than the is lands

themselves 277

IS THERE A WAY FORWARD

The current co nfro ntatio n is no t o nly co ntinuing but even escalating and do mes tic develo pments in bo th co untries are no t creatingan atmo sphere mo re co nducive to better management o f the cris is let alo ne finding a so lutio n Inactio n runs the risk o f a furtherescalatio n o r even a military clash while po s itive o ptio ns are beco ming fewer Meanwhile bo th co untries suffer fro m the eco no micfall-o ut and heightened tens io ns while the integratio n o f a ris ing China into a new s trategic enviro nment in As ia will beco me evenmo re fraught cas ting a shado w o n Japan`s clo se relatio nship with the US

The 2010 incident ended quickly with Japan`s release o f the captain One reaso n fo r this is certainly the fact that China`s demand in2010 was relatively clear and achievable (release o f the captain) if painful fo r Japan at a time o f a weak and inexperiencedgo vernment This time in September 2012 the cris is firs t hit a go vernment which reacted intrans igently because o f its previo usdefeat and o ther unfavo urable do mes tic circumstances and was then replaced by the mo re hawkish Abe go vernment The Abecabinet`s attitude to wards the pas t as exemplif ied by vario us s tatements by cabinet members and peo ple clo se to it the attempt torevise the Ko no s tatement reco gniz ing the fo rced war pro s titutio n (the military co mfo rt wo men) and Abe`s Yasukuni Shrine vis itall served China`s anti-Japan pro paganda wo rsened Japan-Ko rea relatio ns which China is cleverly explo iting and even angered theUS adminis tratio n Abe is seen as utiliz ing the tens io ns with China to win do mes tic and internatio nal suppo rt fo r Japan to have aldquono rmalrdquo natio nal defence po s ture The latter is welco me by the US adminis tratio n because it wo uld help with the US As ianrealignment and suppo rt its China po licy At the same time China`s actio ns cas t an o mino us shado w o n its intentio ns in the So uthChina Sea and Abe and mo re impo rtantly the US is suppo rting the claimants there agains t China

Under these bilateral multilateral and regio nal circumstances wo uld China be satis fied with go ing back to the `unders tanding abo utsetting as ide the dispute` in co njunctio n with Japan`s reco gnitio n o f the exis tence o f a territo rial dispute o r wo uld it demand areversal o f the purchase o f the three is lands Wo uld it demand the end o f Japanese CG patro ls aro und the is lands China`ss tandard demand no w that Japan `co rrect its mis takes` is rather ambiguo us because it co uld be interpreted as go ing back to theshelving unders tanding and the reco gnitio n o f the exis tence o f a dispute o r demanding a reversal o f the go vernment`s purchase o f

the is lands 278 The latter wo uld s imply be impo ss ible in legal and practical terms and o ne can o nly ho pe that the ambiguity is o nlyaimed at rais ing China`s nego tiatio n po s itio n ando r leaving eno ugh wiggle ro o m fo r nego tiatio ns which wo uld satis fy all Chineses takeho lders` interes ts

It seems that it is already to o late fo r go ing back to the shelving agreement o f 19721978 which wo uld imply that the two s ides canso meho w go back to the status quo o f the 1970s This as we have seen has been superseded by deeds and wo rds o n bo th s ides The Chinese have no w no t o nly publicly declared that the shelving agreement was lsquobro kenrsquo by Japan but after the firs t Y12 patro l o n13 December 2012 co mmented that ldquoThe s ituatio n has changed It has beco me no rmal fo r Chinas marine surveillance vessels to

enter the 12-nautical-mile zo ne Japans actual co ntro l o ver the is lands has go nerdquo279

The bilateral relatio nship has deterio rated to the extent that at leas t shelving the co nflicting so vereignty claims without o fficiallyadmitting that there is a territo rial dispute is no lo nger an o ptio n acceptable to China because it feels Japan has abused theshelving co nsensus thro ugh a series o f adminis trative measures with the final s traw having been the central go vernmentrsquos purchaseo f three is lands When s tudying the vario us Chinese o fficial s tatements and news repo rts after the 2012 cris is had fully erupted inSeptember it beco mes clear that until Octo ber 2012 the Chinese s till raised the demand that Japan sho uld go back to the previo uslsquounders tandingrsquo o r lsquoco nsensus rsquo but this demand was no t made o ften thereafter It reappeared in remarks by Wang Jiarui the head o fthe Co mmunis t partys Internatio nal Department when meeting Yamaguchi Natsuo the leader o f the junio r co alitio n partner

Ko meito in January 201328 0 Previo us ly a co mment o n the Xinhua internet s ite o n 29 Octo ber said that ldquoThe lsquopurchasersquo sho wed thatthe Japanese go vernment has who lly abando ned the attitude o f laying as ide disputes and has fundamentally changed the

s ituatio nrdquo28 1 On 30 Octo ber the CMOFA spo kesperso n declared that lsquoJapans illegal purchase o f the Diao yu Is lands bro ke the

impo rtant co nsensus The Japanese s ide sho uld no t have any mo re illus io n o f o ccupying the Diao yu Is lands What the Japaneses ide sho uld do is to face up to the reality admit the so vereignty dispute co rrect mis takes and co me back to the track o f a

nego tiated settlement`28 2 The lates t o fficial pro po sal to shelve the is lands is sue was made by the fo rmer fo reign minis ter Tang

Jiaxuan o n 16 July 201428 3

The reco gnitio n o f a territo rial pro blem wo uld be relatively easy fo r Japanese public o pinio n (and even mo re so fo r Japanrsquos friendsand allies ) to accept because they wo uld no t see the need fo r any kind o f diplo matic o r legal so phis try fo r what is o bvio us ly aterrito rial co nflict whatever the legitimacy o f the Chinese claim might be given also the fact that the current Japanese po s itio nco mes do wn to refus ing to even dis cuss whatever settlement might be po ss ible Acco rding to a survey co nducted by Genro nto gether with Zho ngguo Ribao she in June 2012 627 per cent o f Japanese agreed that there exis ts a territo rial pro blem dispute

(176 disagreed) co mpared with 822 o f the Chinese (139 disagreed)28 4 Ho wever co nsecutive Japanese cabinets haverefused to reco gnise the exis tence o f a territo rial dispute which is o ften the default po s itio n o f a go vernment in actual co ntro l o f adisputed territo ry (fo r example the Ko rean go vernmentrsquos po s itio n o n Do kto Takeshima) This po s itio n has been reinfo rced by theexplicit Japanese denial s ince the 1990s o f a shelving agreement which wo uld have been an implicit admiss io n that there is adispute To circumvent the risk o f being perceived as admitting the exis tence o f a territo rial pro blem the deputy prime minis ter o fthe previo us No da go vernment Okada Katsuya was repo rted to have mentio ned in a speech in Octo ber 2012 that there was no

territo rial dispute but as a matter o f fact a debate exis ted28 5 Ho wever this co mpro mise so lutio n was never co nfirmed by the No dago vernment and did no t beco me po licy It is even less likely to be acceptable to the new Abe go vernment Even amo ng influentialo pinio n makers there is hardly any suppo rt fo r admitting the exis tence o f a territo rial co nflict o r o f a shelving agreement Even mo reco nciliato ry s tatements o n this subject are rather vague Maehara Seiji o f the Demo cratic Party declared in a co nference at QinghuaUnivers ity in Beijing in September 2013 that the Japanese go vernment sho uld add (to its o wn po s itio n) that China has a differentview (Senkakusho to wo meguru Niho n seifu no tachiba ni tsuite lsquoChugo ku ga chigau kangaekata wo mo tte iru to iuko to wo ichigen

tsukekuwaerubeki darsquo) At the same time he emphas ised ho wever that there was no territo rial dispute28 6 Japan Bus inessFederatio n Chairman Yo nekura Hiro masa mentio ned in September 2012 in an NHK interview that the go vernment sho uld be mo re

flexible s ince o therwise its s tance co uld be taken to mean that Japan has no intentio n o f so lving the dispute28 7 Miyamo to Yuji thefo rmer Japanese ambassado r to China is quo ted as saying that lsquoThe go vernment do es no t need to alter its bas ic po s itio n but in

reality a co nflict do es exis t o ver the Senkaku is les rsquo 28 8 This is also the s tance which the previo us Japanese ambassado r Niwa

Uichiro takes in an article after his return to Japan28 9

Co ncerning co nflict reso lutio n it is interes ting to no te that when asked abo ut the mo dern s ignificance o f the 1978 Japan-ChinaPeace and Friendship Treaty 68 4 o f the po lled Japanese agreed with Art 12 (lsquoThe two parties shall settle all disputes by peacefulmeans and shall refrain fro m the use o r threat o f fo rcersquo) but o nly 525 o f the Chinese agreed Mo reo ver 58 1 o f the Chinese

favo ur China s trengthening its co ntro l o ver the area29 0

If therefo re a new ldquoimplicit unders tandingrdquo abo ut shelving the dispute is achievable it wo uld have to be based o n learning fro m thefailures o f the 19721978 shelving ie it wo uld be necessary to achieve a mutual unders tanding o f what the s tatus quo is whatwo uld undermine the s tatus quo and what has to be do ne to mo ve fro m co nflict management to so lutio n Quite clearly such a newunders tanding wo uld be less favo urable to Japan`s current s tance o n the dispute

FROM CONFLICT MANAGEMENT TO ADDRESSING THE SOVEREIGNTY ISSUE

Any mo ve fo rward will certainly require decis ive leadership o n bo th s ides be it to take the initiative o r to respo nd po s itively to theinitiative o f s tarting the pro cess to wards reso lutio n In view o f the co mplex backgro und o f the external and internal dynamics it iso bvio us that address ing the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands dispute requires a s tep-by-s tep appro ach The ultimate is sue to address is theso vereignty is sue and territo rial disputes are generally viewed as zero sum in nature given their clo se link to co re securityinteres ts Even tho se who reco gnize the impo rtance o f transcending such lo gic in favo ur o f co ndo minium o r shared so vereigntygenerally ho ld that the is sue can o nly be addressed at the las t s tage o f any nego tiated pro cess if at all

Two impo rtant is sues have to be co ns idered at the beginning to what extent have the vario us s tages o f the nego tiating pro cess tobe agreed befo rehand (lsquoro ad maprsquo) o r even the final o utco me whether a viable co ndo minium o r o nly shelving the is sues and co uldthe ro le o f a third party mediato r be helpfulacceptable In view o f the po litical diff iculties o n bo th s ides the s tart o f thenego tiatio n pro cess wo uld be endangered if there is no t sufficient ro o m fo r ambiguity and interpretatio n abo ut the vario us s tages altho ugh the general aim o f tens io n reductio n and suspens io n o f the so vereignty is sue mus t be clearly agreed

A third party mediato r is pro bably no t acceptable to the Chinese s ide The third party mo s t o ften mentio ned is the Internatio nalCo urt o f Jus tice (ICJ) o r any kind o f internatio nal arbitratio n Ho wever this seems unlikely in view o f China`s preference fo rbilateral nego tiatio ns and its refusal to accept judicial settlement by the ICJ o r any internatio nal arbitratio n except in no n-po litical

areas such as trade29 1 The Japanese go vernment wo uld be willing to accept the jurisdictio n o f the ICJ but o nly if China brings the

case to the Co urt les t it be perceived as ackno wledging the exis tence o f a territo rial dispute29 2 But there are also po litical andpro cedural arguments agains t the reco urse to the ICJ China`s legal argumentatio n is co mparatively weak and s ince a negativejudgement co uld have implicatio ns fo r China`s legal claim to mo s t o f the So uth China Sea there is even less o f a chance o f Chinamaking an exceptio n fo r the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands dispute In view o f the entrenched po s itio ns o f bo th s ides and the risk o f a`winner takes all` o utco me o f internatio nal litigatio n bo th go vernments wo uld face co ns iderable do mes tic res is tance in case o f anegative o utco me In view o f the urgency o f the dispute and the lo ng time it takes fo r a judgement there wo uld also be the risk o fdo mes tic fo rces trying to pre-empt a negative result

In view o f the security is sues invo lved (let alo ne the American his to rical `debt` as a result o f Washingto n`s ambiguity related toWashingto n`s ending o f the adminis tratio n o f Okinawa in 1972) an American mediatio n co uld be seen as natural and even inAmerican interes ts Such an American ro le ho wever is extremely unlikely as it wo uld be seen by China as unduly advantageo us toJapan Ho wever at so me po int during the Japan-China nego tiatio n pro cess the US might ass is t (o r even be reques ted) by agreeingto certain Co nfidence and Security Building Measures (CSBM) in the area aro und the is lands

The firs t s tage wo uld have to co ns is t o f measures which reduce the risk o f a military clash but in a way which prevents theperceptio n that o ne s ide is giving in to co ercio n This s tage wo uld be a gradual phas ing o ut o f intrus io ns by Chinese o fficial vesselsand aircraft into the territo rial waters co ntiguo us zo ne and airspace o f the is lands which is recipro cated by Japanrsquos reducing in thesame way its co as tguard patro ls in the two zo nes as well as its s crambling activities in the is lands` airspace There were repo rts in

June 2013 that China called o n Japan to agree to a 12-nautical-mile no -entry zo ne aro und the is lands 29 3 Japan rejected this co urse

Ano ther measure wo uld be to increase the dis tance at which vessels o f bo th maritime fo rces o bserve each o ther Such s teps sho uldultimately be o fficialised by a gradually expanding series o f CSBMs and a bilateral liaiso n mechanism This co uld also include ademilitarisatio n agreement as an incentive fo r the Chinese s ide It wo uld be vital that the s teps at this s tage be incremental that nos tep is explo ited in a o ne-s ided way and that they are co ns idered irrevers ible At the same time bo th s ides have to prevent peo plefro m appro aching the is lands s ince this wo uld be seen as a pro vo catio n by the o ther s ide This latter task is technically no t easy

because o f the co ntro vers ial character o f any co mpro mise with certain no n-s tate acto rs in Japan China Ho ng Ko ng and Taiwan The(failed) landing o f a Chinese ho t ballo o n o n o ne o f the is lands in January 2014 demo ns trated at the same time the technical

diff iculty o f a no -entry po licy as well as the po ss ibility o f a success ful co o peratio n o f the co as tguards o f all three co untries 29 4

At this firs t s tage o r leading to the next there will have to be a Japanese go vernment s tatement to the effect that there is alsquopro blemrsquo related to the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands This can be wo rded in such a way that the sens itive express io n `territo rialpro blem` (which is s trenuo us ly denied by the go vernment) is avo ided and it can be supplemented by a sentence that such as tatement in no way prejudices the legal po s itio n o f the go vernment Such a qualifying s tatement is fo r example included in the

Japan-China agreement fo r prio r no tif icatio n o f research vessels fro m bo th co untries in the Eas t China Sea in 200029 5 A s imilarqualif icatio n is part o f the 1997 Japan-China Fisheries Agreement In the jo int co mmuniqueacute o f 1972 which no rmalised diplo maticrelatio ns between Japan and China diplo matic wo rding also managed to bridge the huge gap between their s tances o n Taiwan whichthe PRC co ns iders an lsquoinalienable partrsquo o f its territo ry Japan co ns iders the so vereignty is sue s till unreso lved because the 1951 SanFrancis co Peace Treaty Art 2 (b) o nly s tipulated that lsquoJapan reno unces all right title and claim to Fo rmo sa and the Pescado res rsquowitho ut clarifying the recipient o f the territo ry The co mpro mise in 1972 was reached with the sentence that Japan lsquofully unders tandsand respects this s tand o f the Go vernment o f the Peo ples Republic o f China and it f irmly maintains its s tand under Article 8 o f thePo tsdam Pro clamatio nrsquo

POSSIBLE APPROACHES TO THE SOVEREIGNTY ISSUE

The mo s t diff icult pro blem is the so vereignty is sue which go es to the co re o f any co untry`s security interes ts It is no t imaginablethat either s ide will reno unce its claim to the is lands Sides tepping o r shelving the is sue is o nly useful if the lesso ns fro m the 1972and 1978 attempts as o utlined abo ve can be learned and applied but there is s till the fundamental pro blem with the implicitassumptio n that the quality o f the bilateral relatio nship will always be as go o d as when the s ides tepping agreement was achievedand can be maintained in perpetuity o r until the so vereignty is sue can be addressed But in o rder to so lve the so vereignty is sue aneven better relatio nship has to be created This better relatio nship co uld be bro ught abo ut by the s teps explained abo ve and furtherbelo w

An impo rtant co nditio n fo r any las ting territo rial co mpro mise wo uld be reducing the value o f the is lands fo r bo th co untries whichcan be achieved by o ne o f the measures pro po sed fo r s tage 1 ie reso lutely preventing anyo ne fro m appro aching the territo ries(including to tal demilitarizatio n) which in themselves are eco no mically wo rthless and are uninhabited The main po int is to preventany go vernmental act which co uld be interpreted as being part o f the `so vereignty game` The mo s t diff icult part here is to preventany act by no n-go vernmental acto rs This wo uld have to include the territo rial waters and the explo itatio n there in o f any kind o freso urces including fishing Scientif ic interes ts in the is lands co uld be served by bilateral surveys witho ut any po litical co nno tatio ns

There have been pro po sals to declare the is lands an Internatio nal Nature and Wildlife Preserve29 6 Such a preserve wo uld have to beadminis tered either bilaterally o r by a relevant internatio nal o rganisatio n and as such co uld serve as a co nfidence-building measure

The abo ve s teps wo uld then allo w the two s ides to deal with the co ns iderable eco no mic interes ts in fishing and the explo itatio n o fhydro carbo n reso urces and o ther seabed reso urces aro und the is lands ie in the Exclus ive Eco no mic Zo ne ando r the ExtendedCo ntinental Shelf Once the is lands` land area and the territo rial waters have been put as ide it wo uld be eas ier to co me to ano verall agreement o n the delimitatio n o f the EEZ bo rder (with the exceptio n o f the no rthern part which wo uld require a trilateralagreement between China Japan and Ko rea) which wo uld include the delimitatio n o f these surro unding waters It wo uld facilitate aco mpro mise if bo th s ides agree that the is lands do no t merit their o wn EEZ This might be diff icult fo r Japan which claims an EEZ fo rOkino to rishima refuted by China s ince it co ns iders the reef no t to be an is land acco rding to Art 121 o f UNCLOS

A co mpro mise o n the so vereignty is sue co uld o nly be the o utco me ndash if at all ndash o f a success ful pro cess o f the abo ve o r co mparables teps In o rder to avo id a `winner take all` s ituatio n the co mpro mise wo uld have to invo lve a sharing arrangement His to ry o ffers

quite a number o f internatio nal precedents o f shared so vereignty referred to as co ndo minium in internatio nal law29 7 One case withso me s imilarities to the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands is a small is land (3000 sq m) in the river separating France and Spain kno wn asPheasant Is land o r Co nference Is land which even to day s till changes every s ix mo nths between France and Spain as o wner Like theSenkakuDiao yu Is lands the is land has no eco no mic value anymo re and the is land is o ff limits It was the lo catio n o f the s igning o f

the Treaty o f the Pyrenees in 1659 which ended a lo ng war 29 8 Mo s t o ther examples o f jo int so vereignty co ncern territo ries with apo pulatio n which makes co o peratio n much mo re diff icult Other his to rical precedents o f sharing so vereignty are the es tablishmento f ldquoneutral zo nesrdquo Acco rdingly the is lands and po ss ibly a sea area aro und the is lands co uld be declared a neutral zo ne like the o nebetween Saudi Arabia and Kuwait (1922-1965) On July 7 1965 the two go vernments s igned an agreement (which to o k effect o nJuly 25 1966) to partitio n the Neutral Zo ne adjo ining their respective territo ries A demarcatio n agreement dividing the NeutralZo ne was s igned o n December 17 1967

Particularly relevant here is that Saudi Arabia as well as Kuwait explo ited the o il reso urces under a jo int o perating agreement29 9

Co nclus io ns

The actio n-reactio n pattern o f the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands dispute is accelerating and the initiative seems to be mo re o ften thanno t with the Chinese s ide while the Japanese s ide is in a defens ive po s itio n The danger o f a military co nfro ntatio n is lo o mingincreas ingly larger in what co uld be called a lsquochicken gamersquo At the same time the internal and external dynamics are undermining theenviro nment which is required fo r a peaceful so lutio n as well as fo r maintaining the number o f po s itive o ptio ns While the Japanesego vernment refuses to ackno wledge the very exis tence o f a territo rial dispute the Chinese go vernment is no w (July 2014) evenrefus ing to have a dialo gue with Japan`s current prime minis ter It is po ss ible that the Chinese s ide again wants to wait with anymo ve fo rward until the Japanese prime minis ter has changed as Beijing did with Prime Minis ter Sato Eisaku o r with Prime Minis terKo izumi Junichiro But waiting fo r an impro vement o f the bilateral atmo sphere as the Chinese s ide likes to s tress is a very riskyo ptio n and such an impro vement may anyway be a very sho rt windo w o f o ppo rtunity if lo o king at the ups and do wns o f the po s t-1949 his to ry o f the bilateral relatio nship

To s tart a s tep-by-s tep pro cess o f address ing the territo rial is sue s tro ng leadership is required which unders tands the widerinteres ts o f a functio ning Japanese-Chinese relatio nship Japan s imply asking China fo r a summit meeting is no t very sens ible ifthere is no willingness to engage in subs tantive dis cuss io ns and wo uld be very risky fo r China`s to p leader if the Japanese primeminis ter then vis its the Yasukuni Shrine The his to ry is sue sho uld no lo nger be a Chinese lever fo r pressuris ing Japan but the latterhas to abs tain fro m actio ns which are seen as pro vo cative no t o nly by China but also by Ko rea the US and many o thers There hasto be a co mmitted leadership o n bo th s ides which s tarts with a ro ugh ro ad map and tens io n-reducing s teps such as CSBMs en ro uteto agreeing o n a fo rmula which allo ws the parties to o btain eco no mic as well as security gains while reducing tens io ns

Reinhard Drifte is Emeritus Professor of Japanese Politics University of Newcastle UK and Visiting Professor at various Japanese Universities andPau University (France) He is the author of Japanrsquos Foreign Policy for the Twenty First Century His home page is here

Reco mmended citatio n Reinhard Drifte The Japan-China Confrontation Over the SenkakuDiaoyu Islands--Between shelving and dispute

go vernment10 9

The China Marine Surveillance (CMS) s tarted irregular patro l activities near the Senkaku Is lands in December 2008 when two CMSvessels s tayed fo r o ver nine ho urs in the territo rial waters o f the Senkaku Is lands as mentio ned abo ve This was interpreted in

Japan as a majo r escalatio n110 Fo rmer ambassado r to China Miyamo to Yuji called this new develo pment a qualitative change in the

Senkaku dispute which went beyo nd previo us cases o f intrus io n by fishermen o r pro tes ters 111 This deplo yment was fo llo wed byo thers the fo llo wing year agains t a backgro und o f China reinfo rcing its maritime co ntro l Japan respo nded by building up its o wndefence effo rts in the so uth including planned s tatio ning o f so me tro o ps o n Yo naguni Is land o ne o f the clo ses t is lands to the

Senkaku Is lands 112

THE 2010 FISHING TRAWLER INCIDENT

It is agains t this co mplex backgro und that the Chinese fishing trawler Minjinyu 5179 with a crew o f 15 entered the territo rial waters o fthe Senkaku Is lands o n 7 September 2010 near Kubajima There were many o ther Chinese fishing trawlers in the same area andseveral ships o f the Japanese Co as t Guard were trying to chase them away Pursued by three Japanese CG vessels the Minjinyu 5179twice co llided with two o f the CG vessels There are different interpretatio ns whether the Chinese captain Zhan Qixio ng intentio nally

rammed the CG vessels and there are so me s trange inco ns is tencies highlighted in the repo rts o f the incident113 So me no n-Japanese autho rs like Sheila Smith and Linus Hags trouml m are no n-co mmittal o n the ques tio n o f the co llis io n but mo s t Japanese

autho rs blame the trawler and this autho r is mo re inclined to believe that the ramming was intentio nal114 The Chinese

unsurpris ingly blame the CG vessels 115 The is sue o f intentio n is impo rtant inso far as it gives so me indicatio n abo ut the risk o frecurrence and o f escalatio n The fo llo wing circumstantial evidence sugges ts intentio nal ramming by the Chinese captain

- There is ample video fo o tage leaked by a CG o fficer which specialis ts have interpreted as intentio nal ramming by the Chinese

captain116

- The captain seemed to have been drunk and is kno wn to be a vo latile perso n 117

- Fishing in the Eas t China Sea is very co mpetitive and Chinese fishermen are particularly anno yed abo ut the patro ls and co ntro ls byJapanese and Ko rean law enfo rcement agencies in the as yet un-demarcated EEZs amo ng all three co untries

Chinese fishermen have a reputatio n o f o ften being vio lent as many incidents in the So uth China Sea and in the Yello w Sea seem topro ve Only three mo nths later in December 2010 ano ther Chinese fishing trawler captain rammed a So uth Ko rean co as t guard

vessel in the Yello w Sea ho wever his bo at sank as a result and the Chinese captain dro wned 118 Chinese crews are o ften armed

with metal pipes and attack law enfo rcement agents which have led to o ther fatal casualties in 2011 and 2012119

The 2010 trawler incident is further relevant in o ur co ntext in view o f the Japanese go vernment`s handling it ( legal aspect denial o fthe shelving unders tanding) China`s co untermeasures and the aftermath o f the go vernment`s purchase o f three is lands inSeptember 2012 After the co llis io ns the Japanese go vernment arres ted the crew and co nfis cated the trawler The fo llo wing day theChinese go vernment demanded the release o f the crew and the trawler which the Japanese go vernment did o n the 13 September butkeeping the captain in cus to dy The Japanese ambassado r to China Niwa Uichiro was summo ned s ix times by the Chinese between8 and 19 September Beijing`s reactio n escalated after the Chinese captain`s term o f detentio n was extended o n 19 September tolas t fro m 20 to 29 September On 20 September Chinese autho rities detained fo ur Japanese citizens fo r entering a res trictedmilitary area in Hebei pro vince Even witho ut the trawler incident the detentio n o f the fo ur Japanese wo uld have harmed the bilateralrelatio nship but happening in this co ntext it was rightly o r wro ngly immediately linked by the Japanese to o ther Chinese sanctio ns

as dis cussed belo w The result ho wever was that the Japanese released the Chinese captain120 Even immediately after the crew`sarres t the Chinese go vernment had already begun to cancel the seco nd ro und o f nego tiatio ns fo r implementatio n o f theunders tanding o n energy co o peratio n in the Eas t China Sea co ncluded o n 18 June 2008 Other reprisals and sanctio ns fo llo wedincluding the suspens io n o f rare earth expo rts to Japan o n which the co untry`s high techno lo gy indus try is very dependentAltho ugh befo re the incident the Chinese go vernment had already mo ved to reduce rare earth expo rts which naturally hit Japan asthe bigges t impo rter Japanese media repo rted that the Chinese cus to ms autho rities to tally suspended expo rts in late

September121 The exact circumstances o f this alleged embargo are s till no t yet clear as dis cussed in detail by Alas tair Jo hns to n122

The cris is ended when the deputy pro secuto r in Ishigaki anno unced o n 24 September the release o f the captain citing the`diplo matic impact` o f the case o n the bilateral relatio nship So me co ns idered this as surrender by the Japanese and the result o fdubio us po litical interference into the legal pro cess The o ppo s itio n had a field day attacking the go vernment`s handling o f the

incident123 The Japanese Fo reign Minis try spo kesman declared that the go vernment had applied do mes tic law and again refuted the

idea o f there being a territo rial pro blem to be reso lved124 Others argue that the incident had several benefits fo r the Japanesego vernment because it o btained a reco nfirmatio n o f the US security guarantee to include the Senkaku Is lands it helped to co nvince

the public abo ut the necess ity o f mo re Japanese defence effo rts and it expo sed China as an assertive if no t aggress ive po wer125

China claimed that the incident sho wed that Japan had changed its appro ach to handling this type o f incident which co uld be

interpreted as a co nfirmatio n that bo th s ides had reached an info rmal unders tanding after the 2004 incident126 Ho wever thisincident was much mo re severe s ince the captain`s two co llis io ns with CG ships were interpreted by the Japanese go vernment asintentio nal ramming The captain was charged with o bs tructio n o f Perfo rmance o f Public Duty as a result o f the ramming On theo ther hand o ne canno t blame China fo r allo wing this bo at to leave its Chinese harbo ur because it was a fishing trawler and no t apro tes ters` campaign vessel What made this incident so serio us fo r the Chinese was Japan`s very public assertio n o f itsso vereignty o ver the is lands in the way it handled the Chinese captain and the explicit denial o f the shelving unders tanding o f the

1970s On 21 September Fo reign Minis ter Maehara s tated that Japan had no t agreed with China to shelve the territo rial dispute127

This declaratio n fo llo wed the seco nd extens io n o f the captain`s detentio n o n 19 September which pro mpted the Chinesego vernment to allo w widespread demo ns tratio ns in China and to place a series o f sanctio ns agains t Japan (cancellatio n o fminis terial meetings `self- res trictio ns` o n vis its to Japan by Chinese to uris ts and po s tpo nement at very sho rt no tice o f the vis ito f 1000 Japanese yo uth planned fro m 21 September to the Shanghai Wo rld Exhibitio n) Japan is es timated to have lo s t yen318

billio n due to a decline in the number o f Chinese to uris ts 128

It is diff icult to judge whether these unprecedented co untermeasures were centrally directed and it is likely that it was aco mbinatio n o f vario us po wer centres co mpeting ando r feeling the need to be seen acting in acco rdance with the increas ingly anti-Japanese mo o d

Japan`s do mes tic circumstances made a speedy so lutio n such as that in 2004 difficult The DPJ had co me to po wer o nly in 2009 andlacked fo reign po licy experience There was no effective co mmunicatio n between the two go vernments at leas t at the beginning o fthe incident in co ntras t to earlier times The Japanese leadership o bvio us ly mis judged ho w the Chinese wo uld interpret Japanesehandling o f the incident which it perceived as a reversal o f Japan`s previo us (albeit gradually diminishing) res traint Altho ugh theDPJ had initially a mo re pro -China leadership when it came to po wer (no tably Prime Minis ter Hato yama Yukio and Secretary General

Ozawa Ichiro ) this had changed by 2010 The minis ter in charge o f the CG (which is under the Minis try o f Land Infras tructureTranspo rt and To urism) o n the day o f the incident was Maehara Seiji a kno wn defence hawk who then became Minis ter o f Fo reignAffairs in a cabinet reshuffle o n 17 September He was therefo re much mo re at liberty to take a hard-line s tance agains t China whilethe DPJ pres idential electio n ndash wo n again by Kan Nao to ndash to o k place o n 14 September fo llo wed by the prime minis ter`s departure toNew Yo rk to attend the UN General Assembly o n 22 September The fo reign minis ter befo re the 17 September was Okada Katsuyawho was also mo re inclined to take a s tro ng s tance Maehara as well as Okada had seen the CG`s video o f the co llis io n which co uld

no t but have left them with a very negative impress io n o f the Chinese captain`s actio ns 129 It certainly did no t help when Maehara inhis new po s t as fo reign minis ter qualif ied China`s reactio n in the Diet o n 18 September as `very hys terical` and then declared o n

21 September that there had never been an unders tanding abo ut shelving the territo rial dispute130 On 23 September Secretary o fState Hillary Clinto n assured vis iting Fo reign Minis ter Maehara that the Senkaku Is lands were co vered by the bilateral Japan-USSecurity Treaty an interventio n that was certainly also no t welco me to the Chinese Ho wever there have been speculatio ns that inexchange fo r this s tro ng US reco nfirmatio n o f the security guarantee in o rder to get o ut o f the s talemate the Japanese had to

pro mise to release o f the Chinese captain which o ccurred the fo llo wing day131

The 2010 incident had several co nsequences which made a recurrence very likely Firs t o f all the incident raised tens io ns to a degreelas t seen during the anti-Japan demo ns tratio ns in 2004 and 2005 which had been mainly co ncerned with Japan`s attempt to gain apermanent UN Security Co uncil seat and the his to ry is sue These tens io ns had made it impo ss ible to have any new nego tiatio nro und to co nclude a treaty abo ut co o peratio n in the explo itatio n o f hydro carbo n reso urces in the Eas t China Sea and thus reduceano ther majo r so urce o f bilateral tens io ns and o ne mo reo ver related to the Senkaku is sue Agains t this backgro und but also inline with its previo us po s itio n Japan rejected a Chinese pro po sal made in Octo ber 2010 fo r jo int reso urce develo pment in the

Senkaku area132 The legal aftermath o f the incident co ntinued fo r so me time with Japan claiming co mpensatio n fro m the Chinesecaptain fo r the damage caused to the two CG vessels which was rejected by China and co untered with demands fo r co mpensatio nand an apo lo gy The Japanese pro secuto r dro pped the case agains t the captain o nly in January 2011 but the CG s till sent a bill to

the captain in February 2011133

While the incident helped the Japanese go vernment to o btain s tro ng US suppo rt o n the applicability o f the bilateral security treaty tothe Senkaku Is lands and generally helped to co nvince the Japanese public abo ut the need fo r greater Japanese defence effo rts(including a s trengthening o f US leverage vis-agrave-vis Japan co ncerning the realignment o f its fo rces o n Okinawa) it reduced Japan`sindependence with respect to the degree o f suppo rt it pro vided fo r US China po licy

Seco ndly the incident further undermined the co nditio ns which were the fo undatio n fo r the uno fficial shelving o f the Senkaku is sueIf it was no t yet clear to everybo dy that there was a territo rial dispute o ver the Senkaku Is lands then this incident with theunprecedented Chinese sanctio ns agains t Japan lifted the las t remnants o f do ubt Maehara Seji who repeated o n 25 o ccas io ns inDiet debates between 10 September and 16 No vember 2010 that there exis ted no territo rial dispute made this o fficial po s itio n

even less co nvincing134 The incident pro mpted Beijing to publicly undermine Japan`s territo rial claim further by anno uncing o n 29Octo ber 2010 permanent deplo yment o f large fisheries patro l vessels in waters near the Senkaku Is lands which was recipro cated by

the CG deplo ying patro l vessels o f o ver 1000 to ns in the same area135 In a further tit-fo r-tat o n 17 December 2010 the city

go vernment o f Ishigaki the adminis trative autho rity o f the Senkaku Is lands passed an o rdinance to des ignate 14 January the day to

co mmemo rate the Senkaku Is lands` inco rpo ratio n in 1895136

The further ero s io n o f the shelving agreement after Octo ber 2010

The next majo r co nfro ntatio n o ver the Senkaku Is lands in September 2012 o ccurred agains t the backgro und o f mo re measurestaken by bo th s ides to suppo rt their respective territo rial claims and do mes tic circumstances in bo th co untries which were evenless co nducive to re-es tablish trus t and go o d relatio ns The gro wing US-China po litical and military rivalry in Eas t As ia asexemplif ied by the As ia pivo t which China perceives as directed agains t its rise certainly did no t help Initially the year 2011 saw areco very o f relatio ns fro m the 2010 incident Bilateral trade reached a new high with a vo lume o f $345 billio n Japanese fo reign

direct inves tment in China so ared nearly 50 per cent in 2011 to $6 3bn137 Mo reo ver the Chinese public was very impressed with thedis ciplined way the Japanese peo ple reacted to wards the triple disas ters which hit the co untry o n 11 March 2011 and there was an

o utpo uring o f sympathy which also included the sending o f a Chinese search-and-rescue miss io n to the affected To ho ku area138

Yet this impro ved atmo sphere was quickly dispelled when the results o f the textbo o k review were published o n 27 March whichasserted Japan`s territo rial claim to the Senkaku Is lands (as well as to TakeshimaDo kto ) and denied the Chinese figure o f

300 000 victims in the Nanjing massacre139

In the meantime the Japanese go vernment co ntinued to turn the legal s crews which affected the Senkaku Is lands by implementingdo mes tic laws in o rder to be co ngruent with internatio nal law and s trengthening maritime co ntro l In February 2012 the Japanesecabinet passed bills to enhance the Japan Co as t Guards law enfo rcement po wers in territo rial waters which wo uld fo r example

autho rize the CG to o rder fo reign ships to leave Japan`s Territo rial Waters witho ut firs t bo arding them140 Other adminis trativemeasures derived fro m the Bas ic Law o n Ocean Po licy which had been enacted in 2007 and which pro vides the framewo rk fo radminis trating remo te is lands Since 2009 Japan has given names to hitherto unnamed is lands to subs tantiate its claims to anEEZ Fo r this purpo se in Augus t 2011 the go vernment placed 23 uninhabited is lands under s tate co ntro l but fo ur is lets near theSenkaku Is lands were exempt o ut o f co ns ideratio n fo r China In March 2012 ho wever the go vernment abando ned this cautio n and

regis tered Kitako jima as a natio nal asset141 In No vember 2011 the go vernment had let it be kno wn that it wo uld sho rtly release a

new lis t o f names fo r is lands which wo uld include is lets o f the Senkaku gro up142 China pro tes ted and a meeting in Beijing plannedin February 2012 between Pres ident Hu Jintao and representatives o f seven bilateral friendship gro ups fro m Japan was cancelled Ano pinio n piece in the Peoples Daily (RMRB) o n 17 January 2012 said Japans mo ve lsquois a blatant mo ve to damage Chinas co re

interes ts rsquo143 On 2 March 2012 To kyo finally anno unced a lis t o f 39 is lands which included fo ur is lets in the Senkaku Is lands

gro up144 The Chinese pro tes ted immediately o n the same day and in a tit-fo r-tat the State Oceanic Adminis tratio n released o n 3

March s tandard names and descriptio ns o f the Senkaku is lands and its 70 affiliated is lets 145 Ano ther Chinese co untermo ve was theanno uncement o n 16 March by the SOA that they had s tarted patro lling near the Senkaku Is lands This was fo llo wed pro mptly o n thesame day by o ne CMS ship entering the Territo rial Waters o f the Senkaku Is lands and the same vessels with ano ther CMS ship

cruis ing in the Co ntiguo us Waters o f the is lands 146 In No vember 2010 an o fficial o f the Minis try o f Agricultures Bureau o f Fisherieswhich o perates the Fisheries Law Enfo rcement Co mmand (FLEC) had already anno unced that his o rganizatio n wo uld fro m no w o n

deplo y fisheries patro l vessels o f o ver 1000 to ns to maintain co ntinuo us patro ls 147

THE 2012 CONFRONTATION ISHIHARA SHINTARO LIGHTING THE FUSE

It was in this tense enviro nment that To kyo Go verno r Ishihara Shintaro anno unced o n 16 April 2012 that the To kyo Metro po litanGo vernment (TMG) was nego tiating the purchase o f three o f the fo ur privately-held Senkaku is lands by the end o f the year ie

Uo tsurijima Kita Ko jima and Minami Ko jima The lease o f the central go vernment fo r these three is lands was due to expire in March2013 and no incident wo uld have o ccurred if the go vernment had quietly renewed the lease The central go vernment s tated that ithad no t kno wn abo ut Ishihara`s intentio n but that there had been co ntacts o n vario us o ccas io ns between the go vernment and the

private o wner148 This seems co nvincing s ince s tate o wnership wo uld have pro vided better preventio n o f incidents even mo re thanjus t leas ing Taken aback by Ishihara`s surprise mo ve the Chief Cabinet Secretary Fujimura Osamu declared the fo llo wing day thatthe central go vernment might acquire the is lands `if required` and Prime Minis ter No da implied in a Diet speech o n the 18 April that

a purchase by the central go vernment was o ne o f the o ptio ns Bo th s tatements were widely repo rted in China149 Ishihara hadcho sen his anno uncement fo r maximum effect o n the o ccas io n o f a speech at the co nservative Washingto n DC-based HeritageFo undatio n He made it clear that this pro ject was meant as a criticism o f the DPJ-led central go vernment which he co ns ideredfailing in its duty to sufficiently pro tect Japan`s so vereignty by saying that the central go vernment sho uld be buying the is lands butthat the Gaimusho was to o afraid o f o ffending China The lo catio n o f his anno uncement was meant to gain s tro nger suppo rt fro m

the US fo r Japan`s territo rial claim150 As we have seen abo ve fro m Ishihara`s activities in the 1970s this anno uncement was inmany ways the lo gical co nclus io n o f his lo ng las ting o bsess io n with the Senkaku Is lands and his hatred o f co mmunis t China It wasthe 2010 incident in particular which had enco uraged him to renew his o ld plan o f buying the is lands after his earlier failure to do so His go o d co nnectio ns with the o wner Kurihara Kunio ki who shared his natio nalis t pro clivities helped Ishihara to beco me the

favo ured purchaser151

The po ss ibility o f having the three is lands under the co ntro l o f the natio nalis tic go verno r o f To kyo who wanted to build facilities o nthe is lands to s trengthen Japan`s so vereignty was unpalatable to the No da go vernment which feared co mplicatio ns with China In a

meeting o n 18 May No da and his to p advisers decided in principle to purchase the is lands 152 Pressure o n the go vernmentincreased to pre-empt Ishihara because he was as to nishingly success ful in rais ing vo luntary co ntributio ns fro m the public to buythe three is lands thus circumventing any legal diff iculties in us ing To kyo `s taxpayer mo ney and also pro ving the po pularity o f his

mo ve By 1 June he had co llected 70 000 do natio ns to taling aro und yen101 billio n which increased to yen146 billio n by 6 September153

On 27 July the TMG ran an advertisement in the Wall Street Journal asking fo r US unders tanding and suppo rt fo r the purchase plan154

The TMG had to reques t central go vernment permiss io n to co nduct a survey o f the is lands which the go vernment refused to grant

o n 27 Augus t fo rcing the TMG to co nduct a survey fro m a ship o n 2 September155 In the end it was the higher sum and the sho rtes tdelay o f co ncluding the deal which pro mpted Kurihara Kunio ki who was apparently in so me financial diff iculties to accept the centralgo vernment`s o ffer o f yen205 billio n ($26 millio n) and to s ign the co ntract o n 11 September This was an embarrass ing turn fo rIshihara In additio n he did no t succeed in us ing the o ffer o f his co llected mo ney to entice the No da go vernment to pro mise thebuilding o f any facility o n the is lands No da was presented by his adminis tratio n with several o ptio ns including his favo ured o ptio no f repairing the exis ting light ho use o n Uo tsurijima but in the end was co nvinced by Fo reign Minis ter Gemba to leave things as they

were in o rder no t to further inflame the Chinese156

The central go vernment`s purchase o f the three is lands o n 11 September immediately led to a very harsh reactio n by the Chinesewhich was even wo rse than in 2010 But befo re lo o king at Chinese co untermeasures after 11 September in detail it is impo rtant toinves tigate why the Chinese reactio n was so s tro ng and why the Japanese apparently did no t anticipate it particularly in view o fChina`s unprecedented reactio n in September 2010

CHINESE WARNINGS BEFORE THE NATIONALIZATION ON 11 SEPTEMBER

Prime Minis ter No da admitted o n 19 September o nly eight days into the co mprehens ive Chinese sanctio ns and co unter measures

that he had underes timated their extent157

158 In a named co mmentary o f Xinhua o n 18 April attentio n was drawn to Ishihara`s kno wn right wing and anti-Chinese s tatementsbut also po inted o ut that the CMOFA `wo uld no t hes itate to take any necessary measures to safeguard so vereignty o ver the Diao yu

Is lands`159 Vice-Pres ident Xi Jinping to ld vis iting Ko no Yo hei a kno wn pro -China hand that Japan sho uld no t wo rsen the bilateral

relatio nship and that co re is sues sho uld be reso lved by the two co untries in an appro priate manner16 0 At the end o f April the StateOceanic Adminis tratio n anno unced a plan to des ignate is lands and their surro unding waters as s trategically vital and to pro tect their

enviro nments and develo p marine reso urces 16 1 Mo re specifically targeting the Senkaku Is lands was ho wever the entry o n 3 May o f

two FLEC vessels into the Senkaku Is lands` Co ntiguo us Waters fo r the firs t time s ince Ishihara`s anno uncement16 2 Bilateraltens io ns also increased after a Japanese right wing gro up suppo rted the ho lding o f a meeting o f the Wo rld Uyghur Co ngress in

To kyo fro m 14 to 18 May which led to the cancellatio n by Beijing o f several o fficial vis its 16 3 On 13 May Premier Wen Jiabao raisedthe Senkaku is sue and the Uighur meeting during talks in Beijing with Prime Minis ter Yo shihiko No da cautio ning that lsquoit is impo rtant

to respect Chinarsquos co re interes ts and matters o f great co ncernrsquo16 4 Wang Jiarui head o f the Co mmunis t Partys Internatio nalDepartment was quo ted by Eda Satsuki a fo reign po licy adviser o f the DPJ that bo th the Senkaku and the Uighur is sue were

described as `co re is sues` and Wen`s s tatement was s tressed in a Chinese TV bro adcas t16 5 The Xinjiang is sue as well as Taiwanand Tibet have been referred to fo r so me time by the Chinese go vernment as `co re is sues` but the Senkaku is sue had been called

a `co re is sue` apparently fo r the firs t time o nly in an o pinio n piece by the Renmin Ribao in January 201216 6 Only o n 23 March 2013did the Chinese Fo reign Minis try Spo kesperso n clearly s tate that China regards the Diao yu Is lands as its co re interes t altho ugh the

written reco rd subsequently so ftened this s tatement16 7

The abo ve chro no lo gy certainly gives the impress io n that there was a series o f Chinese reactio ns which expressed s tro ng Chineseco ncern with any purchase (whether by the TMG o r the central go vernment) o f the Senkaku Is lands If that had no t been eno ugh theinterview o f the Financial Times with Japan`s ambassado r in China Niwa Uichiro at the beginning o f June sho wed s tro ng co ncernabo ut the implicatio ns o f a purchase He was quo ted as saying that lsquoif Mr Ishihararsquos plans are acted upo n then it will result in anextremely grave cris is in relatio ns between Japan and ChinahellipWe canno t allo w decades o f pas t effo rt to be bro ught to no thingrsquo He

added that such a cris is wo uld affect bus iness 16 8 Niwa mus t have been truly co ncerned abo ut the severity o f the s ituatio n to makesuch an undiplo matic public s tatement fo r which he was reprimanded by Fo reign Minis ter Gemba and criticized by so me media

o utlets and po liticians ultimately leading to his recall later in the year16 9

The Chinese warnings became sharper at the seco nd s tage when Prime Minis ter No da anno unced o n 7 July that his go vernment wo uldseek to buy the is lands because the purchase co uld no lo nger be put do wn to a mere lo cal maverick with s tro ng anti-Chineseinclinatio ns The Global Times edito rial o f 9 July sho wed the frus tratio n by so me Chinese lsquoEach time Japan takes o ne s tep we sho uldtake o ne and half o r even two s teps fo rward making Japan aware o f the grave co nsequences caused by its aggress io n agains t

Chinarsquo170 A Xinhua co mmentary o n 7 July quo tes the CMOFA`s spo kesperso n referring pro bably fo r the firs t time in this ro w to a`co nsensus` agains t which the Japanese go vernment went by wanting to buy the is lands meaning o f co urse the shelving co nsensus

o f 1972 and 1978171 On 9 July a Xinhua co mmentary titled `Japan playing with fire o ver Diao yu Is lands` called the purchase by the

central go vernment a `farcical ambitio n` an express io n repeated thereafter many times 172 On 11 July the Japanese media repo rtedthe entry by three FLEC vessels into the territo rial waters o f Kubajima the firs t time s ince the 16 March 2012 fo llo wed by o ne vessel

cruis ing the fo llo wing day in the is land`s co ntiguo us zo ne173 Public o pinio n became increas ingly inflamed and the Global Timesrepo rted o n 19 July that 90 8 per cent o f Chinese peo ple surveyed appro ve us ing the military to enfo rce Chinas so vereignty o ver

the is lets with 521 per cent saying a military clash lsquois likelyrsquo between China and Japan o ver the is lands 174

Even the US gave Japan `s tro ng advice` no t to pro ceed with the purchase because it co uld `trigger a cris is` as was revealed in April2013 by Kurt Campbell who was at the time Ass is tant Secretary fo r Eas t As ian and Pacific Affairs Even tho ugh we warned JapanJapan decided to go in a different directio n and they tho ught they had gained the suppo rt o f China o r so me did which we were

certain that they had no t Campbell is quo ted in an interview with Kyo do 175

FAILURE OF COMMUNICATION

The abo ve chro no lo gy and escalatio n o f Chinese reactio ns to the planned purchase o f the is lands o ver the summer 2012 give aclear indicatio n that a Japanese purchase o f the three is lands was no t co ns idered jus t ano ther incident witho ut majo rco nsequences So why did the Japanese go vernment s till go ahead with the purchase In the final analys is the failure to avo id thecris is escalating in September 2012 lay in the wide difference between the interes ts o f the two go vernments Do mes ticcircumstances o n bo th s ides and the inherent zero sum nature o f territo rial disputes prevented the trans itio n fro m dialo gue topreventive actio n let alo ne so lutio n Aggravating events o ver the summer 2012 which raised tempers o n bo th s ides were thedemands by the TMG to send a survey team to the Senkaku Is lands (the No da go vernment after so me initial co nflicting repo rts didno t allo w a landing) the landing o f Ho ng Ko ng activis ts o n Uo tsurijima o n 15 Augus t (timed with the anniversary o f Japan`ssurrender) fo llo wed by the landing o f Japanese activis ts ( including lo cal parliamentarians ) o n 19 Augus t and an attack in Beijing o n27 Augus t o n the car carrying Ambassado r Niwa Despite o ngo ing co mmunicatio n and dialo gue thro ugh vario us channels theseadverse circumstances led to a hardening o f po s itio ns o ver the summer 2012 between the two go vernments

The Japanese central go vernment had been caught sho rt by Ishihara`s sudden anno uncement o n 16 April and became to tallyabso rbed with preventing the maverick po litician fro m go ing ahead with the purchase o f the is lands fearing rightly that this wo uldserio us ly co mplicate Japan-China relatio ns Ishihara wanted to embarrass the No da go vernment which was co ns tantly declining inpo pularity and to fo rce it to deal mo re assertively with the is lands As we have seen fo r Ishihara it was no t jus t abo ut purchas ingthe is lands but abo ut building facilities o n them Fo r the No da go vernment buying the is lands by the s tate was therefo re the lesserevil The go vernment tried all alo ng to co nvince the Chinese o f To kyo `s go o d intentio ns fo r example when Fo reign Minis ter Gembamet with his Chinese co unterpart Yang Jiechi o n 11 July that the purchase was o nly a `do mes tic co mmercial transactio n` and no t a

diplo matic matter and was o nly meant to ensure that the is lands wo uld be `adminis tered peacefully and s tably`176 In December2012 when the full extent o f China`s unprecedented reactio ns had beco me kno wn the new Japanese ambassado r Kitera s till s tatedthat lsquoThe change in o wnership sho uld no t have caused a pro blem in relatio ns with Chinarsquo adding that Japan had given China sufficient

explanatio ns ahead o f the purchase177 Fo reign Minis ter Gemba even tried to highlight in No vember that the purchase was actually areturn to the status quo ante lsquoThe measure taken by the go vernment o f Japan was jus t a trans fer o f title under Japanese do mes ticlaw and jus t means that the o wnership o f the is lands mdash held by the go vernment until 1932 mdash was returned fro m a private citizen to

the go vernmentrsquo178 In sho rt fo r the Japanese the purchase o f the is lands was aimed at maintaining the status quo in such a waythat it ho ped China wo uld co ns ider to be in its o wn interes t that is by cho o s ing the lesser o f two evils That express io ns like`peaceful adminis tratio n` o r `trans fer o f title under do mes tic Japanese law` co uld o nly be interpreted by the Chinese as acts o fasserting Japanese so vereignty was apparently s imply igno red Under these circumstances it was impo ss ible to co nvince theChinese that trans fer o f o wnership had no thing to do with so vereignty Ins tead the Chinese even suspected that the No da

go vernment and Ishihara were co nniving at s trengthening Japan`s co ntro l o ver the is lands 179

Any intended co nciliato ry o verto ne in the abo ve explanatio ns by Gemba and many s imilar declaratio ns befo re and later were furthernegated by the ins is tence that there was no territo rial dispute exactly the po s itio n the Chinese mo s t so ught to change Thefrequent references to `co re interes t` by China were igno red by the Japanese go vernment Fo r the Chinese leaders the `o ffer` tocho o se between the To kyo Metro po litan Go vernment o r the Go vernment o f Japan buying the is lands was as Vice Fo reign Minis ter

Zhang Zhijun later put it like being asked to cho o se between two do ses o f po iso n18 0

It was also unfo rtunate that the Japanese go vernment allo wed the express io n kokuyuka (natio nalizatio n) to prevail even amo ng

go vernment members ins tead o f the o riginal term agreed by the Japanese cabinet shutoku (acquis itio n)18 1 Chinese media hastaken o ver the Japanese term o f lsquonatio nalizatio nrsquo which certainly further co nfused Chinese public o pinio n Since it do es no t kno w thehis to rical backgro und and Japan`s effective co ntro l o f the is lands `natio nalizatio n` tended to be unders to o d as a radical change in

the status quo o r even as invas io n18 2 A well kno wn Japanese o bserver in China Kato Yo shikazu even argued therefo re that the 1972

and 1978 unders tanding abo ut shelving had prevented the Chinese peo ple fro m learning abo ut the is sue as perceived in Japan18 3

Bo th s ides made it impo ss ible with their extreme and diametrically o ppo sed po s itio ns to find a co mpro mise The No da go vernmentwas to o weak (and also to o preo ccupied with o ther is sues like the pass ing o f the law to intro duce a hike o f the value added taxco ping with the aftermath o f the triple disas ter o f March 2011 and s imply trying to s tay in po wer) to find an alternative to the no wabando ned `shelving co mpro mise` and to admit that there was a territo rial pro blem At the end o f Augus t No da was fo rced topro mise Lo wer Ho use electio ns `so metime so o n` despite the grim o utlo o k fo r his party`s chances in the electio ns Making aco mpro mise o n the territo rial is sue wo uld no t have helped to gain po pular suppo rt While the Chinese pro bably felt enco uraged toescalate pressure by their success in fo rcing the Japanese go vernment hand o ver the captain in September 2010 it mo s t likely hadthe effect o n the No da go vernment to remain inflexible in o rder to avo id being seen yet again as caving in to Chinese pressure Butthe Chinese were also no t able to co mpro mise o n their demand that the Japanese sho uld admit the exis tence o f a territo rial is sue

The preparatio n fo r the 18 th Natio nal Party Co ngress in No vember 2012 and the ensuing leadership change to be finalized o nly inspring 2013 s imilarly did no t allo w the Chinese leaders whether inco ming o r o utgo ing to appear so ft Eight o ut o f nine Po litbureaumembers publicly expressed o ppo s itio n to the purchase either befo re o r after the anno uncement o f the purchase o n 11

September18 4 There are also credible repo rts that during the CCP`s summer retreat to Beihaide in Augus t Hu Jintao came underpressure fro m the future gro up o f leaders to take a mo re severe po s itio n o n Japan`s intentio n to natio nalise the three is lands Asa result the leading fo reign po licy interlo cuto rs o f the Japanese go vernment Zhang Zhijun and Dai Bingguo hardened their po s itio n

as well18 5 Public o pinio n in China had gro wn increas ingly ho s tile to Japan o ver the summer and was particularly inflamed when thelanding o f the Ho ng Ko ng activis ts was fo llo wed by the landing o f Japanese activis ts which were treated by the Japanese autho ritiesmo re leniently than the fo rmer ie no t arres ted despite having vio lated private land leased to the s tate Rio ts in several Chinese

cities s tarted thereafter18 6

Altho ugh bo th s ides agreed to co ntinue dialo gue and several o fficial meetings at different levels to o k place they co uld o nly end inres tating kno wn po s itio ns China did no t make things eas ier by later cancelling such meetings depriving bo th s ides o f po ss ibleo ppo rtunities to find a breakthro ugh The s tart o f Chinese sanctio ns acro ss the who le gambit o f bilateral relatio ns deprived theJapanese o f even mo re do mes tic wriggle ro o m fo r a co mpro mise

It seems that the abo ve circumstances did no t allo w Japan`s central decis io n-makers co ncerned with the is sue in particular the

Prime Minis ter and his immediate circle to admit to ando r unders tand until the purchase anno uncement o n 11 September 2012ho w s tro ngly the Chinese felt abo ut it Ambassado r Niwa`s rather undiplo matic s tatements in the Financial Times interview seem toindicate that he felt that the central decis io n-makers did no t unders tand the s trength o f the feelings o f the Chinese and ho w far theymight go Niwa warned in his interview that even a po ss ible pre-purchase survey o f the is lands co uld be diplo matically incendiary

s ince such a survey was dis cussed already at the time to enable the TMG to go ahead with the purchase18 7 As late as the 3September the Yomiuri Shimbun repo rted that the Chinese go vernment was reacting calmly as lo ng as three co nditio ns wereo bserved to maintain the status quo The co nditio ns co ntained no o ppo s itio n to a po ss ible purchase and ins tead jus t mentio ned

abs tentio n fro m landing surveying and building facilities o n the is lands 18 8 Acco rding to Pro fesso r Takahara Akio General ZhuChenghu said o n 5 September that a purchase by the central go vernment wo uld be better and Qu Xing directo r o f the China Ins titute

o f Internatio nal Affairs is said to have expressed a s imilar o pinio n18 9 Even o n 12 September when the s to rm bro ke the deputydirecto r o f the Japan Ins titute o f the Chinese Academy o f So cial Science Gao Ho ng s tated in an interview with the o n-line vers io no f the Renmin Ribao that if Japan wo uld respect the three abs tentio ns mentio ned abo ve the s ituatio n co uld ultimately revert to the

status quo ante19 0 But these were no lo nger the decis ive vo ices o f the Chinese leadership after the Beihaide meeting The abo ve-mentio ned Campbell interview seems to sugges t that Japan was lo ng befo re mo re inclined to act upo n Chinese s tatements whichwere clo ser to what it wanted to unders tand

CHINESE REACTION RHETORICAL WARFARE

The final misco mmunicatio n o r clash o f irreco ncilable interes ts o ccurred when Prime Minis ter No da met Pres ident Hu o n thes idelines o f the As ia Pacific Eco no mic Co o peratio n (APEC) summit in Vladivo s to k o n 9 September then anno unced two days laterthe s igning o f the purchase co ntract with the Kurihara family Whether Hu had no t sufficiently co nveyed his s tro ng feelingsco ncerning the purchase which had been kno wn and bilaterally dis cussed at leas t s ince the Japanese o fficial anno uncement o f itspurchase intentio n o n 7 July o r No da had no t unders tanding the Chinese feeling fo r the po ss ible reaso ns dis cussed abo ve Hu

apparently felt he had lo s t face when Japan anno unced the purchase o n 11 September19 1 Mo reo ver the Japanese anno uncementco uld no t have co me at a mo re awkward time because o f the anniversary o f the Mukden Incident o n the 18 September which likeseveral o ther carefully cultivated anniversaries regarding Japan`s pas t misdeeds in China always aro use latent anti-Japanesefeelings As a result the Japanese anno uncement caused an avalanche o f virulent rheto rical o utburs ts relating to the pas t po liticalsanctio ns further measures to assert China`s territo rial claim (fo r example including the is lands in the Chinese TV weatherfo recas t an exhibitio n o f ancient maps to pro ve Chinese co ntro l) eco no mic sanctio ns and an escalatio n o f patro ls by ChineseFLEC and MSA ships and aircraft aro und the Senkaku Is lands

The mildes t part o f China`s rheto rical o ffens ive was calling the go vernment purchase a `farce` a rather undiplo matic express io nalready used by Xinhua in July 2012 but then taken up at the highes t level by Vice Pres ident Xi Jinping when meeting Secretary o f

Defence Leo n Panetta o n 19 September19 2 But the main line fro m no w o n was that Japan`s claim to the Senkaku Is lands was adenial o f the po s t-Wo rld War II results In its s tatements and rebuttals the Chinese sho wed their frus tratio n at no t having been ableto fundamentally change the status quo and they did no t hes itate to use express io ns which were rather undignified fo r diplo mats andpo litical leaders Japan o n the o ther hand argued fo r peaceful reso lutio n alo ng the lines o f internatio nal law and dialo gue whichpro bably infuriated the Chinese even mo re On 10 September the CMFA is sued a s tatement calling Japans po s itio n o n the disputedis lands `an o utright denial o f the o utco mes o f the victo ry o f the Wo rld Anti-Fascis t War and hellip a grave challenge to the po s t-war

internatio nal o rder`19 3 In a heated exchange at the UN General Assembly between Chinas UN ambassado r Li Bao do ng and JapansDeputy UN ambassado r Ko dama Kazuo Li called the mo tive fo r purchas ing the three is lands to lsquolegalize its s tealing and o ccupatio no f Chinese territo ryrsquo and s tated lsquoThis actio n o f Japan co ns titutes a serio us encro achment upo n Chinas so vereignty and intends toco ntinue and legalize the result o f Japans co lo nial po licy It is an o pen denial o f the o utco mes o f victo ry o f the wo rld anti-fascis twar and a grave challenge to the po s t-war internatio nal o rder and the purpo ses and principles o f the Charter o f the United

Natio ns rsquo19 4 In a further rebuttal o f Japan`s assertio n o f its claim Li characterized the is land purchase as lsquono thing different fro m

mo ney launderingrsquo19 5 At the As ia Euro pe Meeting (ASEM) in Lao s Fo reign Minis ter Yang Jiechi repeated the reference to the`o utco me o f the anti-Fascis t war` while Prime Minis ter No da spo ke o f peaceful reso lutio n o f co nflicts acco rding to internatio nal

law19 6 On 11 Octo ber the CMFA spo kesperso n Ho ng Lei refuted Fo reign Minis ter Gembarsquos his to rical acco unt jus tifying Japan`s

claim by calling it `gangs ter lo gic`19 7

On the Chinese s ide therefo re there are no w two clo sely-linked his to ry narratives o ne is abo ut the is lands having been part o fChina s ince the Ming and Qing dynas ties the o ther co nnects the is lands to the already well-rehearsed his to ry narrative ie Japanhaving victimised China s ince the Sino -Japanese war o f 1894-95 These two narratives co ntinue to be cultivated by the Chineseleadership In Octo ber 2012 the Chinese anno uncement o f the publicatio n o f 80 vo lumes o n the Far Eas t War Criminal Co urt was

clearly meant to link the latter narrative to Japan`s acquis itio n o f the Senkaku Is lands 19 8 Fo rmer Fo reign Minis ter Gemba explicitlytried in Octo ber 2012 to delink the territo rial is sue fro m Japan`s aggress io n agains t China o nly to be reminded by the Chineseambassado r to the UK in an article in the Financial Times (as part o f the ensuing wo rldwide press campaign by bo th s ides ) that lsquothe

Diao yu Dao is sue is all abo ut his to ryrsquo19 9 Since then until no w China has co ntinued this ldquohis to ry warfarerdquo by publishing endlessarticles o n Japan`s aggress io n agains t China befo re 1945 The mo s t recent mo ve in July 2014 is the serialised o n-line publicatio n o f

the hand-written co nfess io ns by 45 Japanese co nvicted war criminals by the State Archives Adminis tratio n20 0

POLITICAL SANCTIONS AND PUBLIC OPINION

Chinese po litical co untermeasures ranged fro m the cancellatio n o f o fficial and uno fficial vis its to further legal acts to reinfo rce

China`s claim to the Senkaku Is lands Aro und 40 per cent o f ceremo nial events in Japan to mark 2012 as the 40 th anniversary o f the

no rmalizatio n o f diplo matic relatio ns with China were cancelled o r po s tpo ned and even mo re events in China20 1 Thesecancellatio ns were no t always the result o f direct go vernment interventio n but so metimes mo re indirect o fficial `dis co uragement`helped by the Chinese preference fo r no t being seen to do so mething in co ntradictio n to the (initially fo mented and later self-pro pelling) anti-Japan atmo sphere o r by fear o f participants running into demo ns tratio ns if no t assaults The legal s crews werefurther turned with lo ng-term implicatio ns On 10 September the Chinese go vernment anno unced the base po ints and baselines o f

the territo rial waters o f the disputed is lands and their affiliated is lets as well as the names and co o rdinates o f 17 base po ints 20 2

On 16 September repo rts appeared that China was submitting pro po sals fo r its extended co ntinental shelf to the UN Co ntinental

Shelf Co mmiss io n which included the Senkaku Is lands but in fact the actual submiss io n o ccurred o nly o n 14 December 201220 3 On

20 September a go vernment agency published a thematic map o f the Diao yu Is land and its affiliated is lands 20 4 Chinarsquos

Meteo ro lo gical Adminis tratio n s tarted pro viding weather fo recas ts fo r the Senkaku area o n the s tate-run TV s tatio n20 5 On 16September the fishery bureau anno unced the lifting o f the fishery ban in the Eas t China Sea and s tressed that China planned to

s trengthen its so vereignty claim o ver the Senkakus 20 6

There were rumo urs that 1000 fishing vessels wo uld co me to the Senkaku area and tho ugh this did no t materialize it helped to

further raise tens io ns 20 7

Mo st attentio n in Japan was fo cused o n the widening s treet pro tes ts in o ver 100 Chinese cities the des tructio n o f Japanese sho ps

res taurants cars and pro ductio n facilities and the attacks o n Japanese citizens in China20 8 The webs ites o f at leas t 19 Japanese

banks univers ities and o ther ins titutio ns came under cyber-attack20 9 At a demo ns tratio n in Shanghai abo ut 7000 pro tes ters

chanted s lo gans such as lsquoBeat Japanese imperialismrsquo lsquoBo yco tt Japanese pro ducts rsquo and lsquoDes tro y Japan and retrieve Okinawarsquo210

Altho ugh o nly 63 per cent o f po lled Japanese in late September 2012 expressed suppo rt fo r their go vernment`s natio nalizatio n o fthe is lands do wn fro m 73 per cent in a previo us po ll o n 15 and 16 September 82 per cent o f respo ndents in a Mainichi Shimbun

survey said the Japanese go vernment had no t pro tes ted s tro ngly eno ugh to Beijing o ver anti-Japan pro tes ts 211 The Chinesego vernment denied any o fficial invo lvement and the spo kesperso n o f the Waijiao bu went o nly as far as saying that the pro tes ts anddemo ns tratio ns were `co mpletely caused by the Japanese go vernments illegal purchase o f the Diao yu Is lands and are peo ples

spo ntaneo us acts`212 There were ho wever repo rts that so me o f the demo ns tratio ns were to lerated if no t abetted by go vernment

agencies 213 The demo ns tratio ns so o n died do wn because to lerating them much lo nger wo uld have run the risk that they wo uld turninto anti-go vernment demo ns tratio ns Even the Chinese Academy o f So cial Sciences repo rted that so me demo ns trato rs who were

arres ted did no t even kno w where the Senkaku Is lands were and that anger o ver the widening wealth gap was behind their acts 214 Inco ntras t to these Chinese demo ns tratio ns and acts o f lawlessness there was hardly any public demo ns tratio n in Japan whichsho ws the relative detachment o f the Japanese fro m the dispute On 22 September `Nippo n Gambare` a right wing o rganizatio nchaired by fo rmer Air Self Defence Fo rce chief Tamo gami To shio s taged a march thro ugh parts o f To kyo which this autho rwitnessed A brief fire was s tarted at a Chinese scho o l in Ko be and two smo ke bo mbs were thro wn into the Chinese Co nsulate

General in Fukuo ka215 But such actio ns were relatively rare and small in s cale

ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND THE QUESTION OF WHO IS MORE DEPENDENT ON WHOM

Pro tes t measures o f a lo nger duratio n and as yet unpredictable co nsequences fo r the bilateral relatio nship have been China`seco no mic sanctio ns and a bo yco tt o f Japanese go o ds by the general public altho ugh the autho rities denied again any go vernmentinterventio n A co mmentary o f Xinhua half admitted ho wever go vernment interventio n when it made the unco nvincing dis tinctio nbetween `measures` and `sanctio ns` `Since Japan purchased Chinas Diao yu Is lands in September the Chinese go vernment hastaken a series o f co untermeasures in the eco no mic legal diplo matic and military fields which have helped it to wres t the initiativeto reso lve the is lands dispute despite China no t impo s ing any eco no mic sanctio ns the Japanese eco no my has been badly

hit`216 Renmin Ribao co mpared `eco no mic punishments` with a `gun` and warned that thro ugh its is land purchase Japan hadalready to uched the `trigger` In a rather heavy hint the paper po inted o ut ho w vulnerable Japan`s eco no my was because o f the

2011 earthquake and the dependence o f key eco no mic secto rs o n China217 Even mo re o fficial was Vice Minis ter o f Co mmerce Jiang

Zengwei`s warning that the is land purchase wo uld inevitably have a negative impact o n Sino -Japanese eco no mic and trade ties 218

After 11 September it so o n became very o bvio us that the heavy hand o f the Chinese go vernment was impo s ing sanctio ns andmaking life fo r Japanese bus iness mo re diff icult On 21 September it was repo rted that Chinese cus to ms autho rities were

s trengthening inspectio ns o f impo rts fro m and expo rts to Japan altho ugh the Chinese autho rities denied this 219 In the same week

repo rts appeared abo ut Japanese co mpanies experiencing delays in o btaining wo rking visas fo r their Japanese emplo yees 220 BigJapanese co mpanies with inves tments in China were experiencing ho ld-ups in gaining regulato ry appro vals fo r Merger amp

Acquis itio ns 221 In co ntras t to the interference in rare earth expo rts to Japan after the trawler incident in 2010 ho wever no such

embargo was implemented because this particular eco no mic weapo n had lo s t its effectiveness s ince then (see belo w)222

The greates t medium-term damage to Japanese eco no mic activities apart fro m the abo ve mentio ned des tructio n o f Japaneseco mmercial and indus trial s ites was caused by a partial co nsumer bo yco tt no tably the fall o f car sales in China and Chineseto urism to Japan Overall bilateral trade decreased by 39 per cent in 2012 to $329 billio n the firs t dro p s ince the co llapse o f theLehman inves tment bank in 2009 and in 2013 to $3125 billio n acco rding to Chinese figures Acco rding to Japanese figures trade in

2013 increased but declined in vo lume223

The wo rs t hit secto r was auto mo biles To yo ta so ld 840 500 vehicles in China in 2012 the firs t annual dro p s ince 2002 Nis san

experienced a 24 per cent dro p in December China sales and Ho nda saw a 19 per cent December fall224 Ho wever as o f 2014Japanese car sales in and to China have again been increas ing The to uris t indus try was also hard hit in bo th co untries Chinese

vis ito rs to Japan decreased by 44 per cent fro m September to December 2012 fro m the year befo re225 The number o f Japanese

to uris ts o n gro up to urs to China plunged by mo re than 70 per cent year-o n-year in the las t three mo nths o f 2012226 This fallco ntinued into 2013 when their number fell to 29 millio n Japanese to uris ts do wn 18 2 fro m 2012 and the 3rd s traight annual

decline227 Ho wever in March 2014 vis ito rs fro m mainland China surged 80 1 fro m the previo us March to to tal 184200 a reco rdhigh fo r the mo nth and a s teeper year-o n-year rise than vis ito rs fro m any o ther co untries and regio ns This was also helped by the

falling yen and the resumptio n o f cruise to urs with large ships which were to tally suspended in March 2012228

Ano ther mo re lo ng-term negative eco no mic effect o n the bilateral relatio nship can be gauged fro m falling Japanese FDI to Chinawhich acco rding to Chinese figures declined by 422 in the firs t five mo nths o f 2014 after having fallen by 43 to $71 billio n in

2013 acco rding to Chinese figures o r by 18 to $10 9 billio n acco rding to Japanese figures 229

China`s multiple eco no mic retributio ns cas t do ubt o n the co ntinued viability o f the earlier `Ho t Eco no mics and Co ld Po litics`dicho to my The answer to the ques tio n which co untry is mo re dependent o n the o ther o r mo re vulnerable to sanctio ns is dependento n the eco no mic indicato rs and secto rs being cho sen and is also a po litical ques tio n because the answer can be po liticallymanipulated Japan`s eco no mic diff iculties s ince the 1990s (and its dependence o n eco no mic interactio n with China to co pe withthese diff iculties ) and China pushing Japan to No 3 in wo rld GDP ranking has diminished the Chinese perceptio n o f Japan as aneco no mic po wer ho use It means that fo r China the relatio nship with Japan became less impo rtant while po litical relatio nsdeterio rated at the same time The s tro ng effect o f the Chinese embargo o n rare earth expo rts to Japan in 2010 can be viewed intwo diametrically o ppo sed ways Chinese o bservers may be inclined to put emphas is o n the s tro ng effect it had o n Japanese publico pinio n and indus trial circles co ntributing to a certain extent to the go vernment`s surrender o f the trawler captain Others maypo int o ut that the case demo ns trated the futility o f abus ing a do minant supplier po s itio n because within a sho rt time Japan`sindus try secured alternative reso urces and demand reductio n thro ugh recycling and pro duct re-engineering no t o nly pro videdeno ugh breathing space but in the end reduced China`s market po wer Still Chinese experts are co nvinced that Japan is no w mo redependent o n China than the o ther way ro und Acco rding to so me specialis ts Chinas impo rts acco unted in 2011fo r 237 per cent o fJapan`s expo rt vo lume The bilateral trade vo lume in 2011 to o k up 21 per cent o f Japanese gro ss trade vo lume o f that year while it

merely acco unted fo r 9 4 per cent o f Chinas annual gro ss trade vo lume230 There seem to be o nly few Chinese vo ices which expressco ncern o ver the negative impact o f China`s sanctio ns o n China`s eco no my itself no tably at a time o f wo rldwide eco no mic

co ntractio n231

The Chinese market is certainly to o impo rtant fo r many Japanese co mpanies to leave A survey in No vember 2012 to which mo rethan 10 000 Japanese co mpanies in China replied sho wed that fo r almo s t 30 per cent o f them the territo rial dispute had affected

their bus iness but s till mo re than half want to maintain their o peratio ns and o nly 16 per cent said that they wanted to either cut

back o r pull o ut232 Japanese co mpanies in certain secto rs are likely to beco me mo re reluctant to make inves tments in China all themo re as o ther So utheas t As ian co untries (no tably Myanmar is currently the New Fro ntier fo r Japanese bus iness ) have cheaper

labo ur co s ts 233 Ho wever Chinese co nsumers s till prefer Japanese pro ducts fo r safer fo o d drinks and daily necess ities and tho se

Japanese co mpanies were hardly affected by the bo yco tt234

A wide gap between bo th s ides` perceptio n abo ut their eco no mic dependence and vulnerability to sanctio ns is dangero us fo r themanagement o f their bilateral relatio nship particularly when o ne s ide tries to leverage its suppo sedly s tro nger po s itio n to achievevicto ry in a sens itive area like territo rial integrity While Chinese co mmentato rs and experts may be inclined to o verrate Japan`svulnerability their Japanese co unterparts have a tendency to lo o k at the is sues to o much in purely eco no mic terms neglecting theimpact o f Chinese emo tio ns and go vernment pro paganda as well as the wider public`s insufficient kno wledge abo ut the o verall

impact o f bad eco no mic relatio ns with Japan o n China`s o wn eco no my235 The Japanese perceptio n remains that China in the endneeds Japan mo re than the o ther way ro und which in view o f China`s huge pro blems and its dependence o n Japanese hightechno lo gy co mpo nents fo r its manufacturing indus try is arguably the case This Japanese perceptio n has fo s tered the co nvictio nas demo ns trated fo r example by the belief in the sus tainability o f `Ho t Eco no mics and Co ld Po litics` that despite recurring

po litical crises in the relatio nship China wo uld in the end co mpro mise as it had do ne several times in the pas t236 Yet the pro blemwith the perceptio n o f `needing Japan` is that it can be po litically manipulated particularly in an autho ritarian sys tem This gapbetween Japanese and Chinese o bservers and experts o n the is sue o f dependence can serio us ly influence the willingness o f bo th

s ides to co mpro mise237 It also challenges the liberal view that clo se eco no mic relatio ns can prevent o r at leas t so ften deeppo litical differences like territo rial co nflicts which mo reo ver are linked to eco no mic interes ts like hydro carbo n reso urces In thisco ntext it is interes ting to no te that China has recently been exchanging with Japan a number o f high-po wered bus iness delegatio ns(apart fro m exchanges with po litical parties and lo cal go vernment o fficials ) The willingness o f Japanese bus iness to take part maybe interpreted by China as an express io n o f Japan`s eco no mic dependence o n China while giving it also the o ppo rtunity to putpressure o n the Abe go vernment to make co ncess io ns and to keep links with Japan fo r the po s t-Abe era

In view o f the impo rtance o f the eco no mic relatio nship and the damage suffered by Japanese bus iness after September 2012 o newo uld have expected mo re pressure fro m the bus iness co mmunity to co me to a territo rial co mpro mise so lutio n and so impro verelatio ns Ho wever this has no t been the case and may have to do with the perceptio n gap dis cussed abo ve but also the relativelack o f influence o n the go vernment (the majo rity o f the China-relevant Japanese bus iness co mmunity co ns is ts o f small- andmedium-s ized co mpanies ) the fear that a mo re vo cal ro le wo uld get co mpanies into tro uble with the autho rities in Japan ando rChina o r the ho pe o f being able to weather the po litical s to rms either because o f alternative market o ppo rtunities o r theco mpany`s s ize

FROM POLICING TO MILITARY INVOLVEMENT

The mo s t serio us co nsequences fo r the bilateral relatio nship ndash let alo ne fo r the so lutio n o f the territo rial dispute and regio nalpeace ndash arise fro m the co ns tant intrus io ns o f Chinese o fficial vessels into the Co ntiguo us Zo ne (CZ) o r even Territo rial Waters(TW) o f the Senkaku Is lands s ince September 2012 and the gro wing invo lvement o f the armed fo rces o f bo th s ides The aim o f theChinese is o bvio us to demo ns trate that the Japanese can no lo nger claim exclus ive co ntro l o f the is lands and to fo rce To kyo toadmit the exis tence o f a territo rial dispute Apparently a task fo rce at the highes t level headed by Xi Jinping was set up in

September 2012 to achieve this go al thro ugh escalating pressure238 So far law enfo rcement actio ns by Japan in the Senkaku areahave been limited to the deplo yment o f the Japanese Co as t Guard and po lice which is no w ho wever co ns tantly challenged byChinese with patro ls by CMS and FLEC (s ince 22 July 2013 unified under the State Ocean Adminis tratio n and renamed China Co as tGuard CG) vessels asserting the same rights in the is lands` CZ and TW The Chinese s ide escalated its pressure o n Japan by firs tdeplo ying FLEC vessels in the CZ and TW o f the disputed is lands then ratcheting up their pressure with CMS vessels do ing the samefo llo wed later in December 2012 with air patro ls by CMS aircraft which led to the deplo yment o f the air fo rce o f bo th s ides inJanuary 2013

As we have seen after the September 2010 incident in No vember 2010 FLEC s tarted to regularly send its vessels to the Senkakuarea which entered fro m time to time the is lands` CZ and also in Augus t 2011 twice the TW Apparently the mo re serio usintrus io ns which are tho se into the TW were so metimes timed with specific spikes o f tens io ns such as the TW incurs io n o n 16March 2012 (the Japanese naming o f so me is lands) July 2012 (No da`s anno uncement o f purchase intentio n o n 7 July) and finallyo n 19 September when s ix vessels entered the TW s tarting a series o f mo re frequent and regular incurs io ns In December 2012

FLEC deplo yed its newes t and bigges t ship the 5800-to n FLEC vessel Yuzheng 206 a fo rmer ship o f the Chinese navy239

The entries o f the vessels o f the CMS into the is lands` CZ and TW seem meant to send an even higher degree o f warning and denialo f Japan`s co ntro l o ver the is lands On 17 September the number o f FLEC and CMS vessels in the CZ and TW had reached the reco rd

o f 17240 Thereafter the frequency o f incurs io ns into the CZ and TW increased but it decreased after March 2013 On 30 Octo berXinhua even repo rted that the CMS had `expelled a number o f Japanese vessels illegally sailing in waters aro und the Diao yu

Is lands` altho ugh it is no t clear what exactly this meant s ince the CG did no t co nfirm such an incident241 Acco rding to Xinhua NewsAgency in 2013 China sent 50 ldquopatro l miss io ns rdquo into the TW o f the disputed is lands and as o f 12 July 2014 by the autho r`s co unt

there had been 17 such Chinese ldquopatro l miss io ns rdquo in 2014 which are ldquoincurs io ns rdquo fo r the Japanese s ide242 Other needle pricks todemo ns trate China`s claims are the o ccas io nal incurs io ns o f Chinese survey ships into the Senkaku Is lands` EEZ o r the bo ardingo f Chinese fishing vessels in the EEZ Defence Minis ter Itsuno ri Ono dera in late Octo ber 2013 called these repeated incurs io ns a

threat to peace which fell in a ldquogray zo ne (between) peacetime and an emergency s ituatio nrdquo243

A new level o f depriving Japan o f the ability to claim so le effective co ntro l o ver the is lands was reached o n 13 December 2012 when

a small turbo pro p aircraft o f the CMS (Harbin Y12 type) flew o ver Uo tsurijima244 Since then regular CMS air patro ls have beenco nducted but the aircraft no rmally s tay abo ut 120 km fro m the is lands With this mo ve Chinese measures to undermine Japan`sco ntro l o ver the is lands were expanded to the air space which fo r o rganizatio nal reaso ns had immediately military implicatio nsbecause the Air Self Defense Fo rce (ASDF) is respo ns ible fo r intercepting aircraft which intrude illegally into Japan`s air space The

incident did no t happen o ut o f the blue because already in January 2012 the SOA had anno unced a plan to deplo y the Y12 in 2012245

On 24 September the SOA had also anno unced plans to deplo y dro nes by 2015 fo llo wing the success ful tes t the previo us day 246

The Chinese acts are apparently carefully planned and co o rdinated s ince the o fficials in the abo ve Kyo do repo rt also said that theairspace vio latio ns o n 13 December 2012 by an airplane o f the CMS was planned by the s taff sectio n o f the natio nal Land and SeaBo rder Defense Co mmittee which acts as a liaiso n o ffice fo r the Chinese military the State Oceanic Adminis tratio n and the fishing

bureau o f the Agriculture Minis try with the aim o f rais ing tens io ns 247

The lo w altitude flight o f the Y12 o n 13 December was particularly upsetting fo r the Japanese go vernment because it was no t pickedup by the ASDF radar (the clo ses t o ne being o n Miyako jima abo ut 200 km fro m the is lands) but ins tead by CG ships in the area Inthis case eight ASDF fighters s crambled but co uld no t detect the Y12 Interceptio n o f aircraft is by nature much mo re diff icult andcarries a certain risk o f accident as happened in 2001 when a US intelligence aircraft co llided with a Chinese intercepto r jet Witho ut

explaining the s tandard Japanese pro ceedures fo r aerial defence which so lely relies o n the ASDF the Chinese media interpreted theuse o f military aircraft by Japan as `aggress ive` and the Global Times cautio ned agains t any interceptio n warning that China might

respo nd by sending its air fo rce248 On the Japanese s ide even the centre-left Asahi Shimbun called the Y12 flight ` a highly

pro vo cative act that co uld lead to an armed co nflict between the two co untries`249 At the beginning o f January 2013 there wereapparently erro neo us repo rts that the ASDF might co ns ider firing warning sho ts (tracer bullets ) at intruding Chinese aircraft which

pro mpted further bellico se co mments in the Chinese press 250 As a co nsequence the Chinese air fo rce also became invo lved o n10 January when the Chinese Minis try o f Defence anno unced that the Peo ple`s Liberatio n Army Air Fo rce (PLAA) had sent two fighterjets agains t two ASDF F-15 intercepto rs because they were fo llo wing a Chinese military Y8 transpo rt aircraft patro lling the airspace

o f Chinese o il platfo rms in the Eas t China Sea251 The Japanese repo rted that mo re than ten Chinese aircraft including military

aircraft had appro ached the Japanese air defence identificatio n zo ne252 In a further escalatio n the Japanese s ide repo rted that o n11 June 2014 two Chinese military jets flew abno rmally clo se to two planes o f Japans Self Defence Fo rce abo ve the Eas t China Sea

an accusatio n which the Chinese s ide refuted speaking ins tead o f two incidents pro vo ked by Japanese fighters 253 Related to thisdevelo pment and further enhancing the po ss ibility o f an incident is the enhanced patro lling o f the PLAA o ver the Eas t China Seawhich caused the ASDF to increase scrambling agains t PLAA aircraft to 415 times between 1 April 2013 and 31 March 2014 (Fis cal

Year 2013) 109 times mo re than in the previo us Fis cal Year 2012254

Co ntinuing to increase the pressure o n Japan the Chinese go vernment decreed o n 23 No vember 2013 an Air Defence Identificatio nZo ne (ADIZ) which includes the airspace o ver the Senkaku Is lands and was certainly meant to reinfo rce China`s territo rial claimdespite the fact that an ADIZ has no territo rial implicatio ns in internatio nal law The threat o f military co untermeasures in the text o fthe decree (lsquoChinas armed fo rces will ado pt defens ive emergency measures to respo nd to aircraft that do no t co o perate in the

identificatio n o r refuse to fo llo w the ins tructio ns rsquo) has further heightened the po ss ibility o f a military clash255 Ho wever theJapanese s ide refuses to accept the ADIZ The Chinese mo ves have wider implicatio ns fo r peace and s tability in the regio n in o rderto pro tect the freedo m o f its military aircraft in Eas t As ian airspace and its ability to o bserve China`s military fo rces Washingto nrefused to reco gnise the zo ne co ntinued to igno re the requirements o f the ADIZ by pursuing its regular patro l f lights and criticisedits implementatio n Simultaneo us ly ho wever the Department o f State advised civilian airlines to fo llo w China`s ins tructio ns andVice Pres ident Biden advised bo th co untries o n his trip to No rtheas t As ia in December 2013 to es tablish a cris is managements tructure Since the US do es no t take a s tance o n the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands` so vereignty Washingto n seemed to igno re Japan`smain grievance abo ut the ADIZ which is China`s intentio n to further reinfo rce its so vereignty claim by extending the ADIZ o ver theis lands The mo s t far-reaching US s tatements were a reco nfirmatio n o f the applicatio n o f the security treaty to the is lands evenmentio ning the is lands by their Japanese and Chinese names and co mplaining that the Chinese actio n was an attempt to unilaterally

change the status quo in the Eas t China Sea which raised regio nal tens io n and increased the risk o f accident and miscalculatio n256

Ho wever in this way the Obama Adminis tratio n risked creating amo ng so me Japanese o bservers do ubts abo ut the Adminis tratio n`sreliability and so gave succo ur to China`s attempt to drive a wedge between the two allies Ano ther co mplicatio n is that the ChineseADIZ o verlaps that o f Ko rea and mo reo ver co vers the submerged ro ck called Ieo do in Ko rean and Suyan in Chinese which has animpact o n the no t yet demarcated EEZ bo rder between bo th co untries Interes tingly the Japanese ADIZ also co vers Ieo do but thishas never been underpinned by any Japanese EEZ claims But China kno ws ho w to play o n So uth Ko rea`s criticism o f Japan`sattitude to wards the his to ry is sue and the territo rial dispute with Japan o ver Do kto Takeshima is land Mo reo ver the As ian co untriesco ntes ting China`s claims to parts o f the So uth China Sea are co ncerned that China wo uld further co mplicate the territo rialdisputes in the area by es tablishing an ADIZ Yet the ASEAN member s tates have been very cautio us in directly criticis ing ChinaChina`s es tablishment o f the ADIZ directly affects many co untries because so many o f them have airlines flying thro ugh the zo neHo wever with the exceptio n o f Japan all o thers agred to co nfo rm with China`s reques t fo r no tif icatio n which undermines theJapanese go vernment`s po s itio n o f explicitly advis ing Japanese airlines no t to co nfo rm

With these escalating develo pments the Chinese s ide achieved its go al o f sho wing that the Japanese autho rities are no lo nger infull co ntro l o f the disputed is lands In the case o f Chinese Co as tguard vessel intrus io ns the reactio n o f the Japanese CG is limitedto shado wing the Chinese vessels to info rm them that they are vio lating Japan`s CZ o r TW and to ask them to leave whichho wever they do at their o wn dis cretio n (the time span ho vering in the CZ o r TW having beco me a further means o f Chinesepressure) fo llo wed by diplo matic pro tes ts Otherwise the CG has avo ided any phys ical co nfro ntatio n o r co ntact When co nfro ntedby the CG the Chinese vessels s imply declare (by radio o r even electro nic displays ) that they are patro lling Chinese waters and thatthe CG ships were o perating illegally in these waters This ritual has so far prevented vio lence This is in co ntras t to an exchange o fwater canno n salvo s between the CG and the Taiwanese co as t guard in the territo rial o f the Senkaku Is lands o n 25 September 2012

and again o n 24 January 2013257

The increase o f patro ls by Japan and China is caus ing o peratio nal s train fo r bo th s ides (also rais ing the risk o f miscalculatio ns o ro verreactio ns ) but this has no t reduced the willingness o f either go vernment to s cale do wn the almo s t daily demo ns tratio ns o f

`effective co ntro l` In Octo ber it was repo rted that the CG no w always maintains ten vessels agains t eight fro m China258 The 11th

regio nal headquarters respo ns ible fo r the Senkaku area is in Naha and has nine patro l ships (but o nly seven vessels o f at leas t

1000 to ns ) but no w needs additio nal ships which are dispatched fro m o ther regio nal headquarters 259 In April 2012 the CG had ato tal o f 357 patro l vessels but o nly 51 o ver 1000 to ns which are tho se mo s t needed fo r a far flung area like the Senkaku

Is lands 26 0 On 14 September 2012 Senio r Vice Minis ter o f Fisheries Iwamo to Tsukasa mentio ned plans to increase the number o f

fishery patro l vessels to ensure fishermens safety amid intens ifying territo rial disputes with China and So uth Ko rea26 1 On 26Octo ber the Minis try o f Land Infras tructure Transpo rt and To urism which heads the CG anno unced plans to increase budgetary

reques ts fo r mo re ships 26 2 The Abe go vernment plans to build mo re vessels o r advance the calendar retro fit vessels which were to

be retired and is co ns idering extending the retirement age o f the o fficers 26 3

The Chinese have fewer vessels which can be deplo yed as far as the Senkaku Is lands In additio n leave o f the sailo rs has been

res tricted and their deplo yment length at sea has increased26 4 In March 2013 the Chinese s ide anno unced clo ser co o peratio nbetween the military and vario us maritime law enfo rcement agencies as well as the merger o f fo ur maritime law enfo rcementagencies under the State Ocean Adminis tratio n (adminis tered by the Minis try o f Land and Reso urces ) ie the China MarineSurveillance the co as t guard fo rces o f the Public Security Minis try the fisheries law enfo rcement co mmand o f the Agriculture

Minis try and the maritime anti-smuggling po lice o f the General Adminis tratio n o f Cus to ms 26 5

Ano ther wo rrying develo pment is the gradual invo lvement o f the PLA navy (PLAN) and the Maritime Self Defence Fo rce (MSDF) TheJapanese MOD anno unced o n 16 Octo ber 2012 that fo r the firs t time PLAN ships were o bserved navigating in the 22-km-wide CZbetween Yo naguni and Irio mo te is lands altho ugh the minis try left o pen the po ss ibility that they did so in o rder to avo id a typho o n

Nevertheless the Gaimusho so ught explanatio ns fro m the Chinese abo ut these ship mo vements 26 6 In December 2012 fo ur PLANships sailed thro ugh the CW o f the Irio mo te-Yo naguni is lands o n the way back fro m drills in the Pacific after having go ne into the

Pacific thro ugh the mo re no rmal ro ute o f the s trait between the Okinawan main is land and Miyako jima26 7 Again there was no thingillegal abo ut it but it raised attentio n at a time o f tens io ns Ho wever there are s igns o f greater co o peratio n o f the PLAN withChinese Co as t Guard vessels as was sho wn in the s tando ff between China and the Philippines aro und the disputed Scarbo ro ugh

Sho al in the So uth China Sea and jo int exercises to o k place between the three in the Eas t China Sea in Octo ber 201226 8 The

patro lling activities o f the MSDF in the Senkaku area became kno wn when the Japanese repo rted at the end o f January 2013 that o n19 January a Chinese frigatersquos target radar had lo cked o nto an MSDF helico pter and o n 30 January ano ther frigate sailing clo se to

an MSDF des tro yer did likewise The Chinese vehemently denied it26 9 Ho wever in March this year the Kyo do news agency repo rtedthat senio r Chinese military o fficials had admitted the incident o f 29 January Even mo re wo rriso me is that the Chinese vessels

acted apparently witho ut prio r appro val fro m the fleet co mmand o r navy headquarters All this was denied by the Chinese s ide270 Itdid no t help that under Prime Minis ter No da the MSDF had been o rdered after the eruptio n o f the 2012 cris is to keep a greaterdis tance fro m PLAN ships than the hitherto 3 km in o rder avo id incidents but this po licy was reversed by the mo re hawkish Abe

adminis tratio n to the previo us 3 km dis tance271 The fire radar lo cking incident had happened at a dis tance o f 3 km

Agains t the backgro und o f greater invo lvement o f military fo rces it is particularly regrettable that a plan to build a maritime liaiso n

mechanism between their defense autho rities o n which they had agreed in June 2012 to make later that year was shelved272

Unfo rtunately it is s till Chinese practice to co ns ider Co nfidence Building Measures (CBM) no t as the firs t s tep to build co nfidencebut as a to o l to extract fro m the o ther s ide prio r co ncess io ns under the pretext o f `creating a better atmo sphere` fo r dis cuss ingCBM The o utbreak o f the September 2012 cris is was therefo re a co nvenient pretext fo r the Chinese to cancel the pro ject Thelates t co nfirmatio n was in March 2013 when General Yin Zhuo explained that there co uld be no military trus t if the po litical and

diplo matic relatio nship is bad273 Since the target radar lo ck-o n incidents the Japanese go vernment is publicly calling fo rresumptio n o f nego tiatio ns fo r the maritime liaiso n mechanism but the Chinese will certainly want to extract so me co ncess io nsbefo re even co ns idering a po s itive respo nse

Ho wever the co ns tant co nfro ntatio n between the po licing and military fo rces o f bo th s ides co uld eas ily lead to a military clasheither as a result o f an unfo reseen civilian o r military incident miscalculatio n o r malicio us intentio n at a lo wer level o f co mmandTwo recent examples o f unfo reseen civilian incidents co uld have escalated One is the attempted landing o n o ne o f the disputedis lands by a Chinese pro tes ter with a ballo o n in January 2014 This incident was peacefully reso lved because Japan did no t arres t theballo o nis t In this case the firs t repo rt o n the crash-landing in the territo rial waters o f Uo tsurijima came fro m the Taiwanese co as tguard which info rmed the Japanese co as t guard fo llo wed by the hand-o ver o f the ballo o nis t to the PRC autho rities o uts ide o f

Japan`s territo rial waters 274 The o ther incident was the s inking o f a Chinese fishing bo at ldquoto the no rth o f the Diao yu Is landsrdquo and

the mo ve o f two Chinese naval () vessels to rescue the crew275 This autho r co uld no t find o ut ho w clo se the fishing bo at came tothe is lands and apparently there has no t been any further repo rting abo ut the incident

The previo us ly mentio ned radar-targeting incidents and these two civilian incidents have no t led to an escalatio n but there is noguarantee fo r the future Shi Yinho ng a pro fesso r at Renmin Univers ity predicts that the territo rial co nflicts in the ECS So uth ChinaSea and alo ng the Sino -Indian bo rder will intens ify because o f po pular natio nalism dynamics within the armed fo rces and o f co urse

also o ur to p leaders perso nal beliefs and s trategic perso nalities 276 Hugh White argues that a war (which co uld lead to a nuclearexchange between China and the US) co uld also begin because the Chinese leadership may co ns ider that s tarting ho s tilities no wrather than later wo uld be mo re beneficial to either tes t US reso lve to defend Japan (which the Chinese leadership do ubts ) anddetermine the is sue o f Chinese supremacy in the As ian regio n which he co ns iders to be the real is sue rather than the is lands

themselves 277

IS THERE A WAY FORWARD

The current co nfro ntatio n is no t o nly co ntinuing but even escalating and do mes tic develo pments in bo th co untries are no t creatingan atmo sphere mo re co nducive to better management o f the cris is let alo ne finding a so lutio n Inactio n runs the risk o f a furtherescalatio n o r even a military clash while po s itive o ptio ns are beco ming fewer Meanwhile bo th co untries suffer fro m the eco no micfall-o ut and heightened tens io ns while the integratio n o f a ris ing China into a new s trategic enviro nment in As ia will beco me evenmo re fraught cas ting a shado w o n Japan`s clo se relatio nship with the US

The 2010 incident ended quickly with Japan`s release o f the captain One reaso n fo r this is certainly the fact that China`s demand in2010 was relatively clear and achievable (release o f the captain) if painful fo r Japan at a time o f a weak and inexperiencedgo vernment This time in September 2012 the cris is firs t hit a go vernment which reacted intrans igently because o f its previo usdefeat and o ther unfavo urable do mes tic circumstances and was then replaced by the mo re hawkish Abe go vernment The Abecabinet`s attitude to wards the pas t as exemplif ied by vario us s tatements by cabinet members and peo ple clo se to it the attempt torevise the Ko no s tatement reco gniz ing the fo rced war pro s titutio n (the military co mfo rt wo men) and Abe`s Yasukuni Shrine vis itall served China`s anti-Japan pro paganda wo rsened Japan-Ko rea relatio ns which China is cleverly explo iting and even angered theUS adminis tratio n Abe is seen as utiliz ing the tens io ns with China to win do mes tic and internatio nal suppo rt fo r Japan to have aldquono rmalrdquo natio nal defence po s ture The latter is welco me by the US adminis tratio n because it wo uld help with the US As ianrealignment and suppo rt its China po licy At the same time China`s actio ns cas t an o mino us shado w o n its intentio ns in the So uthChina Sea and Abe and mo re impo rtantly the US is suppo rting the claimants there agains t China

Under these bilateral multilateral and regio nal circumstances wo uld China be satis fied with go ing back to the `unders tanding abo utsetting as ide the dispute` in co njunctio n with Japan`s reco gnitio n o f the exis tence o f a territo rial dispute o r wo uld it demand areversal o f the purchase o f the three is lands Wo uld it demand the end o f Japanese CG patro ls aro und the is lands China`ss tandard demand no w that Japan `co rrect its mis takes` is rather ambiguo us because it co uld be interpreted as go ing back to theshelving unders tanding and the reco gnitio n o f the exis tence o f a dispute o r demanding a reversal o f the go vernment`s purchase o f

the is lands 278 The latter wo uld s imply be impo ss ible in legal and practical terms and o ne can o nly ho pe that the ambiguity is o nlyaimed at rais ing China`s nego tiatio n po s itio n ando r leaving eno ugh wiggle ro o m fo r nego tiatio ns which wo uld satis fy all Chineses takeho lders` interes ts

It seems that it is already to o late fo r go ing back to the shelving agreement o f 19721978 which wo uld imply that the two s ides canso meho w go back to the status quo o f the 1970s This as we have seen has been superseded by deeds and wo rds o n bo th s ides The Chinese have no w no t o nly publicly declared that the shelving agreement was lsquobro kenrsquo by Japan but after the firs t Y12 patro l o n13 December 2012 co mmented that ldquoThe s ituatio n has changed It has beco me no rmal fo r Chinas marine surveillance vessels to

enter the 12-nautical-mile zo ne Japans actual co ntro l o ver the is lands has go nerdquo279

The bilateral relatio nship has deterio rated to the extent that at leas t shelving the co nflicting so vereignty claims without o fficiallyadmitting that there is a territo rial dispute is no lo nger an o ptio n acceptable to China because it feels Japan has abused theshelving co nsensus thro ugh a series o f adminis trative measures with the final s traw having been the central go vernmentrsquos purchaseo f three is lands When s tudying the vario us Chinese o fficial s tatements and news repo rts after the 2012 cris is had fully erupted inSeptember it beco mes clear that until Octo ber 2012 the Chinese s till raised the demand that Japan sho uld go back to the previo uslsquounders tandingrsquo o r lsquoco nsensus rsquo but this demand was no t made o ften thereafter It reappeared in remarks by Wang Jiarui the head o fthe Co mmunis t partys Internatio nal Department when meeting Yamaguchi Natsuo the leader o f the junio r co alitio n partner

Ko meito in January 201328 0 Previo us ly a co mment o n the Xinhua internet s ite o n 29 Octo ber said that ldquoThe lsquopurchasersquo sho wed thatthe Japanese go vernment has who lly abando ned the attitude o f laying as ide disputes and has fundamentally changed the

s ituatio nrdquo28 1 On 30 Octo ber the CMOFA spo kesperso n declared that lsquoJapans illegal purchase o f the Diao yu Is lands bro ke the

impo rtant co nsensus The Japanese s ide sho uld no t have any mo re illus io n o f o ccupying the Diao yu Is lands What the Japaneses ide sho uld do is to face up to the reality admit the so vereignty dispute co rrect mis takes and co me back to the track o f a

nego tiated settlement`28 2 The lates t o fficial pro po sal to shelve the is lands is sue was made by the fo rmer fo reign minis ter Tang

Jiaxuan o n 16 July 201428 3

The reco gnitio n o f a territo rial pro blem wo uld be relatively easy fo r Japanese public o pinio n (and even mo re so fo r Japanrsquos friendsand allies ) to accept because they wo uld no t see the need fo r any kind o f diplo matic o r legal so phis try fo r what is o bvio us ly aterrito rial co nflict whatever the legitimacy o f the Chinese claim might be given also the fact that the current Japanese po s itio nco mes do wn to refus ing to even dis cuss whatever settlement might be po ss ible Acco rding to a survey co nducted by Genro nto gether with Zho ngguo Ribao she in June 2012 627 per cent o f Japanese agreed that there exis ts a territo rial pro blem dispute

(176 disagreed) co mpared with 822 o f the Chinese (139 disagreed)28 4 Ho wever co nsecutive Japanese cabinets haverefused to reco gnise the exis tence o f a territo rial dispute which is o ften the default po s itio n o f a go vernment in actual co ntro l o f adisputed territo ry (fo r example the Ko rean go vernmentrsquos po s itio n o n Do kto Takeshima) This po s itio n has been reinfo rced by theexplicit Japanese denial s ince the 1990s o f a shelving agreement which wo uld have been an implicit admiss io n that there is adispute To circumvent the risk o f being perceived as admitting the exis tence o f a territo rial pro blem the deputy prime minis ter o fthe previo us No da go vernment Okada Katsuya was repo rted to have mentio ned in a speech in Octo ber 2012 that there was no

territo rial dispute but as a matter o f fact a debate exis ted28 5 Ho wever this co mpro mise so lutio n was never co nfirmed by the No dago vernment and did no t beco me po licy It is even less likely to be acceptable to the new Abe go vernment Even amo ng influentialo pinio n makers there is hardly any suppo rt fo r admitting the exis tence o f a territo rial co nflict o r o f a shelving agreement Even mo reco nciliato ry s tatements o n this subject are rather vague Maehara Seiji o f the Demo cratic Party declared in a co nference at QinghuaUnivers ity in Beijing in September 2013 that the Japanese go vernment sho uld add (to its o wn po s itio n) that China has a differentview (Senkakusho to wo meguru Niho n seifu no tachiba ni tsuite lsquoChugo ku ga chigau kangaekata wo mo tte iru to iuko to wo ichigen

tsukekuwaerubeki darsquo) At the same time he emphas ised ho wever that there was no territo rial dispute28 6 Japan Bus inessFederatio n Chairman Yo nekura Hiro masa mentio ned in September 2012 in an NHK interview that the go vernment sho uld be mo re

flexible s ince o therwise its s tance co uld be taken to mean that Japan has no intentio n o f so lving the dispute28 7 Miyamo to Yuji thefo rmer Japanese ambassado r to China is quo ted as saying that lsquoThe go vernment do es no t need to alter its bas ic po s itio n but in

reality a co nflict do es exis t o ver the Senkaku is les rsquo 28 8 This is also the s tance which the previo us Japanese ambassado r Niwa

Uichiro takes in an article after his return to Japan28 9

Co ncerning co nflict reso lutio n it is interes ting to no te that when asked abo ut the mo dern s ignificance o f the 1978 Japan-ChinaPeace and Friendship Treaty 68 4 o f the po lled Japanese agreed with Art 12 (lsquoThe two parties shall settle all disputes by peacefulmeans and shall refrain fro m the use o r threat o f fo rcersquo) but o nly 525 o f the Chinese agreed Mo reo ver 58 1 o f the Chinese

favo ur China s trengthening its co ntro l o ver the area29 0

If therefo re a new ldquoimplicit unders tandingrdquo abo ut shelving the dispute is achievable it wo uld have to be based o n learning fro m thefailures o f the 19721978 shelving ie it wo uld be necessary to achieve a mutual unders tanding o f what the s tatus quo is whatwo uld undermine the s tatus quo and what has to be do ne to mo ve fro m co nflict management to so lutio n Quite clearly such a newunders tanding wo uld be less favo urable to Japan`s current s tance o n the dispute

FROM CONFLICT MANAGEMENT TO ADDRESSING THE SOVEREIGNTY ISSUE

Any mo ve fo rward will certainly require decis ive leadership o n bo th s ides be it to take the initiative o r to respo nd po s itively to theinitiative o f s tarting the pro cess to wards reso lutio n In view o f the co mplex backgro und o f the external and internal dynamics it iso bvio us that address ing the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands dispute requires a s tep-by-s tep appro ach The ultimate is sue to address is theso vereignty is sue and territo rial disputes are generally viewed as zero sum in nature given their clo se link to co re securityinteres ts Even tho se who reco gnize the impo rtance o f transcending such lo gic in favo ur o f co ndo minium o r shared so vereigntygenerally ho ld that the is sue can o nly be addressed at the las t s tage o f any nego tiated pro cess if at all

Two impo rtant is sues have to be co ns idered at the beginning to what extent have the vario us s tages o f the nego tiating pro cess tobe agreed befo rehand (lsquoro ad maprsquo) o r even the final o utco me whether a viable co ndo minium o r o nly shelving the is sues and co uldthe ro le o f a third party mediato r be helpfulacceptable In view o f the po litical diff iculties o n bo th s ides the s tart o f thenego tiatio n pro cess wo uld be endangered if there is no t sufficient ro o m fo r ambiguity and interpretatio n abo ut the vario us s tages altho ugh the general aim o f tens io n reductio n and suspens io n o f the so vereignty is sue mus t be clearly agreed

A third party mediato r is pro bably no t acceptable to the Chinese s ide The third party mo s t o ften mentio ned is the Internatio nalCo urt o f Jus tice (ICJ) o r any kind o f internatio nal arbitratio n Ho wever this seems unlikely in view o f China`s preference fo rbilateral nego tiatio ns and its refusal to accept judicial settlement by the ICJ o r any internatio nal arbitratio n except in no n-po litical

areas such as trade29 1 The Japanese go vernment wo uld be willing to accept the jurisdictio n o f the ICJ but o nly if China brings the

case to the Co urt les t it be perceived as ackno wledging the exis tence o f a territo rial dispute29 2 But there are also po litical andpro cedural arguments agains t the reco urse to the ICJ China`s legal argumentatio n is co mparatively weak and s ince a negativejudgement co uld have implicatio ns fo r China`s legal claim to mo s t o f the So uth China Sea there is even less o f a chance o f Chinamaking an exceptio n fo r the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands dispute In view o f the entrenched po s itio ns o f bo th s ides and the risk o f a`winner takes all` o utco me o f internatio nal litigatio n bo th go vernments wo uld face co ns iderable do mes tic res is tance in case o f anegative o utco me In view o f the urgency o f the dispute and the lo ng time it takes fo r a judgement there wo uld also be the risk o fdo mes tic fo rces trying to pre-empt a negative result

In view o f the security is sues invo lved (let alo ne the American his to rical `debt` as a result o f Washingto n`s ambiguity related toWashingto n`s ending o f the adminis tratio n o f Okinawa in 1972) an American mediatio n co uld be seen as natural and even inAmerican interes ts Such an American ro le ho wever is extremely unlikely as it wo uld be seen by China as unduly advantageo us toJapan Ho wever at so me po int during the Japan-China nego tiatio n pro cess the US might ass is t (o r even be reques ted) by agreeingto certain Co nfidence and Security Building Measures (CSBM) in the area aro und the is lands

The firs t s tage wo uld have to co ns is t o f measures which reduce the risk o f a military clash but in a way which prevents theperceptio n that o ne s ide is giving in to co ercio n This s tage wo uld be a gradual phas ing o ut o f intrus io ns by Chinese o fficial vesselsand aircraft into the territo rial waters co ntiguo us zo ne and airspace o f the is lands which is recipro cated by Japanrsquos reducing in thesame way its co as tguard patro ls in the two zo nes as well as its s crambling activities in the is lands` airspace There were repo rts in

June 2013 that China called o n Japan to agree to a 12-nautical-mile no -entry zo ne aro und the is lands 29 3 Japan rejected this co urse

Ano ther measure wo uld be to increase the dis tance at which vessels o f bo th maritime fo rces o bserve each o ther Such s teps sho uldultimately be o fficialised by a gradually expanding series o f CSBMs and a bilateral liaiso n mechanism This co uld also include ademilitarisatio n agreement as an incentive fo r the Chinese s ide It wo uld be vital that the s teps at this s tage be incremental that nos tep is explo ited in a o ne-s ided way and that they are co ns idered irrevers ible At the same time bo th s ides have to prevent peo plefro m appro aching the is lands s ince this wo uld be seen as a pro vo catio n by the o ther s ide This latter task is technically no t easy

because o f the co ntro vers ial character o f any co mpro mise with certain no n-s tate acto rs in Japan China Ho ng Ko ng and Taiwan The(failed) landing o f a Chinese ho t ballo o n o n o ne o f the is lands in January 2014 demo ns trated at the same time the technical

diff iculty o f a no -entry po licy as well as the po ss ibility o f a success ful co o peratio n o f the co as tguards o f all three co untries 29 4

At this firs t s tage o r leading to the next there will have to be a Japanese go vernment s tatement to the effect that there is alsquopro blemrsquo related to the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands This can be wo rded in such a way that the sens itive express io n `territo rialpro blem` (which is s trenuo us ly denied by the go vernment) is avo ided and it can be supplemented by a sentence that such as tatement in no way prejudices the legal po s itio n o f the go vernment Such a qualifying s tatement is fo r example included in the

Japan-China agreement fo r prio r no tif icatio n o f research vessels fro m bo th co untries in the Eas t China Sea in 200029 5 A s imilarqualif icatio n is part o f the 1997 Japan-China Fisheries Agreement In the jo int co mmuniqueacute o f 1972 which no rmalised diplo maticrelatio ns between Japan and China diplo matic wo rding also managed to bridge the huge gap between their s tances o n Taiwan whichthe PRC co ns iders an lsquoinalienable partrsquo o f its territo ry Japan co ns iders the so vereignty is sue s till unreso lved because the 1951 SanFrancis co Peace Treaty Art 2 (b) o nly s tipulated that lsquoJapan reno unces all right title and claim to Fo rmo sa and the Pescado res rsquowitho ut clarifying the recipient o f the territo ry The co mpro mise in 1972 was reached with the sentence that Japan lsquofully unders tandsand respects this s tand o f the Go vernment o f the Peo ples Republic o f China and it f irmly maintains its s tand under Article 8 o f thePo tsdam Pro clamatio nrsquo

POSSIBLE APPROACHES TO THE SOVEREIGNTY ISSUE

The mo s t diff icult pro blem is the so vereignty is sue which go es to the co re o f any co untry`s security interes ts It is no t imaginablethat either s ide will reno unce its claim to the is lands Sides tepping o r shelving the is sue is o nly useful if the lesso ns fro m the 1972and 1978 attempts as o utlined abo ve can be learned and applied but there is s till the fundamental pro blem with the implicitassumptio n that the quality o f the bilateral relatio nship will always be as go o d as when the s ides tepping agreement was achievedand can be maintained in perpetuity o r until the so vereignty is sue can be addressed But in o rder to so lve the so vereignty is sue aneven better relatio nship has to be created This better relatio nship co uld be bro ught abo ut by the s teps explained abo ve and furtherbelo w

An impo rtant co nditio n fo r any las ting territo rial co mpro mise wo uld be reducing the value o f the is lands fo r bo th co untries whichcan be achieved by o ne o f the measures pro po sed fo r s tage 1 ie reso lutely preventing anyo ne fro m appro aching the territo ries(including to tal demilitarizatio n) which in themselves are eco no mically wo rthless and are uninhabited The main po int is to preventany go vernmental act which co uld be interpreted as being part o f the `so vereignty game` The mo s t diff icult part here is to preventany act by no n-go vernmental acto rs This wo uld have to include the territo rial waters and the explo itatio n there in o f any kind o freso urces including fishing Scientif ic interes ts in the is lands co uld be served by bilateral surveys witho ut any po litical co nno tatio ns

There have been pro po sals to declare the is lands an Internatio nal Nature and Wildlife Preserve29 6 Such a preserve wo uld have to beadminis tered either bilaterally o r by a relevant internatio nal o rganisatio n and as such co uld serve as a co nfidence-building measure

The abo ve s teps wo uld then allo w the two s ides to deal with the co ns iderable eco no mic interes ts in fishing and the explo itatio n o fhydro carbo n reso urces and o ther seabed reso urces aro und the is lands ie in the Exclus ive Eco no mic Zo ne ando r the ExtendedCo ntinental Shelf Once the is lands` land area and the territo rial waters have been put as ide it wo uld be eas ier to co me to ano verall agreement o n the delimitatio n o f the EEZ bo rder (with the exceptio n o f the no rthern part which wo uld require a trilateralagreement between China Japan and Ko rea) which wo uld include the delimitatio n o f these surro unding waters It wo uld facilitate aco mpro mise if bo th s ides agree that the is lands do no t merit their o wn EEZ This might be diff icult fo r Japan which claims an EEZ fo rOkino to rishima refuted by China s ince it co ns iders the reef no t to be an is land acco rding to Art 121 o f UNCLOS

A co mpro mise o n the so vereignty is sue co uld o nly be the o utco me ndash if at all ndash o f a success ful pro cess o f the abo ve o r co mparables teps In o rder to avo id a `winner take all` s ituatio n the co mpro mise wo uld have to invo lve a sharing arrangement His to ry o ffers

quite a number o f internatio nal precedents o f shared so vereignty referred to as co ndo minium in internatio nal law29 7 One case withso me s imilarities to the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands is a small is land (3000 sq m) in the river separating France and Spain kno wn asPheasant Is land o r Co nference Is land which even to day s till changes every s ix mo nths between France and Spain as o wner Like theSenkakuDiao yu Is lands the is land has no eco no mic value anymo re and the is land is o ff limits It was the lo catio n o f the s igning o f

the Treaty o f the Pyrenees in 1659 which ended a lo ng war 29 8 Mo s t o ther examples o f jo int so vereignty co ncern territo ries with apo pulatio n which makes co o peratio n much mo re diff icult Other his to rical precedents o f sharing so vereignty are the es tablishmento f ldquoneutral zo nesrdquo Acco rdingly the is lands and po ss ibly a sea area aro und the is lands co uld be declared a neutral zo ne like the o nebetween Saudi Arabia and Kuwait (1922-1965) On July 7 1965 the two go vernments s igned an agreement (which to o k effect o nJuly 25 1966) to partitio n the Neutral Zo ne adjo ining their respective territo ries A demarcatio n agreement dividing the NeutralZo ne was s igned o n December 17 1967

Particularly relevant here is that Saudi Arabia as well as Kuwait explo ited the o il reso urces under a jo int o perating agreement29 9

Co nclus io ns

The actio n-reactio n pattern o f the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands dispute is accelerating and the initiative seems to be mo re o ften thanno t with the Chinese s ide while the Japanese s ide is in a defens ive po s itio n The danger o f a military co nfro ntatio n is lo o mingincreas ingly larger in what co uld be called a lsquochicken gamersquo At the same time the internal and external dynamics are undermining theenviro nment which is required fo r a peaceful so lutio n as well as fo r maintaining the number o f po s itive o ptio ns While the Japanesego vernment refuses to ackno wledge the very exis tence o f a territo rial dispute the Chinese go vernment is no w (July 2014) evenrefus ing to have a dialo gue with Japan`s current prime minis ter It is po ss ible that the Chinese s ide again wants to wait with anymo ve fo rward until the Japanese prime minis ter has changed as Beijing did with Prime Minis ter Sato Eisaku o r with Prime Minis terKo izumi Junichiro But waiting fo r an impro vement o f the bilateral atmo sphere as the Chinese s ide likes to s tress is a very riskyo ptio n and such an impro vement may anyway be a very sho rt windo w o f o ppo rtunity if lo o king at the ups and do wns o f the po s t-1949 his to ry o f the bilateral relatio nship

To s tart a s tep-by-s tep pro cess o f address ing the territo rial is sue s tro ng leadership is required which unders tands the widerinteres ts o f a functio ning Japanese-Chinese relatio nship Japan s imply asking China fo r a summit meeting is no t very sens ible ifthere is no willingness to engage in subs tantive dis cuss io ns and wo uld be very risky fo r China`s to p leader if the Japanese primeminis ter then vis its the Yasukuni Shrine The his to ry is sue sho uld no lo nger be a Chinese lever fo r pressuris ing Japan but the latterhas to abs tain fro m actio ns which are seen as pro vo cative no t o nly by China but also by Ko rea the US and many o thers There hasto be a co mmitted leadership o n bo th s ides which s tarts with a ro ugh ro ad map and tens io n-reducing s teps such as CSBMs en ro uteto agreeing o n a fo rmula which allo ws the parties to o btain eco no mic as well as security gains while reducing tens io ns

Reinhard Drifte is Emeritus Professor of Japanese Politics University of Newcastle UK and Visiting Professor at various Japanese Universities andPau University (France) He is the author of Japanrsquos Foreign Policy for the Twenty First Century His home page is here

Reco mmended citatio n Reinhard Drifte The Japan-China Confrontation Over the SenkakuDiaoyu Islands--Between shelving and dispute

Ozawa Ichiro ) this had changed by 2010 The minis ter in charge o f the CG (which is under the Minis try o f Land Infras tructureTranspo rt and To urism) o n the day o f the incident was Maehara Seiji a kno wn defence hawk who then became Minis ter o f Fo reignAffairs in a cabinet reshuffle o n 17 September He was therefo re much mo re at liberty to take a hard-line s tance agains t China whilethe DPJ pres idential electio n ndash wo n again by Kan Nao to ndash to o k place o n 14 September fo llo wed by the prime minis ter`s departure toNew Yo rk to attend the UN General Assembly o n 22 September The fo reign minis ter befo re the 17 September was Okada Katsuyawho was also mo re inclined to take a s tro ng s tance Maehara as well as Okada had seen the CG`s video o f the co llis io n which co uld

no t but have left them with a very negative impress io n o f the Chinese captain`s actio ns 129 It certainly did no t help when Maehara inhis new po s t as fo reign minis ter qualif ied China`s reactio n in the Diet o n 18 September as `very hys terical` and then declared o n

21 September that there had never been an unders tanding abo ut shelving the territo rial dispute130 On 23 September Secretary o fState Hillary Clinto n assured vis iting Fo reign Minis ter Maehara that the Senkaku Is lands were co vered by the bilateral Japan-USSecurity Treaty an interventio n that was certainly also no t welco me to the Chinese Ho wever there have been speculatio ns that inexchange fo r this s tro ng US reco nfirmatio n o f the security guarantee in o rder to get o ut o f the s talemate the Japanese had to

pro mise to release o f the Chinese captain which o ccurred the fo llo wing day131

The 2010 incident had several co nsequences which made a recurrence very likely Firs t o f all the incident raised tens io ns to a degreelas t seen during the anti-Japan demo ns tratio ns in 2004 and 2005 which had been mainly co ncerned with Japan`s attempt to gain apermanent UN Security Co uncil seat and the his to ry is sue These tens io ns had made it impo ss ible to have any new nego tiatio nro und to co nclude a treaty abo ut co o peratio n in the explo itatio n o f hydro carbo n reso urces in the Eas t China Sea and thus reduceano ther majo r so urce o f bilateral tens io ns and o ne mo reo ver related to the Senkaku is sue Agains t this backgro und but also inline with its previo us po s itio n Japan rejected a Chinese pro po sal made in Octo ber 2010 fo r jo int reso urce develo pment in the

Senkaku area132 The legal aftermath o f the incident co ntinued fo r so me time with Japan claiming co mpensatio n fro m the Chinesecaptain fo r the damage caused to the two CG vessels which was rejected by China and co untered with demands fo r co mpensatio nand an apo lo gy The Japanese pro secuto r dro pped the case agains t the captain o nly in January 2011 but the CG s till sent a bill to

the captain in February 2011133

While the incident helped the Japanese go vernment to o btain s tro ng US suppo rt o n the applicability o f the bilateral security treaty tothe Senkaku Is lands and generally helped to co nvince the Japanese public abo ut the need fo r greater Japanese defence effo rts(including a s trengthening o f US leverage vis-agrave-vis Japan co ncerning the realignment o f its fo rces o n Okinawa) it reduced Japan`sindependence with respect to the degree o f suppo rt it pro vided fo r US China po licy

Seco ndly the incident further undermined the co nditio ns which were the fo undatio n fo r the uno fficial shelving o f the Senkaku is sueIf it was no t yet clear to everybo dy that there was a territo rial dispute o ver the Senkaku Is lands then this incident with theunprecedented Chinese sanctio ns agains t Japan lifted the las t remnants o f do ubt Maehara Seji who repeated o n 25 o ccas io ns inDiet debates between 10 September and 16 No vember 2010 that there exis ted no territo rial dispute made this o fficial po s itio n

even less co nvincing134 The incident pro mpted Beijing to publicly undermine Japan`s territo rial claim further by anno uncing o n 29Octo ber 2010 permanent deplo yment o f large fisheries patro l vessels in waters near the Senkaku Is lands which was recipro cated by

the CG deplo ying patro l vessels o f o ver 1000 to ns in the same area135 In a further tit-fo r-tat o n 17 December 2010 the city

go vernment o f Ishigaki the adminis trative autho rity o f the Senkaku Is lands passed an o rdinance to des ignate 14 January the day to

co mmemo rate the Senkaku Is lands` inco rpo ratio n in 1895136

The further ero s io n o f the shelving agreement after Octo ber 2010

The next majo r co nfro ntatio n o ver the Senkaku Is lands in September 2012 o ccurred agains t the backgro und o f mo re measurestaken by bo th s ides to suppo rt their respective territo rial claims and do mes tic circumstances in bo th co untries which were evenless co nducive to re-es tablish trus t and go o d relatio ns The gro wing US-China po litical and military rivalry in Eas t As ia asexemplif ied by the As ia pivo t which China perceives as directed agains t its rise certainly did no t help Initially the year 2011 saw areco very o f relatio ns fro m the 2010 incident Bilateral trade reached a new high with a vo lume o f $345 billio n Japanese fo reign

direct inves tment in China so ared nearly 50 per cent in 2011 to $6 3bn137 Mo reo ver the Chinese public was very impressed with thedis ciplined way the Japanese peo ple reacted to wards the triple disas ters which hit the co untry o n 11 March 2011 and there was an

o utpo uring o f sympathy which also included the sending o f a Chinese search-and-rescue miss io n to the affected To ho ku area138

Yet this impro ved atmo sphere was quickly dispelled when the results o f the textbo o k review were published o n 27 March whichasserted Japan`s territo rial claim to the Senkaku Is lands (as well as to TakeshimaDo kto ) and denied the Chinese figure o f

300 000 victims in the Nanjing massacre139

In the meantime the Japanese go vernment co ntinued to turn the legal s crews which affected the Senkaku Is lands by implementingdo mes tic laws in o rder to be co ngruent with internatio nal law and s trengthening maritime co ntro l In February 2012 the Japanesecabinet passed bills to enhance the Japan Co as t Guards law enfo rcement po wers in territo rial waters which wo uld fo r example

autho rize the CG to o rder fo reign ships to leave Japan`s Territo rial Waters witho ut firs t bo arding them140 Other adminis trativemeasures derived fro m the Bas ic Law o n Ocean Po licy which had been enacted in 2007 and which pro vides the framewo rk fo radminis trating remo te is lands Since 2009 Japan has given names to hitherto unnamed is lands to subs tantiate its claims to anEEZ Fo r this purpo se in Augus t 2011 the go vernment placed 23 uninhabited is lands under s tate co ntro l but fo ur is lets near theSenkaku Is lands were exempt o ut o f co ns ideratio n fo r China In March 2012 ho wever the go vernment abando ned this cautio n and

regis tered Kitako jima as a natio nal asset141 In No vember 2011 the go vernment had let it be kno wn that it wo uld sho rtly release a

new lis t o f names fo r is lands which wo uld include is lets o f the Senkaku gro up142 China pro tes ted and a meeting in Beijing plannedin February 2012 between Pres ident Hu Jintao and representatives o f seven bilateral friendship gro ups fro m Japan was cancelled Ano pinio n piece in the Peoples Daily (RMRB) o n 17 January 2012 said Japans mo ve lsquois a blatant mo ve to damage Chinas co re

interes ts rsquo143 On 2 March 2012 To kyo finally anno unced a lis t o f 39 is lands which included fo ur is lets in the Senkaku Is lands

gro up144 The Chinese pro tes ted immediately o n the same day and in a tit-fo r-tat the State Oceanic Adminis tratio n released o n 3

March s tandard names and descriptio ns o f the Senkaku is lands and its 70 affiliated is lets 145 Ano ther Chinese co untermo ve was theanno uncement o n 16 March by the SOA that they had s tarted patro lling near the Senkaku Is lands This was fo llo wed pro mptly o n thesame day by o ne CMS ship entering the Territo rial Waters o f the Senkaku Is lands and the same vessels with ano ther CMS ship

cruis ing in the Co ntiguo us Waters o f the is lands 146 In No vember 2010 an o fficial o f the Minis try o f Agricultures Bureau o f Fisherieswhich o perates the Fisheries Law Enfo rcement Co mmand (FLEC) had already anno unced that his o rganizatio n wo uld fro m no w o n

deplo y fisheries patro l vessels o f o ver 1000 to ns to maintain co ntinuo us patro ls 147

THE 2012 CONFRONTATION ISHIHARA SHINTARO LIGHTING THE FUSE

It was in this tense enviro nment that To kyo Go verno r Ishihara Shintaro anno unced o n 16 April 2012 that the To kyo Metro po litanGo vernment (TMG) was nego tiating the purchase o f three o f the fo ur privately-held Senkaku is lands by the end o f the year ie

Uo tsurijima Kita Ko jima and Minami Ko jima The lease o f the central go vernment fo r these three is lands was due to expire in March2013 and no incident wo uld have o ccurred if the go vernment had quietly renewed the lease The central go vernment s tated that ithad no t kno wn abo ut Ishihara`s intentio n but that there had been co ntacts o n vario us o ccas io ns between the go vernment and the

private o wner148 This seems co nvincing s ince s tate o wnership wo uld have pro vided better preventio n o f incidents even mo re thanjus t leas ing Taken aback by Ishihara`s surprise mo ve the Chief Cabinet Secretary Fujimura Osamu declared the fo llo wing day thatthe central go vernment might acquire the is lands `if required` and Prime Minis ter No da implied in a Diet speech o n the 18 April that

a purchase by the central go vernment was o ne o f the o ptio ns Bo th s tatements were widely repo rted in China149 Ishihara hadcho sen his anno uncement fo r maximum effect o n the o ccas io n o f a speech at the co nservative Washingto n DC-based HeritageFo undatio n He made it clear that this pro ject was meant as a criticism o f the DPJ-led central go vernment which he co ns ideredfailing in its duty to sufficiently pro tect Japan`s so vereignty by saying that the central go vernment sho uld be buying the is lands butthat the Gaimusho was to o afraid o f o ffending China The lo catio n o f his anno uncement was meant to gain s tro nger suppo rt fro m

the US fo r Japan`s territo rial claim150 As we have seen abo ve fro m Ishihara`s activities in the 1970s this anno uncement was inmany ways the lo gical co nclus io n o f his lo ng las ting o bsess io n with the Senkaku Is lands and his hatred o f co mmunis t China It wasthe 2010 incident in particular which had enco uraged him to renew his o ld plan o f buying the is lands after his earlier failure to do so His go o d co nnectio ns with the o wner Kurihara Kunio ki who shared his natio nalis t pro clivities helped Ishihara to beco me the

favo ured purchaser151

The po ss ibility o f having the three is lands under the co ntro l o f the natio nalis tic go verno r o f To kyo who wanted to build facilities o nthe is lands to s trengthen Japan`s so vereignty was unpalatable to the No da go vernment which feared co mplicatio ns with China In a

meeting o n 18 May No da and his to p advisers decided in principle to purchase the is lands 152 Pressure o n the go vernmentincreased to pre-empt Ishihara because he was as to nishingly success ful in rais ing vo luntary co ntributio ns fro m the public to buythe three is lands thus circumventing any legal diff iculties in us ing To kyo `s taxpayer mo ney and also pro ving the po pularity o f his

mo ve By 1 June he had co llected 70 000 do natio ns to taling aro und yen101 billio n which increased to yen146 billio n by 6 September153

On 27 July the TMG ran an advertisement in the Wall Street Journal asking fo r US unders tanding and suppo rt fo r the purchase plan154

The TMG had to reques t central go vernment permiss io n to co nduct a survey o f the is lands which the go vernment refused to grant

o n 27 Augus t fo rcing the TMG to co nduct a survey fro m a ship o n 2 September155 In the end it was the higher sum and the sho rtes tdelay o f co ncluding the deal which pro mpted Kurihara Kunio ki who was apparently in so me financial diff iculties to accept the centralgo vernment`s o ffer o f yen205 billio n ($26 millio n) and to s ign the co ntract o n 11 September This was an embarrass ing turn fo rIshihara In additio n he did no t succeed in us ing the o ffer o f his co llected mo ney to entice the No da go vernment to pro mise thebuilding o f any facility o n the is lands No da was presented by his adminis tratio n with several o ptio ns including his favo ured o ptio no f repairing the exis ting light ho use o n Uo tsurijima but in the end was co nvinced by Fo reign Minis ter Gemba to leave things as they

were in o rder no t to further inflame the Chinese156

The central go vernment`s purchase o f the three is lands o n 11 September immediately led to a very harsh reactio n by the Chinesewhich was even wo rse than in 2010 But befo re lo o king at Chinese co untermeasures after 11 September in detail it is impo rtant toinves tigate why the Chinese reactio n was so s tro ng and why the Japanese apparently did no t anticipate it particularly in view o fChina`s unprecedented reactio n in September 2010

CHINESE WARNINGS BEFORE THE NATIONALIZATION ON 11 SEPTEMBER

Prime Minis ter No da admitted o n 19 September o nly eight days into the co mprehens ive Chinese sanctio ns and co unter measures

that he had underes timated their extent157

158 In a named co mmentary o f Xinhua o n 18 April attentio n was drawn to Ishihara`s kno wn right wing and anti-Chinese s tatementsbut also po inted o ut that the CMOFA `wo uld no t hes itate to take any necessary measures to safeguard so vereignty o ver the Diao yu

Is lands`159 Vice-Pres ident Xi Jinping to ld vis iting Ko no Yo hei a kno wn pro -China hand that Japan sho uld no t wo rsen the bilateral

relatio nship and that co re is sues sho uld be reso lved by the two co untries in an appro priate manner16 0 At the end o f April the StateOceanic Adminis tratio n anno unced a plan to des ignate is lands and their surro unding waters as s trategically vital and to pro tect their

enviro nments and develo p marine reso urces 16 1 Mo re specifically targeting the Senkaku Is lands was ho wever the entry o n 3 May o f

two FLEC vessels into the Senkaku Is lands` Co ntiguo us Waters fo r the firs t time s ince Ishihara`s anno uncement16 2 Bilateraltens io ns also increased after a Japanese right wing gro up suppo rted the ho lding o f a meeting o f the Wo rld Uyghur Co ngress in

To kyo fro m 14 to 18 May which led to the cancellatio n by Beijing o f several o fficial vis its 16 3 On 13 May Premier Wen Jiabao raisedthe Senkaku is sue and the Uighur meeting during talks in Beijing with Prime Minis ter Yo shihiko No da cautio ning that lsquoit is impo rtant

to respect Chinarsquos co re interes ts and matters o f great co ncernrsquo16 4 Wang Jiarui head o f the Co mmunis t Partys Internatio nalDepartment was quo ted by Eda Satsuki a fo reign po licy adviser o f the DPJ that bo th the Senkaku and the Uighur is sue were

described as `co re is sues` and Wen`s s tatement was s tressed in a Chinese TV bro adcas t16 5 The Xinjiang is sue as well as Taiwanand Tibet have been referred to fo r so me time by the Chinese go vernment as `co re is sues` but the Senkaku is sue had been called

a `co re is sue` apparently fo r the firs t time o nly in an o pinio n piece by the Renmin Ribao in January 201216 6 Only o n 23 March 2013did the Chinese Fo reign Minis try Spo kesperso n clearly s tate that China regards the Diao yu Is lands as its co re interes t altho ugh the

written reco rd subsequently so ftened this s tatement16 7

The abo ve chro no lo gy certainly gives the impress io n that there was a series o f Chinese reactio ns which expressed s tro ng Chineseco ncern with any purchase (whether by the TMG o r the central go vernment) o f the Senkaku Is lands If that had no t been eno ugh theinterview o f the Financial Times with Japan`s ambassado r in China Niwa Uichiro at the beginning o f June sho wed s tro ng co ncernabo ut the implicatio ns o f a purchase He was quo ted as saying that lsquoif Mr Ishihararsquos plans are acted upo n then it will result in anextremely grave cris is in relatio ns between Japan and ChinahellipWe canno t allo w decades o f pas t effo rt to be bro ught to no thingrsquo He

added that such a cris is wo uld affect bus iness 16 8 Niwa mus t have been truly co ncerned abo ut the severity o f the s ituatio n to makesuch an undiplo matic public s tatement fo r which he was reprimanded by Fo reign Minis ter Gemba and criticized by so me media

o utlets and po liticians ultimately leading to his recall later in the year16 9

The Chinese warnings became sharper at the seco nd s tage when Prime Minis ter No da anno unced o n 7 July that his go vernment wo uldseek to buy the is lands because the purchase co uld no lo nger be put do wn to a mere lo cal maverick with s tro ng anti-Chineseinclinatio ns The Global Times edito rial o f 9 July sho wed the frus tratio n by so me Chinese lsquoEach time Japan takes o ne s tep we sho uldtake o ne and half o r even two s teps fo rward making Japan aware o f the grave co nsequences caused by its aggress io n agains t

Chinarsquo170 A Xinhua co mmentary o n 7 July quo tes the CMOFA`s spo kesperso n referring pro bably fo r the firs t time in this ro w to a`co nsensus` agains t which the Japanese go vernment went by wanting to buy the is lands meaning o f co urse the shelving co nsensus

o f 1972 and 1978171 On 9 July a Xinhua co mmentary titled `Japan playing with fire o ver Diao yu Is lands` called the purchase by the

central go vernment a `farcical ambitio n` an express io n repeated thereafter many times 172 On 11 July the Japanese media repo rtedthe entry by three FLEC vessels into the territo rial waters o f Kubajima the firs t time s ince the 16 March 2012 fo llo wed by o ne vessel

cruis ing the fo llo wing day in the is land`s co ntiguo us zo ne173 Public o pinio n became increas ingly inflamed and the Global Timesrepo rted o n 19 July that 90 8 per cent o f Chinese peo ple surveyed appro ve us ing the military to enfo rce Chinas so vereignty o ver

the is lets with 521 per cent saying a military clash lsquois likelyrsquo between China and Japan o ver the is lands 174

Even the US gave Japan `s tro ng advice` no t to pro ceed with the purchase because it co uld `trigger a cris is` as was revealed in April2013 by Kurt Campbell who was at the time Ass is tant Secretary fo r Eas t As ian and Pacific Affairs Even tho ugh we warned JapanJapan decided to go in a different directio n and they tho ught they had gained the suppo rt o f China o r so me did which we were

certain that they had no t Campbell is quo ted in an interview with Kyo do 175

FAILURE OF COMMUNICATION

The abo ve chro no lo gy and escalatio n o f Chinese reactio ns to the planned purchase o f the is lands o ver the summer 2012 give aclear indicatio n that a Japanese purchase o f the three is lands was no t co ns idered jus t ano ther incident witho ut majo rco nsequences So why did the Japanese go vernment s till go ahead with the purchase In the final analys is the failure to avo id thecris is escalating in September 2012 lay in the wide difference between the interes ts o f the two go vernments Do mes ticcircumstances o n bo th s ides and the inherent zero sum nature o f territo rial disputes prevented the trans itio n fro m dialo gue topreventive actio n let alo ne so lutio n Aggravating events o ver the summer 2012 which raised tempers o n bo th s ides were thedemands by the TMG to send a survey team to the Senkaku Is lands (the No da go vernment after so me initial co nflicting repo rts didno t allo w a landing) the landing o f Ho ng Ko ng activis ts o n Uo tsurijima o n 15 Augus t (timed with the anniversary o f Japan`ssurrender) fo llo wed by the landing o f Japanese activis ts ( including lo cal parliamentarians ) o n 19 Augus t and an attack in Beijing o n27 Augus t o n the car carrying Ambassado r Niwa Despite o ngo ing co mmunicatio n and dialo gue thro ugh vario us channels theseadverse circumstances led to a hardening o f po s itio ns o ver the summer 2012 between the two go vernments

The Japanese central go vernment had been caught sho rt by Ishihara`s sudden anno uncement o n 16 April and became to tallyabso rbed with preventing the maverick po litician fro m go ing ahead with the purchase o f the is lands fearing rightly that this wo uldserio us ly co mplicate Japan-China relatio ns Ishihara wanted to embarrass the No da go vernment which was co ns tantly declining inpo pularity and to fo rce it to deal mo re assertively with the is lands As we have seen fo r Ishihara it was no t jus t abo ut purchas ingthe is lands but abo ut building facilities o n them Fo r the No da go vernment buying the is lands by the s tate was therefo re the lesserevil The go vernment tried all alo ng to co nvince the Chinese o f To kyo `s go o d intentio ns fo r example when Fo reign Minis ter Gembamet with his Chinese co unterpart Yang Jiechi o n 11 July that the purchase was o nly a `do mes tic co mmercial transactio n` and no t a

diplo matic matter and was o nly meant to ensure that the is lands wo uld be `adminis tered peacefully and s tably`176 In December2012 when the full extent o f China`s unprecedented reactio ns had beco me kno wn the new Japanese ambassado r Kitera s till s tatedthat lsquoThe change in o wnership sho uld no t have caused a pro blem in relatio ns with Chinarsquo adding that Japan had given China sufficient

explanatio ns ahead o f the purchase177 Fo reign Minis ter Gemba even tried to highlight in No vember that the purchase was actually areturn to the status quo ante lsquoThe measure taken by the go vernment o f Japan was jus t a trans fer o f title under Japanese do mes ticlaw and jus t means that the o wnership o f the is lands mdash held by the go vernment until 1932 mdash was returned fro m a private citizen to

the go vernmentrsquo178 In sho rt fo r the Japanese the purchase o f the is lands was aimed at maintaining the status quo in such a waythat it ho ped China wo uld co ns ider to be in its o wn interes t that is by cho o s ing the lesser o f two evils That express io ns like`peaceful adminis tratio n` o r `trans fer o f title under do mes tic Japanese law` co uld o nly be interpreted by the Chinese as acts o fasserting Japanese so vereignty was apparently s imply igno red Under these circumstances it was impo ss ible to co nvince theChinese that trans fer o f o wnership had no thing to do with so vereignty Ins tead the Chinese even suspected that the No da

go vernment and Ishihara were co nniving at s trengthening Japan`s co ntro l o ver the is lands 179

Any intended co nciliato ry o verto ne in the abo ve explanatio ns by Gemba and many s imilar declaratio ns befo re and later were furthernegated by the ins is tence that there was no territo rial dispute exactly the po s itio n the Chinese mo s t so ught to change Thefrequent references to `co re interes t` by China were igno red by the Japanese go vernment Fo r the Chinese leaders the `o ffer` tocho o se between the To kyo Metro po litan Go vernment o r the Go vernment o f Japan buying the is lands was as Vice Fo reign Minis ter

Zhang Zhijun later put it like being asked to cho o se between two do ses o f po iso n18 0

It was also unfo rtunate that the Japanese go vernment allo wed the express io n kokuyuka (natio nalizatio n) to prevail even amo ng

go vernment members ins tead o f the o riginal term agreed by the Japanese cabinet shutoku (acquis itio n)18 1 Chinese media hastaken o ver the Japanese term o f lsquonatio nalizatio nrsquo which certainly further co nfused Chinese public o pinio n Since it do es no t kno w thehis to rical backgro und and Japan`s effective co ntro l o f the is lands `natio nalizatio n` tended to be unders to o d as a radical change in

the status quo o r even as invas io n18 2 A well kno wn Japanese o bserver in China Kato Yo shikazu even argued therefo re that the 1972

and 1978 unders tanding abo ut shelving had prevented the Chinese peo ple fro m learning abo ut the is sue as perceived in Japan18 3

Bo th s ides made it impo ss ible with their extreme and diametrically o ppo sed po s itio ns to find a co mpro mise The No da go vernmentwas to o weak (and also to o preo ccupied with o ther is sues like the pass ing o f the law to intro duce a hike o f the value added taxco ping with the aftermath o f the triple disas ter o f March 2011 and s imply trying to s tay in po wer) to find an alternative to the no wabando ned `shelving co mpro mise` and to admit that there was a territo rial pro blem At the end o f Augus t No da was fo rced topro mise Lo wer Ho use electio ns `so metime so o n` despite the grim o utlo o k fo r his party`s chances in the electio ns Making aco mpro mise o n the territo rial is sue wo uld no t have helped to gain po pular suppo rt While the Chinese pro bably felt enco uraged toescalate pressure by their success in fo rcing the Japanese go vernment hand o ver the captain in September 2010 it mo s t likely hadthe effect o n the No da go vernment to remain inflexible in o rder to avo id being seen yet again as caving in to Chinese pressure Butthe Chinese were also no t able to co mpro mise o n their demand that the Japanese sho uld admit the exis tence o f a territo rial is sue

The preparatio n fo r the 18 th Natio nal Party Co ngress in No vember 2012 and the ensuing leadership change to be finalized o nly inspring 2013 s imilarly did no t allo w the Chinese leaders whether inco ming o r o utgo ing to appear so ft Eight o ut o f nine Po litbureaumembers publicly expressed o ppo s itio n to the purchase either befo re o r after the anno uncement o f the purchase o n 11

September18 4 There are also credible repo rts that during the CCP`s summer retreat to Beihaide in Augus t Hu Jintao came underpressure fro m the future gro up o f leaders to take a mo re severe po s itio n o n Japan`s intentio n to natio nalise the three is lands Asa result the leading fo reign po licy interlo cuto rs o f the Japanese go vernment Zhang Zhijun and Dai Bingguo hardened their po s itio n

as well18 5 Public o pinio n in China had gro wn increas ingly ho s tile to Japan o ver the summer and was particularly inflamed when thelanding o f the Ho ng Ko ng activis ts was fo llo wed by the landing o f Japanese activis ts which were treated by the Japanese autho ritiesmo re leniently than the fo rmer ie no t arres ted despite having vio lated private land leased to the s tate Rio ts in several Chinese

cities s tarted thereafter18 6

Altho ugh bo th s ides agreed to co ntinue dialo gue and several o fficial meetings at different levels to o k place they co uld o nly end inres tating kno wn po s itio ns China did no t make things eas ier by later cancelling such meetings depriving bo th s ides o f po ss ibleo ppo rtunities to find a breakthro ugh The s tart o f Chinese sanctio ns acro ss the who le gambit o f bilateral relatio ns deprived theJapanese o f even mo re do mes tic wriggle ro o m fo r a co mpro mise

It seems that the abo ve circumstances did no t allo w Japan`s central decis io n-makers co ncerned with the is sue in particular the

Prime Minis ter and his immediate circle to admit to ando r unders tand until the purchase anno uncement o n 11 September 2012ho w s tro ngly the Chinese felt abo ut it Ambassado r Niwa`s rather undiplo matic s tatements in the Financial Times interview seem toindicate that he felt that the central decis io n-makers did no t unders tand the s trength o f the feelings o f the Chinese and ho w far theymight go Niwa warned in his interview that even a po ss ible pre-purchase survey o f the is lands co uld be diplo matically incendiary

s ince such a survey was dis cussed already at the time to enable the TMG to go ahead with the purchase18 7 As late as the 3September the Yomiuri Shimbun repo rted that the Chinese go vernment was reacting calmly as lo ng as three co nditio ns wereo bserved to maintain the status quo The co nditio ns co ntained no o ppo s itio n to a po ss ible purchase and ins tead jus t mentio ned

abs tentio n fro m landing surveying and building facilities o n the is lands 18 8 Acco rding to Pro fesso r Takahara Akio General ZhuChenghu said o n 5 September that a purchase by the central go vernment wo uld be better and Qu Xing directo r o f the China Ins titute

o f Internatio nal Affairs is said to have expressed a s imilar o pinio n18 9 Even o n 12 September when the s to rm bro ke the deputydirecto r o f the Japan Ins titute o f the Chinese Academy o f So cial Science Gao Ho ng s tated in an interview with the o n-line vers io no f the Renmin Ribao that if Japan wo uld respect the three abs tentio ns mentio ned abo ve the s ituatio n co uld ultimately revert to the

status quo ante19 0 But these were no lo nger the decis ive vo ices o f the Chinese leadership after the Beihaide meeting The abo ve-mentio ned Campbell interview seems to sugges t that Japan was lo ng befo re mo re inclined to act upo n Chinese s tatements whichwere clo ser to what it wanted to unders tand

CHINESE REACTION RHETORICAL WARFARE

The final misco mmunicatio n o r clash o f irreco ncilable interes ts o ccurred when Prime Minis ter No da met Pres ident Hu o n thes idelines o f the As ia Pacific Eco no mic Co o peratio n (APEC) summit in Vladivo s to k o n 9 September then anno unced two days laterthe s igning o f the purchase co ntract with the Kurihara family Whether Hu had no t sufficiently co nveyed his s tro ng feelingsco ncerning the purchase which had been kno wn and bilaterally dis cussed at leas t s ince the Japanese o fficial anno uncement o f itspurchase intentio n o n 7 July o r No da had no t unders tanding the Chinese feeling fo r the po ss ible reaso ns dis cussed abo ve Hu

apparently felt he had lo s t face when Japan anno unced the purchase o n 11 September19 1 Mo reo ver the Japanese anno uncementco uld no t have co me at a mo re awkward time because o f the anniversary o f the Mukden Incident o n the 18 September which likeseveral o ther carefully cultivated anniversaries regarding Japan`s pas t misdeeds in China always aro use latent anti-Japanesefeelings As a result the Japanese anno uncement caused an avalanche o f virulent rheto rical o utburs ts relating to the pas t po liticalsanctio ns further measures to assert China`s territo rial claim (fo r example including the is lands in the Chinese TV weatherfo recas t an exhibitio n o f ancient maps to pro ve Chinese co ntro l) eco no mic sanctio ns and an escalatio n o f patro ls by ChineseFLEC and MSA ships and aircraft aro und the Senkaku Is lands

The mildes t part o f China`s rheto rical o ffens ive was calling the go vernment purchase a `farce` a rather undiplo matic express io nalready used by Xinhua in July 2012 but then taken up at the highes t level by Vice Pres ident Xi Jinping when meeting Secretary o f

Defence Leo n Panetta o n 19 September19 2 But the main line fro m no w o n was that Japan`s claim to the Senkaku Is lands was adenial o f the po s t-Wo rld War II results In its s tatements and rebuttals the Chinese sho wed their frus tratio n at no t having been ableto fundamentally change the status quo and they did no t hes itate to use express io ns which were rather undignified fo r diplo mats andpo litical leaders Japan o n the o ther hand argued fo r peaceful reso lutio n alo ng the lines o f internatio nal law and dialo gue whichpro bably infuriated the Chinese even mo re On 10 September the CMFA is sued a s tatement calling Japans po s itio n o n the disputedis lands `an o utright denial o f the o utco mes o f the victo ry o f the Wo rld Anti-Fascis t War and hellip a grave challenge to the po s t-war

internatio nal o rder`19 3 In a heated exchange at the UN General Assembly between Chinas UN ambassado r Li Bao do ng and JapansDeputy UN ambassado r Ko dama Kazuo Li called the mo tive fo r purchas ing the three is lands to lsquolegalize its s tealing and o ccupatio no f Chinese territo ryrsquo and s tated lsquoThis actio n o f Japan co ns titutes a serio us encro achment upo n Chinas so vereignty and intends toco ntinue and legalize the result o f Japans co lo nial po licy It is an o pen denial o f the o utco mes o f victo ry o f the wo rld anti-fascis twar and a grave challenge to the po s t-war internatio nal o rder and the purpo ses and principles o f the Charter o f the United

Natio ns rsquo19 4 In a further rebuttal o f Japan`s assertio n o f its claim Li characterized the is land purchase as lsquono thing different fro m

mo ney launderingrsquo19 5 At the As ia Euro pe Meeting (ASEM) in Lao s Fo reign Minis ter Yang Jiechi repeated the reference to the`o utco me o f the anti-Fascis t war` while Prime Minis ter No da spo ke o f peaceful reso lutio n o f co nflicts acco rding to internatio nal

law19 6 On 11 Octo ber the CMFA spo kesperso n Ho ng Lei refuted Fo reign Minis ter Gembarsquos his to rical acco unt jus tifying Japan`s

claim by calling it `gangs ter lo gic`19 7

On the Chinese s ide therefo re there are no w two clo sely-linked his to ry narratives o ne is abo ut the is lands having been part o fChina s ince the Ming and Qing dynas ties the o ther co nnects the is lands to the already well-rehearsed his to ry narrative ie Japanhaving victimised China s ince the Sino -Japanese war o f 1894-95 These two narratives co ntinue to be cultivated by the Chineseleadership In Octo ber 2012 the Chinese anno uncement o f the publicatio n o f 80 vo lumes o n the Far Eas t War Criminal Co urt was

clearly meant to link the latter narrative to Japan`s acquis itio n o f the Senkaku Is lands 19 8 Fo rmer Fo reign Minis ter Gemba explicitlytried in Octo ber 2012 to delink the territo rial is sue fro m Japan`s aggress io n agains t China o nly to be reminded by the Chineseambassado r to the UK in an article in the Financial Times (as part o f the ensuing wo rldwide press campaign by bo th s ides ) that lsquothe

Diao yu Dao is sue is all abo ut his to ryrsquo19 9 Since then until no w China has co ntinued this ldquohis to ry warfarerdquo by publishing endlessarticles o n Japan`s aggress io n agains t China befo re 1945 The mo s t recent mo ve in July 2014 is the serialised o n-line publicatio n o f

the hand-written co nfess io ns by 45 Japanese co nvicted war criminals by the State Archives Adminis tratio n20 0

POLITICAL SANCTIONS AND PUBLIC OPINION

Chinese po litical co untermeasures ranged fro m the cancellatio n o f o fficial and uno fficial vis its to further legal acts to reinfo rce

China`s claim to the Senkaku Is lands Aro und 40 per cent o f ceremo nial events in Japan to mark 2012 as the 40 th anniversary o f the

no rmalizatio n o f diplo matic relatio ns with China were cancelled o r po s tpo ned and even mo re events in China20 1 Thesecancellatio ns were no t always the result o f direct go vernment interventio n but so metimes mo re indirect o fficial `dis co uragement`helped by the Chinese preference fo r no t being seen to do so mething in co ntradictio n to the (initially fo mented and later self-pro pelling) anti-Japan atmo sphere o r by fear o f participants running into demo ns tratio ns if no t assaults The legal s crews werefurther turned with lo ng-term implicatio ns On 10 September the Chinese go vernment anno unced the base po ints and baselines o f

the territo rial waters o f the disputed is lands and their affiliated is lets as well as the names and co o rdinates o f 17 base po ints 20 2

On 16 September repo rts appeared that China was submitting pro po sals fo r its extended co ntinental shelf to the UN Co ntinental

Shelf Co mmiss io n which included the Senkaku Is lands but in fact the actual submiss io n o ccurred o nly o n 14 December 201220 3 On

20 September a go vernment agency published a thematic map o f the Diao yu Is land and its affiliated is lands 20 4 Chinarsquos

Meteo ro lo gical Adminis tratio n s tarted pro viding weather fo recas ts fo r the Senkaku area o n the s tate-run TV s tatio n20 5 On 16September the fishery bureau anno unced the lifting o f the fishery ban in the Eas t China Sea and s tressed that China planned to

s trengthen its so vereignty claim o ver the Senkakus 20 6

There were rumo urs that 1000 fishing vessels wo uld co me to the Senkaku area and tho ugh this did no t materialize it helped to

further raise tens io ns 20 7

Mo st attentio n in Japan was fo cused o n the widening s treet pro tes ts in o ver 100 Chinese cities the des tructio n o f Japanese sho ps

res taurants cars and pro ductio n facilities and the attacks o n Japanese citizens in China20 8 The webs ites o f at leas t 19 Japanese

banks univers ities and o ther ins titutio ns came under cyber-attack20 9 At a demo ns tratio n in Shanghai abo ut 7000 pro tes ters

chanted s lo gans such as lsquoBeat Japanese imperialismrsquo lsquoBo yco tt Japanese pro ducts rsquo and lsquoDes tro y Japan and retrieve Okinawarsquo210

Altho ugh o nly 63 per cent o f po lled Japanese in late September 2012 expressed suppo rt fo r their go vernment`s natio nalizatio n o fthe is lands do wn fro m 73 per cent in a previo us po ll o n 15 and 16 September 82 per cent o f respo ndents in a Mainichi Shimbun

survey said the Japanese go vernment had no t pro tes ted s tro ngly eno ugh to Beijing o ver anti-Japan pro tes ts 211 The Chinesego vernment denied any o fficial invo lvement and the spo kesperso n o f the Waijiao bu went o nly as far as saying that the pro tes ts anddemo ns tratio ns were `co mpletely caused by the Japanese go vernments illegal purchase o f the Diao yu Is lands and are peo ples

spo ntaneo us acts`212 There were ho wever repo rts that so me o f the demo ns tratio ns were to lerated if no t abetted by go vernment

agencies 213 The demo ns tratio ns so o n died do wn because to lerating them much lo nger wo uld have run the risk that they wo uld turninto anti-go vernment demo ns tratio ns Even the Chinese Academy o f So cial Sciences repo rted that so me demo ns trato rs who were

arres ted did no t even kno w where the Senkaku Is lands were and that anger o ver the widening wealth gap was behind their acts 214 Inco ntras t to these Chinese demo ns tratio ns and acts o f lawlessness there was hardly any public demo ns tratio n in Japan whichsho ws the relative detachment o f the Japanese fro m the dispute On 22 September `Nippo n Gambare` a right wing o rganizatio nchaired by fo rmer Air Self Defence Fo rce chief Tamo gami To shio s taged a march thro ugh parts o f To kyo which this autho rwitnessed A brief fire was s tarted at a Chinese scho o l in Ko be and two smo ke bo mbs were thro wn into the Chinese Co nsulate

General in Fukuo ka215 But such actio ns were relatively rare and small in s cale

ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND THE QUESTION OF WHO IS MORE DEPENDENT ON WHOM

Pro tes t measures o f a lo nger duratio n and as yet unpredictable co nsequences fo r the bilateral relatio nship have been China`seco no mic sanctio ns and a bo yco tt o f Japanese go o ds by the general public altho ugh the autho rities denied again any go vernmentinterventio n A co mmentary o f Xinhua half admitted ho wever go vernment interventio n when it made the unco nvincing dis tinctio nbetween `measures` and `sanctio ns` `Since Japan purchased Chinas Diao yu Is lands in September the Chinese go vernment hastaken a series o f co untermeasures in the eco no mic legal diplo matic and military fields which have helped it to wres t the initiativeto reso lve the is lands dispute despite China no t impo s ing any eco no mic sanctio ns the Japanese eco no my has been badly

hit`216 Renmin Ribao co mpared `eco no mic punishments` with a `gun` and warned that thro ugh its is land purchase Japan hadalready to uched the `trigger` In a rather heavy hint the paper po inted o ut ho w vulnerable Japan`s eco no my was because o f the

2011 earthquake and the dependence o f key eco no mic secto rs o n China217 Even mo re o fficial was Vice Minis ter o f Co mmerce Jiang

Zengwei`s warning that the is land purchase wo uld inevitably have a negative impact o n Sino -Japanese eco no mic and trade ties 218

After 11 September it so o n became very o bvio us that the heavy hand o f the Chinese go vernment was impo s ing sanctio ns andmaking life fo r Japanese bus iness mo re diff icult On 21 September it was repo rted that Chinese cus to ms autho rities were

s trengthening inspectio ns o f impo rts fro m and expo rts to Japan altho ugh the Chinese autho rities denied this 219 In the same week

repo rts appeared abo ut Japanese co mpanies experiencing delays in o btaining wo rking visas fo r their Japanese emplo yees 220 BigJapanese co mpanies with inves tments in China were experiencing ho ld-ups in gaining regulato ry appro vals fo r Merger amp

Acquis itio ns 221 In co ntras t to the interference in rare earth expo rts to Japan after the trawler incident in 2010 ho wever no such

embargo was implemented because this particular eco no mic weapo n had lo s t its effectiveness s ince then (see belo w)222

The greates t medium-term damage to Japanese eco no mic activities apart fro m the abo ve mentio ned des tructio n o f Japaneseco mmercial and indus trial s ites was caused by a partial co nsumer bo yco tt no tably the fall o f car sales in China and Chineseto urism to Japan Overall bilateral trade decreased by 39 per cent in 2012 to $329 billio n the firs t dro p s ince the co llapse o f theLehman inves tment bank in 2009 and in 2013 to $3125 billio n acco rding to Chinese figures Acco rding to Japanese figures trade in

2013 increased but declined in vo lume223

The wo rs t hit secto r was auto mo biles To yo ta so ld 840 500 vehicles in China in 2012 the firs t annual dro p s ince 2002 Nis san

experienced a 24 per cent dro p in December China sales and Ho nda saw a 19 per cent December fall224 Ho wever as o f 2014Japanese car sales in and to China have again been increas ing The to uris t indus try was also hard hit in bo th co untries Chinese

vis ito rs to Japan decreased by 44 per cent fro m September to December 2012 fro m the year befo re225 The number o f Japanese

to uris ts o n gro up to urs to China plunged by mo re than 70 per cent year-o n-year in the las t three mo nths o f 2012226 This fallco ntinued into 2013 when their number fell to 29 millio n Japanese to uris ts do wn 18 2 fro m 2012 and the 3rd s traight annual

decline227 Ho wever in March 2014 vis ito rs fro m mainland China surged 80 1 fro m the previo us March to to tal 184200 a reco rdhigh fo r the mo nth and a s teeper year-o n-year rise than vis ito rs fro m any o ther co untries and regio ns This was also helped by the

falling yen and the resumptio n o f cruise to urs with large ships which were to tally suspended in March 2012228

Ano ther mo re lo ng-term negative eco no mic effect o n the bilateral relatio nship can be gauged fro m falling Japanese FDI to Chinawhich acco rding to Chinese figures declined by 422 in the firs t five mo nths o f 2014 after having fallen by 43 to $71 billio n in

2013 acco rding to Chinese figures o r by 18 to $10 9 billio n acco rding to Japanese figures 229

China`s multiple eco no mic retributio ns cas t do ubt o n the co ntinued viability o f the earlier `Ho t Eco no mics and Co ld Po litics`dicho to my The answer to the ques tio n which co untry is mo re dependent o n the o ther o r mo re vulnerable to sanctio ns is dependento n the eco no mic indicato rs and secto rs being cho sen and is also a po litical ques tio n because the answer can be po liticallymanipulated Japan`s eco no mic diff iculties s ince the 1990s (and its dependence o n eco no mic interactio n with China to co pe withthese diff iculties ) and China pushing Japan to No 3 in wo rld GDP ranking has diminished the Chinese perceptio n o f Japan as aneco no mic po wer ho use It means that fo r China the relatio nship with Japan became less impo rtant while po litical relatio nsdeterio rated at the same time The s tro ng effect o f the Chinese embargo o n rare earth expo rts to Japan in 2010 can be viewed intwo diametrically o ppo sed ways Chinese o bservers may be inclined to put emphas is o n the s tro ng effect it had o n Japanese publico pinio n and indus trial circles co ntributing to a certain extent to the go vernment`s surrender o f the trawler captain Others maypo int o ut that the case demo ns trated the futility o f abus ing a do minant supplier po s itio n because within a sho rt time Japan`sindus try secured alternative reso urces and demand reductio n thro ugh recycling and pro duct re-engineering no t o nly pro videdeno ugh breathing space but in the end reduced China`s market po wer Still Chinese experts are co nvinced that Japan is no w mo redependent o n China than the o ther way ro und Acco rding to so me specialis ts Chinas impo rts acco unted in 2011fo r 237 per cent o fJapan`s expo rt vo lume The bilateral trade vo lume in 2011 to o k up 21 per cent o f Japanese gro ss trade vo lume o f that year while it

merely acco unted fo r 9 4 per cent o f Chinas annual gro ss trade vo lume230 There seem to be o nly few Chinese vo ices which expressco ncern o ver the negative impact o f China`s sanctio ns o n China`s eco no my itself no tably at a time o f wo rldwide eco no mic

co ntractio n231

The Chinese market is certainly to o impo rtant fo r many Japanese co mpanies to leave A survey in No vember 2012 to which mo rethan 10 000 Japanese co mpanies in China replied sho wed that fo r almo s t 30 per cent o f them the territo rial dispute had affected

their bus iness but s till mo re than half want to maintain their o peratio ns and o nly 16 per cent said that they wanted to either cut

back o r pull o ut232 Japanese co mpanies in certain secto rs are likely to beco me mo re reluctant to make inves tments in China all themo re as o ther So utheas t As ian co untries (no tably Myanmar is currently the New Fro ntier fo r Japanese bus iness ) have cheaper

labo ur co s ts 233 Ho wever Chinese co nsumers s till prefer Japanese pro ducts fo r safer fo o d drinks and daily necess ities and tho se

Japanese co mpanies were hardly affected by the bo yco tt234

A wide gap between bo th s ides` perceptio n abo ut their eco no mic dependence and vulnerability to sanctio ns is dangero us fo r themanagement o f their bilateral relatio nship particularly when o ne s ide tries to leverage its suppo sedly s tro nger po s itio n to achievevicto ry in a sens itive area like territo rial integrity While Chinese co mmentato rs and experts may be inclined to o verrate Japan`svulnerability their Japanese co unterparts have a tendency to lo o k at the is sues to o much in purely eco no mic terms neglecting theimpact o f Chinese emo tio ns and go vernment pro paganda as well as the wider public`s insufficient kno wledge abo ut the o verall

impact o f bad eco no mic relatio ns with Japan o n China`s o wn eco no my235 The Japanese perceptio n remains that China in the endneeds Japan mo re than the o ther way ro und which in view o f China`s huge pro blems and its dependence o n Japanese hightechno lo gy co mpo nents fo r its manufacturing indus try is arguably the case This Japanese perceptio n has fo s tered the co nvictio nas demo ns trated fo r example by the belief in the sus tainability o f `Ho t Eco no mics and Co ld Po litics` that despite recurring

po litical crises in the relatio nship China wo uld in the end co mpro mise as it had do ne several times in the pas t236 Yet the pro blemwith the perceptio n o f `needing Japan` is that it can be po litically manipulated particularly in an autho ritarian sys tem This gapbetween Japanese and Chinese o bservers and experts o n the is sue o f dependence can serio us ly influence the willingness o f bo th

s ides to co mpro mise237 It also challenges the liberal view that clo se eco no mic relatio ns can prevent o r at leas t so ften deeppo litical differences like territo rial co nflicts which mo reo ver are linked to eco no mic interes ts like hydro carbo n reso urces In thisco ntext it is interes ting to no te that China has recently been exchanging with Japan a number o f high-po wered bus iness delegatio ns(apart fro m exchanges with po litical parties and lo cal go vernment o fficials ) The willingness o f Japanese bus iness to take part maybe interpreted by China as an express io n o f Japan`s eco no mic dependence o n China while giving it also the o ppo rtunity to putpressure o n the Abe go vernment to make co ncess io ns and to keep links with Japan fo r the po s t-Abe era

In view o f the impo rtance o f the eco no mic relatio nship and the damage suffered by Japanese bus iness after September 2012 o newo uld have expected mo re pressure fro m the bus iness co mmunity to co me to a territo rial co mpro mise so lutio n and so impro verelatio ns Ho wever this has no t been the case and may have to do with the perceptio n gap dis cussed abo ve but also the relativelack o f influence o n the go vernment (the majo rity o f the China-relevant Japanese bus iness co mmunity co ns is ts o f small- andmedium-s ized co mpanies ) the fear that a mo re vo cal ro le wo uld get co mpanies into tro uble with the autho rities in Japan ando rChina o r the ho pe o f being able to weather the po litical s to rms either because o f alternative market o ppo rtunities o r theco mpany`s s ize

FROM POLICING TO MILITARY INVOLVEMENT

The mo s t serio us co nsequences fo r the bilateral relatio nship ndash let alo ne fo r the so lutio n o f the territo rial dispute and regio nalpeace ndash arise fro m the co ns tant intrus io ns o f Chinese o fficial vessels into the Co ntiguo us Zo ne (CZ) o r even Territo rial Waters(TW) o f the Senkaku Is lands s ince September 2012 and the gro wing invo lvement o f the armed fo rces o f bo th s ides The aim o f theChinese is o bvio us to demo ns trate that the Japanese can no lo nger claim exclus ive co ntro l o f the is lands and to fo rce To kyo toadmit the exis tence o f a territo rial dispute Apparently a task fo rce at the highes t level headed by Xi Jinping was set up in

September 2012 to achieve this go al thro ugh escalating pressure238 So far law enfo rcement actio ns by Japan in the Senkaku areahave been limited to the deplo yment o f the Japanese Co as t Guard and po lice which is no w ho wever co ns tantly challenged byChinese with patro ls by CMS and FLEC (s ince 22 July 2013 unified under the State Ocean Adminis tratio n and renamed China Co as tGuard CG) vessels asserting the same rights in the is lands` CZ and TW The Chinese s ide escalated its pressure o n Japan by firs tdeplo ying FLEC vessels in the CZ and TW o f the disputed is lands then ratcheting up their pressure with CMS vessels do ing the samefo llo wed later in December 2012 with air patro ls by CMS aircraft which led to the deplo yment o f the air fo rce o f bo th s ides inJanuary 2013

As we have seen after the September 2010 incident in No vember 2010 FLEC s tarted to regularly send its vessels to the Senkakuarea which entered fro m time to time the is lands` CZ and also in Augus t 2011 twice the TW Apparently the mo re serio usintrus io ns which are tho se into the TW were so metimes timed with specific spikes o f tens io ns such as the TW incurs io n o n 16March 2012 (the Japanese naming o f so me is lands) July 2012 (No da`s anno uncement o f purchase intentio n o n 7 July) and finallyo n 19 September when s ix vessels entered the TW s tarting a series o f mo re frequent and regular incurs io ns In December 2012

FLEC deplo yed its newes t and bigges t ship the 5800-to n FLEC vessel Yuzheng 206 a fo rmer ship o f the Chinese navy239

The entries o f the vessels o f the CMS into the is lands` CZ and TW seem meant to send an even higher degree o f warning and denialo f Japan`s co ntro l o ver the is lands On 17 September the number o f FLEC and CMS vessels in the CZ and TW had reached the reco rd

o f 17240 Thereafter the frequency o f incurs io ns into the CZ and TW increased but it decreased after March 2013 On 30 Octo berXinhua even repo rted that the CMS had `expelled a number o f Japanese vessels illegally sailing in waters aro und the Diao yu

Is lands` altho ugh it is no t clear what exactly this meant s ince the CG did no t co nfirm such an incident241 Acco rding to Xinhua NewsAgency in 2013 China sent 50 ldquopatro l miss io ns rdquo into the TW o f the disputed is lands and as o f 12 July 2014 by the autho r`s co unt

there had been 17 such Chinese ldquopatro l miss io ns rdquo in 2014 which are ldquoincurs io ns rdquo fo r the Japanese s ide242 Other needle pricks todemo ns trate China`s claims are the o ccas io nal incurs io ns o f Chinese survey ships into the Senkaku Is lands` EEZ o r the bo ardingo f Chinese fishing vessels in the EEZ Defence Minis ter Itsuno ri Ono dera in late Octo ber 2013 called these repeated incurs io ns a

threat to peace which fell in a ldquogray zo ne (between) peacetime and an emergency s ituatio nrdquo243

A new level o f depriving Japan o f the ability to claim so le effective co ntro l o ver the is lands was reached o n 13 December 2012 when

a small turbo pro p aircraft o f the CMS (Harbin Y12 type) flew o ver Uo tsurijima244 Since then regular CMS air patro ls have beenco nducted but the aircraft no rmally s tay abo ut 120 km fro m the is lands With this mo ve Chinese measures to undermine Japan`sco ntro l o ver the is lands were expanded to the air space which fo r o rganizatio nal reaso ns had immediately military implicatio nsbecause the Air Self Defense Fo rce (ASDF) is respo ns ible fo r intercepting aircraft which intrude illegally into Japan`s air space The

incident did no t happen o ut o f the blue because already in January 2012 the SOA had anno unced a plan to deplo y the Y12 in 2012245

On 24 September the SOA had also anno unced plans to deplo y dro nes by 2015 fo llo wing the success ful tes t the previo us day 246

The Chinese acts are apparently carefully planned and co o rdinated s ince the o fficials in the abo ve Kyo do repo rt also said that theairspace vio latio ns o n 13 December 2012 by an airplane o f the CMS was planned by the s taff sectio n o f the natio nal Land and SeaBo rder Defense Co mmittee which acts as a liaiso n o ffice fo r the Chinese military the State Oceanic Adminis tratio n and the fishing

bureau o f the Agriculture Minis try with the aim o f rais ing tens io ns 247

The lo w altitude flight o f the Y12 o n 13 December was particularly upsetting fo r the Japanese go vernment because it was no t pickedup by the ASDF radar (the clo ses t o ne being o n Miyako jima abo ut 200 km fro m the is lands) but ins tead by CG ships in the area Inthis case eight ASDF fighters s crambled but co uld no t detect the Y12 Interceptio n o f aircraft is by nature much mo re diff icult andcarries a certain risk o f accident as happened in 2001 when a US intelligence aircraft co llided with a Chinese intercepto r jet Witho ut

explaining the s tandard Japanese pro ceedures fo r aerial defence which so lely relies o n the ASDF the Chinese media interpreted theuse o f military aircraft by Japan as `aggress ive` and the Global Times cautio ned agains t any interceptio n warning that China might

respo nd by sending its air fo rce248 On the Japanese s ide even the centre-left Asahi Shimbun called the Y12 flight ` a highly

pro vo cative act that co uld lead to an armed co nflict between the two co untries`249 At the beginning o f January 2013 there wereapparently erro neo us repo rts that the ASDF might co ns ider firing warning sho ts (tracer bullets ) at intruding Chinese aircraft which

pro mpted further bellico se co mments in the Chinese press 250 As a co nsequence the Chinese air fo rce also became invo lved o n10 January when the Chinese Minis try o f Defence anno unced that the Peo ple`s Liberatio n Army Air Fo rce (PLAA) had sent two fighterjets agains t two ASDF F-15 intercepto rs because they were fo llo wing a Chinese military Y8 transpo rt aircraft patro lling the airspace

o f Chinese o il platfo rms in the Eas t China Sea251 The Japanese repo rted that mo re than ten Chinese aircraft including military

aircraft had appro ached the Japanese air defence identificatio n zo ne252 In a further escalatio n the Japanese s ide repo rted that o n11 June 2014 two Chinese military jets flew abno rmally clo se to two planes o f Japans Self Defence Fo rce abo ve the Eas t China Sea

an accusatio n which the Chinese s ide refuted speaking ins tead o f two incidents pro vo ked by Japanese fighters 253 Related to thisdevelo pment and further enhancing the po ss ibility o f an incident is the enhanced patro lling o f the PLAA o ver the Eas t China Seawhich caused the ASDF to increase scrambling agains t PLAA aircraft to 415 times between 1 April 2013 and 31 March 2014 (Fis cal

Year 2013) 109 times mo re than in the previo us Fis cal Year 2012254

Co ntinuing to increase the pressure o n Japan the Chinese go vernment decreed o n 23 No vember 2013 an Air Defence Identificatio nZo ne (ADIZ) which includes the airspace o ver the Senkaku Is lands and was certainly meant to reinfo rce China`s territo rial claimdespite the fact that an ADIZ has no territo rial implicatio ns in internatio nal law The threat o f military co untermeasures in the text o fthe decree (lsquoChinas armed fo rces will ado pt defens ive emergency measures to respo nd to aircraft that do no t co o perate in the

identificatio n o r refuse to fo llo w the ins tructio ns rsquo) has further heightened the po ss ibility o f a military clash255 Ho wever theJapanese s ide refuses to accept the ADIZ The Chinese mo ves have wider implicatio ns fo r peace and s tability in the regio n in o rderto pro tect the freedo m o f its military aircraft in Eas t As ian airspace and its ability to o bserve China`s military fo rces Washingto nrefused to reco gnise the zo ne co ntinued to igno re the requirements o f the ADIZ by pursuing its regular patro l f lights and criticisedits implementatio n Simultaneo us ly ho wever the Department o f State advised civilian airlines to fo llo w China`s ins tructio ns andVice Pres ident Biden advised bo th co untries o n his trip to No rtheas t As ia in December 2013 to es tablish a cris is managements tructure Since the US do es no t take a s tance o n the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands` so vereignty Washingto n seemed to igno re Japan`smain grievance abo ut the ADIZ which is China`s intentio n to further reinfo rce its so vereignty claim by extending the ADIZ o ver theis lands The mo s t far-reaching US s tatements were a reco nfirmatio n o f the applicatio n o f the security treaty to the is lands evenmentio ning the is lands by their Japanese and Chinese names and co mplaining that the Chinese actio n was an attempt to unilaterally

change the status quo in the Eas t China Sea which raised regio nal tens io n and increased the risk o f accident and miscalculatio n256

Ho wever in this way the Obama Adminis tratio n risked creating amo ng so me Japanese o bservers do ubts abo ut the Adminis tratio n`sreliability and so gave succo ur to China`s attempt to drive a wedge between the two allies Ano ther co mplicatio n is that the ChineseADIZ o verlaps that o f Ko rea and mo reo ver co vers the submerged ro ck called Ieo do in Ko rean and Suyan in Chinese which has animpact o n the no t yet demarcated EEZ bo rder between bo th co untries Interes tingly the Japanese ADIZ also co vers Ieo do but thishas never been underpinned by any Japanese EEZ claims But China kno ws ho w to play o n So uth Ko rea`s criticism o f Japan`sattitude to wards the his to ry is sue and the territo rial dispute with Japan o ver Do kto Takeshima is land Mo reo ver the As ian co untriesco ntes ting China`s claims to parts o f the So uth China Sea are co ncerned that China wo uld further co mplicate the territo rialdisputes in the area by es tablishing an ADIZ Yet the ASEAN member s tates have been very cautio us in directly criticis ing ChinaChina`s es tablishment o f the ADIZ directly affects many co untries because so many o f them have airlines flying thro ugh the zo neHo wever with the exceptio n o f Japan all o thers agred to co nfo rm with China`s reques t fo r no tif icatio n which undermines theJapanese go vernment`s po s itio n o f explicitly advis ing Japanese airlines no t to co nfo rm

With these escalating develo pments the Chinese s ide achieved its go al o f sho wing that the Japanese autho rities are no lo nger infull co ntro l o f the disputed is lands In the case o f Chinese Co as tguard vessel intrus io ns the reactio n o f the Japanese CG is limitedto shado wing the Chinese vessels to info rm them that they are vio lating Japan`s CZ o r TW and to ask them to leave whichho wever they do at their o wn dis cretio n (the time span ho vering in the CZ o r TW having beco me a further means o f Chinesepressure) fo llo wed by diplo matic pro tes ts Otherwise the CG has avo ided any phys ical co nfro ntatio n o r co ntact When co nfro ntedby the CG the Chinese vessels s imply declare (by radio o r even electro nic displays ) that they are patro lling Chinese waters and thatthe CG ships were o perating illegally in these waters This ritual has so far prevented vio lence This is in co ntras t to an exchange o fwater canno n salvo s between the CG and the Taiwanese co as t guard in the territo rial o f the Senkaku Is lands o n 25 September 2012

and again o n 24 January 2013257

The increase o f patro ls by Japan and China is caus ing o peratio nal s train fo r bo th s ides (also rais ing the risk o f miscalculatio ns o ro verreactio ns ) but this has no t reduced the willingness o f either go vernment to s cale do wn the almo s t daily demo ns tratio ns o f

`effective co ntro l` In Octo ber it was repo rted that the CG no w always maintains ten vessels agains t eight fro m China258 The 11th

regio nal headquarters respo ns ible fo r the Senkaku area is in Naha and has nine patro l ships (but o nly seven vessels o f at leas t

1000 to ns ) but no w needs additio nal ships which are dispatched fro m o ther regio nal headquarters 259 In April 2012 the CG had ato tal o f 357 patro l vessels but o nly 51 o ver 1000 to ns which are tho se mo s t needed fo r a far flung area like the Senkaku

Is lands 26 0 On 14 September 2012 Senio r Vice Minis ter o f Fisheries Iwamo to Tsukasa mentio ned plans to increase the number o f

fishery patro l vessels to ensure fishermens safety amid intens ifying territo rial disputes with China and So uth Ko rea26 1 On 26Octo ber the Minis try o f Land Infras tructure Transpo rt and To urism which heads the CG anno unced plans to increase budgetary

reques ts fo r mo re ships 26 2 The Abe go vernment plans to build mo re vessels o r advance the calendar retro fit vessels which were to

be retired and is co ns idering extending the retirement age o f the o fficers 26 3

The Chinese have fewer vessels which can be deplo yed as far as the Senkaku Is lands In additio n leave o f the sailo rs has been

res tricted and their deplo yment length at sea has increased26 4 In March 2013 the Chinese s ide anno unced clo ser co o peratio nbetween the military and vario us maritime law enfo rcement agencies as well as the merger o f fo ur maritime law enfo rcementagencies under the State Ocean Adminis tratio n (adminis tered by the Minis try o f Land and Reso urces ) ie the China MarineSurveillance the co as t guard fo rces o f the Public Security Minis try the fisheries law enfo rcement co mmand o f the Agriculture

Minis try and the maritime anti-smuggling po lice o f the General Adminis tratio n o f Cus to ms 26 5

Ano ther wo rrying develo pment is the gradual invo lvement o f the PLA navy (PLAN) and the Maritime Self Defence Fo rce (MSDF) TheJapanese MOD anno unced o n 16 Octo ber 2012 that fo r the firs t time PLAN ships were o bserved navigating in the 22-km-wide CZbetween Yo naguni and Irio mo te is lands altho ugh the minis try left o pen the po ss ibility that they did so in o rder to avo id a typho o n

Nevertheless the Gaimusho so ught explanatio ns fro m the Chinese abo ut these ship mo vements 26 6 In December 2012 fo ur PLANships sailed thro ugh the CW o f the Irio mo te-Yo naguni is lands o n the way back fro m drills in the Pacific after having go ne into the

Pacific thro ugh the mo re no rmal ro ute o f the s trait between the Okinawan main is land and Miyako jima26 7 Again there was no thingillegal abo ut it but it raised attentio n at a time o f tens io ns Ho wever there are s igns o f greater co o peratio n o f the PLAN withChinese Co as t Guard vessels as was sho wn in the s tando ff between China and the Philippines aro und the disputed Scarbo ro ugh

Sho al in the So uth China Sea and jo int exercises to o k place between the three in the Eas t China Sea in Octo ber 201226 8 The

patro lling activities o f the MSDF in the Senkaku area became kno wn when the Japanese repo rted at the end o f January 2013 that o n19 January a Chinese frigatersquos target radar had lo cked o nto an MSDF helico pter and o n 30 January ano ther frigate sailing clo se to

an MSDF des tro yer did likewise The Chinese vehemently denied it26 9 Ho wever in March this year the Kyo do news agency repo rtedthat senio r Chinese military o fficials had admitted the incident o f 29 January Even mo re wo rriso me is that the Chinese vessels

acted apparently witho ut prio r appro val fro m the fleet co mmand o r navy headquarters All this was denied by the Chinese s ide270 Itdid no t help that under Prime Minis ter No da the MSDF had been o rdered after the eruptio n o f the 2012 cris is to keep a greaterdis tance fro m PLAN ships than the hitherto 3 km in o rder avo id incidents but this po licy was reversed by the mo re hawkish Abe

adminis tratio n to the previo us 3 km dis tance271 The fire radar lo cking incident had happened at a dis tance o f 3 km

Agains t the backgro und o f greater invo lvement o f military fo rces it is particularly regrettable that a plan to build a maritime liaiso n

mechanism between their defense autho rities o n which they had agreed in June 2012 to make later that year was shelved272

Unfo rtunately it is s till Chinese practice to co ns ider Co nfidence Building Measures (CBM) no t as the firs t s tep to build co nfidencebut as a to o l to extract fro m the o ther s ide prio r co ncess io ns under the pretext o f `creating a better atmo sphere` fo r dis cuss ingCBM The o utbreak o f the September 2012 cris is was therefo re a co nvenient pretext fo r the Chinese to cancel the pro ject Thelates t co nfirmatio n was in March 2013 when General Yin Zhuo explained that there co uld be no military trus t if the po litical and

diplo matic relatio nship is bad273 Since the target radar lo ck-o n incidents the Japanese go vernment is publicly calling fo rresumptio n o f nego tiatio ns fo r the maritime liaiso n mechanism but the Chinese will certainly want to extract so me co ncess io nsbefo re even co ns idering a po s itive respo nse

Ho wever the co ns tant co nfro ntatio n between the po licing and military fo rces o f bo th s ides co uld eas ily lead to a military clasheither as a result o f an unfo reseen civilian o r military incident miscalculatio n o r malicio us intentio n at a lo wer level o f co mmandTwo recent examples o f unfo reseen civilian incidents co uld have escalated One is the attempted landing o n o ne o f the disputedis lands by a Chinese pro tes ter with a ballo o n in January 2014 This incident was peacefully reso lved because Japan did no t arres t theballo o nis t In this case the firs t repo rt o n the crash-landing in the territo rial waters o f Uo tsurijima came fro m the Taiwanese co as tguard which info rmed the Japanese co as t guard fo llo wed by the hand-o ver o f the ballo o nis t to the PRC autho rities o uts ide o f

Japan`s territo rial waters 274 The o ther incident was the s inking o f a Chinese fishing bo at ldquoto the no rth o f the Diao yu Is landsrdquo and

the mo ve o f two Chinese naval () vessels to rescue the crew275 This autho r co uld no t find o ut ho w clo se the fishing bo at came tothe is lands and apparently there has no t been any further repo rting abo ut the incident

The previo us ly mentio ned radar-targeting incidents and these two civilian incidents have no t led to an escalatio n but there is noguarantee fo r the future Shi Yinho ng a pro fesso r at Renmin Univers ity predicts that the territo rial co nflicts in the ECS So uth ChinaSea and alo ng the Sino -Indian bo rder will intens ify because o f po pular natio nalism dynamics within the armed fo rces and o f co urse

also o ur to p leaders perso nal beliefs and s trategic perso nalities 276 Hugh White argues that a war (which co uld lead to a nuclearexchange between China and the US) co uld also begin because the Chinese leadership may co ns ider that s tarting ho s tilities no wrather than later wo uld be mo re beneficial to either tes t US reso lve to defend Japan (which the Chinese leadership do ubts ) anddetermine the is sue o f Chinese supremacy in the As ian regio n which he co ns iders to be the real is sue rather than the is lands

themselves 277

IS THERE A WAY FORWARD

The current co nfro ntatio n is no t o nly co ntinuing but even escalating and do mes tic develo pments in bo th co untries are no t creatingan atmo sphere mo re co nducive to better management o f the cris is let alo ne finding a so lutio n Inactio n runs the risk o f a furtherescalatio n o r even a military clash while po s itive o ptio ns are beco ming fewer Meanwhile bo th co untries suffer fro m the eco no micfall-o ut and heightened tens io ns while the integratio n o f a ris ing China into a new s trategic enviro nment in As ia will beco me evenmo re fraught cas ting a shado w o n Japan`s clo se relatio nship with the US

The 2010 incident ended quickly with Japan`s release o f the captain One reaso n fo r this is certainly the fact that China`s demand in2010 was relatively clear and achievable (release o f the captain) if painful fo r Japan at a time o f a weak and inexperiencedgo vernment This time in September 2012 the cris is firs t hit a go vernment which reacted intrans igently because o f its previo usdefeat and o ther unfavo urable do mes tic circumstances and was then replaced by the mo re hawkish Abe go vernment The Abecabinet`s attitude to wards the pas t as exemplif ied by vario us s tatements by cabinet members and peo ple clo se to it the attempt torevise the Ko no s tatement reco gniz ing the fo rced war pro s titutio n (the military co mfo rt wo men) and Abe`s Yasukuni Shrine vis itall served China`s anti-Japan pro paganda wo rsened Japan-Ko rea relatio ns which China is cleverly explo iting and even angered theUS adminis tratio n Abe is seen as utiliz ing the tens io ns with China to win do mes tic and internatio nal suppo rt fo r Japan to have aldquono rmalrdquo natio nal defence po s ture The latter is welco me by the US adminis tratio n because it wo uld help with the US As ianrealignment and suppo rt its China po licy At the same time China`s actio ns cas t an o mino us shado w o n its intentio ns in the So uthChina Sea and Abe and mo re impo rtantly the US is suppo rting the claimants there agains t China

Under these bilateral multilateral and regio nal circumstances wo uld China be satis fied with go ing back to the `unders tanding abo utsetting as ide the dispute` in co njunctio n with Japan`s reco gnitio n o f the exis tence o f a territo rial dispute o r wo uld it demand areversal o f the purchase o f the three is lands Wo uld it demand the end o f Japanese CG patro ls aro und the is lands China`ss tandard demand no w that Japan `co rrect its mis takes` is rather ambiguo us because it co uld be interpreted as go ing back to theshelving unders tanding and the reco gnitio n o f the exis tence o f a dispute o r demanding a reversal o f the go vernment`s purchase o f

the is lands 278 The latter wo uld s imply be impo ss ible in legal and practical terms and o ne can o nly ho pe that the ambiguity is o nlyaimed at rais ing China`s nego tiatio n po s itio n ando r leaving eno ugh wiggle ro o m fo r nego tiatio ns which wo uld satis fy all Chineses takeho lders` interes ts

It seems that it is already to o late fo r go ing back to the shelving agreement o f 19721978 which wo uld imply that the two s ides canso meho w go back to the status quo o f the 1970s This as we have seen has been superseded by deeds and wo rds o n bo th s ides The Chinese have no w no t o nly publicly declared that the shelving agreement was lsquobro kenrsquo by Japan but after the firs t Y12 patro l o n13 December 2012 co mmented that ldquoThe s ituatio n has changed It has beco me no rmal fo r Chinas marine surveillance vessels to

enter the 12-nautical-mile zo ne Japans actual co ntro l o ver the is lands has go nerdquo279

The bilateral relatio nship has deterio rated to the extent that at leas t shelving the co nflicting so vereignty claims without o fficiallyadmitting that there is a territo rial dispute is no lo nger an o ptio n acceptable to China because it feels Japan has abused theshelving co nsensus thro ugh a series o f adminis trative measures with the final s traw having been the central go vernmentrsquos purchaseo f three is lands When s tudying the vario us Chinese o fficial s tatements and news repo rts after the 2012 cris is had fully erupted inSeptember it beco mes clear that until Octo ber 2012 the Chinese s till raised the demand that Japan sho uld go back to the previo uslsquounders tandingrsquo o r lsquoco nsensus rsquo but this demand was no t made o ften thereafter It reappeared in remarks by Wang Jiarui the head o fthe Co mmunis t partys Internatio nal Department when meeting Yamaguchi Natsuo the leader o f the junio r co alitio n partner

Ko meito in January 201328 0 Previo us ly a co mment o n the Xinhua internet s ite o n 29 Octo ber said that ldquoThe lsquopurchasersquo sho wed thatthe Japanese go vernment has who lly abando ned the attitude o f laying as ide disputes and has fundamentally changed the

s ituatio nrdquo28 1 On 30 Octo ber the CMOFA spo kesperso n declared that lsquoJapans illegal purchase o f the Diao yu Is lands bro ke the

impo rtant co nsensus The Japanese s ide sho uld no t have any mo re illus io n o f o ccupying the Diao yu Is lands What the Japaneses ide sho uld do is to face up to the reality admit the so vereignty dispute co rrect mis takes and co me back to the track o f a

nego tiated settlement`28 2 The lates t o fficial pro po sal to shelve the is lands is sue was made by the fo rmer fo reign minis ter Tang

Jiaxuan o n 16 July 201428 3

The reco gnitio n o f a territo rial pro blem wo uld be relatively easy fo r Japanese public o pinio n (and even mo re so fo r Japanrsquos friendsand allies ) to accept because they wo uld no t see the need fo r any kind o f diplo matic o r legal so phis try fo r what is o bvio us ly aterrito rial co nflict whatever the legitimacy o f the Chinese claim might be given also the fact that the current Japanese po s itio nco mes do wn to refus ing to even dis cuss whatever settlement might be po ss ible Acco rding to a survey co nducted by Genro nto gether with Zho ngguo Ribao she in June 2012 627 per cent o f Japanese agreed that there exis ts a territo rial pro blem dispute

(176 disagreed) co mpared with 822 o f the Chinese (139 disagreed)28 4 Ho wever co nsecutive Japanese cabinets haverefused to reco gnise the exis tence o f a territo rial dispute which is o ften the default po s itio n o f a go vernment in actual co ntro l o f adisputed territo ry (fo r example the Ko rean go vernmentrsquos po s itio n o n Do kto Takeshima) This po s itio n has been reinfo rced by theexplicit Japanese denial s ince the 1990s o f a shelving agreement which wo uld have been an implicit admiss io n that there is adispute To circumvent the risk o f being perceived as admitting the exis tence o f a territo rial pro blem the deputy prime minis ter o fthe previo us No da go vernment Okada Katsuya was repo rted to have mentio ned in a speech in Octo ber 2012 that there was no

territo rial dispute but as a matter o f fact a debate exis ted28 5 Ho wever this co mpro mise so lutio n was never co nfirmed by the No dago vernment and did no t beco me po licy It is even less likely to be acceptable to the new Abe go vernment Even amo ng influentialo pinio n makers there is hardly any suppo rt fo r admitting the exis tence o f a territo rial co nflict o r o f a shelving agreement Even mo reco nciliato ry s tatements o n this subject are rather vague Maehara Seiji o f the Demo cratic Party declared in a co nference at QinghuaUnivers ity in Beijing in September 2013 that the Japanese go vernment sho uld add (to its o wn po s itio n) that China has a differentview (Senkakusho to wo meguru Niho n seifu no tachiba ni tsuite lsquoChugo ku ga chigau kangaekata wo mo tte iru to iuko to wo ichigen

tsukekuwaerubeki darsquo) At the same time he emphas ised ho wever that there was no territo rial dispute28 6 Japan Bus inessFederatio n Chairman Yo nekura Hiro masa mentio ned in September 2012 in an NHK interview that the go vernment sho uld be mo re

flexible s ince o therwise its s tance co uld be taken to mean that Japan has no intentio n o f so lving the dispute28 7 Miyamo to Yuji thefo rmer Japanese ambassado r to China is quo ted as saying that lsquoThe go vernment do es no t need to alter its bas ic po s itio n but in

reality a co nflict do es exis t o ver the Senkaku is les rsquo 28 8 This is also the s tance which the previo us Japanese ambassado r Niwa

Uichiro takes in an article after his return to Japan28 9

Co ncerning co nflict reso lutio n it is interes ting to no te that when asked abo ut the mo dern s ignificance o f the 1978 Japan-ChinaPeace and Friendship Treaty 68 4 o f the po lled Japanese agreed with Art 12 (lsquoThe two parties shall settle all disputes by peacefulmeans and shall refrain fro m the use o r threat o f fo rcersquo) but o nly 525 o f the Chinese agreed Mo reo ver 58 1 o f the Chinese

favo ur China s trengthening its co ntro l o ver the area29 0

If therefo re a new ldquoimplicit unders tandingrdquo abo ut shelving the dispute is achievable it wo uld have to be based o n learning fro m thefailures o f the 19721978 shelving ie it wo uld be necessary to achieve a mutual unders tanding o f what the s tatus quo is whatwo uld undermine the s tatus quo and what has to be do ne to mo ve fro m co nflict management to so lutio n Quite clearly such a newunders tanding wo uld be less favo urable to Japan`s current s tance o n the dispute

FROM CONFLICT MANAGEMENT TO ADDRESSING THE SOVEREIGNTY ISSUE

Any mo ve fo rward will certainly require decis ive leadership o n bo th s ides be it to take the initiative o r to respo nd po s itively to theinitiative o f s tarting the pro cess to wards reso lutio n In view o f the co mplex backgro und o f the external and internal dynamics it iso bvio us that address ing the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands dispute requires a s tep-by-s tep appro ach The ultimate is sue to address is theso vereignty is sue and territo rial disputes are generally viewed as zero sum in nature given their clo se link to co re securityinteres ts Even tho se who reco gnize the impo rtance o f transcending such lo gic in favo ur o f co ndo minium o r shared so vereigntygenerally ho ld that the is sue can o nly be addressed at the las t s tage o f any nego tiated pro cess if at all

Two impo rtant is sues have to be co ns idered at the beginning to what extent have the vario us s tages o f the nego tiating pro cess tobe agreed befo rehand (lsquoro ad maprsquo) o r even the final o utco me whether a viable co ndo minium o r o nly shelving the is sues and co uldthe ro le o f a third party mediato r be helpfulacceptable In view o f the po litical diff iculties o n bo th s ides the s tart o f thenego tiatio n pro cess wo uld be endangered if there is no t sufficient ro o m fo r ambiguity and interpretatio n abo ut the vario us s tages altho ugh the general aim o f tens io n reductio n and suspens io n o f the so vereignty is sue mus t be clearly agreed

A third party mediato r is pro bably no t acceptable to the Chinese s ide The third party mo s t o ften mentio ned is the Internatio nalCo urt o f Jus tice (ICJ) o r any kind o f internatio nal arbitratio n Ho wever this seems unlikely in view o f China`s preference fo rbilateral nego tiatio ns and its refusal to accept judicial settlement by the ICJ o r any internatio nal arbitratio n except in no n-po litical

areas such as trade29 1 The Japanese go vernment wo uld be willing to accept the jurisdictio n o f the ICJ but o nly if China brings the

case to the Co urt les t it be perceived as ackno wledging the exis tence o f a territo rial dispute29 2 But there are also po litical andpro cedural arguments agains t the reco urse to the ICJ China`s legal argumentatio n is co mparatively weak and s ince a negativejudgement co uld have implicatio ns fo r China`s legal claim to mo s t o f the So uth China Sea there is even less o f a chance o f Chinamaking an exceptio n fo r the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands dispute In view o f the entrenched po s itio ns o f bo th s ides and the risk o f a`winner takes all` o utco me o f internatio nal litigatio n bo th go vernments wo uld face co ns iderable do mes tic res is tance in case o f anegative o utco me In view o f the urgency o f the dispute and the lo ng time it takes fo r a judgement there wo uld also be the risk o fdo mes tic fo rces trying to pre-empt a negative result

In view o f the security is sues invo lved (let alo ne the American his to rical `debt` as a result o f Washingto n`s ambiguity related toWashingto n`s ending o f the adminis tratio n o f Okinawa in 1972) an American mediatio n co uld be seen as natural and even inAmerican interes ts Such an American ro le ho wever is extremely unlikely as it wo uld be seen by China as unduly advantageo us toJapan Ho wever at so me po int during the Japan-China nego tiatio n pro cess the US might ass is t (o r even be reques ted) by agreeingto certain Co nfidence and Security Building Measures (CSBM) in the area aro und the is lands

The firs t s tage wo uld have to co ns is t o f measures which reduce the risk o f a military clash but in a way which prevents theperceptio n that o ne s ide is giving in to co ercio n This s tage wo uld be a gradual phas ing o ut o f intrus io ns by Chinese o fficial vesselsand aircraft into the territo rial waters co ntiguo us zo ne and airspace o f the is lands which is recipro cated by Japanrsquos reducing in thesame way its co as tguard patro ls in the two zo nes as well as its s crambling activities in the is lands` airspace There were repo rts in

June 2013 that China called o n Japan to agree to a 12-nautical-mile no -entry zo ne aro und the is lands 29 3 Japan rejected this co urse

Ano ther measure wo uld be to increase the dis tance at which vessels o f bo th maritime fo rces o bserve each o ther Such s teps sho uldultimately be o fficialised by a gradually expanding series o f CSBMs and a bilateral liaiso n mechanism This co uld also include ademilitarisatio n agreement as an incentive fo r the Chinese s ide It wo uld be vital that the s teps at this s tage be incremental that nos tep is explo ited in a o ne-s ided way and that they are co ns idered irrevers ible At the same time bo th s ides have to prevent peo plefro m appro aching the is lands s ince this wo uld be seen as a pro vo catio n by the o ther s ide This latter task is technically no t easy

because o f the co ntro vers ial character o f any co mpro mise with certain no n-s tate acto rs in Japan China Ho ng Ko ng and Taiwan The(failed) landing o f a Chinese ho t ballo o n o n o ne o f the is lands in January 2014 demo ns trated at the same time the technical

diff iculty o f a no -entry po licy as well as the po ss ibility o f a success ful co o peratio n o f the co as tguards o f all three co untries 29 4

At this firs t s tage o r leading to the next there will have to be a Japanese go vernment s tatement to the effect that there is alsquopro blemrsquo related to the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands This can be wo rded in such a way that the sens itive express io n `territo rialpro blem` (which is s trenuo us ly denied by the go vernment) is avo ided and it can be supplemented by a sentence that such as tatement in no way prejudices the legal po s itio n o f the go vernment Such a qualifying s tatement is fo r example included in the

Japan-China agreement fo r prio r no tif icatio n o f research vessels fro m bo th co untries in the Eas t China Sea in 200029 5 A s imilarqualif icatio n is part o f the 1997 Japan-China Fisheries Agreement In the jo int co mmuniqueacute o f 1972 which no rmalised diplo maticrelatio ns between Japan and China diplo matic wo rding also managed to bridge the huge gap between their s tances o n Taiwan whichthe PRC co ns iders an lsquoinalienable partrsquo o f its territo ry Japan co ns iders the so vereignty is sue s till unreso lved because the 1951 SanFrancis co Peace Treaty Art 2 (b) o nly s tipulated that lsquoJapan reno unces all right title and claim to Fo rmo sa and the Pescado res rsquowitho ut clarifying the recipient o f the territo ry The co mpro mise in 1972 was reached with the sentence that Japan lsquofully unders tandsand respects this s tand o f the Go vernment o f the Peo ples Republic o f China and it f irmly maintains its s tand under Article 8 o f thePo tsdam Pro clamatio nrsquo

POSSIBLE APPROACHES TO THE SOVEREIGNTY ISSUE

The mo s t diff icult pro blem is the so vereignty is sue which go es to the co re o f any co untry`s security interes ts It is no t imaginablethat either s ide will reno unce its claim to the is lands Sides tepping o r shelving the is sue is o nly useful if the lesso ns fro m the 1972and 1978 attempts as o utlined abo ve can be learned and applied but there is s till the fundamental pro blem with the implicitassumptio n that the quality o f the bilateral relatio nship will always be as go o d as when the s ides tepping agreement was achievedand can be maintained in perpetuity o r until the so vereignty is sue can be addressed But in o rder to so lve the so vereignty is sue aneven better relatio nship has to be created This better relatio nship co uld be bro ught abo ut by the s teps explained abo ve and furtherbelo w

An impo rtant co nditio n fo r any las ting territo rial co mpro mise wo uld be reducing the value o f the is lands fo r bo th co untries whichcan be achieved by o ne o f the measures pro po sed fo r s tage 1 ie reso lutely preventing anyo ne fro m appro aching the territo ries(including to tal demilitarizatio n) which in themselves are eco no mically wo rthless and are uninhabited The main po int is to preventany go vernmental act which co uld be interpreted as being part o f the `so vereignty game` The mo s t diff icult part here is to preventany act by no n-go vernmental acto rs This wo uld have to include the territo rial waters and the explo itatio n there in o f any kind o freso urces including fishing Scientif ic interes ts in the is lands co uld be served by bilateral surveys witho ut any po litical co nno tatio ns

There have been pro po sals to declare the is lands an Internatio nal Nature and Wildlife Preserve29 6 Such a preserve wo uld have to beadminis tered either bilaterally o r by a relevant internatio nal o rganisatio n and as such co uld serve as a co nfidence-building measure

The abo ve s teps wo uld then allo w the two s ides to deal with the co ns iderable eco no mic interes ts in fishing and the explo itatio n o fhydro carbo n reso urces and o ther seabed reso urces aro und the is lands ie in the Exclus ive Eco no mic Zo ne ando r the ExtendedCo ntinental Shelf Once the is lands` land area and the territo rial waters have been put as ide it wo uld be eas ier to co me to ano verall agreement o n the delimitatio n o f the EEZ bo rder (with the exceptio n o f the no rthern part which wo uld require a trilateralagreement between China Japan and Ko rea) which wo uld include the delimitatio n o f these surro unding waters It wo uld facilitate aco mpro mise if bo th s ides agree that the is lands do no t merit their o wn EEZ This might be diff icult fo r Japan which claims an EEZ fo rOkino to rishima refuted by China s ince it co ns iders the reef no t to be an is land acco rding to Art 121 o f UNCLOS

A co mpro mise o n the so vereignty is sue co uld o nly be the o utco me ndash if at all ndash o f a success ful pro cess o f the abo ve o r co mparables teps In o rder to avo id a `winner take all` s ituatio n the co mpro mise wo uld have to invo lve a sharing arrangement His to ry o ffers

quite a number o f internatio nal precedents o f shared so vereignty referred to as co ndo minium in internatio nal law29 7 One case withso me s imilarities to the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands is a small is land (3000 sq m) in the river separating France and Spain kno wn asPheasant Is land o r Co nference Is land which even to day s till changes every s ix mo nths between France and Spain as o wner Like theSenkakuDiao yu Is lands the is land has no eco no mic value anymo re and the is land is o ff limits It was the lo catio n o f the s igning o f

the Treaty o f the Pyrenees in 1659 which ended a lo ng war 29 8 Mo s t o ther examples o f jo int so vereignty co ncern territo ries with apo pulatio n which makes co o peratio n much mo re diff icult Other his to rical precedents o f sharing so vereignty are the es tablishmento f ldquoneutral zo nesrdquo Acco rdingly the is lands and po ss ibly a sea area aro und the is lands co uld be declared a neutral zo ne like the o nebetween Saudi Arabia and Kuwait (1922-1965) On July 7 1965 the two go vernments s igned an agreement (which to o k effect o nJuly 25 1966) to partitio n the Neutral Zo ne adjo ining their respective territo ries A demarcatio n agreement dividing the NeutralZo ne was s igned o n December 17 1967

Particularly relevant here is that Saudi Arabia as well as Kuwait explo ited the o il reso urces under a jo int o perating agreement29 9

Co nclus io ns

The actio n-reactio n pattern o f the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands dispute is accelerating and the initiative seems to be mo re o ften thanno t with the Chinese s ide while the Japanese s ide is in a defens ive po s itio n The danger o f a military co nfro ntatio n is lo o mingincreas ingly larger in what co uld be called a lsquochicken gamersquo At the same time the internal and external dynamics are undermining theenviro nment which is required fo r a peaceful so lutio n as well as fo r maintaining the number o f po s itive o ptio ns While the Japanesego vernment refuses to ackno wledge the very exis tence o f a territo rial dispute the Chinese go vernment is no w (July 2014) evenrefus ing to have a dialo gue with Japan`s current prime minis ter It is po ss ible that the Chinese s ide again wants to wait with anymo ve fo rward until the Japanese prime minis ter has changed as Beijing did with Prime Minis ter Sato Eisaku o r with Prime Minis terKo izumi Junichiro But waiting fo r an impro vement o f the bilateral atmo sphere as the Chinese s ide likes to s tress is a very riskyo ptio n and such an impro vement may anyway be a very sho rt windo w o f o ppo rtunity if lo o king at the ups and do wns o f the po s t-1949 his to ry o f the bilateral relatio nship

To s tart a s tep-by-s tep pro cess o f address ing the territo rial is sue s tro ng leadership is required which unders tands the widerinteres ts o f a functio ning Japanese-Chinese relatio nship Japan s imply asking China fo r a summit meeting is no t very sens ible ifthere is no willingness to engage in subs tantive dis cuss io ns and wo uld be very risky fo r China`s to p leader if the Japanese primeminis ter then vis its the Yasukuni Shrine The his to ry is sue sho uld no lo nger be a Chinese lever fo r pressuris ing Japan but the latterhas to abs tain fro m actio ns which are seen as pro vo cative no t o nly by China but also by Ko rea the US and many o thers There hasto be a co mmitted leadership o n bo th s ides which s tarts with a ro ugh ro ad map and tens io n-reducing s teps such as CSBMs en ro uteto agreeing o n a fo rmula which allo ws the parties to o btain eco no mic as well as security gains while reducing tens io ns

Reinhard Drifte is Emeritus Professor of Japanese Politics University of Newcastle UK and Visiting Professor at various Japanese Universities andPau University (France) He is the author of Japanrsquos Foreign Policy for the Twenty First Century His home page is here

Reco mmended citatio n Reinhard Drifte The Japan-China Confrontation Over the SenkakuDiaoyu Islands--Between shelving and dispute

Uo tsurijima Kita Ko jima and Minami Ko jima The lease o f the central go vernment fo r these three is lands was due to expire in March2013 and no incident wo uld have o ccurred if the go vernment had quietly renewed the lease The central go vernment s tated that ithad no t kno wn abo ut Ishihara`s intentio n but that there had been co ntacts o n vario us o ccas io ns between the go vernment and the

private o wner148 This seems co nvincing s ince s tate o wnership wo uld have pro vided better preventio n o f incidents even mo re thanjus t leas ing Taken aback by Ishihara`s surprise mo ve the Chief Cabinet Secretary Fujimura Osamu declared the fo llo wing day thatthe central go vernment might acquire the is lands `if required` and Prime Minis ter No da implied in a Diet speech o n the 18 April that

a purchase by the central go vernment was o ne o f the o ptio ns Bo th s tatements were widely repo rted in China149 Ishihara hadcho sen his anno uncement fo r maximum effect o n the o ccas io n o f a speech at the co nservative Washingto n DC-based HeritageFo undatio n He made it clear that this pro ject was meant as a criticism o f the DPJ-led central go vernment which he co ns ideredfailing in its duty to sufficiently pro tect Japan`s so vereignty by saying that the central go vernment sho uld be buying the is lands butthat the Gaimusho was to o afraid o f o ffending China The lo catio n o f his anno uncement was meant to gain s tro nger suppo rt fro m

the US fo r Japan`s territo rial claim150 As we have seen abo ve fro m Ishihara`s activities in the 1970s this anno uncement was inmany ways the lo gical co nclus io n o f his lo ng las ting o bsess io n with the Senkaku Is lands and his hatred o f co mmunis t China It wasthe 2010 incident in particular which had enco uraged him to renew his o ld plan o f buying the is lands after his earlier failure to do so His go o d co nnectio ns with the o wner Kurihara Kunio ki who shared his natio nalis t pro clivities helped Ishihara to beco me the

favo ured purchaser151

The po ss ibility o f having the three is lands under the co ntro l o f the natio nalis tic go verno r o f To kyo who wanted to build facilities o nthe is lands to s trengthen Japan`s so vereignty was unpalatable to the No da go vernment which feared co mplicatio ns with China In a

meeting o n 18 May No da and his to p advisers decided in principle to purchase the is lands 152 Pressure o n the go vernmentincreased to pre-empt Ishihara because he was as to nishingly success ful in rais ing vo luntary co ntributio ns fro m the public to buythe three is lands thus circumventing any legal diff iculties in us ing To kyo `s taxpayer mo ney and also pro ving the po pularity o f his

mo ve By 1 June he had co llected 70 000 do natio ns to taling aro und yen101 billio n which increased to yen146 billio n by 6 September153

On 27 July the TMG ran an advertisement in the Wall Street Journal asking fo r US unders tanding and suppo rt fo r the purchase plan154

The TMG had to reques t central go vernment permiss io n to co nduct a survey o f the is lands which the go vernment refused to grant

o n 27 Augus t fo rcing the TMG to co nduct a survey fro m a ship o n 2 September155 In the end it was the higher sum and the sho rtes tdelay o f co ncluding the deal which pro mpted Kurihara Kunio ki who was apparently in so me financial diff iculties to accept the centralgo vernment`s o ffer o f yen205 billio n ($26 millio n) and to s ign the co ntract o n 11 September This was an embarrass ing turn fo rIshihara In additio n he did no t succeed in us ing the o ffer o f his co llected mo ney to entice the No da go vernment to pro mise thebuilding o f any facility o n the is lands No da was presented by his adminis tratio n with several o ptio ns including his favo ured o ptio no f repairing the exis ting light ho use o n Uo tsurijima but in the end was co nvinced by Fo reign Minis ter Gemba to leave things as they

were in o rder no t to further inflame the Chinese156

The central go vernment`s purchase o f the three is lands o n 11 September immediately led to a very harsh reactio n by the Chinesewhich was even wo rse than in 2010 But befo re lo o king at Chinese co untermeasures after 11 September in detail it is impo rtant toinves tigate why the Chinese reactio n was so s tro ng and why the Japanese apparently did no t anticipate it particularly in view o fChina`s unprecedented reactio n in September 2010

CHINESE WARNINGS BEFORE THE NATIONALIZATION ON 11 SEPTEMBER

Prime Minis ter No da admitted o n 19 September o nly eight days into the co mprehens ive Chinese sanctio ns and co unter measures

that he had underes timated their extent157

158 In a named co mmentary o f Xinhua o n 18 April attentio n was drawn to Ishihara`s kno wn right wing and anti-Chinese s tatementsbut also po inted o ut that the CMOFA `wo uld no t hes itate to take any necessary measures to safeguard so vereignty o ver the Diao yu

Is lands`159 Vice-Pres ident Xi Jinping to ld vis iting Ko no Yo hei a kno wn pro -China hand that Japan sho uld no t wo rsen the bilateral

relatio nship and that co re is sues sho uld be reso lved by the two co untries in an appro priate manner16 0 At the end o f April the StateOceanic Adminis tratio n anno unced a plan to des ignate is lands and their surro unding waters as s trategically vital and to pro tect their

enviro nments and develo p marine reso urces 16 1 Mo re specifically targeting the Senkaku Is lands was ho wever the entry o n 3 May o f

two FLEC vessels into the Senkaku Is lands` Co ntiguo us Waters fo r the firs t time s ince Ishihara`s anno uncement16 2 Bilateraltens io ns also increased after a Japanese right wing gro up suppo rted the ho lding o f a meeting o f the Wo rld Uyghur Co ngress in

To kyo fro m 14 to 18 May which led to the cancellatio n by Beijing o f several o fficial vis its 16 3 On 13 May Premier Wen Jiabao raisedthe Senkaku is sue and the Uighur meeting during talks in Beijing with Prime Minis ter Yo shihiko No da cautio ning that lsquoit is impo rtant

to respect Chinarsquos co re interes ts and matters o f great co ncernrsquo16 4 Wang Jiarui head o f the Co mmunis t Partys Internatio nalDepartment was quo ted by Eda Satsuki a fo reign po licy adviser o f the DPJ that bo th the Senkaku and the Uighur is sue were

described as `co re is sues` and Wen`s s tatement was s tressed in a Chinese TV bro adcas t16 5 The Xinjiang is sue as well as Taiwanand Tibet have been referred to fo r so me time by the Chinese go vernment as `co re is sues` but the Senkaku is sue had been called

a `co re is sue` apparently fo r the firs t time o nly in an o pinio n piece by the Renmin Ribao in January 201216 6 Only o n 23 March 2013did the Chinese Fo reign Minis try Spo kesperso n clearly s tate that China regards the Diao yu Is lands as its co re interes t altho ugh the

written reco rd subsequently so ftened this s tatement16 7

The abo ve chro no lo gy certainly gives the impress io n that there was a series o f Chinese reactio ns which expressed s tro ng Chineseco ncern with any purchase (whether by the TMG o r the central go vernment) o f the Senkaku Is lands If that had no t been eno ugh theinterview o f the Financial Times with Japan`s ambassado r in China Niwa Uichiro at the beginning o f June sho wed s tro ng co ncernabo ut the implicatio ns o f a purchase He was quo ted as saying that lsquoif Mr Ishihararsquos plans are acted upo n then it will result in anextremely grave cris is in relatio ns between Japan and ChinahellipWe canno t allo w decades o f pas t effo rt to be bro ught to no thingrsquo He

added that such a cris is wo uld affect bus iness 16 8 Niwa mus t have been truly co ncerned abo ut the severity o f the s ituatio n to makesuch an undiplo matic public s tatement fo r which he was reprimanded by Fo reign Minis ter Gemba and criticized by so me media

o utlets and po liticians ultimately leading to his recall later in the year16 9

The Chinese warnings became sharper at the seco nd s tage when Prime Minis ter No da anno unced o n 7 July that his go vernment wo uldseek to buy the is lands because the purchase co uld no lo nger be put do wn to a mere lo cal maverick with s tro ng anti-Chineseinclinatio ns The Global Times edito rial o f 9 July sho wed the frus tratio n by so me Chinese lsquoEach time Japan takes o ne s tep we sho uldtake o ne and half o r even two s teps fo rward making Japan aware o f the grave co nsequences caused by its aggress io n agains t

Chinarsquo170 A Xinhua co mmentary o n 7 July quo tes the CMOFA`s spo kesperso n referring pro bably fo r the firs t time in this ro w to a`co nsensus` agains t which the Japanese go vernment went by wanting to buy the is lands meaning o f co urse the shelving co nsensus

o f 1972 and 1978171 On 9 July a Xinhua co mmentary titled `Japan playing with fire o ver Diao yu Is lands` called the purchase by the

central go vernment a `farcical ambitio n` an express io n repeated thereafter many times 172 On 11 July the Japanese media repo rtedthe entry by three FLEC vessels into the territo rial waters o f Kubajima the firs t time s ince the 16 March 2012 fo llo wed by o ne vessel

cruis ing the fo llo wing day in the is land`s co ntiguo us zo ne173 Public o pinio n became increas ingly inflamed and the Global Timesrepo rted o n 19 July that 90 8 per cent o f Chinese peo ple surveyed appro ve us ing the military to enfo rce Chinas so vereignty o ver

the is lets with 521 per cent saying a military clash lsquois likelyrsquo between China and Japan o ver the is lands 174

Even the US gave Japan `s tro ng advice` no t to pro ceed with the purchase because it co uld `trigger a cris is` as was revealed in April2013 by Kurt Campbell who was at the time Ass is tant Secretary fo r Eas t As ian and Pacific Affairs Even tho ugh we warned JapanJapan decided to go in a different directio n and they tho ught they had gained the suppo rt o f China o r so me did which we were

certain that they had no t Campbell is quo ted in an interview with Kyo do 175

FAILURE OF COMMUNICATION

The abo ve chro no lo gy and escalatio n o f Chinese reactio ns to the planned purchase o f the is lands o ver the summer 2012 give aclear indicatio n that a Japanese purchase o f the three is lands was no t co ns idered jus t ano ther incident witho ut majo rco nsequences So why did the Japanese go vernment s till go ahead with the purchase In the final analys is the failure to avo id thecris is escalating in September 2012 lay in the wide difference between the interes ts o f the two go vernments Do mes ticcircumstances o n bo th s ides and the inherent zero sum nature o f territo rial disputes prevented the trans itio n fro m dialo gue topreventive actio n let alo ne so lutio n Aggravating events o ver the summer 2012 which raised tempers o n bo th s ides were thedemands by the TMG to send a survey team to the Senkaku Is lands (the No da go vernment after so me initial co nflicting repo rts didno t allo w a landing) the landing o f Ho ng Ko ng activis ts o n Uo tsurijima o n 15 Augus t (timed with the anniversary o f Japan`ssurrender) fo llo wed by the landing o f Japanese activis ts ( including lo cal parliamentarians ) o n 19 Augus t and an attack in Beijing o n27 Augus t o n the car carrying Ambassado r Niwa Despite o ngo ing co mmunicatio n and dialo gue thro ugh vario us channels theseadverse circumstances led to a hardening o f po s itio ns o ver the summer 2012 between the two go vernments

The Japanese central go vernment had been caught sho rt by Ishihara`s sudden anno uncement o n 16 April and became to tallyabso rbed with preventing the maverick po litician fro m go ing ahead with the purchase o f the is lands fearing rightly that this wo uldserio us ly co mplicate Japan-China relatio ns Ishihara wanted to embarrass the No da go vernment which was co ns tantly declining inpo pularity and to fo rce it to deal mo re assertively with the is lands As we have seen fo r Ishihara it was no t jus t abo ut purchas ingthe is lands but abo ut building facilities o n them Fo r the No da go vernment buying the is lands by the s tate was therefo re the lesserevil The go vernment tried all alo ng to co nvince the Chinese o f To kyo `s go o d intentio ns fo r example when Fo reign Minis ter Gembamet with his Chinese co unterpart Yang Jiechi o n 11 July that the purchase was o nly a `do mes tic co mmercial transactio n` and no t a

diplo matic matter and was o nly meant to ensure that the is lands wo uld be `adminis tered peacefully and s tably`176 In December2012 when the full extent o f China`s unprecedented reactio ns had beco me kno wn the new Japanese ambassado r Kitera s till s tatedthat lsquoThe change in o wnership sho uld no t have caused a pro blem in relatio ns with Chinarsquo adding that Japan had given China sufficient

explanatio ns ahead o f the purchase177 Fo reign Minis ter Gemba even tried to highlight in No vember that the purchase was actually areturn to the status quo ante lsquoThe measure taken by the go vernment o f Japan was jus t a trans fer o f title under Japanese do mes ticlaw and jus t means that the o wnership o f the is lands mdash held by the go vernment until 1932 mdash was returned fro m a private citizen to

the go vernmentrsquo178 In sho rt fo r the Japanese the purchase o f the is lands was aimed at maintaining the status quo in such a waythat it ho ped China wo uld co ns ider to be in its o wn interes t that is by cho o s ing the lesser o f two evils That express io ns like`peaceful adminis tratio n` o r `trans fer o f title under do mes tic Japanese law` co uld o nly be interpreted by the Chinese as acts o fasserting Japanese so vereignty was apparently s imply igno red Under these circumstances it was impo ss ible to co nvince theChinese that trans fer o f o wnership had no thing to do with so vereignty Ins tead the Chinese even suspected that the No da

go vernment and Ishihara were co nniving at s trengthening Japan`s co ntro l o ver the is lands 179

Any intended co nciliato ry o verto ne in the abo ve explanatio ns by Gemba and many s imilar declaratio ns befo re and later were furthernegated by the ins is tence that there was no territo rial dispute exactly the po s itio n the Chinese mo s t so ught to change Thefrequent references to `co re interes t` by China were igno red by the Japanese go vernment Fo r the Chinese leaders the `o ffer` tocho o se between the To kyo Metro po litan Go vernment o r the Go vernment o f Japan buying the is lands was as Vice Fo reign Minis ter

Zhang Zhijun later put it like being asked to cho o se between two do ses o f po iso n18 0

It was also unfo rtunate that the Japanese go vernment allo wed the express io n kokuyuka (natio nalizatio n) to prevail even amo ng

go vernment members ins tead o f the o riginal term agreed by the Japanese cabinet shutoku (acquis itio n)18 1 Chinese media hastaken o ver the Japanese term o f lsquonatio nalizatio nrsquo which certainly further co nfused Chinese public o pinio n Since it do es no t kno w thehis to rical backgro und and Japan`s effective co ntro l o f the is lands `natio nalizatio n` tended to be unders to o d as a radical change in

the status quo o r even as invas io n18 2 A well kno wn Japanese o bserver in China Kato Yo shikazu even argued therefo re that the 1972

and 1978 unders tanding abo ut shelving had prevented the Chinese peo ple fro m learning abo ut the is sue as perceived in Japan18 3

Bo th s ides made it impo ss ible with their extreme and diametrically o ppo sed po s itio ns to find a co mpro mise The No da go vernmentwas to o weak (and also to o preo ccupied with o ther is sues like the pass ing o f the law to intro duce a hike o f the value added taxco ping with the aftermath o f the triple disas ter o f March 2011 and s imply trying to s tay in po wer) to find an alternative to the no wabando ned `shelving co mpro mise` and to admit that there was a territo rial pro blem At the end o f Augus t No da was fo rced topro mise Lo wer Ho use electio ns `so metime so o n` despite the grim o utlo o k fo r his party`s chances in the electio ns Making aco mpro mise o n the territo rial is sue wo uld no t have helped to gain po pular suppo rt While the Chinese pro bably felt enco uraged toescalate pressure by their success in fo rcing the Japanese go vernment hand o ver the captain in September 2010 it mo s t likely hadthe effect o n the No da go vernment to remain inflexible in o rder to avo id being seen yet again as caving in to Chinese pressure Butthe Chinese were also no t able to co mpro mise o n their demand that the Japanese sho uld admit the exis tence o f a territo rial is sue

The preparatio n fo r the 18 th Natio nal Party Co ngress in No vember 2012 and the ensuing leadership change to be finalized o nly inspring 2013 s imilarly did no t allo w the Chinese leaders whether inco ming o r o utgo ing to appear so ft Eight o ut o f nine Po litbureaumembers publicly expressed o ppo s itio n to the purchase either befo re o r after the anno uncement o f the purchase o n 11

September18 4 There are also credible repo rts that during the CCP`s summer retreat to Beihaide in Augus t Hu Jintao came underpressure fro m the future gro up o f leaders to take a mo re severe po s itio n o n Japan`s intentio n to natio nalise the three is lands Asa result the leading fo reign po licy interlo cuto rs o f the Japanese go vernment Zhang Zhijun and Dai Bingguo hardened their po s itio n

as well18 5 Public o pinio n in China had gro wn increas ingly ho s tile to Japan o ver the summer and was particularly inflamed when thelanding o f the Ho ng Ko ng activis ts was fo llo wed by the landing o f Japanese activis ts which were treated by the Japanese autho ritiesmo re leniently than the fo rmer ie no t arres ted despite having vio lated private land leased to the s tate Rio ts in several Chinese

cities s tarted thereafter18 6

Altho ugh bo th s ides agreed to co ntinue dialo gue and several o fficial meetings at different levels to o k place they co uld o nly end inres tating kno wn po s itio ns China did no t make things eas ier by later cancelling such meetings depriving bo th s ides o f po ss ibleo ppo rtunities to find a breakthro ugh The s tart o f Chinese sanctio ns acro ss the who le gambit o f bilateral relatio ns deprived theJapanese o f even mo re do mes tic wriggle ro o m fo r a co mpro mise

It seems that the abo ve circumstances did no t allo w Japan`s central decis io n-makers co ncerned with the is sue in particular the

Prime Minis ter and his immediate circle to admit to ando r unders tand until the purchase anno uncement o n 11 September 2012ho w s tro ngly the Chinese felt abo ut it Ambassado r Niwa`s rather undiplo matic s tatements in the Financial Times interview seem toindicate that he felt that the central decis io n-makers did no t unders tand the s trength o f the feelings o f the Chinese and ho w far theymight go Niwa warned in his interview that even a po ss ible pre-purchase survey o f the is lands co uld be diplo matically incendiary

s ince such a survey was dis cussed already at the time to enable the TMG to go ahead with the purchase18 7 As late as the 3September the Yomiuri Shimbun repo rted that the Chinese go vernment was reacting calmly as lo ng as three co nditio ns wereo bserved to maintain the status quo The co nditio ns co ntained no o ppo s itio n to a po ss ible purchase and ins tead jus t mentio ned

abs tentio n fro m landing surveying and building facilities o n the is lands 18 8 Acco rding to Pro fesso r Takahara Akio General ZhuChenghu said o n 5 September that a purchase by the central go vernment wo uld be better and Qu Xing directo r o f the China Ins titute

o f Internatio nal Affairs is said to have expressed a s imilar o pinio n18 9 Even o n 12 September when the s to rm bro ke the deputydirecto r o f the Japan Ins titute o f the Chinese Academy o f So cial Science Gao Ho ng s tated in an interview with the o n-line vers io no f the Renmin Ribao that if Japan wo uld respect the three abs tentio ns mentio ned abo ve the s ituatio n co uld ultimately revert to the

status quo ante19 0 But these were no lo nger the decis ive vo ices o f the Chinese leadership after the Beihaide meeting The abo ve-mentio ned Campbell interview seems to sugges t that Japan was lo ng befo re mo re inclined to act upo n Chinese s tatements whichwere clo ser to what it wanted to unders tand

CHINESE REACTION RHETORICAL WARFARE

The final misco mmunicatio n o r clash o f irreco ncilable interes ts o ccurred when Prime Minis ter No da met Pres ident Hu o n thes idelines o f the As ia Pacific Eco no mic Co o peratio n (APEC) summit in Vladivo s to k o n 9 September then anno unced two days laterthe s igning o f the purchase co ntract with the Kurihara family Whether Hu had no t sufficiently co nveyed his s tro ng feelingsco ncerning the purchase which had been kno wn and bilaterally dis cussed at leas t s ince the Japanese o fficial anno uncement o f itspurchase intentio n o n 7 July o r No da had no t unders tanding the Chinese feeling fo r the po ss ible reaso ns dis cussed abo ve Hu

apparently felt he had lo s t face when Japan anno unced the purchase o n 11 September19 1 Mo reo ver the Japanese anno uncementco uld no t have co me at a mo re awkward time because o f the anniversary o f the Mukden Incident o n the 18 September which likeseveral o ther carefully cultivated anniversaries regarding Japan`s pas t misdeeds in China always aro use latent anti-Japanesefeelings As a result the Japanese anno uncement caused an avalanche o f virulent rheto rical o utburs ts relating to the pas t po liticalsanctio ns further measures to assert China`s territo rial claim (fo r example including the is lands in the Chinese TV weatherfo recas t an exhibitio n o f ancient maps to pro ve Chinese co ntro l) eco no mic sanctio ns and an escalatio n o f patro ls by ChineseFLEC and MSA ships and aircraft aro und the Senkaku Is lands

The mildes t part o f China`s rheto rical o ffens ive was calling the go vernment purchase a `farce` a rather undiplo matic express io nalready used by Xinhua in July 2012 but then taken up at the highes t level by Vice Pres ident Xi Jinping when meeting Secretary o f

Defence Leo n Panetta o n 19 September19 2 But the main line fro m no w o n was that Japan`s claim to the Senkaku Is lands was adenial o f the po s t-Wo rld War II results In its s tatements and rebuttals the Chinese sho wed their frus tratio n at no t having been ableto fundamentally change the status quo and they did no t hes itate to use express io ns which were rather undignified fo r diplo mats andpo litical leaders Japan o n the o ther hand argued fo r peaceful reso lutio n alo ng the lines o f internatio nal law and dialo gue whichpro bably infuriated the Chinese even mo re On 10 September the CMFA is sued a s tatement calling Japans po s itio n o n the disputedis lands `an o utright denial o f the o utco mes o f the victo ry o f the Wo rld Anti-Fascis t War and hellip a grave challenge to the po s t-war

internatio nal o rder`19 3 In a heated exchange at the UN General Assembly between Chinas UN ambassado r Li Bao do ng and JapansDeputy UN ambassado r Ko dama Kazuo Li called the mo tive fo r purchas ing the three is lands to lsquolegalize its s tealing and o ccupatio no f Chinese territo ryrsquo and s tated lsquoThis actio n o f Japan co ns titutes a serio us encro achment upo n Chinas so vereignty and intends toco ntinue and legalize the result o f Japans co lo nial po licy It is an o pen denial o f the o utco mes o f victo ry o f the wo rld anti-fascis twar and a grave challenge to the po s t-war internatio nal o rder and the purpo ses and principles o f the Charter o f the United

Natio ns rsquo19 4 In a further rebuttal o f Japan`s assertio n o f its claim Li characterized the is land purchase as lsquono thing different fro m

mo ney launderingrsquo19 5 At the As ia Euro pe Meeting (ASEM) in Lao s Fo reign Minis ter Yang Jiechi repeated the reference to the`o utco me o f the anti-Fascis t war` while Prime Minis ter No da spo ke o f peaceful reso lutio n o f co nflicts acco rding to internatio nal

law19 6 On 11 Octo ber the CMFA spo kesperso n Ho ng Lei refuted Fo reign Minis ter Gembarsquos his to rical acco unt jus tifying Japan`s

claim by calling it `gangs ter lo gic`19 7

On the Chinese s ide therefo re there are no w two clo sely-linked his to ry narratives o ne is abo ut the is lands having been part o fChina s ince the Ming and Qing dynas ties the o ther co nnects the is lands to the already well-rehearsed his to ry narrative ie Japanhaving victimised China s ince the Sino -Japanese war o f 1894-95 These two narratives co ntinue to be cultivated by the Chineseleadership In Octo ber 2012 the Chinese anno uncement o f the publicatio n o f 80 vo lumes o n the Far Eas t War Criminal Co urt was

clearly meant to link the latter narrative to Japan`s acquis itio n o f the Senkaku Is lands 19 8 Fo rmer Fo reign Minis ter Gemba explicitlytried in Octo ber 2012 to delink the territo rial is sue fro m Japan`s aggress io n agains t China o nly to be reminded by the Chineseambassado r to the UK in an article in the Financial Times (as part o f the ensuing wo rldwide press campaign by bo th s ides ) that lsquothe

Diao yu Dao is sue is all abo ut his to ryrsquo19 9 Since then until no w China has co ntinued this ldquohis to ry warfarerdquo by publishing endlessarticles o n Japan`s aggress io n agains t China befo re 1945 The mo s t recent mo ve in July 2014 is the serialised o n-line publicatio n o f

the hand-written co nfess io ns by 45 Japanese co nvicted war criminals by the State Archives Adminis tratio n20 0

POLITICAL SANCTIONS AND PUBLIC OPINION

Chinese po litical co untermeasures ranged fro m the cancellatio n o f o fficial and uno fficial vis its to further legal acts to reinfo rce

China`s claim to the Senkaku Is lands Aro und 40 per cent o f ceremo nial events in Japan to mark 2012 as the 40 th anniversary o f the

no rmalizatio n o f diplo matic relatio ns with China were cancelled o r po s tpo ned and even mo re events in China20 1 Thesecancellatio ns were no t always the result o f direct go vernment interventio n but so metimes mo re indirect o fficial `dis co uragement`helped by the Chinese preference fo r no t being seen to do so mething in co ntradictio n to the (initially fo mented and later self-pro pelling) anti-Japan atmo sphere o r by fear o f participants running into demo ns tratio ns if no t assaults The legal s crews werefurther turned with lo ng-term implicatio ns On 10 September the Chinese go vernment anno unced the base po ints and baselines o f

the territo rial waters o f the disputed is lands and their affiliated is lets as well as the names and co o rdinates o f 17 base po ints 20 2

On 16 September repo rts appeared that China was submitting pro po sals fo r its extended co ntinental shelf to the UN Co ntinental

Shelf Co mmiss io n which included the Senkaku Is lands but in fact the actual submiss io n o ccurred o nly o n 14 December 201220 3 On

20 September a go vernment agency published a thematic map o f the Diao yu Is land and its affiliated is lands 20 4 Chinarsquos

Meteo ro lo gical Adminis tratio n s tarted pro viding weather fo recas ts fo r the Senkaku area o n the s tate-run TV s tatio n20 5 On 16September the fishery bureau anno unced the lifting o f the fishery ban in the Eas t China Sea and s tressed that China planned to

s trengthen its so vereignty claim o ver the Senkakus 20 6

There were rumo urs that 1000 fishing vessels wo uld co me to the Senkaku area and tho ugh this did no t materialize it helped to

further raise tens io ns 20 7

Mo st attentio n in Japan was fo cused o n the widening s treet pro tes ts in o ver 100 Chinese cities the des tructio n o f Japanese sho ps

res taurants cars and pro ductio n facilities and the attacks o n Japanese citizens in China20 8 The webs ites o f at leas t 19 Japanese

banks univers ities and o ther ins titutio ns came under cyber-attack20 9 At a demo ns tratio n in Shanghai abo ut 7000 pro tes ters

chanted s lo gans such as lsquoBeat Japanese imperialismrsquo lsquoBo yco tt Japanese pro ducts rsquo and lsquoDes tro y Japan and retrieve Okinawarsquo210

Altho ugh o nly 63 per cent o f po lled Japanese in late September 2012 expressed suppo rt fo r their go vernment`s natio nalizatio n o fthe is lands do wn fro m 73 per cent in a previo us po ll o n 15 and 16 September 82 per cent o f respo ndents in a Mainichi Shimbun

survey said the Japanese go vernment had no t pro tes ted s tro ngly eno ugh to Beijing o ver anti-Japan pro tes ts 211 The Chinesego vernment denied any o fficial invo lvement and the spo kesperso n o f the Waijiao bu went o nly as far as saying that the pro tes ts anddemo ns tratio ns were `co mpletely caused by the Japanese go vernments illegal purchase o f the Diao yu Is lands and are peo ples

spo ntaneo us acts`212 There were ho wever repo rts that so me o f the demo ns tratio ns were to lerated if no t abetted by go vernment

agencies 213 The demo ns tratio ns so o n died do wn because to lerating them much lo nger wo uld have run the risk that they wo uld turninto anti-go vernment demo ns tratio ns Even the Chinese Academy o f So cial Sciences repo rted that so me demo ns trato rs who were

arres ted did no t even kno w where the Senkaku Is lands were and that anger o ver the widening wealth gap was behind their acts 214 Inco ntras t to these Chinese demo ns tratio ns and acts o f lawlessness there was hardly any public demo ns tratio n in Japan whichsho ws the relative detachment o f the Japanese fro m the dispute On 22 September `Nippo n Gambare` a right wing o rganizatio nchaired by fo rmer Air Self Defence Fo rce chief Tamo gami To shio s taged a march thro ugh parts o f To kyo which this autho rwitnessed A brief fire was s tarted at a Chinese scho o l in Ko be and two smo ke bo mbs were thro wn into the Chinese Co nsulate

General in Fukuo ka215 But such actio ns were relatively rare and small in s cale

ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND THE QUESTION OF WHO IS MORE DEPENDENT ON WHOM

Pro tes t measures o f a lo nger duratio n and as yet unpredictable co nsequences fo r the bilateral relatio nship have been China`seco no mic sanctio ns and a bo yco tt o f Japanese go o ds by the general public altho ugh the autho rities denied again any go vernmentinterventio n A co mmentary o f Xinhua half admitted ho wever go vernment interventio n when it made the unco nvincing dis tinctio nbetween `measures` and `sanctio ns` `Since Japan purchased Chinas Diao yu Is lands in September the Chinese go vernment hastaken a series o f co untermeasures in the eco no mic legal diplo matic and military fields which have helped it to wres t the initiativeto reso lve the is lands dispute despite China no t impo s ing any eco no mic sanctio ns the Japanese eco no my has been badly

hit`216 Renmin Ribao co mpared `eco no mic punishments` with a `gun` and warned that thro ugh its is land purchase Japan hadalready to uched the `trigger` In a rather heavy hint the paper po inted o ut ho w vulnerable Japan`s eco no my was because o f the

2011 earthquake and the dependence o f key eco no mic secto rs o n China217 Even mo re o fficial was Vice Minis ter o f Co mmerce Jiang

Zengwei`s warning that the is land purchase wo uld inevitably have a negative impact o n Sino -Japanese eco no mic and trade ties 218

After 11 September it so o n became very o bvio us that the heavy hand o f the Chinese go vernment was impo s ing sanctio ns andmaking life fo r Japanese bus iness mo re diff icult On 21 September it was repo rted that Chinese cus to ms autho rities were

s trengthening inspectio ns o f impo rts fro m and expo rts to Japan altho ugh the Chinese autho rities denied this 219 In the same week

repo rts appeared abo ut Japanese co mpanies experiencing delays in o btaining wo rking visas fo r their Japanese emplo yees 220 BigJapanese co mpanies with inves tments in China were experiencing ho ld-ups in gaining regulato ry appro vals fo r Merger amp

Acquis itio ns 221 In co ntras t to the interference in rare earth expo rts to Japan after the trawler incident in 2010 ho wever no such

embargo was implemented because this particular eco no mic weapo n had lo s t its effectiveness s ince then (see belo w)222

The greates t medium-term damage to Japanese eco no mic activities apart fro m the abo ve mentio ned des tructio n o f Japaneseco mmercial and indus trial s ites was caused by a partial co nsumer bo yco tt no tably the fall o f car sales in China and Chineseto urism to Japan Overall bilateral trade decreased by 39 per cent in 2012 to $329 billio n the firs t dro p s ince the co llapse o f theLehman inves tment bank in 2009 and in 2013 to $3125 billio n acco rding to Chinese figures Acco rding to Japanese figures trade in

2013 increased but declined in vo lume223

The wo rs t hit secto r was auto mo biles To yo ta so ld 840 500 vehicles in China in 2012 the firs t annual dro p s ince 2002 Nis san

experienced a 24 per cent dro p in December China sales and Ho nda saw a 19 per cent December fall224 Ho wever as o f 2014Japanese car sales in and to China have again been increas ing The to uris t indus try was also hard hit in bo th co untries Chinese

vis ito rs to Japan decreased by 44 per cent fro m September to December 2012 fro m the year befo re225 The number o f Japanese

to uris ts o n gro up to urs to China plunged by mo re than 70 per cent year-o n-year in the las t three mo nths o f 2012226 This fallco ntinued into 2013 when their number fell to 29 millio n Japanese to uris ts do wn 18 2 fro m 2012 and the 3rd s traight annual

decline227 Ho wever in March 2014 vis ito rs fro m mainland China surged 80 1 fro m the previo us March to to tal 184200 a reco rdhigh fo r the mo nth and a s teeper year-o n-year rise than vis ito rs fro m any o ther co untries and regio ns This was also helped by the

falling yen and the resumptio n o f cruise to urs with large ships which were to tally suspended in March 2012228

Ano ther mo re lo ng-term negative eco no mic effect o n the bilateral relatio nship can be gauged fro m falling Japanese FDI to Chinawhich acco rding to Chinese figures declined by 422 in the firs t five mo nths o f 2014 after having fallen by 43 to $71 billio n in

2013 acco rding to Chinese figures o r by 18 to $10 9 billio n acco rding to Japanese figures 229

China`s multiple eco no mic retributio ns cas t do ubt o n the co ntinued viability o f the earlier `Ho t Eco no mics and Co ld Po litics`dicho to my The answer to the ques tio n which co untry is mo re dependent o n the o ther o r mo re vulnerable to sanctio ns is dependento n the eco no mic indicato rs and secto rs being cho sen and is also a po litical ques tio n because the answer can be po liticallymanipulated Japan`s eco no mic diff iculties s ince the 1990s (and its dependence o n eco no mic interactio n with China to co pe withthese diff iculties ) and China pushing Japan to No 3 in wo rld GDP ranking has diminished the Chinese perceptio n o f Japan as aneco no mic po wer ho use It means that fo r China the relatio nship with Japan became less impo rtant while po litical relatio nsdeterio rated at the same time The s tro ng effect o f the Chinese embargo o n rare earth expo rts to Japan in 2010 can be viewed intwo diametrically o ppo sed ways Chinese o bservers may be inclined to put emphas is o n the s tro ng effect it had o n Japanese publico pinio n and indus trial circles co ntributing to a certain extent to the go vernment`s surrender o f the trawler captain Others maypo int o ut that the case demo ns trated the futility o f abus ing a do minant supplier po s itio n because within a sho rt time Japan`sindus try secured alternative reso urces and demand reductio n thro ugh recycling and pro duct re-engineering no t o nly pro videdeno ugh breathing space but in the end reduced China`s market po wer Still Chinese experts are co nvinced that Japan is no w mo redependent o n China than the o ther way ro und Acco rding to so me specialis ts Chinas impo rts acco unted in 2011fo r 237 per cent o fJapan`s expo rt vo lume The bilateral trade vo lume in 2011 to o k up 21 per cent o f Japanese gro ss trade vo lume o f that year while it

merely acco unted fo r 9 4 per cent o f Chinas annual gro ss trade vo lume230 There seem to be o nly few Chinese vo ices which expressco ncern o ver the negative impact o f China`s sanctio ns o n China`s eco no my itself no tably at a time o f wo rldwide eco no mic

co ntractio n231

The Chinese market is certainly to o impo rtant fo r many Japanese co mpanies to leave A survey in No vember 2012 to which mo rethan 10 000 Japanese co mpanies in China replied sho wed that fo r almo s t 30 per cent o f them the territo rial dispute had affected

their bus iness but s till mo re than half want to maintain their o peratio ns and o nly 16 per cent said that they wanted to either cut

back o r pull o ut232 Japanese co mpanies in certain secto rs are likely to beco me mo re reluctant to make inves tments in China all themo re as o ther So utheas t As ian co untries (no tably Myanmar is currently the New Fro ntier fo r Japanese bus iness ) have cheaper

labo ur co s ts 233 Ho wever Chinese co nsumers s till prefer Japanese pro ducts fo r safer fo o d drinks and daily necess ities and tho se

Japanese co mpanies were hardly affected by the bo yco tt234

A wide gap between bo th s ides` perceptio n abo ut their eco no mic dependence and vulnerability to sanctio ns is dangero us fo r themanagement o f their bilateral relatio nship particularly when o ne s ide tries to leverage its suppo sedly s tro nger po s itio n to achievevicto ry in a sens itive area like territo rial integrity While Chinese co mmentato rs and experts may be inclined to o verrate Japan`svulnerability their Japanese co unterparts have a tendency to lo o k at the is sues to o much in purely eco no mic terms neglecting theimpact o f Chinese emo tio ns and go vernment pro paganda as well as the wider public`s insufficient kno wledge abo ut the o verall

impact o f bad eco no mic relatio ns with Japan o n China`s o wn eco no my235 The Japanese perceptio n remains that China in the endneeds Japan mo re than the o ther way ro und which in view o f China`s huge pro blems and its dependence o n Japanese hightechno lo gy co mpo nents fo r its manufacturing indus try is arguably the case This Japanese perceptio n has fo s tered the co nvictio nas demo ns trated fo r example by the belief in the sus tainability o f `Ho t Eco no mics and Co ld Po litics` that despite recurring

po litical crises in the relatio nship China wo uld in the end co mpro mise as it had do ne several times in the pas t236 Yet the pro blemwith the perceptio n o f `needing Japan` is that it can be po litically manipulated particularly in an autho ritarian sys tem This gapbetween Japanese and Chinese o bservers and experts o n the is sue o f dependence can serio us ly influence the willingness o f bo th

s ides to co mpro mise237 It also challenges the liberal view that clo se eco no mic relatio ns can prevent o r at leas t so ften deeppo litical differences like territo rial co nflicts which mo reo ver are linked to eco no mic interes ts like hydro carbo n reso urces In thisco ntext it is interes ting to no te that China has recently been exchanging with Japan a number o f high-po wered bus iness delegatio ns(apart fro m exchanges with po litical parties and lo cal go vernment o fficials ) The willingness o f Japanese bus iness to take part maybe interpreted by China as an express io n o f Japan`s eco no mic dependence o n China while giving it also the o ppo rtunity to putpressure o n the Abe go vernment to make co ncess io ns and to keep links with Japan fo r the po s t-Abe era

In view o f the impo rtance o f the eco no mic relatio nship and the damage suffered by Japanese bus iness after September 2012 o newo uld have expected mo re pressure fro m the bus iness co mmunity to co me to a territo rial co mpro mise so lutio n and so impro verelatio ns Ho wever this has no t been the case and may have to do with the perceptio n gap dis cussed abo ve but also the relativelack o f influence o n the go vernment (the majo rity o f the China-relevant Japanese bus iness co mmunity co ns is ts o f small- andmedium-s ized co mpanies ) the fear that a mo re vo cal ro le wo uld get co mpanies into tro uble with the autho rities in Japan ando rChina o r the ho pe o f being able to weather the po litical s to rms either because o f alternative market o ppo rtunities o r theco mpany`s s ize

FROM POLICING TO MILITARY INVOLVEMENT

The mo s t serio us co nsequences fo r the bilateral relatio nship ndash let alo ne fo r the so lutio n o f the territo rial dispute and regio nalpeace ndash arise fro m the co ns tant intrus io ns o f Chinese o fficial vessels into the Co ntiguo us Zo ne (CZ) o r even Territo rial Waters(TW) o f the Senkaku Is lands s ince September 2012 and the gro wing invo lvement o f the armed fo rces o f bo th s ides The aim o f theChinese is o bvio us to demo ns trate that the Japanese can no lo nger claim exclus ive co ntro l o f the is lands and to fo rce To kyo toadmit the exis tence o f a territo rial dispute Apparently a task fo rce at the highes t level headed by Xi Jinping was set up in

September 2012 to achieve this go al thro ugh escalating pressure238 So far law enfo rcement actio ns by Japan in the Senkaku areahave been limited to the deplo yment o f the Japanese Co as t Guard and po lice which is no w ho wever co ns tantly challenged byChinese with patro ls by CMS and FLEC (s ince 22 July 2013 unified under the State Ocean Adminis tratio n and renamed China Co as tGuard CG) vessels asserting the same rights in the is lands` CZ and TW The Chinese s ide escalated its pressure o n Japan by firs tdeplo ying FLEC vessels in the CZ and TW o f the disputed is lands then ratcheting up their pressure with CMS vessels do ing the samefo llo wed later in December 2012 with air patro ls by CMS aircraft which led to the deplo yment o f the air fo rce o f bo th s ides inJanuary 2013

As we have seen after the September 2010 incident in No vember 2010 FLEC s tarted to regularly send its vessels to the Senkakuarea which entered fro m time to time the is lands` CZ and also in Augus t 2011 twice the TW Apparently the mo re serio usintrus io ns which are tho se into the TW were so metimes timed with specific spikes o f tens io ns such as the TW incurs io n o n 16March 2012 (the Japanese naming o f so me is lands) July 2012 (No da`s anno uncement o f purchase intentio n o n 7 July) and finallyo n 19 September when s ix vessels entered the TW s tarting a series o f mo re frequent and regular incurs io ns In December 2012

FLEC deplo yed its newes t and bigges t ship the 5800-to n FLEC vessel Yuzheng 206 a fo rmer ship o f the Chinese navy239

The entries o f the vessels o f the CMS into the is lands` CZ and TW seem meant to send an even higher degree o f warning and denialo f Japan`s co ntro l o ver the is lands On 17 September the number o f FLEC and CMS vessels in the CZ and TW had reached the reco rd

o f 17240 Thereafter the frequency o f incurs io ns into the CZ and TW increased but it decreased after March 2013 On 30 Octo berXinhua even repo rted that the CMS had `expelled a number o f Japanese vessels illegally sailing in waters aro und the Diao yu

Is lands` altho ugh it is no t clear what exactly this meant s ince the CG did no t co nfirm such an incident241 Acco rding to Xinhua NewsAgency in 2013 China sent 50 ldquopatro l miss io ns rdquo into the TW o f the disputed is lands and as o f 12 July 2014 by the autho r`s co unt

there had been 17 such Chinese ldquopatro l miss io ns rdquo in 2014 which are ldquoincurs io ns rdquo fo r the Japanese s ide242 Other needle pricks todemo ns trate China`s claims are the o ccas io nal incurs io ns o f Chinese survey ships into the Senkaku Is lands` EEZ o r the bo ardingo f Chinese fishing vessels in the EEZ Defence Minis ter Itsuno ri Ono dera in late Octo ber 2013 called these repeated incurs io ns a

threat to peace which fell in a ldquogray zo ne (between) peacetime and an emergency s ituatio nrdquo243

A new level o f depriving Japan o f the ability to claim so le effective co ntro l o ver the is lands was reached o n 13 December 2012 when

a small turbo pro p aircraft o f the CMS (Harbin Y12 type) flew o ver Uo tsurijima244 Since then regular CMS air patro ls have beenco nducted but the aircraft no rmally s tay abo ut 120 km fro m the is lands With this mo ve Chinese measures to undermine Japan`sco ntro l o ver the is lands were expanded to the air space which fo r o rganizatio nal reaso ns had immediately military implicatio nsbecause the Air Self Defense Fo rce (ASDF) is respo ns ible fo r intercepting aircraft which intrude illegally into Japan`s air space The

incident did no t happen o ut o f the blue because already in January 2012 the SOA had anno unced a plan to deplo y the Y12 in 2012245

On 24 September the SOA had also anno unced plans to deplo y dro nes by 2015 fo llo wing the success ful tes t the previo us day 246

The Chinese acts are apparently carefully planned and co o rdinated s ince the o fficials in the abo ve Kyo do repo rt also said that theairspace vio latio ns o n 13 December 2012 by an airplane o f the CMS was planned by the s taff sectio n o f the natio nal Land and SeaBo rder Defense Co mmittee which acts as a liaiso n o ffice fo r the Chinese military the State Oceanic Adminis tratio n and the fishing

bureau o f the Agriculture Minis try with the aim o f rais ing tens io ns 247

The lo w altitude flight o f the Y12 o n 13 December was particularly upsetting fo r the Japanese go vernment because it was no t pickedup by the ASDF radar (the clo ses t o ne being o n Miyako jima abo ut 200 km fro m the is lands) but ins tead by CG ships in the area Inthis case eight ASDF fighters s crambled but co uld no t detect the Y12 Interceptio n o f aircraft is by nature much mo re diff icult andcarries a certain risk o f accident as happened in 2001 when a US intelligence aircraft co llided with a Chinese intercepto r jet Witho ut

explaining the s tandard Japanese pro ceedures fo r aerial defence which so lely relies o n the ASDF the Chinese media interpreted theuse o f military aircraft by Japan as `aggress ive` and the Global Times cautio ned agains t any interceptio n warning that China might

respo nd by sending its air fo rce248 On the Japanese s ide even the centre-left Asahi Shimbun called the Y12 flight ` a highly

pro vo cative act that co uld lead to an armed co nflict between the two co untries`249 At the beginning o f January 2013 there wereapparently erro neo us repo rts that the ASDF might co ns ider firing warning sho ts (tracer bullets ) at intruding Chinese aircraft which

pro mpted further bellico se co mments in the Chinese press 250 As a co nsequence the Chinese air fo rce also became invo lved o n10 January when the Chinese Minis try o f Defence anno unced that the Peo ple`s Liberatio n Army Air Fo rce (PLAA) had sent two fighterjets agains t two ASDF F-15 intercepto rs because they were fo llo wing a Chinese military Y8 transpo rt aircraft patro lling the airspace

o f Chinese o il platfo rms in the Eas t China Sea251 The Japanese repo rted that mo re than ten Chinese aircraft including military

aircraft had appro ached the Japanese air defence identificatio n zo ne252 In a further escalatio n the Japanese s ide repo rted that o n11 June 2014 two Chinese military jets flew abno rmally clo se to two planes o f Japans Self Defence Fo rce abo ve the Eas t China Sea

an accusatio n which the Chinese s ide refuted speaking ins tead o f two incidents pro vo ked by Japanese fighters 253 Related to thisdevelo pment and further enhancing the po ss ibility o f an incident is the enhanced patro lling o f the PLAA o ver the Eas t China Seawhich caused the ASDF to increase scrambling agains t PLAA aircraft to 415 times between 1 April 2013 and 31 March 2014 (Fis cal

Year 2013) 109 times mo re than in the previo us Fis cal Year 2012254

Co ntinuing to increase the pressure o n Japan the Chinese go vernment decreed o n 23 No vember 2013 an Air Defence Identificatio nZo ne (ADIZ) which includes the airspace o ver the Senkaku Is lands and was certainly meant to reinfo rce China`s territo rial claimdespite the fact that an ADIZ has no territo rial implicatio ns in internatio nal law The threat o f military co untermeasures in the text o fthe decree (lsquoChinas armed fo rces will ado pt defens ive emergency measures to respo nd to aircraft that do no t co o perate in the

identificatio n o r refuse to fo llo w the ins tructio ns rsquo) has further heightened the po ss ibility o f a military clash255 Ho wever theJapanese s ide refuses to accept the ADIZ The Chinese mo ves have wider implicatio ns fo r peace and s tability in the regio n in o rderto pro tect the freedo m o f its military aircraft in Eas t As ian airspace and its ability to o bserve China`s military fo rces Washingto nrefused to reco gnise the zo ne co ntinued to igno re the requirements o f the ADIZ by pursuing its regular patro l f lights and criticisedits implementatio n Simultaneo us ly ho wever the Department o f State advised civilian airlines to fo llo w China`s ins tructio ns andVice Pres ident Biden advised bo th co untries o n his trip to No rtheas t As ia in December 2013 to es tablish a cris is managements tructure Since the US do es no t take a s tance o n the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands` so vereignty Washingto n seemed to igno re Japan`smain grievance abo ut the ADIZ which is China`s intentio n to further reinfo rce its so vereignty claim by extending the ADIZ o ver theis lands The mo s t far-reaching US s tatements were a reco nfirmatio n o f the applicatio n o f the security treaty to the is lands evenmentio ning the is lands by their Japanese and Chinese names and co mplaining that the Chinese actio n was an attempt to unilaterally

change the status quo in the Eas t China Sea which raised regio nal tens io n and increased the risk o f accident and miscalculatio n256

Ho wever in this way the Obama Adminis tratio n risked creating amo ng so me Japanese o bservers do ubts abo ut the Adminis tratio n`sreliability and so gave succo ur to China`s attempt to drive a wedge between the two allies Ano ther co mplicatio n is that the ChineseADIZ o verlaps that o f Ko rea and mo reo ver co vers the submerged ro ck called Ieo do in Ko rean and Suyan in Chinese which has animpact o n the no t yet demarcated EEZ bo rder between bo th co untries Interes tingly the Japanese ADIZ also co vers Ieo do but thishas never been underpinned by any Japanese EEZ claims But China kno ws ho w to play o n So uth Ko rea`s criticism o f Japan`sattitude to wards the his to ry is sue and the territo rial dispute with Japan o ver Do kto Takeshima is land Mo reo ver the As ian co untriesco ntes ting China`s claims to parts o f the So uth China Sea are co ncerned that China wo uld further co mplicate the territo rialdisputes in the area by es tablishing an ADIZ Yet the ASEAN member s tates have been very cautio us in directly criticis ing ChinaChina`s es tablishment o f the ADIZ directly affects many co untries because so many o f them have airlines flying thro ugh the zo neHo wever with the exceptio n o f Japan all o thers agred to co nfo rm with China`s reques t fo r no tif icatio n which undermines theJapanese go vernment`s po s itio n o f explicitly advis ing Japanese airlines no t to co nfo rm

With these escalating develo pments the Chinese s ide achieved its go al o f sho wing that the Japanese autho rities are no lo nger infull co ntro l o f the disputed is lands In the case o f Chinese Co as tguard vessel intrus io ns the reactio n o f the Japanese CG is limitedto shado wing the Chinese vessels to info rm them that they are vio lating Japan`s CZ o r TW and to ask them to leave whichho wever they do at their o wn dis cretio n (the time span ho vering in the CZ o r TW having beco me a further means o f Chinesepressure) fo llo wed by diplo matic pro tes ts Otherwise the CG has avo ided any phys ical co nfro ntatio n o r co ntact When co nfro ntedby the CG the Chinese vessels s imply declare (by radio o r even electro nic displays ) that they are patro lling Chinese waters and thatthe CG ships were o perating illegally in these waters This ritual has so far prevented vio lence This is in co ntras t to an exchange o fwater canno n salvo s between the CG and the Taiwanese co as t guard in the territo rial o f the Senkaku Is lands o n 25 September 2012

and again o n 24 January 2013257

The increase o f patro ls by Japan and China is caus ing o peratio nal s train fo r bo th s ides (also rais ing the risk o f miscalculatio ns o ro verreactio ns ) but this has no t reduced the willingness o f either go vernment to s cale do wn the almo s t daily demo ns tratio ns o f

`effective co ntro l` In Octo ber it was repo rted that the CG no w always maintains ten vessels agains t eight fro m China258 The 11th

regio nal headquarters respo ns ible fo r the Senkaku area is in Naha and has nine patro l ships (but o nly seven vessels o f at leas t

1000 to ns ) but no w needs additio nal ships which are dispatched fro m o ther regio nal headquarters 259 In April 2012 the CG had ato tal o f 357 patro l vessels but o nly 51 o ver 1000 to ns which are tho se mo s t needed fo r a far flung area like the Senkaku

Is lands 26 0 On 14 September 2012 Senio r Vice Minis ter o f Fisheries Iwamo to Tsukasa mentio ned plans to increase the number o f

fishery patro l vessels to ensure fishermens safety amid intens ifying territo rial disputes with China and So uth Ko rea26 1 On 26Octo ber the Minis try o f Land Infras tructure Transpo rt and To urism which heads the CG anno unced plans to increase budgetary

reques ts fo r mo re ships 26 2 The Abe go vernment plans to build mo re vessels o r advance the calendar retro fit vessels which were to

be retired and is co ns idering extending the retirement age o f the o fficers 26 3

The Chinese have fewer vessels which can be deplo yed as far as the Senkaku Is lands In additio n leave o f the sailo rs has been

res tricted and their deplo yment length at sea has increased26 4 In March 2013 the Chinese s ide anno unced clo ser co o peratio nbetween the military and vario us maritime law enfo rcement agencies as well as the merger o f fo ur maritime law enfo rcementagencies under the State Ocean Adminis tratio n (adminis tered by the Minis try o f Land and Reso urces ) ie the China MarineSurveillance the co as t guard fo rces o f the Public Security Minis try the fisheries law enfo rcement co mmand o f the Agriculture

Minis try and the maritime anti-smuggling po lice o f the General Adminis tratio n o f Cus to ms 26 5

Ano ther wo rrying develo pment is the gradual invo lvement o f the PLA navy (PLAN) and the Maritime Self Defence Fo rce (MSDF) TheJapanese MOD anno unced o n 16 Octo ber 2012 that fo r the firs t time PLAN ships were o bserved navigating in the 22-km-wide CZbetween Yo naguni and Irio mo te is lands altho ugh the minis try left o pen the po ss ibility that they did so in o rder to avo id a typho o n

Nevertheless the Gaimusho so ught explanatio ns fro m the Chinese abo ut these ship mo vements 26 6 In December 2012 fo ur PLANships sailed thro ugh the CW o f the Irio mo te-Yo naguni is lands o n the way back fro m drills in the Pacific after having go ne into the

Pacific thro ugh the mo re no rmal ro ute o f the s trait between the Okinawan main is land and Miyako jima26 7 Again there was no thingillegal abo ut it but it raised attentio n at a time o f tens io ns Ho wever there are s igns o f greater co o peratio n o f the PLAN withChinese Co as t Guard vessels as was sho wn in the s tando ff between China and the Philippines aro und the disputed Scarbo ro ugh

Sho al in the So uth China Sea and jo int exercises to o k place between the three in the Eas t China Sea in Octo ber 201226 8 The

patro lling activities o f the MSDF in the Senkaku area became kno wn when the Japanese repo rted at the end o f January 2013 that o n19 January a Chinese frigatersquos target radar had lo cked o nto an MSDF helico pter and o n 30 January ano ther frigate sailing clo se to

an MSDF des tro yer did likewise The Chinese vehemently denied it26 9 Ho wever in March this year the Kyo do news agency repo rtedthat senio r Chinese military o fficials had admitted the incident o f 29 January Even mo re wo rriso me is that the Chinese vessels

acted apparently witho ut prio r appro val fro m the fleet co mmand o r navy headquarters All this was denied by the Chinese s ide270 Itdid no t help that under Prime Minis ter No da the MSDF had been o rdered after the eruptio n o f the 2012 cris is to keep a greaterdis tance fro m PLAN ships than the hitherto 3 km in o rder avo id incidents but this po licy was reversed by the mo re hawkish Abe

adminis tratio n to the previo us 3 km dis tance271 The fire radar lo cking incident had happened at a dis tance o f 3 km

Agains t the backgro und o f greater invo lvement o f military fo rces it is particularly regrettable that a plan to build a maritime liaiso n

mechanism between their defense autho rities o n which they had agreed in June 2012 to make later that year was shelved272

Unfo rtunately it is s till Chinese practice to co ns ider Co nfidence Building Measures (CBM) no t as the firs t s tep to build co nfidencebut as a to o l to extract fro m the o ther s ide prio r co ncess io ns under the pretext o f `creating a better atmo sphere` fo r dis cuss ingCBM The o utbreak o f the September 2012 cris is was therefo re a co nvenient pretext fo r the Chinese to cancel the pro ject Thelates t co nfirmatio n was in March 2013 when General Yin Zhuo explained that there co uld be no military trus t if the po litical and

diplo matic relatio nship is bad273 Since the target radar lo ck-o n incidents the Japanese go vernment is publicly calling fo rresumptio n o f nego tiatio ns fo r the maritime liaiso n mechanism but the Chinese will certainly want to extract so me co ncess io nsbefo re even co ns idering a po s itive respo nse

Ho wever the co ns tant co nfro ntatio n between the po licing and military fo rces o f bo th s ides co uld eas ily lead to a military clasheither as a result o f an unfo reseen civilian o r military incident miscalculatio n o r malicio us intentio n at a lo wer level o f co mmandTwo recent examples o f unfo reseen civilian incidents co uld have escalated One is the attempted landing o n o ne o f the disputedis lands by a Chinese pro tes ter with a ballo o n in January 2014 This incident was peacefully reso lved because Japan did no t arres t theballo o nis t In this case the firs t repo rt o n the crash-landing in the territo rial waters o f Uo tsurijima came fro m the Taiwanese co as tguard which info rmed the Japanese co as t guard fo llo wed by the hand-o ver o f the ballo o nis t to the PRC autho rities o uts ide o f

Japan`s territo rial waters 274 The o ther incident was the s inking o f a Chinese fishing bo at ldquoto the no rth o f the Diao yu Is landsrdquo and

the mo ve o f two Chinese naval () vessels to rescue the crew275 This autho r co uld no t find o ut ho w clo se the fishing bo at came tothe is lands and apparently there has no t been any further repo rting abo ut the incident

The previo us ly mentio ned radar-targeting incidents and these two civilian incidents have no t led to an escalatio n but there is noguarantee fo r the future Shi Yinho ng a pro fesso r at Renmin Univers ity predicts that the territo rial co nflicts in the ECS So uth ChinaSea and alo ng the Sino -Indian bo rder will intens ify because o f po pular natio nalism dynamics within the armed fo rces and o f co urse

also o ur to p leaders perso nal beliefs and s trategic perso nalities 276 Hugh White argues that a war (which co uld lead to a nuclearexchange between China and the US) co uld also begin because the Chinese leadership may co ns ider that s tarting ho s tilities no wrather than later wo uld be mo re beneficial to either tes t US reso lve to defend Japan (which the Chinese leadership do ubts ) anddetermine the is sue o f Chinese supremacy in the As ian regio n which he co ns iders to be the real is sue rather than the is lands

themselves 277

IS THERE A WAY FORWARD

The current co nfro ntatio n is no t o nly co ntinuing but even escalating and do mes tic develo pments in bo th co untries are no t creatingan atmo sphere mo re co nducive to better management o f the cris is let alo ne finding a so lutio n Inactio n runs the risk o f a furtherescalatio n o r even a military clash while po s itive o ptio ns are beco ming fewer Meanwhile bo th co untries suffer fro m the eco no micfall-o ut and heightened tens io ns while the integratio n o f a ris ing China into a new s trategic enviro nment in As ia will beco me evenmo re fraught cas ting a shado w o n Japan`s clo se relatio nship with the US

The 2010 incident ended quickly with Japan`s release o f the captain One reaso n fo r this is certainly the fact that China`s demand in2010 was relatively clear and achievable (release o f the captain) if painful fo r Japan at a time o f a weak and inexperiencedgo vernment This time in September 2012 the cris is firs t hit a go vernment which reacted intrans igently because o f its previo usdefeat and o ther unfavo urable do mes tic circumstances and was then replaced by the mo re hawkish Abe go vernment The Abecabinet`s attitude to wards the pas t as exemplif ied by vario us s tatements by cabinet members and peo ple clo se to it the attempt torevise the Ko no s tatement reco gniz ing the fo rced war pro s titutio n (the military co mfo rt wo men) and Abe`s Yasukuni Shrine vis itall served China`s anti-Japan pro paganda wo rsened Japan-Ko rea relatio ns which China is cleverly explo iting and even angered theUS adminis tratio n Abe is seen as utiliz ing the tens io ns with China to win do mes tic and internatio nal suppo rt fo r Japan to have aldquono rmalrdquo natio nal defence po s ture The latter is welco me by the US adminis tratio n because it wo uld help with the US As ianrealignment and suppo rt its China po licy At the same time China`s actio ns cas t an o mino us shado w o n its intentio ns in the So uthChina Sea and Abe and mo re impo rtantly the US is suppo rting the claimants there agains t China

Under these bilateral multilateral and regio nal circumstances wo uld China be satis fied with go ing back to the `unders tanding abo utsetting as ide the dispute` in co njunctio n with Japan`s reco gnitio n o f the exis tence o f a territo rial dispute o r wo uld it demand areversal o f the purchase o f the three is lands Wo uld it demand the end o f Japanese CG patro ls aro und the is lands China`ss tandard demand no w that Japan `co rrect its mis takes` is rather ambiguo us because it co uld be interpreted as go ing back to theshelving unders tanding and the reco gnitio n o f the exis tence o f a dispute o r demanding a reversal o f the go vernment`s purchase o f

the is lands 278 The latter wo uld s imply be impo ss ible in legal and practical terms and o ne can o nly ho pe that the ambiguity is o nlyaimed at rais ing China`s nego tiatio n po s itio n ando r leaving eno ugh wiggle ro o m fo r nego tiatio ns which wo uld satis fy all Chineses takeho lders` interes ts

It seems that it is already to o late fo r go ing back to the shelving agreement o f 19721978 which wo uld imply that the two s ides canso meho w go back to the status quo o f the 1970s This as we have seen has been superseded by deeds and wo rds o n bo th s ides The Chinese have no w no t o nly publicly declared that the shelving agreement was lsquobro kenrsquo by Japan but after the firs t Y12 patro l o n13 December 2012 co mmented that ldquoThe s ituatio n has changed It has beco me no rmal fo r Chinas marine surveillance vessels to

enter the 12-nautical-mile zo ne Japans actual co ntro l o ver the is lands has go nerdquo279

The bilateral relatio nship has deterio rated to the extent that at leas t shelving the co nflicting so vereignty claims without o fficiallyadmitting that there is a territo rial dispute is no lo nger an o ptio n acceptable to China because it feels Japan has abused theshelving co nsensus thro ugh a series o f adminis trative measures with the final s traw having been the central go vernmentrsquos purchaseo f three is lands When s tudying the vario us Chinese o fficial s tatements and news repo rts after the 2012 cris is had fully erupted inSeptember it beco mes clear that until Octo ber 2012 the Chinese s till raised the demand that Japan sho uld go back to the previo uslsquounders tandingrsquo o r lsquoco nsensus rsquo but this demand was no t made o ften thereafter It reappeared in remarks by Wang Jiarui the head o fthe Co mmunis t partys Internatio nal Department when meeting Yamaguchi Natsuo the leader o f the junio r co alitio n partner

Ko meito in January 201328 0 Previo us ly a co mment o n the Xinhua internet s ite o n 29 Octo ber said that ldquoThe lsquopurchasersquo sho wed thatthe Japanese go vernment has who lly abando ned the attitude o f laying as ide disputes and has fundamentally changed the

s ituatio nrdquo28 1 On 30 Octo ber the CMOFA spo kesperso n declared that lsquoJapans illegal purchase o f the Diao yu Is lands bro ke the

impo rtant co nsensus The Japanese s ide sho uld no t have any mo re illus io n o f o ccupying the Diao yu Is lands What the Japaneses ide sho uld do is to face up to the reality admit the so vereignty dispute co rrect mis takes and co me back to the track o f a

nego tiated settlement`28 2 The lates t o fficial pro po sal to shelve the is lands is sue was made by the fo rmer fo reign minis ter Tang

Jiaxuan o n 16 July 201428 3

The reco gnitio n o f a territo rial pro blem wo uld be relatively easy fo r Japanese public o pinio n (and even mo re so fo r Japanrsquos friendsand allies ) to accept because they wo uld no t see the need fo r any kind o f diplo matic o r legal so phis try fo r what is o bvio us ly aterrito rial co nflict whatever the legitimacy o f the Chinese claim might be given also the fact that the current Japanese po s itio nco mes do wn to refus ing to even dis cuss whatever settlement might be po ss ible Acco rding to a survey co nducted by Genro nto gether with Zho ngguo Ribao she in June 2012 627 per cent o f Japanese agreed that there exis ts a territo rial pro blem dispute

(176 disagreed) co mpared with 822 o f the Chinese (139 disagreed)28 4 Ho wever co nsecutive Japanese cabinets haverefused to reco gnise the exis tence o f a territo rial dispute which is o ften the default po s itio n o f a go vernment in actual co ntro l o f adisputed territo ry (fo r example the Ko rean go vernmentrsquos po s itio n o n Do kto Takeshima) This po s itio n has been reinfo rced by theexplicit Japanese denial s ince the 1990s o f a shelving agreement which wo uld have been an implicit admiss io n that there is adispute To circumvent the risk o f being perceived as admitting the exis tence o f a territo rial pro blem the deputy prime minis ter o fthe previo us No da go vernment Okada Katsuya was repo rted to have mentio ned in a speech in Octo ber 2012 that there was no

territo rial dispute but as a matter o f fact a debate exis ted28 5 Ho wever this co mpro mise so lutio n was never co nfirmed by the No dago vernment and did no t beco me po licy It is even less likely to be acceptable to the new Abe go vernment Even amo ng influentialo pinio n makers there is hardly any suppo rt fo r admitting the exis tence o f a territo rial co nflict o r o f a shelving agreement Even mo reco nciliato ry s tatements o n this subject are rather vague Maehara Seiji o f the Demo cratic Party declared in a co nference at QinghuaUnivers ity in Beijing in September 2013 that the Japanese go vernment sho uld add (to its o wn po s itio n) that China has a differentview (Senkakusho to wo meguru Niho n seifu no tachiba ni tsuite lsquoChugo ku ga chigau kangaekata wo mo tte iru to iuko to wo ichigen

tsukekuwaerubeki darsquo) At the same time he emphas ised ho wever that there was no territo rial dispute28 6 Japan Bus inessFederatio n Chairman Yo nekura Hiro masa mentio ned in September 2012 in an NHK interview that the go vernment sho uld be mo re

flexible s ince o therwise its s tance co uld be taken to mean that Japan has no intentio n o f so lving the dispute28 7 Miyamo to Yuji thefo rmer Japanese ambassado r to China is quo ted as saying that lsquoThe go vernment do es no t need to alter its bas ic po s itio n but in

reality a co nflict do es exis t o ver the Senkaku is les rsquo 28 8 This is also the s tance which the previo us Japanese ambassado r Niwa

Uichiro takes in an article after his return to Japan28 9

Co ncerning co nflict reso lutio n it is interes ting to no te that when asked abo ut the mo dern s ignificance o f the 1978 Japan-ChinaPeace and Friendship Treaty 68 4 o f the po lled Japanese agreed with Art 12 (lsquoThe two parties shall settle all disputes by peacefulmeans and shall refrain fro m the use o r threat o f fo rcersquo) but o nly 525 o f the Chinese agreed Mo reo ver 58 1 o f the Chinese

favo ur China s trengthening its co ntro l o ver the area29 0

If therefo re a new ldquoimplicit unders tandingrdquo abo ut shelving the dispute is achievable it wo uld have to be based o n learning fro m thefailures o f the 19721978 shelving ie it wo uld be necessary to achieve a mutual unders tanding o f what the s tatus quo is whatwo uld undermine the s tatus quo and what has to be do ne to mo ve fro m co nflict management to so lutio n Quite clearly such a newunders tanding wo uld be less favo urable to Japan`s current s tance o n the dispute

FROM CONFLICT MANAGEMENT TO ADDRESSING THE SOVEREIGNTY ISSUE

Any mo ve fo rward will certainly require decis ive leadership o n bo th s ides be it to take the initiative o r to respo nd po s itively to theinitiative o f s tarting the pro cess to wards reso lutio n In view o f the co mplex backgro und o f the external and internal dynamics it iso bvio us that address ing the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands dispute requires a s tep-by-s tep appro ach The ultimate is sue to address is theso vereignty is sue and territo rial disputes are generally viewed as zero sum in nature given their clo se link to co re securityinteres ts Even tho se who reco gnize the impo rtance o f transcending such lo gic in favo ur o f co ndo minium o r shared so vereigntygenerally ho ld that the is sue can o nly be addressed at the las t s tage o f any nego tiated pro cess if at all

Two impo rtant is sues have to be co ns idered at the beginning to what extent have the vario us s tages o f the nego tiating pro cess tobe agreed befo rehand (lsquoro ad maprsquo) o r even the final o utco me whether a viable co ndo minium o r o nly shelving the is sues and co uldthe ro le o f a third party mediato r be helpfulacceptable In view o f the po litical diff iculties o n bo th s ides the s tart o f thenego tiatio n pro cess wo uld be endangered if there is no t sufficient ro o m fo r ambiguity and interpretatio n abo ut the vario us s tages altho ugh the general aim o f tens io n reductio n and suspens io n o f the so vereignty is sue mus t be clearly agreed

A third party mediato r is pro bably no t acceptable to the Chinese s ide The third party mo s t o ften mentio ned is the Internatio nalCo urt o f Jus tice (ICJ) o r any kind o f internatio nal arbitratio n Ho wever this seems unlikely in view o f China`s preference fo rbilateral nego tiatio ns and its refusal to accept judicial settlement by the ICJ o r any internatio nal arbitratio n except in no n-po litical

areas such as trade29 1 The Japanese go vernment wo uld be willing to accept the jurisdictio n o f the ICJ but o nly if China brings the

case to the Co urt les t it be perceived as ackno wledging the exis tence o f a territo rial dispute29 2 But there are also po litical andpro cedural arguments agains t the reco urse to the ICJ China`s legal argumentatio n is co mparatively weak and s ince a negativejudgement co uld have implicatio ns fo r China`s legal claim to mo s t o f the So uth China Sea there is even less o f a chance o f Chinamaking an exceptio n fo r the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands dispute In view o f the entrenched po s itio ns o f bo th s ides and the risk o f a`winner takes all` o utco me o f internatio nal litigatio n bo th go vernments wo uld face co ns iderable do mes tic res is tance in case o f anegative o utco me In view o f the urgency o f the dispute and the lo ng time it takes fo r a judgement there wo uld also be the risk o fdo mes tic fo rces trying to pre-empt a negative result

In view o f the security is sues invo lved (let alo ne the American his to rical `debt` as a result o f Washingto n`s ambiguity related toWashingto n`s ending o f the adminis tratio n o f Okinawa in 1972) an American mediatio n co uld be seen as natural and even inAmerican interes ts Such an American ro le ho wever is extremely unlikely as it wo uld be seen by China as unduly advantageo us toJapan Ho wever at so me po int during the Japan-China nego tiatio n pro cess the US might ass is t (o r even be reques ted) by agreeingto certain Co nfidence and Security Building Measures (CSBM) in the area aro und the is lands

The firs t s tage wo uld have to co ns is t o f measures which reduce the risk o f a military clash but in a way which prevents theperceptio n that o ne s ide is giving in to co ercio n This s tage wo uld be a gradual phas ing o ut o f intrus io ns by Chinese o fficial vesselsand aircraft into the territo rial waters co ntiguo us zo ne and airspace o f the is lands which is recipro cated by Japanrsquos reducing in thesame way its co as tguard patro ls in the two zo nes as well as its s crambling activities in the is lands` airspace There were repo rts in

June 2013 that China called o n Japan to agree to a 12-nautical-mile no -entry zo ne aro und the is lands 29 3 Japan rejected this co urse

Ano ther measure wo uld be to increase the dis tance at which vessels o f bo th maritime fo rces o bserve each o ther Such s teps sho uldultimately be o fficialised by a gradually expanding series o f CSBMs and a bilateral liaiso n mechanism This co uld also include ademilitarisatio n agreement as an incentive fo r the Chinese s ide It wo uld be vital that the s teps at this s tage be incremental that nos tep is explo ited in a o ne-s ided way and that they are co ns idered irrevers ible At the same time bo th s ides have to prevent peo plefro m appro aching the is lands s ince this wo uld be seen as a pro vo catio n by the o ther s ide This latter task is technically no t easy

because o f the co ntro vers ial character o f any co mpro mise with certain no n-s tate acto rs in Japan China Ho ng Ko ng and Taiwan The(failed) landing o f a Chinese ho t ballo o n o n o ne o f the is lands in January 2014 demo ns trated at the same time the technical

diff iculty o f a no -entry po licy as well as the po ss ibility o f a success ful co o peratio n o f the co as tguards o f all three co untries 29 4

At this firs t s tage o r leading to the next there will have to be a Japanese go vernment s tatement to the effect that there is alsquopro blemrsquo related to the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands This can be wo rded in such a way that the sens itive express io n `territo rialpro blem` (which is s trenuo us ly denied by the go vernment) is avo ided and it can be supplemented by a sentence that such as tatement in no way prejudices the legal po s itio n o f the go vernment Such a qualifying s tatement is fo r example included in the

Japan-China agreement fo r prio r no tif icatio n o f research vessels fro m bo th co untries in the Eas t China Sea in 200029 5 A s imilarqualif icatio n is part o f the 1997 Japan-China Fisheries Agreement In the jo int co mmuniqueacute o f 1972 which no rmalised diplo maticrelatio ns between Japan and China diplo matic wo rding also managed to bridge the huge gap between their s tances o n Taiwan whichthe PRC co ns iders an lsquoinalienable partrsquo o f its territo ry Japan co ns iders the so vereignty is sue s till unreso lved because the 1951 SanFrancis co Peace Treaty Art 2 (b) o nly s tipulated that lsquoJapan reno unces all right title and claim to Fo rmo sa and the Pescado res rsquowitho ut clarifying the recipient o f the territo ry The co mpro mise in 1972 was reached with the sentence that Japan lsquofully unders tandsand respects this s tand o f the Go vernment o f the Peo ples Republic o f China and it f irmly maintains its s tand under Article 8 o f thePo tsdam Pro clamatio nrsquo

POSSIBLE APPROACHES TO THE SOVEREIGNTY ISSUE

The mo s t diff icult pro blem is the so vereignty is sue which go es to the co re o f any co untry`s security interes ts It is no t imaginablethat either s ide will reno unce its claim to the is lands Sides tepping o r shelving the is sue is o nly useful if the lesso ns fro m the 1972and 1978 attempts as o utlined abo ve can be learned and applied but there is s till the fundamental pro blem with the implicitassumptio n that the quality o f the bilateral relatio nship will always be as go o d as when the s ides tepping agreement was achievedand can be maintained in perpetuity o r until the so vereignty is sue can be addressed But in o rder to so lve the so vereignty is sue aneven better relatio nship has to be created This better relatio nship co uld be bro ught abo ut by the s teps explained abo ve and furtherbelo w

An impo rtant co nditio n fo r any las ting territo rial co mpro mise wo uld be reducing the value o f the is lands fo r bo th co untries whichcan be achieved by o ne o f the measures pro po sed fo r s tage 1 ie reso lutely preventing anyo ne fro m appro aching the territo ries(including to tal demilitarizatio n) which in themselves are eco no mically wo rthless and are uninhabited The main po int is to preventany go vernmental act which co uld be interpreted as being part o f the `so vereignty game` The mo s t diff icult part here is to preventany act by no n-go vernmental acto rs This wo uld have to include the territo rial waters and the explo itatio n there in o f any kind o freso urces including fishing Scientif ic interes ts in the is lands co uld be served by bilateral surveys witho ut any po litical co nno tatio ns

There have been pro po sals to declare the is lands an Internatio nal Nature and Wildlife Preserve29 6 Such a preserve wo uld have to beadminis tered either bilaterally o r by a relevant internatio nal o rganisatio n and as such co uld serve as a co nfidence-building measure

The abo ve s teps wo uld then allo w the two s ides to deal with the co ns iderable eco no mic interes ts in fishing and the explo itatio n o fhydro carbo n reso urces and o ther seabed reso urces aro und the is lands ie in the Exclus ive Eco no mic Zo ne ando r the ExtendedCo ntinental Shelf Once the is lands` land area and the territo rial waters have been put as ide it wo uld be eas ier to co me to ano verall agreement o n the delimitatio n o f the EEZ bo rder (with the exceptio n o f the no rthern part which wo uld require a trilateralagreement between China Japan and Ko rea) which wo uld include the delimitatio n o f these surro unding waters It wo uld facilitate aco mpro mise if bo th s ides agree that the is lands do no t merit their o wn EEZ This might be diff icult fo r Japan which claims an EEZ fo rOkino to rishima refuted by China s ince it co ns iders the reef no t to be an is land acco rding to Art 121 o f UNCLOS

A co mpro mise o n the so vereignty is sue co uld o nly be the o utco me ndash if at all ndash o f a success ful pro cess o f the abo ve o r co mparables teps In o rder to avo id a `winner take all` s ituatio n the co mpro mise wo uld have to invo lve a sharing arrangement His to ry o ffers

quite a number o f internatio nal precedents o f shared so vereignty referred to as co ndo minium in internatio nal law29 7 One case withso me s imilarities to the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands is a small is land (3000 sq m) in the river separating France and Spain kno wn asPheasant Is land o r Co nference Is land which even to day s till changes every s ix mo nths between France and Spain as o wner Like theSenkakuDiao yu Is lands the is land has no eco no mic value anymo re and the is land is o ff limits It was the lo catio n o f the s igning o f

the Treaty o f the Pyrenees in 1659 which ended a lo ng war 29 8 Mo s t o ther examples o f jo int so vereignty co ncern territo ries with apo pulatio n which makes co o peratio n much mo re diff icult Other his to rical precedents o f sharing so vereignty are the es tablishmento f ldquoneutral zo nesrdquo Acco rdingly the is lands and po ss ibly a sea area aro und the is lands co uld be declared a neutral zo ne like the o nebetween Saudi Arabia and Kuwait (1922-1965) On July 7 1965 the two go vernments s igned an agreement (which to o k effect o nJuly 25 1966) to partitio n the Neutral Zo ne adjo ining their respective territo ries A demarcatio n agreement dividing the NeutralZo ne was s igned o n December 17 1967

Particularly relevant here is that Saudi Arabia as well as Kuwait explo ited the o il reso urces under a jo int o perating agreement29 9

Co nclus io ns

The actio n-reactio n pattern o f the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands dispute is accelerating and the initiative seems to be mo re o ften thanno t with the Chinese s ide while the Japanese s ide is in a defens ive po s itio n The danger o f a military co nfro ntatio n is lo o mingincreas ingly larger in what co uld be called a lsquochicken gamersquo At the same time the internal and external dynamics are undermining theenviro nment which is required fo r a peaceful so lutio n as well as fo r maintaining the number o f po s itive o ptio ns While the Japanesego vernment refuses to ackno wledge the very exis tence o f a territo rial dispute the Chinese go vernment is no w (July 2014) evenrefus ing to have a dialo gue with Japan`s current prime minis ter It is po ss ible that the Chinese s ide again wants to wait with anymo ve fo rward until the Japanese prime minis ter has changed as Beijing did with Prime Minis ter Sato Eisaku o r with Prime Minis terKo izumi Junichiro But waiting fo r an impro vement o f the bilateral atmo sphere as the Chinese s ide likes to s tress is a very riskyo ptio n and such an impro vement may anyway be a very sho rt windo w o f o ppo rtunity if lo o king at the ups and do wns o f the po s t-1949 his to ry o f the bilateral relatio nship

To s tart a s tep-by-s tep pro cess o f address ing the territo rial is sue s tro ng leadership is required which unders tands the widerinteres ts o f a functio ning Japanese-Chinese relatio nship Japan s imply asking China fo r a summit meeting is no t very sens ible ifthere is no willingness to engage in subs tantive dis cuss io ns and wo uld be very risky fo r China`s to p leader if the Japanese primeminis ter then vis its the Yasukuni Shrine The his to ry is sue sho uld no lo nger be a Chinese lever fo r pressuris ing Japan but the latterhas to abs tain fro m actio ns which are seen as pro vo cative no t o nly by China but also by Ko rea the US and many o thers There hasto be a co mmitted leadership o n bo th s ides which s tarts with a ro ugh ro ad map and tens io n-reducing s teps such as CSBMs en ro uteto agreeing o n a fo rmula which allo ws the parties to o btain eco no mic as well as security gains while reducing tens io ns

Reinhard Drifte is Emeritus Professor of Japanese Politics University of Newcastle UK and Visiting Professor at various Japanese Universities andPau University (France) He is the author of Japanrsquos Foreign Policy for the Twenty First Century His home page is here

Reco mmended citatio n Reinhard Drifte The Japan-China Confrontation Over the SenkakuDiaoyu Islands--Between shelving and dispute

cruis ing the fo llo wing day in the is land`s co ntiguo us zo ne173 Public o pinio n became increas ingly inflamed and the Global Timesrepo rted o n 19 July that 90 8 per cent o f Chinese peo ple surveyed appro ve us ing the military to enfo rce Chinas so vereignty o ver

the is lets with 521 per cent saying a military clash lsquois likelyrsquo between China and Japan o ver the is lands 174

Even the US gave Japan `s tro ng advice` no t to pro ceed with the purchase because it co uld `trigger a cris is` as was revealed in April2013 by Kurt Campbell who was at the time Ass is tant Secretary fo r Eas t As ian and Pacific Affairs Even tho ugh we warned JapanJapan decided to go in a different directio n and they tho ught they had gained the suppo rt o f China o r so me did which we were

certain that they had no t Campbell is quo ted in an interview with Kyo do 175

FAILURE OF COMMUNICATION

The abo ve chro no lo gy and escalatio n o f Chinese reactio ns to the planned purchase o f the is lands o ver the summer 2012 give aclear indicatio n that a Japanese purchase o f the three is lands was no t co ns idered jus t ano ther incident witho ut majo rco nsequences So why did the Japanese go vernment s till go ahead with the purchase In the final analys is the failure to avo id thecris is escalating in September 2012 lay in the wide difference between the interes ts o f the two go vernments Do mes ticcircumstances o n bo th s ides and the inherent zero sum nature o f territo rial disputes prevented the trans itio n fro m dialo gue topreventive actio n let alo ne so lutio n Aggravating events o ver the summer 2012 which raised tempers o n bo th s ides were thedemands by the TMG to send a survey team to the Senkaku Is lands (the No da go vernment after so me initial co nflicting repo rts didno t allo w a landing) the landing o f Ho ng Ko ng activis ts o n Uo tsurijima o n 15 Augus t (timed with the anniversary o f Japan`ssurrender) fo llo wed by the landing o f Japanese activis ts ( including lo cal parliamentarians ) o n 19 Augus t and an attack in Beijing o n27 Augus t o n the car carrying Ambassado r Niwa Despite o ngo ing co mmunicatio n and dialo gue thro ugh vario us channels theseadverse circumstances led to a hardening o f po s itio ns o ver the summer 2012 between the two go vernments

The Japanese central go vernment had been caught sho rt by Ishihara`s sudden anno uncement o n 16 April and became to tallyabso rbed with preventing the maverick po litician fro m go ing ahead with the purchase o f the is lands fearing rightly that this wo uldserio us ly co mplicate Japan-China relatio ns Ishihara wanted to embarrass the No da go vernment which was co ns tantly declining inpo pularity and to fo rce it to deal mo re assertively with the is lands As we have seen fo r Ishihara it was no t jus t abo ut purchas ingthe is lands but abo ut building facilities o n them Fo r the No da go vernment buying the is lands by the s tate was therefo re the lesserevil The go vernment tried all alo ng to co nvince the Chinese o f To kyo `s go o d intentio ns fo r example when Fo reign Minis ter Gembamet with his Chinese co unterpart Yang Jiechi o n 11 July that the purchase was o nly a `do mes tic co mmercial transactio n` and no t a

diplo matic matter and was o nly meant to ensure that the is lands wo uld be `adminis tered peacefully and s tably`176 In December2012 when the full extent o f China`s unprecedented reactio ns had beco me kno wn the new Japanese ambassado r Kitera s till s tatedthat lsquoThe change in o wnership sho uld no t have caused a pro blem in relatio ns with Chinarsquo adding that Japan had given China sufficient

explanatio ns ahead o f the purchase177 Fo reign Minis ter Gemba even tried to highlight in No vember that the purchase was actually areturn to the status quo ante lsquoThe measure taken by the go vernment o f Japan was jus t a trans fer o f title under Japanese do mes ticlaw and jus t means that the o wnership o f the is lands mdash held by the go vernment until 1932 mdash was returned fro m a private citizen to

the go vernmentrsquo178 In sho rt fo r the Japanese the purchase o f the is lands was aimed at maintaining the status quo in such a waythat it ho ped China wo uld co ns ider to be in its o wn interes t that is by cho o s ing the lesser o f two evils That express io ns like`peaceful adminis tratio n` o r `trans fer o f title under do mes tic Japanese law` co uld o nly be interpreted by the Chinese as acts o fasserting Japanese so vereignty was apparently s imply igno red Under these circumstances it was impo ss ible to co nvince theChinese that trans fer o f o wnership had no thing to do with so vereignty Ins tead the Chinese even suspected that the No da

go vernment and Ishihara were co nniving at s trengthening Japan`s co ntro l o ver the is lands 179

Any intended co nciliato ry o verto ne in the abo ve explanatio ns by Gemba and many s imilar declaratio ns befo re and later were furthernegated by the ins is tence that there was no territo rial dispute exactly the po s itio n the Chinese mo s t so ught to change Thefrequent references to `co re interes t` by China were igno red by the Japanese go vernment Fo r the Chinese leaders the `o ffer` tocho o se between the To kyo Metro po litan Go vernment o r the Go vernment o f Japan buying the is lands was as Vice Fo reign Minis ter

Zhang Zhijun later put it like being asked to cho o se between two do ses o f po iso n18 0

It was also unfo rtunate that the Japanese go vernment allo wed the express io n kokuyuka (natio nalizatio n) to prevail even amo ng

go vernment members ins tead o f the o riginal term agreed by the Japanese cabinet shutoku (acquis itio n)18 1 Chinese media hastaken o ver the Japanese term o f lsquonatio nalizatio nrsquo which certainly further co nfused Chinese public o pinio n Since it do es no t kno w thehis to rical backgro und and Japan`s effective co ntro l o f the is lands `natio nalizatio n` tended to be unders to o d as a radical change in

the status quo o r even as invas io n18 2 A well kno wn Japanese o bserver in China Kato Yo shikazu even argued therefo re that the 1972

and 1978 unders tanding abo ut shelving had prevented the Chinese peo ple fro m learning abo ut the is sue as perceived in Japan18 3

Bo th s ides made it impo ss ible with their extreme and diametrically o ppo sed po s itio ns to find a co mpro mise The No da go vernmentwas to o weak (and also to o preo ccupied with o ther is sues like the pass ing o f the law to intro duce a hike o f the value added taxco ping with the aftermath o f the triple disas ter o f March 2011 and s imply trying to s tay in po wer) to find an alternative to the no wabando ned `shelving co mpro mise` and to admit that there was a territo rial pro blem At the end o f Augus t No da was fo rced topro mise Lo wer Ho use electio ns `so metime so o n` despite the grim o utlo o k fo r his party`s chances in the electio ns Making aco mpro mise o n the territo rial is sue wo uld no t have helped to gain po pular suppo rt While the Chinese pro bably felt enco uraged toescalate pressure by their success in fo rcing the Japanese go vernment hand o ver the captain in September 2010 it mo s t likely hadthe effect o n the No da go vernment to remain inflexible in o rder to avo id being seen yet again as caving in to Chinese pressure Butthe Chinese were also no t able to co mpro mise o n their demand that the Japanese sho uld admit the exis tence o f a territo rial is sue

The preparatio n fo r the 18 th Natio nal Party Co ngress in No vember 2012 and the ensuing leadership change to be finalized o nly inspring 2013 s imilarly did no t allo w the Chinese leaders whether inco ming o r o utgo ing to appear so ft Eight o ut o f nine Po litbureaumembers publicly expressed o ppo s itio n to the purchase either befo re o r after the anno uncement o f the purchase o n 11

September18 4 There are also credible repo rts that during the CCP`s summer retreat to Beihaide in Augus t Hu Jintao came underpressure fro m the future gro up o f leaders to take a mo re severe po s itio n o n Japan`s intentio n to natio nalise the three is lands Asa result the leading fo reign po licy interlo cuto rs o f the Japanese go vernment Zhang Zhijun and Dai Bingguo hardened their po s itio n

as well18 5 Public o pinio n in China had gro wn increas ingly ho s tile to Japan o ver the summer and was particularly inflamed when thelanding o f the Ho ng Ko ng activis ts was fo llo wed by the landing o f Japanese activis ts which were treated by the Japanese autho ritiesmo re leniently than the fo rmer ie no t arres ted despite having vio lated private land leased to the s tate Rio ts in several Chinese

cities s tarted thereafter18 6

Altho ugh bo th s ides agreed to co ntinue dialo gue and several o fficial meetings at different levels to o k place they co uld o nly end inres tating kno wn po s itio ns China did no t make things eas ier by later cancelling such meetings depriving bo th s ides o f po ss ibleo ppo rtunities to find a breakthro ugh The s tart o f Chinese sanctio ns acro ss the who le gambit o f bilateral relatio ns deprived theJapanese o f even mo re do mes tic wriggle ro o m fo r a co mpro mise

It seems that the abo ve circumstances did no t allo w Japan`s central decis io n-makers co ncerned with the is sue in particular the

Prime Minis ter and his immediate circle to admit to ando r unders tand until the purchase anno uncement o n 11 September 2012ho w s tro ngly the Chinese felt abo ut it Ambassado r Niwa`s rather undiplo matic s tatements in the Financial Times interview seem toindicate that he felt that the central decis io n-makers did no t unders tand the s trength o f the feelings o f the Chinese and ho w far theymight go Niwa warned in his interview that even a po ss ible pre-purchase survey o f the is lands co uld be diplo matically incendiary

s ince such a survey was dis cussed already at the time to enable the TMG to go ahead with the purchase18 7 As late as the 3September the Yomiuri Shimbun repo rted that the Chinese go vernment was reacting calmly as lo ng as three co nditio ns wereo bserved to maintain the status quo The co nditio ns co ntained no o ppo s itio n to a po ss ible purchase and ins tead jus t mentio ned

abs tentio n fro m landing surveying and building facilities o n the is lands 18 8 Acco rding to Pro fesso r Takahara Akio General ZhuChenghu said o n 5 September that a purchase by the central go vernment wo uld be better and Qu Xing directo r o f the China Ins titute

o f Internatio nal Affairs is said to have expressed a s imilar o pinio n18 9 Even o n 12 September when the s to rm bro ke the deputydirecto r o f the Japan Ins titute o f the Chinese Academy o f So cial Science Gao Ho ng s tated in an interview with the o n-line vers io no f the Renmin Ribao that if Japan wo uld respect the three abs tentio ns mentio ned abo ve the s ituatio n co uld ultimately revert to the

status quo ante19 0 But these were no lo nger the decis ive vo ices o f the Chinese leadership after the Beihaide meeting The abo ve-mentio ned Campbell interview seems to sugges t that Japan was lo ng befo re mo re inclined to act upo n Chinese s tatements whichwere clo ser to what it wanted to unders tand

CHINESE REACTION RHETORICAL WARFARE

The final misco mmunicatio n o r clash o f irreco ncilable interes ts o ccurred when Prime Minis ter No da met Pres ident Hu o n thes idelines o f the As ia Pacific Eco no mic Co o peratio n (APEC) summit in Vladivo s to k o n 9 September then anno unced two days laterthe s igning o f the purchase co ntract with the Kurihara family Whether Hu had no t sufficiently co nveyed his s tro ng feelingsco ncerning the purchase which had been kno wn and bilaterally dis cussed at leas t s ince the Japanese o fficial anno uncement o f itspurchase intentio n o n 7 July o r No da had no t unders tanding the Chinese feeling fo r the po ss ible reaso ns dis cussed abo ve Hu

apparently felt he had lo s t face when Japan anno unced the purchase o n 11 September19 1 Mo reo ver the Japanese anno uncementco uld no t have co me at a mo re awkward time because o f the anniversary o f the Mukden Incident o n the 18 September which likeseveral o ther carefully cultivated anniversaries regarding Japan`s pas t misdeeds in China always aro use latent anti-Japanesefeelings As a result the Japanese anno uncement caused an avalanche o f virulent rheto rical o utburs ts relating to the pas t po liticalsanctio ns further measures to assert China`s territo rial claim (fo r example including the is lands in the Chinese TV weatherfo recas t an exhibitio n o f ancient maps to pro ve Chinese co ntro l) eco no mic sanctio ns and an escalatio n o f patro ls by ChineseFLEC and MSA ships and aircraft aro und the Senkaku Is lands

The mildes t part o f China`s rheto rical o ffens ive was calling the go vernment purchase a `farce` a rather undiplo matic express io nalready used by Xinhua in July 2012 but then taken up at the highes t level by Vice Pres ident Xi Jinping when meeting Secretary o f

Defence Leo n Panetta o n 19 September19 2 But the main line fro m no w o n was that Japan`s claim to the Senkaku Is lands was adenial o f the po s t-Wo rld War II results In its s tatements and rebuttals the Chinese sho wed their frus tratio n at no t having been ableto fundamentally change the status quo and they did no t hes itate to use express io ns which were rather undignified fo r diplo mats andpo litical leaders Japan o n the o ther hand argued fo r peaceful reso lutio n alo ng the lines o f internatio nal law and dialo gue whichpro bably infuriated the Chinese even mo re On 10 September the CMFA is sued a s tatement calling Japans po s itio n o n the disputedis lands `an o utright denial o f the o utco mes o f the victo ry o f the Wo rld Anti-Fascis t War and hellip a grave challenge to the po s t-war

internatio nal o rder`19 3 In a heated exchange at the UN General Assembly between Chinas UN ambassado r Li Bao do ng and JapansDeputy UN ambassado r Ko dama Kazuo Li called the mo tive fo r purchas ing the three is lands to lsquolegalize its s tealing and o ccupatio no f Chinese territo ryrsquo and s tated lsquoThis actio n o f Japan co ns titutes a serio us encro achment upo n Chinas so vereignty and intends toco ntinue and legalize the result o f Japans co lo nial po licy It is an o pen denial o f the o utco mes o f victo ry o f the wo rld anti-fascis twar and a grave challenge to the po s t-war internatio nal o rder and the purpo ses and principles o f the Charter o f the United

Natio ns rsquo19 4 In a further rebuttal o f Japan`s assertio n o f its claim Li characterized the is land purchase as lsquono thing different fro m

mo ney launderingrsquo19 5 At the As ia Euro pe Meeting (ASEM) in Lao s Fo reign Minis ter Yang Jiechi repeated the reference to the`o utco me o f the anti-Fascis t war` while Prime Minis ter No da spo ke o f peaceful reso lutio n o f co nflicts acco rding to internatio nal

law19 6 On 11 Octo ber the CMFA spo kesperso n Ho ng Lei refuted Fo reign Minis ter Gembarsquos his to rical acco unt jus tifying Japan`s

claim by calling it `gangs ter lo gic`19 7

On the Chinese s ide therefo re there are no w two clo sely-linked his to ry narratives o ne is abo ut the is lands having been part o fChina s ince the Ming and Qing dynas ties the o ther co nnects the is lands to the already well-rehearsed his to ry narrative ie Japanhaving victimised China s ince the Sino -Japanese war o f 1894-95 These two narratives co ntinue to be cultivated by the Chineseleadership In Octo ber 2012 the Chinese anno uncement o f the publicatio n o f 80 vo lumes o n the Far Eas t War Criminal Co urt was

clearly meant to link the latter narrative to Japan`s acquis itio n o f the Senkaku Is lands 19 8 Fo rmer Fo reign Minis ter Gemba explicitlytried in Octo ber 2012 to delink the territo rial is sue fro m Japan`s aggress io n agains t China o nly to be reminded by the Chineseambassado r to the UK in an article in the Financial Times (as part o f the ensuing wo rldwide press campaign by bo th s ides ) that lsquothe

Diao yu Dao is sue is all abo ut his to ryrsquo19 9 Since then until no w China has co ntinued this ldquohis to ry warfarerdquo by publishing endlessarticles o n Japan`s aggress io n agains t China befo re 1945 The mo s t recent mo ve in July 2014 is the serialised o n-line publicatio n o f

the hand-written co nfess io ns by 45 Japanese co nvicted war criminals by the State Archives Adminis tratio n20 0

POLITICAL SANCTIONS AND PUBLIC OPINION

Chinese po litical co untermeasures ranged fro m the cancellatio n o f o fficial and uno fficial vis its to further legal acts to reinfo rce

China`s claim to the Senkaku Is lands Aro und 40 per cent o f ceremo nial events in Japan to mark 2012 as the 40 th anniversary o f the

no rmalizatio n o f diplo matic relatio ns with China were cancelled o r po s tpo ned and even mo re events in China20 1 Thesecancellatio ns were no t always the result o f direct go vernment interventio n but so metimes mo re indirect o fficial `dis co uragement`helped by the Chinese preference fo r no t being seen to do so mething in co ntradictio n to the (initially fo mented and later self-pro pelling) anti-Japan atmo sphere o r by fear o f participants running into demo ns tratio ns if no t assaults The legal s crews werefurther turned with lo ng-term implicatio ns On 10 September the Chinese go vernment anno unced the base po ints and baselines o f

the territo rial waters o f the disputed is lands and their affiliated is lets as well as the names and co o rdinates o f 17 base po ints 20 2

On 16 September repo rts appeared that China was submitting pro po sals fo r its extended co ntinental shelf to the UN Co ntinental

Shelf Co mmiss io n which included the Senkaku Is lands but in fact the actual submiss io n o ccurred o nly o n 14 December 201220 3 On

20 September a go vernment agency published a thematic map o f the Diao yu Is land and its affiliated is lands 20 4 Chinarsquos

Meteo ro lo gical Adminis tratio n s tarted pro viding weather fo recas ts fo r the Senkaku area o n the s tate-run TV s tatio n20 5 On 16September the fishery bureau anno unced the lifting o f the fishery ban in the Eas t China Sea and s tressed that China planned to

s trengthen its so vereignty claim o ver the Senkakus 20 6

There were rumo urs that 1000 fishing vessels wo uld co me to the Senkaku area and tho ugh this did no t materialize it helped to

further raise tens io ns 20 7

Mo st attentio n in Japan was fo cused o n the widening s treet pro tes ts in o ver 100 Chinese cities the des tructio n o f Japanese sho ps

res taurants cars and pro ductio n facilities and the attacks o n Japanese citizens in China20 8 The webs ites o f at leas t 19 Japanese

banks univers ities and o ther ins titutio ns came under cyber-attack20 9 At a demo ns tratio n in Shanghai abo ut 7000 pro tes ters

chanted s lo gans such as lsquoBeat Japanese imperialismrsquo lsquoBo yco tt Japanese pro ducts rsquo and lsquoDes tro y Japan and retrieve Okinawarsquo210

Altho ugh o nly 63 per cent o f po lled Japanese in late September 2012 expressed suppo rt fo r their go vernment`s natio nalizatio n o fthe is lands do wn fro m 73 per cent in a previo us po ll o n 15 and 16 September 82 per cent o f respo ndents in a Mainichi Shimbun

survey said the Japanese go vernment had no t pro tes ted s tro ngly eno ugh to Beijing o ver anti-Japan pro tes ts 211 The Chinesego vernment denied any o fficial invo lvement and the spo kesperso n o f the Waijiao bu went o nly as far as saying that the pro tes ts anddemo ns tratio ns were `co mpletely caused by the Japanese go vernments illegal purchase o f the Diao yu Is lands and are peo ples

spo ntaneo us acts`212 There were ho wever repo rts that so me o f the demo ns tratio ns were to lerated if no t abetted by go vernment

agencies 213 The demo ns tratio ns so o n died do wn because to lerating them much lo nger wo uld have run the risk that they wo uld turninto anti-go vernment demo ns tratio ns Even the Chinese Academy o f So cial Sciences repo rted that so me demo ns trato rs who were

arres ted did no t even kno w where the Senkaku Is lands were and that anger o ver the widening wealth gap was behind their acts 214 Inco ntras t to these Chinese demo ns tratio ns and acts o f lawlessness there was hardly any public demo ns tratio n in Japan whichsho ws the relative detachment o f the Japanese fro m the dispute On 22 September `Nippo n Gambare` a right wing o rganizatio nchaired by fo rmer Air Self Defence Fo rce chief Tamo gami To shio s taged a march thro ugh parts o f To kyo which this autho rwitnessed A brief fire was s tarted at a Chinese scho o l in Ko be and two smo ke bo mbs were thro wn into the Chinese Co nsulate

General in Fukuo ka215 But such actio ns were relatively rare and small in s cale

ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND THE QUESTION OF WHO IS MORE DEPENDENT ON WHOM

Pro tes t measures o f a lo nger duratio n and as yet unpredictable co nsequences fo r the bilateral relatio nship have been China`seco no mic sanctio ns and a bo yco tt o f Japanese go o ds by the general public altho ugh the autho rities denied again any go vernmentinterventio n A co mmentary o f Xinhua half admitted ho wever go vernment interventio n when it made the unco nvincing dis tinctio nbetween `measures` and `sanctio ns` `Since Japan purchased Chinas Diao yu Is lands in September the Chinese go vernment hastaken a series o f co untermeasures in the eco no mic legal diplo matic and military fields which have helped it to wres t the initiativeto reso lve the is lands dispute despite China no t impo s ing any eco no mic sanctio ns the Japanese eco no my has been badly

hit`216 Renmin Ribao co mpared `eco no mic punishments` with a `gun` and warned that thro ugh its is land purchase Japan hadalready to uched the `trigger` In a rather heavy hint the paper po inted o ut ho w vulnerable Japan`s eco no my was because o f the

2011 earthquake and the dependence o f key eco no mic secto rs o n China217 Even mo re o fficial was Vice Minis ter o f Co mmerce Jiang

Zengwei`s warning that the is land purchase wo uld inevitably have a negative impact o n Sino -Japanese eco no mic and trade ties 218

After 11 September it so o n became very o bvio us that the heavy hand o f the Chinese go vernment was impo s ing sanctio ns andmaking life fo r Japanese bus iness mo re diff icult On 21 September it was repo rted that Chinese cus to ms autho rities were

s trengthening inspectio ns o f impo rts fro m and expo rts to Japan altho ugh the Chinese autho rities denied this 219 In the same week

repo rts appeared abo ut Japanese co mpanies experiencing delays in o btaining wo rking visas fo r their Japanese emplo yees 220 BigJapanese co mpanies with inves tments in China were experiencing ho ld-ups in gaining regulato ry appro vals fo r Merger amp

Acquis itio ns 221 In co ntras t to the interference in rare earth expo rts to Japan after the trawler incident in 2010 ho wever no such

embargo was implemented because this particular eco no mic weapo n had lo s t its effectiveness s ince then (see belo w)222

The greates t medium-term damage to Japanese eco no mic activities apart fro m the abo ve mentio ned des tructio n o f Japaneseco mmercial and indus trial s ites was caused by a partial co nsumer bo yco tt no tably the fall o f car sales in China and Chineseto urism to Japan Overall bilateral trade decreased by 39 per cent in 2012 to $329 billio n the firs t dro p s ince the co llapse o f theLehman inves tment bank in 2009 and in 2013 to $3125 billio n acco rding to Chinese figures Acco rding to Japanese figures trade in

2013 increased but declined in vo lume223

The wo rs t hit secto r was auto mo biles To yo ta so ld 840 500 vehicles in China in 2012 the firs t annual dro p s ince 2002 Nis san

experienced a 24 per cent dro p in December China sales and Ho nda saw a 19 per cent December fall224 Ho wever as o f 2014Japanese car sales in and to China have again been increas ing The to uris t indus try was also hard hit in bo th co untries Chinese

vis ito rs to Japan decreased by 44 per cent fro m September to December 2012 fro m the year befo re225 The number o f Japanese

to uris ts o n gro up to urs to China plunged by mo re than 70 per cent year-o n-year in the las t three mo nths o f 2012226 This fallco ntinued into 2013 when their number fell to 29 millio n Japanese to uris ts do wn 18 2 fro m 2012 and the 3rd s traight annual

decline227 Ho wever in March 2014 vis ito rs fro m mainland China surged 80 1 fro m the previo us March to to tal 184200 a reco rdhigh fo r the mo nth and a s teeper year-o n-year rise than vis ito rs fro m any o ther co untries and regio ns This was also helped by the

falling yen and the resumptio n o f cruise to urs with large ships which were to tally suspended in March 2012228

Ano ther mo re lo ng-term negative eco no mic effect o n the bilateral relatio nship can be gauged fro m falling Japanese FDI to Chinawhich acco rding to Chinese figures declined by 422 in the firs t five mo nths o f 2014 after having fallen by 43 to $71 billio n in

2013 acco rding to Chinese figures o r by 18 to $10 9 billio n acco rding to Japanese figures 229

China`s multiple eco no mic retributio ns cas t do ubt o n the co ntinued viability o f the earlier `Ho t Eco no mics and Co ld Po litics`dicho to my The answer to the ques tio n which co untry is mo re dependent o n the o ther o r mo re vulnerable to sanctio ns is dependento n the eco no mic indicato rs and secto rs being cho sen and is also a po litical ques tio n because the answer can be po liticallymanipulated Japan`s eco no mic diff iculties s ince the 1990s (and its dependence o n eco no mic interactio n with China to co pe withthese diff iculties ) and China pushing Japan to No 3 in wo rld GDP ranking has diminished the Chinese perceptio n o f Japan as aneco no mic po wer ho use It means that fo r China the relatio nship with Japan became less impo rtant while po litical relatio nsdeterio rated at the same time The s tro ng effect o f the Chinese embargo o n rare earth expo rts to Japan in 2010 can be viewed intwo diametrically o ppo sed ways Chinese o bservers may be inclined to put emphas is o n the s tro ng effect it had o n Japanese publico pinio n and indus trial circles co ntributing to a certain extent to the go vernment`s surrender o f the trawler captain Others maypo int o ut that the case demo ns trated the futility o f abus ing a do minant supplier po s itio n because within a sho rt time Japan`sindus try secured alternative reso urces and demand reductio n thro ugh recycling and pro duct re-engineering no t o nly pro videdeno ugh breathing space but in the end reduced China`s market po wer Still Chinese experts are co nvinced that Japan is no w mo redependent o n China than the o ther way ro und Acco rding to so me specialis ts Chinas impo rts acco unted in 2011fo r 237 per cent o fJapan`s expo rt vo lume The bilateral trade vo lume in 2011 to o k up 21 per cent o f Japanese gro ss trade vo lume o f that year while it

merely acco unted fo r 9 4 per cent o f Chinas annual gro ss trade vo lume230 There seem to be o nly few Chinese vo ices which expressco ncern o ver the negative impact o f China`s sanctio ns o n China`s eco no my itself no tably at a time o f wo rldwide eco no mic

co ntractio n231

The Chinese market is certainly to o impo rtant fo r many Japanese co mpanies to leave A survey in No vember 2012 to which mo rethan 10 000 Japanese co mpanies in China replied sho wed that fo r almo s t 30 per cent o f them the territo rial dispute had affected

their bus iness but s till mo re than half want to maintain their o peratio ns and o nly 16 per cent said that they wanted to either cut

back o r pull o ut232 Japanese co mpanies in certain secto rs are likely to beco me mo re reluctant to make inves tments in China all themo re as o ther So utheas t As ian co untries (no tably Myanmar is currently the New Fro ntier fo r Japanese bus iness ) have cheaper

labo ur co s ts 233 Ho wever Chinese co nsumers s till prefer Japanese pro ducts fo r safer fo o d drinks and daily necess ities and tho se

Japanese co mpanies were hardly affected by the bo yco tt234

A wide gap between bo th s ides` perceptio n abo ut their eco no mic dependence and vulnerability to sanctio ns is dangero us fo r themanagement o f their bilateral relatio nship particularly when o ne s ide tries to leverage its suppo sedly s tro nger po s itio n to achievevicto ry in a sens itive area like territo rial integrity While Chinese co mmentato rs and experts may be inclined to o verrate Japan`svulnerability their Japanese co unterparts have a tendency to lo o k at the is sues to o much in purely eco no mic terms neglecting theimpact o f Chinese emo tio ns and go vernment pro paganda as well as the wider public`s insufficient kno wledge abo ut the o verall

impact o f bad eco no mic relatio ns with Japan o n China`s o wn eco no my235 The Japanese perceptio n remains that China in the endneeds Japan mo re than the o ther way ro und which in view o f China`s huge pro blems and its dependence o n Japanese hightechno lo gy co mpo nents fo r its manufacturing indus try is arguably the case This Japanese perceptio n has fo s tered the co nvictio nas demo ns trated fo r example by the belief in the sus tainability o f `Ho t Eco no mics and Co ld Po litics` that despite recurring

po litical crises in the relatio nship China wo uld in the end co mpro mise as it had do ne several times in the pas t236 Yet the pro blemwith the perceptio n o f `needing Japan` is that it can be po litically manipulated particularly in an autho ritarian sys tem This gapbetween Japanese and Chinese o bservers and experts o n the is sue o f dependence can serio us ly influence the willingness o f bo th

s ides to co mpro mise237 It also challenges the liberal view that clo se eco no mic relatio ns can prevent o r at leas t so ften deeppo litical differences like territo rial co nflicts which mo reo ver are linked to eco no mic interes ts like hydro carbo n reso urces In thisco ntext it is interes ting to no te that China has recently been exchanging with Japan a number o f high-po wered bus iness delegatio ns(apart fro m exchanges with po litical parties and lo cal go vernment o fficials ) The willingness o f Japanese bus iness to take part maybe interpreted by China as an express io n o f Japan`s eco no mic dependence o n China while giving it also the o ppo rtunity to putpressure o n the Abe go vernment to make co ncess io ns and to keep links with Japan fo r the po s t-Abe era

In view o f the impo rtance o f the eco no mic relatio nship and the damage suffered by Japanese bus iness after September 2012 o newo uld have expected mo re pressure fro m the bus iness co mmunity to co me to a territo rial co mpro mise so lutio n and so impro verelatio ns Ho wever this has no t been the case and may have to do with the perceptio n gap dis cussed abo ve but also the relativelack o f influence o n the go vernment (the majo rity o f the China-relevant Japanese bus iness co mmunity co ns is ts o f small- andmedium-s ized co mpanies ) the fear that a mo re vo cal ro le wo uld get co mpanies into tro uble with the autho rities in Japan ando rChina o r the ho pe o f being able to weather the po litical s to rms either because o f alternative market o ppo rtunities o r theco mpany`s s ize

FROM POLICING TO MILITARY INVOLVEMENT

The mo s t serio us co nsequences fo r the bilateral relatio nship ndash let alo ne fo r the so lutio n o f the territo rial dispute and regio nalpeace ndash arise fro m the co ns tant intrus io ns o f Chinese o fficial vessels into the Co ntiguo us Zo ne (CZ) o r even Territo rial Waters(TW) o f the Senkaku Is lands s ince September 2012 and the gro wing invo lvement o f the armed fo rces o f bo th s ides The aim o f theChinese is o bvio us to demo ns trate that the Japanese can no lo nger claim exclus ive co ntro l o f the is lands and to fo rce To kyo toadmit the exis tence o f a territo rial dispute Apparently a task fo rce at the highes t level headed by Xi Jinping was set up in

September 2012 to achieve this go al thro ugh escalating pressure238 So far law enfo rcement actio ns by Japan in the Senkaku areahave been limited to the deplo yment o f the Japanese Co as t Guard and po lice which is no w ho wever co ns tantly challenged byChinese with patro ls by CMS and FLEC (s ince 22 July 2013 unified under the State Ocean Adminis tratio n and renamed China Co as tGuard CG) vessels asserting the same rights in the is lands` CZ and TW The Chinese s ide escalated its pressure o n Japan by firs tdeplo ying FLEC vessels in the CZ and TW o f the disputed is lands then ratcheting up their pressure with CMS vessels do ing the samefo llo wed later in December 2012 with air patro ls by CMS aircraft which led to the deplo yment o f the air fo rce o f bo th s ides inJanuary 2013

As we have seen after the September 2010 incident in No vember 2010 FLEC s tarted to regularly send its vessels to the Senkakuarea which entered fro m time to time the is lands` CZ and also in Augus t 2011 twice the TW Apparently the mo re serio usintrus io ns which are tho se into the TW were so metimes timed with specific spikes o f tens io ns such as the TW incurs io n o n 16March 2012 (the Japanese naming o f so me is lands) July 2012 (No da`s anno uncement o f purchase intentio n o n 7 July) and finallyo n 19 September when s ix vessels entered the TW s tarting a series o f mo re frequent and regular incurs io ns In December 2012

FLEC deplo yed its newes t and bigges t ship the 5800-to n FLEC vessel Yuzheng 206 a fo rmer ship o f the Chinese navy239

The entries o f the vessels o f the CMS into the is lands` CZ and TW seem meant to send an even higher degree o f warning and denialo f Japan`s co ntro l o ver the is lands On 17 September the number o f FLEC and CMS vessels in the CZ and TW had reached the reco rd

o f 17240 Thereafter the frequency o f incurs io ns into the CZ and TW increased but it decreased after March 2013 On 30 Octo berXinhua even repo rted that the CMS had `expelled a number o f Japanese vessels illegally sailing in waters aro und the Diao yu

Is lands` altho ugh it is no t clear what exactly this meant s ince the CG did no t co nfirm such an incident241 Acco rding to Xinhua NewsAgency in 2013 China sent 50 ldquopatro l miss io ns rdquo into the TW o f the disputed is lands and as o f 12 July 2014 by the autho r`s co unt

there had been 17 such Chinese ldquopatro l miss io ns rdquo in 2014 which are ldquoincurs io ns rdquo fo r the Japanese s ide242 Other needle pricks todemo ns trate China`s claims are the o ccas io nal incurs io ns o f Chinese survey ships into the Senkaku Is lands` EEZ o r the bo ardingo f Chinese fishing vessels in the EEZ Defence Minis ter Itsuno ri Ono dera in late Octo ber 2013 called these repeated incurs io ns a

threat to peace which fell in a ldquogray zo ne (between) peacetime and an emergency s ituatio nrdquo243

A new level o f depriving Japan o f the ability to claim so le effective co ntro l o ver the is lands was reached o n 13 December 2012 when

a small turbo pro p aircraft o f the CMS (Harbin Y12 type) flew o ver Uo tsurijima244 Since then regular CMS air patro ls have beenco nducted but the aircraft no rmally s tay abo ut 120 km fro m the is lands With this mo ve Chinese measures to undermine Japan`sco ntro l o ver the is lands were expanded to the air space which fo r o rganizatio nal reaso ns had immediately military implicatio nsbecause the Air Self Defense Fo rce (ASDF) is respo ns ible fo r intercepting aircraft which intrude illegally into Japan`s air space The

incident did no t happen o ut o f the blue because already in January 2012 the SOA had anno unced a plan to deplo y the Y12 in 2012245

On 24 September the SOA had also anno unced plans to deplo y dro nes by 2015 fo llo wing the success ful tes t the previo us day 246

The Chinese acts are apparently carefully planned and co o rdinated s ince the o fficials in the abo ve Kyo do repo rt also said that theairspace vio latio ns o n 13 December 2012 by an airplane o f the CMS was planned by the s taff sectio n o f the natio nal Land and SeaBo rder Defense Co mmittee which acts as a liaiso n o ffice fo r the Chinese military the State Oceanic Adminis tratio n and the fishing

bureau o f the Agriculture Minis try with the aim o f rais ing tens io ns 247

The lo w altitude flight o f the Y12 o n 13 December was particularly upsetting fo r the Japanese go vernment because it was no t pickedup by the ASDF radar (the clo ses t o ne being o n Miyako jima abo ut 200 km fro m the is lands) but ins tead by CG ships in the area Inthis case eight ASDF fighters s crambled but co uld no t detect the Y12 Interceptio n o f aircraft is by nature much mo re diff icult andcarries a certain risk o f accident as happened in 2001 when a US intelligence aircraft co llided with a Chinese intercepto r jet Witho ut

explaining the s tandard Japanese pro ceedures fo r aerial defence which so lely relies o n the ASDF the Chinese media interpreted theuse o f military aircraft by Japan as `aggress ive` and the Global Times cautio ned agains t any interceptio n warning that China might

respo nd by sending its air fo rce248 On the Japanese s ide even the centre-left Asahi Shimbun called the Y12 flight ` a highly

pro vo cative act that co uld lead to an armed co nflict between the two co untries`249 At the beginning o f January 2013 there wereapparently erro neo us repo rts that the ASDF might co ns ider firing warning sho ts (tracer bullets ) at intruding Chinese aircraft which

pro mpted further bellico se co mments in the Chinese press 250 As a co nsequence the Chinese air fo rce also became invo lved o n10 January when the Chinese Minis try o f Defence anno unced that the Peo ple`s Liberatio n Army Air Fo rce (PLAA) had sent two fighterjets agains t two ASDF F-15 intercepto rs because they were fo llo wing a Chinese military Y8 transpo rt aircraft patro lling the airspace

o f Chinese o il platfo rms in the Eas t China Sea251 The Japanese repo rted that mo re than ten Chinese aircraft including military

aircraft had appro ached the Japanese air defence identificatio n zo ne252 In a further escalatio n the Japanese s ide repo rted that o n11 June 2014 two Chinese military jets flew abno rmally clo se to two planes o f Japans Self Defence Fo rce abo ve the Eas t China Sea

an accusatio n which the Chinese s ide refuted speaking ins tead o f two incidents pro vo ked by Japanese fighters 253 Related to thisdevelo pment and further enhancing the po ss ibility o f an incident is the enhanced patro lling o f the PLAA o ver the Eas t China Seawhich caused the ASDF to increase scrambling agains t PLAA aircraft to 415 times between 1 April 2013 and 31 March 2014 (Fis cal

Year 2013) 109 times mo re than in the previo us Fis cal Year 2012254

Co ntinuing to increase the pressure o n Japan the Chinese go vernment decreed o n 23 No vember 2013 an Air Defence Identificatio nZo ne (ADIZ) which includes the airspace o ver the Senkaku Is lands and was certainly meant to reinfo rce China`s territo rial claimdespite the fact that an ADIZ has no territo rial implicatio ns in internatio nal law The threat o f military co untermeasures in the text o fthe decree (lsquoChinas armed fo rces will ado pt defens ive emergency measures to respo nd to aircraft that do no t co o perate in the

identificatio n o r refuse to fo llo w the ins tructio ns rsquo) has further heightened the po ss ibility o f a military clash255 Ho wever theJapanese s ide refuses to accept the ADIZ The Chinese mo ves have wider implicatio ns fo r peace and s tability in the regio n in o rderto pro tect the freedo m o f its military aircraft in Eas t As ian airspace and its ability to o bserve China`s military fo rces Washingto nrefused to reco gnise the zo ne co ntinued to igno re the requirements o f the ADIZ by pursuing its regular patro l f lights and criticisedits implementatio n Simultaneo us ly ho wever the Department o f State advised civilian airlines to fo llo w China`s ins tructio ns andVice Pres ident Biden advised bo th co untries o n his trip to No rtheas t As ia in December 2013 to es tablish a cris is managements tructure Since the US do es no t take a s tance o n the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands` so vereignty Washingto n seemed to igno re Japan`smain grievance abo ut the ADIZ which is China`s intentio n to further reinfo rce its so vereignty claim by extending the ADIZ o ver theis lands The mo s t far-reaching US s tatements were a reco nfirmatio n o f the applicatio n o f the security treaty to the is lands evenmentio ning the is lands by their Japanese and Chinese names and co mplaining that the Chinese actio n was an attempt to unilaterally

change the status quo in the Eas t China Sea which raised regio nal tens io n and increased the risk o f accident and miscalculatio n256

Ho wever in this way the Obama Adminis tratio n risked creating amo ng so me Japanese o bservers do ubts abo ut the Adminis tratio n`sreliability and so gave succo ur to China`s attempt to drive a wedge between the two allies Ano ther co mplicatio n is that the ChineseADIZ o verlaps that o f Ko rea and mo reo ver co vers the submerged ro ck called Ieo do in Ko rean and Suyan in Chinese which has animpact o n the no t yet demarcated EEZ bo rder between bo th co untries Interes tingly the Japanese ADIZ also co vers Ieo do but thishas never been underpinned by any Japanese EEZ claims But China kno ws ho w to play o n So uth Ko rea`s criticism o f Japan`sattitude to wards the his to ry is sue and the territo rial dispute with Japan o ver Do kto Takeshima is land Mo reo ver the As ian co untriesco ntes ting China`s claims to parts o f the So uth China Sea are co ncerned that China wo uld further co mplicate the territo rialdisputes in the area by es tablishing an ADIZ Yet the ASEAN member s tates have been very cautio us in directly criticis ing ChinaChina`s es tablishment o f the ADIZ directly affects many co untries because so many o f them have airlines flying thro ugh the zo neHo wever with the exceptio n o f Japan all o thers agred to co nfo rm with China`s reques t fo r no tif icatio n which undermines theJapanese go vernment`s po s itio n o f explicitly advis ing Japanese airlines no t to co nfo rm

With these escalating develo pments the Chinese s ide achieved its go al o f sho wing that the Japanese autho rities are no lo nger infull co ntro l o f the disputed is lands In the case o f Chinese Co as tguard vessel intrus io ns the reactio n o f the Japanese CG is limitedto shado wing the Chinese vessels to info rm them that they are vio lating Japan`s CZ o r TW and to ask them to leave whichho wever they do at their o wn dis cretio n (the time span ho vering in the CZ o r TW having beco me a further means o f Chinesepressure) fo llo wed by diplo matic pro tes ts Otherwise the CG has avo ided any phys ical co nfro ntatio n o r co ntact When co nfro ntedby the CG the Chinese vessels s imply declare (by radio o r even electro nic displays ) that they are patro lling Chinese waters and thatthe CG ships were o perating illegally in these waters This ritual has so far prevented vio lence This is in co ntras t to an exchange o fwater canno n salvo s between the CG and the Taiwanese co as t guard in the territo rial o f the Senkaku Is lands o n 25 September 2012

and again o n 24 January 2013257

The increase o f patro ls by Japan and China is caus ing o peratio nal s train fo r bo th s ides (also rais ing the risk o f miscalculatio ns o ro verreactio ns ) but this has no t reduced the willingness o f either go vernment to s cale do wn the almo s t daily demo ns tratio ns o f

`effective co ntro l` In Octo ber it was repo rted that the CG no w always maintains ten vessels agains t eight fro m China258 The 11th

regio nal headquarters respo ns ible fo r the Senkaku area is in Naha and has nine patro l ships (but o nly seven vessels o f at leas t

1000 to ns ) but no w needs additio nal ships which are dispatched fro m o ther regio nal headquarters 259 In April 2012 the CG had ato tal o f 357 patro l vessels but o nly 51 o ver 1000 to ns which are tho se mo s t needed fo r a far flung area like the Senkaku

Is lands 26 0 On 14 September 2012 Senio r Vice Minis ter o f Fisheries Iwamo to Tsukasa mentio ned plans to increase the number o f

fishery patro l vessels to ensure fishermens safety amid intens ifying territo rial disputes with China and So uth Ko rea26 1 On 26Octo ber the Minis try o f Land Infras tructure Transpo rt and To urism which heads the CG anno unced plans to increase budgetary

reques ts fo r mo re ships 26 2 The Abe go vernment plans to build mo re vessels o r advance the calendar retro fit vessels which were to

be retired and is co ns idering extending the retirement age o f the o fficers 26 3

The Chinese have fewer vessels which can be deplo yed as far as the Senkaku Is lands In additio n leave o f the sailo rs has been

res tricted and their deplo yment length at sea has increased26 4 In March 2013 the Chinese s ide anno unced clo ser co o peratio nbetween the military and vario us maritime law enfo rcement agencies as well as the merger o f fo ur maritime law enfo rcementagencies under the State Ocean Adminis tratio n (adminis tered by the Minis try o f Land and Reso urces ) ie the China MarineSurveillance the co as t guard fo rces o f the Public Security Minis try the fisheries law enfo rcement co mmand o f the Agriculture

Minis try and the maritime anti-smuggling po lice o f the General Adminis tratio n o f Cus to ms 26 5

Ano ther wo rrying develo pment is the gradual invo lvement o f the PLA navy (PLAN) and the Maritime Self Defence Fo rce (MSDF) TheJapanese MOD anno unced o n 16 Octo ber 2012 that fo r the firs t time PLAN ships were o bserved navigating in the 22-km-wide CZbetween Yo naguni and Irio mo te is lands altho ugh the minis try left o pen the po ss ibility that they did so in o rder to avo id a typho o n

Nevertheless the Gaimusho so ught explanatio ns fro m the Chinese abo ut these ship mo vements 26 6 In December 2012 fo ur PLANships sailed thro ugh the CW o f the Irio mo te-Yo naguni is lands o n the way back fro m drills in the Pacific after having go ne into the

Pacific thro ugh the mo re no rmal ro ute o f the s trait between the Okinawan main is land and Miyako jima26 7 Again there was no thingillegal abo ut it but it raised attentio n at a time o f tens io ns Ho wever there are s igns o f greater co o peratio n o f the PLAN withChinese Co as t Guard vessels as was sho wn in the s tando ff between China and the Philippines aro und the disputed Scarbo ro ugh

Sho al in the So uth China Sea and jo int exercises to o k place between the three in the Eas t China Sea in Octo ber 201226 8 The

patro lling activities o f the MSDF in the Senkaku area became kno wn when the Japanese repo rted at the end o f January 2013 that o n19 January a Chinese frigatersquos target radar had lo cked o nto an MSDF helico pter and o n 30 January ano ther frigate sailing clo se to

an MSDF des tro yer did likewise The Chinese vehemently denied it26 9 Ho wever in March this year the Kyo do news agency repo rtedthat senio r Chinese military o fficials had admitted the incident o f 29 January Even mo re wo rriso me is that the Chinese vessels

acted apparently witho ut prio r appro val fro m the fleet co mmand o r navy headquarters All this was denied by the Chinese s ide270 Itdid no t help that under Prime Minis ter No da the MSDF had been o rdered after the eruptio n o f the 2012 cris is to keep a greaterdis tance fro m PLAN ships than the hitherto 3 km in o rder avo id incidents but this po licy was reversed by the mo re hawkish Abe

adminis tratio n to the previo us 3 km dis tance271 The fire radar lo cking incident had happened at a dis tance o f 3 km

Agains t the backgro und o f greater invo lvement o f military fo rces it is particularly regrettable that a plan to build a maritime liaiso n

mechanism between their defense autho rities o n which they had agreed in June 2012 to make later that year was shelved272

Unfo rtunately it is s till Chinese practice to co ns ider Co nfidence Building Measures (CBM) no t as the firs t s tep to build co nfidencebut as a to o l to extract fro m the o ther s ide prio r co ncess io ns under the pretext o f `creating a better atmo sphere` fo r dis cuss ingCBM The o utbreak o f the September 2012 cris is was therefo re a co nvenient pretext fo r the Chinese to cancel the pro ject Thelates t co nfirmatio n was in March 2013 when General Yin Zhuo explained that there co uld be no military trus t if the po litical and

diplo matic relatio nship is bad273 Since the target radar lo ck-o n incidents the Japanese go vernment is publicly calling fo rresumptio n o f nego tiatio ns fo r the maritime liaiso n mechanism but the Chinese will certainly want to extract so me co ncess io nsbefo re even co ns idering a po s itive respo nse

Ho wever the co ns tant co nfro ntatio n between the po licing and military fo rces o f bo th s ides co uld eas ily lead to a military clasheither as a result o f an unfo reseen civilian o r military incident miscalculatio n o r malicio us intentio n at a lo wer level o f co mmandTwo recent examples o f unfo reseen civilian incidents co uld have escalated One is the attempted landing o n o ne o f the disputedis lands by a Chinese pro tes ter with a ballo o n in January 2014 This incident was peacefully reso lved because Japan did no t arres t theballo o nis t In this case the firs t repo rt o n the crash-landing in the territo rial waters o f Uo tsurijima came fro m the Taiwanese co as tguard which info rmed the Japanese co as t guard fo llo wed by the hand-o ver o f the ballo o nis t to the PRC autho rities o uts ide o f

Japan`s territo rial waters 274 The o ther incident was the s inking o f a Chinese fishing bo at ldquoto the no rth o f the Diao yu Is landsrdquo and

the mo ve o f two Chinese naval () vessels to rescue the crew275 This autho r co uld no t find o ut ho w clo se the fishing bo at came tothe is lands and apparently there has no t been any further repo rting abo ut the incident

The previo us ly mentio ned radar-targeting incidents and these two civilian incidents have no t led to an escalatio n but there is noguarantee fo r the future Shi Yinho ng a pro fesso r at Renmin Univers ity predicts that the territo rial co nflicts in the ECS So uth ChinaSea and alo ng the Sino -Indian bo rder will intens ify because o f po pular natio nalism dynamics within the armed fo rces and o f co urse

also o ur to p leaders perso nal beliefs and s trategic perso nalities 276 Hugh White argues that a war (which co uld lead to a nuclearexchange between China and the US) co uld also begin because the Chinese leadership may co ns ider that s tarting ho s tilities no wrather than later wo uld be mo re beneficial to either tes t US reso lve to defend Japan (which the Chinese leadership do ubts ) anddetermine the is sue o f Chinese supremacy in the As ian regio n which he co ns iders to be the real is sue rather than the is lands

themselves 277

IS THERE A WAY FORWARD

The current co nfro ntatio n is no t o nly co ntinuing but even escalating and do mes tic develo pments in bo th co untries are no t creatingan atmo sphere mo re co nducive to better management o f the cris is let alo ne finding a so lutio n Inactio n runs the risk o f a furtherescalatio n o r even a military clash while po s itive o ptio ns are beco ming fewer Meanwhile bo th co untries suffer fro m the eco no micfall-o ut and heightened tens io ns while the integratio n o f a ris ing China into a new s trategic enviro nment in As ia will beco me evenmo re fraught cas ting a shado w o n Japan`s clo se relatio nship with the US

The 2010 incident ended quickly with Japan`s release o f the captain One reaso n fo r this is certainly the fact that China`s demand in2010 was relatively clear and achievable (release o f the captain) if painful fo r Japan at a time o f a weak and inexperiencedgo vernment This time in September 2012 the cris is firs t hit a go vernment which reacted intrans igently because o f its previo usdefeat and o ther unfavo urable do mes tic circumstances and was then replaced by the mo re hawkish Abe go vernment The Abecabinet`s attitude to wards the pas t as exemplif ied by vario us s tatements by cabinet members and peo ple clo se to it the attempt torevise the Ko no s tatement reco gniz ing the fo rced war pro s titutio n (the military co mfo rt wo men) and Abe`s Yasukuni Shrine vis itall served China`s anti-Japan pro paganda wo rsened Japan-Ko rea relatio ns which China is cleverly explo iting and even angered theUS adminis tratio n Abe is seen as utiliz ing the tens io ns with China to win do mes tic and internatio nal suppo rt fo r Japan to have aldquono rmalrdquo natio nal defence po s ture The latter is welco me by the US adminis tratio n because it wo uld help with the US As ianrealignment and suppo rt its China po licy At the same time China`s actio ns cas t an o mino us shado w o n its intentio ns in the So uthChina Sea and Abe and mo re impo rtantly the US is suppo rting the claimants there agains t China

Under these bilateral multilateral and regio nal circumstances wo uld China be satis fied with go ing back to the `unders tanding abo utsetting as ide the dispute` in co njunctio n with Japan`s reco gnitio n o f the exis tence o f a territo rial dispute o r wo uld it demand areversal o f the purchase o f the three is lands Wo uld it demand the end o f Japanese CG patro ls aro und the is lands China`ss tandard demand no w that Japan `co rrect its mis takes` is rather ambiguo us because it co uld be interpreted as go ing back to theshelving unders tanding and the reco gnitio n o f the exis tence o f a dispute o r demanding a reversal o f the go vernment`s purchase o f

the is lands 278 The latter wo uld s imply be impo ss ible in legal and practical terms and o ne can o nly ho pe that the ambiguity is o nlyaimed at rais ing China`s nego tiatio n po s itio n ando r leaving eno ugh wiggle ro o m fo r nego tiatio ns which wo uld satis fy all Chineses takeho lders` interes ts

It seems that it is already to o late fo r go ing back to the shelving agreement o f 19721978 which wo uld imply that the two s ides canso meho w go back to the status quo o f the 1970s This as we have seen has been superseded by deeds and wo rds o n bo th s ides The Chinese have no w no t o nly publicly declared that the shelving agreement was lsquobro kenrsquo by Japan but after the firs t Y12 patro l o n13 December 2012 co mmented that ldquoThe s ituatio n has changed It has beco me no rmal fo r Chinas marine surveillance vessels to

enter the 12-nautical-mile zo ne Japans actual co ntro l o ver the is lands has go nerdquo279

The bilateral relatio nship has deterio rated to the extent that at leas t shelving the co nflicting so vereignty claims without o fficiallyadmitting that there is a territo rial dispute is no lo nger an o ptio n acceptable to China because it feels Japan has abused theshelving co nsensus thro ugh a series o f adminis trative measures with the final s traw having been the central go vernmentrsquos purchaseo f three is lands When s tudying the vario us Chinese o fficial s tatements and news repo rts after the 2012 cris is had fully erupted inSeptember it beco mes clear that until Octo ber 2012 the Chinese s till raised the demand that Japan sho uld go back to the previo uslsquounders tandingrsquo o r lsquoco nsensus rsquo but this demand was no t made o ften thereafter It reappeared in remarks by Wang Jiarui the head o fthe Co mmunis t partys Internatio nal Department when meeting Yamaguchi Natsuo the leader o f the junio r co alitio n partner

Ko meito in January 201328 0 Previo us ly a co mment o n the Xinhua internet s ite o n 29 Octo ber said that ldquoThe lsquopurchasersquo sho wed thatthe Japanese go vernment has who lly abando ned the attitude o f laying as ide disputes and has fundamentally changed the

s ituatio nrdquo28 1 On 30 Octo ber the CMOFA spo kesperso n declared that lsquoJapans illegal purchase o f the Diao yu Is lands bro ke the

impo rtant co nsensus The Japanese s ide sho uld no t have any mo re illus io n o f o ccupying the Diao yu Is lands What the Japaneses ide sho uld do is to face up to the reality admit the so vereignty dispute co rrect mis takes and co me back to the track o f a

nego tiated settlement`28 2 The lates t o fficial pro po sal to shelve the is lands is sue was made by the fo rmer fo reign minis ter Tang

Jiaxuan o n 16 July 201428 3

The reco gnitio n o f a territo rial pro blem wo uld be relatively easy fo r Japanese public o pinio n (and even mo re so fo r Japanrsquos friendsand allies ) to accept because they wo uld no t see the need fo r any kind o f diplo matic o r legal so phis try fo r what is o bvio us ly aterrito rial co nflict whatever the legitimacy o f the Chinese claim might be given also the fact that the current Japanese po s itio nco mes do wn to refus ing to even dis cuss whatever settlement might be po ss ible Acco rding to a survey co nducted by Genro nto gether with Zho ngguo Ribao she in June 2012 627 per cent o f Japanese agreed that there exis ts a territo rial pro blem dispute

(176 disagreed) co mpared with 822 o f the Chinese (139 disagreed)28 4 Ho wever co nsecutive Japanese cabinets haverefused to reco gnise the exis tence o f a territo rial dispute which is o ften the default po s itio n o f a go vernment in actual co ntro l o f adisputed territo ry (fo r example the Ko rean go vernmentrsquos po s itio n o n Do kto Takeshima) This po s itio n has been reinfo rced by theexplicit Japanese denial s ince the 1990s o f a shelving agreement which wo uld have been an implicit admiss io n that there is adispute To circumvent the risk o f being perceived as admitting the exis tence o f a territo rial pro blem the deputy prime minis ter o fthe previo us No da go vernment Okada Katsuya was repo rted to have mentio ned in a speech in Octo ber 2012 that there was no

territo rial dispute but as a matter o f fact a debate exis ted28 5 Ho wever this co mpro mise so lutio n was never co nfirmed by the No dago vernment and did no t beco me po licy It is even less likely to be acceptable to the new Abe go vernment Even amo ng influentialo pinio n makers there is hardly any suppo rt fo r admitting the exis tence o f a territo rial co nflict o r o f a shelving agreement Even mo reco nciliato ry s tatements o n this subject are rather vague Maehara Seiji o f the Demo cratic Party declared in a co nference at QinghuaUnivers ity in Beijing in September 2013 that the Japanese go vernment sho uld add (to its o wn po s itio n) that China has a differentview (Senkakusho to wo meguru Niho n seifu no tachiba ni tsuite lsquoChugo ku ga chigau kangaekata wo mo tte iru to iuko to wo ichigen

tsukekuwaerubeki darsquo) At the same time he emphas ised ho wever that there was no territo rial dispute28 6 Japan Bus inessFederatio n Chairman Yo nekura Hiro masa mentio ned in September 2012 in an NHK interview that the go vernment sho uld be mo re

flexible s ince o therwise its s tance co uld be taken to mean that Japan has no intentio n o f so lving the dispute28 7 Miyamo to Yuji thefo rmer Japanese ambassado r to China is quo ted as saying that lsquoThe go vernment do es no t need to alter its bas ic po s itio n but in

reality a co nflict do es exis t o ver the Senkaku is les rsquo 28 8 This is also the s tance which the previo us Japanese ambassado r Niwa

Uichiro takes in an article after his return to Japan28 9

Co ncerning co nflict reso lutio n it is interes ting to no te that when asked abo ut the mo dern s ignificance o f the 1978 Japan-ChinaPeace and Friendship Treaty 68 4 o f the po lled Japanese agreed with Art 12 (lsquoThe two parties shall settle all disputes by peacefulmeans and shall refrain fro m the use o r threat o f fo rcersquo) but o nly 525 o f the Chinese agreed Mo reo ver 58 1 o f the Chinese

favo ur China s trengthening its co ntro l o ver the area29 0

If therefo re a new ldquoimplicit unders tandingrdquo abo ut shelving the dispute is achievable it wo uld have to be based o n learning fro m thefailures o f the 19721978 shelving ie it wo uld be necessary to achieve a mutual unders tanding o f what the s tatus quo is whatwo uld undermine the s tatus quo and what has to be do ne to mo ve fro m co nflict management to so lutio n Quite clearly such a newunders tanding wo uld be less favo urable to Japan`s current s tance o n the dispute

FROM CONFLICT MANAGEMENT TO ADDRESSING THE SOVEREIGNTY ISSUE

Any mo ve fo rward will certainly require decis ive leadership o n bo th s ides be it to take the initiative o r to respo nd po s itively to theinitiative o f s tarting the pro cess to wards reso lutio n In view o f the co mplex backgro und o f the external and internal dynamics it iso bvio us that address ing the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands dispute requires a s tep-by-s tep appro ach The ultimate is sue to address is theso vereignty is sue and territo rial disputes are generally viewed as zero sum in nature given their clo se link to co re securityinteres ts Even tho se who reco gnize the impo rtance o f transcending such lo gic in favo ur o f co ndo minium o r shared so vereigntygenerally ho ld that the is sue can o nly be addressed at the las t s tage o f any nego tiated pro cess if at all

Two impo rtant is sues have to be co ns idered at the beginning to what extent have the vario us s tages o f the nego tiating pro cess tobe agreed befo rehand (lsquoro ad maprsquo) o r even the final o utco me whether a viable co ndo minium o r o nly shelving the is sues and co uldthe ro le o f a third party mediato r be helpfulacceptable In view o f the po litical diff iculties o n bo th s ides the s tart o f thenego tiatio n pro cess wo uld be endangered if there is no t sufficient ro o m fo r ambiguity and interpretatio n abo ut the vario us s tages altho ugh the general aim o f tens io n reductio n and suspens io n o f the so vereignty is sue mus t be clearly agreed

A third party mediato r is pro bably no t acceptable to the Chinese s ide The third party mo s t o ften mentio ned is the Internatio nalCo urt o f Jus tice (ICJ) o r any kind o f internatio nal arbitratio n Ho wever this seems unlikely in view o f China`s preference fo rbilateral nego tiatio ns and its refusal to accept judicial settlement by the ICJ o r any internatio nal arbitratio n except in no n-po litical

areas such as trade29 1 The Japanese go vernment wo uld be willing to accept the jurisdictio n o f the ICJ but o nly if China brings the

case to the Co urt les t it be perceived as ackno wledging the exis tence o f a territo rial dispute29 2 But there are also po litical andpro cedural arguments agains t the reco urse to the ICJ China`s legal argumentatio n is co mparatively weak and s ince a negativejudgement co uld have implicatio ns fo r China`s legal claim to mo s t o f the So uth China Sea there is even less o f a chance o f Chinamaking an exceptio n fo r the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands dispute In view o f the entrenched po s itio ns o f bo th s ides and the risk o f a`winner takes all` o utco me o f internatio nal litigatio n bo th go vernments wo uld face co ns iderable do mes tic res is tance in case o f anegative o utco me In view o f the urgency o f the dispute and the lo ng time it takes fo r a judgement there wo uld also be the risk o fdo mes tic fo rces trying to pre-empt a negative result

In view o f the security is sues invo lved (let alo ne the American his to rical `debt` as a result o f Washingto n`s ambiguity related toWashingto n`s ending o f the adminis tratio n o f Okinawa in 1972) an American mediatio n co uld be seen as natural and even inAmerican interes ts Such an American ro le ho wever is extremely unlikely as it wo uld be seen by China as unduly advantageo us toJapan Ho wever at so me po int during the Japan-China nego tiatio n pro cess the US might ass is t (o r even be reques ted) by agreeingto certain Co nfidence and Security Building Measures (CSBM) in the area aro und the is lands

The firs t s tage wo uld have to co ns is t o f measures which reduce the risk o f a military clash but in a way which prevents theperceptio n that o ne s ide is giving in to co ercio n This s tage wo uld be a gradual phas ing o ut o f intrus io ns by Chinese o fficial vesselsand aircraft into the territo rial waters co ntiguo us zo ne and airspace o f the is lands which is recipro cated by Japanrsquos reducing in thesame way its co as tguard patro ls in the two zo nes as well as its s crambling activities in the is lands` airspace There were repo rts in

June 2013 that China called o n Japan to agree to a 12-nautical-mile no -entry zo ne aro und the is lands 29 3 Japan rejected this co urse

Ano ther measure wo uld be to increase the dis tance at which vessels o f bo th maritime fo rces o bserve each o ther Such s teps sho uldultimately be o fficialised by a gradually expanding series o f CSBMs and a bilateral liaiso n mechanism This co uld also include ademilitarisatio n agreement as an incentive fo r the Chinese s ide It wo uld be vital that the s teps at this s tage be incremental that nos tep is explo ited in a o ne-s ided way and that they are co ns idered irrevers ible At the same time bo th s ides have to prevent peo plefro m appro aching the is lands s ince this wo uld be seen as a pro vo catio n by the o ther s ide This latter task is technically no t easy

because o f the co ntro vers ial character o f any co mpro mise with certain no n-s tate acto rs in Japan China Ho ng Ko ng and Taiwan The(failed) landing o f a Chinese ho t ballo o n o n o ne o f the is lands in January 2014 demo ns trated at the same time the technical

diff iculty o f a no -entry po licy as well as the po ss ibility o f a success ful co o peratio n o f the co as tguards o f all three co untries 29 4

At this firs t s tage o r leading to the next there will have to be a Japanese go vernment s tatement to the effect that there is alsquopro blemrsquo related to the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands This can be wo rded in such a way that the sens itive express io n `territo rialpro blem` (which is s trenuo us ly denied by the go vernment) is avo ided and it can be supplemented by a sentence that such as tatement in no way prejudices the legal po s itio n o f the go vernment Such a qualifying s tatement is fo r example included in the

Japan-China agreement fo r prio r no tif icatio n o f research vessels fro m bo th co untries in the Eas t China Sea in 200029 5 A s imilarqualif icatio n is part o f the 1997 Japan-China Fisheries Agreement In the jo int co mmuniqueacute o f 1972 which no rmalised diplo maticrelatio ns between Japan and China diplo matic wo rding also managed to bridge the huge gap between their s tances o n Taiwan whichthe PRC co ns iders an lsquoinalienable partrsquo o f its territo ry Japan co ns iders the so vereignty is sue s till unreso lved because the 1951 SanFrancis co Peace Treaty Art 2 (b) o nly s tipulated that lsquoJapan reno unces all right title and claim to Fo rmo sa and the Pescado res rsquowitho ut clarifying the recipient o f the territo ry The co mpro mise in 1972 was reached with the sentence that Japan lsquofully unders tandsand respects this s tand o f the Go vernment o f the Peo ples Republic o f China and it f irmly maintains its s tand under Article 8 o f thePo tsdam Pro clamatio nrsquo

POSSIBLE APPROACHES TO THE SOVEREIGNTY ISSUE

The mo s t diff icult pro blem is the so vereignty is sue which go es to the co re o f any co untry`s security interes ts It is no t imaginablethat either s ide will reno unce its claim to the is lands Sides tepping o r shelving the is sue is o nly useful if the lesso ns fro m the 1972and 1978 attempts as o utlined abo ve can be learned and applied but there is s till the fundamental pro blem with the implicitassumptio n that the quality o f the bilateral relatio nship will always be as go o d as when the s ides tepping agreement was achievedand can be maintained in perpetuity o r until the so vereignty is sue can be addressed But in o rder to so lve the so vereignty is sue aneven better relatio nship has to be created This better relatio nship co uld be bro ught abo ut by the s teps explained abo ve and furtherbelo w

An impo rtant co nditio n fo r any las ting territo rial co mpro mise wo uld be reducing the value o f the is lands fo r bo th co untries whichcan be achieved by o ne o f the measures pro po sed fo r s tage 1 ie reso lutely preventing anyo ne fro m appro aching the territo ries(including to tal demilitarizatio n) which in themselves are eco no mically wo rthless and are uninhabited The main po int is to preventany go vernmental act which co uld be interpreted as being part o f the `so vereignty game` The mo s t diff icult part here is to preventany act by no n-go vernmental acto rs This wo uld have to include the territo rial waters and the explo itatio n there in o f any kind o freso urces including fishing Scientif ic interes ts in the is lands co uld be served by bilateral surveys witho ut any po litical co nno tatio ns

There have been pro po sals to declare the is lands an Internatio nal Nature and Wildlife Preserve29 6 Such a preserve wo uld have to beadminis tered either bilaterally o r by a relevant internatio nal o rganisatio n and as such co uld serve as a co nfidence-building measure

The abo ve s teps wo uld then allo w the two s ides to deal with the co ns iderable eco no mic interes ts in fishing and the explo itatio n o fhydro carbo n reso urces and o ther seabed reso urces aro und the is lands ie in the Exclus ive Eco no mic Zo ne ando r the ExtendedCo ntinental Shelf Once the is lands` land area and the territo rial waters have been put as ide it wo uld be eas ier to co me to ano verall agreement o n the delimitatio n o f the EEZ bo rder (with the exceptio n o f the no rthern part which wo uld require a trilateralagreement between China Japan and Ko rea) which wo uld include the delimitatio n o f these surro unding waters It wo uld facilitate aco mpro mise if bo th s ides agree that the is lands do no t merit their o wn EEZ This might be diff icult fo r Japan which claims an EEZ fo rOkino to rishima refuted by China s ince it co ns iders the reef no t to be an is land acco rding to Art 121 o f UNCLOS

A co mpro mise o n the so vereignty is sue co uld o nly be the o utco me ndash if at all ndash o f a success ful pro cess o f the abo ve o r co mparables teps In o rder to avo id a `winner take all` s ituatio n the co mpro mise wo uld have to invo lve a sharing arrangement His to ry o ffers

quite a number o f internatio nal precedents o f shared so vereignty referred to as co ndo minium in internatio nal law29 7 One case withso me s imilarities to the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands is a small is land (3000 sq m) in the river separating France and Spain kno wn asPheasant Is land o r Co nference Is land which even to day s till changes every s ix mo nths between France and Spain as o wner Like theSenkakuDiao yu Is lands the is land has no eco no mic value anymo re and the is land is o ff limits It was the lo catio n o f the s igning o f

the Treaty o f the Pyrenees in 1659 which ended a lo ng war 29 8 Mo s t o ther examples o f jo int so vereignty co ncern territo ries with apo pulatio n which makes co o peratio n much mo re diff icult Other his to rical precedents o f sharing so vereignty are the es tablishmento f ldquoneutral zo nesrdquo Acco rdingly the is lands and po ss ibly a sea area aro und the is lands co uld be declared a neutral zo ne like the o nebetween Saudi Arabia and Kuwait (1922-1965) On July 7 1965 the two go vernments s igned an agreement (which to o k effect o nJuly 25 1966) to partitio n the Neutral Zo ne adjo ining their respective territo ries A demarcatio n agreement dividing the NeutralZo ne was s igned o n December 17 1967

Particularly relevant here is that Saudi Arabia as well as Kuwait explo ited the o il reso urces under a jo int o perating agreement29 9

Co nclus io ns

The actio n-reactio n pattern o f the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands dispute is accelerating and the initiative seems to be mo re o ften thanno t with the Chinese s ide while the Japanese s ide is in a defens ive po s itio n The danger o f a military co nfro ntatio n is lo o mingincreas ingly larger in what co uld be called a lsquochicken gamersquo At the same time the internal and external dynamics are undermining theenviro nment which is required fo r a peaceful so lutio n as well as fo r maintaining the number o f po s itive o ptio ns While the Japanesego vernment refuses to ackno wledge the very exis tence o f a territo rial dispute the Chinese go vernment is no w (July 2014) evenrefus ing to have a dialo gue with Japan`s current prime minis ter It is po ss ible that the Chinese s ide again wants to wait with anymo ve fo rward until the Japanese prime minis ter has changed as Beijing did with Prime Minis ter Sato Eisaku o r with Prime Minis terKo izumi Junichiro But waiting fo r an impro vement o f the bilateral atmo sphere as the Chinese s ide likes to s tress is a very riskyo ptio n and such an impro vement may anyway be a very sho rt windo w o f o ppo rtunity if lo o king at the ups and do wns o f the po s t-1949 his to ry o f the bilateral relatio nship

To s tart a s tep-by-s tep pro cess o f address ing the territo rial is sue s tro ng leadership is required which unders tands the widerinteres ts o f a functio ning Japanese-Chinese relatio nship Japan s imply asking China fo r a summit meeting is no t very sens ible ifthere is no willingness to engage in subs tantive dis cuss io ns and wo uld be very risky fo r China`s to p leader if the Japanese primeminis ter then vis its the Yasukuni Shrine The his to ry is sue sho uld no lo nger be a Chinese lever fo r pressuris ing Japan but the latterhas to abs tain fro m actio ns which are seen as pro vo cative no t o nly by China but also by Ko rea the US and many o thers There hasto be a co mmitted leadership o n bo th s ides which s tarts with a ro ugh ro ad map and tens io n-reducing s teps such as CSBMs en ro uteto agreeing o n a fo rmula which allo ws the parties to o btain eco no mic as well as security gains while reducing tens io ns

Reinhard Drifte is Emeritus Professor of Japanese Politics University of Newcastle UK and Visiting Professor at various Japanese Universities andPau University (France) He is the author of Japanrsquos Foreign Policy for the Twenty First Century His home page is here

Reco mmended citatio n Reinhard Drifte The Japan-China Confrontation Over the SenkakuDiaoyu Islands--Between shelving and dispute

Prime Minis ter and his immediate circle to admit to ando r unders tand until the purchase anno uncement o n 11 September 2012ho w s tro ngly the Chinese felt abo ut it Ambassado r Niwa`s rather undiplo matic s tatements in the Financial Times interview seem toindicate that he felt that the central decis io n-makers did no t unders tand the s trength o f the feelings o f the Chinese and ho w far theymight go Niwa warned in his interview that even a po ss ible pre-purchase survey o f the is lands co uld be diplo matically incendiary

s ince such a survey was dis cussed already at the time to enable the TMG to go ahead with the purchase18 7 As late as the 3September the Yomiuri Shimbun repo rted that the Chinese go vernment was reacting calmly as lo ng as three co nditio ns wereo bserved to maintain the status quo The co nditio ns co ntained no o ppo s itio n to a po ss ible purchase and ins tead jus t mentio ned

abs tentio n fro m landing surveying and building facilities o n the is lands 18 8 Acco rding to Pro fesso r Takahara Akio General ZhuChenghu said o n 5 September that a purchase by the central go vernment wo uld be better and Qu Xing directo r o f the China Ins titute

o f Internatio nal Affairs is said to have expressed a s imilar o pinio n18 9 Even o n 12 September when the s to rm bro ke the deputydirecto r o f the Japan Ins titute o f the Chinese Academy o f So cial Science Gao Ho ng s tated in an interview with the o n-line vers io no f the Renmin Ribao that if Japan wo uld respect the three abs tentio ns mentio ned abo ve the s ituatio n co uld ultimately revert to the

status quo ante19 0 But these were no lo nger the decis ive vo ices o f the Chinese leadership after the Beihaide meeting The abo ve-mentio ned Campbell interview seems to sugges t that Japan was lo ng befo re mo re inclined to act upo n Chinese s tatements whichwere clo ser to what it wanted to unders tand

CHINESE REACTION RHETORICAL WARFARE

The final misco mmunicatio n o r clash o f irreco ncilable interes ts o ccurred when Prime Minis ter No da met Pres ident Hu o n thes idelines o f the As ia Pacific Eco no mic Co o peratio n (APEC) summit in Vladivo s to k o n 9 September then anno unced two days laterthe s igning o f the purchase co ntract with the Kurihara family Whether Hu had no t sufficiently co nveyed his s tro ng feelingsco ncerning the purchase which had been kno wn and bilaterally dis cussed at leas t s ince the Japanese o fficial anno uncement o f itspurchase intentio n o n 7 July o r No da had no t unders tanding the Chinese feeling fo r the po ss ible reaso ns dis cussed abo ve Hu

apparently felt he had lo s t face when Japan anno unced the purchase o n 11 September19 1 Mo reo ver the Japanese anno uncementco uld no t have co me at a mo re awkward time because o f the anniversary o f the Mukden Incident o n the 18 September which likeseveral o ther carefully cultivated anniversaries regarding Japan`s pas t misdeeds in China always aro use latent anti-Japanesefeelings As a result the Japanese anno uncement caused an avalanche o f virulent rheto rical o utburs ts relating to the pas t po liticalsanctio ns further measures to assert China`s territo rial claim (fo r example including the is lands in the Chinese TV weatherfo recas t an exhibitio n o f ancient maps to pro ve Chinese co ntro l) eco no mic sanctio ns and an escalatio n o f patro ls by ChineseFLEC and MSA ships and aircraft aro und the Senkaku Is lands

The mildes t part o f China`s rheto rical o ffens ive was calling the go vernment purchase a `farce` a rather undiplo matic express io nalready used by Xinhua in July 2012 but then taken up at the highes t level by Vice Pres ident Xi Jinping when meeting Secretary o f

Defence Leo n Panetta o n 19 September19 2 But the main line fro m no w o n was that Japan`s claim to the Senkaku Is lands was adenial o f the po s t-Wo rld War II results In its s tatements and rebuttals the Chinese sho wed their frus tratio n at no t having been ableto fundamentally change the status quo and they did no t hes itate to use express io ns which were rather undignified fo r diplo mats andpo litical leaders Japan o n the o ther hand argued fo r peaceful reso lutio n alo ng the lines o f internatio nal law and dialo gue whichpro bably infuriated the Chinese even mo re On 10 September the CMFA is sued a s tatement calling Japans po s itio n o n the disputedis lands `an o utright denial o f the o utco mes o f the victo ry o f the Wo rld Anti-Fascis t War and hellip a grave challenge to the po s t-war

internatio nal o rder`19 3 In a heated exchange at the UN General Assembly between Chinas UN ambassado r Li Bao do ng and JapansDeputy UN ambassado r Ko dama Kazuo Li called the mo tive fo r purchas ing the three is lands to lsquolegalize its s tealing and o ccupatio no f Chinese territo ryrsquo and s tated lsquoThis actio n o f Japan co ns titutes a serio us encro achment upo n Chinas so vereignty and intends toco ntinue and legalize the result o f Japans co lo nial po licy It is an o pen denial o f the o utco mes o f victo ry o f the wo rld anti-fascis twar and a grave challenge to the po s t-war internatio nal o rder and the purpo ses and principles o f the Charter o f the United

Natio ns rsquo19 4 In a further rebuttal o f Japan`s assertio n o f its claim Li characterized the is land purchase as lsquono thing different fro m

mo ney launderingrsquo19 5 At the As ia Euro pe Meeting (ASEM) in Lao s Fo reign Minis ter Yang Jiechi repeated the reference to the`o utco me o f the anti-Fascis t war` while Prime Minis ter No da spo ke o f peaceful reso lutio n o f co nflicts acco rding to internatio nal

law19 6 On 11 Octo ber the CMFA spo kesperso n Ho ng Lei refuted Fo reign Minis ter Gembarsquos his to rical acco unt jus tifying Japan`s

claim by calling it `gangs ter lo gic`19 7

On the Chinese s ide therefo re there are no w two clo sely-linked his to ry narratives o ne is abo ut the is lands having been part o fChina s ince the Ming and Qing dynas ties the o ther co nnects the is lands to the already well-rehearsed his to ry narrative ie Japanhaving victimised China s ince the Sino -Japanese war o f 1894-95 These two narratives co ntinue to be cultivated by the Chineseleadership In Octo ber 2012 the Chinese anno uncement o f the publicatio n o f 80 vo lumes o n the Far Eas t War Criminal Co urt was

clearly meant to link the latter narrative to Japan`s acquis itio n o f the Senkaku Is lands 19 8 Fo rmer Fo reign Minis ter Gemba explicitlytried in Octo ber 2012 to delink the territo rial is sue fro m Japan`s aggress io n agains t China o nly to be reminded by the Chineseambassado r to the UK in an article in the Financial Times (as part o f the ensuing wo rldwide press campaign by bo th s ides ) that lsquothe

Diao yu Dao is sue is all abo ut his to ryrsquo19 9 Since then until no w China has co ntinued this ldquohis to ry warfarerdquo by publishing endlessarticles o n Japan`s aggress io n agains t China befo re 1945 The mo s t recent mo ve in July 2014 is the serialised o n-line publicatio n o f

the hand-written co nfess io ns by 45 Japanese co nvicted war criminals by the State Archives Adminis tratio n20 0

POLITICAL SANCTIONS AND PUBLIC OPINION

Chinese po litical co untermeasures ranged fro m the cancellatio n o f o fficial and uno fficial vis its to further legal acts to reinfo rce

China`s claim to the Senkaku Is lands Aro und 40 per cent o f ceremo nial events in Japan to mark 2012 as the 40 th anniversary o f the

no rmalizatio n o f diplo matic relatio ns with China were cancelled o r po s tpo ned and even mo re events in China20 1 Thesecancellatio ns were no t always the result o f direct go vernment interventio n but so metimes mo re indirect o fficial `dis co uragement`helped by the Chinese preference fo r no t being seen to do so mething in co ntradictio n to the (initially fo mented and later self-pro pelling) anti-Japan atmo sphere o r by fear o f participants running into demo ns tratio ns if no t assaults The legal s crews werefurther turned with lo ng-term implicatio ns On 10 September the Chinese go vernment anno unced the base po ints and baselines o f

the territo rial waters o f the disputed is lands and their affiliated is lets as well as the names and co o rdinates o f 17 base po ints 20 2

On 16 September repo rts appeared that China was submitting pro po sals fo r its extended co ntinental shelf to the UN Co ntinental

Shelf Co mmiss io n which included the Senkaku Is lands but in fact the actual submiss io n o ccurred o nly o n 14 December 201220 3 On

20 September a go vernment agency published a thematic map o f the Diao yu Is land and its affiliated is lands 20 4 Chinarsquos

Meteo ro lo gical Adminis tratio n s tarted pro viding weather fo recas ts fo r the Senkaku area o n the s tate-run TV s tatio n20 5 On 16September the fishery bureau anno unced the lifting o f the fishery ban in the Eas t China Sea and s tressed that China planned to

s trengthen its so vereignty claim o ver the Senkakus 20 6

There were rumo urs that 1000 fishing vessels wo uld co me to the Senkaku area and tho ugh this did no t materialize it helped to

further raise tens io ns 20 7

Mo st attentio n in Japan was fo cused o n the widening s treet pro tes ts in o ver 100 Chinese cities the des tructio n o f Japanese sho ps

res taurants cars and pro ductio n facilities and the attacks o n Japanese citizens in China20 8 The webs ites o f at leas t 19 Japanese

banks univers ities and o ther ins titutio ns came under cyber-attack20 9 At a demo ns tratio n in Shanghai abo ut 7000 pro tes ters

chanted s lo gans such as lsquoBeat Japanese imperialismrsquo lsquoBo yco tt Japanese pro ducts rsquo and lsquoDes tro y Japan and retrieve Okinawarsquo210

Altho ugh o nly 63 per cent o f po lled Japanese in late September 2012 expressed suppo rt fo r their go vernment`s natio nalizatio n o fthe is lands do wn fro m 73 per cent in a previo us po ll o n 15 and 16 September 82 per cent o f respo ndents in a Mainichi Shimbun

survey said the Japanese go vernment had no t pro tes ted s tro ngly eno ugh to Beijing o ver anti-Japan pro tes ts 211 The Chinesego vernment denied any o fficial invo lvement and the spo kesperso n o f the Waijiao bu went o nly as far as saying that the pro tes ts anddemo ns tratio ns were `co mpletely caused by the Japanese go vernments illegal purchase o f the Diao yu Is lands and are peo ples

spo ntaneo us acts`212 There were ho wever repo rts that so me o f the demo ns tratio ns were to lerated if no t abetted by go vernment

agencies 213 The demo ns tratio ns so o n died do wn because to lerating them much lo nger wo uld have run the risk that they wo uld turninto anti-go vernment demo ns tratio ns Even the Chinese Academy o f So cial Sciences repo rted that so me demo ns trato rs who were

arres ted did no t even kno w where the Senkaku Is lands were and that anger o ver the widening wealth gap was behind their acts 214 Inco ntras t to these Chinese demo ns tratio ns and acts o f lawlessness there was hardly any public demo ns tratio n in Japan whichsho ws the relative detachment o f the Japanese fro m the dispute On 22 September `Nippo n Gambare` a right wing o rganizatio nchaired by fo rmer Air Self Defence Fo rce chief Tamo gami To shio s taged a march thro ugh parts o f To kyo which this autho rwitnessed A brief fire was s tarted at a Chinese scho o l in Ko be and two smo ke bo mbs were thro wn into the Chinese Co nsulate

General in Fukuo ka215 But such actio ns were relatively rare and small in s cale

ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND THE QUESTION OF WHO IS MORE DEPENDENT ON WHOM

Pro tes t measures o f a lo nger duratio n and as yet unpredictable co nsequences fo r the bilateral relatio nship have been China`seco no mic sanctio ns and a bo yco tt o f Japanese go o ds by the general public altho ugh the autho rities denied again any go vernmentinterventio n A co mmentary o f Xinhua half admitted ho wever go vernment interventio n when it made the unco nvincing dis tinctio nbetween `measures` and `sanctio ns` `Since Japan purchased Chinas Diao yu Is lands in September the Chinese go vernment hastaken a series o f co untermeasures in the eco no mic legal diplo matic and military fields which have helped it to wres t the initiativeto reso lve the is lands dispute despite China no t impo s ing any eco no mic sanctio ns the Japanese eco no my has been badly

hit`216 Renmin Ribao co mpared `eco no mic punishments` with a `gun` and warned that thro ugh its is land purchase Japan hadalready to uched the `trigger` In a rather heavy hint the paper po inted o ut ho w vulnerable Japan`s eco no my was because o f the

2011 earthquake and the dependence o f key eco no mic secto rs o n China217 Even mo re o fficial was Vice Minis ter o f Co mmerce Jiang

Zengwei`s warning that the is land purchase wo uld inevitably have a negative impact o n Sino -Japanese eco no mic and trade ties 218

After 11 September it so o n became very o bvio us that the heavy hand o f the Chinese go vernment was impo s ing sanctio ns andmaking life fo r Japanese bus iness mo re diff icult On 21 September it was repo rted that Chinese cus to ms autho rities were

s trengthening inspectio ns o f impo rts fro m and expo rts to Japan altho ugh the Chinese autho rities denied this 219 In the same week

repo rts appeared abo ut Japanese co mpanies experiencing delays in o btaining wo rking visas fo r their Japanese emplo yees 220 BigJapanese co mpanies with inves tments in China were experiencing ho ld-ups in gaining regulato ry appro vals fo r Merger amp

Acquis itio ns 221 In co ntras t to the interference in rare earth expo rts to Japan after the trawler incident in 2010 ho wever no such

embargo was implemented because this particular eco no mic weapo n had lo s t its effectiveness s ince then (see belo w)222

The greates t medium-term damage to Japanese eco no mic activities apart fro m the abo ve mentio ned des tructio n o f Japaneseco mmercial and indus trial s ites was caused by a partial co nsumer bo yco tt no tably the fall o f car sales in China and Chineseto urism to Japan Overall bilateral trade decreased by 39 per cent in 2012 to $329 billio n the firs t dro p s ince the co llapse o f theLehman inves tment bank in 2009 and in 2013 to $3125 billio n acco rding to Chinese figures Acco rding to Japanese figures trade in

2013 increased but declined in vo lume223

The wo rs t hit secto r was auto mo biles To yo ta so ld 840 500 vehicles in China in 2012 the firs t annual dro p s ince 2002 Nis san

experienced a 24 per cent dro p in December China sales and Ho nda saw a 19 per cent December fall224 Ho wever as o f 2014Japanese car sales in and to China have again been increas ing The to uris t indus try was also hard hit in bo th co untries Chinese

vis ito rs to Japan decreased by 44 per cent fro m September to December 2012 fro m the year befo re225 The number o f Japanese

to uris ts o n gro up to urs to China plunged by mo re than 70 per cent year-o n-year in the las t three mo nths o f 2012226 This fallco ntinued into 2013 when their number fell to 29 millio n Japanese to uris ts do wn 18 2 fro m 2012 and the 3rd s traight annual

decline227 Ho wever in March 2014 vis ito rs fro m mainland China surged 80 1 fro m the previo us March to to tal 184200 a reco rdhigh fo r the mo nth and a s teeper year-o n-year rise than vis ito rs fro m any o ther co untries and regio ns This was also helped by the

falling yen and the resumptio n o f cruise to urs with large ships which were to tally suspended in March 2012228

Ano ther mo re lo ng-term negative eco no mic effect o n the bilateral relatio nship can be gauged fro m falling Japanese FDI to Chinawhich acco rding to Chinese figures declined by 422 in the firs t five mo nths o f 2014 after having fallen by 43 to $71 billio n in

2013 acco rding to Chinese figures o r by 18 to $10 9 billio n acco rding to Japanese figures 229

China`s multiple eco no mic retributio ns cas t do ubt o n the co ntinued viability o f the earlier `Ho t Eco no mics and Co ld Po litics`dicho to my The answer to the ques tio n which co untry is mo re dependent o n the o ther o r mo re vulnerable to sanctio ns is dependento n the eco no mic indicato rs and secto rs being cho sen and is also a po litical ques tio n because the answer can be po liticallymanipulated Japan`s eco no mic diff iculties s ince the 1990s (and its dependence o n eco no mic interactio n with China to co pe withthese diff iculties ) and China pushing Japan to No 3 in wo rld GDP ranking has diminished the Chinese perceptio n o f Japan as aneco no mic po wer ho use It means that fo r China the relatio nship with Japan became less impo rtant while po litical relatio nsdeterio rated at the same time The s tro ng effect o f the Chinese embargo o n rare earth expo rts to Japan in 2010 can be viewed intwo diametrically o ppo sed ways Chinese o bservers may be inclined to put emphas is o n the s tro ng effect it had o n Japanese publico pinio n and indus trial circles co ntributing to a certain extent to the go vernment`s surrender o f the trawler captain Others maypo int o ut that the case demo ns trated the futility o f abus ing a do minant supplier po s itio n because within a sho rt time Japan`sindus try secured alternative reso urces and demand reductio n thro ugh recycling and pro duct re-engineering no t o nly pro videdeno ugh breathing space but in the end reduced China`s market po wer Still Chinese experts are co nvinced that Japan is no w mo redependent o n China than the o ther way ro und Acco rding to so me specialis ts Chinas impo rts acco unted in 2011fo r 237 per cent o fJapan`s expo rt vo lume The bilateral trade vo lume in 2011 to o k up 21 per cent o f Japanese gro ss trade vo lume o f that year while it

merely acco unted fo r 9 4 per cent o f Chinas annual gro ss trade vo lume230 There seem to be o nly few Chinese vo ices which expressco ncern o ver the negative impact o f China`s sanctio ns o n China`s eco no my itself no tably at a time o f wo rldwide eco no mic

co ntractio n231

The Chinese market is certainly to o impo rtant fo r many Japanese co mpanies to leave A survey in No vember 2012 to which mo rethan 10 000 Japanese co mpanies in China replied sho wed that fo r almo s t 30 per cent o f them the territo rial dispute had affected

their bus iness but s till mo re than half want to maintain their o peratio ns and o nly 16 per cent said that they wanted to either cut

back o r pull o ut232 Japanese co mpanies in certain secto rs are likely to beco me mo re reluctant to make inves tments in China all themo re as o ther So utheas t As ian co untries (no tably Myanmar is currently the New Fro ntier fo r Japanese bus iness ) have cheaper

labo ur co s ts 233 Ho wever Chinese co nsumers s till prefer Japanese pro ducts fo r safer fo o d drinks and daily necess ities and tho se

Japanese co mpanies were hardly affected by the bo yco tt234

A wide gap between bo th s ides` perceptio n abo ut their eco no mic dependence and vulnerability to sanctio ns is dangero us fo r themanagement o f their bilateral relatio nship particularly when o ne s ide tries to leverage its suppo sedly s tro nger po s itio n to achievevicto ry in a sens itive area like territo rial integrity While Chinese co mmentato rs and experts may be inclined to o verrate Japan`svulnerability their Japanese co unterparts have a tendency to lo o k at the is sues to o much in purely eco no mic terms neglecting theimpact o f Chinese emo tio ns and go vernment pro paganda as well as the wider public`s insufficient kno wledge abo ut the o verall

impact o f bad eco no mic relatio ns with Japan o n China`s o wn eco no my235 The Japanese perceptio n remains that China in the endneeds Japan mo re than the o ther way ro und which in view o f China`s huge pro blems and its dependence o n Japanese hightechno lo gy co mpo nents fo r its manufacturing indus try is arguably the case This Japanese perceptio n has fo s tered the co nvictio nas demo ns trated fo r example by the belief in the sus tainability o f `Ho t Eco no mics and Co ld Po litics` that despite recurring

po litical crises in the relatio nship China wo uld in the end co mpro mise as it had do ne several times in the pas t236 Yet the pro blemwith the perceptio n o f `needing Japan` is that it can be po litically manipulated particularly in an autho ritarian sys tem This gapbetween Japanese and Chinese o bservers and experts o n the is sue o f dependence can serio us ly influence the willingness o f bo th

s ides to co mpro mise237 It also challenges the liberal view that clo se eco no mic relatio ns can prevent o r at leas t so ften deeppo litical differences like territo rial co nflicts which mo reo ver are linked to eco no mic interes ts like hydro carbo n reso urces In thisco ntext it is interes ting to no te that China has recently been exchanging with Japan a number o f high-po wered bus iness delegatio ns(apart fro m exchanges with po litical parties and lo cal go vernment o fficials ) The willingness o f Japanese bus iness to take part maybe interpreted by China as an express io n o f Japan`s eco no mic dependence o n China while giving it also the o ppo rtunity to putpressure o n the Abe go vernment to make co ncess io ns and to keep links with Japan fo r the po s t-Abe era

In view o f the impo rtance o f the eco no mic relatio nship and the damage suffered by Japanese bus iness after September 2012 o newo uld have expected mo re pressure fro m the bus iness co mmunity to co me to a territo rial co mpro mise so lutio n and so impro verelatio ns Ho wever this has no t been the case and may have to do with the perceptio n gap dis cussed abo ve but also the relativelack o f influence o n the go vernment (the majo rity o f the China-relevant Japanese bus iness co mmunity co ns is ts o f small- andmedium-s ized co mpanies ) the fear that a mo re vo cal ro le wo uld get co mpanies into tro uble with the autho rities in Japan ando rChina o r the ho pe o f being able to weather the po litical s to rms either because o f alternative market o ppo rtunities o r theco mpany`s s ize

FROM POLICING TO MILITARY INVOLVEMENT

The mo s t serio us co nsequences fo r the bilateral relatio nship ndash let alo ne fo r the so lutio n o f the territo rial dispute and regio nalpeace ndash arise fro m the co ns tant intrus io ns o f Chinese o fficial vessels into the Co ntiguo us Zo ne (CZ) o r even Territo rial Waters(TW) o f the Senkaku Is lands s ince September 2012 and the gro wing invo lvement o f the armed fo rces o f bo th s ides The aim o f theChinese is o bvio us to demo ns trate that the Japanese can no lo nger claim exclus ive co ntro l o f the is lands and to fo rce To kyo toadmit the exis tence o f a territo rial dispute Apparently a task fo rce at the highes t level headed by Xi Jinping was set up in

September 2012 to achieve this go al thro ugh escalating pressure238 So far law enfo rcement actio ns by Japan in the Senkaku areahave been limited to the deplo yment o f the Japanese Co as t Guard and po lice which is no w ho wever co ns tantly challenged byChinese with patro ls by CMS and FLEC (s ince 22 July 2013 unified under the State Ocean Adminis tratio n and renamed China Co as tGuard CG) vessels asserting the same rights in the is lands` CZ and TW The Chinese s ide escalated its pressure o n Japan by firs tdeplo ying FLEC vessels in the CZ and TW o f the disputed is lands then ratcheting up their pressure with CMS vessels do ing the samefo llo wed later in December 2012 with air patro ls by CMS aircraft which led to the deplo yment o f the air fo rce o f bo th s ides inJanuary 2013

As we have seen after the September 2010 incident in No vember 2010 FLEC s tarted to regularly send its vessels to the Senkakuarea which entered fro m time to time the is lands` CZ and also in Augus t 2011 twice the TW Apparently the mo re serio usintrus io ns which are tho se into the TW were so metimes timed with specific spikes o f tens io ns such as the TW incurs io n o n 16March 2012 (the Japanese naming o f so me is lands) July 2012 (No da`s anno uncement o f purchase intentio n o n 7 July) and finallyo n 19 September when s ix vessels entered the TW s tarting a series o f mo re frequent and regular incurs io ns In December 2012

FLEC deplo yed its newes t and bigges t ship the 5800-to n FLEC vessel Yuzheng 206 a fo rmer ship o f the Chinese navy239

The entries o f the vessels o f the CMS into the is lands` CZ and TW seem meant to send an even higher degree o f warning and denialo f Japan`s co ntro l o ver the is lands On 17 September the number o f FLEC and CMS vessels in the CZ and TW had reached the reco rd

o f 17240 Thereafter the frequency o f incurs io ns into the CZ and TW increased but it decreased after March 2013 On 30 Octo berXinhua even repo rted that the CMS had `expelled a number o f Japanese vessels illegally sailing in waters aro und the Diao yu

Is lands` altho ugh it is no t clear what exactly this meant s ince the CG did no t co nfirm such an incident241 Acco rding to Xinhua NewsAgency in 2013 China sent 50 ldquopatro l miss io ns rdquo into the TW o f the disputed is lands and as o f 12 July 2014 by the autho r`s co unt

there had been 17 such Chinese ldquopatro l miss io ns rdquo in 2014 which are ldquoincurs io ns rdquo fo r the Japanese s ide242 Other needle pricks todemo ns trate China`s claims are the o ccas io nal incurs io ns o f Chinese survey ships into the Senkaku Is lands` EEZ o r the bo ardingo f Chinese fishing vessels in the EEZ Defence Minis ter Itsuno ri Ono dera in late Octo ber 2013 called these repeated incurs io ns a

threat to peace which fell in a ldquogray zo ne (between) peacetime and an emergency s ituatio nrdquo243

A new level o f depriving Japan o f the ability to claim so le effective co ntro l o ver the is lands was reached o n 13 December 2012 when

a small turbo pro p aircraft o f the CMS (Harbin Y12 type) flew o ver Uo tsurijima244 Since then regular CMS air patro ls have beenco nducted but the aircraft no rmally s tay abo ut 120 km fro m the is lands With this mo ve Chinese measures to undermine Japan`sco ntro l o ver the is lands were expanded to the air space which fo r o rganizatio nal reaso ns had immediately military implicatio nsbecause the Air Self Defense Fo rce (ASDF) is respo ns ible fo r intercepting aircraft which intrude illegally into Japan`s air space The

incident did no t happen o ut o f the blue because already in January 2012 the SOA had anno unced a plan to deplo y the Y12 in 2012245

On 24 September the SOA had also anno unced plans to deplo y dro nes by 2015 fo llo wing the success ful tes t the previo us day 246

The Chinese acts are apparently carefully planned and co o rdinated s ince the o fficials in the abo ve Kyo do repo rt also said that theairspace vio latio ns o n 13 December 2012 by an airplane o f the CMS was planned by the s taff sectio n o f the natio nal Land and SeaBo rder Defense Co mmittee which acts as a liaiso n o ffice fo r the Chinese military the State Oceanic Adminis tratio n and the fishing

bureau o f the Agriculture Minis try with the aim o f rais ing tens io ns 247

The lo w altitude flight o f the Y12 o n 13 December was particularly upsetting fo r the Japanese go vernment because it was no t pickedup by the ASDF radar (the clo ses t o ne being o n Miyako jima abo ut 200 km fro m the is lands) but ins tead by CG ships in the area Inthis case eight ASDF fighters s crambled but co uld no t detect the Y12 Interceptio n o f aircraft is by nature much mo re diff icult andcarries a certain risk o f accident as happened in 2001 when a US intelligence aircraft co llided with a Chinese intercepto r jet Witho ut

explaining the s tandard Japanese pro ceedures fo r aerial defence which so lely relies o n the ASDF the Chinese media interpreted theuse o f military aircraft by Japan as `aggress ive` and the Global Times cautio ned agains t any interceptio n warning that China might

respo nd by sending its air fo rce248 On the Japanese s ide even the centre-left Asahi Shimbun called the Y12 flight ` a highly

pro vo cative act that co uld lead to an armed co nflict between the two co untries`249 At the beginning o f January 2013 there wereapparently erro neo us repo rts that the ASDF might co ns ider firing warning sho ts (tracer bullets ) at intruding Chinese aircraft which

pro mpted further bellico se co mments in the Chinese press 250 As a co nsequence the Chinese air fo rce also became invo lved o n10 January when the Chinese Minis try o f Defence anno unced that the Peo ple`s Liberatio n Army Air Fo rce (PLAA) had sent two fighterjets agains t two ASDF F-15 intercepto rs because they were fo llo wing a Chinese military Y8 transpo rt aircraft patro lling the airspace

o f Chinese o il platfo rms in the Eas t China Sea251 The Japanese repo rted that mo re than ten Chinese aircraft including military

aircraft had appro ached the Japanese air defence identificatio n zo ne252 In a further escalatio n the Japanese s ide repo rted that o n11 June 2014 two Chinese military jets flew abno rmally clo se to two planes o f Japans Self Defence Fo rce abo ve the Eas t China Sea

an accusatio n which the Chinese s ide refuted speaking ins tead o f two incidents pro vo ked by Japanese fighters 253 Related to thisdevelo pment and further enhancing the po ss ibility o f an incident is the enhanced patro lling o f the PLAA o ver the Eas t China Seawhich caused the ASDF to increase scrambling agains t PLAA aircraft to 415 times between 1 April 2013 and 31 March 2014 (Fis cal

Year 2013) 109 times mo re than in the previo us Fis cal Year 2012254

Co ntinuing to increase the pressure o n Japan the Chinese go vernment decreed o n 23 No vember 2013 an Air Defence Identificatio nZo ne (ADIZ) which includes the airspace o ver the Senkaku Is lands and was certainly meant to reinfo rce China`s territo rial claimdespite the fact that an ADIZ has no territo rial implicatio ns in internatio nal law The threat o f military co untermeasures in the text o fthe decree (lsquoChinas armed fo rces will ado pt defens ive emergency measures to respo nd to aircraft that do no t co o perate in the

identificatio n o r refuse to fo llo w the ins tructio ns rsquo) has further heightened the po ss ibility o f a military clash255 Ho wever theJapanese s ide refuses to accept the ADIZ The Chinese mo ves have wider implicatio ns fo r peace and s tability in the regio n in o rderto pro tect the freedo m o f its military aircraft in Eas t As ian airspace and its ability to o bserve China`s military fo rces Washingto nrefused to reco gnise the zo ne co ntinued to igno re the requirements o f the ADIZ by pursuing its regular patro l f lights and criticisedits implementatio n Simultaneo us ly ho wever the Department o f State advised civilian airlines to fo llo w China`s ins tructio ns andVice Pres ident Biden advised bo th co untries o n his trip to No rtheas t As ia in December 2013 to es tablish a cris is managements tructure Since the US do es no t take a s tance o n the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands` so vereignty Washingto n seemed to igno re Japan`smain grievance abo ut the ADIZ which is China`s intentio n to further reinfo rce its so vereignty claim by extending the ADIZ o ver theis lands The mo s t far-reaching US s tatements were a reco nfirmatio n o f the applicatio n o f the security treaty to the is lands evenmentio ning the is lands by their Japanese and Chinese names and co mplaining that the Chinese actio n was an attempt to unilaterally

change the status quo in the Eas t China Sea which raised regio nal tens io n and increased the risk o f accident and miscalculatio n256

Ho wever in this way the Obama Adminis tratio n risked creating amo ng so me Japanese o bservers do ubts abo ut the Adminis tratio n`sreliability and so gave succo ur to China`s attempt to drive a wedge between the two allies Ano ther co mplicatio n is that the ChineseADIZ o verlaps that o f Ko rea and mo reo ver co vers the submerged ro ck called Ieo do in Ko rean and Suyan in Chinese which has animpact o n the no t yet demarcated EEZ bo rder between bo th co untries Interes tingly the Japanese ADIZ also co vers Ieo do but thishas never been underpinned by any Japanese EEZ claims But China kno ws ho w to play o n So uth Ko rea`s criticism o f Japan`sattitude to wards the his to ry is sue and the territo rial dispute with Japan o ver Do kto Takeshima is land Mo reo ver the As ian co untriesco ntes ting China`s claims to parts o f the So uth China Sea are co ncerned that China wo uld further co mplicate the territo rialdisputes in the area by es tablishing an ADIZ Yet the ASEAN member s tates have been very cautio us in directly criticis ing ChinaChina`s es tablishment o f the ADIZ directly affects many co untries because so many o f them have airlines flying thro ugh the zo neHo wever with the exceptio n o f Japan all o thers agred to co nfo rm with China`s reques t fo r no tif icatio n which undermines theJapanese go vernment`s po s itio n o f explicitly advis ing Japanese airlines no t to co nfo rm

With these escalating develo pments the Chinese s ide achieved its go al o f sho wing that the Japanese autho rities are no lo nger infull co ntro l o f the disputed is lands In the case o f Chinese Co as tguard vessel intrus io ns the reactio n o f the Japanese CG is limitedto shado wing the Chinese vessels to info rm them that they are vio lating Japan`s CZ o r TW and to ask them to leave whichho wever they do at their o wn dis cretio n (the time span ho vering in the CZ o r TW having beco me a further means o f Chinesepressure) fo llo wed by diplo matic pro tes ts Otherwise the CG has avo ided any phys ical co nfro ntatio n o r co ntact When co nfro ntedby the CG the Chinese vessels s imply declare (by radio o r even electro nic displays ) that they are patro lling Chinese waters and thatthe CG ships were o perating illegally in these waters This ritual has so far prevented vio lence This is in co ntras t to an exchange o fwater canno n salvo s between the CG and the Taiwanese co as t guard in the territo rial o f the Senkaku Is lands o n 25 September 2012

and again o n 24 January 2013257

The increase o f patro ls by Japan and China is caus ing o peratio nal s train fo r bo th s ides (also rais ing the risk o f miscalculatio ns o ro verreactio ns ) but this has no t reduced the willingness o f either go vernment to s cale do wn the almo s t daily demo ns tratio ns o f

`effective co ntro l` In Octo ber it was repo rted that the CG no w always maintains ten vessels agains t eight fro m China258 The 11th

regio nal headquarters respo ns ible fo r the Senkaku area is in Naha and has nine patro l ships (but o nly seven vessels o f at leas t

1000 to ns ) but no w needs additio nal ships which are dispatched fro m o ther regio nal headquarters 259 In April 2012 the CG had ato tal o f 357 patro l vessels but o nly 51 o ver 1000 to ns which are tho se mo s t needed fo r a far flung area like the Senkaku

Is lands 26 0 On 14 September 2012 Senio r Vice Minis ter o f Fisheries Iwamo to Tsukasa mentio ned plans to increase the number o f

fishery patro l vessels to ensure fishermens safety amid intens ifying territo rial disputes with China and So uth Ko rea26 1 On 26Octo ber the Minis try o f Land Infras tructure Transpo rt and To urism which heads the CG anno unced plans to increase budgetary

reques ts fo r mo re ships 26 2 The Abe go vernment plans to build mo re vessels o r advance the calendar retro fit vessels which were to

be retired and is co ns idering extending the retirement age o f the o fficers 26 3

The Chinese have fewer vessels which can be deplo yed as far as the Senkaku Is lands In additio n leave o f the sailo rs has been

res tricted and their deplo yment length at sea has increased26 4 In March 2013 the Chinese s ide anno unced clo ser co o peratio nbetween the military and vario us maritime law enfo rcement agencies as well as the merger o f fo ur maritime law enfo rcementagencies under the State Ocean Adminis tratio n (adminis tered by the Minis try o f Land and Reso urces ) ie the China MarineSurveillance the co as t guard fo rces o f the Public Security Minis try the fisheries law enfo rcement co mmand o f the Agriculture

Minis try and the maritime anti-smuggling po lice o f the General Adminis tratio n o f Cus to ms 26 5

Ano ther wo rrying develo pment is the gradual invo lvement o f the PLA navy (PLAN) and the Maritime Self Defence Fo rce (MSDF) TheJapanese MOD anno unced o n 16 Octo ber 2012 that fo r the firs t time PLAN ships were o bserved navigating in the 22-km-wide CZbetween Yo naguni and Irio mo te is lands altho ugh the minis try left o pen the po ss ibility that they did so in o rder to avo id a typho o n

Nevertheless the Gaimusho so ught explanatio ns fro m the Chinese abo ut these ship mo vements 26 6 In December 2012 fo ur PLANships sailed thro ugh the CW o f the Irio mo te-Yo naguni is lands o n the way back fro m drills in the Pacific after having go ne into the

Pacific thro ugh the mo re no rmal ro ute o f the s trait between the Okinawan main is land and Miyako jima26 7 Again there was no thingillegal abo ut it but it raised attentio n at a time o f tens io ns Ho wever there are s igns o f greater co o peratio n o f the PLAN withChinese Co as t Guard vessels as was sho wn in the s tando ff between China and the Philippines aro und the disputed Scarbo ro ugh

Sho al in the So uth China Sea and jo int exercises to o k place between the three in the Eas t China Sea in Octo ber 201226 8 The

patro lling activities o f the MSDF in the Senkaku area became kno wn when the Japanese repo rted at the end o f January 2013 that o n19 January a Chinese frigatersquos target radar had lo cked o nto an MSDF helico pter and o n 30 January ano ther frigate sailing clo se to

an MSDF des tro yer did likewise The Chinese vehemently denied it26 9 Ho wever in March this year the Kyo do news agency repo rtedthat senio r Chinese military o fficials had admitted the incident o f 29 January Even mo re wo rriso me is that the Chinese vessels

acted apparently witho ut prio r appro val fro m the fleet co mmand o r navy headquarters All this was denied by the Chinese s ide270 Itdid no t help that under Prime Minis ter No da the MSDF had been o rdered after the eruptio n o f the 2012 cris is to keep a greaterdis tance fro m PLAN ships than the hitherto 3 km in o rder avo id incidents but this po licy was reversed by the mo re hawkish Abe

adminis tratio n to the previo us 3 km dis tance271 The fire radar lo cking incident had happened at a dis tance o f 3 km

Agains t the backgro und o f greater invo lvement o f military fo rces it is particularly regrettable that a plan to build a maritime liaiso n

mechanism between their defense autho rities o n which they had agreed in June 2012 to make later that year was shelved272

Unfo rtunately it is s till Chinese practice to co ns ider Co nfidence Building Measures (CBM) no t as the firs t s tep to build co nfidencebut as a to o l to extract fro m the o ther s ide prio r co ncess io ns under the pretext o f `creating a better atmo sphere` fo r dis cuss ingCBM The o utbreak o f the September 2012 cris is was therefo re a co nvenient pretext fo r the Chinese to cancel the pro ject Thelates t co nfirmatio n was in March 2013 when General Yin Zhuo explained that there co uld be no military trus t if the po litical and

diplo matic relatio nship is bad273 Since the target radar lo ck-o n incidents the Japanese go vernment is publicly calling fo rresumptio n o f nego tiatio ns fo r the maritime liaiso n mechanism but the Chinese will certainly want to extract so me co ncess io nsbefo re even co ns idering a po s itive respo nse

Ho wever the co ns tant co nfro ntatio n between the po licing and military fo rces o f bo th s ides co uld eas ily lead to a military clasheither as a result o f an unfo reseen civilian o r military incident miscalculatio n o r malicio us intentio n at a lo wer level o f co mmandTwo recent examples o f unfo reseen civilian incidents co uld have escalated One is the attempted landing o n o ne o f the disputedis lands by a Chinese pro tes ter with a ballo o n in January 2014 This incident was peacefully reso lved because Japan did no t arres t theballo o nis t In this case the firs t repo rt o n the crash-landing in the territo rial waters o f Uo tsurijima came fro m the Taiwanese co as tguard which info rmed the Japanese co as t guard fo llo wed by the hand-o ver o f the ballo o nis t to the PRC autho rities o uts ide o f

Japan`s territo rial waters 274 The o ther incident was the s inking o f a Chinese fishing bo at ldquoto the no rth o f the Diao yu Is landsrdquo and

the mo ve o f two Chinese naval () vessels to rescue the crew275 This autho r co uld no t find o ut ho w clo se the fishing bo at came tothe is lands and apparently there has no t been any further repo rting abo ut the incident

The previo us ly mentio ned radar-targeting incidents and these two civilian incidents have no t led to an escalatio n but there is noguarantee fo r the future Shi Yinho ng a pro fesso r at Renmin Univers ity predicts that the territo rial co nflicts in the ECS So uth ChinaSea and alo ng the Sino -Indian bo rder will intens ify because o f po pular natio nalism dynamics within the armed fo rces and o f co urse

also o ur to p leaders perso nal beliefs and s trategic perso nalities 276 Hugh White argues that a war (which co uld lead to a nuclearexchange between China and the US) co uld also begin because the Chinese leadership may co ns ider that s tarting ho s tilities no wrather than later wo uld be mo re beneficial to either tes t US reso lve to defend Japan (which the Chinese leadership do ubts ) anddetermine the is sue o f Chinese supremacy in the As ian regio n which he co ns iders to be the real is sue rather than the is lands

themselves 277

IS THERE A WAY FORWARD

The current co nfro ntatio n is no t o nly co ntinuing but even escalating and do mes tic develo pments in bo th co untries are no t creatingan atmo sphere mo re co nducive to better management o f the cris is let alo ne finding a so lutio n Inactio n runs the risk o f a furtherescalatio n o r even a military clash while po s itive o ptio ns are beco ming fewer Meanwhile bo th co untries suffer fro m the eco no micfall-o ut and heightened tens io ns while the integratio n o f a ris ing China into a new s trategic enviro nment in As ia will beco me evenmo re fraught cas ting a shado w o n Japan`s clo se relatio nship with the US

The 2010 incident ended quickly with Japan`s release o f the captain One reaso n fo r this is certainly the fact that China`s demand in2010 was relatively clear and achievable (release o f the captain) if painful fo r Japan at a time o f a weak and inexperiencedgo vernment This time in September 2012 the cris is firs t hit a go vernment which reacted intrans igently because o f its previo usdefeat and o ther unfavo urable do mes tic circumstances and was then replaced by the mo re hawkish Abe go vernment The Abecabinet`s attitude to wards the pas t as exemplif ied by vario us s tatements by cabinet members and peo ple clo se to it the attempt torevise the Ko no s tatement reco gniz ing the fo rced war pro s titutio n (the military co mfo rt wo men) and Abe`s Yasukuni Shrine vis itall served China`s anti-Japan pro paganda wo rsened Japan-Ko rea relatio ns which China is cleverly explo iting and even angered theUS adminis tratio n Abe is seen as utiliz ing the tens io ns with China to win do mes tic and internatio nal suppo rt fo r Japan to have aldquono rmalrdquo natio nal defence po s ture The latter is welco me by the US adminis tratio n because it wo uld help with the US As ianrealignment and suppo rt its China po licy At the same time China`s actio ns cas t an o mino us shado w o n its intentio ns in the So uthChina Sea and Abe and mo re impo rtantly the US is suppo rting the claimants there agains t China

Under these bilateral multilateral and regio nal circumstances wo uld China be satis fied with go ing back to the `unders tanding abo utsetting as ide the dispute` in co njunctio n with Japan`s reco gnitio n o f the exis tence o f a territo rial dispute o r wo uld it demand areversal o f the purchase o f the three is lands Wo uld it demand the end o f Japanese CG patro ls aro und the is lands China`ss tandard demand no w that Japan `co rrect its mis takes` is rather ambiguo us because it co uld be interpreted as go ing back to theshelving unders tanding and the reco gnitio n o f the exis tence o f a dispute o r demanding a reversal o f the go vernment`s purchase o f

the is lands 278 The latter wo uld s imply be impo ss ible in legal and practical terms and o ne can o nly ho pe that the ambiguity is o nlyaimed at rais ing China`s nego tiatio n po s itio n ando r leaving eno ugh wiggle ro o m fo r nego tiatio ns which wo uld satis fy all Chineses takeho lders` interes ts

It seems that it is already to o late fo r go ing back to the shelving agreement o f 19721978 which wo uld imply that the two s ides canso meho w go back to the status quo o f the 1970s This as we have seen has been superseded by deeds and wo rds o n bo th s ides The Chinese have no w no t o nly publicly declared that the shelving agreement was lsquobro kenrsquo by Japan but after the firs t Y12 patro l o n13 December 2012 co mmented that ldquoThe s ituatio n has changed It has beco me no rmal fo r Chinas marine surveillance vessels to

enter the 12-nautical-mile zo ne Japans actual co ntro l o ver the is lands has go nerdquo279

The bilateral relatio nship has deterio rated to the extent that at leas t shelving the co nflicting so vereignty claims without o fficiallyadmitting that there is a territo rial dispute is no lo nger an o ptio n acceptable to China because it feels Japan has abused theshelving co nsensus thro ugh a series o f adminis trative measures with the final s traw having been the central go vernmentrsquos purchaseo f three is lands When s tudying the vario us Chinese o fficial s tatements and news repo rts after the 2012 cris is had fully erupted inSeptember it beco mes clear that until Octo ber 2012 the Chinese s till raised the demand that Japan sho uld go back to the previo uslsquounders tandingrsquo o r lsquoco nsensus rsquo but this demand was no t made o ften thereafter It reappeared in remarks by Wang Jiarui the head o fthe Co mmunis t partys Internatio nal Department when meeting Yamaguchi Natsuo the leader o f the junio r co alitio n partner

Ko meito in January 201328 0 Previo us ly a co mment o n the Xinhua internet s ite o n 29 Octo ber said that ldquoThe lsquopurchasersquo sho wed thatthe Japanese go vernment has who lly abando ned the attitude o f laying as ide disputes and has fundamentally changed the

s ituatio nrdquo28 1 On 30 Octo ber the CMOFA spo kesperso n declared that lsquoJapans illegal purchase o f the Diao yu Is lands bro ke the

impo rtant co nsensus The Japanese s ide sho uld no t have any mo re illus io n o f o ccupying the Diao yu Is lands What the Japaneses ide sho uld do is to face up to the reality admit the so vereignty dispute co rrect mis takes and co me back to the track o f a

nego tiated settlement`28 2 The lates t o fficial pro po sal to shelve the is lands is sue was made by the fo rmer fo reign minis ter Tang

Jiaxuan o n 16 July 201428 3

The reco gnitio n o f a territo rial pro blem wo uld be relatively easy fo r Japanese public o pinio n (and even mo re so fo r Japanrsquos friendsand allies ) to accept because they wo uld no t see the need fo r any kind o f diplo matic o r legal so phis try fo r what is o bvio us ly aterrito rial co nflict whatever the legitimacy o f the Chinese claim might be given also the fact that the current Japanese po s itio nco mes do wn to refus ing to even dis cuss whatever settlement might be po ss ible Acco rding to a survey co nducted by Genro nto gether with Zho ngguo Ribao she in June 2012 627 per cent o f Japanese agreed that there exis ts a territo rial pro blem dispute

(176 disagreed) co mpared with 822 o f the Chinese (139 disagreed)28 4 Ho wever co nsecutive Japanese cabinets haverefused to reco gnise the exis tence o f a territo rial dispute which is o ften the default po s itio n o f a go vernment in actual co ntro l o f adisputed territo ry (fo r example the Ko rean go vernmentrsquos po s itio n o n Do kto Takeshima) This po s itio n has been reinfo rced by theexplicit Japanese denial s ince the 1990s o f a shelving agreement which wo uld have been an implicit admiss io n that there is adispute To circumvent the risk o f being perceived as admitting the exis tence o f a territo rial pro blem the deputy prime minis ter o fthe previo us No da go vernment Okada Katsuya was repo rted to have mentio ned in a speech in Octo ber 2012 that there was no

territo rial dispute but as a matter o f fact a debate exis ted28 5 Ho wever this co mpro mise so lutio n was never co nfirmed by the No dago vernment and did no t beco me po licy It is even less likely to be acceptable to the new Abe go vernment Even amo ng influentialo pinio n makers there is hardly any suppo rt fo r admitting the exis tence o f a territo rial co nflict o r o f a shelving agreement Even mo reco nciliato ry s tatements o n this subject are rather vague Maehara Seiji o f the Demo cratic Party declared in a co nference at QinghuaUnivers ity in Beijing in September 2013 that the Japanese go vernment sho uld add (to its o wn po s itio n) that China has a differentview (Senkakusho to wo meguru Niho n seifu no tachiba ni tsuite lsquoChugo ku ga chigau kangaekata wo mo tte iru to iuko to wo ichigen

tsukekuwaerubeki darsquo) At the same time he emphas ised ho wever that there was no territo rial dispute28 6 Japan Bus inessFederatio n Chairman Yo nekura Hiro masa mentio ned in September 2012 in an NHK interview that the go vernment sho uld be mo re

flexible s ince o therwise its s tance co uld be taken to mean that Japan has no intentio n o f so lving the dispute28 7 Miyamo to Yuji thefo rmer Japanese ambassado r to China is quo ted as saying that lsquoThe go vernment do es no t need to alter its bas ic po s itio n but in

reality a co nflict do es exis t o ver the Senkaku is les rsquo 28 8 This is also the s tance which the previo us Japanese ambassado r Niwa

Uichiro takes in an article after his return to Japan28 9

Co ncerning co nflict reso lutio n it is interes ting to no te that when asked abo ut the mo dern s ignificance o f the 1978 Japan-ChinaPeace and Friendship Treaty 68 4 o f the po lled Japanese agreed with Art 12 (lsquoThe two parties shall settle all disputes by peacefulmeans and shall refrain fro m the use o r threat o f fo rcersquo) but o nly 525 o f the Chinese agreed Mo reo ver 58 1 o f the Chinese

favo ur China s trengthening its co ntro l o ver the area29 0

If therefo re a new ldquoimplicit unders tandingrdquo abo ut shelving the dispute is achievable it wo uld have to be based o n learning fro m thefailures o f the 19721978 shelving ie it wo uld be necessary to achieve a mutual unders tanding o f what the s tatus quo is whatwo uld undermine the s tatus quo and what has to be do ne to mo ve fro m co nflict management to so lutio n Quite clearly such a newunders tanding wo uld be less favo urable to Japan`s current s tance o n the dispute

FROM CONFLICT MANAGEMENT TO ADDRESSING THE SOVEREIGNTY ISSUE

Any mo ve fo rward will certainly require decis ive leadership o n bo th s ides be it to take the initiative o r to respo nd po s itively to theinitiative o f s tarting the pro cess to wards reso lutio n In view o f the co mplex backgro und o f the external and internal dynamics it iso bvio us that address ing the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands dispute requires a s tep-by-s tep appro ach The ultimate is sue to address is theso vereignty is sue and territo rial disputes are generally viewed as zero sum in nature given their clo se link to co re securityinteres ts Even tho se who reco gnize the impo rtance o f transcending such lo gic in favo ur o f co ndo minium o r shared so vereigntygenerally ho ld that the is sue can o nly be addressed at the las t s tage o f any nego tiated pro cess if at all

Two impo rtant is sues have to be co ns idered at the beginning to what extent have the vario us s tages o f the nego tiating pro cess tobe agreed befo rehand (lsquoro ad maprsquo) o r even the final o utco me whether a viable co ndo minium o r o nly shelving the is sues and co uldthe ro le o f a third party mediato r be helpfulacceptable In view o f the po litical diff iculties o n bo th s ides the s tart o f thenego tiatio n pro cess wo uld be endangered if there is no t sufficient ro o m fo r ambiguity and interpretatio n abo ut the vario us s tages altho ugh the general aim o f tens io n reductio n and suspens io n o f the so vereignty is sue mus t be clearly agreed

A third party mediato r is pro bably no t acceptable to the Chinese s ide The third party mo s t o ften mentio ned is the Internatio nalCo urt o f Jus tice (ICJ) o r any kind o f internatio nal arbitratio n Ho wever this seems unlikely in view o f China`s preference fo rbilateral nego tiatio ns and its refusal to accept judicial settlement by the ICJ o r any internatio nal arbitratio n except in no n-po litical

areas such as trade29 1 The Japanese go vernment wo uld be willing to accept the jurisdictio n o f the ICJ but o nly if China brings the

case to the Co urt les t it be perceived as ackno wledging the exis tence o f a territo rial dispute29 2 But there are also po litical andpro cedural arguments agains t the reco urse to the ICJ China`s legal argumentatio n is co mparatively weak and s ince a negativejudgement co uld have implicatio ns fo r China`s legal claim to mo s t o f the So uth China Sea there is even less o f a chance o f Chinamaking an exceptio n fo r the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands dispute In view o f the entrenched po s itio ns o f bo th s ides and the risk o f a`winner takes all` o utco me o f internatio nal litigatio n bo th go vernments wo uld face co ns iderable do mes tic res is tance in case o f anegative o utco me In view o f the urgency o f the dispute and the lo ng time it takes fo r a judgement there wo uld also be the risk o fdo mes tic fo rces trying to pre-empt a negative result

In view o f the security is sues invo lved (let alo ne the American his to rical `debt` as a result o f Washingto n`s ambiguity related toWashingto n`s ending o f the adminis tratio n o f Okinawa in 1972) an American mediatio n co uld be seen as natural and even inAmerican interes ts Such an American ro le ho wever is extremely unlikely as it wo uld be seen by China as unduly advantageo us toJapan Ho wever at so me po int during the Japan-China nego tiatio n pro cess the US might ass is t (o r even be reques ted) by agreeingto certain Co nfidence and Security Building Measures (CSBM) in the area aro und the is lands

The firs t s tage wo uld have to co ns is t o f measures which reduce the risk o f a military clash but in a way which prevents theperceptio n that o ne s ide is giving in to co ercio n This s tage wo uld be a gradual phas ing o ut o f intrus io ns by Chinese o fficial vesselsand aircraft into the territo rial waters co ntiguo us zo ne and airspace o f the is lands which is recipro cated by Japanrsquos reducing in thesame way its co as tguard patro ls in the two zo nes as well as its s crambling activities in the is lands` airspace There were repo rts in

June 2013 that China called o n Japan to agree to a 12-nautical-mile no -entry zo ne aro und the is lands 29 3 Japan rejected this co urse

Ano ther measure wo uld be to increase the dis tance at which vessels o f bo th maritime fo rces o bserve each o ther Such s teps sho uldultimately be o fficialised by a gradually expanding series o f CSBMs and a bilateral liaiso n mechanism This co uld also include ademilitarisatio n agreement as an incentive fo r the Chinese s ide It wo uld be vital that the s teps at this s tage be incremental that nos tep is explo ited in a o ne-s ided way and that they are co ns idered irrevers ible At the same time bo th s ides have to prevent peo plefro m appro aching the is lands s ince this wo uld be seen as a pro vo catio n by the o ther s ide This latter task is technically no t easy

because o f the co ntro vers ial character o f any co mpro mise with certain no n-s tate acto rs in Japan China Ho ng Ko ng and Taiwan The(failed) landing o f a Chinese ho t ballo o n o n o ne o f the is lands in January 2014 demo ns trated at the same time the technical

diff iculty o f a no -entry po licy as well as the po ss ibility o f a success ful co o peratio n o f the co as tguards o f all three co untries 29 4

At this firs t s tage o r leading to the next there will have to be a Japanese go vernment s tatement to the effect that there is alsquopro blemrsquo related to the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands This can be wo rded in such a way that the sens itive express io n `territo rialpro blem` (which is s trenuo us ly denied by the go vernment) is avo ided and it can be supplemented by a sentence that such as tatement in no way prejudices the legal po s itio n o f the go vernment Such a qualifying s tatement is fo r example included in the

Japan-China agreement fo r prio r no tif icatio n o f research vessels fro m bo th co untries in the Eas t China Sea in 200029 5 A s imilarqualif icatio n is part o f the 1997 Japan-China Fisheries Agreement In the jo int co mmuniqueacute o f 1972 which no rmalised diplo maticrelatio ns between Japan and China diplo matic wo rding also managed to bridge the huge gap between their s tances o n Taiwan whichthe PRC co ns iders an lsquoinalienable partrsquo o f its territo ry Japan co ns iders the so vereignty is sue s till unreso lved because the 1951 SanFrancis co Peace Treaty Art 2 (b) o nly s tipulated that lsquoJapan reno unces all right title and claim to Fo rmo sa and the Pescado res rsquowitho ut clarifying the recipient o f the territo ry The co mpro mise in 1972 was reached with the sentence that Japan lsquofully unders tandsand respects this s tand o f the Go vernment o f the Peo ples Republic o f China and it f irmly maintains its s tand under Article 8 o f thePo tsdam Pro clamatio nrsquo

POSSIBLE APPROACHES TO THE SOVEREIGNTY ISSUE

The mo s t diff icult pro blem is the so vereignty is sue which go es to the co re o f any co untry`s security interes ts It is no t imaginablethat either s ide will reno unce its claim to the is lands Sides tepping o r shelving the is sue is o nly useful if the lesso ns fro m the 1972and 1978 attempts as o utlined abo ve can be learned and applied but there is s till the fundamental pro blem with the implicitassumptio n that the quality o f the bilateral relatio nship will always be as go o d as when the s ides tepping agreement was achievedand can be maintained in perpetuity o r until the so vereignty is sue can be addressed But in o rder to so lve the so vereignty is sue aneven better relatio nship has to be created This better relatio nship co uld be bro ught abo ut by the s teps explained abo ve and furtherbelo w

An impo rtant co nditio n fo r any las ting territo rial co mpro mise wo uld be reducing the value o f the is lands fo r bo th co untries whichcan be achieved by o ne o f the measures pro po sed fo r s tage 1 ie reso lutely preventing anyo ne fro m appro aching the territo ries(including to tal demilitarizatio n) which in themselves are eco no mically wo rthless and are uninhabited The main po int is to preventany go vernmental act which co uld be interpreted as being part o f the `so vereignty game` The mo s t diff icult part here is to preventany act by no n-go vernmental acto rs This wo uld have to include the territo rial waters and the explo itatio n there in o f any kind o freso urces including fishing Scientif ic interes ts in the is lands co uld be served by bilateral surveys witho ut any po litical co nno tatio ns

There have been pro po sals to declare the is lands an Internatio nal Nature and Wildlife Preserve29 6 Such a preserve wo uld have to beadminis tered either bilaterally o r by a relevant internatio nal o rganisatio n and as such co uld serve as a co nfidence-building measure

The abo ve s teps wo uld then allo w the two s ides to deal with the co ns iderable eco no mic interes ts in fishing and the explo itatio n o fhydro carbo n reso urces and o ther seabed reso urces aro und the is lands ie in the Exclus ive Eco no mic Zo ne ando r the ExtendedCo ntinental Shelf Once the is lands` land area and the territo rial waters have been put as ide it wo uld be eas ier to co me to ano verall agreement o n the delimitatio n o f the EEZ bo rder (with the exceptio n o f the no rthern part which wo uld require a trilateralagreement between China Japan and Ko rea) which wo uld include the delimitatio n o f these surro unding waters It wo uld facilitate aco mpro mise if bo th s ides agree that the is lands do no t merit their o wn EEZ This might be diff icult fo r Japan which claims an EEZ fo rOkino to rishima refuted by China s ince it co ns iders the reef no t to be an is land acco rding to Art 121 o f UNCLOS

A co mpro mise o n the so vereignty is sue co uld o nly be the o utco me ndash if at all ndash o f a success ful pro cess o f the abo ve o r co mparables teps In o rder to avo id a `winner take all` s ituatio n the co mpro mise wo uld have to invo lve a sharing arrangement His to ry o ffers

quite a number o f internatio nal precedents o f shared so vereignty referred to as co ndo minium in internatio nal law29 7 One case withso me s imilarities to the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands is a small is land (3000 sq m) in the river separating France and Spain kno wn asPheasant Is land o r Co nference Is land which even to day s till changes every s ix mo nths between France and Spain as o wner Like theSenkakuDiao yu Is lands the is land has no eco no mic value anymo re and the is land is o ff limits It was the lo catio n o f the s igning o f

the Treaty o f the Pyrenees in 1659 which ended a lo ng war 29 8 Mo s t o ther examples o f jo int so vereignty co ncern territo ries with apo pulatio n which makes co o peratio n much mo re diff icult Other his to rical precedents o f sharing so vereignty are the es tablishmento f ldquoneutral zo nesrdquo Acco rdingly the is lands and po ss ibly a sea area aro und the is lands co uld be declared a neutral zo ne like the o nebetween Saudi Arabia and Kuwait (1922-1965) On July 7 1965 the two go vernments s igned an agreement (which to o k effect o nJuly 25 1966) to partitio n the Neutral Zo ne adjo ining their respective territo ries A demarcatio n agreement dividing the NeutralZo ne was s igned o n December 17 1967

Particularly relevant here is that Saudi Arabia as well as Kuwait explo ited the o il reso urces under a jo int o perating agreement29 9

Co nclus io ns

The actio n-reactio n pattern o f the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands dispute is accelerating and the initiative seems to be mo re o ften thanno t with the Chinese s ide while the Japanese s ide is in a defens ive po s itio n The danger o f a military co nfro ntatio n is lo o mingincreas ingly larger in what co uld be called a lsquochicken gamersquo At the same time the internal and external dynamics are undermining theenviro nment which is required fo r a peaceful so lutio n as well as fo r maintaining the number o f po s itive o ptio ns While the Japanesego vernment refuses to ackno wledge the very exis tence o f a territo rial dispute the Chinese go vernment is no w (July 2014) evenrefus ing to have a dialo gue with Japan`s current prime minis ter It is po ss ible that the Chinese s ide again wants to wait with anymo ve fo rward until the Japanese prime minis ter has changed as Beijing did with Prime Minis ter Sato Eisaku o r with Prime Minis terKo izumi Junichiro But waiting fo r an impro vement o f the bilateral atmo sphere as the Chinese s ide likes to s tress is a very riskyo ptio n and such an impro vement may anyway be a very sho rt windo w o f o ppo rtunity if lo o king at the ups and do wns o f the po s t-1949 his to ry o f the bilateral relatio nship

To s tart a s tep-by-s tep pro cess o f address ing the territo rial is sue s tro ng leadership is required which unders tands the widerinteres ts o f a functio ning Japanese-Chinese relatio nship Japan s imply asking China fo r a summit meeting is no t very sens ible ifthere is no willingness to engage in subs tantive dis cuss io ns and wo uld be very risky fo r China`s to p leader if the Japanese primeminis ter then vis its the Yasukuni Shrine The his to ry is sue sho uld no lo nger be a Chinese lever fo r pressuris ing Japan but the latterhas to abs tain fro m actio ns which are seen as pro vo cative no t o nly by China but also by Ko rea the US and many o thers There hasto be a co mmitted leadership o n bo th s ides which s tarts with a ro ugh ro ad map and tens io n-reducing s teps such as CSBMs en ro uteto agreeing o n a fo rmula which allo ws the parties to o btain eco no mic as well as security gains while reducing tens io ns

Reinhard Drifte is Emeritus Professor of Japanese Politics University of Newcastle UK and Visiting Professor at various Japanese Universities andPau University (France) He is the author of Japanrsquos Foreign Policy for the Twenty First Century His home page is here

Reco mmended citatio n Reinhard Drifte The Japan-China Confrontation Over the SenkakuDiaoyu Islands--Between shelving and dispute

Mo st attentio n in Japan was fo cused o n the widening s treet pro tes ts in o ver 100 Chinese cities the des tructio n o f Japanese sho ps

res taurants cars and pro ductio n facilities and the attacks o n Japanese citizens in China20 8 The webs ites o f at leas t 19 Japanese

banks univers ities and o ther ins titutio ns came under cyber-attack20 9 At a demo ns tratio n in Shanghai abo ut 7000 pro tes ters

chanted s lo gans such as lsquoBeat Japanese imperialismrsquo lsquoBo yco tt Japanese pro ducts rsquo and lsquoDes tro y Japan and retrieve Okinawarsquo210

Altho ugh o nly 63 per cent o f po lled Japanese in late September 2012 expressed suppo rt fo r their go vernment`s natio nalizatio n o fthe is lands do wn fro m 73 per cent in a previo us po ll o n 15 and 16 September 82 per cent o f respo ndents in a Mainichi Shimbun

survey said the Japanese go vernment had no t pro tes ted s tro ngly eno ugh to Beijing o ver anti-Japan pro tes ts 211 The Chinesego vernment denied any o fficial invo lvement and the spo kesperso n o f the Waijiao bu went o nly as far as saying that the pro tes ts anddemo ns tratio ns were `co mpletely caused by the Japanese go vernments illegal purchase o f the Diao yu Is lands and are peo ples

spo ntaneo us acts`212 There were ho wever repo rts that so me o f the demo ns tratio ns were to lerated if no t abetted by go vernment

agencies 213 The demo ns tratio ns so o n died do wn because to lerating them much lo nger wo uld have run the risk that they wo uld turninto anti-go vernment demo ns tratio ns Even the Chinese Academy o f So cial Sciences repo rted that so me demo ns trato rs who were

arres ted did no t even kno w where the Senkaku Is lands were and that anger o ver the widening wealth gap was behind their acts 214 Inco ntras t to these Chinese demo ns tratio ns and acts o f lawlessness there was hardly any public demo ns tratio n in Japan whichsho ws the relative detachment o f the Japanese fro m the dispute On 22 September `Nippo n Gambare` a right wing o rganizatio nchaired by fo rmer Air Self Defence Fo rce chief Tamo gami To shio s taged a march thro ugh parts o f To kyo which this autho rwitnessed A brief fire was s tarted at a Chinese scho o l in Ko be and two smo ke bo mbs were thro wn into the Chinese Co nsulate

General in Fukuo ka215 But such actio ns were relatively rare and small in s cale

ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND THE QUESTION OF WHO IS MORE DEPENDENT ON WHOM

Pro tes t measures o f a lo nger duratio n and as yet unpredictable co nsequences fo r the bilateral relatio nship have been China`seco no mic sanctio ns and a bo yco tt o f Japanese go o ds by the general public altho ugh the autho rities denied again any go vernmentinterventio n A co mmentary o f Xinhua half admitted ho wever go vernment interventio n when it made the unco nvincing dis tinctio nbetween `measures` and `sanctio ns` `Since Japan purchased Chinas Diao yu Is lands in September the Chinese go vernment hastaken a series o f co untermeasures in the eco no mic legal diplo matic and military fields which have helped it to wres t the initiativeto reso lve the is lands dispute despite China no t impo s ing any eco no mic sanctio ns the Japanese eco no my has been badly

hit`216 Renmin Ribao co mpared `eco no mic punishments` with a `gun` and warned that thro ugh its is land purchase Japan hadalready to uched the `trigger` In a rather heavy hint the paper po inted o ut ho w vulnerable Japan`s eco no my was because o f the

2011 earthquake and the dependence o f key eco no mic secto rs o n China217 Even mo re o fficial was Vice Minis ter o f Co mmerce Jiang

Zengwei`s warning that the is land purchase wo uld inevitably have a negative impact o n Sino -Japanese eco no mic and trade ties 218

After 11 September it so o n became very o bvio us that the heavy hand o f the Chinese go vernment was impo s ing sanctio ns andmaking life fo r Japanese bus iness mo re diff icult On 21 September it was repo rted that Chinese cus to ms autho rities were

s trengthening inspectio ns o f impo rts fro m and expo rts to Japan altho ugh the Chinese autho rities denied this 219 In the same week

repo rts appeared abo ut Japanese co mpanies experiencing delays in o btaining wo rking visas fo r their Japanese emplo yees 220 BigJapanese co mpanies with inves tments in China were experiencing ho ld-ups in gaining regulato ry appro vals fo r Merger amp

Acquis itio ns 221 In co ntras t to the interference in rare earth expo rts to Japan after the trawler incident in 2010 ho wever no such

embargo was implemented because this particular eco no mic weapo n had lo s t its effectiveness s ince then (see belo w)222

The greates t medium-term damage to Japanese eco no mic activities apart fro m the abo ve mentio ned des tructio n o f Japaneseco mmercial and indus trial s ites was caused by a partial co nsumer bo yco tt no tably the fall o f car sales in China and Chineseto urism to Japan Overall bilateral trade decreased by 39 per cent in 2012 to $329 billio n the firs t dro p s ince the co llapse o f theLehman inves tment bank in 2009 and in 2013 to $3125 billio n acco rding to Chinese figures Acco rding to Japanese figures trade in

2013 increased but declined in vo lume223

The wo rs t hit secto r was auto mo biles To yo ta so ld 840 500 vehicles in China in 2012 the firs t annual dro p s ince 2002 Nis san

experienced a 24 per cent dro p in December China sales and Ho nda saw a 19 per cent December fall224 Ho wever as o f 2014Japanese car sales in and to China have again been increas ing The to uris t indus try was also hard hit in bo th co untries Chinese

vis ito rs to Japan decreased by 44 per cent fro m September to December 2012 fro m the year befo re225 The number o f Japanese

to uris ts o n gro up to urs to China plunged by mo re than 70 per cent year-o n-year in the las t three mo nths o f 2012226 This fallco ntinued into 2013 when their number fell to 29 millio n Japanese to uris ts do wn 18 2 fro m 2012 and the 3rd s traight annual

decline227 Ho wever in March 2014 vis ito rs fro m mainland China surged 80 1 fro m the previo us March to to tal 184200 a reco rdhigh fo r the mo nth and a s teeper year-o n-year rise than vis ito rs fro m any o ther co untries and regio ns This was also helped by the

falling yen and the resumptio n o f cruise to urs with large ships which were to tally suspended in March 2012228

Ano ther mo re lo ng-term negative eco no mic effect o n the bilateral relatio nship can be gauged fro m falling Japanese FDI to Chinawhich acco rding to Chinese figures declined by 422 in the firs t five mo nths o f 2014 after having fallen by 43 to $71 billio n in

2013 acco rding to Chinese figures o r by 18 to $10 9 billio n acco rding to Japanese figures 229

China`s multiple eco no mic retributio ns cas t do ubt o n the co ntinued viability o f the earlier `Ho t Eco no mics and Co ld Po litics`dicho to my The answer to the ques tio n which co untry is mo re dependent o n the o ther o r mo re vulnerable to sanctio ns is dependento n the eco no mic indicato rs and secto rs being cho sen and is also a po litical ques tio n because the answer can be po liticallymanipulated Japan`s eco no mic diff iculties s ince the 1990s (and its dependence o n eco no mic interactio n with China to co pe withthese diff iculties ) and China pushing Japan to No 3 in wo rld GDP ranking has diminished the Chinese perceptio n o f Japan as aneco no mic po wer ho use It means that fo r China the relatio nship with Japan became less impo rtant while po litical relatio nsdeterio rated at the same time The s tro ng effect o f the Chinese embargo o n rare earth expo rts to Japan in 2010 can be viewed intwo diametrically o ppo sed ways Chinese o bservers may be inclined to put emphas is o n the s tro ng effect it had o n Japanese publico pinio n and indus trial circles co ntributing to a certain extent to the go vernment`s surrender o f the trawler captain Others maypo int o ut that the case demo ns trated the futility o f abus ing a do minant supplier po s itio n because within a sho rt time Japan`sindus try secured alternative reso urces and demand reductio n thro ugh recycling and pro duct re-engineering no t o nly pro videdeno ugh breathing space but in the end reduced China`s market po wer Still Chinese experts are co nvinced that Japan is no w mo redependent o n China than the o ther way ro und Acco rding to so me specialis ts Chinas impo rts acco unted in 2011fo r 237 per cent o fJapan`s expo rt vo lume The bilateral trade vo lume in 2011 to o k up 21 per cent o f Japanese gro ss trade vo lume o f that year while it

merely acco unted fo r 9 4 per cent o f Chinas annual gro ss trade vo lume230 There seem to be o nly few Chinese vo ices which expressco ncern o ver the negative impact o f China`s sanctio ns o n China`s eco no my itself no tably at a time o f wo rldwide eco no mic

co ntractio n231

The Chinese market is certainly to o impo rtant fo r many Japanese co mpanies to leave A survey in No vember 2012 to which mo rethan 10 000 Japanese co mpanies in China replied sho wed that fo r almo s t 30 per cent o f them the territo rial dispute had affected

their bus iness but s till mo re than half want to maintain their o peratio ns and o nly 16 per cent said that they wanted to either cut

back o r pull o ut232 Japanese co mpanies in certain secto rs are likely to beco me mo re reluctant to make inves tments in China all themo re as o ther So utheas t As ian co untries (no tably Myanmar is currently the New Fro ntier fo r Japanese bus iness ) have cheaper

labo ur co s ts 233 Ho wever Chinese co nsumers s till prefer Japanese pro ducts fo r safer fo o d drinks and daily necess ities and tho se

Japanese co mpanies were hardly affected by the bo yco tt234

A wide gap between bo th s ides` perceptio n abo ut their eco no mic dependence and vulnerability to sanctio ns is dangero us fo r themanagement o f their bilateral relatio nship particularly when o ne s ide tries to leverage its suppo sedly s tro nger po s itio n to achievevicto ry in a sens itive area like territo rial integrity While Chinese co mmentato rs and experts may be inclined to o verrate Japan`svulnerability their Japanese co unterparts have a tendency to lo o k at the is sues to o much in purely eco no mic terms neglecting theimpact o f Chinese emo tio ns and go vernment pro paganda as well as the wider public`s insufficient kno wledge abo ut the o verall

impact o f bad eco no mic relatio ns with Japan o n China`s o wn eco no my235 The Japanese perceptio n remains that China in the endneeds Japan mo re than the o ther way ro und which in view o f China`s huge pro blems and its dependence o n Japanese hightechno lo gy co mpo nents fo r its manufacturing indus try is arguably the case This Japanese perceptio n has fo s tered the co nvictio nas demo ns trated fo r example by the belief in the sus tainability o f `Ho t Eco no mics and Co ld Po litics` that despite recurring

po litical crises in the relatio nship China wo uld in the end co mpro mise as it had do ne several times in the pas t236 Yet the pro blemwith the perceptio n o f `needing Japan` is that it can be po litically manipulated particularly in an autho ritarian sys tem This gapbetween Japanese and Chinese o bservers and experts o n the is sue o f dependence can serio us ly influence the willingness o f bo th

s ides to co mpro mise237 It also challenges the liberal view that clo se eco no mic relatio ns can prevent o r at leas t so ften deeppo litical differences like territo rial co nflicts which mo reo ver are linked to eco no mic interes ts like hydro carbo n reso urces In thisco ntext it is interes ting to no te that China has recently been exchanging with Japan a number o f high-po wered bus iness delegatio ns(apart fro m exchanges with po litical parties and lo cal go vernment o fficials ) The willingness o f Japanese bus iness to take part maybe interpreted by China as an express io n o f Japan`s eco no mic dependence o n China while giving it also the o ppo rtunity to putpressure o n the Abe go vernment to make co ncess io ns and to keep links with Japan fo r the po s t-Abe era

In view o f the impo rtance o f the eco no mic relatio nship and the damage suffered by Japanese bus iness after September 2012 o newo uld have expected mo re pressure fro m the bus iness co mmunity to co me to a territo rial co mpro mise so lutio n and so impro verelatio ns Ho wever this has no t been the case and may have to do with the perceptio n gap dis cussed abo ve but also the relativelack o f influence o n the go vernment (the majo rity o f the China-relevant Japanese bus iness co mmunity co ns is ts o f small- andmedium-s ized co mpanies ) the fear that a mo re vo cal ro le wo uld get co mpanies into tro uble with the autho rities in Japan ando rChina o r the ho pe o f being able to weather the po litical s to rms either because o f alternative market o ppo rtunities o r theco mpany`s s ize

FROM POLICING TO MILITARY INVOLVEMENT

The mo s t serio us co nsequences fo r the bilateral relatio nship ndash let alo ne fo r the so lutio n o f the territo rial dispute and regio nalpeace ndash arise fro m the co ns tant intrus io ns o f Chinese o fficial vessels into the Co ntiguo us Zo ne (CZ) o r even Territo rial Waters(TW) o f the Senkaku Is lands s ince September 2012 and the gro wing invo lvement o f the armed fo rces o f bo th s ides The aim o f theChinese is o bvio us to demo ns trate that the Japanese can no lo nger claim exclus ive co ntro l o f the is lands and to fo rce To kyo toadmit the exis tence o f a territo rial dispute Apparently a task fo rce at the highes t level headed by Xi Jinping was set up in

September 2012 to achieve this go al thro ugh escalating pressure238 So far law enfo rcement actio ns by Japan in the Senkaku areahave been limited to the deplo yment o f the Japanese Co as t Guard and po lice which is no w ho wever co ns tantly challenged byChinese with patro ls by CMS and FLEC (s ince 22 July 2013 unified under the State Ocean Adminis tratio n and renamed China Co as tGuard CG) vessels asserting the same rights in the is lands` CZ and TW The Chinese s ide escalated its pressure o n Japan by firs tdeplo ying FLEC vessels in the CZ and TW o f the disputed is lands then ratcheting up their pressure with CMS vessels do ing the samefo llo wed later in December 2012 with air patro ls by CMS aircraft which led to the deplo yment o f the air fo rce o f bo th s ides inJanuary 2013

As we have seen after the September 2010 incident in No vember 2010 FLEC s tarted to regularly send its vessels to the Senkakuarea which entered fro m time to time the is lands` CZ and also in Augus t 2011 twice the TW Apparently the mo re serio usintrus io ns which are tho se into the TW were so metimes timed with specific spikes o f tens io ns such as the TW incurs io n o n 16March 2012 (the Japanese naming o f so me is lands) July 2012 (No da`s anno uncement o f purchase intentio n o n 7 July) and finallyo n 19 September when s ix vessels entered the TW s tarting a series o f mo re frequent and regular incurs io ns In December 2012

FLEC deplo yed its newes t and bigges t ship the 5800-to n FLEC vessel Yuzheng 206 a fo rmer ship o f the Chinese navy239

The entries o f the vessels o f the CMS into the is lands` CZ and TW seem meant to send an even higher degree o f warning and denialo f Japan`s co ntro l o ver the is lands On 17 September the number o f FLEC and CMS vessels in the CZ and TW had reached the reco rd

o f 17240 Thereafter the frequency o f incurs io ns into the CZ and TW increased but it decreased after March 2013 On 30 Octo berXinhua even repo rted that the CMS had `expelled a number o f Japanese vessels illegally sailing in waters aro und the Diao yu

Is lands` altho ugh it is no t clear what exactly this meant s ince the CG did no t co nfirm such an incident241 Acco rding to Xinhua NewsAgency in 2013 China sent 50 ldquopatro l miss io ns rdquo into the TW o f the disputed is lands and as o f 12 July 2014 by the autho r`s co unt

there had been 17 such Chinese ldquopatro l miss io ns rdquo in 2014 which are ldquoincurs io ns rdquo fo r the Japanese s ide242 Other needle pricks todemo ns trate China`s claims are the o ccas io nal incurs io ns o f Chinese survey ships into the Senkaku Is lands` EEZ o r the bo ardingo f Chinese fishing vessels in the EEZ Defence Minis ter Itsuno ri Ono dera in late Octo ber 2013 called these repeated incurs io ns a

threat to peace which fell in a ldquogray zo ne (between) peacetime and an emergency s ituatio nrdquo243

A new level o f depriving Japan o f the ability to claim so le effective co ntro l o ver the is lands was reached o n 13 December 2012 when

a small turbo pro p aircraft o f the CMS (Harbin Y12 type) flew o ver Uo tsurijima244 Since then regular CMS air patro ls have beenco nducted but the aircraft no rmally s tay abo ut 120 km fro m the is lands With this mo ve Chinese measures to undermine Japan`sco ntro l o ver the is lands were expanded to the air space which fo r o rganizatio nal reaso ns had immediately military implicatio nsbecause the Air Self Defense Fo rce (ASDF) is respo ns ible fo r intercepting aircraft which intrude illegally into Japan`s air space The

incident did no t happen o ut o f the blue because already in January 2012 the SOA had anno unced a plan to deplo y the Y12 in 2012245

On 24 September the SOA had also anno unced plans to deplo y dro nes by 2015 fo llo wing the success ful tes t the previo us day 246

The Chinese acts are apparently carefully planned and co o rdinated s ince the o fficials in the abo ve Kyo do repo rt also said that theairspace vio latio ns o n 13 December 2012 by an airplane o f the CMS was planned by the s taff sectio n o f the natio nal Land and SeaBo rder Defense Co mmittee which acts as a liaiso n o ffice fo r the Chinese military the State Oceanic Adminis tratio n and the fishing

bureau o f the Agriculture Minis try with the aim o f rais ing tens io ns 247

The lo w altitude flight o f the Y12 o n 13 December was particularly upsetting fo r the Japanese go vernment because it was no t pickedup by the ASDF radar (the clo ses t o ne being o n Miyako jima abo ut 200 km fro m the is lands) but ins tead by CG ships in the area Inthis case eight ASDF fighters s crambled but co uld no t detect the Y12 Interceptio n o f aircraft is by nature much mo re diff icult andcarries a certain risk o f accident as happened in 2001 when a US intelligence aircraft co llided with a Chinese intercepto r jet Witho ut

explaining the s tandard Japanese pro ceedures fo r aerial defence which so lely relies o n the ASDF the Chinese media interpreted theuse o f military aircraft by Japan as `aggress ive` and the Global Times cautio ned agains t any interceptio n warning that China might

respo nd by sending its air fo rce248 On the Japanese s ide even the centre-left Asahi Shimbun called the Y12 flight ` a highly

pro vo cative act that co uld lead to an armed co nflict between the two co untries`249 At the beginning o f January 2013 there wereapparently erro neo us repo rts that the ASDF might co ns ider firing warning sho ts (tracer bullets ) at intruding Chinese aircraft which

pro mpted further bellico se co mments in the Chinese press 250 As a co nsequence the Chinese air fo rce also became invo lved o n10 January when the Chinese Minis try o f Defence anno unced that the Peo ple`s Liberatio n Army Air Fo rce (PLAA) had sent two fighterjets agains t two ASDF F-15 intercepto rs because they were fo llo wing a Chinese military Y8 transpo rt aircraft patro lling the airspace

o f Chinese o il platfo rms in the Eas t China Sea251 The Japanese repo rted that mo re than ten Chinese aircraft including military

aircraft had appro ached the Japanese air defence identificatio n zo ne252 In a further escalatio n the Japanese s ide repo rted that o n11 June 2014 two Chinese military jets flew abno rmally clo se to two planes o f Japans Self Defence Fo rce abo ve the Eas t China Sea

an accusatio n which the Chinese s ide refuted speaking ins tead o f two incidents pro vo ked by Japanese fighters 253 Related to thisdevelo pment and further enhancing the po ss ibility o f an incident is the enhanced patro lling o f the PLAA o ver the Eas t China Seawhich caused the ASDF to increase scrambling agains t PLAA aircraft to 415 times between 1 April 2013 and 31 March 2014 (Fis cal

Year 2013) 109 times mo re than in the previo us Fis cal Year 2012254

Co ntinuing to increase the pressure o n Japan the Chinese go vernment decreed o n 23 No vember 2013 an Air Defence Identificatio nZo ne (ADIZ) which includes the airspace o ver the Senkaku Is lands and was certainly meant to reinfo rce China`s territo rial claimdespite the fact that an ADIZ has no territo rial implicatio ns in internatio nal law The threat o f military co untermeasures in the text o fthe decree (lsquoChinas armed fo rces will ado pt defens ive emergency measures to respo nd to aircraft that do no t co o perate in the

identificatio n o r refuse to fo llo w the ins tructio ns rsquo) has further heightened the po ss ibility o f a military clash255 Ho wever theJapanese s ide refuses to accept the ADIZ The Chinese mo ves have wider implicatio ns fo r peace and s tability in the regio n in o rderto pro tect the freedo m o f its military aircraft in Eas t As ian airspace and its ability to o bserve China`s military fo rces Washingto nrefused to reco gnise the zo ne co ntinued to igno re the requirements o f the ADIZ by pursuing its regular patro l f lights and criticisedits implementatio n Simultaneo us ly ho wever the Department o f State advised civilian airlines to fo llo w China`s ins tructio ns andVice Pres ident Biden advised bo th co untries o n his trip to No rtheas t As ia in December 2013 to es tablish a cris is managements tructure Since the US do es no t take a s tance o n the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands` so vereignty Washingto n seemed to igno re Japan`smain grievance abo ut the ADIZ which is China`s intentio n to further reinfo rce its so vereignty claim by extending the ADIZ o ver theis lands The mo s t far-reaching US s tatements were a reco nfirmatio n o f the applicatio n o f the security treaty to the is lands evenmentio ning the is lands by their Japanese and Chinese names and co mplaining that the Chinese actio n was an attempt to unilaterally

change the status quo in the Eas t China Sea which raised regio nal tens io n and increased the risk o f accident and miscalculatio n256

Ho wever in this way the Obama Adminis tratio n risked creating amo ng so me Japanese o bservers do ubts abo ut the Adminis tratio n`sreliability and so gave succo ur to China`s attempt to drive a wedge between the two allies Ano ther co mplicatio n is that the ChineseADIZ o verlaps that o f Ko rea and mo reo ver co vers the submerged ro ck called Ieo do in Ko rean and Suyan in Chinese which has animpact o n the no t yet demarcated EEZ bo rder between bo th co untries Interes tingly the Japanese ADIZ also co vers Ieo do but thishas never been underpinned by any Japanese EEZ claims But China kno ws ho w to play o n So uth Ko rea`s criticism o f Japan`sattitude to wards the his to ry is sue and the territo rial dispute with Japan o ver Do kto Takeshima is land Mo reo ver the As ian co untriesco ntes ting China`s claims to parts o f the So uth China Sea are co ncerned that China wo uld further co mplicate the territo rialdisputes in the area by es tablishing an ADIZ Yet the ASEAN member s tates have been very cautio us in directly criticis ing ChinaChina`s es tablishment o f the ADIZ directly affects many co untries because so many o f them have airlines flying thro ugh the zo neHo wever with the exceptio n o f Japan all o thers agred to co nfo rm with China`s reques t fo r no tif icatio n which undermines theJapanese go vernment`s po s itio n o f explicitly advis ing Japanese airlines no t to co nfo rm

With these escalating develo pments the Chinese s ide achieved its go al o f sho wing that the Japanese autho rities are no lo nger infull co ntro l o f the disputed is lands In the case o f Chinese Co as tguard vessel intrus io ns the reactio n o f the Japanese CG is limitedto shado wing the Chinese vessels to info rm them that they are vio lating Japan`s CZ o r TW and to ask them to leave whichho wever they do at their o wn dis cretio n (the time span ho vering in the CZ o r TW having beco me a further means o f Chinesepressure) fo llo wed by diplo matic pro tes ts Otherwise the CG has avo ided any phys ical co nfro ntatio n o r co ntact When co nfro ntedby the CG the Chinese vessels s imply declare (by radio o r even electro nic displays ) that they are patro lling Chinese waters and thatthe CG ships were o perating illegally in these waters This ritual has so far prevented vio lence This is in co ntras t to an exchange o fwater canno n salvo s between the CG and the Taiwanese co as t guard in the territo rial o f the Senkaku Is lands o n 25 September 2012

and again o n 24 January 2013257

The increase o f patro ls by Japan and China is caus ing o peratio nal s train fo r bo th s ides (also rais ing the risk o f miscalculatio ns o ro verreactio ns ) but this has no t reduced the willingness o f either go vernment to s cale do wn the almo s t daily demo ns tratio ns o f

`effective co ntro l` In Octo ber it was repo rted that the CG no w always maintains ten vessels agains t eight fro m China258 The 11th

regio nal headquarters respo ns ible fo r the Senkaku area is in Naha and has nine patro l ships (but o nly seven vessels o f at leas t

1000 to ns ) but no w needs additio nal ships which are dispatched fro m o ther regio nal headquarters 259 In April 2012 the CG had ato tal o f 357 patro l vessels but o nly 51 o ver 1000 to ns which are tho se mo s t needed fo r a far flung area like the Senkaku

Is lands 26 0 On 14 September 2012 Senio r Vice Minis ter o f Fisheries Iwamo to Tsukasa mentio ned plans to increase the number o f

fishery patro l vessels to ensure fishermens safety amid intens ifying territo rial disputes with China and So uth Ko rea26 1 On 26Octo ber the Minis try o f Land Infras tructure Transpo rt and To urism which heads the CG anno unced plans to increase budgetary

reques ts fo r mo re ships 26 2 The Abe go vernment plans to build mo re vessels o r advance the calendar retro fit vessels which were to

be retired and is co ns idering extending the retirement age o f the o fficers 26 3

The Chinese have fewer vessels which can be deplo yed as far as the Senkaku Is lands In additio n leave o f the sailo rs has been

res tricted and their deplo yment length at sea has increased26 4 In March 2013 the Chinese s ide anno unced clo ser co o peratio nbetween the military and vario us maritime law enfo rcement agencies as well as the merger o f fo ur maritime law enfo rcementagencies under the State Ocean Adminis tratio n (adminis tered by the Minis try o f Land and Reso urces ) ie the China MarineSurveillance the co as t guard fo rces o f the Public Security Minis try the fisheries law enfo rcement co mmand o f the Agriculture

Minis try and the maritime anti-smuggling po lice o f the General Adminis tratio n o f Cus to ms 26 5

Ano ther wo rrying develo pment is the gradual invo lvement o f the PLA navy (PLAN) and the Maritime Self Defence Fo rce (MSDF) TheJapanese MOD anno unced o n 16 Octo ber 2012 that fo r the firs t time PLAN ships were o bserved navigating in the 22-km-wide CZbetween Yo naguni and Irio mo te is lands altho ugh the minis try left o pen the po ss ibility that they did so in o rder to avo id a typho o n

Nevertheless the Gaimusho so ught explanatio ns fro m the Chinese abo ut these ship mo vements 26 6 In December 2012 fo ur PLANships sailed thro ugh the CW o f the Irio mo te-Yo naguni is lands o n the way back fro m drills in the Pacific after having go ne into the

Pacific thro ugh the mo re no rmal ro ute o f the s trait between the Okinawan main is land and Miyako jima26 7 Again there was no thingillegal abo ut it but it raised attentio n at a time o f tens io ns Ho wever there are s igns o f greater co o peratio n o f the PLAN withChinese Co as t Guard vessels as was sho wn in the s tando ff between China and the Philippines aro und the disputed Scarbo ro ugh

Sho al in the So uth China Sea and jo int exercises to o k place between the three in the Eas t China Sea in Octo ber 201226 8 The

patro lling activities o f the MSDF in the Senkaku area became kno wn when the Japanese repo rted at the end o f January 2013 that o n19 January a Chinese frigatersquos target radar had lo cked o nto an MSDF helico pter and o n 30 January ano ther frigate sailing clo se to

an MSDF des tro yer did likewise The Chinese vehemently denied it26 9 Ho wever in March this year the Kyo do news agency repo rtedthat senio r Chinese military o fficials had admitted the incident o f 29 January Even mo re wo rriso me is that the Chinese vessels

acted apparently witho ut prio r appro val fro m the fleet co mmand o r navy headquarters All this was denied by the Chinese s ide270 Itdid no t help that under Prime Minis ter No da the MSDF had been o rdered after the eruptio n o f the 2012 cris is to keep a greaterdis tance fro m PLAN ships than the hitherto 3 km in o rder avo id incidents but this po licy was reversed by the mo re hawkish Abe

adminis tratio n to the previo us 3 km dis tance271 The fire radar lo cking incident had happened at a dis tance o f 3 km

Agains t the backgro und o f greater invo lvement o f military fo rces it is particularly regrettable that a plan to build a maritime liaiso n

mechanism between their defense autho rities o n which they had agreed in June 2012 to make later that year was shelved272

Unfo rtunately it is s till Chinese practice to co ns ider Co nfidence Building Measures (CBM) no t as the firs t s tep to build co nfidencebut as a to o l to extract fro m the o ther s ide prio r co ncess io ns under the pretext o f `creating a better atmo sphere` fo r dis cuss ingCBM The o utbreak o f the September 2012 cris is was therefo re a co nvenient pretext fo r the Chinese to cancel the pro ject Thelates t co nfirmatio n was in March 2013 when General Yin Zhuo explained that there co uld be no military trus t if the po litical and

diplo matic relatio nship is bad273 Since the target radar lo ck-o n incidents the Japanese go vernment is publicly calling fo rresumptio n o f nego tiatio ns fo r the maritime liaiso n mechanism but the Chinese will certainly want to extract so me co ncess io nsbefo re even co ns idering a po s itive respo nse

Ho wever the co ns tant co nfro ntatio n between the po licing and military fo rces o f bo th s ides co uld eas ily lead to a military clasheither as a result o f an unfo reseen civilian o r military incident miscalculatio n o r malicio us intentio n at a lo wer level o f co mmandTwo recent examples o f unfo reseen civilian incidents co uld have escalated One is the attempted landing o n o ne o f the disputedis lands by a Chinese pro tes ter with a ballo o n in January 2014 This incident was peacefully reso lved because Japan did no t arres t theballo o nis t In this case the firs t repo rt o n the crash-landing in the territo rial waters o f Uo tsurijima came fro m the Taiwanese co as tguard which info rmed the Japanese co as t guard fo llo wed by the hand-o ver o f the ballo o nis t to the PRC autho rities o uts ide o f

Japan`s territo rial waters 274 The o ther incident was the s inking o f a Chinese fishing bo at ldquoto the no rth o f the Diao yu Is landsrdquo and

the mo ve o f two Chinese naval () vessels to rescue the crew275 This autho r co uld no t find o ut ho w clo se the fishing bo at came tothe is lands and apparently there has no t been any further repo rting abo ut the incident

The previo us ly mentio ned radar-targeting incidents and these two civilian incidents have no t led to an escalatio n but there is noguarantee fo r the future Shi Yinho ng a pro fesso r at Renmin Univers ity predicts that the territo rial co nflicts in the ECS So uth ChinaSea and alo ng the Sino -Indian bo rder will intens ify because o f po pular natio nalism dynamics within the armed fo rces and o f co urse

also o ur to p leaders perso nal beliefs and s trategic perso nalities 276 Hugh White argues that a war (which co uld lead to a nuclearexchange between China and the US) co uld also begin because the Chinese leadership may co ns ider that s tarting ho s tilities no wrather than later wo uld be mo re beneficial to either tes t US reso lve to defend Japan (which the Chinese leadership do ubts ) anddetermine the is sue o f Chinese supremacy in the As ian regio n which he co ns iders to be the real is sue rather than the is lands

themselves 277

IS THERE A WAY FORWARD

The current co nfro ntatio n is no t o nly co ntinuing but even escalating and do mes tic develo pments in bo th co untries are no t creatingan atmo sphere mo re co nducive to better management o f the cris is let alo ne finding a so lutio n Inactio n runs the risk o f a furtherescalatio n o r even a military clash while po s itive o ptio ns are beco ming fewer Meanwhile bo th co untries suffer fro m the eco no micfall-o ut and heightened tens io ns while the integratio n o f a ris ing China into a new s trategic enviro nment in As ia will beco me evenmo re fraught cas ting a shado w o n Japan`s clo se relatio nship with the US

The 2010 incident ended quickly with Japan`s release o f the captain One reaso n fo r this is certainly the fact that China`s demand in2010 was relatively clear and achievable (release o f the captain) if painful fo r Japan at a time o f a weak and inexperiencedgo vernment This time in September 2012 the cris is firs t hit a go vernment which reacted intrans igently because o f its previo usdefeat and o ther unfavo urable do mes tic circumstances and was then replaced by the mo re hawkish Abe go vernment The Abecabinet`s attitude to wards the pas t as exemplif ied by vario us s tatements by cabinet members and peo ple clo se to it the attempt torevise the Ko no s tatement reco gniz ing the fo rced war pro s titutio n (the military co mfo rt wo men) and Abe`s Yasukuni Shrine vis itall served China`s anti-Japan pro paganda wo rsened Japan-Ko rea relatio ns which China is cleverly explo iting and even angered theUS adminis tratio n Abe is seen as utiliz ing the tens io ns with China to win do mes tic and internatio nal suppo rt fo r Japan to have aldquono rmalrdquo natio nal defence po s ture The latter is welco me by the US adminis tratio n because it wo uld help with the US As ianrealignment and suppo rt its China po licy At the same time China`s actio ns cas t an o mino us shado w o n its intentio ns in the So uthChina Sea and Abe and mo re impo rtantly the US is suppo rting the claimants there agains t China

Under these bilateral multilateral and regio nal circumstances wo uld China be satis fied with go ing back to the `unders tanding abo utsetting as ide the dispute` in co njunctio n with Japan`s reco gnitio n o f the exis tence o f a territo rial dispute o r wo uld it demand areversal o f the purchase o f the three is lands Wo uld it demand the end o f Japanese CG patro ls aro und the is lands China`ss tandard demand no w that Japan `co rrect its mis takes` is rather ambiguo us because it co uld be interpreted as go ing back to theshelving unders tanding and the reco gnitio n o f the exis tence o f a dispute o r demanding a reversal o f the go vernment`s purchase o f

the is lands 278 The latter wo uld s imply be impo ss ible in legal and practical terms and o ne can o nly ho pe that the ambiguity is o nlyaimed at rais ing China`s nego tiatio n po s itio n ando r leaving eno ugh wiggle ro o m fo r nego tiatio ns which wo uld satis fy all Chineses takeho lders` interes ts

It seems that it is already to o late fo r go ing back to the shelving agreement o f 19721978 which wo uld imply that the two s ides canso meho w go back to the status quo o f the 1970s This as we have seen has been superseded by deeds and wo rds o n bo th s ides The Chinese have no w no t o nly publicly declared that the shelving agreement was lsquobro kenrsquo by Japan but after the firs t Y12 patro l o n13 December 2012 co mmented that ldquoThe s ituatio n has changed It has beco me no rmal fo r Chinas marine surveillance vessels to

enter the 12-nautical-mile zo ne Japans actual co ntro l o ver the is lands has go nerdquo279

The bilateral relatio nship has deterio rated to the extent that at leas t shelving the co nflicting so vereignty claims without o fficiallyadmitting that there is a territo rial dispute is no lo nger an o ptio n acceptable to China because it feels Japan has abused theshelving co nsensus thro ugh a series o f adminis trative measures with the final s traw having been the central go vernmentrsquos purchaseo f three is lands When s tudying the vario us Chinese o fficial s tatements and news repo rts after the 2012 cris is had fully erupted inSeptember it beco mes clear that until Octo ber 2012 the Chinese s till raised the demand that Japan sho uld go back to the previo uslsquounders tandingrsquo o r lsquoco nsensus rsquo but this demand was no t made o ften thereafter It reappeared in remarks by Wang Jiarui the head o fthe Co mmunis t partys Internatio nal Department when meeting Yamaguchi Natsuo the leader o f the junio r co alitio n partner

Ko meito in January 201328 0 Previo us ly a co mment o n the Xinhua internet s ite o n 29 Octo ber said that ldquoThe lsquopurchasersquo sho wed thatthe Japanese go vernment has who lly abando ned the attitude o f laying as ide disputes and has fundamentally changed the

s ituatio nrdquo28 1 On 30 Octo ber the CMOFA spo kesperso n declared that lsquoJapans illegal purchase o f the Diao yu Is lands bro ke the

impo rtant co nsensus The Japanese s ide sho uld no t have any mo re illus io n o f o ccupying the Diao yu Is lands What the Japaneses ide sho uld do is to face up to the reality admit the so vereignty dispute co rrect mis takes and co me back to the track o f a

nego tiated settlement`28 2 The lates t o fficial pro po sal to shelve the is lands is sue was made by the fo rmer fo reign minis ter Tang

Jiaxuan o n 16 July 201428 3

The reco gnitio n o f a territo rial pro blem wo uld be relatively easy fo r Japanese public o pinio n (and even mo re so fo r Japanrsquos friendsand allies ) to accept because they wo uld no t see the need fo r any kind o f diplo matic o r legal so phis try fo r what is o bvio us ly aterrito rial co nflict whatever the legitimacy o f the Chinese claim might be given also the fact that the current Japanese po s itio nco mes do wn to refus ing to even dis cuss whatever settlement might be po ss ible Acco rding to a survey co nducted by Genro nto gether with Zho ngguo Ribao she in June 2012 627 per cent o f Japanese agreed that there exis ts a territo rial pro blem dispute

(176 disagreed) co mpared with 822 o f the Chinese (139 disagreed)28 4 Ho wever co nsecutive Japanese cabinets haverefused to reco gnise the exis tence o f a territo rial dispute which is o ften the default po s itio n o f a go vernment in actual co ntro l o f adisputed territo ry (fo r example the Ko rean go vernmentrsquos po s itio n o n Do kto Takeshima) This po s itio n has been reinfo rced by theexplicit Japanese denial s ince the 1990s o f a shelving agreement which wo uld have been an implicit admiss io n that there is adispute To circumvent the risk o f being perceived as admitting the exis tence o f a territo rial pro blem the deputy prime minis ter o fthe previo us No da go vernment Okada Katsuya was repo rted to have mentio ned in a speech in Octo ber 2012 that there was no

territo rial dispute but as a matter o f fact a debate exis ted28 5 Ho wever this co mpro mise so lutio n was never co nfirmed by the No dago vernment and did no t beco me po licy It is even less likely to be acceptable to the new Abe go vernment Even amo ng influentialo pinio n makers there is hardly any suppo rt fo r admitting the exis tence o f a territo rial co nflict o r o f a shelving agreement Even mo reco nciliato ry s tatements o n this subject are rather vague Maehara Seiji o f the Demo cratic Party declared in a co nference at QinghuaUnivers ity in Beijing in September 2013 that the Japanese go vernment sho uld add (to its o wn po s itio n) that China has a differentview (Senkakusho to wo meguru Niho n seifu no tachiba ni tsuite lsquoChugo ku ga chigau kangaekata wo mo tte iru to iuko to wo ichigen

tsukekuwaerubeki darsquo) At the same time he emphas ised ho wever that there was no territo rial dispute28 6 Japan Bus inessFederatio n Chairman Yo nekura Hiro masa mentio ned in September 2012 in an NHK interview that the go vernment sho uld be mo re

flexible s ince o therwise its s tance co uld be taken to mean that Japan has no intentio n o f so lving the dispute28 7 Miyamo to Yuji thefo rmer Japanese ambassado r to China is quo ted as saying that lsquoThe go vernment do es no t need to alter its bas ic po s itio n but in

reality a co nflict do es exis t o ver the Senkaku is les rsquo 28 8 This is also the s tance which the previo us Japanese ambassado r Niwa

Uichiro takes in an article after his return to Japan28 9

Co ncerning co nflict reso lutio n it is interes ting to no te that when asked abo ut the mo dern s ignificance o f the 1978 Japan-ChinaPeace and Friendship Treaty 68 4 o f the po lled Japanese agreed with Art 12 (lsquoThe two parties shall settle all disputes by peacefulmeans and shall refrain fro m the use o r threat o f fo rcersquo) but o nly 525 o f the Chinese agreed Mo reo ver 58 1 o f the Chinese

favo ur China s trengthening its co ntro l o ver the area29 0

If therefo re a new ldquoimplicit unders tandingrdquo abo ut shelving the dispute is achievable it wo uld have to be based o n learning fro m thefailures o f the 19721978 shelving ie it wo uld be necessary to achieve a mutual unders tanding o f what the s tatus quo is whatwo uld undermine the s tatus quo and what has to be do ne to mo ve fro m co nflict management to so lutio n Quite clearly such a newunders tanding wo uld be less favo urable to Japan`s current s tance o n the dispute

FROM CONFLICT MANAGEMENT TO ADDRESSING THE SOVEREIGNTY ISSUE

Any mo ve fo rward will certainly require decis ive leadership o n bo th s ides be it to take the initiative o r to respo nd po s itively to theinitiative o f s tarting the pro cess to wards reso lutio n In view o f the co mplex backgro und o f the external and internal dynamics it iso bvio us that address ing the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands dispute requires a s tep-by-s tep appro ach The ultimate is sue to address is theso vereignty is sue and territo rial disputes are generally viewed as zero sum in nature given their clo se link to co re securityinteres ts Even tho se who reco gnize the impo rtance o f transcending such lo gic in favo ur o f co ndo minium o r shared so vereigntygenerally ho ld that the is sue can o nly be addressed at the las t s tage o f any nego tiated pro cess if at all

Two impo rtant is sues have to be co ns idered at the beginning to what extent have the vario us s tages o f the nego tiating pro cess tobe agreed befo rehand (lsquoro ad maprsquo) o r even the final o utco me whether a viable co ndo minium o r o nly shelving the is sues and co uldthe ro le o f a third party mediato r be helpfulacceptable In view o f the po litical diff iculties o n bo th s ides the s tart o f thenego tiatio n pro cess wo uld be endangered if there is no t sufficient ro o m fo r ambiguity and interpretatio n abo ut the vario us s tages altho ugh the general aim o f tens io n reductio n and suspens io n o f the so vereignty is sue mus t be clearly agreed

A third party mediato r is pro bably no t acceptable to the Chinese s ide The third party mo s t o ften mentio ned is the Internatio nalCo urt o f Jus tice (ICJ) o r any kind o f internatio nal arbitratio n Ho wever this seems unlikely in view o f China`s preference fo rbilateral nego tiatio ns and its refusal to accept judicial settlement by the ICJ o r any internatio nal arbitratio n except in no n-po litical

areas such as trade29 1 The Japanese go vernment wo uld be willing to accept the jurisdictio n o f the ICJ but o nly if China brings the

case to the Co urt les t it be perceived as ackno wledging the exis tence o f a territo rial dispute29 2 But there are also po litical andpro cedural arguments agains t the reco urse to the ICJ China`s legal argumentatio n is co mparatively weak and s ince a negativejudgement co uld have implicatio ns fo r China`s legal claim to mo s t o f the So uth China Sea there is even less o f a chance o f Chinamaking an exceptio n fo r the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands dispute In view o f the entrenched po s itio ns o f bo th s ides and the risk o f a`winner takes all` o utco me o f internatio nal litigatio n bo th go vernments wo uld face co ns iderable do mes tic res is tance in case o f anegative o utco me In view o f the urgency o f the dispute and the lo ng time it takes fo r a judgement there wo uld also be the risk o fdo mes tic fo rces trying to pre-empt a negative result

In view o f the security is sues invo lved (let alo ne the American his to rical `debt` as a result o f Washingto n`s ambiguity related toWashingto n`s ending o f the adminis tratio n o f Okinawa in 1972) an American mediatio n co uld be seen as natural and even inAmerican interes ts Such an American ro le ho wever is extremely unlikely as it wo uld be seen by China as unduly advantageo us toJapan Ho wever at so me po int during the Japan-China nego tiatio n pro cess the US might ass is t (o r even be reques ted) by agreeingto certain Co nfidence and Security Building Measures (CSBM) in the area aro und the is lands

The firs t s tage wo uld have to co ns is t o f measures which reduce the risk o f a military clash but in a way which prevents theperceptio n that o ne s ide is giving in to co ercio n This s tage wo uld be a gradual phas ing o ut o f intrus io ns by Chinese o fficial vesselsand aircraft into the territo rial waters co ntiguo us zo ne and airspace o f the is lands which is recipro cated by Japanrsquos reducing in thesame way its co as tguard patro ls in the two zo nes as well as its s crambling activities in the is lands` airspace There were repo rts in

June 2013 that China called o n Japan to agree to a 12-nautical-mile no -entry zo ne aro und the is lands 29 3 Japan rejected this co urse

Ano ther measure wo uld be to increase the dis tance at which vessels o f bo th maritime fo rces o bserve each o ther Such s teps sho uldultimately be o fficialised by a gradually expanding series o f CSBMs and a bilateral liaiso n mechanism This co uld also include ademilitarisatio n agreement as an incentive fo r the Chinese s ide It wo uld be vital that the s teps at this s tage be incremental that nos tep is explo ited in a o ne-s ided way and that they are co ns idered irrevers ible At the same time bo th s ides have to prevent peo plefro m appro aching the is lands s ince this wo uld be seen as a pro vo catio n by the o ther s ide This latter task is technically no t easy

because o f the co ntro vers ial character o f any co mpro mise with certain no n-s tate acto rs in Japan China Ho ng Ko ng and Taiwan The(failed) landing o f a Chinese ho t ballo o n o n o ne o f the is lands in January 2014 demo ns trated at the same time the technical

diff iculty o f a no -entry po licy as well as the po ss ibility o f a success ful co o peratio n o f the co as tguards o f all three co untries 29 4

At this firs t s tage o r leading to the next there will have to be a Japanese go vernment s tatement to the effect that there is alsquopro blemrsquo related to the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands This can be wo rded in such a way that the sens itive express io n `territo rialpro blem` (which is s trenuo us ly denied by the go vernment) is avo ided and it can be supplemented by a sentence that such as tatement in no way prejudices the legal po s itio n o f the go vernment Such a qualifying s tatement is fo r example included in the

Japan-China agreement fo r prio r no tif icatio n o f research vessels fro m bo th co untries in the Eas t China Sea in 200029 5 A s imilarqualif icatio n is part o f the 1997 Japan-China Fisheries Agreement In the jo int co mmuniqueacute o f 1972 which no rmalised diplo maticrelatio ns between Japan and China diplo matic wo rding also managed to bridge the huge gap between their s tances o n Taiwan whichthe PRC co ns iders an lsquoinalienable partrsquo o f its territo ry Japan co ns iders the so vereignty is sue s till unreso lved because the 1951 SanFrancis co Peace Treaty Art 2 (b) o nly s tipulated that lsquoJapan reno unces all right title and claim to Fo rmo sa and the Pescado res rsquowitho ut clarifying the recipient o f the territo ry The co mpro mise in 1972 was reached with the sentence that Japan lsquofully unders tandsand respects this s tand o f the Go vernment o f the Peo ples Republic o f China and it f irmly maintains its s tand under Article 8 o f thePo tsdam Pro clamatio nrsquo

POSSIBLE APPROACHES TO THE SOVEREIGNTY ISSUE

The mo s t diff icult pro blem is the so vereignty is sue which go es to the co re o f any co untry`s security interes ts It is no t imaginablethat either s ide will reno unce its claim to the is lands Sides tepping o r shelving the is sue is o nly useful if the lesso ns fro m the 1972and 1978 attempts as o utlined abo ve can be learned and applied but there is s till the fundamental pro blem with the implicitassumptio n that the quality o f the bilateral relatio nship will always be as go o d as when the s ides tepping agreement was achievedand can be maintained in perpetuity o r until the so vereignty is sue can be addressed But in o rder to so lve the so vereignty is sue aneven better relatio nship has to be created This better relatio nship co uld be bro ught abo ut by the s teps explained abo ve and furtherbelo w

An impo rtant co nditio n fo r any las ting territo rial co mpro mise wo uld be reducing the value o f the is lands fo r bo th co untries whichcan be achieved by o ne o f the measures pro po sed fo r s tage 1 ie reso lutely preventing anyo ne fro m appro aching the territo ries(including to tal demilitarizatio n) which in themselves are eco no mically wo rthless and are uninhabited The main po int is to preventany go vernmental act which co uld be interpreted as being part o f the `so vereignty game` The mo s t diff icult part here is to preventany act by no n-go vernmental acto rs This wo uld have to include the territo rial waters and the explo itatio n there in o f any kind o freso urces including fishing Scientif ic interes ts in the is lands co uld be served by bilateral surveys witho ut any po litical co nno tatio ns

There have been pro po sals to declare the is lands an Internatio nal Nature and Wildlife Preserve29 6 Such a preserve wo uld have to beadminis tered either bilaterally o r by a relevant internatio nal o rganisatio n and as such co uld serve as a co nfidence-building measure

The abo ve s teps wo uld then allo w the two s ides to deal with the co ns iderable eco no mic interes ts in fishing and the explo itatio n o fhydro carbo n reso urces and o ther seabed reso urces aro und the is lands ie in the Exclus ive Eco no mic Zo ne ando r the ExtendedCo ntinental Shelf Once the is lands` land area and the territo rial waters have been put as ide it wo uld be eas ier to co me to ano verall agreement o n the delimitatio n o f the EEZ bo rder (with the exceptio n o f the no rthern part which wo uld require a trilateralagreement between China Japan and Ko rea) which wo uld include the delimitatio n o f these surro unding waters It wo uld facilitate aco mpro mise if bo th s ides agree that the is lands do no t merit their o wn EEZ This might be diff icult fo r Japan which claims an EEZ fo rOkino to rishima refuted by China s ince it co ns iders the reef no t to be an is land acco rding to Art 121 o f UNCLOS

A co mpro mise o n the so vereignty is sue co uld o nly be the o utco me ndash if at all ndash o f a success ful pro cess o f the abo ve o r co mparables teps In o rder to avo id a `winner take all` s ituatio n the co mpro mise wo uld have to invo lve a sharing arrangement His to ry o ffers

quite a number o f internatio nal precedents o f shared so vereignty referred to as co ndo minium in internatio nal law29 7 One case withso me s imilarities to the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands is a small is land (3000 sq m) in the river separating France and Spain kno wn asPheasant Is land o r Co nference Is land which even to day s till changes every s ix mo nths between France and Spain as o wner Like theSenkakuDiao yu Is lands the is land has no eco no mic value anymo re and the is land is o ff limits It was the lo catio n o f the s igning o f

the Treaty o f the Pyrenees in 1659 which ended a lo ng war 29 8 Mo s t o ther examples o f jo int so vereignty co ncern territo ries with apo pulatio n which makes co o peratio n much mo re diff icult Other his to rical precedents o f sharing so vereignty are the es tablishmento f ldquoneutral zo nesrdquo Acco rdingly the is lands and po ss ibly a sea area aro und the is lands co uld be declared a neutral zo ne like the o nebetween Saudi Arabia and Kuwait (1922-1965) On July 7 1965 the two go vernments s igned an agreement (which to o k effect o nJuly 25 1966) to partitio n the Neutral Zo ne adjo ining their respective territo ries A demarcatio n agreement dividing the NeutralZo ne was s igned o n December 17 1967

Particularly relevant here is that Saudi Arabia as well as Kuwait explo ited the o il reso urces under a jo int o perating agreement29 9

Co nclus io ns

The actio n-reactio n pattern o f the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands dispute is accelerating and the initiative seems to be mo re o ften thanno t with the Chinese s ide while the Japanese s ide is in a defens ive po s itio n The danger o f a military co nfro ntatio n is lo o mingincreas ingly larger in what co uld be called a lsquochicken gamersquo At the same time the internal and external dynamics are undermining theenviro nment which is required fo r a peaceful so lutio n as well as fo r maintaining the number o f po s itive o ptio ns While the Japanesego vernment refuses to ackno wledge the very exis tence o f a territo rial dispute the Chinese go vernment is no w (July 2014) evenrefus ing to have a dialo gue with Japan`s current prime minis ter It is po ss ible that the Chinese s ide again wants to wait with anymo ve fo rward until the Japanese prime minis ter has changed as Beijing did with Prime Minis ter Sato Eisaku o r with Prime Minis terKo izumi Junichiro But waiting fo r an impro vement o f the bilateral atmo sphere as the Chinese s ide likes to s tress is a very riskyo ptio n and such an impro vement may anyway be a very sho rt windo w o f o ppo rtunity if lo o king at the ups and do wns o f the po s t-1949 his to ry o f the bilateral relatio nship

To s tart a s tep-by-s tep pro cess o f address ing the territo rial is sue s tro ng leadership is required which unders tands the widerinteres ts o f a functio ning Japanese-Chinese relatio nship Japan s imply asking China fo r a summit meeting is no t very sens ible ifthere is no willingness to engage in subs tantive dis cuss io ns and wo uld be very risky fo r China`s to p leader if the Japanese primeminis ter then vis its the Yasukuni Shrine The his to ry is sue sho uld no lo nger be a Chinese lever fo r pressuris ing Japan but the latterhas to abs tain fro m actio ns which are seen as pro vo cative no t o nly by China but also by Ko rea the US and many o thers There hasto be a co mmitted leadership o n bo th s ides which s tarts with a ro ugh ro ad map and tens io n-reducing s teps such as CSBMs en ro uteto agreeing o n a fo rmula which allo ws the parties to o btain eco no mic as well as security gains while reducing tens io ns

Reinhard Drifte is Emeritus Professor of Japanese Politics University of Newcastle UK and Visiting Professor at various Japanese Universities andPau University (France) He is the author of Japanrsquos Foreign Policy for the Twenty First Century His home page is here

Reco mmended citatio n Reinhard Drifte The Japan-China Confrontation Over the SenkakuDiaoyu Islands--Between shelving and dispute

their bus iness but s till mo re than half want to maintain their o peratio ns and o nly 16 per cent said that they wanted to either cut

back o r pull o ut232 Japanese co mpanies in certain secto rs are likely to beco me mo re reluctant to make inves tments in China all themo re as o ther So utheas t As ian co untries (no tably Myanmar is currently the New Fro ntier fo r Japanese bus iness ) have cheaper

labo ur co s ts 233 Ho wever Chinese co nsumers s till prefer Japanese pro ducts fo r safer fo o d drinks and daily necess ities and tho se

Japanese co mpanies were hardly affected by the bo yco tt234

A wide gap between bo th s ides` perceptio n abo ut their eco no mic dependence and vulnerability to sanctio ns is dangero us fo r themanagement o f their bilateral relatio nship particularly when o ne s ide tries to leverage its suppo sedly s tro nger po s itio n to achievevicto ry in a sens itive area like territo rial integrity While Chinese co mmentato rs and experts may be inclined to o verrate Japan`svulnerability their Japanese co unterparts have a tendency to lo o k at the is sues to o much in purely eco no mic terms neglecting theimpact o f Chinese emo tio ns and go vernment pro paganda as well as the wider public`s insufficient kno wledge abo ut the o verall

impact o f bad eco no mic relatio ns with Japan o n China`s o wn eco no my235 The Japanese perceptio n remains that China in the endneeds Japan mo re than the o ther way ro und which in view o f China`s huge pro blems and its dependence o n Japanese hightechno lo gy co mpo nents fo r its manufacturing indus try is arguably the case This Japanese perceptio n has fo s tered the co nvictio nas demo ns trated fo r example by the belief in the sus tainability o f `Ho t Eco no mics and Co ld Po litics` that despite recurring

po litical crises in the relatio nship China wo uld in the end co mpro mise as it had do ne several times in the pas t236 Yet the pro blemwith the perceptio n o f `needing Japan` is that it can be po litically manipulated particularly in an autho ritarian sys tem This gapbetween Japanese and Chinese o bservers and experts o n the is sue o f dependence can serio us ly influence the willingness o f bo th

s ides to co mpro mise237 It also challenges the liberal view that clo se eco no mic relatio ns can prevent o r at leas t so ften deeppo litical differences like territo rial co nflicts which mo reo ver are linked to eco no mic interes ts like hydro carbo n reso urces In thisco ntext it is interes ting to no te that China has recently been exchanging with Japan a number o f high-po wered bus iness delegatio ns(apart fro m exchanges with po litical parties and lo cal go vernment o fficials ) The willingness o f Japanese bus iness to take part maybe interpreted by China as an express io n o f Japan`s eco no mic dependence o n China while giving it also the o ppo rtunity to putpressure o n the Abe go vernment to make co ncess io ns and to keep links with Japan fo r the po s t-Abe era

In view o f the impo rtance o f the eco no mic relatio nship and the damage suffered by Japanese bus iness after September 2012 o newo uld have expected mo re pressure fro m the bus iness co mmunity to co me to a territo rial co mpro mise so lutio n and so impro verelatio ns Ho wever this has no t been the case and may have to do with the perceptio n gap dis cussed abo ve but also the relativelack o f influence o n the go vernment (the majo rity o f the China-relevant Japanese bus iness co mmunity co ns is ts o f small- andmedium-s ized co mpanies ) the fear that a mo re vo cal ro le wo uld get co mpanies into tro uble with the autho rities in Japan ando rChina o r the ho pe o f being able to weather the po litical s to rms either because o f alternative market o ppo rtunities o r theco mpany`s s ize

FROM POLICING TO MILITARY INVOLVEMENT

The mo s t serio us co nsequences fo r the bilateral relatio nship ndash let alo ne fo r the so lutio n o f the territo rial dispute and regio nalpeace ndash arise fro m the co ns tant intrus io ns o f Chinese o fficial vessels into the Co ntiguo us Zo ne (CZ) o r even Territo rial Waters(TW) o f the Senkaku Is lands s ince September 2012 and the gro wing invo lvement o f the armed fo rces o f bo th s ides The aim o f theChinese is o bvio us to demo ns trate that the Japanese can no lo nger claim exclus ive co ntro l o f the is lands and to fo rce To kyo toadmit the exis tence o f a territo rial dispute Apparently a task fo rce at the highes t level headed by Xi Jinping was set up in

September 2012 to achieve this go al thro ugh escalating pressure238 So far law enfo rcement actio ns by Japan in the Senkaku areahave been limited to the deplo yment o f the Japanese Co as t Guard and po lice which is no w ho wever co ns tantly challenged byChinese with patro ls by CMS and FLEC (s ince 22 July 2013 unified under the State Ocean Adminis tratio n and renamed China Co as tGuard CG) vessels asserting the same rights in the is lands` CZ and TW The Chinese s ide escalated its pressure o n Japan by firs tdeplo ying FLEC vessels in the CZ and TW o f the disputed is lands then ratcheting up their pressure with CMS vessels do ing the samefo llo wed later in December 2012 with air patro ls by CMS aircraft which led to the deplo yment o f the air fo rce o f bo th s ides inJanuary 2013

As we have seen after the September 2010 incident in No vember 2010 FLEC s tarted to regularly send its vessels to the Senkakuarea which entered fro m time to time the is lands` CZ and also in Augus t 2011 twice the TW Apparently the mo re serio usintrus io ns which are tho se into the TW were so metimes timed with specific spikes o f tens io ns such as the TW incurs io n o n 16March 2012 (the Japanese naming o f so me is lands) July 2012 (No da`s anno uncement o f purchase intentio n o n 7 July) and finallyo n 19 September when s ix vessels entered the TW s tarting a series o f mo re frequent and regular incurs io ns In December 2012

FLEC deplo yed its newes t and bigges t ship the 5800-to n FLEC vessel Yuzheng 206 a fo rmer ship o f the Chinese navy239

The entries o f the vessels o f the CMS into the is lands` CZ and TW seem meant to send an even higher degree o f warning and denialo f Japan`s co ntro l o ver the is lands On 17 September the number o f FLEC and CMS vessels in the CZ and TW had reached the reco rd

o f 17240 Thereafter the frequency o f incurs io ns into the CZ and TW increased but it decreased after March 2013 On 30 Octo berXinhua even repo rted that the CMS had `expelled a number o f Japanese vessels illegally sailing in waters aro und the Diao yu

Is lands` altho ugh it is no t clear what exactly this meant s ince the CG did no t co nfirm such an incident241 Acco rding to Xinhua NewsAgency in 2013 China sent 50 ldquopatro l miss io ns rdquo into the TW o f the disputed is lands and as o f 12 July 2014 by the autho r`s co unt

there had been 17 such Chinese ldquopatro l miss io ns rdquo in 2014 which are ldquoincurs io ns rdquo fo r the Japanese s ide242 Other needle pricks todemo ns trate China`s claims are the o ccas io nal incurs io ns o f Chinese survey ships into the Senkaku Is lands` EEZ o r the bo ardingo f Chinese fishing vessels in the EEZ Defence Minis ter Itsuno ri Ono dera in late Octo ber 2013 called these repeated incurs io ns a

threat to peace which fell in a ldquogray zo ne (between) peacetime and an emergency s ituatio nrdquo243

A new level o f depriving Japan o f the ability to claim so le effective co ntro l o ver the is lands was reached o n 13 December 2012 when

a small turbo pro p aircraft o f the CMS (Harbin Y12 type) flew o ver Uo tsurijima244 Since then regular CMS air patro ls have beenco nducted but the aircraft no rmally s tay abo ut 120 km fro m the is lands With this mo ve Chinese measures to undermine Japan`sco ntro l o ver the is lands were expanded to the air space which fo r o rganizatio nal reaso ns had immediately military implicatio nsbecause the Air Self Defense Fo rce (ASDF) is respo ns ible fo r intercepting aircraft which intrude illegally into Japan`s air space The

incident did no t happen o ut o f the blue because already in January 2012 the SOA had anno unced a plan to deplo y the Y12 in 2012245

On 24 September the SOA had also anno unced plans to deplo y dro nes by 2015 fo llo wing the success ful tes t the previo us day 246

The Chinese acts are apparently carefully planned and co o rdinated s ince the o fficials in the abo ve Kyo do repo rt also said that theairspace vio latio ns o n 13 December 2012 by an airplane o f the CMS was planned by the s taff sectio n o f the natio nal Land and SeaBo rder Defense Co mmittee which acts as a liaiso n o ffice fo r the Chinese military the State Oceanic Adminis tratio n and the fishing

bureau o f the Agriculture Minis try with the aim o f rais ing tens io ns 247

The lo w altitude flight o f the Y12 o n 13 December was particularly upsetting fo r the Japanese go vernment because it was no t pickedup by the ASDF radar (the clo ses t o ne being o n Miyako jima abo ut 200 km fro m the is lands) but ins tead by CG ships in the area Inthis case eight ASDF fighters s crambled but co uld no t detect the Y12 Interceptio n o f aircraft is by nature much mo re diff icult andcarries a certain risk o f accident as happened in 2001 when a US intelligence aircraft co llided with a Chinese intercepto r jet Witho ut

explaining the s tandard Japanese pro ceedures fo r aerial defence which so lely relies o n the ASDF the Chinese media interpreted theuse o f military aircraft by Japan as `aggress ive` and the Global Times cautio ned agains t any interceptio n warning that China might

respo nd by sending its air fo rce248 On the Japanese s ide even the centre-left Asahi Shimbun called the Y12 flight ` a highly

pro vo cative act that co uld lead to an armed co nflict between the two co untries`249 At the beginning o f January 2013 there wereapparently erro neo us repo rts that the ASDF might co ns ider firing warning sho ts (tracer bullets ) at intruding Chinese aircraft which

pro mpted further bellico se co mments in the Chinese press 250 As a co nsequence the Chinese air fo rce also became invo lved o n10 January when the Chinese Minis try o f Defence anno unced that the Peo ple`s Liberatio n Army Air Fo rce (PLAA) had sent two fighterjets agains t two ASDF F-15 intercepto rs because they were fo llo wing a Chinese military Y8 transpo rt aircraft patro lling the airspace

o f Chinese o il platfo rms in the Eas t China Sea251 The Japanese repo rted that mo re than ten Chinese aircraft including military

aircraft had appro ached the Japanese air defence identificatio n zo ne252 In a further escalatio n the Japanese s ide repo rted that o n11 June 2014 two Chinese military jets flew abno rmally clo se to two planes o f Japans Self Defence Fo rce abo ve the Eas t China Sea

an accusatio n which the Chinese s ide refuted speaking ins tead o f two incidents pro vo ked by Japanese fighters 253 Related to thisdevelo pment and further enhancing the po ss ibility o f an incident is the enhanced patro lling o f the PLAA o ver the Eas t China Seawhich caused the ASDF to increase scrambling agains t PLAA aircraft to 415 times between 1 April 2013 and 31 March 2014 (Fis cal

Year 2013) 109 times mo re than in the previo us Fis cal Year 2012254

Co ntinuing to increase the pressure o n Japan the Chinese go vernment decreed o n 23 No vember 2013 an Air Defence Identificatio nZo ne (ADIZ) which includes the airspace o ver the Senkaku Is lands and was certainly meant to reinfo rce China`s territo rial claimdespite the fact that an ADIZ has no territo rial implicatio ns in internatio nal law The threat o f military co untermeasures in the text o fthe decree (lsquoChinas armed fo rces will ado pt defens ive emergency measures to respo nd to aircraft that do no t co o perate in the

identificatio n o r refuse to fo llo w the ins tructio ns rsquo) has further heightened the po ss ibility o f a military clash255 Ho wever theJapanese s ide refuses to accept the ADIZ The Chinese mo ves have wider implicatio ns fo r peace and s tability in the regio n in o rderto pro tect the freedo m o f its military aircraft in Eas t As ian airspace and its ability to o bserve China`s military fo rces Washingto nrefused to reco gnise the zo ne co ntinued to igno re the requirements o f the ADIZ by pursuing its regular patro l f lights and criticisedits implementatio n Simultaneo us ly ho wever the Department o f State advised civilian airlines to fo llo w China`s ins tructio ns andVice Pres ident Biden advised bo th co untries o n his trip to No rtheas t As ia in December 2013 to es tablish a cris is managements tructure Since the US do es no t take a s tance o n the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands` so vereignty Washingto n seemed to igno re Japan`smain grievance abo ut the ADIZ which is China`s intentio n to further reinfo rce its so vereignty claim by extending the ADIZ o ver theis lands The mo s t far-reaching US s tatements were a reco nfirmatio n o f the applicatio n o f the security treaty to the is lands evenmentio ning the is lands by their Japanese and Chinese names and co mplaining that the Chinese actio n was an attempt to unilaterally

change the status quo in the Eas t China Sea which raised regio nal tens io n and increased the risk o f accident and miscalculatio n256

Ho wever in this way the Obama Adminis tratio n risked creating amo ng so me Japanese o bservers do ubts abo ut the Adminis tratio n`sreliability and so gave succo ur to China`s attempt to drive a wedge between the two allies Ano ther co mplicatio n is that the ChineseADIZ o verlaps that o f Ko rea and mo reo ver co vers the submerged ro ck called Ieo do in Ko rean and Suyan in Chinese which has animpact o n the no t yet demarcated EEZ bo rder between bo th co untries Interes tingly the Japanese ADIZ also co vers Ieo do but thishas never been underpinned by any Japanese EEZ claims But China kno ws ho w to play o n So uth Ko rea`s criticism o f Japan`sattitude to wards the his to ry is sue and the territo rial dispute with Japan o ver Do kto Takeshima is land Mo reo ver the As ian co untriesco ntes ting China`s claims to parts o f the So uth China Sea are co ncerned that China wo uld further co mplicate the territo rialdisputes in the area by es tablishing an ADIZ Yet the ASEAN member s tates have been very cautio us in directly criticis ing ChinaChina`s es tablishment o f the ADIZ directly affects many co untries because so many o f them have airlines flying thro ugh the zo neHo wever with the exceptio n o f Japan all o thers agred to co nfo rm with China`s reques t fo r no tif icatio n which undermines theJapanese go vernment`s po s itio n o f explicitly advis ing Japanese airlines no t to co nfo rm

With these escalating develo pments the Chinese s ide achieved its go al o f sho wing that the Japanese autho rities are no lo nger infull co ntro l o f the disputed is lands In the case o f Chinese Co as tguard vessel intrus io ns the reactio n o f the Japanese CG is limitedto shado wing the Chinese vessels to info rm them that they are vio lating Japan`s CZ o r TW and to ask them to leave whichho wever they do at their o wn dis cretio n (the time span ho vering in the CZ o r TW having beco me a further means o f Chinesepressure) fo llo wed by diplo matic pro tes ts Otherwise the CG has avo ided any phys ical co nfro ntatio n o r co ntact When co nfro ntedby the CG the Chinese vessels s imply declare (by radio o r even electro nic displays ) that they are patro lling Chinese waters and thatthe CG ships were o perating illegally in these waters This ritual has so far prevented vio lence This is in co ntras t to an exchange o fwater canno n salvo s between the CG and the Taiwanese co as t guard in the territo rial o f the Senkaku Is lands o n 25 September 2012

and again o n 24 January 2013257

The increase o f patro ls by Japan and China is caus ing o peratio nal s train fo r bo th s ides (also rais ing the risk o f miscalculatio ns o ro verreactio ns ) but this has no t reduced the willingness o f either go vernment to s cale do wn the almo s t daily demo ns tratio ns o f

`effective co ntro l` In Octo ber it was repo rted that the CG no w always maintains ten vessels agains t eight fro m China258 The 11th

regio nal headquarters respo ns ible fo r the Senkaku area is in Naha and has nine patro l ships (but o nly seven vessels o f at leas t

1000 to ns ) but no w needs additio nal ships which are dispatched fro m o ther regio nal headquarters 259 In April 2012 the CG had ato tal o f 357 patro l vessels but o nly 51 o ver 1000 to ns which are tho se mo s t needed fo r a far flung area like the Senkaku

Is lands 26 0 On 14 September 2012 Senio r Vice Minis ter o f Fisheries Iwamo to Tsukasa mentio ned plans to increase the number o f

fishery patro l vessels to ensure fishermens safety amid intens ifying territo rial disputes with China and So uth Ko rea26 1 On 26Octo ber the Minis try o f Land Infras tructure Transpo rt and To urism which heads the CG anno unced plans to increase budgetary

reques ts fo r mo re ships 26 2 The Abe go vernment plans to build mo re vessels o r advance the calendar retro fit vessels which were to

be retired and is co ns idering extending the retirement age o f the o fficers 26 3

The Chinese have fewer vessels which can be deplo yed as far as the Senkaku Is lands In additio n leave o f the sailo rs has been

res tricted and their deplo yment length at sea has increased26 4 In March 2013 the Chinese s ide anno unced clo ser co o peratio nbetween the military and vario us maritime law enfo rcement agencies as well as the merger o f fo ur maritime law enfo rcementagencies under the State Ocean Adminis tratio n (adminis tered by the Minis try o f Land and Reso urces ) ie the China MarineSurveillance the co as t guard fo rces o f the Public Security Minis try the fisheries law enfo rcement co mmand o f the Agriculture

Minis try and the maritime anti-smuggling po lice o f the General Adminis tratio n o f Cus to ms 26 5

Ano ther wo rrying develo pment is the gradual invo lvement o f the PLA navy (PLAN) and the Maritime Self Defence Fo rce (MSDF) TheJapanese MOD anno unced o n 16 Octo ber 2012 that fo r the firs t time PLAN ships were o bserved navigating in the 22-km-wide CZbetween Yo naguni and Irio mo te is lands altho ugh the minis try left o pen the po ss ibility that they did so in o rder to avo id a typho o n

Nevertheless the Gaimusho so ught explanatio ns fro m the Chinese abo ut these ship mo vements 26 6 In December 2012 fo ur PLANships sailed thro ugh the CW o f the Irio mo te-Yo naguni is lands o n the way back fro m drills in the Pacific after having go ne into the

Pacific thro ugh the mo re no rmal ro ute o f the s trait between the Okinawan main is land and Miyako jima26 7 Again there was no thingillegal abo ut it but it raised attentio n at a time o f tens io ns Ho wever there are s igns o f greater co o peratio n o f the PLAN withChinese Co as t Guard vessels as was sho wn in the s tando ff between China and the Philippines aro und the disputed Scarbo ro ugh

Sho al in the So uth China Sea and jo int exercises to o k place between the three in the Eas t China Sea in Octo ber 201226 8 The

patro lling activities o f the MSDF in the Senkaku area became kno wn when the Japanese repo rted at the end o f January 2013 that o n19 January a Chinese frigatersquos target radar had lo cked o nto an MSDF helico pter and o n 30 January ano ther frigate sailing clo se to

an MSDF des tro yer did likewise The Chinese vehemently denied it26 9 Ho wever in March this year the Kyo do news agency repo rtedthat senio r Chinese military o fficials had admitted the incident o f 29 January Even mo re wo rriso me is that the Chinese vessels

acted apparently witho ut prio r appro val fro m the fleet co mmand o r navy headquarters All this was denied by the Chinese s ide270 Itdid no t help that under Prime Minis ter No da the MSDF had been o rdered after the eruptio n o f the 2012 cris is to keep a greaterdis tance fro m PLAN ships than the hitherto 3 km in o rder avo id incidents but this po licy was reversed by the mo re hawkish Abe

adminis tratio n to the previo us 3 km dis tance271 The fire radar lo cking incident had happened at a dis tance o f 3 km

Agains t the backgro und o f greater invo lvement o f military fo rces it is particularly regrettable that a plan to build a maritime liaiso n

mechanism between their defense autho rities o n which they had agreed in June 2012 to make later that year was shelved272

Unfo rtunately it is s till Chinese practice to co ns ider Co nfidence Building Measures (CBM) no t as the firs t s tep to build co nfidencebut as a to o l to extract fro m the o ther s ide prio r co ncess io ns under the pretext o f `creating a better atmo sphere` fo r dis cuss ingCBM The o utbreak o f the September 2012 cris is was therefo re a co nvenient pretext fo r the Chinese to cancel the pro ject Thelates t co nfirmatio n was in March 2013 when General Yin Zhuo explained that there co uld be no military trus t if the po litical and

diplo matic relatio nship is bad273 Since the target radar lo ck-o n incidents the Japanese go vernment is publicly calling fo rresumptio n o f nego tiatio ns fo r the maritime liaiso n mechanism but the Chinese will certainly want to extract so me co ncess io nsbefo re even co ns idering a po s itive respo nse

Ho wever the co ns tant co nfro ntatio n between the po licing and military fo rces o f bo th s ides co uld eas ily lead to a military clasheither as a result o f an unfo reseen civilian o r military incident miscalculatio n o r malicio us intentio n at a lo wer level o f co mmandTwo recent examples o f unfo reseen civilian incidents co uld have escalated One is the attempted landing o n o ne o f the disputedis lands by a Chinese pro tes ter with a ballo o n in January 2014 This incident was peacefully reso lved because Japan did no t arres t theballo o nis t In this case the firs t repo rt o n the crash-landing in the territo rial waters o f Uo tsurijima came fro m the Taiwanese co as tguard which info rmed the Japanese co as t guard fo llo wed by the hand-o ver o f the ballo o nis t to the PRC autho rities o uts ide o f

Japan`s territo rial waters 274 The o ther incident was the s inking o f a Chinese fishing bo at ldquoto the no rth o f the Diao yu Is landsrdquo and

the mo ve o f two Chinese naval () vessels to rescue the crew275 This autho r co uld no t find o ut ho w clo se the fishing bo at came tothe is lands and apparently there has no t been any further repo rting abo ut the incident

The previo us ly mentio ned radar-targeting incidents and these two civilian incidents have no t led to an escalatio n but there is noguarantee fo r the future Shi Yinho ng a pro fesso r at Renmin Univers ity predicts that the territo rial co nflicts in the ECS So uth ChinaSea and alo ng the Sino -Indian bo rder will intens ify because o f po pular natio nalism dynamics within the armed fo rces and o f co urse

also o ur to p leaders perso nal beliefs and s trategic perso nalities 276 Hugh White argues that a war (which co uld lead to a nuclearexchange between China and the US) co uld also begin because the Chinese leadership may co ns ider that s tarting ho s tilities no wrather than later wo uld be mo re beneficial to either tes t US reso lve to defend Japan (which the Chinese leadership do ubts ) anddetermine the is sue o f Chinese supremacy in the As ian regio n which he co ns iders to be the real is sue rather than the is lands

themselves 277

IS THERE A WAY FORWARD

The current co nfro ntatio n is no t o nly co ntinuing but even escalating and do mes tic develo pments in bo th co untries are no t creatingan atmo sphere mo re co nducive to better management o f the cris is let alo ne finding a so lutio n Inactio n runs the risk o f a furtherescalatio n o r even a military clash while po s itive o ptio ns are beco ming fewer Meanwhile bo th co untries suffer fro m the eco no micfall-o ut and heightened tens io ns while the integratio n o f a ris ing China into a new s trategic enviro nment in As ia will beco me evenmo re fraught cas ting a shado w o n Japan`s clo se relatio nship with the US

The 2010 incident ended quickly with Japan`s release o f the captain One reaso n fo r this is certainly the fact that China`s demand in2010 was relatively clear and achievable (release o f the captain) if painful fo r Japan at a time o f a weak and inexperiencedgo vernment This time in September 2012 the cris is firs t hit a go vernment which reacted intrans igently because o f its previo usdefeat and o ther unfavo urable do mes tic circumstances and was then replaced by the mo re hawkish Abe go vernment The Abecabinet`s attitude to wards the pas t as exemplif ied by vario us s tatements by cabinet members and peo ple clo se to it the attempt torevise the Ko no s tatement reco gniz ing the fo rced war pro s titutio n (the military co mfo rt wo men) and Abe`s Yasukuni Shrine vis itall served China`s anti-Japan pro paganda wo rsened Japan-Ko rea relatio ns which China is cleverly explo iting and even angered theUS adminis tratio n Abe is seen as utiliz ing the tens io ns with China to win do mes tic and internatio nal suppo rt fo r Japan to have aldquono rmalrdquo natio nal defence po s ture The latter is welco me by the US adminis tratio n because it wo uld help with the US As ianrealignment and suppo rt its China po licy At the same time China`s actio ns cas t an o mino us shado w o n its intentio ns in the So uthChina Sea and Abe and mo re impo rtantly the US is suppo rting the claimants there agains t China

Under these bilateral multilateral and regio nal circumstances wo uld China be satis fied with go ing back to the `unders tanding abo utsetting as ide the dispute` in co njunctio n with Japan`s reco gnitio n o f the exis tence o f a territo rial dispute o r wo uld it demand areversal o f the purchase o f the three is lands Wo uld it demand the end o f Japanese CG patro ls aro und the is lands China`ss tandard demand no w that Japan `co rrect its mis takes` is rather ambiguo us because it co uld be interpreted as go ing back to theshelving unders tanding and the reco gnitio n o f the exis tence o f a dispute o r demanding a reversal o f the go vernment`s purchase o f

the is lands 278 The latter wo uld s imply be impo ss ible in legal and practical terms and o ne can o nly ho pe that the ambiguity is o nlyaimed at rais ing China`s nego tiatio n po s itio n ando r leaving eno ugh wiggle ro o m fo r nego tiatio ns which wo uld satis fy all Chineses takeho lders` interes ts

It seems that it is already to o late fo r go ing back to the shelving agreement o f 19721978 which wo uld imply that the two s ides canso meho w go back to the status quo o f the 1970s This as we have seen has been superseded by deeds and wo rds o n bo th s ides The Chinese have no w no t o nly publicly declared that the shelving agreement was lsquobro kenrsquo by Japan but after the firs t Y12 patro l o n13 December 2012 co mmented that ldquoThe s ituatio n has changed It has beco me no rmal fo r Chinas marine surveillance vessels to

enter the 12-nautical-mile zo ne Japans actual co ntro l o ver the is lands has go nerdquo279

The bilateral relatio nship has deterio rated to the extent that at leas t shelving the co nflicting so vereignty claims without o fficiallyadmitting that there is a territo rial dispute is no lo nger an o ptio n acceptable to China because it feels Japan has abused theshelving co nsensus thro ugh a series o f adminis trative measures with the final s traw having been the central go vernmentrsquos purchaseo f three is lands When s tudying the vario us Chinese o fficial s tatements and news repo rts after the 2012 cris is had fully erupted inSeptember it beco mes clear that until Octo ber 2012 the Chinese s till raised the demand that Japan sho uld go back to the previo uslsquounders tandingrsquo o r lsquoco nsensus rsquo but this demand was no t made o ften thereafter It reappeared in remarks by Wang Jiarui the head o fthe Co mmunis t partys Internatio nal Department when meeting Yamaguchi Natsuo the leader o f the junio r co alitio n partner

Ko meito in January 201328 0 Previo us ly a co mment o n the Xinhua internet s ite o n 29 Octo ber said that ldquoThe lsquopurchasersquo sho wed thatthe Japanese go vernment has who lly abando ned the attitude o f laying as ide disputes and has fundamentally changed the

s ituatio nrdquo28 1 On 30 Octo ber the CMOFA spo kesperso n declared that lsquoJapans illegal purchase o f the Diao yu Is lands bro ke the

impo rtant co nsensus The Japanese s ide sho uld no t have any mo re illus io n o f o ccupying the Diao yu Is lands What the Japaneses ide sho uld do is to face up to the reality admit the so vereignty dispute co rrect mis takes and co me back to the track o f a

nego tiated settlement`28 2 The lates t o fficial pro po sal to shelve the is lands is sue was made by the fo rmer fo reign minis ter Tang

Jiaxuan o n 16 July 201428 3

The reco gnitio n o f a territo rial pro blem wo uld be relatively easy fo r Japanese public o pinio n (and even mo re so fo r Japanrsquos friendsand allies ) to accept because they wo uld no t see the need fo r any kind o f diplo matic o r legal so phis try fo r what is o bvio us ly aterrito rial co nflict whatever the legitimacy o f the Chinese claim might be given also the fact that the current Japanese po s itio nco mes do wn to refus ing to even dis cuss whatever settlement might be po ss ible Acco rding to a survey co nducted by Genro nto gether with Zho ngguo Ribao she in June 2012 627 per cent o f Japanese agreed that there exis ts a territo rial pro blem dispute

(176 disagreed) co mpared with 822 o f the Chinese (139 disagreed)28 4 Ho wever co nsecutive Japanese cabinets haverefused to reco gnise the exis tence o f a territo rial dispute which is o ften the default po s itio n o f a go vernment in actual co ntro l o f adisputed territo ry (fo r example the Ko rean go vernmentrsquos po s itio n o n Do kto Takeshima) This po s itio n has been reinfo rced by theexplicit Japanese denial s ince the 1990s o f a shelving agreement which wo uld have been an implicit admiss io n that there is adispute To circumvent the risk o f being perceived as admitting the exis tence o f a territo rial pro blem the deputy prime minis ter o fthe previo us No da go vernment Okada Katsuya was repo rted to have mentio ned in a speech in Octo ber 2012 that there was no

territo rial dispute but as a matter o f fact a debate exis ted28 5 Ho wever this co mpro mise so lutio n was never co nfirmed by the No dago vernment and did no t beco me po licy It is even less likely to be acceptable to the new Abe go vernment Even amo ng influentialo pinio n makers there is hardly any suppo rt fo r admitting the exis tence o f a territo rial co nflict o r o f a shelving agreement Even mo reco nciliato ry s tatements o n this subject are rather vague Maehara Seiji o f the Demo cratic Party declared in a co nference at QinghuaUnivers ity in Beijing in September 2013 that the Japanese go vernment sho uld add (to its o wn po s itio n) that China has a differentview (Senkakusho to wo meguru Niho n seifu no tachiba ni tsuite lsquoChugo ku ga chigau kangaekata wo mo tte iru to iuko to wo ichigen

tsukekuwaerubeki darsquo) At the same time he emphas ised ho wever that there was no territo rial dispute28 6 Japan Bus inessFederatio n Chairman Yo nekura Hiro masa mentio ned in September 2012 in an NHK interview that the go vernment sho uld be mo re

flexible s ince o therwise its s tance co uld be taken to mean that Japan has no intentio n o f so lving the dispute28 7 Miyamo to Yuji thefo rmer Japanese ambassado r to China is quo ted as saying that lsquoThe go vernment do es no t need to alter its bas ic po s itio n but in

reality a co nflict do es exis t o ver the Senkaku is les rsquo 28 8 This is also the s tance which the previo us Japanese ambassado r Niwa

Uichiro takes in an article after his return to Japan28 9

Co ncerning co nflict reso lutio n it is interes ting to no te that when asked abo ut the mo dern s ignificance o f the 1978 Japan-ChinaPeace and Friendship Treaty 68 4 o f the po lled Japanese agreed with Art 12 (lsquoThe two parties shall settle all disputes by peacefulmeans and shall refrain fro m the use o r threat o f fo rcersquo) but o nly 525 o f the Chinese agreed Mo reo ver 58 1 o f the Chinese

favo ur China s trengthening its co ntro l o ver the area29 0

If therefo re a new ldquoimplicit unders tandingrdquo abo ut shelving the dispute is achievable it wo uld have to be based o n learning fro m thefailures o f the 19721978 shelving ie it wo uld be necessary to achieve a mutual unders tanding o f what the s tatus quo is whatwo uld undermine the s tatus quo and what has to be do ne to mo ve fro m co nflict management to so lutio n Quite clearly such a newunders tanding wo uld be less favo urable to Japan`s current s tance o n the dispute

FROM CONFLICT MANAGEMENT TO ADDRESSING THE SOVEREIGNTY ISSUE

Any mo ve fo rward will certainly require decis ive leadership o n bo th s ides be it to take the initiative o r to respo nd po s itively to theinitiative o f s tarting the pro cess to wards reso lutio n In view o f the co mplex backgro und o f the external and internal dynamics it iso bvio us that address ing the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands dispute requires a s tep-by-s tep appro ach The ultimate is sue to address is theso vereignty is sue and territo rial disputes are generally viewed as zero sum in nature given their clo se link to co re securityinteres ts Even tho se who reco gnize the impo rtance o f transcending such lo gic in favo ur o f co ndo minium o r shared so vereigntygenerally ho ld that the is sue can o nly be addressed at the las t s tage o f any nego tiated pro cess if at all

Two impo rtant is sues have to be co ns idered at the beginning to what extent have the vario us s tages o f the nego tiating pro cess tobe agreed befo rehand (lsquoro ad maprsquo) o r even the final o utco me whether a viable co ndo minium o r o nly shelving the is sues and co uldthe ro le o f a third party mediato r be helpfulacceptable In view o f the po litical diff iculties o n bo th s ides the s tart o f thenego tiatio n pro cess wo uld be endangered if there is no t sufficient ro o m fo r ambiguity and interpretatio n abo ut the vario us s tages altho ugh the general aim o f tens io n reductio n and suspens io n o f the so vereignty is sue mus t be clearly agreed

A third party mediato r is pro bably no t acceptable to the Chinese s ide The third party mo s t o ften mentio ned is the Internatio nalCo urt o f Jus tice (ICJ) o r any kind o f internatio nal arbitratio n Ho wever this seems unlikely in view o f China`s preference fo rbilateral nego tiatio ns and its refusal to accept judicial settlement by the ICJ o r any internatio nal arbitratio n except in no n-po litical

areas such as trade29 1 The Japanese go vernment wo uld be willing to accept the jurisdictio n o f the ICJ but o nly if China brings the

case to the Co urt les t it be perceived as ackno wledging the exis tence o f a territo rial dispute29 2 But there are also po litical andpro cedural arguments agains t the reco urse to the ICJ China`s legal argumentatio n is co mparatively weak and s ince a negativejudgement co uld have implicatio ns fo r China`s legal claim to mo s t o f the So uth China Sea there is even less o f a chance o f Chinamaking an exceptio n fo r the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands dispute In view o f the entrenched po s itio ns o f bo th s ides and the risk o f a`winner takes all` o utco me o f internatio nal litigatio n bo th go vernments wo uld face co ns iderable do mes tic res is tance in case o f anegative o utco me In view o f the urgency o f the dispute and the lo ng time it takes fo r a judgement there wo uld also be the risk o fdo mes tic fo rces trying to pre-empt a negative result

In view o f the security is sues invo lved (let alo ne the American his to rical `debt` as a result o f Washingto n`s ambiguity related toWashingto n`s ending o f the adminis tratio n o f Okinawa in 1972) an American mediatio n co uld be seen as natural and even inAmerican interes ts Such an American ro le ho wever is extremely unlikely as it wo uld be seen by China as unduly advantageo us toJapan Ho wever at so me po int during the Japan-China nego tiatio n pro cess the US might ass is t (o r even be reques ted) by agreeingto certain Co nfidence and Security Building Measures (CSBM) in the area aro und the is lands

The firs t s tage wo uld have to co ns is t o f measures which reduce the risk o f a military clash but in a way which prevents theperceptio n that o ne s ide is giving in to co ercio n This s tage wo uld be a gradual phas ing o ut o f intrus io ns by Chinese o fficial vesselsand aircraft into the territo rial waters co ntiguo us zo ne and airspace o f the is lands which is recipro cated by Japanrsquos reducing in thesame way its co as tguard patro ls in the two zo nes as well as its s crambling activities in the is lands` airspace There were repo rts in

June 2013 that China called o n Japan to agree to a 12-nautical-mile no -entry zo ne aro und the is lands 29 3 Japan rejected this co urse

Ano ther measure wo uld be to increase the dis tance at which vessels o f bo th maritime fo rces o bserve each o ther Such s teps sho uldultimately be o fficialised by a gradually expanding series o f CSBMs and a bilateral liaiso n mechanism This co uld also include ademilitarisatio n agreement as an incentive fo r the Chinese s ide It wo uld be vital that the s teps at this s tage be incremental that nos tep is explo ited in a o ne-s ided way and that they are co ns idered irrevers ible At the same time bo th s ides have to prevent peo plefro m appro aching the is lands s ince this wo uld be seen as a pro vo catio n by the o ther s ide This latter task is technically no t easy

because o f the co ntro vers ial character o f any co mpro mise with certain no n-s tate acto rs in Japan China Ho ng Ko ng and Taiwan The(failed) landing o f a Chinese ho t ballo o n o n o ne o f the is lands in January 2014 demo ns trated at the same time the technical

diff iculty o f a no -entry po licy as well as the po ss ibility o f a success ful co o peratio n o f the co as tguards o f all three co untries 29 4

At this firs t s tage o r leading to the next there will have to be a Japanese go vernment s tatement to the effect that there is alsquopro blemrsquo related to the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands This can be wo rded in such a way that the sens itive express io n `territo rialpro blem` (which is s trenuo us ly denied by the go vernment) is avo ided and it can be supplemented by a sentence that such as tatement in no way prejudices the legal po s itio n o f the go vernment Such a qualifying s tatement is fo r example included in the

Japan-China agreement fo r prio r no tif icatio n o f research vessels fro m bo th co untries in the Eas t China Sea in 200029 5 A s imilarqualif icatio n is part o f the 1997 Japan-China Fisheries Agreement In the jo int co mmuniqueacute o f 1972 which no rmalised diplo maticrelatio ns between Japan and China diplo matic wo rding also managed to bridge the huge gap between their s tances o n Taiwan whichthe PRC co ns iders an lsquoinalienable partrsquo o f its territo ry Japan co ns iders the so vereignty is sue s till unreso lved because the 1951 SanFrancis co Peace Treaty Art 2 (b) o nly s tipulated that lsquoJapan reno unces all right title and claim to Fo rmo sa and the Pescado res rsquowitho ut clarifying the recipient o f the territo ry The co mpro mise in 1972 was reached with the sentence that Japan lsquofully unders tandsand respects this s tand o f the Go vernment o f the Peo ples Republic o f China and it f irmly maintains its s tand under Article 8 o f thePo tsdam Pro clamatio nrsquo

POSSIBLE APPROACHES TO THE SOVEREIGNTY ISSUE

The mo s t diff icult pro blem is the so vereignty is sue which go es to the co re o f any co untry`s security interes ts It is no t imaginablethat either s ide will reno unce its claim to the is lands Sides tepping o r shelving the is sue is o nly useful if the lesso ns fro m the 1972and 1978 attempts as o utlined abo ve can be learned and applied but there is s till the fundamental pro blem with the implicitassumptio n that the quality o f the bilateral relatio nship will always be as go o d as when the s ides tepping agreement was achievedand can be maintained in perpetuity o r until the so vereignty is sue can be addressed But in o rder to so lve the so vereignty is sue aneven better relatio nship has to be created This better relatio nship co uld be bro ught abo ut by the s teps explained abo ve and furtherbelo w

An impo rtant co nditio n fo r any las ting territo rial co mpro mise wo uld be reducing the value o f the is lands fo r bo th co untries whichcan be achieved by o ne o f the measures pro po sed fo r s tage 1 ie reso lutely preventing anyo ne fro m appro aching the territo ries(including to tal demilitarizatio n) which in themselves are eco no mically wo rthless and are uninhabited The main po int is to preventany go vernmental act which co uld be interpreted as being part o f the `so vereignty game` The mo s t diff icult part here is to preventany act by no n-go vernmental acto rs This wo uld have to include the territo rial waters and the explo itatio n there in o f any kind o freso urces including fishing Scientif ic interes ts in the is lands co uld be served by bilateral surveys witho ut any po litical co nno tatio ns

There have been pro po sals to declare the is lands an Internatio nal Nature and Wildlife Preserve29 6 Such a preserve wo uld have to beadminis tered either bilaterally o r by a relevant internatio nal o rganisatio n and as such co uld serve as a co nfidence-building measure

The abo ve s teps wo uld then allo w the two s ides to deal with the co ns iderable eco no mic interes ts in fishing and the explo itatio n o fhydro carbo n reso urces and o ther seabed reso urces aro und the is lands ie in the Exclus ive Eco no mic Zo ne ando r the ExtendedCo ntinental Shelf Once the is lands` land area and the territo rial waters have been put as ide it wo uld be eas ier to co me to ano verall agreement o n the delimitatio n o f the EEZ bo rder (with the exceptio n o f the no rthern part which wo uld require a trilateralagreement between China Japan and Ko rea) which wo uld include the delimitatio n o f these surro unding waters It wo uld facilitate aco mpro mise if bo th s ides agree that the is lands do no t merit their o wn EEZ This might be diff icult fo r Japan which claims an EEZ fo rOkino to rishima refuted by China s ince it co ns iders the reef no t to be an is land acco rding to Art 121 o f UNCLOS

A co mpro mise o n the so vereignty is sue co uld o nly be the o utco me ndash if at all ndash o f a success ful pro cess o f the abo ve o r co mparables teps In o rder to avo id a `winner take all` s ituatio n the co mpro mise wo uld have to invo lve a sharing arrangement His to ry o ffers

quite a number o f internatio nal precedents o f shared so vereignty referred to as co ndo minium in internatio nal law29 7 One case withso me s imilarities to the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands is a small is land (3000 sq m) in the river separating France and Spain kno wn asPheasant Is land o r Co nference Is land which even to day s till changes every s ix mo nths between France and Spain as o wner Like theSenkakuDiao yu Is lands the is land has no eco no mic value anymo re and the is land is o ff limits It was the lo catio n o f the s igning o f

the Treaty o f the Pyrenees in 1659 which ended a lo ng war 29 8 Mo s t o ther examples o f jo int so vereignty co ncern territo ries with apo pulatio n which makes co o peratio n much mo re diff icult Other his to rical precedents o f sharing so vereignty are the es tablishmento f ldquoneutral zo nesrdquo Acco rdingly the is lands and po ss ibly a sea area aro und the is lands co uld be declared a neutral zo ne like the o nebetween Saudi Arabia and Kuwait (1922-1965) On July 7 1965 the two go vernments s igned an agreement (which to o k effect o nJuly 25 1966) to partitio n the Neutral Zo ne adjo ining their respective territo ries A demarcatio n agreement dividing the NeutralZo ne was s igned o n December 17 1967

Particularly relevant here is that Saudi Arabia as well as Kuwait explo ited the o il reso urces under a jo int o perating agreement29 9

Co nclus io ns

The actio n-reactio n pattern o f the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands dispute is accelerating and the initiative seems to be mo re o ften thanno t with the Chinese s ide while the Japanese s ide is in a defens ive po s itio n The danger o f a military co nfro ntatio n is lo o mingincreas ingly larger in what co uld be called a lsquochicken gamersquo At the same time the internal and external dynamics are undermining theenviro nment which is required fo r a peaceful so lutio n as well as fo r maintaining the number o f po s itive o ptio ns While the Japanesego vernment refuses to ackno wledge the very exis tence o f a territo rial dispute the Chinese go vernment is no w (July 2014) evenrefus ing to have a dialo gue with Japan`s current prime minis ter It is po ss ible that the Chinese s ide again wants to wait with anymo ve fo rward until the Japanese prime minis ter has changed as Beijing did with Prime Minis ter Sato Eisaku o r with Prime Minis terKo izumi Junichiro But waiting fo r an impro vement o f the bilateral atmo sphere as the Chinese s ide likes to s tress is a very riskyo ptio n and such an impro vement may anyway be a very sho rt windo w o f o ppo rtunity if lo o king at the ups and do wns o f the po s t-1949 his to ry o f the bilateral relatio nship

To s tart a s tep-by-s tep pro cess o f address ing the territo rial is sue s tro ng leadership is required which unders tands the widerinteres ts o f a functio ning Japanese-Chinese relatio nship Japan s imply asking China fo r a summit meeting is no t very sens ible ifthere is no willingness to engage in subs tantive dis cuss io ns and wo uld be very risky fo r China`s to p leader if the Japanese primeminis ter then vis its the Yasukuni Shrine The his to ry is sue sho uld no lo nger be a Chinese lever fo r pressuris ing Japan but the latterhas to abs tain fro m actio ns which are seen as pro vo cative no t o nly by China but also by Ko rea the US and many o thers There hasto be a co mmitted leadership o n bo th s ides which s tarts with a ro ugh ro ad map and tens io n-reducing s teps such as CSBMs en ro uteto agreeing o n a fo rmula which allo ws the parties to o btain eco no mic as well as security gains while reducing tens io ns

Reinhard Drifte is Emeritus Professor of Japanese Politics University of Newcastle UK and Visiting Professor at various Japanese Universities andPau University (France) He is the author of Japanrsquos Foreign Policy for the Twenty First Century His home page is here

Reco mmended citatio n Reinhard Drifte The Japan-China Confrontation Over the SenkakuDiaoyu Islands--Between shelving and dispute

explaining the s tandard Japanese pro ceedures fo r aerial defence which so lely relies o n the ASDF the Chinese media interpreted theuse o f military aircraft by Japan as `aggress ive` and the Global Times cautio ned agains t any interceptio n warning that China might

respo nd by sending its air fo rce248 On the Japanese s ide even the centre-left Asahi Shimbun called the Y12 flight ` a highly

pro vo cative act that co uld lead to an armed co nflict between the two co untries`249 At the beginning o f January 2013 there wereapparently erro neo us repo rts that the ASDF might co ns ider firing warning sho ts (tracer bullets ) at intruding Chinese aircraft which

pro mpted further bellico se co mments in the Chinese press 250 As a co nsequence the Chinese air fo rce also became invo lved o n10 January when the Chinese Minis try o f Defence anno unced that the Peo ple`s Liberatio n Army Air Fo rce (PLAA) had sent two fighterjets agains t two ASDF F-15 intercepto rs because they were fo llo wing a Chinese military Y8 transpo rt aircraft patro lling the airspace

o f Chinese o il platfo rms in the Eas t China Sea251 The Japanese repo rted that mo re than ten Chinese aircraft including military

aircraft had appro ached the Japanese air defence identificatio n zo ne252 In a further escalatio n the Japanese s ide repo rted that o n11 June 2014 two Chinese military jets flew abno rmally clo se to two planes o f Japans Self Defence Fo rce abo ve the Eas t China Sea

an accusatio n which the Chinese s ide refuted speaking ins tead o f two incidents pro vo ked by Japanese fighters 253 Related to thisdevelo pment and further enhancing the po ss ibility o f an incident is the enhanced patro lling o f the PLAA o ver the Eas t China Seawhich caused the ASDF to increase scrambling agains t PLAA aircraft to 415 times between 1 April 2013 and 31 March 2014 (Fis cal

Year 2013) 109 times mo re than in the previo us Fis cal Year 2012254

Co ntinuing to increase the pressure o n Japan the Chinese go vernment decreed o n 23 No vember 2013 an Air Defence Identificatio nZo ne (ADIZ) which includes the airspace o ver the Senkaku Is lands and was certainly meant to reinfo rce China`s territo rial claimdespite the fact that an ADIZ has no territo rial implicatio ns in internatio nal law The threat o f military co untermeasures in the text o fthe decree (lsquoChinas armed fo rces will ado pt defens ive emergency measures to respo nd to aircraft that do no t co o perate in the

identificatio n o r refuse to fo llo w the ins tructio ns rsquo) has further heightened the po ss ibility o f a military clash255 Ho wever theJapanese s ide refuses to accept the ADIZ The Chinese mo ves have wider implicatio ns fo r peace and s tability in the regio n in o rderto pro tect the freedo m o f its military aircraft in Eas t As ian airspace and its ability to o bserve China`s military fo rces Washingto nrefused to reco gnise the zo ne co ntinued to igno re the requirements o f the ADIZ by pursuing its regular patro l f lights and criticisedits implementatio n Simultaneo us ly ho wever the Department o f State advised civilian airlines to fo llo w China`s ins tructio ns andVice Pres ident Biden advised bo th co untries o n his trip to No rtheas t As ia in December 2013 to es tablish a cris is managements tructure Since the US do es no t take a s tance o n the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands` so vereignty Washingto n seemed to igno re Japan`smain grievance abo ut the ADIZ which is China`s intentio n to further reinfo rce its so vereignty claim by extending the ADIZ o ver theis lands The mo s t far-reaching US s tatements were a reco nfirmatio n o f the applicatio n o f the security treaty to the is lands evenmentio ning the is lands by their Japanese and Chinese names and co mplaining that the Chinese actio n was an attempt to unilaterally

change the status quo in the Eas t China Sea which raised regio nal tens io n and increased the risk o f accident and miscalculatio n256

Ho wever in this way the Obama Adminis tratio n risked creating amo ng so me Japanese o bservers do ubts abo ut the Adminis tratio n`sreliability and so gave succo ur to China`s attempt to drive a wedge between the two allies Ano ther co mplicatio n is that the ChineseADIZ o verlaps that o f Ko rea and mo reo ver co vers the submerged ro ck called Ieo do in Ko rean and Suyan in Chinese which has animpact o n the no t yet demarcated EEZ bo rder between bo th co untries Interes tingly the Japanese ADIZ also co vers Ieo do but thishas never been underpinned by any Japanese EEZ claims But China kno ws ho w to play o n So uth Ko rea`s criticism o f Japan`sattitude to wards the his to ry is sue and the territo rial dispute with Japan o ver Do kto Takeshima is land Mo reo ver the As ian co untriesco ntes ting China`s claims to parts o f the So uth China Sea are co ncerned that China wo uld further co mplicate the territo rialdisputes in the area by es tablishing an ADIZ Yet the ASEAN member s tates have been very cautio us in directly criticis ing ChinaChina`s es tablishment o f the ADIZ directly affects many co untries because so many o f them have airlines flying thro ugh the zo neHo wever with the exceptio n o f Japan all o thers agred to co nfo rm with China`s reques t fo r no tif icatio n which undermines theJapanese go vernment`s po s itio n o f explicitly advis ing Japanese airlines no t to co nfo rm

With these escalating develo pments the Chinese s ide achieved its go al o f sho wing that the Japanese autho rities are no lo nger infull co ntro l o f the disputed is lands In the case o f Chinese Co as tguard vessel intrus io ns the reactio n o f the Japanese CG is limitedto shado wing the Chinese vessels to info rm them that they are vio lating Japan`s CZ o r TW and to ask them to leave whichho wever they do at their o wn dis cretio n (the time span ho vering in the CZ o r TW having beco me a further means o f Chinesepressure) fo llo wed by diplo matic pro tes ts Otherwise the CG has avo ided any phys ical co nfro ntatio n o r co ntact When co nfro ntedby the CG the Chinese vessels s imply declare (by radio o r even electro nic displays ) that they are patro lling Chinese waters and thatthe CG ships were o perating illegally in these waters This ritual has so far prevented vio lence This is in co ntras t to an exchange o fwater canno n salvo s between the CG and the Taiwanese co as t guard in the territo rial o f the Senkaku Is lands o n 25 September 2012

and again o n 24 January 2013257

The increase o f patro ls by Japan and China is caus ing o peratio nal s train fo r bo th s ides (also rais ing the risk o f miscalculatio ns o ro verreactio ns ) but this has no t reduced the willingness o f either go vernment to s cale do wn the almo s t daily demo ns tratio ns o f

`effective co ntro l` In Octo ber it was repo rted that the CG no w always maintains ten vessels agains t eight fro m China258 The 11th

regio nal headquarters respo ns ible fo r the Senkaku area is in Naha and has nine patro l ships (but o nly seven vessels o f at leas t

1000 to ns ) but no w needs additio nal ships which are dispatched fro m o ther regio nal headquarters 259 In April 2012 the CG had ato tal o f 357 patro l vessels but o nly 51 o ver 1000 to ns which are tho se mo s t needed fo r a far flung area like the Senkaku

Is lands 26 0 On 14 September 2012 Senio r Vice Minis ter o f Fisheries Iwamo to Tsukasa mentio ned plans to increase the number o f

fishery patro l vessels to ensure fishermens safety amid intens ifying territo rial disputes with China and So uth Ko rea26 1 On 26Octo ber the Minis try o f Land Infras tructure Transpo rt and To urism which heads the CG anno unced plans to increase budgetary

reques ts fo r mo re ships 26 2 The Abe go vernment plans to build mo re vessels o r advance the calendar retro fit vessels which were to

be retired and is co ns idering extending the retirement age o f the o fficers 26 3

The Chinese have fewer vessels which can be deplo yed as far as the Senkaku Is lands In additio n leave o f the sailo rs has been

res tricted and their deplo yment length at sea has increased26 4 In March 2013 the Chinese s ide anno unced clo ser co o peratio nbetween the military and vario us maritime law enfo rcement agencies as well as the merger o f fo ur maritime law enfo rcementagencies under the State Ocean Adminis tratio n (adminis tered by the Minis try o f Land and Reso urces ) ie the China MarineSurveillance the co as t guard fo rces o f the Public Security Minis try the fisheries law enfo rcement co mmand o f the Agriculture

Minis try and the maritime anti-smuggling po lice o f the General Adminis tratio n o f Cus to ms 26 5

Ano ther wo rrying develo pment is the gradual invo lvement o f the PLA navy (PLAN) and the Maritime Self Defence Fo rce (MSDF) TheJapanese MOD anno unced o n 16 Octo ber 2012 that fo r the firs t time PLAN ships were o bserved navigating in the 22-km-wide CZbetween Yo naguni and Irio mo te is lands altho ugh the minis try left o pen the po ss ibility that they did so in o rder to avo id a typho o n

Nevertheless the Gaimusho so ught explanatio ns fro m the Chinese abo ut these ship mo vements 26 6 In December 2012 fo ur PLANships sailed thro ugh the CW o f the Irio mo te-Yo naguni is lands o n the way back fro m drills in the Pacific after having go ne into the

Pacific thro ugh the mo re no rmal ro ute o f the s trait between the Okinawan main is land and Miyako jima26 7 Again there was no thingillegal abo ut it but it raised attentio n at a time o f tens io ns Ho wever there are s igns o f greater co o peratio n o f the PLAN withChinese Co as t Guard vessels as was sho wn in the s tando ff between China and the Philippines aro und the disputed Scarbo ro ugh

Sho al in the So uth China Sea and jo int exercises to o k place between the three in the Eas t China Sea in Octo ber 201226 8 The

patro lling activities o f the MSDF in the Senkaku area became kno wn when the Japanese repo rted at the end o f January 2013 that o n19 January a Chinese frigatersquos target radar had lo cked o nto an MSDF helico pter and o n 30 January ano ther frigate sailing clo se to

an MSDF des tro yer did likewise The Chinese vehemently denied it26 9 Ho wever in March this year the Kyo do news agency repo rtedthat senio r Chinese military o fficials had admitted the incident o f 29 January Even mo re wo rriso me is that the Chinese vessels

acted apparently witho ut prio r appro val fro m the fleet co mmand o r navy headquarters All this was denied by the Chinese s ide270 Itdid no t help that under Prime Minis ter No da the MSDF had been o rdered after the eruptio n o f the 2012 cris is to keep a greaterdis tance fro m PLAN ships than the hitherto 3 km in o rder avo id incidents but this po licy was reversed by the mo re hawkish Abe

adminis tratio n to the previo us 3 km dis tance271 The fire radar lo cking incident had happened at a dis tance o f 3 km

Agains t the backgro und o f greater invo lvement o f military fo rces it is particularly regrettable that a plan to build a maritime liaiso n

mechanism between their defense autho rities o n which they had agreed in June 2012 to make later that year was shelved272

Unfo rtunately it is s till Chinese practice to co ns ider Co nfidence Building Measures (CBM) no t as the firs t s tep to build co nfidencebut as a to o l to extract fro m the o ther s ide prio r co ncess io ns under the pretext o f `creating a better atmo sphere` fo r dis cuss ingCBM The o utbreak o f the September 2012 cris is was therefo re a co nvenient pretext fo r the Chinese to cancel the pro ject Thelates t co nfirmatio n was in March 2013 when General Yin Zhuo explained that there co uld be no military trus t if the po litical and

diplo matic relatio nship is bad273 Since the target radar lo ck-o n incidents the Japanese go vernment is publicly calling fo rresumptio n o f nego tiatio ns fo r the maritime liaiso n mechanism but the Chinese will certainly want to extract so me co ncess io nsbefo re even co ns idering a po s itive respo nse

Ho wever the co ns tant co nfro ntatio n between the po licing and military fo rces o f bo th s ides co uld eas ily lead to a military clasheither as a result o f an unfo reseen civilian o r military incident miscalculatio n o r malicio us intentio n at a lo wer level o f co mmandTwo recent examples o f unfo reseen civilian incidents co uld have escalated One is the attempted landing o n o ne o f the disputedis lands by a Chinese pro tes ter with a ballo o n in January 2014 This incident was peacefully reso lved because Japan did no t arres t theballo o nis t In this case the firs t repo rt o n the crash-landing in the territo rial waters o f Uo tsurijima came fro m the Taiwanese co as tguard which info rmed the Japanese co as t guard fo llo wed by the hand-o ver o f the ballo o nis t to the PRC autho rities o uts ide o f

Japan`s territo rial waters 274 The o ther incident was the s inking o f a Chinese fishing bo at ldquoto the no rth o f the Diao yu Is landsrdquo and

the mo ve o f two Chinese naval () vessels to rescue the crew275 This autho r co uld no t find o ut ho w clo se the fishing bo at came tothe is lands and apparently there has no t been any further repo rting abo ut the incident

The previo us ly mentio ned radar-targeting incidents and these two civilian incidents have no t led to an escalatio n but there is noguarantee fo r the future Shi Yinho ng a pro fesso r at Renmin Univers ity predicts that the territo rial co nflicts in the ECS So uth ChinaSea and alo ng the Sino -Indian bo rder will intens ify because o f po pular natio nalism dynamics within the armed fo rces and o f co urse

also o ur to p leaders perso nal beliefs and s trategic perso nalities 276 Hugh White argues that a war (which co uld lead to a nuclearexchange between China and the US) co uld also begin because the Chinese leadership may co ns ider that s tarting ho s tilities no wrather than later wo uld be mo re beneficial to either tes t US reso lve to defend Japan (which the Chinese leadership do ubts ) anddetermine the is sue o f Chinese supremacy in the As ian regio n which he co ns iders to be the real is sue rather than the is lands

themselves 277

IS THERE A WAY FORWARD

The current co nfro ntatio n is no t o nly co ntinuing but even escalating and do mes tic develo pments in bo th co untries are no t creatingan atmo sphere mo re co nducive to better management o f the cris is let alo ne finding a so lutio n Inactio n runs the risk o f a furtherescalatio n o r even a military clash while po s itive o ptio ns are beco ming fewer Meanwhile bo th co untries suffer fro m the eco no micfall-o ut and heightened tens io ns while the integratio n o f a ris ing China into a new s trategic enviro nment in As ia will beco me evenmo re fraught cas ting a shado w o n Japan`s clo se relatio nship with the US

The 2010 incident ended quickly with Japan`s release o f the captain One reaso n fo r this is certainly the fact that China`s demand in2010 was relatively clear and achievable (release o f the captain) if painful fo r Japan at a time o f a weak and inexperiencedgo vernment This time in September 2012 the cris is firs t hit a go vernment which reacted intrans igently because o f its previo usdefeat and o ther unfavo urable do mes tic circumstances and was then replaced by the mo re hawkish Abe go vernment The Abecabinet`s attitude to wards the pas t as exemplif ied by vario us s tatements by cabinet members and peo ple clo se to it the attempt torevise the Ko no s tatement reco gniz ing the fo rced war pro s titutio n (the military co mfo rt wo men) and Abe`s Yasukuni Shrine vis itall served China`s anti-Japan pro paganda wo rsened Japan-Ko rea relatio ns which China is cleverly explo iting and even angered theUS adminis tratio n Abe is seen as utiliz ing the tens io ns with China to win do mes tic and internatio nal suppo rt fo r Japan to have aldquono rmalrdquo natio nal defence po s ture The latter is welco me by the US adminis tratio n because it wo uld help with the US As ianrealignment and suppo rt its China po licy At the same time China`s actio ns cas t an o mino us shado w o n its intentio ns in the So uthChina Sea and Abe and mo re impo rtantly the US is suppo rting the claimants there agains t China

Under these bilateral multilateral and regio nal circumstances wo uld China be satis fied with go ing back to the `unders tanding abo utsetting as ide the dispute` in co njunctio n with Japan`s reco gnitio n o f the exis tence o f a territo rial dispute o r wo uld it demand areversal o f the purchase o f the three is lands Wo uld it demand the end o f Japanese CG patro ls aro und the is lands China`ss tandard demand no w that Japan `co rrect its mis takes` is rather ambiguo us because it co uld be interpreted as go ing back to theshelving unders tanding and the reco gnitio n o f the exis tence o f a dispute o r demanding a reversal o f the go vernment`s purchase o f

the is lands 278 The latter wo uld s imply be impo ss ible in legal and practical terms and o ne can o nly ho pe that the ambiguity is o nlyaimed at rais ing China`s nego tiatio n po s itio n ando r leaving eno ugh wiggle ro o m fo r nego tiatio ns which wo uld satis fy all Chineses takeho lders` interes ts

It seems that it is already to o late fo r go ing back to the shelving agreement o f 19721978 which wo uld imply that the two s ides canso meho w go back to the status quo o f the 1970s This as we have seen has been superseded by deeds and wo rds o n bo th s ides The Chinese have no w no t o nly publicly declared that the shelving agreement was lsquobro kenrsquo by Japan but after the firs t Y12 patro l o n13 December 2012 co mmented that ldquoThe s ituatio n has changed It has beco me no rmal fo r Chinas marine surveillance vessels to

enter the 12-nautical-mile zo ne Japans actual co ntro l o ver the is lands has go nerdquo279

The bilateral relatio nship has deterio rated to the extent that at leas t shelving the co nflicting so vereignty claims without o fficiallyadmitting that there is a territo rial dispute is no lo nger an o ptio n acceptable to China because it feels Japan has abused theshelving co nsensus thro ugh a series o f adminis trative measures with the final s traw having been the central go vernmentrsquos purchaseo f three is lands When s tudying the vario us Chinese o fficial s tatements and news repo rts after the 2012 cris is had fully erupted inSeptember it beco mes clear that until Octo ber 2012 the Chinese s till raised the demand that Japan sho uld go back to the previo uslsquounders tandingrsquo o r lsquoco nsensus rsquo but this demand was no t made o ften thereafter It reappeared in remarks by Wang Jiarui the head o fthe Co mmunis t partys Internatio nal Department when meeting Yamaguchi Natsuo the leader o f the junio r co alitio n partner

Ko meito in January 201328 0 Previo us ly a co mment o n the Xinhua internet s ite o n 29 Octo ber said that ldquoThe lsquopurchasersquo sho wed thatthe Japanese go vernment has who lly abando ned the attitude o f laying as ide disputes and has fundamentally changed the

s ituatio nrdquo28 1 On 30 Octo ber the CMOFA spo kesperso n declared that lsquoJapans illegal purchase o f the Diao yu Is lands bro ke the

impo rtant co nsensus The Japanese s ide sho uld no t have any mo re illus io n o f o ccupying the Diao yu Is lands What the Japaneses ide sho uld do is to face up to the reality admit the so vereignty dispute co rrect mis takes and co me back to the track o f a

nego tiated settlement`28 2 The lates t o fficial pro po sal to shelve the is lands is sue was made by the fo rmer fo reign minis ter Tang

Jiaxuan o n 16 July 201428 3

The reco gnitio n o f a territo rial pro blem wo uld be relatively easy fo r Japanese public o pinio n (and even mo re so fo r Japanrsquos friendsand allies ) to accept because they wo uld no t see the need fo r any kind o f diplo matic o r legal so phis try fo r what is o bvio us ly aterrito rial co nflict whatever the legitimacy o f the Chinese claim might be given also the fact that the current Japanese po s itio nco mes do wn to refus ing to even dis cuss whatever settlement might be po ss ible Acco rding to a survey co nducted by Genro nto gether with Zho ngguo Ribao she in June 2012 627 per cent o f Japanese agreed that there exis ts a territo rial pro blem dispute

(176 disagreed) co mpared with 822 o f the Chinese (139 disagreed)28 4 Ho wever co nsecutive Japanese cabinets haverefused to reco gnise the exis tence o f a territo rial dispute which is o ften the default po s itio n o f a go vernment in actual co ntro l o f adisputed territo ry (fo r example the Ko rean go vernmentrsquos po s itio n o n Do kto Takeshima) This po s itio n has been reinfo rced by theexplicit Japanese denial s ince the 1990s o f a shelving agreement which wo uld have been an implicit admiss io n that there is adispute To circumvent the risk o f being perceived as admitting the exis tence o f a territo rial pro blem the deputy prime minis ter o fthe previo us No da go vernment Okada Katsuya was repo rted to have mentio ned in a speech in Octo ber 2012 that there was no

territo rial dispute but as a matter o f fact a debate exis ted28 5 Ho wever this co mpro mise so lutio n was never co nfirmed by the No dago vernment and did no t beco me po licy It is even less likely to be acceptable to the new Abe go vernment Even amo ng influentialo pinio n makers there is hardly any suppo rt fo r admitting the exis tence o f a territo rial co nflict o r o f a shelving agreement Even mo reco nciliato ry s tatements o n this subject are rather vague Maehara Seiji o f the Demo cratic Party declared in a co nference at QinghuaUnivers ity in Beijing in September 2013 that the Japanese go vernment sho uld add (to its o wn po s itio n) that China has a differentview (Senkakusho to wo meguru Niho n seifu no tachiba ni tsuite lsquoChugo ku ga chigau kangaekata wo mo tte iru to iuko to wo ichigen

tsukekuwaerubeki darsquo) At the same time he emphas ised ho wever that there was no territo rial dispute28 6 Japan Bus inessFederatio n Chairman Yo nekura Hiro masa mentio ned in September 2012 in an NHK interview that the go vernment sho uld be mo re

flexible s ince o therwise its s tance co uld be taken to mean that Japan has no intentio n o f so lving the dispute28 7 Miyamo to Yuji thefo rmer Japanese ambassado r to China is quo ted as saying that lsquoThe go vernment do es no t need to alter its bas ic po s itio n but in

reality a co nflict do es exis t o ver the Senkaku is les rsquo 28 8 This is also the s tance which the previo us Japanese ambassado r Niwa

Uichiro takes in an article after his return to Japan28 9

Co ncerning co nflict reso lutio n it is interes ting to no te that when asked abo ut the mo dern s ignificance o f the 1978 Japan-ChinaPeace and Friendship Treaty 68 4 o f the po lled Japanese agreed with Art 12 (lsquoThe two parties shall settle all disputes by peacefulmeans and shall refrain fro m the use o r threat o f fo rcersquo) but o nly 525 o f the Chinese agreed Mo reo ver 58 1 o f the Chinese

favo ur China s trengthening its co ntro l o ver the area29 0

If therefo re a new ldquoimplicit unders tandingrdquo abo ut shelving the dispute is achievable it wo uld have to be based o n learning fro m thefailures o f the 19721978 shelving ie it wo uld be necessary to achieve a mutual unders tanding o f what the s tatus quo is whatwo uld undermine the s tatus quo and what has to be do ne to mo ve fro m co nflict management to so lutio n Quite clearly such a newunders tanding wo uld be less favo urable to Japan`s current s tance o n the dispute

FROM CONFLICT MANAGEMENT TO ADDRESSING THE SOVEREIGNTY ISSUE

Any mo ve fo rward will certainly require decis ive leadership o n bo th s ides be it to take the initiative o r to respo nd po s itively to theinitiative o f s tarting the pro cess to wards reso lutio n In view o f the co mplex backgro und o f the external and internal dynamics it iso bvio us that address ing the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands dispute requires a s tep-by-s tep appro ach The ultimate is sue to address is theso vereignty is sue and territo rial disputes are generally viewed as zero sum in nature given their clo se link to co re securityinteres ts Even tho se who reco gnize the impo rtance o f transcending such lo gic in favo ur o f co ndo minium o r shared so vereigntygenerally ho ld that the is sue can o nly be addressed at the las t s tage o f any nego tiated pro cess if at all

Two impo rtant is sues have to be co ns idered at the beginning to what extent have the vario us s tages o f the nego tiating pro cess tobe agreed befo rehand (lsquoro ad maprsquo) o r even the final o utco me whether a viable co ndo minium o r o nly shelving the is sues and co uldthe ro le o f a third party mediato r be helpfulacceptable In view o f the po litical diff iculties o n bo th s ides the s tart o f thenego tiatio n pro cess wo uld be endangered if there is no t sufficient ro o m fo r ambiguity and interpretatio n abo ut the vario us s tages altho ugh the general aim o f tens io n reductio n and suspens io n o f the so vereignty is sue mus t be clearly agreed

A third party mediato r is pro bably no t acceptable to the Chinese s ide The third party mo s t o ften mentio ned is the Internatio nalCo urt o f Jus tice (ICJ) o r any kind o f internatio nal arbitratio n Ho wever this seems unlikely in view o f China`s preference fo rbilateral nego tiatio ns and its refusal to accept judicial settlement by the ICJ o r any internatio nal arbitratio n except in no n-po litical

areas such as trade29 1 The Japanese go vernment wo uld be willing to accept the jurisdictio n o f the ICJ but o nly if China brings the

case to the Co urt les t it be perceived as ackno wledging the exis tence o f a territo rial dispute29 2 But there are also po litical andpro cedural arguments agains t the reco urse to the ICJ China`s legal argumentatio n is co mparatively weak and s ince a negativejudgement co uld have implicatio ns fo r China`s legal claim to mo s t o f the So uth China Sea there is even less o f a chance o f Chinamaking an exceptio n fo r the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands dispute In view o f the entrenched po s itio ns o f bo th s ides and the risk o f a`winner takes all` o utco me o f internatio nal litigatio n bo th go vernments wo uld face co ns iderable do mes tic res is tance in case o f anegative o utco me In view o f the urgency o f the dispute and the lo ng time it takes fo r a judgement there wo uld also be the risk o fdo mes tic fo rces trying to pre-empt a negative result

In view o f the security is sues invo lved (let alo ne the American his to rical `debt` as a result o f Washingto n`s ambiguity related toWashingto n`s ending o f the adminis tratio n o f Okinawa in 1972) an American mediatio n co uld be seen as natural and even inAmerican interes ts Such an American ro le ho wever is extremely unlikely as it wo uld be seen by China as unduly advantageo us toJapan Ho wever at so me po int during the Japan-China nego tiatio n pro cess the US might ass is t (o r even be reques ted) by agreeingto certain Co nfidence and Security Building Measures (CSBM) in the area aro und the is lands

The firs t s tage wo uld have to co ns is t o f measures which reduce the risk o f a military clash but in a way which prevents theperceptio n that o ne s ide is giving in to co ercio n This s tage wo uld be a gradual phas ing o ut o f intrus io ns by Chinese o fficial vesselsand aircraft into the territo rial waters co ntiguo us zo ne and airspace o f the is lands which is recipro cated by Japanrsquos reducing in thesame way its co as tguard patro ls in the two zo nes as well as its s crambling activities in the is lands` airspace There were repo rts in

June 2013 that China called o n Japan to agree to a 12-nautical-mile no -entry zo ne aro und the is lands 29 3 Japan rejected this co urse

Ano ther measure wo uld be to increase the dis tance at which vessels o f bo th maritime fo rces o bserve each o ther Such s teps sho uldultimately be o fficialised by a gradually expanding series o f CSBMs and a bilateral liaiso n mechanism This co uld also include ademilitarisatio n agreement as an incentive fo r the Chinese s ide It wo uld be vital that the s teps at this s tage be incremental that nos tep is explo ited in a o ne-s ided way and that they are co ns idered irrevers ible At the same time bo th s ides have to prevent peo plefro m appro aching the is lands s ince this wo uld be seen as a pro vo catio n by the o ther s ide This latter task is technically no t easy

because o f the co ntro vers ial character o f any co mpro mise with certain no n-s tate acto rs in Japan China Ho ng Ko ng and Taiwan The(failed) landing o f a Chinese ho t ballo o n o n o ne o f the is lands in January 2014 demo ns trated at the same time the technical

diff iculty o f a no -entry po licy as well as the po ss ibility o f a success ful co o peratio n o f the co as tguards o f all three co untries 29 4

At this firs t s tage o r leading to the next there will have to be a Japanese go vernment s tatement to the effect that there is alsquopro blemrsquo related to the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands This can be wo rded in such a way that the sens itive express io n `territo rialpro blem` (which is s trenuo us ly denied by the go vernment) is avo ided and it can be supplemented by a sentence that such as tatement in no way prejudices the legal po s itio n o f the go vernment Such a qualifying s tatement is fo r example included in the

Japan-China agreement fo r prio r no tif icatio n o f research vessels fro m bo th co untries in the Eas t China Sea in 200029 5 A s imilarqualif icatio n is part o f the 1997 Japan-China Fisheries Agreement In the jo int co mmuniqueacute o f 1972 which no rmalised diplo maticrelatio ns between Japan and China diplo matic wo rding also managed to bridge the huge gap between their s tances o n Taiwan whichthe PRC co ns iders an lsquoinalienable partrsquo o f its territo ry Japan co ns iders the so vereignty is sue s till unreso lved because the 1951 SanFrancis co Peace Treaty Art 2 (b) o nly s tipulated that lsquoJapan reno unces all right title and claim to Fo rmo sa and the Pescado res rsquowitho ut clarifying the recipient o f the territo ry The co mpro mise in 1972 was reached with the sentence that Japan lsquofully unders tandsand respects this s tand o f the Go vernment o f the Peo ples Republic o f China and it f irmly maintains its s tand under Article 8 o f thePo tsdam Pro clamatio nrsquo

POSSIBLE APPROACHES TO THE SOVEREIGNTY ISSUE

The mo s t diff icult pro blem is the so vereignty is sue which go es to the co re o f any co untry`s security interes ts It is no t imaginablethat either s ide will reno unce its claim to the is lands Sides tepping o r shelving the is sue is o nly useful if the lesso ns fro m the 1972and 1978 attempts as o utlined abo ve can be learned and applied but there is s till the fundamental pro blem with the implicitassumptio n that the quality o f the bilateral relatio nship will always be as go o d as when the s ides tepping agreement was achievedand can be maintained in perpetuity o r until the so vereignty is sue can be addressed But in o rder to so lve the so vereignty is sue aneven better relatio nship has to be created This better relatio nship co uld be bro ught abo ut by the s teps explained abo ve and furtherbelo w

An impo rtant co nditio n fo r any las ting territo rial co mpro mise wo uld be reducing the value o f the is lands fo r bo th co untries whichcan be achieved by o ne o f the measures pro po sed fo r s tage 1 ie reso lutely preventing anyo ne fro m appro aching the territo ries(including to tal demilitarizatio n) which in themselves are eco no mically wo rthless and are uninhabited The main po int is to preventany go vernmental act which co uld be interpreted as being part o f the `so vereignty game` The mo s t diff icult part here is to preventany act by no n-go vernmental acto rs This wo uld have to include the territo rial waters and the explo itatio n there in o f any kind o freso urces including fishing Scientif ic interes ts in the is lands co uld be served by bilateral surveys witho ut any po litical co nno tatio ns

There have been pro po sals to declare the is lands an Internatio nal Nature and Wildlife Preserve29 6 Such a preserve wo uld have to beadminis tered either bilaterally o r by a relevant internatio nal o rganisatio n and as such co uld serve as a co nfidence-building measure

The abo ve s teps wo uld then allo w the two s ides to deal with the co ns iderable eco no mic interes ts in fishing and the explo itatio n o fhydro carbo n reso urces and o ther seabed reso urces aro und the is lands ie in the Exclus ive Eco no mic Zo ne ando r the ExtendedCo ntinental Shelf Once the is lands` land area and the territo rial waters have been put as ide it wo uld be eas ier to co me to ano verall agreement o n the delimitatio n o f the EEZ bo rder (with the exceptio n o f the no rthern part which wo uld require a trilateralagreement between China Japan and Ko rea) which wo uld include the delimitatio n o f these surro unding waters It wo uld facilitate aco mpro mise if bo th s ides agree that the is lands do no t merit their o wn EEZ This might be diff icult fo r Japan which claims an EEZ fo rOkino to rishima refuted by China s ince it co ns iders the reef no t to be an is land acco rding to Art 121 o f UNCLOS

A co mpro mise o n the so vereignty is sue co uld o nly be the o utco me ndash if at all ndash o f a success ful pro cess o f the abo ve o r co mparables teps In o rder to avo id a `winner take all` s ituatio n the co mpro mise wo uld have to invo lve a sharing arrangement His to ry o ffers

quite a number o f internatio nal precedents o f shared so vereignty referred to as co ndo minium in internatio nal law29 7 One case withso me s imilarities to the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands is a small is land (3000 sq m) in the river separating France and Spain kno wn asPheasant Is land o r Co nference Is land which even to day s till changes every s ix mo nths between France and Spain as o wner Like theSenkakuDiao yu Is lands the is land has no eco no mic value anymo re and the is land is o ff limits It was the lo catio n o f the s igning o f

the Treaty o f the Pyrenees in 1659 which ended a lo ng war 29 8 Mo s t o ther examples o f jo int so vereignty co ncern territo ries with apo pulatio n which makes co o peratio n much mo re diff icult Other his to rical precedents o f sharing so vereignty are the es tablishmento f ldquoneutral zo nesrdquo Acco rdingly the is lands and po ss ibly a sea area aro und the is lands co uld be declared a neutral zo ne like the o nebetween Saudi Arabia and Kuwait (1922-1965) On July 7 1965 the two go vernments s igned an agreement (which to o k effect o nJuly 25 1966) to partitio n the Neutral Zo ne adjo ining their respective territo ries A demarcatio n agreement dividing the NeutralZo ne was s igned o n December 17 1967

Particularly relevant here is that Saudi Arabia as well as Kuwait explo ited the o il reso urces under a jo int o perating agreement29 9

Co nclus io ns

The actio n-reactio n pattern o f the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands dispute is accelerating and the initiative seems to be mo re o ften thanno t with the Chinese s ide while the Japanese s ide is in a defens ive po s itio n The danger o f a military co nfro ntatio n is lo o mingincreas ingly larger in what co uld be called a lsquochicken gamersquo At the same time the internal and external dynamics are undermining theenviro nment which is required fo r a peaceful so lutio n as well as fo r maintaining the number o f po s itive o ptio ns While the Japanesego vernment refuses to ackno wledge the very exis tence o f a territo rial dispute the Chinese go vernment is no w (July 2014) evenrefus ing to have a dialo gue with Japan`s current prime minis ter It is po ss ible that the Chinese s ide again wants to wait with anymo ve fo rward until the Japanese prime minis ter has changed as Beijing did with Prime Minis ter Sato Eisaku o r with Prime Minis terKo izumi Junichiro But waiting fo r an impro vement o f the bilateral atmo sphere as the Chinese s ide likes to s tress is a very riskyo ptio n and such an impro vement may anyway be a very sho rt windo w o f o ppo rtunity if lo o king at the ups and do wns o f the po s t-1949 his to ry o f the bilateral relatio nship

To s tart a s tep-by-s tep pro cess o f address ing the territo rial is sue s tro ng leadership is required which unders tands the widerinteres ts o f a functio ning Japanese-Chinese relatio nship Japan s imply asking China fo r a summit meeting is no t very sens ible ifthere is no willingness to engage in subs tantive dis cuss io ns and wo uld be very risky fo r China`s to p leader if the Japanese primeminis ter then vis its the Yasukuni Shrine The his to ry is sue sho uld no lo nger be a Chinese lever fo r pressuris ing Japan but the latterhas to abs tain fro m actio ns which are seen as pro vo cative no t o nly by China but also by Ko rea the US and many o thers There hasto be a co mmitted leadership o n bo th s ides which s tarts with a ro ugh ro ad map and tens io n-reducing s teps such as CSBMs en ro uteto agreeing o n a fo rmula which allo ws the parties to o btain eco no mic as well as security gains while reducing tens io ns

Reinhard Drifte is Emeritus Professor of Japanese Politics University of Newcastle UK and Visiting Professor at various Japanese Universities andPau University (France) He is the author of Japanrsquos Foreign Policy for the Twenty First Century His home page is here

Reco mmended citatio n Reinhard Drifte The Japan-China Confrontation Over the SenkakuDiaoyu Islands--Between shelving and dispute

patro lling activities o f the MSDF in the Senkaku area became kno wn when the Japanese repo rted at the end o f January 2013 that o n19 January a Chinese frigatersquos target radar had lo cked o nto an MSDF helico pter and o n 30 January ano ther frigate sailing clo se to

an MSDF des tro yer did likewise The Chinese vehemently denied it26 9 Ho wever in March this year the Kyo do news agency repo rtedthat senio r Chinese military o fficials had admitted the incident o f 29 January Even mo re wo rriso me is that the Chinese vessels

acted apparently witho ut prio r appro val fro m the fleet co mmand o r navy headquarters All this was denied by the Chinese s ide270 Itdid no t help that under Prime Minis ter No da the MSDF had been o rdered after the eruptio n o f the 2012 cris is to keep a greaterdis tance fro m PLAN ships than the hitherto 3 km in o rder avo id incidents but this po licy was reversed by the mo re hawkish Abe

adminis tratio n to the previo us 3 km dis tance271 The fire radar lo cking incident had happened at a dis tance o f 3 km

Agains t the backgro und o f greater invo lvement o f military fo rces it is particularly regrettable that a plan to build a maritime liaiso n

mechanism between their defense autho rities o n which they had agreed in June 2012 to make later that year was shelved272

Unfo rtunately it is s till Chinese practice to co ns ider Co nfidence Building Measures (CBM) no t as the firs t s tep to build co nfidencebut as a to o l to extract fro m the o ther s ide prio r co ncess io ns under the pretext o f `creating a better atmo sphere` fo r dis cuss ingCBM The o utbreak o f the September 2012 cris is was therefo re a co nvenient pretext fo r the Chinese to cancel the pro ject Thelates t co nfirmatio n was in March 2013 when General Yin Zhuo explained that there co uld be no military trus t if the po litical and

diplo matic relatio nship is bad273 Since the target radar lo ck-o n incidents the Japanese go vernment is publicly calling fo rresumptio n o f nego tiatio ns fo r the maritime liaiso n mechanism but the Chinese will certainly want to extract so me co ncess io nsbefo re even co ns idering a po s itive respo nse

Ho wever the co ns tant co nfro ntatio n between the po licing and military fo rces o f bo th s ides co uld eas ily lead to a military clasheither as a result o f an unfo reseen civilian o r military incident miscalculatio n o r malicio us intentio n at a lo wer level o f co mmandTwo recent examples o f unfo reseen civilian incidents co uld have escalated One is the attempted landing o n o ne o f the disputedis lands by a Chinese pro tes ter with a ballo o n in January 2014 This incident was peacefully reso lved because Japan did no t arres t theballo o nis t In this case the firs t repo rt o n the crash-landing in the territo rial waters o f Uo tsurijima came fro m the Taiwanese co as tguard which info rmed the Japanese co as t guard fo llo wed by the hand-o ver o f the ballo o nis t to the PRC autho rities o uts ide o f

Japan`s territo rial waters 274 The o ther incident was the s inking o f a Chinese fishing bo at ldquoto the no rth o f the Diao yu Is landsrdquo and

the mo ve o f two Chinese naval () vessels to rescue the crew275 This autho r co uld no t find o ut ho w clo se the fishing bo at came tothe is lands and apparently there has no t been any further repo rting abo ut the incident

The previo us ly mentio ned radar-targeting incidents and these two civilian incidents have no t led to an escalatio n but there is noguarantee fo r the future Shi Yinho ng a pro fesso r at Renmin Univers ity predicts that the territo rial co nflicts in the ECS So uth ChinaSea and alo ng the Sino -Indian bo rder will intens ify because o f po pular natio nalism dynamics within the armed fo rces and o f co urse

also o ur to p leaders perso nal beliefs and s trategic perso nalities 276 Hugh White argues that a war (which co uld lead to a nuclearexchange between China and the US) co uld also begin because the Chinese leadership may co ns ider that s tarting ho s tilities no wrather than later wo uld be mo re beneficial to either tes t US reso lve to defend Japan (which the Chinese leadership do ubts ) anddetermine the is sue o f Chinese supremacy in the As ian regio n which he co ns iders to be the real is sue rather than the is lands

themselves 277

IS THERE A WAY FORWARD

The current co nfro ntatio n is no t o nly co ntinuing but even escalating and do mes tic develo pments in bo th co untries are no t creatingan atmo sphere mo re co nducive to better management o f the cris is let alo ne finding a so lutio n Inactio n runs the risk o f a furtherescalatio n o r even a military clash while po s itive o ptio ns are beco ming fewer Meanwhile bo th co untries suffer fro m the eco no micfall-o ut and heightened tens io ns while the integratio n o f a ris ing China into a new s trategic enviro nment in As ia will beco me evenmo re fraught cas ting a shado w o n Japan`s clo se relatio nship with the US

The 2010 incident ended quickly with Japan`s release o f the captain One reaso n fo r this is certainly the fact that China`s demand in2010 was relatively clear and achievable (release o f the captain) if painful fo r Japan at a time o f a weak and inexperiencedgo vernment This time in September 2012 the cris is firs t hit a go vernment which reacted intrans igently because o f its previo usdefeat and o ther unfavo urable do mes tic circumstances and was then replaced by the mo re hawkish Abe go vernment The Abecabinet`s attitude to wards the pas t as exemplif ied by vario us s tatements by cabinet members and peo ple clo se to it the attempt torevise the Ko no s tatement reco gniz ing the fo rced war pro s titutio n (the military co mfo rt wo men) and Abe`s Yasukuni Shrine vis itall served China`s anti-Japan pro paganda wo rsened Japan-Ko rea relatio ns which China is cleverly explo iting and even angered theUS adminis tratio n Abe is seen as utiliz ing the tens io ns with China to win do mes tic and internatio nal suppo rt fo r Japan to have aldquono rmalrdquo natio nal defence po s ture The latter is welco me by the US adminis tratio n because it wo uld help with the US As ianrealignment and suppo rt its China po licy At the same time China`s actio ns cas t an o mino us shado w o n its intentio ns in the So uthChina Sea and Abe and mo re impo rtantly the US is suppo rting the claimants there agains t China

Under these bilateral multilateral and regio nal circumstances wo uld China be satis fied with go ing back to the `unders tanding abo utsetting as ide the dispute` in co njunctio n with Japan`s reco gnitio n o f the exis tence o f a territo rial dispute o r wo uld it demand areversal o f the purchase o f the three is lands Wo uld it demand the end o f Japanese CG patro ls aro und the is lands China`ss tandard demand no w that Japan `co rrect its mis takes` is rather ambiguo us because it co uld be interpreted as go ing back to theshelving unders tanding and the reco gnitio n o f the exis tence o f a dispute o r demanding a reversal o f the go vernment`s purchase o f

the is lands 278 The latter wo uld s imply be impo ss ible in legal and practical terms and o ne can o nly ho pe that the ambiguity is o nlyaimed at rais ing China`s nego tiatio n po s itio n ando r leaving eno ugh wiggle ro o m fo r nego tiatio ns which wo uld satis fy all Chineses takeho lders` interes ts

It seems that it is already to o late fo r go ing back to the shelving agreement o f 19721978 which wo uld imply that the two s ides canso meho w go back to the status quo o f the 1970s This as we have seen has been superseded by deeds and wo rds o n bo th s ides The Chinese have no w no t o nly publicly declared that the shelving agreement was lsquobro kenrsquo by Japan but after the firs t Y12 patro l o n13 December 2012 co mmented that ldquoThe s ituatio n has changed It has beco me no rmal fo r Chinas marine surveillance vessels to

enter the 12-nautical-mile zo ne Japans actual co ntro l o ver the is lands has go nerdquo279

The bilateral relatio nship has deterio rated to the extent that at leas t shelving the co nflicting so vereignty claims without o fficiallyadmitting that there is a territo rial dispute is no lo nger an o ptio n acceptable to China because it feels Japan has abused theshelving co nsensus thro ugh a series o f adminis trative measures with the final s traw having been the central go vernmentrsquos purchaseo f three is lands When s tudying the vario us Chinese o fficial s tatements and news repo rts after the 2012 cris is had fully erupted inSeptember it beco mes clear that until Octo ber 2012 the Chinese s till raised the demand that Japan sho uld go back to the previo uslsquounders tandingrsquo o r lsquoco nsensus rsquo but this demand was no t made o ften thereafter It reappeared in remarks by Wang Jiarui the head o fthe Co mmunis t partys Internatio nal Department when meeting Yamaguchi Natsuo the leader o f the junio r co alitio n partner

Ko meito in January 201328 0 Previo us ly a co mment o n the Xinhua internet s ite o n 29 Octo ber said that ldquoThe lsquopurchasersquo sho wed thatthe Japanese go vernment has who lly abando ned the attitude o f laying as ide disputes and has fundamentally changed the

s ituatio nrdquo28 1 On 30 Octo ber the CMOFA spo kesperso n declared that lsquoJapans illegal purchase o f the Diao yu Is lands bro ke the

impo rtant co nsensus The Japanese s ide sho uld no t have any mo re illus io n o f o ccupying the Diao yu Is lands What the Japaneses ide sho uld do is to face up to the reality admit the so vereignty dispute co rrect mis takes and co me back to the track o f a

nego tiated settlement`28 2 The lates t o fficial pro po sal to shelve the is lands is sue was made by the fo rmer fo reign minis ter Tang

Jiaxuan o n 16 July 201428 3

The reco gnitio n o f a territo rial pro blem wo uld be relatively easy fo r Japanese public o pinio n (and even mo re so fo r Japanrsquos friendsand allies ) to accept because they wo uld no t see the need fo r any kind o f diplo matic o r legal so phis try fo r what is o bvio us ly aterrito rial co nflict whatever the legitimacy o f the Chinese claim might be given also the fact that the current Japanese po s itio nco mes do wn to refus ing to even dis cuss whatever settlement might be po ss ible Acco rding to a survey co nducted by Genro nto gether with Zho ngguo Ribao she in June 2012 627 per cent o f Japanese agreed that there exis ts a territo rial pro blem dispute

(176 disagreed) co mpared with 822 o f the Chinese (139 disagreed)28 4 Ho wever co nsecutive Japanese cabinets haverefused to reco gnise the exis tence o f a territo rial dispute which is o ften the default po s itio n o f a go vernment in actual co ntro l o f adisputed territo ry (fo r example the Ko rean go vernmentrsquos po s itio n o n Do kto Takeshima) This po s itio n has been reinfo rced by theexplicit Japanese denial s ince the 1990s o f a shelving agreement which wo uld have been an implicit admiss io n that there is adispute To circumvent the risk o f being perceived as admitting the exis tence o f a territo rial pro blem the deputy prime minis ter o fthe previo us No da go vernment Okada Katsuya was repo rted to have mentio ned in a speech in Octo ber 2012 that there was no

territo rial dispute but as a matter o f fact a debate exis ted28 5 Ho wever this co mpro mise so lutio n was never co nfirmed by the No dago vernment and did no t beco me po licy It is even less likely to be acceptable to the new Abe go vernment Even amo ng influentialo pinio n makers there is hardly any suppo rt fo r admitting the exis tence o f a territo rial co nflict o r o f a shelving agreement Even mo reco nciliato ry s tatements o n this subject are rather vague Maehara Seiji o f the Demo cratic Party declared in a co nference at QinghuaUnivers ity in Beijing in September 2013 that the Japanese go vernment sho uld add (to its o wn po s itio n) that China has a differentview (Senkakusho to wo meguru Niho n seifu no tachiba ni tsuite lsquoChugo ku ga chigau kangaekata wo mo tte iru to iuko to wo ichigen

tsukekuwaerubeki darsquo) At the same time he emphas ised ho wever that there was no territo rial dispute28 6 Japan Bus inessFederatio n Chairman Yo nekura Hiro masa mentio ned in September 2012 in an NHK interview that the go vernment sho uld be mo re

flexible s ince o therwise its s tance co uld be taken to mean that Japan has no intentio n o f so lving the dispute28 7 Miyamo to Yuji thefo rmer Japanese ambassado r to China is quo ted as saying that lsquoThe go vernment do es no t need to alter its bas ic po s itio n but in

reality a co nflict do es exis t o ver the Senkaku is les rsquo 28 8 This is also the s tance which the previo us Japanese ambassado r Niwa

Uichiro takes in an article after his return to Japan28 9

Co ncerning co nflict reso lutio n it is interes ting to no te that when asked abo ut the mo dern s ignificance o f the 1978 Japan-ChinaPeace and Friendship Treaty 68 4 o f the po lled Japanese agreed with Art 12 (lsquoThe two parties shall settle all disputes by peacefulmeans and shall refrain fro m the use o r threat o f fo rcersquo) but o nly 525 o f the Chinese agreed Mo reo ver 58 1 o f the Chinese

favo ur China s trengthening its co ntro l o ver the area29 0

If therefo re a new ldquoimplicit unders tandingrdquo abo ut shelving the dispute is achievable it wo uld have to be based o n learning fro m thefailures o f the 19721978 shelving ie it wo uld be necessary to achieve a mutual unders tanding o f what the s tatus quo is whatwo uld undermine the s tatus quo and what has to be do ne to mo ve fro m co nflict management to so lutio n Quite clearly such a newunders tanding wo uld be less favo urable to Japan`s current s tance o n the dispute

FROM CONFLICT MANAGEMENT TO ADDRESSING THE SOVEREIGNTY ISSUE

Any mo ve fo rward will certainly require decis ive leadership o n bo th s ides be it to take the initiative o r to respo nd po s itively to theinitiative o f s tarting the pro cess to wards reso lutio n In view o f the co mplex backgro und o f the external and internal dynamics it iso bvio us that address ing the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands dispute requires a s tep-by-s tep appro ach The ultimate is sue to address is theso vereignty is sue and territo rial disputes are generally viewed as zero sum in nature given their clo se link to co re securityinteres ts Even tho se who reco gnize the impo rtance o f transcending such lo gic in favo ur o f co ndo minium o r shared so vereigntygenerally ho ld that the is sue can o nly be addressed at the las t s tage o f any nego tiated pro cess if at all

Two impo rtant is sues have to be co ns idered at the beginning to what extent have the vario us s tages o f the nego tiating pro cess tobe agreed befo rehand (lsquoro ad maprsquo) o r even the final o utco me whether a viable co ndo minium o r o nly shelving the is sues and co uldthe ro le o f a third party mediato r be helpfulacceptable In view o f the po litical diff iculties o n bo th s ides the s tart o f thenego tiatio n pro cess wo uld be endangered if there is no t sufficient ro o m fo r ambiguity and interpretatio n abo ut the vario us s tages altho ugh the general aim o f tens io n reductio n and suspens io n o f the so vereignty is sue mus t be clearly agreed

A third party mediato r is pro bably no t acceptable to the Chinese s ide The third party mo s t o ften mentio ned is the Internatio nalCo urt o f Jus tice (ICJ) o r any kind o f internatio nal arbitratio n Ho wever this seems unlikely in view o f China`s preference fo rbilateral nego tiatio ns and its refusal to accept judicial settlement by the ICJ o r any internatio nal arbitratio n except in no n-po litical

areas such as trade29 1 The Japanese go vernment wo uld be willing to accept the jurisdictio n o f the ICJ but o nly if China brings the

case to the Co urt les t it be perceived as ackno wledging the exis tence o f a territo rial dispute29 2 But there are also po litical andpro cedural arguments agains t the reco urse to the ICJ China`s legal argumentatio n is co mparatively weak and s ince a negativejudgement co uld have implicatio ns fo r China`s legal claim to mo s t o f the So uth China Sea there is even less o f a chance o f Chinamaking an exceptio n fo r the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands dispute In view o f the entrenched po s itio ns o f bo th s ides and the risk o f a`winner takes all` o utco me o f internatio nal litigatio n bo th go vernments wo uld face co ns iderable do mes tic res is tance in case o f anegative o utco me In view o f the urgency o f the dispute and the lo ng time it takes fo r a judgement there wo uld also be the risk o fdo mes tic fo rces trying to pre-empt a negative result

In view o f the security is sues invo lved (let alo ne the American his to rical `debt` as a result o f Washingto n`s ambiguity related toWashingto n`s ending o f the adminis tratio n o f Okinawa in 1972) an American mediatio n co uld be seen as natural and even inAmerican interes ts Such an American ro le ho wever is extremely unlikely as it wo uld be seen by China as unduly advantageo us toJapan Ho wever at so me po int during the Japan-China nego tiatio n pro cess the US might ass is t (o r even be reques ted) by agreeingto certain Co nfidence and Security Building Measures (CSBM) in the area aro und the is lands

The firs t s tage wo uld have to co ns is t o f measures which reduce the risk o f a military clash but in a way which prevents theperceptio n that o ne s ide is giving in to co ercio n This s tage wo uld be a gradual phas ing o ut o f intrus io ns by Chinese o fficial vesselsand aircraft into the territo rial waters co ntiguo us zo ne and airspace o f the is lands which is recipro cated by Japanrsquos reducing in thesame way its co as tguard patro ls in the two zo nes as well as its s crambling activities in the is lands` airspace There were repo rts in

June 2013 that China called o n Japan to agree to a 12-nautical-mile no -entry zo ne aro und the is lands 29 3 Japan rejected this co urse

Ano ther measure wo uld be to increase the dis tance at which vessels o f bo th maritime fo rces o bserve each o ther Such s teps sho uldultimately be o fficialised by a gradually expanding series o f CSBMs and a bilateral liaiso n mechanism This co uld also include ademilitarisatio n agreement as an incentive fo r the Chinese s ide It wo uld be vital that the s teps at this s tage be incremental that nos tep is explo ited in a o ne-s ided way and that they are co ns idered irrevers ible At the same time bo th s ides have to prevent peo plefro m appro aching the is lands s ince this wo uld be seen as a pro vo catio n by the o ther s ide This latter task is technically no t easy

because o f the co ntro vers ial character o f any co mpro mise with certain no n-s tate acto rs in Japan China Ho ng Ko ng and Taiwan The(failed) landing o f a Chinese ho t ballo o n o n o ne o f the is lands in January 2014 demo ns trated at the same time the technical

diff iculty o f a no -entry po licy as well as the po ss ibility o f a success ful co o peratio n o f the co as tguards o f all three co untries 29 4

At this firs t s tage o r leading to the next there will have to be a Japanese go vernment s tatement to the effect that there is alsquopro blemrsquo related to the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands This can be wo rded in such a way that the sens itive express io n `territo rialpro blem` (which is s trenuo us ly denied by the go vernment) is avo ided and it can be supplemented by a sentence that such as tatement in no way prejudices the legal po s itio n o f the go vernment Such a qualifying s tatement is fo r example included in the

Japan-China agreement fo r prio r no tif icatio n o f research vessels fro m bo th co untries in the Eas t China Sea in 200029 5 A s imilarqualif icatio n is part o f the 1997 Japan-China Fisheries Agreement In the jo int co mmuniqueacute o f 1972 which no rmalised diplo maticrelatio ns between Japan and China diplo matic wo rding also managed to bridge the huge gap between their s tances o n Taiwan whichthe PRC co ns iders an lsquoinalienable partrsquo o f its territo ry Japan co ns iders the so vereignty is sue s till unreso lved because the 1951 SanFrancis co Peace Treaty Art 2 (b) o nly s tipulated that lsquoJapan reno unces all right title and claim to Fo rmo sa and the Pescado res rsquowitho ut clarifying the recipient o f the territo ry The co mpro mise in 1972 was reached with the sentence that Japan lsquofully unders tandsand respects this s tand o f the Go vernment o f the Peo ples Republic o f China and it f irmly maintains its s tand under Article 8 o f thePo tsdam Pro clamatio nrsquo

POSSIBLE APPROACHES TO THE SOVEREIGNTY ISSUE

The mo s t diff icult pro blem is the so vereignty is sue which go es to the co re o f any co untry`s security interes ts It is no t imaginablethat either s ide will reno unce its claim to the is lands Sides tepping o r shelving the is sue is o nly useful if the lesso ns fro m the 1972and 1978 attempts as o utlined abo ve can be learned and applied but there is s till the fundamental pro blem with the implicitassumptio n that the quality o f the bilateral relatio nship will always be as go o d as when the s ides tepping agreement was achievedand can be maintained in perpetuity o r until the so vereignty is sue can be addressed But in o rder to so lve the so vereignty is sue aneven better relatio nship has to be created This better relatio nship co uld be bro ught abo ut by the s teps explained abo ve and furtherbelo w

An impo rtant co nditio n fo r any las ting territo rial co mpro mise wo uld be reducing the value o f the is lands fo r bo th co untries whichcan be achieved by o ne o f the measures pro po sed fo r s tage 1 ie reso lutely preventing anyo ne fro m appro aching the territo ries(including to tal demilitarizatio n) which in themselves are eco no mically wo rthless and are uninhabited The main po int is to preventany go vernmental act which co uld be interpreted as being part o f the `so vereignty game` The mo s t diff icult part here is to preventany act by no n-go vernmental acto rs This wo uld have to include the territo rial waters and the explo itatio n there in o f any kind o freso urces including fishing Scientif ic interes ts in the is lands co uld be served by bilateral surveys witho ut any po litical co nno tatio ns

There have been pro po sals to declare the is lands an Internatio nal Nature and Wildlife Preserve29 6 Such a preserve wo uld have to beadminis tered either bilaterally o r by a relevant internatio nal o rganisatio n and as such co uld serve as a co nfidence-building measure

The abo ve s teps wo uld then allo w the two s ides to deal with the co ns iderable eco no mic interes ts in fishing and the explo itatio n o fhydro carbo n reso urces and o ther seabed reso urces aro und the is lands ie in the Exclus ive Eco no mic Zo ne ando r the ExtendedCo ntinental Shelf Once the is lands` land area and the territo rial waters have been put as ide it wo uld be eas ier to co me to ano verall agreement o n the delimitatio n o f the EEZ bo rder (with the exceptio n o f the no rthern part which wo uld require a trilateralagreement between China Japan and Ko rea) which wo uld include the delimitatio n o f these surro unding waters It wo uld facilitate aco mpro mise if bo th s ides agree that the is lands do no t merit their o wn EEZ This might be diff icult fo r Japan which claims an EEZ fo rOkino to rishima refuted by China s ince it co ns iders the reef no t to be an is land acco rding to Art 121 o f UNCLOS

A co mpro mise o n the so vereignty is sue co uld o nly be the o utco me ndash if at all ndash o f a success ful pro cess o f the abo ve o r co mparables teps In o rder to avo id a `winner take all` s ituatio n the co mpro mise wo uld have to invo lve a sharing arrangement His to ry o ffers

quite a number o f internatio nal precedents o f shared so vereignty referred to as co ndo minium in internatio nal law29 7 One case withso me s imilarities to the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands is a small is land (3000 sq m) in the river separating France and Spain kno wn asPheasant Is land o r Co nference Is land which even to day s till changes every s ix mo nths between France and Spain as o wner Like theSenkakuDiao yu Is lands the is land has no eco no mic value anymo re and the is land is o ff limits It was the lo catio n o f the s igning o f

the Treaty o f the Pyrenees in 1659 which ended a lo ng war 29 8 Mo s t o ther examples o f jo int so vereignty co ncern territo ries with apo pulatio n which makes co o peratio n much mo re diff icult Other his to rical precedents o f sharing so vereignty are the es tablishmento f ldquoneutral zo nesrdquo Acco rdingly the is lands and po ss ibly a sea area aro und the is lands co uld be declared a neutral zo ne like the o nebetween Saudi Arabia and Kuwait (1922-1965) On July 7 1965 the two go vernments s igned an agreement (which to o k effect o nJuly 25 1966) to partitio n the Neutral Zo ne adjo ining their respective territo ries A demarcatio n agreement dividing the NeutralZo ne was s igned o n December 17 1967

Particularly relevant here is that Saudi Arabia as well as Kuwait explo ited the o il reso urces under a jo int o perating agreement29 9

Co nclus io ns

The actio n-reactio n pattern o f the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands dispute is accelerating and the initiative seems to be mo re o ften thanno t with the Chinese s ide while the Japanese s ide is in a defens ive po s itio n The danger o f a military co nfro ntatio n is lo o mingincreas ingly larger in what co uld be called a lsquochicken gamersquo At the same time the internal and external dynamics are undermining theenviro nment which is required fo r a peaceful so lutio n as well as fo r maintaining the number o f po s itive o ptio ns While the Japanesego vernment refuses to ackno wledge the very exis tence o f a territo rial dispute the Chinese go vernment is no w (July 2014) evenrefus ing to have a dialo gue with Japan`s current prime minis ter It is po ss ible that the Chinese s ide again wants to wait with anymo ve fo rward until the Japanese prime minis ter has changed as Beijing did with Prime Minis ter Sato Eisaku o r with Prime Minis terKo izumi Junichiro But waiting fo r an impro vement o f the bilateral atmo sphere as the Chinese s ide likes to s tress is a very riskyo ptio n and such an impro vement may anyway be a very sho rt windo w o f o ppo rtunity if lo o king at the ups and do wns o f the po s t-1949 his to ry o f the bilateral relatio nship

To s tart a s tep-by-s tep pro cess o f address ing the territo rial is sue s tro ng leadership is required which unders tands the widerinteres ts o f a functio ning Japanese-Chinese relatio nship Japan s imply asking China fo r a summit meeting is no t very sens ible ifthere is no willingness to engage in subs tantive dis cuss io ns and wo uld be very risky fo r China`s to p leader if the Japanese primeminis ter then vis its the Yasukuni Shrine The his to ry is sue sho uld no lo nger be a Chinese lever fo r pressuris ing Japan but the latterhas to abs tain fro m actio ns which are seen as pro vo cative no t o nly by China but also by Ko rea the US and many o thers There hasto be a co mmitted leadership o n bo th s ides which s tarts with a ro ugh ro ad map and tens io n-reducing s teps such as CSBMs en ro uteto agreeing o n a fo rmula which allo ws the parties to o btain eco no mic as well as security gains while reducing tens io ns

Reinhard Drifte is Emeritus Professor of Japanese Politics University of Newcastle UK and Visiting Professor at various Japanese Universities andPau University (France) He is the author of Japanrsquos Foreign Policy for the Twenty First Century His home page is here

Reco mmended citatio n Reinhard Drifte The Japan-China Confrontation Over the SenkakuDiaoyu Islands--Between shelving and dispute

impo rtant co nsensus The Japanese s ide sho uld no t have any mo re illus io n o f o ccupying the Diao yu Is lands What the Japaneses ide sho uld do is to face up to the reality admit the so vereignty dispute co rrect mis takes and co me back to the track o f a

nego tiated settlement`28 2 The lates t o fficial pro po sal to shelve the is lands is sue was made by the fo rmer fo reign minis ter Tang

Jiaxuan o n 16 July 201428 3

The reco gnitio n o f a territo rial pro blem wo uld be relatively easy fo r Japanese public o pinio n (and even mo re so fo r Japanrsquos friendsand allies ) to accept because they wo uld no t see the need fo r any kind o f diplo matic o r legal so phis try fo r what is o bvio us ly aterrito rial co nflict whatever the legitimacy o f the Chinese claim might be given also the fact that the current Japanese po s itio nco mes do wn to refus ing to even dis cuss whatever settlement might be po ss ible Acco rding to a survey co nducted by Genro nto gether with Zho ngguo Ribao she in June 2012 627 per cent o f Japanese agreed that there exis ts a territo rial pro blem dispute

(176 disagreed) co mpared with 822 o f the Chinese (139 disagreed)28 4 Ho wever co nsecutive Japanese cabinets haverefused to reco gnise the exis tence o f a territo rial dispute which is o ften the default po s itio n o f a go vernment in actual co ntro l o f adisputed territo ry (fo r example the Ko rean go vernmentrsquos po s itio n o n Do kto Takeshima) This po s itio n has been reinfo rced by theexplicit Japanese denial s ince the 1990s o f a shelving agreement which wo uld have been an implicit admiss io n that there is adispute To circumvent the risk o f being perceived as admitting the exis tence o f a territo rial pro blem the deputy prime minis ter o fthe previo us No da go vernment Okada Katsuya was repo rted to have mentio ned in a speech in Octo ber 2012 that there was no

territo rial dispute but as a matter o f fact a debate exis ted28 5 Ho wever this co mpro mise so lutio n was never co nfirmed by the No dago vernment and did no t beco me po licy It is even less likely to be acceptable to the new Abe go vernment Even amo ng influentialo pinio n makers there is hardly any suppo rt fo r admitting the exis tence o f a territo rial co nflict o r o f a shelving agreement Even mo reco nciliato ry s tatements o n this subject are rather vague Maehara Seiji o f the Demo cratic Party declared in a co nference at QinghuaUnivers ity in Beijing in September 2013 that the Japanese go vernment sho uld add (to its o wn po s itio n) that China has a differentview (Senkakusho to wo meguru Niho n seifu no tachiba ni tsuite lsquoChugo ku ga chigau kangaekata wo mo tte iru to iuko to wo ichigen

tsukekuwaerubeki darsquo) At the same time he emphas ised ho wever that there was no territo rial dispute28 6 Japan Bus inessFederatio n Chairman Yo nekura Hiro masa mentio ned in September 2012 in an NHK interview that the go vernment sho uld be mo re

flexible s ince o therwise its s tance co uld be taken to mean that Japan has no intentio n o f so lving the dispute28 7 Miyamo to Yuji thefo rmer Japanese ambassado r to China is quo ted as saying that lsquoThe go vernment do es no t need to alter its bas ic po s itio n but in

reality a co nflict do es exis t o ver the Senkaku is les rsquo 28 8 This is also the s tance which the previo us Japanese ambassado r Niwa

Uichiro takes in an article after his return to Japan28 9

Co ncerning co nflict reso lutio n it is interes ting to no te that when asked abo ut the mo dern s ignificance o f the 1978 Japan-ChinaPeace and Friendship Treaty 68 4 o f the po lled Japanese agreed with Art 12 (lsquoThe two parties shall settle all disputes by peacefulmeans and shall refrain fro m the use o r threat o f fo rcersquo) but o nly 525 o f the Chinese agreed Mo reo ver 58 1 o f the Chinese

favo ur China s trengthening its co ntro l o ver the area29 0

If therefo re a new ldquoimplicit unders tandingrdquo abo ut shelving the dispute is achievable it wo uld have to be based o n learning fro m thefailures o f the 19721978 shelving ie it wo uld be necessary to achieve a mutual unders tanding o f what the s tatus quo is whatwo uld undermine the s tatus quo and what has to be do ne to mo ve fro m co nflict management to so lutio n Quite clearly such a newunders tanding wo uld be less favo urable to Japan`s current s tance o n the dispute

FROM CONFLICT MANAGEMENT TO ADDRESSING THE SOVEREIGNTY ISSUE

Any mo ve fo rward will certainly require decis ive leadership o n bo th s ides be it to take the initiative o r to respo nd po s itively to theinitiative o f s tarting the pro cess to wards reso lutio n In view o f the co mplex backgro und o f the external and internal dynamics it iso bvio us that address ing the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands dispute requires a s tep-by-s tep appro ach The ultimate is sue to address is theso vereignty is sue and territo rial disputes are generally viewed as zero sum in nature given their clo se link to co re securityinteres ts Even tho se who reco gnize the impo rtance o f transcending such lo gic in favo ur o f co ndo minium o r shared so vereigntygenerally ho ld that the is sue can o nly be addressed at the las t s tage o f any nego tiated pro cess if at all

Two impo rtant is sues have to be co ns idered at the beginning to what extent have the vario us s tages o f the nego tiating pro cess tobe agreed befo rehand (lsquoro ad maprsquo) o r even the final o utco me whether a viable co ndo minium o r o nly shelving the is sues and co uldthe ro le o f a third party mediato r be helpfulacceptable In view o f the po litical diff iculties o n bo th s ides the s tart o f thenego tiatio n pro cess wo uld be endangered if there is no t sufficient ro o m fo r ambiguity and interpretatio n abo ut the vario us s tages altho ugh the general aim o f tens io n reductio n and suspens io n o f the so vereignty is sue mus t be clearly agreed

A third party mediato r is pro bably no t acceptable to the Chinese s ide The third party mo s t o ften mentio ned is the Internatio nalCo urt o f Jus tice (ICJ) o r any kind o f internatio nal arbitratio n Ho wever this seems unlikely in view o f China`s preference fo rbilateral nego tiatio ns and its refusal to accept judicial settlement by the ICJ o r any internatio nal arbitratio n except in no n-po litical

areas such as trade29 1 The Japanese go vernment wo uld be willing to accept the jurisdictio n o f the ICJ but o nly if China brings the

case to the Co urt les t it be perceived as ackno wledging the exis tence o f a territo rial dispute29 2 But there are also po litical andpro cedural arguments agains t the reco urse to the ICJ China`s legal argumentatio n is co mparatively weak and s ince a negativejudgement co uld have implicatio ns fo r China`s legal claim to mo s t o f the So uth China Sea there is even less o f a chance o f Chinamaking an exceptio n fo r the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands dispute In view o f the entrenched po s itio ns o f bo th s ides and the risk o f a`winner takes all` o utco me o f internatio nal litigatio n bo th go vernments wo uld face co ns iderable do mes tic res is tance in case o f anegative o utco me In view o f the urgency o f the dispute and the lo ng time it takes fo r a judgement there wo uld also be the risk o fdo mes tic fo rces trying to pre-empt a negative result

In view o f the security is sues invo lved (let alo ne the American his to rical `debt` as a result o f Washingto n`s ambiguity related toWashingto n`s ending o f the adminis tratio n o f Okinawa in 1972) an American mediatio n co uld be seen as natural and even inAmerican interes ts Such an American ro le ho wever is extremely unlikely as it wo uld be seen by China as unduly advantageo us toJapan Ho wever at so me po int during the Japan-China nego tiatio n pro cess the US might ass is t (o r even be reques ted) by agreeingto certain Co nfidence and Security Building Measures (CSBM) in the area aro und the is lands

The firs t s tage wo uld have to co ns is t o f measures which reduce the risk o f a military clash but in a way which prevents theperceptio n that o ne s ide is giving in to co ercio n This s tage wo uld be a gradual phas ing o ut o f intrus io ns by Chinese o fficial vesselsand aircraft into the territo rial waters co ntiguo us zo ne and airspace o f the is lands which is recipro cated by Japanrsquos reducing in thesame way its co as tguard patro ls in the two zo nes as well as its s crambling activities in the is lands` airspace There were repo rts in

June 2013 that China called o n Japan to agree to a 12-nautical-mile no -entry zo ne aro und the is lands 29 3 Japan rejected this co urse

Ano ther measure wo uld be to increase the dis tance at which vessels o f bo th maritime fo rces o bserve each o ther Such s teps sho uldultimately be o fficialised by a gradually expanding series o f CSBMs and a bilateral liaiso n mechanism This co uld also include ademilitarisatio n agreement as an incentive fo r the Chinese s ide It wo uld be vital that the s teps at this s tage be incremental that nos tep is explo ited in a o ne-s ided way and that they are co ns idered irrevers ible At the same time bo th s ides have to prevent peo plefro m appro aching the is lands s ince this wo uld be seen as a pro vo catio n by the o ther s ide This latter task is technically no t easy

because o f the co ntro vers ial character o f any co mpro mise with certain no n-s tate acto rs in Japan China Ho ng Ko ng and Taiwan The(failed) landing o f a Chinese ho t ballo o n o n o ne o f the is lands in January 2014 demo ns trated at the same time the technical

diff iculty o f a no -entry po licy as well as the po ss ibility o f a success ful co o peratio n o f the co as tguards o f all three co untries 29 4

At this firs t s tage o r leading to the next there will have to be a Japanese go vernment s tatement to the effect that there is alsquopro blemrsquo related to the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands This can be wo rded in such a way that the sens itive express io n `territo rialpro blem` (which is s trenuo us ly denied by the go vernment) is avo ided and it can be supplemented by a sentence that such as tatement in no way prejudices the legal po s itio n o f the go vernment Such a qualifying s tatement is fo r example included in the

Japan-China agreement fo r prio r no tif icatio n o f research vessels fro m bo th co untries in the Eas t China Sea in 200029 5 A s imilarqualif icatio n is part o f the 1997 Japan-China Fisheries Agreement In the jo int co mmuniqueacute o f 1972 which no rmalised diplo maticrelatio ns between Japan and China diplo matic wo rding also managed to bridge the huge gap between their s tances o n Taiwan whichthe PRC co ns iders an lsquoinalienable partrsquo o f its territo ry Japan co ns iders the so vereignty is sue s till unreso lved because the 1951 SanFrancis co Peace Treaty Art 2 (b) o nly s tipulated that lsquoJapan reno unces all right title and claim to Fo rmo sa and the Pescado res rsquowitho ut clarifying the recipient o f the territo ry The co mpro mise in 1972 was reached with the sentence that Japan lsquofully unders tandsand respects this s tand o f the Go vernment o f the Peo ples Republic o f China and it f irmly maintains its s tand under Article 8 o f thePo tsdam Pro clamatio nrsquo

POSSIBLE APPROACHES TO THE SOVEREIGNTY ISSUE

The mo s t diff icult pro blem is the so vereignty is sue which go es to the co re o f any co untry`s security interes ts It is no t imaginablethat either s ide will reno unce its claim to the is lands Sides tepping o r shelving the is sue is o nly useful if the lesso ns fro m the 1972and 1978 attempts as o utlined abo ve can be learned and applied but there is s till the fundamental pro blem with the implicitassumptio n that the quality o f the bilateral relatio nship will always be as go o d as when the s ides tepping agreement was achievedand can be maintained in perpetuity o r until the so vereignty is sue can be addressed But in o rder to so lve the so vereignty is sue aneven better relatio nship has to be created This better relatio nship co uld be bro ught abo ut by the s teps explained abo ve and furtherbelo w

An impo rtant co nditio n fo r any las ting territo rial co mpro mise wo uld be reducing the value o f the is lands fo r bo th co untries whichcan be achieved by o ne o f the measures pro po sed fo r s tage 1 ie reso lutely preventing anyo ne fro m appro aching the territo ries(including to tal demilitarizatio n) which in themselves are eco no mically wo rthless and are uninhabited The main po int is to preventany go vernmental act which co uld be interpreted as being part o f the `so vereignty game` The mo s t diff icult part here is to preventany act by no n-go vernmental acto rs This wo uld have to include the territo rial waters and the explo itatio n there in o f any kind o freso urces including fishing Scientif ic interes ts in the is lands co uld be served by bilateral surveys witho ut any po litical co nno tatio ns

There have been pro po sals to declare the is lands an Internatio nal Nature and Wildlife Preserve29 6 Such a preserve wo uld have to beadminis tered either bilaterally o r by a relevant internatio nal o rganisatio n and as such co uld serve as a co nfidence-building measure

The abo ve s teps wo uld then allo w the two s ides to deal with the co ns iderable eco no mic interes ts in fishing and the explo itatio n o fhydro carbo n reso urces and o ther seabed reso urces aro und the is lands ie in the Exclus ive Eco no mic Zo ne ando r the ExtendedCo ntinental Shelf Once the is lands` land area and the territo rial waters have been put as ide it wo uld be eas ier to co me to ano verall agreement o n the delimitatio n o f the EEZ bo rder (with the exceptio n o f the no rthern part which wo uld require a trilateralagreement between China Japan and Ko rea) which wo uld include the delimitatio n o f these surro unding waters It wo uld facilitate aco mpro mise if bo th s ides agree that the is lands do no t merit their o wn EEZ This might be diff icult fo r Japan which claims an EEZ fo rOkino to rishima refuted by China s ince it co ns iders the reef no t to be an is land acco rding to Art 121 o f UNCLOS

A co mpro mise o n the so vereignty is sue co uld o nly be the o utco me ndash if at all ndash o f a success ful pro cess o f the abo ve o r co mparables teps In o rder to avo id a `winner take all` s ituatio n the co mpro mise wo uld have to invo lve a sharing arrangement His to ry o ffers

quite a number o f internatio nal precedents o f shared so vereignty referred to as co ndo minium in internatio nal law29 7 One case withso me s imilarities to the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands is a small is land (3000 sq m) in the river separating France and Spain kno wn asPheasant Is land o r Co nference Is land which even to day s till changes every s ix mo nths between France and Spain as o wner Like theSenkakuDiao yu Is lands the is land has no eco no mic value anymo re and the is land is o ff limits It was the lo catio n o f the s igning o f

the Treaty o f the Pyrenees in 1659 which ended a lo ng war 29 8 Mo s t o ther examples o f jo int so vereignty co ncern territo ries with apo pulatio n which makes co o peratio n much mo re diff icult Other his to rical precedents o f sharing so vereignty are the es tablishmento f ldquoneutral zo nesrdquo Acco rdingly the is lands and po ss ibly a sea area aro und the is lands co uld be declared a neutral zo ne like the o nebetween Saudi Arabia and Kuwait (1922-1965) On July 7 1965 the two go vernments s igned an agreement (which to o k effect o nJuly 25 1966) to partitio n the Neutral Zo ne adjo ining their respective territo ries A demarcatio n agreement dividing the NeutralZo ne was s igned o n December 17 1967

Particularly relevant here is that Saudi Arabia as well as Kuwait explo ited the o il reso urces under a jo int o perating agreement29 9

Co nclus io ns

The actio n-reactio n pattern o f the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands dispute is accelerating and the initiative seems to be mo re o ften thanno t with the Chinese s ide while the Japanese s ide is in a defens ive po s itio n The danger o f a military co nfro ntatio n is lo o mingincreas ingly larger in what co uld be called a lsquochicken gamersquo At the same time the internal and external dynamics are undermining theenviro nment which is required fo r a peaceful so lutio n as well as fo r maintaining the number o f po s itive o ptio ns While the Japanesego vernment refuses to ackno wledge the very exis tence o f a territo rial dispute the Chinese go vernment is no w (July 2014) evenrefus ing to have a dialo gue with Japan`s current prime minis ter It is po ss ible that the Chinese s ide again wants to wait with anymo ve fo rward until the Japanese prime minis ter has changed as Beijing did with Prime Minis ter Sato Eisaku o r with Prime Minis terKo izumi Junichiro But waiting fo r an impro vement o f the bilateral atmo sphere as the Chinese s ide likes to s tress is a very riskyo ptio n and such an impro vement may anyway be a very sho rt windo w o f o ppo rtunity if lo o king at the ups and do wns o f the po s t-1949 his to ry o f the bilateral relatio nship

To s tart a s tep-by-s tep pro cess o f address ing the territo rial is sue s tro ng leadership is required which unders tands the widerinteres ts o f a functio ning Japanese-Chinese relatio nship Japan s imply asking China fo r a summit meeting is no t very sens ible ifthere is no willingness to engage in subs tantive dis cuss io ns and wo uld be very risky fo r China`s to p leader if the Japanese primeminis ter then vis its the Yasukuni Shrine The his to ry is sue sho uld no lo nger be a Chinese lever fo r pressuris ing Japan but the latterhas to abs tain fro m actio ns which are seen as pro vo cative no t o nly by China but also by Ko rea the US and many o thers There hasto be a co mmitted leadership o n bo th s ides which s tarts with a ro ugh ro ad map and tens io n-reducing s teps such as CSBMs en ro uteto agreeing o n a fo rmula which allo ws the parties to o btain eco no mic as well as security gains while reducing tens io ns

Reinhard Drifte is Emeritus Professor of Japanese Politics University of Newcastle UK and Visiting Professor at various Japanese Universities andPau University (France) He is the author of Japanrsquos Foreign Policy for the Twenty First Century His home page is here

Reco mmended citatio n Reinhard Drifte The Japan-China Confrontation Over the SenkakuDiaoyu Islands--Between shelving and dispute

because o f the co ntro vers ial character o f any co mpro mise with certain no n-s tate acto rs in Japan China Ho ng Ko ng and Taiwan The(failed) landing o f a Chinese ho t ballo o n o n o ne o f the is lands in January 2014 demo ns trated at the same time the technical

diff iculty o f a no -entry po licy as well as the po ss ibility o f a success ful co o peratio n o f the co as tguards o f all three co untries 29 4

At this firs t s tage o r leading to the next there will have to be a Japanese go vernment s tatement to the effect that there is alsquopro blemrsquo related to the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands This can be wo rded in such a way that the sens itive express io n `territo rialpro blem` (which is s trenuo us ly denied by the go vernment) is avo ided and it can be supplemented by a sentence that such as tatement in no way prejudices the legal po s itio n o f the go vernment Such a qualifying s tatement is fo r example included in the

Japan-China agreement fo r prio r no tif icatio n o f research vessels fro m bo th co untries in the Eas t China Sea in 200029 5 A s imilarqualif icatio n is part o f the 1997 Japan-China Fisheries Agreement In the jo int co mmuniqueacute o f 1972 which no rmalised diplo maticrelatio ns between Japan and China diplo matic wo rding also managed to bridge the huge gap between their s tances o n Taiwan whichthe PRC co ns iders an lsquoinalienable partrsquo o f its territo ry Japan co ns iders the so vereignty is sue s till unreso lved because the 1951 SanFrancis co Peace Treaty Art 2 (b) o nly s tipulated that lsquoJapan reno unces all right title and claim to Fo rmo sa and the Pescado res rsquowitho ut clarifying the recipient o f the territo ry The co mpro mise in 1972 was reached with the sentence that Japan lsquofully unders tandsand respects this s tand o f the Go vernment o f the Peo ples Republic o f China and it f irmly maintains its s tand under Article 8 o f thePo tsdam Pro clamatio nrsquo

POSSIBLE APPROACHES TO THE SOVEREIGNTY ISSUE

The mo s t diff icult pro blem is the so vereignty is sue which go es to the co re o f any co untry`s security interes ts It is no t imaginablethat either s ide will reno unce its claim to the is lands Sides tepping o r shelving the is sue is o nly useful if the lesso ns fro m the 1972and 1978 attempts as o utlined abo ve can be learned and applied but there is s till the fundamental pro blem with the implicitassumptio n that the quality o f the bilateral relatio nship will always be as go o d as when the s ides tepping agreement was achievedand can be maintained in perpetuity o r until the so vereignty is sue can be addressed But in o rder to so lve the so vereignty is sue aneven better relatio nship has to be created This better relatio nship co uld be bro ught abo ut by the s teps explained abo ve and furtherbelo w

An impo rtant co nditio n fo r any las ting territo rial co mpro mise wo uld be reducing the value o f the is lands fo r bo th co untries whichcan be achieved by o ne o f the measures pro po sed fo r s tage 1 ie reso lutely preventing anyo ne fro m appro aching the territo ries(including to tal demilitarizatio n) which in themselves are eco no mically wo rthless and are uninhabited The main po int is to preventany go vernmental act which co uld be interpreted as being part o f the `so vereignty game` The mo s t diff icult part here is to preventany act by no n-go vernmental acto rs This wo uld have to include the territo rial waters and the explo itatio n there in o f any kind o freso urces including fishing Scientif ic interes ts in the is lands co uld be served by bilateral surveys witho ut any po litical co nno tatio ns

There have been pro po sals to declare the is lands an Internatio nal Nature and Wildlife Preserve29 6 Such a preserve wo uld have to beadminis tered either bilaterally o r by a relevant internatio nal o rganisatio n and as such co uld serve as a co nfidence-building measure

The abo ve s teps wo uld then allo w the two s ides to deal with the co ns iderable eco no mic interes ts in fishing and the explo itatio n o fhydro carbo n reso urces and o ther seabed reso urces aro und the is lands ie in the Exclus ive Eco no mic Zo ne ando r the ExtendedCo ntinental Shelf Once the is lands` land area and the territo rial waters have been put as ide it wo uld be eas ier to co me to ano verall agreement o n the delimitatio n o f the EEZ bo rder (with the exceptio n o f the no rthern part which wo uld require a trilateralagreement between China Japan and Ko rea) which wo uld include the delimitatio n o f these surro unding waters It wo uld facilitate aco mpro mise if bo th s ides agree that the is lands do no t merit their o wn EEZ This might be diff icult fo r Japan which claims an EEZ fo rOkino to rishima refuted by China s ince it co ns iders the reef no t to be an is land acco rding to Art 121 o f UNCLOS

A co mpro mise o n the so vereignty is sue co uld o nly be the o utco me ndash if at all ndash o f a success ful pro cess o f the abo ve o r co mparables teps In o rder to avo id a `winner take all` s ituatio n the co mpro mise wo uld have to invo lve a sharing arrangement His to ry o ffers

quite a number o f internatio nal precedents o f shared so vereignty referred to as co ndo minium in internatio nal law29 7 One case withso me s imilarities to the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands is a small is land (3000 sq m) in the river separating France and Spain kno wn asPheasant Is land o r Co nference Is land which even to day s till changes every s ix mo nths between France and Spain as o wner Like theSenkakuDiao yu Is lands the is land has no eco no mic value anymo re and the is land is o ff limits It was the lo catio n o f the s igning o f

the Treaty o f the Pyrenees in 1659 which ended a lo ng war 29 8 Mo s t o ther examples o f jo int so vereignty co ncern territo ries with apo pulatio n which makes co o peratio n much mo re diff icult Other his to rical precedents o f sharing so vereignty are the es tablishmento f ldquoneutral zo nesrdquo Acco rdingly the is lands and po ss ibly a sea area aro und the is lands co uld be declared a neutral zo ne like the o nebetween Saudi Arabia and Kuwait (1922-1965) On July 7 1965 the two go vernments s igned an agreement (which to o k effect o nJuly 25 1966) to partitio n the Neutral Zo ne adjo ining their respective territo ries A demarcatio n agreement dividing the NeutralZo ne was s igned o n December 17 1967

Particularly relevant here is that Saudi Arabia as well as Kuwait explo ited the o il reso urces under a jo int o perating agreement29 9

Co nclus io ns

The actio n-reactio n pattern o f the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands dispute is accelerating and the initiative seems to be mo re o ften thanno t with the Chinese s ide while the Japanese s ide is in a defens ive po s itio n The danger o f a military co nfro ntatio n is lo o mingincreas ingly larger in what co uld be called a lsquochicken gamersquo At the same time the internal and external dynamics are undermining theenviro nment which is required fo r a peaceful so lutio n as well as fo r maintaining the number o f po s itive o ptio ns While the Japanesego vernment refuses to ackno wledge the very exis tence o f a territo rial dispute the Chinese go vernment is no w (July 2014) evenrefus ing to have a dialo gue with Japan`s current prime minis ter It is po ss ible that the Chinese s ide again wants to wait with anymo ve fo rward until the Japanese prime minis ter has changed as Beijing did with Prime Minis ter Sato Eisaku o r with Prime Minis terKo izumi Junichiro But waiting fo r an impro vement o f the bilateral atmo sphere as the Chinese s ide likes to s tress is a very riskyo ptio n and such an impro vement may anyway be a very sho rt windo w o f o ppo rtunity if lo o king at the ups and do wns o f the po s t-1949 his to ry o f the bilateral relatio nship

To s tart a s tep-by-s tep pro cess o f address ing the territo rial is sue s tro ng leadership is required which unders tands the widerinteres ts o f a functio ning Japanese-Chinese relatio nship Japan s imply asking China fo r a summit meeting is no t very sens ible ifthere is no willingness to engage in subs tantive dis cuss io ns and wo uld be very risky fo r China`s to p leader if the Japanese primeminis ter then vis its the Yasukuni Shrine The his to ry is sue sho uld no lo nger be a Chinese lever fo r pressuris ing Japan but the latterhas to abs tain fro m actio ns which are seen as pro vo cative no t o nly by China but also by Ko rea the US and many o thers There hasto be a co mmitted leadership o n bo th s ides which s tarts with a ro ugh ro ad map and tens io n-reducing s teps such as CSBMs en ro uteto agreeing o n a fo rmula which allo ws the parties to o btain eco no mic as well as security gains while reducing tens io ns

Reinhard Drifte is Emeritus Professor of Japanese Politics University of Newcastle UK and Visiting Professor at various Japanese Universities andPau University (France) He is the author of Japanrsquos Foreign Policy for the Twenty First Century His home page is here

Reco mmended citatio n Reinhard Drifte The Japan-China Confrontation Over the SenkakuDiaoyu Islands--Between shelving and dispute

escalation The As ia-Pacific Jo urnal Vol 12 Issue 30 No 3 July 28 2014

Relat ed art icles

bull Yabuki Susumu with Mark Selden T he Origins o f t he SenkakuDiao yu Disput e bet ween China T aiwan and Japan

bull Gavan McCo rmack Much Ado o ver Small Islands T he Sino -Japanese Co nfro nt at io n o ver SenkakuDiao yu

bull Richard Tanter An Aust ralian Ro le in Reducing t he Pro spect s o f China-Japan War o ver t he SenkakusDiao yut ai

bull Lio nel Fatto n T he Pando rarsquos Bo x o f So vereignt y Co nf lict s Far-reaching regio nal co nsequences o f Japanrsquosnat io naliz at io n o f t he Senkakus

bull Ivy Lee and Fang Ming Deco nst ruct ing Japanrsquos Claim o f So vereignt y o ver t he Diao yuSenkaku Islands

bull Wada Haruki Reso lving t he China-Japan Co nf lict Over t he SenkakuDiao yu Islands

1 Shaw Han-yi (1999) The DiaoyutaiSenkaku Islands dispute its history and an analysis of the ownership claims of the PRC ROC andJapan Baltimo re Univers ity o f Maryland Scho o l o f Law p 64-68

2 ldquoJapan-China Relatio ns Surro unding the Situatio n o f the Senkaku Is lands In respo nse to Chinas Airspace Incurs io nrdquo Gaimusho Position Paper (18 December 2012) here Shaw Han-yi (1999) The DiaoyutaiSenkaku Islands dispute its history and an analysis of theownership claims of the PRC ROC and Japan Baltimo re Univers ity o f Maryland Scho o l o f Law p 22

3 Shaw op cit pp 42-69

4 Reedman Antho ny and Shimzaki Yo shihiko A world of Difference Forty Years of the Coordinating Committee for Geoscience Programmes inEast And Southeast Asia 1966-2006 Bangko k CCOP (September 2006) here p 43

5 See fo r example Yabuki Susumi with an intro ductio n by Mark Selden The Origins o f the SenkakuDiao yu Dispute between ChinaTaiwan and Japan

6 Zhang Haiwen and Gao Zhigo u (ed) (2012) Zhongguo de lingtu Diaoyudao Beijing Haiyangqu Chubanshe p 2 p 11

7 Diao yu Dao an inherent Territo ry o f China 25 September White Paper (2012) here

8 Treaty o f Shimo no seki Article 2c and 3

9 Shaw op cit p 25

10 Hane Jiro ldquoSenkaku mo ndai ni naizai suru ho riteki mujunrdquo Sekai (No vember 2012) p 113 Shaw op cit p 70

11 Shaw op cit p 84

12 Hane op cit p 120

13 Hane op cit pp 117-8 McCo rmack Gavan and Oka No rimatsu Sato ko RyukyuOkinawa Fro m Dispo sal to Res is tance TheAsia-Pacific Journal vol 10 Iss 38 no 1 (17 September 2012)

14 Shaw op cit p 85

15 White Paper Diao yu Dao op cit

16 Even in the early 1950s fishermen fro m Irabujima near Miyako jima so metimes s tayed o n Minami Ko jima (o ne o f the disputedis lands) fo r up to three mo nths to pro cess bo nito and keep vegetable gardens but were to ld in 1971 by the Japanese go vernmentno t to go there anymo re when China suddenly claimed the Senkaku Is lands Until then Japanese researchers had also go ne to theis lands o n several o ccas io ns and the is lands were used as shelter during typho o ns ldquoA ho me away fro m ho me Fishermen wo rkedto o k shelter grew vegetables o n Senkakusrdquo Yomiuri Shimbun 7 July 2012 at

17 Text o f the letter here

18 Zhu Jianro ng ldquoChugo kugawa kara mita `Senkaku mo ndai`rdquo Sekai (No vember 2012) p 107

19 Text o f the article at Japan-China Relatio ns op cit

20 Liu Jiangyo ng ldquoUS Japan canno t change His to ry by co nfus ing the Public People`s Daily Online 8 January 2013 Fo r a tho ro ughdis cuss io n o f maps by all s ides see Shaw op cit pp 52-55 and also the Wikipedia entry as o f 16 July 2014

21 Cairo Declaration

22 Potsdam Declaration

23 San Francisco Peace Treaty

24 White Paper Diao yu Dao op cit

25 Shaw op cit p 121

26 Text excerpts here Fo r a full dis cuss io n o f this do cument see Shiro yama HidemirdquoFuin sareta Senkaku gaiko bunsho rdquo BungeiShunju June 2013 pp 264-271

27 Liu Jiangyo ng ldquoUS Japan canno t change His to ry by co nfus ing the Public People`s Daily Online 8 January 2013 Fo r a tho ro ughdis cuss io n o f maps by all s ides see Shaw op cit pp 52-55

28 Liu Xiao yuan (1996) ldquoA Partnership fo r Diso rder China the United States and their Po licies fo r the Po s twar Dispo s itio n o f theJapanese Empire 1941-1945rdquo Cambridge Univers ity o f Cambridge Press pp 77-78 Eldridge op cit

29 Ishii Akira ldquoChugo ku to Niho n ASEAN kan no aida no ko kkyo mo ndairdquo in Iwashita Akihiro (ed) (2006) Kokkyo Dare ga kono senwo hikiitaka-Nihon to Yurasia Sappo ro Ho kkaido Daigaku Shuppankan p 140

30 Jiang Jieshi ho uhui jusho u Liujiu qundao News of the Communist Party of China This is also co nfirmed by an article o n theJapanese vers io n o f the Guo mindang webs ite Jiang Jieshi ga Ryukyu wo sesshu shinakatano wo ko kai based o n an article inTaiwan`s Zhongguo Shibao 9 September 2012

31 Shaw op cit p 27 fn 26 Kimie Hara do cuments the pro gress io n o f US drafts in the co urse o f nego tiatio ns fro m precisespecificatio n o f bo rders to eliminatio n o f all latitudes and lo ngitudes fo r the Senkakus and o ther is lands that were then andsubsequently disputed Cold War Frontiers in the Asia-Pacific Lo ndo n Ro utledge 2007 See also Kimie Hara The San Francis co PeaceTreaty and Fro ntier Pro blems in the Regio nal Order in Eas t As ia A Sixty Year Perspective The As ia-Pacific Jo urnal

32 Treaty of Peace between Japan and the Republic of China

33 Shaw op cit p 114 fn 135

34 Fo reign Relatio ns o f the United States (FRUS) vo l XVII (1969-1976) p 292 fn 6

35 Ibid p 296

36 Haruna Mikio Senkaku ryo do Amerika ha Niho n wo urikitta Bungei Shunju July 2013 pp 260-268

37 On the is sue o f Okinawa`s res idual so vereignty see the detailed research in Ro bert D Eldridge The o rigin o f the bilateral Okinawapro blem Okinawa in po s twar US-Japan relatio ns 1945-1952 Psycho lo gy press 2001 p 318

38 Niksch Larry ldquoSenkaku (Diao yu) Is lands Dispute The US Legal Relatio nship and Obligatio ns rdquo Congressional Research Committee(1996) p 4

39 FRUS 2006 op cit p 297

40 Shaw op cit p 119

41 FRUS op cit p 292 On the Overseas Chinese see also Shaw op cit pp 13-14

42 Gao Zhiguo and Wu Jilu ldquoKey Is sues in the Eas t China Sea A Status Repo rt and reco mmended Appro achesrdquo in Harriso n Selig(ed) (2005) Seabed Petroleum in Northeast Asia Conflict or Cooperation Washingto n DC Wo o dro w Wilso n Internatio nal Center fo rScho lars p 32

43 The 1969 nego tiatio ns sugges t po ss ibilities fo r co ntempo rary nego tiatio ns that might invo lve no t o nly Japan Taiwan and So uthKo rea but also China and perhaps o thers Drifte Reinhard ldquoFro m `Sea o f Co nfro ntatio n` to `Sea o f Peace Co o peratio n andFriendship` - Japan facing China in the Eas t China Sea Japan Aktuell no 3 (2008)

44 Urano Tatsuo (ed) (2001) Diaoyutai qundao (Senkaku Shoto) wenti Yanjiu ziliao huibian Ho ng Ko ng Lishi Chubanshe pp 35-6People`s Daily 18 May 1970 4 and 29 December 1970

45 Shaw op cit p 121

46 Bo nnet Franccedilo is -Xavier ldquoGeo po litics o f the Scarbo ro ugh Sho alrdquo IRASEC`s Discussion Paper no 14 (No vember 2012) pp 22-23Buszynski Leszek and Saz lan Iskandar ldquoMaritime Claims and Energy Co o peratio n in the So uth China Seardquo Contemporary SoutheastAsia vo l 29 no 1 (April 2007) p 151

47 See here

48 Yabuki Susumu ldquoSenkaku mo ndai no ko sho keii no shinso rdquo p 1 (revised editio n o f 28 September 2012)

49 Yabuki op cit p2 See also Guo op cit p 5

50 Ishii Akira (2006) ldquoChugo ku to Niho n ASEAN kan no aida no ko kkyo mo ndairdquo in Iwashita Akihiro (ed) (2006) Kokkyou Darega kono sen wo hikiitaka-Nihon to Yurasia Sappo ro Ho kkaido Daigaku Shuppankan p 142 Yabuki op cit p 3

51 Fravel M Taylo r Explaining Stability in the SenkakuDiao yu Is lands Dispute in Curtis Gerald Ko kubun Ryo sei and Wang Jis i(eds ) (2010) Getting the Triangle Straight Managing China-Japan-US Relations Washingto n DC Bro o kings Ins titutio n Press

52 Yabuki op cit p 5 Ishii op cit p 144

53 Okada Takashi (2012) Senkaku shoto mondai To kyo So so sha p 102

54 So no da Sunao (1981) Sekai Nihon Ai To kyo Daisan Seikei Kenkyukai p 184

55 Yabuki Susumu Sasae gaimu jikan to Kuriyama Takakazu mo to gaimu jikan no sekinin wo to urdquo 6 No vember 2012

56 ldquoGaimusho ni mai jita no gimanrdquo Aera 8 Octo ber 2012 p 66

57 Ro undtable with Nakanishi Terumasa Sato Masaru Mikio Haruna and Miyage Kunihiko Bungei Shunju (No vember 2012) p 101

58 Sankei Shimbun 20 June 2013

59 Mago saki Ukeru ldquoSenkaku mo ndai Niho n no go kairdquo Sekai (No vember 2012) p90

6 0 Ishii op cit p 158

6 1 Okabe Tatsumi (2006) Nitchu kankei no kako to shorai To kyo Iwanami Gendai Bunko p 91

6 2 China Aktuell (Octo ber 1990) p 781 quo ting Kyodo 23 Octo ber 1990

6 3 Hags trouml m Linus (2003) Enigmatic power Relational power analysis and statecraft in Japanrsquos China policy Sto ckho lm Sto ckho lmStudies in Po litics 93 Department o f Po litics Sto ckho lm Univers ity pp 150 155

6 4 Ishii op cit p 158

6 5 Ramo s-Mro so vsky Carlo s Internatio nal Laws Unhelpful Ro le in the Senkaku Is lands University of Pennsylvania Journal ofInternational Law (2009) p 906

6 6 O`Shea Paul ldquoSo vereignty and the SenkakuDiao yu Disputerdquo Sto ckho lm Scho o l o f Eco no mics Working Paper no 240(September 2012) p 6

6 7 Ramo s-Mro so vsky Ibid

6 8 Shisaku blog (31 Octo ber 2012)

6 9 Okada Senkaku sho to mo ndai opcit p 111

70 Drifte Reinhard ldquoJapanese ndash Chinese Territo rial Disputes in the Eas t China Sea ndash between Military Co nfro ntatio n and Eco no micCo o peratio nrdquo LSE Asia Research Centre Working Paper no 24 (April 2008) p 9

71 Suganuma op cit p 143

72 Takahara Akio (2011) ldquoThe Senkaku Trawler Co llis io n Incidentrdquo (to be published in Mo chizuki Mike (ed) The Okinawa questionregional security the US-Japan alliance and Futenma Washingto n DC Sigur Center fo r As ian Studies ) p3

73 Ibid

74 Dzurek Daniel ldquoThe SenkakuDiao yu Is lands Dispute Durham Univers ity International Boundaries Research Unit 18 Octo ber 1996

75 Fo r their texts see here and here

76 Gupta So urabh ldquoChina-Japan trawler incident Japanrsquos unwise mdash and bo rderline illegal mdash detentio n o f the Chinese skipperrdquo EastAsia Forum (30 September 2010)

77 Aera op cit p 66

78 Nakanishi Sato Haruna and Miyage op cit p 101

79 Tiberghien Yves ldquoThe Diao yuSenkaku Dispute Analyz ing the Chinese Perspectiverdquo Canada-Asia Agenda Is s 30 (Octo ber 2012)pp 5-6

8 0 Suganuma Unryu (2000) Sovereign Rights and Territorial Space in Sino-Japanese Relations Irredentism and the DiaoyuSenkaku IslandsHo no lulu Asso ciatio n fo r As ian Studies and Univers ity o f Hawairsquoi Press p 119

8 1 Shaw op cit p 31 Asahi Shimbun13 No vember 2012

8 2 ldquoNiho n to taishaku keiyakurdquo Sankei Shimbun 21 September 1996 p 1

8 3 Zhu Jianro ng Cho go ku gawa kara mita lsquoSenkaku mo ndairsquo Sekai No vember 2012 p 108

8 4 Yo shida Reiji ldquoSenkaku Beaco n set up by Rightis ts no w s tate pro pertyrdquo Japan Times 10 February 2005 op cit p 38

8 5 Fo r a detailed acco unt see Drifte Japanese-Chinese territo rial disputes op cit pp 15-18

8 6 Funabashi Yo ichi China pro po ses 3-Natio n Oil Develo pment o ff Senkakusrdquo Asahi Evening News 11 Octo ber 1980

8 7 Drifte Japanese-Chinese territo rial disputes op cit pp 13-14

8 8 Ibid p 19 Sullivan Kevin and Jo rdan Mary ldquoTiny Is lands so rely tax 3 Natio ns rdquo International Herald Tribune 1 Augus t 1996

8 9 Drifte ldquoFro m `Sea o f Co nfro ntatio n` to `Sea o f Peace op cit p 43

9 0 Zhang Xinjun ldquoWhy the 2008 Sino -Japanese Co nsensus o n the Eas t China Sea Has Stalled Go o d Faith and Recipro cityCo ns ideratio ns in Interim Measures Pending a Maritime Bo undary Delimitatio nrdquo Ocean Development amp International Law vo l 42 no 1(2010) p 61 ShimizuYo shikazu Kan Seiken ga mino gashita Chugo ku lsquogo ki no naka no mo ro sarsquordquo Chuo Koron (No vember 2010)p 65

9 1 Shimizu op cit p 65

9 2 Babb James ldquoThe Seirankai and the Fate o f its Members The Rise and Fall o f the New Right Po liticians rdquo Japan Forum vo l 24 no 1(2012) p 83

9 3 Przys tup James J ldquoNo t quite all abo ut So vereignty ndash but clo serdquo CSIS p 2

9 4 ldquoDPJ exec wants SDF o n Senkakusrdquo Japan Times 2 May 2005

9 5 Okada op cit p 39

9 6 Drifte Japanese ndash Chinese Territo rial Disputes in the Eas t China Sea op cit p 14

9 7 Murakami Takio Taiwan had secret plan to land elite tro o ps o n Senkakus to des tro y lightho userdquo Asahi Shimbun 5 December2012

9 8 Kaijo Ho an Repo rt (2007) p 16

9 9 No mura Hataru ldquoSenkaku sho to Kaitei yudenrdquo Shokun (May 2005) p 64

10 0 Okada Senkaku sho to mo ndai opcit p 102

10 1 Kurihara Hiro yuki (2012) Senkaku shoto wo urimasu To kyo Ko saido pp 78-82

10 2 Takahara Akio ldquoGendai Chugo kushi no saikento Hua Guo feng to Deng Xiao ping so shite 1978 nen no gakkisei ni tsuiterdquo Toano 495 (September 2008) p 36 Li Enmin (2005) Nitchu heiwa yuko joyaku Kosho no seijikatei To kyo Ochano mizu Sho bo p 71

10 3 Drifte Reinhard (2003) Japanrsquos Security Relationship with China since 1989 From balancing to bandwagoning Oxfo rdLo ndo n Nis sanIns tituteRo utledge Japanese Studies

10 4 Drifte ldquoJapanese ndash Chinese Territo rial Disputes in the Eas t China Sea op cit p 22

10 5 Drifte Japan`s Security Relatio nship with China op cit pp 64-67

10 6 Drifte Japanese ndash Chinese Territo rial Disputes in the Eas t China Sea op cit p 31

10 7 The info rmatio n abo ut the applicatio n o f the immigratio n law is fro m Pro fesso r Takahara Akio Email 4 May 2013

10 8 Asahi Evening News 27 and 29 March 2004

10 9 ldquoNitchu `Senkaku mitsuyaku` attardquo Aera 25 Octo ber 2010 Okada Takashi ldquo`Bo tan no kakechigae` wa naze o ko tta kardquo Sekai(December 2010) p 129

110 Shimizu op cit p 65

111 Miyamo to Yuji ldquoNitchu sho mo sen wo kachinuku chie Bungei Shunju (December 2012) p 145

112 Gavan McCo rmack Yo naguni Dilemmas o f a Fro ntier Is land in the Eas t China Sea The As ia- Pacific Jo urnal Vo l 10 Is sue 40 No 1 Octo ber 1 2012 McCo rmack no tes that Defense Agency feelers were put o ut as early as 2007

113 Takahara The Senkaku Trawler Co llis io n Incident op cit p 7 Kaneko Hideto shi ldquoTruth behind co llis io n o ff Senkaku Is landsawash in mys teryrdquo Mainichi Shimbun 12 No vember 2010

114 Smith Sheila A ldquoJapan and The Eas t China Sea Disputerdquo Orbis vo l 56 Is s 3 (2012) p 374 Hags trouml m Linus ldquoPo wer Shiftrsquo inEas t As ia A Critical Reappraisal o f Narratives o n the Diao yuSenkaku Is lands Incident in 2010rdquo Chinese Journal of International Politicsvo l 5 no 3 (Autumn 2012) p 272 fn 29

115 ldquoRiben xunluo chuan Diao yudao zhuang wo yuchuan Zho ngfang tichu yanzheng jiao she Xinhuawang 8 September 2010

116 William D O`Neil Senkaku Incident o n Yo uTube NBR Japan Forum (9 No vember 2010)

117 Perso nal email to this autho r by Andrew Ho rvat 24 December 2010 giving an acco unt o f an NTV bro adcas t o n 23 December2010

118 ldquoChina urged to rein in Fishermenrdquo Japan Times 21 December 2010

119 ldquoKo rea mus t get to ugh o n illegal fishingrdquo The Chosun Ilbo 18 No vember 2011 ldquoCo as t Guard kill Chinese Fishermanrdquo The ChosonIlbo 17 Octo ber 2012

120 Interview with a senio r Japanese diplo mat in China 26 May 2011 ldquoPo wer Shiftrsquo in Eas t As ia op cit p 281

121 No impro vement in Chinas rare earths ban Japan Times 13 Octo ber 2010

122 Jo hns to n Alas tair Iain Ho w new and assertive is China`s new assertivenessrdquo International Security vo l 37 no 4 (Spring2013) pp 23-26

123 Shimizu op cit p 62 Okada Bo tan kakechigae op cit p 130 ldquoJapanese go vernment tipped o ff Chinese o fficials abo utfishing bo at captains releaserdquo

124 ldquoSenkaku sho to shuhen ryo kainai ni o keru Wagakuni junshisen to Chugo ku gyo sen to no sessho ku jianrdquo Gaimusho PositionPaper (25 September 2010

125 See eg Hags trouml m ldquoPo wer Shiftrsquo in Eas t As ia op cit p 296

126 Smith Sheila A ldquoJapan and The Eas t China Sea Disputerdquo Orbis vo l 56 Is s 3 (2012) p 377

127 Hags trouml m ldquoPo wer Shiftrsquo in Eas t As ia op cit p 285

128 Stando ff o ver Senkakus co uld s tall gro wth in bo th natio ns Japan Times 4 Octo ber 2012

129 Takahara The Senkaku Trawler Co llis io n Incident op cit p 9

130 Hags trouml m ldquoPo wer Shiftrsquo in Eas t As ia op cit p276 and 285

131 Kaneko Hideto shi ldquoUS Interventio n in Japan-China fishing bo at ro wldquo Mainichi Shimbun Octo ber 2010

132 ldquoChina seeks Japan nixes jo int reso urce develo pment near Senkakusrdquo Mainichi Shimbun 22 Octo ber 2010

133 China spurns demand to pay fo r Senkaku ship co llis io ns Japan Times 13 February 2011

134 Hags trouml m Po wer Shift in Eas t As ia op cit p 285

135 Minemura Kenji ldquoChina to es tablish permanent Senkaku Patro ls rdquo Asahi Shimbun 20 December 2010

136 Senkaku memo rial day riles China Furio us Beijing blas ts Ishigakis planned Pio neering Day to celebrate the is les integratio n Japan Times 18 December 2010

137 D ickie Mure ldquoTo kyo warned o ver Plans to buy Is landsrdquo Financial Times 6 June 2012

138 Matsubara Miho ko and Yang Yi ldquoChinese so cial Media reshape Image o f Japanrdquo Japan Times 29 September 2012

139 Fo reign Minis try Spo kesperso n Ho ng Leis Regular Press Co nference o n March 29 2012

140 ldquoCo as t Guard`s Enhancements OK`drdquo Japan Times 29 February 2012

141 ldquoJapan declares Is lands near Senkakus natio nal Assetrdquo Japan Times 27 March 2012

142 Fo r the o fficial lis ts o f is lands see here

143 ldquoHu Meeting nixed amid Senkaku Spatrdquo Japan Times 12 February 2012

144 ldquo23 remo te is les put under s tate o wnershiprdquo Yomiuri Shimbun 8 March 2012

145 ldquoChina o ppo ses Japan`s naming Diao yu Is landsrdquo Xinhua 3 March 2012 ldquoChina releases Standard Names o f Diao yu Is landsrdquoXinhua 3 March 2012

146 NHK 16 March 2012 here ldquoChinese ship enters Japanese Waters near disputed Is landsrdquo Jiji 16 March 2012

147 Minemura Kenji ldquoChina to es tablish permanent Senkaku Patro ls rdquo Asahi Shimbun 20 December 2010

148 ldquoGo verno r seen as go ading adminis tratio n into actio nrdquo 16 April 2012

149 ldquoTo kyo go vt in talks with o wners to buy Senkaku Is lands Ishiharardquo Kyodo News 15 April 2012

Tiberghien Yves ldquoMisunders tadings Misco mmunicatio n and mis -s ignaling Senkakus thro ugh Chinese eyesrdquo The Oriental Economistvo l 80 no 12 (December 2012) p 8

150 ldquoTo kyo nego tiating purchase o f Senkaku Is landsrdquo NHK 17 April 2012

151 Hijikata Shinji and Nakayama Sho zo ldquoIshihara challenges Go vt o n territo rial Is sues Plan to buy Senkaku Is lands a Slap atDPJ-led Adminis tratio n was hatched Mo nths ago in Secretrdquo Yomiuri Shimbun 19 April 2012

152 ldquoSenkaku ko nyu ni fumidashitardquo Asahi Shimbun 26 September 2012 pp 1-2 See also the series in Nihon Keizai Shimbun 25 to 28March 2013 which co nfirms No da`s determinatio n and also his co ncern abo ut Ishihara`s alleged s tatement that he wo uld even riskwar with China

153 ldquoDo natio ns to metro go vernment to buy Senkaku Is lands to p yen1 billio nrdquo Japan Times 2 June 2012 Yomiuri Shimbun here

154 ldquoAd in Wall Street Jo urnal seeks US suppo rt fo r Senkaku purchase planrdquo Japan Times 29 July 2012 atwwwjapantimes co jptextnn20120729a2html

155 ldquoTo kyo metro go vernments inspectio n team sets sail fo r Senkaku Is landsrdquo Japan Times 02 September 2012

156 ldquoGo vt to buy 3 Senkaku is les fo r 2 billio n yenrdquo Yomiuri 6 September 2012

157 ldquoJapan sho uld see things clearlyrdquo China Daily 25 September 2012

158 ldquoFo reign Minis try Spo kesperso n Liu Weimin Press Co nferencerdquo Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC 18 April 2012

159 Haiqing Wang ldquoCo mmentary Pro vo catio n by Japanese o fficial o ver Diao yu Is lands detrimental to ties with Chinardquo Xinhua News18 April 2012

16 0 ldquoXi Jinping checks Japan o n Senkaku Is landsrdquo NHK 24 April 2012

16 1 ldquoChina to set up Pro tectio n o f Is landsrdquo NHK 20 April 2012

16 2 ldquoChinese ships near the Senkakus againrdquo Japan Times 04 May 2012

16 3 ldquoChina calls o ff Yang-Yo nekura talks rdquo Japan Times 16 May 2012

16 4 ldquoAre Senkakus a lsquoco re interes trsquo fo r Chinardquo Japan Times 24 May 2012 Przys tup James J ldquoJapan-China Relatio ns ldquoHappy 40 th

Anniversaryhellip Part 2rdquo CSIS Comparative Connections (September 2012)

16 5 ldquoAre Senkakus a co re interes t fo r Chinardquo Japan Times 24 May 2012 Inuma Yo shisuke ldquoSenkakusrdquo The Oriental Economist vo l80 no 12 (December 2012)

16 6 ldquoAre Senkakus a lsquoco re interes trsquo fo r Chinardquo op cit

16 7 ldquoFo reign Minis try Spo kesperso n Hua Chunyings Regular Press Co nferencerdquo Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC 26 April 2013 Fo ra critical dis cuss io n o f this is sue see Campbell Caitlin Meick Ethan Hsu Kimberley and Murray Craig ldquoChinarsquos ldquoCo re Interes tsand the Eas t China Seardquo US-China Economic and Security Review Commission Staff Research Backgrounder 10 May 2013

16 8 D ickie Mure ldquoTo kyo warned o ver Plans to buy Is landsrdquo Financial Times 6 June 2012

16 9 ldquoJapan`s main Oppo s itio n Party calls o n Go v`t to sack Envo yrdquo Kyodo News 16 June 2012 ldquoNo need to pander to China o verSenkaku Is landsrdquo Yomiuri Shimbun 13 June 2012

170 Richardso n Michael ldquoTime to dial do wn Senkakus frictio nrdquo Japan Times 19 July 2012

171 ldquoCo mmentary Japan playing with fire o ver Diao yu Is landsrdquo Xinhua News at 09 July 2012

172 Ibid ldquoBuying-Is lands farce to badly damage hard-wo n China-Japan relatio ns rdquo Xinhua News at 13 July 2012

173 ldquoChina patro l ships enter waters near Senkakusrdquo Japan Times 12 July 2012 ldquoAno ther Chinese Patro l Ship spo tted near SenkakuIs landsrdquo Jiji Press 12 July 2013

174 ldquoCentral go vernment wo uld have to build harbo rs if it buys is les fro m metro autho rityrdquo Japan Times 21 July 2012

175 ldquoUS warned Japan agains t purchase o f Senkakus Campbellrdquo Kyodo News 10 April 2013

176 ldquoSenkaku talks with China end in s talematerdquo Yomiuri Shimbun 13 July 2012

177 ldquoNew ambassado r to China upbeat o n impro ving ties rdquo Japan Times 11 December 2012

178 Genba Ko ichiro New York Times 20 No vember 2012

179 Miyamo to op cit p 146

18 0 ldquoChina Vo ice Japan sho uld face up to pas t present wro ngdo ingrdquo Xinhua News 29 Octo ber 2012

18 1 Nakanishi Sato Haruna and Miyake op cit p 97

18 2 Takahara Akio ldquointerviewrdquo Jiji Press 24 Octo ber 2012 (pro vided to the autho r by Pro fesso r Takahara)

18 3 Kato Yo shikazu ldquoEco uter l`autre plus que jamais rdquo Courrier International 27 September 2012

18 4 Zhu op cit p 103

18 5 Nihon Keizai Shimbun 27 March 2013 This is also co nfirmed by Nagashima Akihisa in his bo o k Katsu Bei to iu ryugi To kyo Ko dansha 2013

18 6 ldquoChinese s tage anti-Japan rallies o ver Senkakusrdquo Japan Times 20 Augus t 2012

18 7 Financial Times 6 June 2012 op cit

18 8 Yomiuri Shimbun 3 September 2012

18 9 Interview with Pro fesso r Takahara Akio 10 Octo ber 2012

19 0 Renminwang Niho ngo ban 12 September 2012 here

19 1 ldquoIs les ro w puts chill o n 40 th anniversary o f ties rdquo Japan Times 30 September 2012

19 2 Buying-Is lands farce to badly damage hard-wo n China-Japan relatio ns rdquo op cit ldquoChina delays appro val o f wo rking visas Firmsmade to wait as Beijing retaliates amid Senkakus disputerdquo Japan Times 23 September 2012

19 3 ldquoStatement o f the Minis try o f Fo reign Affairs o f the Peo ple`s Republic o f Chinardquo 10 September 2012

19 4 ldquoChinas UN ambassado r rebuts remarks by Japanese representative o n Diao yu Is landsrdquo Xinhua News 28 September 2012

19 5 ldquoChina says Japan s to le is les in verbal war at UNrdquo Mainichi 28 September 2012

19 6 ldquoJapan China engage in war o f wo rds at ASEM summitrdquo Japan Times 07 No vember 2012

19 7 Fo reign Minis try Spo kesperso n Ho ng Lei`s Regular Press Co nference 11 Octo ber 2012

19 8 ldquoChina to publish bo o ks o n To kyo Trials rdquo Xinhua News 24 Octo ber 2012

19 9 ldquoFo reign Minis ter Ko ichiro Gemba interviewrdquo Financial Times 19 Octo ber 2012 Liu Xiao ming ldquoChina respo nds to Japan`sPro vo catio nrdquo Financial Times 1 No vember 2012

20 0 Anno uncement o n 4 July 2014

20 1 ldquo40 o f Japan-China 40th anniversary events canceled acro ss Japanrdquo Japan Times 30 September 2012

20 2 ldquoJapan to take all po ss ible measures in respo nse to Chinese patro l aro und Diao yu Is lands repo rtrdquo Xinhua News 14 September2012 Fo r a critical dis cuss io n o f these base lines see Ro ach J Ashley China`s Straight Baseline Claim Senkaku (Diao yu)Is landsrdquo Insights (13 February 2013)

20 3 Asahi Shimbun 28 September 2012 ldquoSubmiss io n by the Peo ple`s Republic o f China co ncerning the Outer Limits o f theCo ntinental Shelf beyo nd 200 Nautical Miles in Part o f the Eas t China Seardquo p 5

20 4 ldquoFo reign Minis try Spo kesperso n Ho ng Leis Regular Press Co nferencerdquo Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC 21 September 2012

20 5 ldquoChina to Pro vide Weather Fo recas ts fo r Is lands Claimed by Japanrdquo Bloomberg 12 September 2012

20 6 ldquoChinese Fishing Bo ats to head fo r Senkaku Waters rdquo NHK 14 September 2012

20 7 ldquoChinese armada repo rts co nflict o ver fishing bo ats po s itio nrdquo Japan Times 02 September 2012

20 8 ldquoChina-Japan Dispute Takes Ris ing To ll o n To p As ian Eco no mies rdquo Bloomberg News 9 January 2013

20 9 ldquoJapanese webs ites co me under attack as Senkaku squabble co ntinuesrdquo Japan Times 20 September 2012

210 ldquoPro tes ts flare in China o n co ntentio us anniversary The pretext fo r invas io n 81 years ago fuels rallies in 125 cities rdquo Japan Times19 September 2012

211 ldquo82 rap lukewarm respo nse to anti-Japan pro tes ts in China o ver Senkakus Mainichi po llrdquo Mainichi 01 Octo ber 2012

212 ldquoFo reign Minis try Spo kesperso n Ho ng Leis Regular Press Co nferencerdquo Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC 20 September 2012

213 Tiberghien op cit p 3

214 ldquoJapan pro tes ts No 1 to pic o n China webrdquo NHK 18 December 2012

215 ldquoNo da urges dignityrdquo Japan Times 21 September 2012 ldquoMan thro ws smo ke bo mbs into Chinese co nsulate general in Fukuo kardquoJapan Times 18 September 2012

216 ldquoGo o d mo ve o n Diao yu Is landsrdquo Xinhua News 26 Octo ber 2012

217 ldquoPeo ples Daily implies eco no mic measures agains t Japanrdquo Xinhua News 17 September 2012 see also Ye Xiao wen op cit

218 ldquoPurchase o f Diao yu Is lands co uld co s t Japanrdquo Xinhua News

219 ldquoJapan Bo o s ts Info Gathering o n Cus to ms Pro cedures in Chinardquo Jiji News 21 September 2012 ldquoFo reign Minis try Spo kesperso nHo ng Leis Regular Press Co nferencerdquo Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC 11 Octo ber 2012

220 ldquoChina delays appro val o f wo rking visas Firms made to wait as Beijing retaliates amid Senkakus disputerdquo Japan Times 23September 2012

221 ldquoJapanese inves tment in China falls sharplyrdquo Financial Times 20 No vember 2012

222 Seaman Jo hn ldquoRare Earths and the Eas t China Sea Why hasn`t China embargo ed Shipments to Japanrdquo IFRI-CIGS Op-Ed Series(2012)

223 ldquoTrade with China falls firs t time in three years rdquo Japan Times 11 January 2013 Acco rding to JETRO the bilateral trade fell to $335billio n ldquoJapan-China Trade Deficit hits Reco rd in 2012 NHK 19 February 2013 ldquoChinas trade with Japan do wn 51 in 2013rdquo MainichiShimbun 10 January 2013 ldquoReco rd trade deficit o f yen1147 trillio n set in rsquo13rdquo Japan Times 27 January 2013

224 ldquoTo yo ta delays plan fo r China expans io nrdquo Japan Times 09 January 2013

225 ldquoChinese vis ito rs fall s ince Septemberrdquo Japan Times 17 January 2013

226 ldquoTo ur travelers to China do wn by o ver 70 per centrdquo NHK

227 ldquoNumber o f Japanese vis iting China at 10-year lo wrdquo NHK 26 January 2014

228 Vis ito rs to Japan Hits Reco rd 105 M in March Jiji Press 23 April 2014

229 ldquoNew Japanese inves tment in China dro ps 42 in Jan-Mayrdquo Kyodo News 17 June 2014 2013 figures here and ldquoChinas FDI inflo wgro ws 525 pct in 2013rdquo Xinhua 16 January 20113

230 ldquoChina Fo cus Diao yu Is lands rift takes to ll o n China-Japan eco no mic trade ties rdquo Xinhua News

231 D ing Gang ldquoSpat co s ts Sino -Japanese bus iness dearrdquo Global Times 5 December 2012

232 Nakata Hiro ko ldquoNo t all but sundry find niche in Chinardquo Japan Times 4 January 2013

233 ldquoFacto ry shift to no n-Chinese s ites seen accelerating Co mpanies reo pen as anger eases in Chinardquo Japan Times 21 September2012 Nakata Hiro ko ldquoFirms mo ve so me eggs o ut o f China basketrdquo Japan Times 19 December 2012

234 Nakata ldquoNo t all but sundryrdquo op cit

235 Fo r examples o f o verrating see Wu Di Caijing 9 September 2012 quo ted in China Analysis no 40 2012 p 44 here

236 Drifte Reinhard ldquoThe Future o f the Japanese-Chinese Relatio nship The Case fo r a Grand Po litical Bargainrdquo Asia-Pacific Reviewvo l 16 no 2 (2009) p 56

237 ldquoFacto ry shift to no n-Chinese s ites seen accelerating Co mpanies reo pen as anger eases in Chinardquo Japan Times 21 September2012

238 Chubb Andrew ldquoRadar Incident o bscures Beijing`s co nciliato ry turn to ward Japanrdquo China Brief vo l 13 Is s 4 (15 February 2013)

239 ldquoChina sending helico pter-carrying ships in Senkakus disputerdquo Asahi Shimbun 4 March 2013

240 ldquoVessel carrying Taiwanese activis ts is spo tted near to Senkaku Is landsrdquo Japan Times 22 September 2012

241 ldquoJapanese vessels expelled fro m Diao yu Is lands waters rdquo Xinhua News 30 Octo ber 2012

242 ldquoChina sent 50 maritime patro l miss io ns to Senkakus in 2013rdquo Asahi Shimbun 17 January 2014

243 ldquoChinarsquos new air defense zo ne abo ve Senkakus lsquovery dangero us rsquo escalatio n Japan says rdquo Japan Times 23 No vember 2013

244 ldquoSenkaku air intrus io n pro mpts radar upgraderdquo Japan Times 15 December 2012

245 ldquoChina to bo o s t surveillance flights o ver disputed Eas t China Sea areas rdquo Japan Times 27 January 2012

246 ldquoBeijing plans dro nes to mo nito r is lets rdquo Japan Times 25 September 2012

247 ldquoChinese o fficials admit to MSDF radar lo ck allegatio ns rdquo Japan Times 18 March 2013

248 Avic Internatio nal

249 ldquoChinas pro vo catio ns co uld lead to armed co nflictrdquo Asahi Shimbun 15 December 2012

250 ldquoJapan tracer bullets will bring war clo serrdquo Global Times 10 January 2013 ldquo朝日の記事引用で「誤報」論争　中国メディアＶＳ香港の記者rdquoSankei 26 January 2013

251 ldquoChina sends fighters to co unter Japanese aircraftrdquo Xinhua News 11 January 2013

252 ldquoChina accuses Japan as increas ing tens io nrdquo NHK 11 January 2013

253 Japan China at o dds o ver plane enco unter as tens io ns mo unt Mainichi Shimbun 13 June 2014

254 ldquoJo int Staff Press Releaserdquo 23 April 2014

255 Text o f the ADIZ anno uncement here

256 See here and here

257 ldquo50 Taiwanese bo ats intrude near Senkakus Co as t guard cutters deplo y water canno nsrdquo Japan Times 26 September 2013 Co as t guards rsquo water duel ends Taiwanese is le trip AFP-JIJI Kyodo 25 January 2013

258 Interview with a senio r o fficial o f the Japanese Minis try o f Defense 12 Octo ber 2012

259 ldquoJCG s tretched thin o ver Senkakusrdquo Yomiuri Shimbun 4 Octo ber 2012

26 0 ldquoCo as t guard needs mo re ships sailo rs amid pro tracted is le-ro w co mmandantrdquo Japan Times 14 December 2012

26 1 ldquoJapan to increase fishery patro l vessels rdquo NHK 13 September 2012

26 2 ldquoJapan Co as t Guard clo ses in o n mo re ships cho ppers rdquo Kyodo News 26 Octo ber 2012

26 3 ldquoJapan Co as t Guard to bo ls ter patro ls aro und Senkaku Is landsrdquo Asahi Shimbun 11 January 2013

26 4 ldquoChinese surveillance fleet busy due to is land disputerdquo Xinhua News 08 January 2013

26 5 Chinese military to further co o peratio n with maritime law enfo rcement Xinhua News 29 March 2013

26 6 ldquo7 Chinese warships pass waters near Okinawa is landrdquo Mainichi Shimbun 16 Octo ber 2012

26 7 ldquoChina navy ships pass co ntiguo us zo ne in so uthwes tern Japanrdquo Asahi Shimbun 10 December 2012

26 8 ldquoRepo rt China military beefing up civilian maritime surveillancerdquo Asahi Shimbun 20 December 2012

26 9 Yo shida Reiji ldquoBeijing denies MSDF Lo ck-o nrdquo Japan Times 9 February 2013

270 Chinese o fficials admit to MSDF radar lo ck allegatio ns Japan Times 18 March 2013 ldquoJapans radar targeting allegatio nsgro undless minis tryrdquo Xinhua 18 March 2013

271 ldquoNo da to ld MSDF to s tay away Vessels ins tructed to avo id Chinese Navy near Senkakurdquo Yomiuiri Shimbun 9 March 2013

272 ldquoChina o ppo ses Japanese military drills DM spo kesmanrdquo Ministry of National Defense of PRC 26 Octo ber 2012

273 ldquoHigashi Shinakai de no Chu-Nichi sho to tsu kaihi no kagi wa Niho n ni arurdquo Xinhua 11 March 2013

274 ldquoChina secretly asked Japan no t to snatch Senkakus ho t air ballo o nis trdquo Japan Times 26 January 2014

275 ldquoChinese fishing bo at s inks o ff Diao yu Is landsrdquo Xinhua 27 June 2014

276 ldquoBrace fo r mo re tens io ns in As iaChinese analys trdquo The Sydney Morning Herald 3 July 2014

277 Hugh White As ias Nightmare Scenario A War in the Eas t China Sea Over the Senkakus National Interest 5 July 5 2014 HughWhite Ho w the unthinkable co uld happen in As iamdashand the ramificatio ns fo r America National Interest 15 July 5 2014

278 The lates t repetitio n o f the demand to `co rrect mis takes` is by Fo reign Minis ter Yang Jiechi which was interpreted by Kyodo butno t all o ther media as a call to reverse the purchase ldquoBeijing urges Senkaku Natio nalizatio n Reversalrdquo Japan Times 10 March 2013Fo r a different interpretatio n see eg Hayashi No zo mu ldquoChina calls fo r `res traint` by Japan o ver Senkakurdquo Asahi Shimbun 9 March2013 fo r the o riginal Chinese repo rt see eg ldquoJapan sho uld no t escalate o ver Diao yu Is lands China`s FMrdquo Xinhua 9 March 2013

279 ldquoDiao yu Is lands dispute enters new s tagerdquo Glo bal Times December 14 2012

28 0 ldquoChina o fficial Senkaku is sue can be shelvedrdquo NHK 25 January 2013

28 1 ldquoChina Vo ice Japan sho uld face up to pas t present wro ngdo ingrdquo Xinhua 29 Octo ber 2012

28 2 Fo reign Minis try Spo kesperso n Ho ng Leis Regular Press Co nferencerdquo Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC 30 Octo ber 2012

28 3 Kaieda exchanges views with Liu o ver so ured ties here

28 4 Zhu opcitp109

28 5 ldquoJapans deputy PM admits Diao yus dispute o pening path to China talks rdquo South China Morning Post 23 Octo ber 2012

28 6 Asahi Shimbun 29 September 2013

28 7 ldquoYo nekura urges flexibility by Japan o ver Senkakusrdquo NHK 28 September 2012

28 8 ldquoEx-ambassado r to China calls fo r Senkakus talks rdquo Japan Times 27 September 2012

28 9 Niwa Uichiro ldquoNitchu gaiko no shinjitsurdquo Bungei Shunju (February 2013) pp 120-131

29 0 See here

29 1 Ho ng No ng Law and Politics in the South China Sea Assessing the role of UNCLOS in Ocean Dispute Settlement (Ph D Alberta Univers ityEdmo nto n Alberta 2010) p 172

29 2 ldquoFo reign Minis ter Ko ichiro Gemba interviewrdquo Financial Times 19 Octo ber 2012

29 3 See here

29 4 Japan rescues ditched Chinese ballo o nis t Global Times 3 January 2014

29 5 MOFA Press Co nference 3 Octo ber 2000

29 6 James J Przys tup and Phillip C Saunders ldquoTime fo r China and Japan to co o l itrdquo 1 March 2013

29 7 Jo el H Samuels ldquoCo ndo minium Arrangements in Internatio nal Practice Reviving an Abando ned Co ncept o f Bo undary DisputeReso lutio nrdquo 29 Michigan Journal of International Law 727(2008) Fo r a lis t o f co ndo miniums see here

29 8 See here

29 9 Mo hd Talaat El Gho neimy ldquoThe Legal Status o f the Saudi-Kuwaiti Neutral Zo nerdquo The International and Comparative Law QuarterlyVo l 15 no 3 July 1966

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